Tight Quantum Security Bound of the 4-Round Luby-Rackoff Construction

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Abstract. The Luby-Rackoff construction, or the Feistel construction, is one of the most important approaches to construct secure block ciphers from secure pseudorandom functions. The 3-round and 4-round Luby-Rackoff constructions are proven to be secure against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPAs) and chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCAs), respectively, in the classical setting. However, Kuwakado and Morii showed that a quantum superposed chosen-plaintext attack (qCPA) can distinguish the 3-round Luby-Rackoff construction from a random permutation in polynomial time. In addition, a recent work by Ito et al. showed a quantum superposed chosen-ciphertext attack (qCCA) that distinguishes the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction. Since Kuwakado and Morii showed the result, it has been a problem of much interest how many rounds are sufficient to achieve the provable security against quantum query attacks. This paper shows the answer to this fundamental question by showing that 4-rounds suffice against qCPAs. Concretely, we prove that the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction is secure up to $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries. We also show that our bound is tight by giving a distinguishing qCPA with $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries. Our result is the first one that shows security of a typical block-cipher construction against quantum query attacks, without any algebraic assumptions. To give security proofs, we introduce a proof technique which is a modification of Zhandry’s compressed oracle technique.

Keywords: symmetric-key cryptography · post-quantum cryptography · provable security · quantum security · quantum chosen plaintext attacks · Luby-Rackoff constructions.

1 Introduction

Post-quantum public-key cryptography has been one of the most active research areas in cryptography research community since Shor developed the polynomial-time integer factoring quantum algorithm \cite{Shor}. NIST is working on a standardization process for post-quantum public-key schemes such as public-key encryption, key-establishment, and digital signature schemes \cite{NIST}.
On the other hand, for symmetric key cryptography, it has been said that the security of symmetric-key schemes would not be much affected by quantum computers. However, a series of recent results has shown that some of them are also broken in polynomial time by using Simon’s algorithm [30] if quantum adversaries have access to quantum circuits that implement keyed primitives [17,19,9,22,28,13,12,11,16], though they are proven or assumed to be secure in the classical setting. Now it is also important to study post-quantum security of symmetric-key schemes.

While many quantum query attacks on symmetric-key schemes have been proposed, the development on post-quantum provable security of symmetric-key schemes is limited. There are two possible post-quantum security notions for symmetric-key schemes: standard security and quantum security [32]. The standard security is the one that assumes adversaries have quantum computers, but have access to keyed oracles in a classical manner. On the other hand, the quantum security is the one that assumes adversaries can make queries to keyed primitives in quantum superpositions. If a scheme is proven to have quantum security, then it will remain secure even in a far future where all computations and communications are done in quantum superpositions. Therefore, it is a problem of much interest whether a classically secure symmetric-key scheme also has quantum security, and if it does, it would also be an interesting question to study the tight quantum security bound of it.

**The Luby-Rackoff construction.** The Luby-Rackoff construction, or the Feistel construction, is one of the most important approaches to construct efficient and secure block ciphers, which are pseudorandom permutations (PRPs), from efficient and secure pseudorandom functions (PRFs). A significant number of block ciphers including popular ones such as DES [24] and Camellia [4] were designed based on this construction.

For families of functions \( f_i := \{f_{i,k} : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \to \{0,1\}^{n/2}\}_{k \in K} \) that are parameterized by \( k \) in a key space \( K \) (\( 1 \leq i \leq r \)), the \( r \)-round Luby-Rackoff construction \( LR_r(f_1, \ldots, f_r) \) is defined as follows: First, keys \( k_1, \ldots, k_r \) are chosen independently and uniformly at random from \( K \). For each input \( x_0 = x_{0L} \parallel x_{0R} \), where \( x_{0L}, x_{0R} \in \{0,1\}^{n/2} \), the state is updated as

\[
x_{(i-1)L} \parallel x_{(i-1)R} \mapsto x_{iL} \parallel x_{iR} := x_{(i-1)R} \oplus f_{i,k_i}(x_{(i-1)L} \parallel x_{(i-1)L})
\]

for \( i = 1, \ldots, r \) in a sequential order (see Fig. 1). The output is the final state \( x_r = x_{rL} \parallel x_{rR} \). Then the resulting function becomes a keyed permutation over \( \{0,1\}^n \) with keys in \( (K)^4 \).

In the classical setting, if each \( f_i \) is a secure PRF, \( LR_r \) becomes a secure PRP against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPAs) for \( r \geq 3 \) and a secure PRP against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCAs) for \( r \geq 4 \) [22], i.e., \( LR_r \) becomes a strong PRP. However, in the quantum setting, Kuwakado and Morii showed that \( LR_3 \) can be distinguished in polynomial time from a truly random permutation by
a quantum superposed chosen-plaintext attack (qCPA). Moreover, the recent work by Ito et al. showed that LR_4 can be distinguished in polynomial time by a quantum superposed chosen-ciphertext attack (qCCA). On the other hand, for any r, no post-quantum security proof of LR_r is known. A very natural question is then whether such a proof is feasible for some r, and if so, to determine the minimum number of r so that we can prove the post-quantum security of LR_r.

1.1 Our Contributions

As the first step to giving post-quantum security proofs for the Luby-Rackoff constructions, this paper shows that the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction LR_4 is secure against qCPAs. In particular, we give a security bound of LR_4 against qCPAs in the case that all round functions are truly random functions, and show that the bound is tight, i.e., we give a matching attack. Concretely, we show the following theorems.

**Theorem 1 (Lower bound and matching attack, informal).** If all round functions are truly random functions, then the following claims hold.

1. LR_4 cannot be distinguished from a truly random permutation by qCPAs up to $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries.
2. There exists a quantum algorithm that distinguishes LR_4 from a truly random permutation with a constant probability by making $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum chosen-plaintext queries.

