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Paper 2019/467

Revisiting Location Privacy from a Side-Channel Analysis Viewpoint (Extended Version)

Clément Massart and François-Xavier Standaert

Abstract

Inspired by the literature on side-channel attacks against cryptographic implementations, we describe a framework for the analysis of location privacy. It allows us to revisit (continuous) re-identification attacks with a combination of information theoretic and security metrics. Our results highlight conceptual differences between re-identification attacks exploiting leakages that are internal or external to a pseudonymised database. They put forward the amount of data to collect in order to estimate a predictive model as an important -- yet less discussed -- dimension of privacy assessments. They finally leverage recent results on the security evaluations/certification of cryptographic implementations to connect information theoretic and security metrics, and to formally bound the risk of re-identification with external leakages.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. Proceedings of Africacrypt 2019
Keywords
side-channel analysislocation privacy
Contact author(s)
clement massart @ uclouvain be
History
2019-05-10: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/467
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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