Sync HotStuff: Simple and Practical Synchronous State Machine Replication

Ittai Abraham¹, Dahlia Malkhi¹, Kartik Nayak¹², Ling Ren¹³, and Maofan Yin⁴

¹VMware Research – {iabraham, dmalkhi, nkartik, lingren}@vmware.com
²Duke University
³University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
⁴Cornell University – tedyin@cs.cornell.edu

Abstract—Synchronous solutions for Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) can tolerate up to minority faults. In this work, we present Sync HotStuff, a surprisingly simple and intuitive synchronous BFT solution that achieves consensus with a latency of $2\Delta$ in the steady state (where $\Delta$ is a synchronous message delay upper bound). In addition, Sync HotStuff ensures safety in a weaker synchronous model in which the synchrony assumption does not have to hold for all replicas all the time. Moreover, Sync HotStuff has responsiveness, i.e., it advances at network speed when less than one-quarter of the replicas are not responding, a small sacrifice in availability compared with optimal partially synchronous solutions. Borrowing from practical partially synchronous BFT solutions, Sync HotStuff has a two-phase leader-based structure, and has been fully prototyped under the standard synchronous message delay assumption. When tolerating a single fault, Sync HotStuff achieves a throughput of over 280 Kops/sec under typical network performance, which is comparable to the best known partially synchronous solution and more than a factor of two better than the state-of-the-art synchronous solution.

I. INTRODUCTION

Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) protocols relying on a synchrony assumption have the advantage of tolerating up to one-half Byzantine faults [1], while asynchronous or partially synchronous protocols tolerate only one-third [2]. On the flip side, synchronous protocols are often considered impractical for three main reasons. First, existing synchronous protocols require a large number of rounds. Second, most synchronous protocols require lock-step execution (i.e., replicas must start and end each round at the same time), making them hard to implement and further exacerbating the latency problem. Third, an adversary may attack the network to violate the synchrony assumption, causing the protocol to be unsafe.

In this work, we introduce Sync HotStuff, a synchronous BFT state machine replication (SMR) protocol that addresses the above concerns with a surprisingly simple and intuitive solution (see Figure 1). In Sync HotStuff, in the standard synchrony model, a leader broadcasts a proposal; the replicas echo it; and each replica can commit after waiting for the maximum round-trip delay unless it hears by that time an equivocated proposal signed by the leader. (If the leader does not propose, replicas time out and perform a leader change; details on this step are given in the body of the paper.)

Simple yet powerful, Sync HotStuff achieves the following desirable properties. First, as in most synchronous solutions, Sync HotStuff tolerates up to one-half Byzantine replicas. Second, inspired by Hanke et al. [3], Sync HotStuff does not require lock step execution in the steady state. Third, with minor modifications, Sync HotStuff can handle a weaker and more realistic synchrony model suggested by Chan et al. [4]. Finally, Sync HotStuff is prototyped and shown to offer practical performance. It achieves a throughput comparable to partially synchronous protocols and the commit latency is roughly a single maximum round-trip delay. Given the above properties, we believe Sync HotStuff can be the protocol of choice for single-datacenter replicated services as well as consortium blockchain applications.

We proceed to elaborate on the key techniques and key results of Sync HotStuff, which removes performance barriers on synchronous BFT under weaker assumptions.

Near-optimal latency. The first key contribution is the aforementioned extremely simple steady state protocol (Figure 1). We observe that waiting for a single maximum round-trip delay suffices for replicas to commit. Furthermore, our protocol does not have to be executed in a lock-step fashion, despite relying on synchrony. In other words, other than the last waiting step, replicas move to the next step upon receiving enough messages of the previous step, without waiting for the conservative synchrony delay bound. This gives a latency of $2\Delta + O(\delta)$ in steady state where $\Delta$ denotes the known bound assumed on maximal network transmission delay and $\delta$ denotes the actual network delay, which can be much smaller than $\Delta$.

Assuming $\delta \ll \Delta$, the above latency is within a factor of two of the optimal latency that can be obtained by synchronous protocols: we give a minor adaptation to the proof of Dwork et al. [2] to show that a $\Delta$ latency is necessary for any protocol tolerating more than one-third Byzantine faults. The $\Delta$ latency lower bound should not be surprising because a protocol that commits faster than $\Delta$, in a way, does not take advantage of synchrony and is thus subject to the one-third partial synchrony barrier. In fact, we conjecture a stronger latency lower bound of $2\Delta$. Our intuition is that replicas can be out-of-sync by $\Delta$, so one $\Delta$ is needed for lagging replicas to catch up and another $\Delta$ is needed for messages to be delivered (the current lower bound proof only captures the latter $\Delta$).
Moreover, though $O(\delta)$ latency is impossible to guarantee under more than one-third faults, it can be achieved optimistically. The Thunderella protocol [5] achieves $O(\delta)$ latency when the leader is honest and more than three-quarter of the replicas are responding. We show that our protocol can be adapted to incorporate this idea.

**Practical throughput.** The key technique to improve throughput is to move the synchronous waiting steps off the critical path. In more detail, there are two steps in our protocol that require waiting for a conservative $O(\Delta)$ time. One is to check for a leader equivocation before committing and it is made non-blocking. Thus, replicas start working on the next block without waiting for the previous blocks to be committed. (The non-blocking commit also reduces latency, since a block can now be proposed before the previous block is committed.) The other is before sending a status message to the leader, but it is in the view-change protocol, which occurs infrequently. With these tricks, in the steady state, the replicas are always sending protocol messages and utilizing the entire network capacity, thus behaving exactly like partially synchronous protocols. Our experiments validate that Sync HotStuff achieves throughput comparable to partially synchronous protocols. In fact, since a synchronous solution tolerates more corruption (half vs. one-third), it requires fewer replicas to be deployed to tolerate a given number of faults. In our experiments, we observe that for tolerating a fixed number of faults, Sync HotStuff can even slightly outperform partially synchronous solutions in throughput.

**Safety despite some sluggish honest replicas.** Synchronous protocols proven secure under the standard synchrony assumption fail to provide safety if a single message between honest replicas is delayed. Recently, Guo et al. [6] proposed a “weak synchrony” model that allows the message delay bound $\Delta$, at any point in time, to be violated for a set of honest replicas. We call these replicas sluggish. We call the remaining honest replicas prompt and messages of prompt replicas can reach each other within $\Delta$ time. To reflect reality and be more conservative, the model allows sluggish replicas to be arbitrarily mobile, i.e., an adversary decides which replicas are sluggish at any time. Messages sent by or sent to a sluggish replica may take an arbitrarily long time until the replica is prompt again. Since “weak synchrony” has been used in the literature to describe other models (e.g., [7], [8], [9]), we will refer to this model as the mobile sluggish model in this paper. We call the synchrony mode without mobile sluggish faults standard synchrony.

With standard synchrony, if a replica sends a message to another replica, it is guaranteed to arrive within $\Delta$ time. Our protocol and proofs crucially use this fact to achieve safety. With a mobile sluggish fault model, on the other hand, the delivery is not guaranteed if the sender or the receiver is sluggish. In that sense, the guarantee for a single replica sending or receiving a message is similar to that of partially synchronous network model. The central observation enabling us to tackle mobile sluggish faults is the following: assuming a minority of the replicas are sluggish or Byzantine at any point in time, if a replica receives a message from a majority of replicas, at least one of the senders must be prompt and honest. We use this observation atop Sync-HotStuff-under-standard-synchrony to obtain a protocol in the mobile sluggish model.

