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Paper 2019/340

Ease of Side-Channel Attacks on AES-192/256 by Targeting Extreme Keys

Antoine Wurcker

Abstract

Concerning the side-channel attacks on Advanced Encryp- tion Standard, it seems that majority of studies focus on the lowest size: AES-128. Even when adaptable to higher sizes (AES-192 and AES-256), lots of state-of-the-art attacks see their complexity substantially raised. Indeed, it often requires to perform two consecutive dependent attacks. The first is similar to the one applied on AES-128, but a part of the key remains unknown and must be retrieved through a second attack directly dependent on the success of the first. This configuration may substantially raise the complexity for the at- tacker, especially if new signal acquisitions with specific input, built using the first key part recovered, must be performed. Any error/uncertainty in the first attack raise the key recovery complexity. Our contribution is to show that this complexity can be lowered to two independent attacks by the mean of attacking separately first and last round keys. We show that the information is enough to recover the main key (or a very small list of candidates) in a negligible exploratory effort.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Advanced Encryption StandardAESAES-192AES-256key recoverySide-Channel AnalysisSCA
Contact author(s)
wurcker01 @ gmail com
History
2019-04-03: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/340
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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