**Theorem 2 (Construction of PRP from PRF, informal).** Suppose that each $f_i$ is a secure PRF against efficient quantum query attacks, for $1 \leq i \leq 4$. Then LR_4($f_1, f_2, f_3, f_4$) is a secure PRP against efficient qCPAs.

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3 Strictly speaking, the attack by Kuwakado and Morii works only for the case that all round functions are keyed permutations. Kaplan et al. [17] showed that the attack works for more general cases.
Technical details. To give a quantum security proof for LR₄ in the case that all round functions are truly random, we introduce a technique that we call compressed oracle technique with errors, which is a modification of the compressed oracle technique developed by Zhandry [36].

One of the challenging obstacles to give security proofs against quantum superposed query adversaries is that we cannot record transcripts of quantum queries and answers. While it is trivial that we can store query-answer records in the classical setting, it is highly non-trivial to store them in the quantum setting, since measuring or copying (parts of) quantum states will lead to perturbing them, which may be detected by adversaries.

Zhandry’s compressed oracle technique enables us to overcome the obstacle in the case when oracles are truly random functions. The technique is so powerful that it can be used to show quantum indifferentiability of the Merkle-Damgård domain extender and quantum security for the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [36], in addition to the (tight) lower bounds for the multicollision-finding problems [21]. His crucial observation is that we can record queries and answers without affecting quantum states by appropriately forgetting previous records. To check if a previous record is the one that should be forgot, we have to do a “test and forget” procedure after each query.

The compressed oracle technique is a powerful tool, while we see that the “test and forget” procedure is not intuitively and mathematically clear, which would be problematic when we apply it to complex schemes such as the Luby-Rackoff construction. To overcome this issue, we scrutinized the compressed oracle technique, and observed that we can re-formalize the technique without “test and forget” procedures by introducing some errors. This modification enables us to describe properties and behaviors of oracles in an intuitively clear manner. We also explicitly describe error terms, which enables us to give mathematically rigorous proofs. We name the modified version compressed oracle technique with errors. We believe that our modified technique would be useful for other applications. See Section 3 for details on the technique.

By making heavy use of our compressed oracle technique with errors, we complete the security proof of LR₄ against quantum superposed query attacks,
taking advantage of classical proof intuitions to some extent. First, we consider \( LR_3 \), the 3-round Luby-Rackoff construction, which is easy to be distinguished from a truly random permutation, and a slightly modified version of it, where the last-round state update of \( LR_3 \) is modified. Our observation is that it seems hard even for quantum (chosen-plaintext) query adversaries to notice the modification, and we are actually able to show that this is indeed the case. Intuitively, the proof is possible since it is infeasible even for quantum query adversaries to produce collisions on the input of the third round. Second, we prove that a family of random permutations (i.e., a function \( P : \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \times \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \) such that \( P(x, \cdot) \) is a truly random permutation over \( \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \) for each \( x \)) is hard to distinguish from a truly random function. Once we prove these two hardness results, the rest of the proof can be done easily without any argument that is specific to the quantum setting. Our proof is much more complex than the classical one, though, we give rigorous and careful analyses. See Section 4 for details on the security proof of \( LR_4 \).

In contrast to the high complexity of the provable security result, our matching attack is a simple quantum polynomial speed-up of existing classical attacks. See Section 5 for details on the matching attack.

1.2 Related Works

With respect to security proofs against quantum query adversaries for symmetric key schemes other than the ones we introduced above, there is a proof for standard modes of operations by Targhi et al. [3], one for the Carter-Wegman MACs by Boneh and Zhandry [6], one for NMAC by Song and Yun [31], and one for Davies-Meyer and Merkle-Damgård constructions by Hosoyamada and Yasuda [15]. Zhandry showed the PRP-PRF switching lemma in the quantum setting [34], and that quantum-secure PRPs can be constructed from quantum-secure PRFs by using a technique of format preserving encryption [35]. Czajkowski et al. showed that the sponge construction is collapsing (collapsing is a quantum extension of the classical notion of collision-resistance) when round functions are one-way random permutations or functions [11]. Alagic and Russell proved that polynomial time attacks against symmetric-key schemes that make use of Simon’s algorithm can be prevented by replacing XOR operations with modular additions based on an algebraic hardness assumption [1], however, Bonnetain and Naya-Plasencia showed that the countermeasure is not practical [8]. Regarding standard security proofs (against quantum adversaries that make only classical queries) for symmetric-schemes, Mennink and Szepieniec proved security for XOR of PRPs [23].

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4 Note that the condition that the round function of the sponge construction is one-way is unusual in the context of classical symmetric-key provable security.
2 Preliminaries

This section describes notations and definitions. In this paper, any algorithm (or adversary) is supposed to be a quantum algorithm, and makes quantum superposed queries to oracles.

For any finite sets \(X\) and \(Y\), let \(\text{Func}(X, Y)\) denote the set of all functions from \(X\) to \(Y\). For any \(n\)-bit string \(x\), we denote the left half \(n/2\)-bits of \(x\) by \(x_L\) and the right half \(n/2\)-bits by \(x_R\), respectively. We identify the set \(\{0, 1\}^m\) with the set of the integers \(\{0, 1, \ldots, 2^m - 1\}\).