The above technique allows Sync HotStuff to ensure safety as long as the number of sluggish plus Byzantine faults combined is less than one-half; in other words, at any time, a majority of replicas must be honest and prompt (which has been shown to be a necessary condition [6] in the mobile sluggish model). More importantly, with the above technique, Sync HotStuff manages to handle the mobile sluggish model at almost no extra cost: the communication complexity remains the same and the commit latency increases only by $O(\delta)$.

**Organization.** In the remainder of this section, we define state machine replication. In Section II, we describe Sync HotStuff in the standard synchrony model without sluggish faults. Section III augments this protocol tolerate sluggish faults. Section IV adds an optimistically responsive track to Sync HotStuff with sluggish faults. Section V presents the results based on our implementation and evaluation. Section VI compares with closely related works.

### A. Definitions and Model

**State Machine Replication (SMR).** A state machine replication protocol is used for building a fault-tolerant service to process client requests. The service consists of $n$ replicas, up to $f$ of which may be faulty. The service commits client requests into a linearizable log and produces a consistent view of the log akin to a single non-faulty server. More formally, a state machine replication service provides the following two guarantees

- **Safety:** If a value is committed by any non-faulty replica at a log position, all non-faulty replicas eventually commit that value at the same position.
- **Liveness:** Each client request is eventually committed by non-faulty replicas.

We assume that the network consists of pairwise, authenticated communication channels between replicas. We assume digital signatures and a public-key infrastructure (PKI), and use $(x)_p$ to denote a message $x$ signed by replica $p$. (It is sufficient to sign the hash digest of a message for efficiency.) We also assume that there is no drift between the clocks used by the replicas, i.e., the clocks run at the same rate. Our protocol is secure under a sluggish mobile adversary. However, for ease of exposition we first explain the protocol in the standard synchrony model. We describe these models in the respective sections.

### II. Sync HotStuff under Standard Synchrony

We first present Sync HotStuff in the standard synchrony model (without mobile sluggish faults). Here, the synchrony assumption states that a message sent at time $t$ by any replica arrives at another replica by time $t + \Delta$ where $\Delta$ is a known maximum network delay. We use $\delta$ to denote the...
actual message delay in the network. We show a protocol that tolerates minority Byzantine replicas, i.e., \( n = 2f + 1 \).

Sync HotStuff takes the Paxos/PBFT’s approach of having a stable leader in a steady state. The reign of a leader is called a view, numbered by integers. The leader of view \( v \) can simply be replica \((v \mod n)\), i.e., leaders are decided in a round-robinc order. The leader is expected to keep making progress by committing client requests at increasing heights. If replicas detect Byzantine behavior by the leader or lack of progress in a view, they blame the leader and engage in a view-change protocol to replace the leader. Figures 1 and 2 describe the steady state and view-change protocols, respectively.

**Blocks and block format.** As commonly done in SMR, client requests are batched into blocks. The protocol forms a chain of blocks. We refer to a block’s position in the chain as its height. A block \( B_k \) at height \( k \) has the following format

\[
B_k := (b_k, h_{k-1})
\]

where \( b_k \) denotes a proposed value at height \( k \) and \( h_{k-1} := H(B_{k-1}) \) is a hash digest of the predecessor block. The first block \( B_1 = (b_1, \perp) \) has no predecessor. Every subsequent block \( B_k \) must specify a predecessor block \( B_{k-1} \) by including a hash of it. We say a block is valid if (i) its predecessor is valid or \( \perp \), and (ii) its proposed value meets application-level validity conditions and is consistent with its chain of ancestors (e.g., does not double spend a transaction in one of its ancestor blocks).

**Additional terminology on blocks.** If a block \( B_k \) is an ancestor of another \( B_l \) \((l \geq k)\), we say \( B_l \) extends \( B_k \). If two blocks \( B_k \) and \( B_k' \) have the same height but different contents, we say they are conflicting blocks. If two conflicting blocks are proposed by the same leader, we say the leader has equivocated and the two blocks are equivocated blocks.

**Certificates and certified blocks.** A key ingredient of BFT solutions is a quorum certificate (certificate for short), a set of signatures on a block by a quorum of replicas. In Sync HotStuff, a quorum consists of \( f + 1 \) replicas (out of \( 2f + 1 \)). We use \( C(B_k) \) to denote a quorum of signatures on \( h_k = H(B_k) \) from the same view and call it a certificate for \( B_k \). Certified blocks are ranked by heights. During the protocol execution, each replica keeps track of all signatures for all blocks and keeps updating the highest certified block to its knowledge. Looking ahead, the notion of highest certified blocks will be used to guard the safety of a commit.

**Block chaining.** Blocks across heights are chained by hashes (cf. block format) and certificates (cf. Figure 1). This idea originated from the Bitcoin white paper [10] and it was incorporated into BFT by Casper [11] and HotStuff [12]. It greatly simplifies BFT protocols since now the voting step on a block also serves as a voting step for all its ancestor blocks that have not been committed. Hence, crucially, committing a block commits all its ancestors.

### A. Steady State Protocol

The steady state protocol runs in iterations. In each iteration, the leader \( L \) proposes a block by sending \( \langle \text{propose}, B_k, v, C(B_{k-1}) \rangle_L \) where \( B_k := (b_k, h_{k-1}) \) is a new block and \( B_{k-1} \) is the highest certified block known to \( L \) (Step 1). If the leader has been in the steady state, it should extend the previous block it has proposed. If a leader has just entered the steady state after a view change, it should extend the highest certified block it learned during the view-change. If there are multiple such blocks (which implies that a previous Byzantine leader has equivocated), the leader can pick one arbitrarily.

Each replica \( r \), upon receiving a valid block \( B_k \) from the leader, broadcasts a vote \( \langle \text{vote}, B_k, v \rangle_r \) for it if it extends a highest certified block known to \( r \) (Step 2). Although the protocol assumes synchrony, replicas do not progress in lock steps. A replica \( r \) may first hear a block through another replica’s vote. A vote for a block can thus be considered a re-proposal of the block. In this case, if the block extends the highest certified block known to \( r \), replica \( r \) also broadcasts a vote for \( B_k \).

Once replica \( r \) votes for \( B_k \), it starts a timer called commit-timer\( \text{r} \) (Step 3). \( B_k \) is committed if \( r \) does not observe any equivocated blocks at height \( k \) within the next \( 2\Delta \) time. We note again that blocks across heights form a chain, and committing a block commits all its ancestors. Note that the commit timers do not affect the critical path of progress. A replica starts the next iteration “concurrently” without waiting for the previous height to be committed. In fact, a replica can potentially have many previous heights whose commit timers are still running.

**Why does absence of an equivocated block within \( 2\Delta \) time suffice to ensure safety?** Consider an honest replica \( r \) that votes for a block \( B_k \) at time \( t \), does not observe any equivocated block, and hence commits \( B_k \) at time \( t + 2\Delta \). We will show that \( B_k \) will be the only certified block at height \( k \). For that, we need to show that (i) \( B_k \) will be certified, and (ii) no conflicting height-\( k \) block can be certified.

\( r \)’s vote reaches all honest replicas before \( t + \Delta \). Recall that honest replicas vote for the first valid block received at each height in a view, and that they vote on blocks obtained through votes (i.e., votes serve as re-proposals). Thus, if any honest replica votes for a conflicting block \( B'_k \), it must do so before \( t + \Delta \); otherwise, it would receive \( B_k \) from \( r \) first and vote for \( B_k \). Therefore, if any honest replica votes for a conflicting block \( B'_k \), \( r \) would have known about \( B'_k \) before \( t + 2\Delta \). This contradicts with the fact that \( r \) commits \( B_k \).

