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Paper 2019/761
Athena: A verifiable, coercion-resistant voting system with linear complexity
Ben Smyth
Abstract
Seminal work by Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson delivered a verifiable, coercion-resistant voting system with quadratic complexity. This manuscript attempts to advance the state-of-the-art by delivering a voting system with equivalent security and linear complexity.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- election schemes
- Contact author(s)
- research @ bensmyth com
- History
- 2019-12-17: last of 4 revisions
- 2019-07-02: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/761
- License
-
CC BY