2.1 Quantum Computation

Throughout this paper, we assume that readers have basic knowledge about quantum computation and finite dimensional linear algebra (see textbooks such as [25],[18] for an introduction). We use the computational model of quantum circuits. We measure complexity of quantum algorithms by the number of queries, and the number of basic gates in addition to oracle gates. In this paper, by basic gates we denote the gates in the standard basis of quantum circuits \(Q\) [18]. Let \(\| \cdot \|\) and \(\| \cdot \|_{tr}\) denote the norm of vectors and the trace norm of operators, respectively. In addition, let \(\text{td}(\cdot, \cdot)\) denote the trace distance. For Hermitian operators \(\rho, \sigma\) on a Hilbert space \(\mathcal{H}\), \(\text{td}(\rho, \sigma) = \frac{1}{2}\|\rho - \sigma\|_{tr}\) holds. For a mixed state \(\rho\) of a joint quantum system \(\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B\), let \(\text{tr}_B(\rho)\) (resp., \(\text{tr}_A(\rho)\)) denote the partial trace of \(\rho\) over \(\mathcal{H}_B\) (resp., \(\mathcal{H}_A\)). Moreover, for a pure state \(|\psi\rangle\) of the joint quantum system \(\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B\), we write \(\text{tr}_B(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)\) (resp., \(\text{tr}_A(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)\)) instead of \(\text{tr}_B(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)\) (resp., \(\text{tr}_A(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)\)), for simplicity. Similarly, for a pure state \(|\psi\rangle\) and a mixed state \(\rho\) of a quantum system \(\mathcal{H}\), we write \(\text{td}(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|, \rho)\) and \(\text{td}(\rho, |\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)\) instead of \(\text{td}(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|, \rho)\) and \(\text{td}(\rho, |\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)\), respectively. For an integer \(n \geq 1\), by \(I_n\) and \(H^n\) we denote the identity operator on \(n\)-qubit systems and the \(n\)-qubit Hadamard operator, respectively. If \(n\) is clear from the context, we just write \(I\) instead of \(I_n\), for short. By abuse of notation, for an operator \(V\), we sometimes use the same notation \(V\otimes I\) or \(I \otimes V\) for simplicity, when it will cause no confusion. In addition, for a vector \(|\phi\rangle\) and a positive integer \(m\), we sometimes use the same notation \(|\phi\rangle\otimes |0^m\rangle\) or \(|0^m\rangle \otimes |\phi\rangle\) for simplicity, when it will cause no confusion.

**Quantum oracle query algorithms.** Following previous works (see [5], for example), any quantum oracle query algorithm \(\mathcal{A}\) that makes at most \(q\) queries to oracles is modeled as a sequence of unitary operators \((U_0, \ldots, U_q)\), where each \(U_i\) is a unitary operator on an \(\ell\)-qubit quantum system, for some integer \(\ell\). Here, \(U_0\) can be regarded as the initialization process, and for \(1 \leq i \leq q - 1\), \(U_i\) is the process after the \(i\)-th query. \(U_q\) can be regarded as the finalization process. We only consider quantum algorithms that take no inputs, and we assume that the initial state of \(\mathcal{A}\) is \(|0^\ell\rangle\).
of some distributions. We define the oracles. We consider the situation that $O$ makes at most $q$ queries. Let $\alpha$ be an output $O$ in a sequential order on the initial state $|0\rangle$. (We consider that $O_f$ acts on the first $(m+n)$-qubits of $A$’s quantum register.) Finally, $A$ measures the resulting quantum state $U_q O_f U_{q-1} \cdots O_f U_0 |0\rangle$, and returns the measurement result as the output. $f$ may be chosen according to a distribution at the beginning of each game. Let us denote the event that $A$ runs relative to the oracle $O_f$ and returns an output $\alpha$ by $\alpha \leftarrow A^{O_f()}$ or by $A^{O_f()} \to \alpha$.

**Stateful oracles.** In this paper, we also consider more general cases that quantum oracles are stateful, i.e., oracles have $\ell'$-qubit quantum states for an integer $\ell' \geq 0$\footnote{Here we do not mean that our model captures all reasonable stateful quantum oracles. We use our model of stateful quantum oracles just for intermediate arguments to prove our main results, and the claims of the main results are described in the typical model of stateless oracles.}. In these cases, an oracle $O$ is modeled as a sequence of unitary operators $(O_1, \ldots, O_q)$ that acts on the first $(m+n)$-qubits of $A$’s quantum register in addition to $O$’s quantum register. When we run $A$ relative to the oracle $O$, the unitary operators $U_0 \otimes I_{\ell'}, O_1, \ldots, (U_{q-1} \otimes I_{\ell'}), O_q, (U_q \otimes I_{\ell'})$ act in a sequential order on the initial state $|0\rangle^\ell \otimes |\text{init}_O\rangle$, where $|\text{init}_O\rangle$ is the initial state of $O$. Finally, $A$ measures the resulting quantum state $(U_q \otimes I_{\ell'}) O_q (U_{q-1} \otimes I_{\ell'}) \cdots O_1 (U_0 \otimes I_{\ell'}) |0\rangle^\ell \otimes |\text{init}_O\rangle$, and returns the measurement result as the output. If $O$ has no state and $O_i = O_f$ holds for each $i$, the behavior of $A$ relative to $O$ precisely matches that of $A$ relative to the stateless oracle $O_f$. Thus, our model of stateful oracles is an extension of the typical model of stateless oracles described above. $O$ may be chosen according to a distribution at the beginning of each game. We denote the event that $A$ runs relative to the oracle $O$ and returns an output $\alpha$ by $\alpha \leftarrow A^O()$ or by $A^O() \to \alpha$.

**Quantum distinguishing advantages.** Let $A$ be a quantum algorithm that makes at most $q$ queries, outputs 0 or 1 as the final output, and let $O_1$ and $O_2$ be some oracles. We consider the situation that $O_1$ and $O_2$ are chosen randomly according to some distributions. We define the quantum distinguishing advantage of $A$ by

$$\text{Adv}_{O_1, O_2}^{\text{dist}}(A) := \left| \Pr_{O_1} [A^{O_1()} \to 1] - \Pr_{O_2} [A^{O_2()} \to 1] \right| .$$

When we are interested only in the number of queries and do not consider other complexities such as the number of gates (i.e., we focus on information theoretic adversaries), we use the notation

$$\text{Adv}_{O_1, O_2}^{\text{dist}}(q) := \max_A \left\{ \text{Adv}_{O_1, O_2}^{\text{dist}}(A) \right\},$$

where the maximum is taken over all quantum algorithms that make at most $q$ quantum queries.
Quantum PRF advantages. By RF we denote the quantum oracle of random functions, i.e., the oracle such that a function \( f \in \text{Func}(\{0,1\}^m, \{0,1\}^n) \) is chosen uniformly at random, and an oracle access to \( O_f \) is given to adversaries.