Hence, (ii) holds. On the other hand, if \( r \) does not receive a vote for an equivocated block before \( t + 2\Delta \), \( r \) can be sure that all honest replicas have voted for \( B_k \) before \( t + \Delta \), and that it will receive all these votes, which form a certificate for \( B_k \) before \( t + 2\Delta \). Hence, (i) holds. Note that (i) holds even if the leader did not propose \( B_k \) to all replicas. In summary, if a block \( B_k \) is committed by some honest replica, it will be the only certified block for that height.
Let $v$ be the current view number and replica $L$ be the leader of the current view. The steady state protocol runs the following steps in iterations.

1) **Propose.** The leader $L$ broadcasts $\langle$propose, $B_k, v, C(B_{k-1})\rangle_L$ where $B_k = (b_k, h_{k-1})$, $b_k$ is a batch of new client requests, and $B_{k-1}$ is the highest certified block known to $L$.

2) **Vote.** Upon receiving the first valid proposal for a height-$k$ block $B_k$ from $L$ or through a vote by some other replica, if it is extending a highest certified block, forward the proposal to all other replicas and broadcast a vote in the form of $\langle$vote, $B_k, v\rangle$. Set commit-timer$_k$ to $2\Delta$ and start counting down.

3) **(Non-blocking) Commit.** When commit-timer$_k$ reaches 0, if $B_k$ is the only height-$k$ block received, commit $B_k$ and all its ancestors.

**Fig. 1:** The steady state protocol.

Let $L$ and $L'$ be the leader of view $v$ and $v + 1$, respectively.

i **Blame.** If less than $p$ blocks are received from $L$ in $(2p + 1)\Delta$ time in view $v$, broadcast $\langle$blame, $v\rangle$. If more than one block is proposed by $L$ at any height ($L$ has equivocated), broadcast $\langle$blame, $v\rangle$ and the two equivocated blocks.

ii **Quit old view.** Upon gathering $f + 1$ $\langle$blame, $v\rangle$ messages, broadcast them, and quits view $v$ (abort all commit-timer(s) and stop voting in view $v$).

iii **Status.** Wait for $\Delta$ time and enter view $v + 1$. Upon entering view $v + 1$, send a highest certified block to $L'$ and transition back to steady state.

**Fig. 2:** The view-change protocol.

**Remark.** A commit by some honest replica at height $k$ does not imply a commit by all honest replicas at that height. This is because a Byzantine leader can send an equivocated block to a subset of honest replicas before their commit timers expires, causing them to not commit. But the view-change protocol will ensure that all honest replicas eventually commit the same block, as will be explained in the next subsection.

**B. View-change Protocol**

The view-change protocol ensures liveness. The leader can prevent progress through two mechanisms – stalling and equivocating. The two blame conditions, based on no progress and equivocation, defend against these two attacks, respectively. A leader is expected to propose a block every $2\Delta$ time: one $\Delta$ for its proposal to reach other replicas and one $\Delta$ for other replicas’ votes to arrive. An extra $\Delta$ time is given to the leader in the beginning of the view to receive status. This forces a Byzantine leader to propose a block every $2\Delta$ time to avoid being overthrown. If a leader equivocates by proposing conflicting blocks, the two equivocated blocks serve as a proof of Byzantine behavior and are sent together with the blame message. All honest replicas will blame the leader within $\Delta$ time. Note that equivocated blocks may be received directly from $L$ or through a vote from other replicas.

If a replica gathers $f + 1$ $\langle$blame, $v\rangle$ messages, it starts a view-change process by broadcasting the $f + 1$ blame messages (Step ii). At this point, it quits view $v$, which involves stopping all commit timers and stop voting in view $v$.

The replica then waits for $\Delta$ time to learn the highest certified block held among honest replicas, and then reports one such block to $L'$ (Step iii). The $\Delta$ wait before sending status ensures that an honest replica learns all blocks committed by all honest replicas in previous views before sending status in a new view (formalized in Lemma 1). After that, a replica transitions back to steady state, and waits for the leader to propose a block that extends the block it reports in status.

**C. Safety and Liveness**

We say a block $B_l$ is committed **directly** if an honest replica commits it by observing no equivocated block at height $k$ within $2\Delta$ after it votes. We say a block $B_l$ is committed **indirectly** if it is a result of directly committing a block extending $B_k$.

**Lemma 1.** If an honest replica directly commits a block $B_l$ in a view, then (i) every honest replica votes for $B_l$ in that view, and (ii) every honest replica receives $C(B_l)$ before entering the next view.

**Proof.** Suppose an honest replica $r$ directly commits $B_l$ at time $t$. $r$ votes for $B_l$ at time $t - 2\Delta$. This vote reaches all honest replicas by time $t - \Delta$. At this point, an honest replica $r'$ will vote for $B_l$ unless one of the two conditions below holds: (1) $r'$ has already voted for $B_l' \neq B_l$ before time $t - \Delta$, or (2) $r'$ has already received (and sent) $f + 1$ blame messages before time $t - \Delta$. However, if either happens, $r$ would have received either a vote for an equivocated block or $f + 1$ blame messages before time $t$, which contradicts the hypothesis of $r$ committing $B_l$ at time $t$. Thus, at time $t - \Delta$, all honest replicas are still in the view and they all vote for $B_l$. Moreover, all of them enter the next view at or after time $t$, and by then, they all receive $C(B_l)$.

$\square$
Lemma 2. If an honest replica directly commits a block $B_l$ in view $v$, then there does not exist $C(B'_l)$ where $B'_l \neq B_l$.

Proof. Suppose an honest $r$ replica directly commits a block $B_l$ in view $v$. We will argue why a conflicting certificate does not exist prior to, in, or after view $v$. Firstly, if conflicting certificate exists prior to view $v$, then at least one of the votes comes from an honest replica. This vote would have reached $r$ before view $v$ and would have prevented $r$ from committing $B_l$. Second, by Lemma 1, all honest replicas vote for $B_l$ in view $v$. Thus, a conflicting height-$l$ certificate cannot be formed in view $v$. Lastly, again by Lemma 1, every honest replica receives $C(B_l)$ before entering view $v+1$, and there was no conflicting height-$l$ certificate up until then. From then on, the highest certified block of every honest replica is at least $B_l$, and no honest replica will vote for height-$l$ blocks any more. Thus, no $C(B'_l)$ where $B'_l \neq B_l$ can come into existence in views greater than $v$.

Theorem 3 (Safety). Honest replicas always commit the same block $B_k$ for each height $k$.

Proof. Suppose for contradiction that two distinct blocks $B_k$ and $B'_k$ are committed at height $k$. Suppose $B_k$ is committed as a result of $B_l$ being directly committed in view $v$ and $B'_k$ is committed as a result of $B'_l$ being directly committed in view $v'$. This implies $B_l$ extends $B_k$ and $B'_l$ extends $B'_k$. Without loss of generality, assume $l \leq l'$. By Lemma 2, there exists no other certified block at height $l$. If $l = l'$, then $B'_l = B_l$; if $l < l'$, then $B'_l$ extends $B_l$. In either case, $B'_l = B_l$.

Theorem 4 (Liveness). (i) A view change will not happen if the current leader is honest; (ii) A Byzantine leader must propose $p$ blocks in $(2p+1)\Delta$ time to avoid a view change; and (iii) If $k$ is the highest height at which some honest replica has committed a block in view $v$, then leaders in subsequent views must propose blocks at heights higher than $k$.

