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Paper 2019/682

Modern Family: A Revocable Hybrid Encryption Scheme Based on Attribute-Based Encryption, Symmetric Searchable Encryption and SGX

Alexandros Bakas and Antonis Michalas

Abstract

Secure cloud storage is considered as one of the most important issues that both businesses and end-users take into account before moving their private data to the cloud. Lately, we have seen some interesting approaches that are based either on the promising concept of Symmetric Searchable Encryption (SSE) or on the well-studied field of Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE). In the first case, researchers are trying to design protocols where users' data will be protected from both internal and external attacks without paying the necessary attention to the problem of user revocation. In the second case, existing approaches address the problem of revocation. However, the overall efficiency of these systems is compromised since the proposed protocols are solely based on ABE schemes and the size of the produced ciphertexts and the time required to decrypt grows with the complexity of the access formula. In this paper, we propose a hybrid encryption scheme that combines both SSE and ABE by utilizing the advantages of both these techniques. In contrast to many approaches, we design a revocation mechanism that is completely separated from the ABE scheme and solely based on the functionality offered by SGX.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. 15th EAI International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm 2019)
Keywords
Cloud SecurityStorage ProtectionAccess ControlPoliciesAttribute-Based EncryptionSymmetric Searchable EncryptionHybrid Encryption
Contact author(s)
antonios michalas @ tuni fi
History
2019-06-11: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/682
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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