Let \( \mathcal{F} = \{ F_k : \{0,1\}^m \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n \}_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \) be a family of functions. Let us use the same symbol \( \mathcal{F} \) to denote the oracle such that \( k \) is chosen uniformly at random, and an oracle access to \( O_{F_k} \) is given to adversaries. In addition, let \( \mathcal{A} \) be an oracle query algorithm that outputs 0 or 1. Then we define the quantum pseudorandom-function (qPRF) advantage by

\[
\text{Adv}_{qPRF}^F(\mathcal{A}) := \text{Adv}_{\text{dist}}(\mathcal{F}, RF)(\mathcal{A}).
\]

Similarly, we define \( \text{Adv}_{qPRF}^F(q) \) by

\[
\text{Adv}_{qPRF}^F(q) := \max_{\mathcal{A}} \left\{ \text{Adv}_{qPRF}^F(\mathcal{A}) \right\},
\]

where the maximum is taken over all quantum algorithms \( \mathcal{A} \) that make at most \( q \) quantum queries.

Quantum PRP advantages. By RP we denote the quantum oracle of random permutations, i.e., the oracle such that a permutation \( P \in \text{Perm}(\{0,1\}^n) \) is chosen uniformly at random, and an oracle access to \( O_P \) is given to adversaries.

Let \( \mathcal{P} = \{ P_k : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n \}_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \) be a family of permutations. We use the same symbol \( \mathcal{P} \) to denote the oracle such that \( k \) is chosen uniformly at random, and an oracle access to \( O_{P_k} \) is given to adversaries. Let \( \mathcal{A} \) be an oracle query algorithm that outputs 0 or 1, and we define the quantum pseudorandom-permutation (qPRP) advantage by

\[
\text{Adv}_{qPRP}^P(\mathcal{A}) := \text{Adv}_{\text{dist}}(\mathcal{P}, RP)(\mathcal{A}).
\]

Similarly, we define \( \text{Adv}_{qPRP}^P(q) \) by

\[
\text{Adv}_{qPRP}^P(q) := \max_{\mathcal{A}} \left\{ \text{Adv}_{qPRP}^P(\mathcal{A}) \right\},
\]

where the maximum is taken over all quantum algorithms \( \mathcal{A} \) that make at most \( q \) quantum queries.

Security against efficient adversaries. An algorithm \( \mathcal{A} \) is called efficient if it can be realized as a quantum circuit of which the number of basic gates and oracle gates is polynomial in \( n \). A set of functions \( \mathcal{F} \) (resp., a set of permutations \( \mathcal{P} \)) is a quantumly secure PRF (resp., a quantumly secure PRP) if the following properties are satisfied:

1. Uniform sampling \( f \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{F} \) (resp., \( P \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{P} \)) and evaluation of each \( f \) (resp., each \( P \)) can be implemented on quantum circuits of which the number of basic gates is polynomial in \( n \).
2. \( \text{Adv}_{\text{qPRF}}^P(\mathcal{A}) \) (resp., \( \text{Adv}_{\text{qPRP}}^P(\mathcal{A}) \)) is negligible (i.e., for any positive integer \( c \), it is upper bounded by \( n^{-c} \) for all sufficiently large \( n \)) for any efficient algorithm \( \mathcal{A} \).

2.2 The Luby-Rackoff Constructions

The Luby-Rackoff construction [22] is a construction of \( n \)-bit permutations from \( n/2 \)-bit functions by using the Feistel network.

Fix \( r \geq 1 \), and for \( 1 \leq i \leq r \), let \( f_i := \{ f_{i,k} : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2} \}_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \) be a family of functions parameterized by key \( k \) in a key space \( \mathcal{K} \). Then, the Luby-Rackoff construction for \( f_1, \ldots, f_r \) is defined as a family of \( n \)-bit permutations
\[ \text{LR}_r(f_1, \ldots, f_r) := \{ \text{LR}_r(f_{1,k_1}, \ldots, f_{r,k_r}) \}_{k_1, \ldots, k_r \in K} \] with the key space \((K)^r\). For each fixed key \((k_1, \ldots, k_r)\), \(\text{LR}_r(f_{1,k_1}, \ldots, f_{r,k_r})\) is defined by the following procedure: First, given an input \(x_0 \in \{0, 1\}^n\), divide it into \(n/2\)-bit strings \(x_0L\) and \(x_0R\). Second, iteratively update \(n\)-bit states as

\[ (x_{(i-1)L}, x_{(i-1)R}) \mapsto (x_iL, x_iR) := (x_{(i-1)R} \oplus f_{i,k_i}(x_{(i-1)L}), x_{(i-1)L}) \] (4)

for \(1 \leq i \leq r\). Finally, return the final state \(x_r := x_rL \parallel x_rR\) as the output (see Fig. 2).

**Fig. 2.** The 3-round Luby-Rackoff construction.

The resulting function \(\text{LR}_r(f_1, k_1, \ldots, f_r, k_r) : x_0 \mapsto x_r\) becomes an \(n\)-bit permutation owing to the property of the Feistel network. Each \(f_{i,k_i}\) is called the \(i\)-th round function. When we say that an adversary is given an oracle access to \(\text{LR}_r(f_1, \ldots, f_r)\), we consider the situation that keys \(k_1, \ldots, k_r\) are first chosen independently and uniformly at random, and then the adversary runs relative to the stateless oracle \(O_{\text{LR}_r(f_{1,k_1}, \ldots, f_{r,k_r})} : |x\rangle |y\rangle \mapsto |x\rangle |y \oplus \text{LR}_r(f_{1,k_1}, \ldots, f_{r,k_r})(x)\).

When each round function is chosen from \(\text{Func}(\{0, 1\}^{n/2}, \{0, 1\}^{n/2})\) uniformly at random (i.e., each \(f_i\) is the set of all functions \(\text{Func}(\{0, 1\}^{n/2}, \{0, 1\}^{n/2})\) for all \(i\)), we use the notation \(\text{LR}_r\) for short.