Proof. For (i), note that an honest leader $L$ is able to propose $p$ blocks in $(2p+1)\Delta$ time. Immediately after entering its view, $L$ needs $\Delta$ time to gather status; after that, it can propose a block every $2\Delta$ time: one $\Delta$ for its proposed block to reach all replicas and another $\Delta$ for other replicas’ votes to arrive. Thus, an honest leader has sufficient time and does not equivocate, so it will not be blamed by any other honest replica. On the other hand, if a Byzantine leader delays beyond the above allotted time it will be blamed by all honest replicas.

Part (ii) follows by Theorem 1. Hence, in status of subsequent views, they all report a certified block at height at least $k$. If the leader does not propose a block with a height higher than $k$ within $3\Delta$, it will be blamed by all honest replicas.

D. Efficiency Analysis

Throughput. In steady state (Figure 1), the only step that uses the synchrony bound $\Delta$ is the commit step. But as we have mentioned, the commit step is not on the critical path (non-blocking). Thus, the choice of $\Delta$, no matter how conservative, does not affect the protocol’s throughput in steady state. Thus, Sync HotStuff should have similar throughput as partially synchronous protocols. Our experiments in Section V confirm this.

Latency. From an honest leader’s perspective, each block incurs a latency of $2\Delta+\delta$ after being proposed. (Step 1 proceeds at the actual network delay $\delta$.) But for SMR, it is more customary to calculate latency from a client’s perspective, that is, the time difference between when a client sends a request and when it receives a response. If a client’s request arrives between two leader proposals, it incurs an additional delay before being getting proposed. From a client’s perspective, it takes $\delta$ to send its request to the replicas; on average, this request will arrive half way between two leader proposals, so the average queue-up delay is $\delta$; it takes an additional $\delta$ time for replicas to reply to the client. So the average client latency of Sync HotStuff is $2\Delta+4\delta$. Our experiments in Section V confirm this.

For comparison, the best prior synchronous protocol in terms of latency is Hanke et al. [3]. Its average latency is $8\Delta+9\delta$ from a leader’s perspective [13], and $9\Delta+11.5\delta$ from a client’s perspective, following a similar analysis.

E. Bound on Responsiveness

Sync HotStuff commits with a $2\Delta$ latency in the steady state when $f < n/2$. For completeness, in this section, we show a lower bound on the latency when $f > n/3$. The lower bound and the proof closely follow Dwork et al. [2]. For clarity, we present the bound in the Byzantine broadcast formulation. Recall that in Byzantine broadcast, a designated sender tries to broadcast a value to $n$ parties. A solution needs to satisfy three requirements:

- (termination) all honest parties eventually commit,
- (agreement) all honest parties commit on the same value, and
- (validity) if the sender is honest, then all honest parties commit on the value it broadcasts.

Theorem 5. There exists no Byzantine broadcast protocol that simultaneously satisfy the following:

- termination, agreement and validity as defined above;
- tolerates $f \geq n/3$ Byzantine faults;
- terminates in less than $\Delta$ time if the designated sender is honest.

Proof. Suppose such a protocol exists. Divide parties into three groups $P$, $Q$ and $R$, each of size $f$. Parties in $P$ and $Q$ are honest and parties in $R$ are Byzantine. Consider the following three scenarios. In Scenario A, parties in $R$ remain silent and an honest designated sender sends 0. In this scenario, parties in $P$ and $Q$ commit 0 in less than $\Delta$ time. In Scenario B, parties in $R$ remain silent and an honest designated sender sends 1. In this scenario, parties in $P$ and $Q$ commit 1 in less than $\Delta$ time. In Scenario C, the designated sender is Byzantine and sends 0 to $P$ and 1 to $Q$; parties in $R$ behave like $Q$ in Scenario A to $P$, and behave like $P$ in scenario B to $Q$. Our experiments confirm this.
Messages from $P$ take $\Delta$ to reach $Q$ and messages from $Q$ take $\Delta$ to reach $P$. Before time $\Delta$, $P$ receive no messages from $Q$ and $Q$ receive no messages from $P$, and thus the scenario is indistinguishable from Scenario A to $P$ and indistinguishable from Scenario B to $Q$. Thus, $P$ commits 0 and $Q$ commits 1 in less than $\Delta$ time, violating agreement.

III. Sync HotStuff with Mobile Sluggish Faults

The standard synchrony model used in the previous section requires that every message sent by an honest replica arrives at every other honest replica within $\Delta$ time. In practice, such an assumption may not hold all the time due to potential unforeseen aberrations in the network at either the sender or the receiver, causing some messages to be delayed. Under such aberrations, a protocol proved secure under the standard synchrony assumption may lose safety. For our protocol specifically, if a replica that voted for an equivocated block runs into a network glitch, then another honest replica may not receive it in time and may incorrectly commit another block. A potential way to “fix” this is to account for the sender (or receiver) of the delayed message as Byzantine and thus tolerate fewer actual Byzantine faults. Unfortunately, over the course of a long execution, every replica is bound to observe such an aberration and this “fix” will result in a dishonest majority of replicas, thus breaking safety eventually.

A. The Mobile Sluggish Model

Chan et al. [4] consider a weaker model that allows some replicas to be sluggish, i.e., allows delays for messages sent/received by sluggish replicas in the network. On the other hand, messages sent by prompt replicas will respect the synchrony bound. More specifically, if a replica $r_1$ is prompt at time $t_1$, then any message sent by $r_1$ at time $t_1 \leq t_1$ will arrive at a replica $r_2$ prompt at time $t_2$ if $t_2 \geq t_1 + \Delta$. Moreover, the set of sluggish replicas can arbitrarily change at every instant of time. Hence, we call this model the mobile sluggish fault model. We denote the number of sluggish replicas by $d$, the number of Byzantine replicas by $b$ and the total number of faults by $f$. Thus, $f = d + b + 1$.

We note that the mobile sluggish model expects that a message sent by a sluggish replica would respect the synchrony bound as soon as it becomes prompt. In practice, this model captures temporary loss in network connectivity causing message delays. The replica can resend messages as soon as network connectivity is restored. A similar argument holds for receiving messages. However, it is not a good model for capturing a replica going offline for too long since this would require the replica to either buffer a huge amount of messages to be resent or to resend each message many times, both of which are impractical.

B. Protocol

Under weak synchrony, Guo et al. [6] show that no protocol can tolerate a total number of faults (sluggish plus Byzantine replicas) greater than $n/2$. The intuition is that a majority set consisting of Byzantine and sluggish replicas might reach a commit decision without interacting with the rest of the world and might cause conflicting commits. Thus, we assume $> n/2$ replicas are honest and prompt at any time. Moreover, the protocol guarantees liveness when all honest replicas are prompt for a “sufficiently long” period of time, i.e., there can be sluggish replicas but they are not mobile. The duration is directly related to the time required to commit a block in the protocol.

Protocol intuition. In the synchronous protocol described in Section II, the $2\Delta$ period immediately after a vote was used to ensure the following. If no equivocation was observed, i.e., if the $2\Delta$ period was undisturbed, then a vote for a block $B_k$ by a replica $r$ ensures that both, the replica $r$ and all other replicas receive $C(B_k)$ within $2\Delta$. This is because no other honest replica would have received an equivocating block and thus all honest replicas would vote for $B_k$. Thus, no other certificate would have been formed or committed. On the other hand, the presence of an equivocation implies the potential existence of another certificate, preventing replica $r$ from committing.

In the presence of sluggish replicas, unfortunately, none of the above arguments hold. A sluggish replica, even in the absence of an equivocation, may not receive a certificate in the $2\Delta$ period. Similarly, other replicas may not receive its votes and consequently certificates. Finally, if an equivocation exists, the replica may not receive it in time.

