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Paper 2019/919

Detecting Faults in Inner Product Masking Scheme - IPM-FD: IPM with Fault Detection

Wei Cheng and Claude Carlet and Kouassi Goli and Sylvain Guilley and Jean-Luc Danger

Abstract

Side-channel analysis and fault injection attacks are two typical threats to cryptographic implementations, especially in modern embedded devices. Thus there is an insistent demand for dual side-channel and fault injection protections. As it is known, masking is a kind of provable countermeasure against side-channel attacks. Recently, inner product masking (IPM) was proposed as a promising higher-order masking scheme against side-channel analysis, but not for fault injection attacks. In this paper, we devise a new masking scheme named IPM-FD. It is built on IPM, which enables fault detection. This novel masking scheme has three properties: the security orders in the word-level probing model, bit-level probing model, and the number of detected faults. IPM-FD is proven secure both in the word-level and in the bit-level probing models, and allows for end-to-end fault detection against fault injection attacks. Furthermore, we illustrate its security order by interpreting IPM-FD as a coding problem then linking it to one defining parameters of linear code, and show its implementation cost by applying IPM-FD to AES-128.

Note: This is the full version with complete appendix of the submission to PROOFS 2019.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. PROOFS 2019
Keywords
Side-channel AnalysisInner Product MaskingFault Detection
Contact author(s)
wei cheng @ telecom-paristech fr
History
2020-06-16: last of 2 revisions
2019-08-13: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/919
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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