### 3 Compressed Oracle Technique with Errors

In many security proofs in the *classical* random oracle model (ROM), they implicitly rely on the fact that transcripts of queries and answers can be recorded. However, such proofs do not necessarily work in the *quantum random oracle model* (QROM) [3], since recording transcripts may significantly perturb quantum states, which might be detected by adversaries. To solve this issue, Zhandry introduced the “compressed oracle technique” [36] to enable us to record transcripts of queries and answers even in QROM.

Zhandry’s technique was originally developed for QROM in which adversaries can make direct queries to random functions, but it can also be applied to the case that adversaries can make queries to random functions only indirectly. In
particular, one may think that the technique is applicable to giving a security
proof for the Luby-Rackoff constructions for the cases that all round functions
are truly random.

However, there is an issue with the technique when we apply it to complex
schemes such as the Luby-Rackoff construction. In this section, we scrutinize the
technique and study how we can modify and re-formalize it to avoid the issue.
We name our modified version the compressed oracle technique with errors. In
later sections, we apply our modified technique to showing the security of the
4-round Luby-Rackoff construction.

In Section 3.1 we give an overview of the original technique by Zhandry, and
describe which part of it can be improved. Then, in Section 3.2 we describe our
modified technique.

3.1 An Overview of the Original Technique

First, Zhandry observed that the oracle \( O_f \) can be implemented with an encoding
of \( f \) and an operator \( stO \) that is independent of \( f \). In this subsection, we consider
that each function \( f: \{0,1\}^m \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n \) is encoded into the \((n^2 m)\)-qubit state
\( |f\rangle = |f(0)\rangle \parallel f(1)\rangle \cdots \parallel f(2^m - 1)\rangle \). The operator \( stO \) is the unitary operator that
acts on \((n + m + n^2 m)\)-qubit states defined as

\[
\text{stO} : |x\rangle |y\rangle |α_0\rangle \cdots |α_{2^m - 1}\rangle \mapsto |x\rangle |y \oplus f(x)\rangle |α_0\rangle \cdots |α_{2^m - 1}\rangle ,
\]

where \( α_x \in \{0,1\}^n \) for each \( 0 \leq x \leq 2^m - 1 \). We can easily confirm that
\( \text{stO} |x\rangle |y\rangle |f\rangle = |x\rangle |y \oplus f(x)\rangle |f\rangle \) holds. Here, we consider that \( |x\rangle |y\rangle \) corre-
sponds to the first \((m + n)\)-qubits of adversaries’ registers.

When \( f \) is chosen uniformly at random and \( A \) runs relative to \( stO \) and \( |f\rangle \)
(i.e., \( A \) runs relative to the quantum oracle of a random function), the whole
quantum state before \( A \) makes the \((i + 1)\)-st quantum query becomes

\[
|φ_{f,i+1}\rangle = (U_i \otimes I)stO(U_{i-1} \otimes I)stO \cdots stO(U_0 \otimes I) |0^f\rangle |f\rangle
\]

with probability \( 1/2^{n^2 m} \). Here, we assume that \( A \) has \( ℓ\)-qubit quantum states.

Random choice of \( f \) can be implemented by first making the uniform super-
position of functions \( \sum_f \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{n^2 m}}} |f\rangle = H^{\otimes n^2 m} |0^{n^2 m}\rangle \) and then measure the state
with the computational basis. So far we have considered that a random function
\( f \) is chosen at the beginning of games, but the output distribution of \( A \) will not
be changed even if we measure the \( |f\rangle \) register at the same time as we measure
\( A \)’s register. Thus, below we consider that all quantum registers including those
of functions are measured only once at the end of each game.

Then the whole quantum state before \( A \) makes the \((i + 1)\)-st quantum query becomes

\[
|φ_{i+1}\rangle = \sum_f |φ_{f,i+1}\rangle = (U_i \otimes I)stO \cdots stO(U_0 \otimes I) \left( |0^f\rangle \otimes \sum_f \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{n^2 m}}} |f\rangle \right).
\]

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Next, we change the basis of the y register and α_i registers in \( |u \rangle \) from the standard computational basis \( \{|u\rangle : u \in \{0,1\}^n \} \) to the one \( \{H^\otimes n |u\rangle : u \in \{0,1\}^n \} \), which is called Fourier basis \(^7\) by Zhandry \[^{36}\]. In what follows, we use the symbol “ \( \sim \) ” to denote the encoding of classical bit strings into quantum states by using the Fourier basis instead of the computational basis, and we ambiguously denote \( H^\otimes n |u\rangle \) by \( |\widetilde{u}\rangle \) for each \( u \in \{0,1\}^n \). Then, it can be easily confirmed that

\[
\text{stO} \, |x\rangle \, |\widetilde{y}\rangle \otimes |\widetilde{\alpha_0}\rangle \cdots |\widetilde{\alpha}_{2^n-1}\rangle = |x\rangle \, |\widetilde{y}\rangle \otimes |\widetilde{\alpha_0}\rangle \cdots |\widetilde{\alpha}_x \oplus \widetilde{y}\rangle \cdots |\widetilde{\alpha}_{2^n-1}\rangle \quad (8)
\]

holds. Intuitively, the direction of data writing changes when we change the basis: When we use the standard computational basis, data is written from the function registers to adversaries’ registers as in (5). On the other hand, when we use the Fourier basis, data is written in the opposite direction as in (8). With the Fourier basis, \( |\phi_{i+1}\rangle \) can be written as

\[
|\phi_{i+1}\rangle = (U_i \otimes I)\text{stO}(U_{i-1} \otimes I)\text{stO} \cdots \text{stO}(U_0 \otimes I) \left( |0^i\rangle \otimes |0^{n2^m}\rangle \right). \quad (9)
\]