Intuitively, these argument fail in the mobile sluggish model because we rely on a single replica’s vote to ensure safety but this replica can now be sluggish. The natural fix is to rely on $\geq d + 1$ honest replicas’ votes. Then, at least one of the votes would have been sent by a prompt replica and it would ensure safety. Unfortunately, if a replica receives $d$ + 1 votes, it cannot determine if the votes are received from $d$ + 1 prompt replicas or a combination of Byzantine and sluggish replicas. Thus, we rely on a certificate $C(B_k)$ which is bound to contain one vote from an honest and prompt replica which is capable of sending it to other prompt replicas.

The above intuition suffices for a certificate to be formed at replica $r$; it knows it can obtain a certificate because it has already received the certificate. However, it doesn’t guarantee a certificate at other honest replicas. This can cause safety violations if at the end of the view, sufficient honest replicas do not have a certificate and some other value is proposed and committed in subsequent views. We solve this by using the same intuition again — if a replica has received a $C(C(B_k))$, then $C(B_k)$ must have been voted by one of the prompt replicas. This ensures a certificate at all prompt replicas.

Finally, observe that even if a replica observes an undisturbed $2\Delta$ period after receiving $C(C(B_k))$, then the commit is not guaranteed. This is because the replica could be sluggish and may not have received an equivocating block. However, if the replica hears from a majority honest replicas about an undisturbed $2\Delta$ period, then an equivocation could not have missed all of them and thus the replica can commit the block. We call the prior state a pre-commit and the latter state a commit.
Let $v$ be the current view number and replica $L$ be the leader of the current view. The steady state protocol runs the following steps in iterations.

1) **Propose.** The leader $L$ broadcasts $\langle \text{propose, } B_k, v, C(B_{k-1}) \rangle_L$ where $B_k = (b_k, h_{k-1})$, $b_k$ is a batch of new client requests, and $B_{k-1}$ is the highest certified block known to $L$.

2) **Vote.** Upon receiving the first valid proposal for a height-$k$ block $B_k$ from $L$ or through a vote by some other replica, if it is extending a highest certified block, forward the proposal to all other replicas and broadcast a vote in the form of $\langle \text{vote, } B_k, v \rangle$. Set pre-commit-timer$_{k-2}$ to $2\Delta$ and start counting down.

3) **(Non-blocking) Pre-commit.** When pre-commit-timer$_k$ reaches 0, if $B_k$ is the only height-$k$ block received, pre-commit $B_k$ and broadcast $\langle \text{commit, } B_k, v \rangle$.

4) **(Non-blocking) Commit.** On receiving $\langle \text{commit, } B_k, v \rangle$ from $f + 1$ distinct replicas with the same $v$, commit $B_k$ and all its ancestors.

**Protocol.** Interestingly, despite a weaker model than the standard synchrony assumption, based on the intuition presented above, the protocol is only marginally different from the one presented in Figures 1 and 2. For clarity we present the entire steady state protocol and gray out the repetition in Figure 3. The view change protocol remains unchanged.

Now, since we require a $C(C(B_k))$ before waiting for the $2\Delta$ period, we start a pre-commit timer for $B_{k-2}$ on receiving $B_k$. When the pre-commit timer expires, the replica broadcasts a commit request $\langle \text{commit, } B_k, v \rangle$ to all replicas. Upon receiving $f + 1$ commit requests, the replica commits since at least one of the requests is from a prompt replica.

**C. Safety and Liveness**

As before, we say a block $B_k$ is committed directly if it is committed due to $f + 1$ pre-commits. We say a block $B_k$ is committed indirectly if it is a result of directly committing a block extending $B_k$.

**Lemma 6.** If an honest replica directly commits a block $B_l$ in view $v$, then $f + 1$ honest replicas (i) vote for $B_l$ in that view, and (ii) receive $C(B_l)$ before entering the next view.

**Proof.** If an honest replica directly commits $B_l$ in view $v$, then $f + 1$ honest requests pre-commit $B_l$ in view $v$. Denote the set of these $d + 1$ replicas by $R$. Let the earliest pre-commit among $R$ be performed by replica $r$ at time $t$. Thus, replica $r$ must have received $B_{l+2}$ at time $t - 2\Delta$. This implies that $f + 1$ replicas have voted for $B_{l+1}$ before time $t - 2\Delta$. Since $f + 1$ replicas are honest and prompt at $t - 2\Delta$, at least one of these replicas $r$ intersects the quorum of replicas who voted for $B_{l+1}$. Denote the set of honest and prompt replicas at $t - \Delta$ by $R'$. Since $r$ is honest and prompt at $t - \Delta$, its vote for $B_{l+1}$, which contains $C(B_l)$, reaches all replicas in $R'$ by time $t - \Delta$.

We will now prove that the set $R'$ is the required set that satisfies the two conditions in the lemma. The only scenario in which this is not true is if one of the replicas in $R'$, say replica $r'$ has voted for a conflicting block or has quit view $v$ before time $t - \Delta$. However, because $r'$ is honest and prompt at $t - \Delta$, before time $t$, its broadcast of conflicting vote or blame certificate will reach all honest replicas that are prompt at time $t$. At least one replica in the pre-committing set $R$ would be prompt and would have received this message by time $t$. It would have prevented the pre-commit of $B_l$ at that replica, a contradiction.

**Remark.** Note that the above lemma states that $R'$ receives $C(B_l)$ before quitting view $v$. Thus, the $\Delta$ wait during view change is not needed for the protocol with sluggish faults.

**Lemma 7.** If an honest replica directly commits a block $B_l$ in view, then there does not exist $C(B'_l)$ where $B_l \neq B'_l$.

**Proof.** If an honest replica directly commits $B_l$ in view $v$, then a set $R$ of $d + 1$ honest replicas pre-commit $B_l$ in view $v$. We will argue why a conflicting certificate does not exist prior to, in, or after view $v$. Firstly, if conflicting certificate exists prior to view $v$, at least one replica in $R$ would not receive a conflicting vote before view $v$, and would not have pre-committed $B_l$. Secondly, by Lemma 6, $f + 1$ honest replicas vote for $B_l$ in view $v$. Thus, a conflicting height-$l$ certificate cannot be formed in view $v$. Lastly, again by Lemma 6, $f + 1$ honest replica receive $C(B_l)$ before entering view $v + 1$, and there was no conflicting height-$l$ certificate up until then. From then on, the highest certified block of these $f + 1$ honest replicas is at least $B_l$, and they will not vote for height-$l$ blocks any more. Thus, no $C(B'_l)$ where $B'_l \neq B_l$ can come into existence in views greater than $v$.

**Safety.** The safety proof remains identical to that of Theorem 3 except that Lemma 7 is invoked in lieu of Lemma 2.

**Liveness.** In the mobile sluggish model, liveness is guaranteed only during periods in which all honest replicas stay prompt. In that case, the same arguments in Theorem 4 hold. We do not repeat the proof.

**D. Efficiency.**

In the mobile sluggish model, each pre-commit timer starts two proposals later, adding $4\Delta$ latency. The commit messages add another round of communication and $\delta$ latency. So the total latency becomes $2\Delta + 4\delta + 5\delta = 2\Delta + 9\delta$. Fig. 3: The steady state protocol.
IV. **Sync HotStuff with Optimistic Responsiveness**

In this section, we incorporate the Thunderella [5] optimistic responsive mode into Sync HotStuff. In Section II, a certificate/quorum required only \( f + 1 \) votes. Thus, a vote from a single honest replica can result in a certificate if all \( f \) Byzantine replicas vote on the same block. Therefore, before committing a block, a replica needs to wait long enough to hear all honest replicas’ votes and make sure none of them voted for a conflicting block. The commit latency thus inherently depends on the maximum network delay \( \Delta \). In contrast, partially synchronous protocols rule out the existence of a conflicting certificate with larger quorums. For instance, PBFT requires \( 2n/3 \) votes (in two phases) and tolerates \( f < n/3 \) Byzantine replicas. A simple quorum intersection argument shows that two conflicting blocks cannot both receive \( 2n/3 \) votes. Thus, partially synchronous protocols commit as soon as these quorums of votes are obtained, so the latency does not depend on \( \Delta \).