Here, note that \( \sum_f |f\rangle = H^\otimes n |0^{n2^m}\rangle = |0^{n2^m}\rangle \) holds. In particular, the register of the functions are initially set as \( |n2^m\rangle \), and at most one data is written (in superpositions) when an adversary makes a query. Thus

\[
|\phi_{i+1}\rangle = \sum_{xyz} a'_{xyz\hat{\theta}} |xyz\rangle \otimes |\hat{\theta}\rangle \quad (10)
\]

holds for some complex numbers \( a'_{xyz\hat{\theta}} \) such that \( \sum_{xyz\hat{\theta}} |a'_{xyz\hat{\theta}}|^2 = 1 \), where each \( x \) is an \( m \)-bit string that corresponds to \( A \)’s query register, \( y \) is an \( n \)-bit string that corresponds to \( A \)’s answer register, \( z \) corresponds to \( A \)’s remaining register, and \( \hat{\theta} = |\alpha_0\rangle \cdots |\alpha_{2^n-1}\rangle \) is a concatenation of \( 2^n \) many \( n \)-bit strings.

Zhandry’s key observation is that, since \( \text{stO} \) adds at most one data to the \( \hat{\theta} \)-register in each query, \( \alpha_x \neq 0^n \) holds for at most \( i \) many \( x \), and thus \( \hat{\theta} \) can be “compressed” to a database with at most \( i \) many entries. (Note that \( \hat{\theta} \) may contain less than \( i \) entries. For example, if a state \( |x\rangle \, |\widetilde{y}\rangle \) is successively queried to \( \text{stO} \) twice, then the database will remain unchanged since \( \text{stO} \cdot \text{stO} = I \).) We use the same notation \( \hat{\theta} \) for the compressed database, and call it compressed Fourier database since now we are using the Fourier basis for \( \hat{\theta} \). Each entry of \( \hat{\theta} \) has the form \( (x, \alpha_x) \), where \( x \in \{0,1\}^m \), \( \alpha_x \in \{0,1\}^n \), and \( \alpha_x \neq 0^n \).

Intuitively, if the compressed Fourier database \( \hat{\theta} \) contains an entry \( (x, \alpha_x) \), it means that \( A \) has queried \( x \) to a random function \( f \) and holds some information about the value \( f(x) \). Hence \( \hat{\theta} \) can be seen as a record of transcripts for queries and answers. However, it is still not clear what kind of information \( A \) has about the value \( f(x) \), since we are now using the Fourier basis. To make it clear, let the Hadamard operator \( H^\otimes n \) act on each \( \alpha_x \) in \( \hat{\theta} \) and obtain another (superposition of) database \( \hat{\theta} \). Then, intuitively, \( \hat{\theta} \) satisfies the condition \( ^{(6)}(x, \alpha_x) \in \hat{\theta} \)

\(^6\) Note that the Hadamard operator \( H^\otimes n \) corresponds to the Fourier transformation over the group \( (\mathbb{Z}/2^2)^\otimes n \).
corresponds to the condition that \( A \) has queried \( x \) to the oracle and gotten the value \( \alpha_x \) in response”. We call \( D \) a compressed standard database.

In summary, Zhandry observed that the quantum random oracle can be described as a stateful quantum oracle \( \text{CstO} \). The whole quantum state of an adversary \( A \) and the oracle just before the \((i + 1)\)st query is

\[
|\phi_{i+1}\rangle = \sum_{xyzD} a_{xyzD} |xyz\rangle \otimes |D\rangle,
\]

where each \( D \) is a compressed standard database which contains at most \( i \) entries. Initially, the database \( D \) is empty. In [36], Zhandry describes that, when \( A \) makes a query \(|x,y\rangle\) to the oracle, \( \text{CstO} \) does the following procedures.

The three procedures of \( \text{CstO} \).

1. Look for a tuple \((x, \alpha_x) \in D\). If one is found, respond with \(|x, y \oplus \alpha_x\rangle\).
2. If no tuple is found, create new registers initialized to the state \( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum \alpha_x |\alpha_x\rangle \).
   Add the registers \((x, \alpha_x)\) to \( D \). Then respond with \(|x, y \oplus \alpha_x\rangle\).
3. Finally, regardless of whether the tuple was found or added, there is now a tuple \((x, \alpha_x)\) in \( D \), which may have to be removed. To do so, test whether the registers containing \( \alpha_x \) contain \( 0^n \) in the Fourier basis. If so, remove the tuple from \( D \). Otherwise, leave the tuple in \( D \).

Intuitively, the first and second steps correspond to the classical lazy sampling, which do the following procedures: When an adversary makes a query \( x \) to the oracle, look for a tuple \((x, \alpha_x)\) in the database. If one is found, respond with \( \alpha_x \) (this part corresponds to the first procedure of \( \text{CstO} \)). If no tuple is found, choose \( \alpha_x \) uniformly at random from \( \{0, 1\}^n \) (this part corresponds to creating the superposition \( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum \alpha_x |\alpha_x\rangle \) in the second procedure of \( \text{CstO} \)), respond with \( \alpha_x \), and add \((x, \alpha_x)\) to the database.

The third “test and forget” step is crucial and specific to the quantum setting. Intuitively, the third step forgets data which is no longer used by the adversary from the database. By appropriately forgetting information, we can record transcripts of queries and answers without perturbing quantum states.

An issue. The above technique by Zhandry is so clever and insightful, but there is a point that can be improved. The third “test and forget” step is crucial to avoid perturbing quantum states, but hard to capture intuitively, and its mathematically explicit description as a unitary operation is not given in the original paper [36]. This would be problematic if we apply the technique to showing security of complex schemes that are composed of multiple random functions. If we apply the technique to such schemes, quantum entanglements

\[\text{We remark that these three-step procedures are a verbatim quotation from the original paper [36] of version 20180814:183812, except that the symbol } y' \text{ and } 0 \text{ are used instead of } \alpha_x \text{ and } 0^n, \text{ respectively, in the original one.}\]

\[\text{Again, here we consider the original paper of version 20180814:183812.}\]
among multiple compressed databases will be extremely complex, where it will be very hard to appropriately operate the “test and forget” procedure to each database. Since unexpected properties often hold in the quantum setting, it is more important to give mathematically rigorous proofs than in the classical setting. Moreover, if we could apply the technique without caring about such procedures, we can give quantum proofs with classical intuitions to a greater extent.