Pass and Shi [5] use the term **responsive** to capture the above latency distinction. A protocol is said to be **responsive** if the latency only depends on the actual network \( \delta \) but not the maximum network delay \( \Delta \). A protocol is said to be **optimistically responsive** if it achieves responsiveness when some additional constraints are met.

Since Sync HotStuff aims to tolerate up to minority corruption, similar to Thunderella [5], to achieve responsiveness we will use a quorum size of \( > 3n/4 \). This will give Sync HotStuff a **responsive mode** that is optimistically responsive when messages from \( > 3n/4 \) replicas reach within time \( \delta \). This happens if the actual number of faults is less than \( n/4 \). Put differently, if more than \( n/4 \) replicas are faulty, they can prevent responsiveness but they cannot cause a safety violation. In that case there is no responsive progress, we fall back to the **synchronous mode** in Section III.

**A. Protocol**

Since the responsive mode requires a larger quorum, we introduce the notion of a **strong certificate**. A block \( B \) is said to have a strong certificate if it has \( > 3n/4 \) votes. It is denoted by \( C_q(B) \). In the responsive mode, honest replicas only vote for blocks that extend predecessors with strong certificates, namely, in the form of \( B_k = (b_k, C_q(h_k-1)) \).

Figure 4 describes the augmented protocol with the responsive mode, augmented from the protocol in Section III. Below, we highlight the modifications and how to switch between the modes. Each view starts in the synchronous mode. If the leader recognizes that \( > 3n/4 \) replicas are voting, it signals a switch to the responsive mode by including a strong certificate. Once a replica votes for a block containing a strong certificate, it switches to the responsive mode. Once in the responsive mode, a replica will only vote for blocks containing strong certificates for the rest of the view. But crucially, the responsive commit rule (based on two strong certificates) does not immediately kick in. The replicas need to commit one more block using the synchronous commit rule after switching to the responsive mode. This essentially “commits the switch” using the regular synchronous commit rule, i.e., it ensures that most replicas have switched to the responsive mode.

Whenever the responsive mode fails due to an equivocating leader or lack of progress, replicas engage in a view change (Figure 5) to move to the next view and start in its synchronous mode. Guarding the safety of responsive commits turns out to be non-trivial. We provide an intuition of the concern and our approach to solving it. This is discussed formally in Lemmas 8 and 9.

In the protocol without responsiveness, a commit implied that a certificate was broadcast by some prompt replica \( 2\Delta \) time earlier. This ensured that a certificate was obtained at a majority of honest replicas at or before they quit the view. Since we do not wait for \( 2\Delta \) time in the responsive mode, this does not hold any more. First, some of the sluggish replicas (sluggish even before the responsive honest commit) can quit the old view and enter the new view without informing a majoriy of honest replicas. In the new view, they may vote for an unsafe block. By itself, this does not create a safety violation since \( d + b < f \). However, in combination with the sluggish mobility that is introduced right after a prompt responsive honest commit, another set of \( d \) replica may not learn a certificate before switching to the next view leading to a safety violation. Our solution separates the process of quitting the old view and entering the new view with a \( 2\Delta \) delay (Steps ii and iii). The delay is introduced at a replica after learning that a majority of replicas have quit the view giving it sufficient time for the certificates to be sent across to a majority of prompt replicas before they enter and subsequently vote in the next view (Step iii). These changes will be utilized in the proof of Lemma 8.

**B. Safety with Optimistic Responsiveness**

We now amend the proofs for safety to account for the addition of the responsive mode. Lemma 6 and 7 apply to directly committed blocks in the synchronous mode. We provide two similar lemmas for directly committed blocks in the responsive mode.

**Lemma 8.** If an honest replica directly commits a block \( B_1 \) in a view, then \( f + 1 \) honest replicas receive \( C(B_1) \) before entering the next view.

The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 6. The only difference is that the \( 2\Delta \) before pre-commit now happens during view change.

**Proof.** If an honest replica directly commits \( B_1 \) in view \( v \), then \( d + 1 \) honest replicas pre-commit \( B_1 \) in view \( v \). Denote the set of these \( d + 1 \) replicas by \( R \). Let the earliest pre-commit among \( R \) be performed by replica \( r \) at time \( t \). At least \( d + 1 \) honest replicas voted for \( B_{t+1} \) before time \( t \). At least one of them is honest prompt at time \( t \). Its vote \( B_{t+1} \) reaches the set of honest replicas that are prompt time \( t + \Delta \). Denote this set by \( R’ \). \( R’ \) has size at least \( f + 1 \) and satisfies the lemma. The only scenario in which this is not true is if one of the replicas in \( R’ \), say replica \( r’ \) has entered view \( v + 1 \) before
Let $v$ be the current view number and replica $L$ be the leader of the current view. The steady state protocol runs the following steps in iterations.

1) **Propose.** The leader $L$ broadcasts $\langle\text{propose}, B_k, v, C(B_{k-1})\rangle_L$ where $B_k = (b_k, h_k-1)$, $b_k$ is a batch of new client requests, and $B_{k-1}$ is the highest certified block known to $L$.

2) **Vote.** Upon receiving the first valid proposal for a height-$k$ block $B_k$ from $L$ or through a vote by some other replica, if it is extending a highest certified block, forward the proposal to all other replicas and broadcast a vote in the form of $\langle\text{vote}, B_k, v\rangle$. If $B_k$ contains a strong certificate for its predecessor, switches to the responsive mode and only vote for blocks with strong certificates for the rest of this view.

3) **(Non-blocking) Pre-commit.** If at least one block has been committed in the responsive mode of this view, pre-commit $B_{k-2}$ and broadcast $\langle\text{commit}, B_{k-2}, v\rangle$ right away. Else, set pre-commit-timer$_{k-2}$ to $2\Delta$ and start counting down. When pre-commit-timer$_{k-2}$ reaches 0, if $B_{k-2}$ is the only height-$k$ block received, pre-commit $B_{k-2}$ and broadcast $\langle\text{commit}, B_{k-2}, v\rangle$.

4) **(Non-blocking) Commit.** On receiving $\langle\text{commit}, B_k, v\rangle$ from $f+1$ distinct replicas with the same $v$, commit $B_k$ and all its ancestors.

**Fig. 4:** The steady state protocol augmented with the responsive mode.

Let $L$ and $L'$ be the leader of view $v$ and $v + 1$, respectively.

i) **Blame.** If less than $p$ blocks are received from $L$ in $(2p + 1)\Delta$ time in view $v$, broadcast $\langle\text{blame}, v\rangle$. If more than one block is proposed by $L$ at any height ($L$ has equivocated), broadcast $\langle\text{blame}, v\rangle$ and the two equivocated blocks.

ii) **Quit old view.** Upon gathering $f+1$ $\langle\text{blame}, v\rangle$ messages, broadcast them along with $\langle\text{blame2}, v\rangle$, and quits view $v$ (abort all pre-commit-timer(s) and stop voting in view $v$).

iii) **Status.** Upon gathering $f+1$ $\langle\text{blame2}, v\rangle$ messages, Wait for $2\Delta$ time and enter view $v + 1$. Upon entering view $v + 1$, send a highest certified block to $L'$ and transition back to steady state.

**Fig. 5:** The view-change protocol to support the responsive mode.

time $t + \Delta$. In that case, due to the $2\Delta$ wait during view change, $r'$ has received $f + 1$ blame2 messages before time $t - \Delta$. Thus, $f + 1$ replicas have sent blame2 and quit view $v$ before time $t - \Delta$. One of them is honest and prompt at time $t - \Delta$. Thus, at least one replica in the pre-committing set $R$ would be prompt and would have received this blame2 message by time $t$. It would have prevented the pre-commit of $B_l$ at that replica, a contradiction. $

**Lemma 9.** If an honest replica directly commits a block $B_l$ in the responsive mode, then there does not exist $C(B'_l)$ where $B'_l \neq B_l$.

**Proof.** If an honest replica directly commits $B_l$ in the responsive mode of view $v$, it implies two things: (1) that replica has performed a synchronous commit on an ancestor of $B_l$, say $B_k$, that contains a strong certificate to its predecessor, (2) a set $R$ of $d + 1$ honest replicas pre-commit $B_l$ in the responsive mode of view $v$. We will argue why a conflicting certificate does not exist prior to, in, or after view $v$. Firstly, due to Lemma 7, a synchronous commit of $B_k$ rules out any conflicting certificate for $B'_k \neq B_k$ in prior views. So there will not be any conflicting certificate for $B'_l \neq B_l$ in prior views. Secondly, the commit if $B_k$ implies that at most $d$ honest replicas are left behind in the synchronous mode, not enough to produce a conflicting certificate. Meanwhile, a strong certificate for $B'_l \neq B_l$ requires at least $(3n/4 + 1) + (3n/4 + 1) - n = n/2 + 1 = f + 1$ replicas to double-vote at height $l$, which cannot happen. Lastly, by Lemma 8, $f + 1$ honest replica receive $C(B_l)$ before entering view $v + 1$, and there was no conflicting height-$l$ certificate up until then. From then on, the highest certified block of these $f+1$ honest replicas is at least $B_l$, and they will not vote for height-$l$ blocks any more. Thus, no $C(B'_l)$ where $B'_l \neq B_l$ can come into existence in views greater than $v$.

**Safety.** The safety proof remains identical to that of Theorem 3 except that Lemma 7 and Lemma 9 both need to be invoked.

**V. EVALUATION**

In this section, we first evaluate the throughput and latency of Sync HotStuff under different parameters and conditions (batch size, payload, and client command load). We then evaluate the impact of $\Delta$ on throughput and latency and show it is insignificant as expected. Lastly, we compare Sync HotStuff with HotStuff [12] and Dfinity [3].

**A. Implementation Details and Methodology**

We implement the Sync HotStuff protocol under the standard synchrony model. Our implementation is an adaptation of the open-source implementation of HotStuff [12]. We modify the HotStuff code to primarily replace the core protocol logic
while reusing some of its utility modules, such as its event queue and network library.

In our implementation, replicas reach consensus on a sequence of blocks. Each block contains a batch of commands sent by clients. A command consists of a unique identifier and an associated payload. We refer to the maximum number of commands in a block as the batch size. A conceptual representation of a block is shown in Figure 6.

All throughput and latency results were measured from clients which are separate processes running on machines different from those for replicas. Each client generates a number of outstanding commands and broadcasts them to every replica. Replicas only use the unique identifier (e.g. hash) of a command to represent it in proposals and votes. To execute the commands for the replicated state machine, a replica either has the command content received from the client’s initial broadcast, or fetches it from the leader if the client crashes before it finishes the broadcast. We use four machines, each running four client processes, to inject commands into the system. Each client process can maintain a configurable number of outstanding commands at any time. We ensure that the performance of replicas will not be limited by lack of client commands.

**Experimental setup.** All our experiments were conducted over Amazon EC2 where each replica was executed on a c5.4xlarge virtual machine. Each VM had 16 vCPUs supported by Intel Xeon Platinum 8000 processors. All cores sustained a Turbo CPU clock speed up to 3.4GHz. The maximum TCP bandwidth measured by iperf is around 4.9 Gbps, i.e., 0.6 Gigabytes per second. We did not throttle the bandwidth in any run. The network latency between two machines is measured to be less than 1 ms. We used secp256k1 for digital signatures in votes and a certificate consists of a compact array of secp256k1 signatures.

**Baselines.** We compare with two baselines: (i) HotStuff, a partially synchronous protocol, and (ii) Dfinity, a synchronous protocol. We use HotStuff as a baseline because (i) Sync HotStuff shares the same code base as HotStuff enabling a fair comparison, and (ii) HotStuff achieves comparable (sometimes even better) performance to the state-of-the-art partially synchronous BFT implementation [12]. We pick Dfinity as our other baseline because it is the state-of-the-art synchronous BFT protocol. We did not find an implementation of Dfinity’s consensus protocol in its Github repository, so we implemented our own version of Dfinity using our codebase (which should also help ensure a fair comparison). While implementing and evaluating Dfinity, we made several simplifications that are favorable to Dfinity. For instance, it was shown that a malicious leader can exploit a flaw in the original Dfinity design to force unbounded communication complexity [13]. We did not implement the suggested fix to this flaw (and of course we did not exploit this flaw). We assume all leaders in Dfinity are honest, which will improve Dfinity’s theoretical latency from $9\Delta$ to $7\Delta$. We simulate their Verifiable Random Functions (VRF), essentially assuming VRF generation is free in Dfinity. Implementing these extra fixes and mechanisms will only further hurt Dfinity’s performance.

### B. Basic Performance

We first evaluate the basic performance of Sync HotStuff to tolerate $f = 1$ fault for a synchrony bound of $\Delta = 50$ ms. We measure the observed throughput (in number of commands committed/sec, or ops/sec) and end-to-end latency for clients (in ms). We conduct two experiments. The first one fixes the payload and varies batch size (Figure 7a) while the other fixes a batch size and varies the payload size (Figure 7b).

In Figure 7a, each command has a zero-byte payload to demonstrate the overhead induced solely by consensus and state machine replication. We consider three different batch sizes, 100, 400 and 800, represented by the three lines in the throughput-latency graph. In the graph, each point represents the measured throughput and latency for one run with a given “load” by the clients. More specifically, a client process maintains a fixed number of outstanding commands at any moment. When an outstanding command is committed, a new command is immediately issued to keep up with the specified number. We vary the size of the outstanding command pool to simulate different loads. The points at the lower left represent the state where the system is not saturated by client commands. As the load increases, the throughput initially increases without incurring a loss in latency. Finally, after the load saturates the bandwidth, the throughput remains unchanged (or slightly degrades) when clients inject more commands, while the latency goes up. The latency increases because the commands stay in the command pool longer before they are proposed in a block for consensus. For a batch size of 400, we observe that the throughput is saturated at around 280 Kops/sec. There is no further throughput gain when batch size increases from 400 to 800. So in all of our following experiments, we fix our batch size to 400.