With the above in mind, in the next subsection, we modify Zhandry’s technique so that we can intuitively capture properties of oracles without “test and forget” procedures, while keeping mathematically clear descriptions. Instead of getting rid of the “test and forget” procedure, we introduce some errors when we describe properties of the oracles.

3.2 Our Modified Technique

From now on, we represent each function $f : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ as $(n + 1)2^m$-bit strings $(0\|f(0))\cdot\cdot\cdot(0\|f(2^m − 1))$.

Remember that the whole quantum state before $\mathcal{A}$ makes the $(i + 1)$-st query is described as

\[ |\phi_{i+1}\rangle = (U_i \otimes I)\text{stO}(U_{i−1} \otimes I)\text{stO} \cdot \cdot \cdot \text{stO}(U_0 \otimes I) \left( |0^i\rangle \otimes \sum_f \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{n2^m}}} |f\rangle \right). \]  

(12)

At each query, unlike the original technique that adds/deletes at most one entry to/from each database, we first “decode” superpositions of databases to superpositions of functions when an adversary makes a query, secondly respond to the adversary, and finally “encode” again superpositions of functions to superpositions of databases. Below we describe our encoding.

Encoding functions to databases: Intuitive descriptions. Modifying the idea of Zhandry, we apply the following operations to the $|f\rangle$-register of $|\phi_{i+1}\rangle$.

1. Let the Hadamard operator $H^\otimes n$ act on the $f(x)$ register for all $x$. Now the state becomes

\[ \sum_{xyz\tilde{D}} a'_{xyz\tilde{D}} |xyz\rangle \otimes |\tilde{D}\rangle \]  

for some complex numbers $a'_{xyz\tilde{D}}$, where each $\tilde{D} = (0\|\tilde{\alpha}_0)\cdot\cdot\cdot(0\|\tilde{\alpha}_{2^m−1})$ is a concatenation of $2^m$ many $(n + 1)$-bit strings, and $\tilde{\alpha}_x \neq 0^n$ at most $i$-many $x$.

2. For each $x$, if $\tilde{\alpha}_x \neq 0^n$, flip the bit just before $\tilde{\alpha}_x$. Now each $\tilde{D}$ changes to the bit strings $(b_0\|\tilde{\alpha}_0)\cdot\cdot\cdot(\tilde{b}_{2^m−1}\|\tilde{\alpha}_{2^m−1})$, where $b_x \in \{0, 1\}$, and $b_x = 1$ if and only if $\tilde{\alpha}_x \neq 0^n$. 

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3. For each \( x \in \{0, 1\}^n \), let the \( n \)-bit Hadamard transformation \( H^{\otimes n} \) act on \( |\tilde{\alpha}_x\rangle \) if and only if \( b_x = 1 \). Then the quantum state becomes

\[
|\psi_{i+1}\rangle := \sum_{xyzD} a_{xyzD} |xyz\rangle \otimes |D\rangle
\]

for some complex numbers \( a_{xyzD} \), where each \( D \) is a concatenation of \( 2^m \)
many \((n + 1)\)-bit strings \((b_0||\alpha_0)||\cdots||\alpha_2^{m-1}\) such that \( b_x \neq 0 \) holds
for at most \( i \) many \( x \), and intuitively \( b_x \neq 0 \) means that \( A \) has queried \( x \) to
a random function \( f \) and has information that \( f(x) = \alpha_x \).

**Encoding functions to databases: Formal descriptions.** The above three
operations can be formally realized as actions of unitary operators on \(|f\rangle\)-registers.
The first one is realized as \( I \mathcal{H} := (I_1 \otimes H^{\otimes n})^{\otimes 2^m} \). The second one is realized as
\( U_{\text{toggle}} := (I_1 \otimes |0^n\rangle \langle 0^n| + X \otimes (I_n - |0^n\rangle \langle 0^n|))^{\otimes 2^m} \), where \( X \) is the 1-qubit
operator such that \( X |0\rangle = |1\rangle \) and \( X |1\rangle = |0\rangle \). The third one is realized by the
operator \( \mathcal{C}H := (CH^{\otimes n})^{\otimes 2^m} \), where \( CH := |0\rangle \langle 0| \otimes I_n + |1\rangle \langle 1| \otimes H^{\otimes n} \).

We call the action of unitary operator \( U_{\text{enc}} := \mathcal{C}H \cdot U_{\text{toggle}} \cdot I \mathcal{H} \) and its conjugate
\( U_{\text{enc}}^* \) encoding and decoding, respectively. By using our encoding and decoding,
the compressed standard oracle with errors is defined as follows.

**Definition 1 (Compressed standard oracle with errors).** The compressed
standard oracle with errors is the stateful quantum oracle such that queries are
processed with the unitary operator \( \text{CstOE} \) defined by \( \text{CstOE} := (I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}) \cdot \text{stO} \cdot
(I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}^*) \).

Note that \( |\psi_{i+1}\rangle = (U_i \otimes I) \text{CstOE}(U_{i-1} \otimes I) \text{CstOE} \cdots \text{CstOE}(U_0 \otimes I)(|0^i\rangle \otimes
|0^{(n+1)2^m}\rangle) \) and \( |\phi_{i+1}\rangle = (I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}^*) |\psi_{i+1}\rangle \) hold for each \( i \).

Next, we introduce some notations related to our compressed standard oracle
with errors, which are required to describe properties of \( \text{CstOE} \).