We also test how payload size of a command affects performance. Figure 7b shows the performance with three client request/reply payload sizes (in bytes) 0/0, 128/128 and 1024/1024, denoted by “p0”, “p128”, and “p1024”. In addition to the actual payload, each command also contains
Figures 8a and 8b study the effect of varying $\Delta$ on throughput and latency. Each line represents a choice of $f$, denoted by “1”, “8”, “32”, “64”. As expected, we observe that the saturated throughput remains unaffected by different choices of $\Delta$, whereas the latency deviates little from the theoretical $2\Delta$ line. We do note that the latency remains unaffected only when the $\Delta$ bound is conservative, because that is when the time for certifying a block (the $O(\delta)$ terms in our theoretical analysis) is overshadowed by the $2\Delta$ wait. When tolerating a larger number of faults or when deployed on slower network conditions (e.g., consortium blockchains), $\Delta$ should be set appropriately to ensure safety.

D. Scalability and Comparison with Prior Work

We perform an experiment to understand how Sync HotStuff scales as the number of replicas increases. We also compare this with HotStuff and Dfinity. In our baseline, clients issue zero-byte payload commands and saturate the system, without overloading the replicas. We then vary the choice of $f$. Each experiment is repeated five times with the same setup to average out fluctuations. A data point shows the average value, capped by error bars indicating the standard deviation. Since synchronous protocols tolerate one-half faults as against one-third in case of partial synchrony, for the same $f$, the actual number of replicas is $2f + 1$ for Sync HotStuff and Dfinity, whereas it is $3f + 1$ for HotStuff. We would
also like to point out that such comparison is not entirely fair since HotStuff does not assume synchrony. Nevertheless, it is still helpful to understand the performance of Sync HotStuff by comparing it to a state-of-the-art partially synchronous protocol like HotStuff.

Comparison with HotStuff. Figures 10 and 11 show the throughput and latency for two different payload configurations, 0/0 and 1024/1024. We use a batch size of 400 for Sync HotStuff and HotStuff. Generally, the throughput of Sync HotStuff tends to be slightly worse than HotStuff HotStuff. But at more faults, the throughput of Sync HotStuff gets closer to HotStuff HotStuff and in the 1024/1024 case, eventually surpasses HotStuff HotStuff. This is because in both cases the system is bottlenecked by a leader communicating with all other replicas and since Sync HotStuff requires fewer replicas to tolerate $f$ faults, its performance scales better than HotStuff.

Comparison with Dfinity. For Dfinity, we first perform an experiment to determine a good batch sizes that maximize its throughput. The results are shown in Figure 9. We observe that Dfinity requires a batch size of 14000 to reach its peak throughput of $\sim 130$ Kops/sec. The reason why Dfinity requires a much larger batch size is because proposals are made much less frequently at every $2\delta$ time. In contrast, in Sync HotStuff, a new proposal is made every $2\delta \ll 2\Delta$ time, i.e., as soon as the previous proposal has been “processed” (i.e., certified). This allows Sync HotStuff to fully utilize available network bandwidth with much smaller batch sizes.

Figures 10b and 11b show the latency for two different payload configurations, 0/0 and 1024/1024. As can be seen in the figures, the latency of Dfinity varies between 330ms and 400ms. This is much higher than that for Sync HotStuff and is consistent with the expected theoretical average latency as described in Section V-A. We also observe that at $f = 64$, the large batch size we choose for Dfinity violates our $\Delta = 50$ms synchrony bound, leading to safety violations. Hence, our evaluation does not include that data point.

VI. RELATED WORK

Several decades of research on the Byzantine agreement problem [14] brought a myriad of solutions. Dolev and Strong gave a deterministic Byzantine broadcast protocol for $f < n - 1$ [15]. Their protocol achieves $f + 1$ round complexity and $O(n^2f)$ communication complexity. The $f + 1$ round complexity matches the lower bound for deterministic protocols [16], [15]. To further improve round complexity, randomized protocols have been introduced [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22]. We review the most recent and closely related works below.

Some key design goals of Sync HotStuff are inspired by recent related works. In particular, elimination of lock-step synchrony is first explored by Hanke et al. [3] and the mobile sluggish model is introduced by Guo et al. [6]. Compared to these works, Sync HotStuff uses techniques that are significantly simpler and more efficient to achieve the same goals.

Dfinity. The Dfinity Consensus protocol described in [3] is a replication protocol in the synchrony model that tolerates
This results in a large latency of sense, Hanke et al. did not fully remove lock-step execution. The election step is on the critical path and is blocking (in this sense, Hanke et al. did not fully remove lock-step execution.) This results in a large latency of $O(\delta)$.

In comparison, Sync HotStuff removes lock-step execution using a simple and natural protocol (replicas do not vote for conflicting proposals). Sync HotStuff embraces the stable leader approach, common in the partial synchrony SMR (e.g., PBFT [23], Paxos [24]), that uses a steady state leader to drive many decisions. These techniques allow Sync HotStuff to achieve $2\Delta + O(\delta)$ latency and expected quadratic communication complexity.

Guo et al. and PiLi. Guo et al. [6] introduced the mobile sluggish model (called weak synchronous model in that work). This model better reflects reality compared to the standard synchrony model and we adopt it. PiLi [4] presents a BFT SMR protocol in the mobile sluggish model. Its solution is theoretical and highly involved. It assumes lock-step execution in “epochs”. Each epoch lasts for $5\Delta$ time and the protocol commits five blocks after 13 consecutive epochs if certain conditions are met. Thus, PiLi requires a latency of at least $40\Delta - 65\Delta$ ($65\Delta$ for the earliest and $40\Delta$ for the latest of the five blocks). In contrast, we observe that simple techniques suffice to handle mobile sluggish faults at almost no extra overhead.

Thunderella. The notion of optimistic responsiveness (under one-quarter faults) was introduced in Thunderella [5]. Thunderella observes that it is safe to commit a decision in $O(\delta)$ time if $> 3n/4$ votes are received. In this paper, we adopt the key idea of Thunderella to achieve optimistic responsiveness. But we also make two changes. First, when more than $3n/4$ replicas are correct, Thunderella commits a decision after a single round of voting. However, the decision cannot be conveyed to external clients, hence it does not support SMR. Sync HotStuff uses two-phase commit in the responsive path, and hence provides safety for SMR. Second, Thunderella uses the synchronous mode to monitor the progress of the responsive mode and, if it does not make progress quickly, falls back to the synchronous mode. The fallback mechanism is presented in a black-box fashion but it is unclear how it works in a non-Nakamoto-style protocol. In Sync HotStuff, we take the conventional approach of having replicas monitor the progress of the responsive mode, and using the view-change protocol to perform the fallback.

XFT. A different type of protocol with optimistic responsiveness is XFT [25]. XFT guarantees responsiveness when a group of $f + 1$ honest replicas is determined. Thus, when the actual number of faults is $t$, it may take $\binom{n}{t+1}/\binom{t+1}{f+1}$ view changes for an honest group of $f + 1$ to emerge; after that, the protocol is responsive. Such a solution is practical when $f$ is a small constant but for $t = \Theta(n)$, it requires an exponential number of view changes to find an honest group. In comparison, Sync HotStuff and Thunderella are responsive under $t < n/4$ faults after at most $t$ view changes.

VII. CONCLUSION

In this work, we introduce Sync HotStuff, a simple and practical synchronous BFT SMR protocol. Sync HotStuff does not require lock step execution, tolerates mobile sluggish faults, and offers practical performance. As we mentioned, the mobile sluggish fault model captures short network glitches but is not ideal for replicas going offline for too long. It remains interesting future work to come up an even weaker and more realistic synchronous model as well as practical solutions in that model that still tolerate up to minority faults.

REFERENCES


[22] I. Abraham, S. Devadas, D. Dolev, K. Nayak, and L. Ren, “Synchronous byzantine agreement with expected $o(1)$ rounds, expected $o(n^2)$ communication, and optimal resilience,” in Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC), 2019.