**Notations related to \( \text{CstOE} \).** We call a bit string \( D = (b_0||\alpha_0)||\cdots||\alpha_2^{m-1}, \) where \( b_x \in \{0, 1\} \) and \( \alpha_x \in \{0, 1\}^n \) for each \( x \in \{0, 1\}^m \), is
a valid database if \( \alpha_x \neq 0^n \) holds only if \( b_x \neq 0 \). We call \( D \) an invalid database
if it is not a valid database. Note that, in a valid database, \( b_x \) can be 0 or 1 if
\( \alpha_x = 0^n \). We identify a valid database \( D \) with the partially defined function from
\( \{0, 1\}^m \) to \( \{0, 1\}^n \) of which value on \( x \in \{0, 1\}^m \) is defined to be \( y \) if and only if
\( b_x \neq 0 \) and \( \alpha_x = y \). We use the same notation \( D \) for this function. Moreover, we
identify \( D \) with the set \( \{(x, D(x))\}_{x \in \text{dom}(D)} \subset \{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^n \). We say that an
entry of \( x \) is in \( D \) if \( (x, y) \in D \) for some \( y \). Unless otherwise noted, we always
assume that \( D \) is valid.

We say that a valid database \( D \) is compatible with a function \( f : \{0, 1\}^m \to
\{0, 1\}^n \) if \( D(x) = f(x) \) holds for each \( x \) in the domain of \( D \). For each valid

\[ \text{Actually the idea of toggle is noted by Zhandry in the original paper [36], but there is no formalization about it. Moreover, it was described with “test and forget” procedures and without any errors.} \]
database $D$, let $\text{comp}(D)$ denote the set of functions that are compatible with $D$.

If $\| |\psi⟩ - |\psi'⟩ \|$ is in $O(\epsilon)$ for two vectors $|\psi⟩, |\psi'⟩$, and some parameter $\epsilon$ (which will be a function of $n$ in later applications), then we say that $|\psi⟩$ is equal to $|\psi'⟩$ with an error in $O(\epsilon)$, or just write $|\psi⟩ = |\psi'⟩$ with an error in $O(\epsilon)$.

The following proposition describes the core properties of $\text{CstOE}$.

**Proposition 1 (Core Properties).** Let $D$ be a valid database. Then, the following properties hold.

1. Suppose that $|D| \leq i$ holds. Then

$$U^*_{\text{enc}} |D⟩ = \sum_{f \in \text{comp}(D)} \sqrt{\frac{1}{|\text{comp}(D)|}} |f⟩$$

holds with an error in $O(\sqrt{i^2/2n})$.

2. Suppose that there is no entry of $x$ in $D$. Then, for any $y$,

$$\text{CstOE} |x⟩ |y⟩ \otimes |D \cup (x, \alpha)⟩ = |x⟩ |y \oplus \alpha⟩ \otimes |D \cup (x, \alpha)⟩$$

with an error in $O(1/\sqrt{2^n})$. More precisely,

$$\text{CstOE} |x, y⟩ \otimes |D \cup (x, \alpha)⟩ = |x, y \oplus \alpha⟩ \otimes |D \cup (x, \alpha)⟩ + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x⟩ |\hat{0}^n⟩ \otimes \left( 2 \sum_{\delta \in \{0, 1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x, \delta)⟩ - |D⟩ \right)$$

holds, where $|D^\text{invalid}_\gamma⟩$ is a superposition of invalid databases for each $\gamma$, and $|\hat{0}^n⟩ = H^{\otimes n} |0^n⟩$.

3. Suppose that there is no entry of $x$ in $D$. Then, for any $y$,

$$\text{CstOE} |x⟩ |y⟩ \otimes |D⟩ = \sum_{\alpha \in \{0, 1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \alpha⟩ \otimes |D \cup (x, \alpha)⟩$$

with an error in $O(1/\sqrt{2^n})$. To be more precise,

$$\text{CstOE} |x⟩ |y⟩ \otimes |D⟩ = \sum_{\alpha \in \{0, 1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \alpha⟩ \otimes |D \cup (x, \alpha)⟩$$
\[
|\hat{0}\rangle_n = \mathcal{H} \otimes |0\rangle^n.
\]

Proposition 1 can be shown by straightforward calculations. For completeness, a proof of Proposition 1 is given in Section A in the appendix.

An intuitive interpretation of Proposition 1. The first property is a subsidiary one, which would be useful in later applications. When we ignore error terms, the second and third properties correspond to the first and second procedures of \(\text{CstO}\), respectively: When an adversary makes a query \(x\) to the oracle, \(\text{CstOE}\) looks for a tuple \((x, \alpha)\) in the database. If one is found, respond with \(\alpha\) (the second property in the above proposition). If no tuple is found, create the superposition \(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{x} |x, \alpha_x\rangle\), respond with \(\alpha_x\), and add \((x, \alpha_x)\) to the database (the third property in the above proposition).

Note that we do not need any “test and forget” procedure to describe the second and third properties in Proposition 1. Thus we can intuitively capture time evolutions of databases with only the (classical) lazy-sampling-like arguments. When we apply the original technique, we have to strictly care the three procedures of \(\text{CstO}\) since, while they give the properties of \(\text{CstO}\), they also describe the definition of \(\text{CstO}\). On the other hand, the definition of \(\text{CstOE}\) is clearly given as a unitary operator (Definition 1), and it is not mandatory to use the properties in Proposition 1.

To get rid of the “test and forget” procedure, we have to introduce some errors. The error increases as the number of adversaries’ queries \(q\) increases, but it remains negligible as long as \(q \ll 2^n/2\). Thus the error will not be problematic when we focus on the situation \(q \ll 2^n/2\), which is the case for showing the (tight) security bound of the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction.

In later applications, similarly to classical proofs, we introduce good and bad transcripts. The explicit formulas of the second and third properties will be used to show that, intuitively, adversaries cannot distinguish two oracles if transcripts are “good”. Moreover, the first property and the descriptions with errors of the second and third properties will be used to show that the probability that transcripts become “bad” is negligible.

4 Security Proofs

The goal of this section is to show the following theorem, which gives the quantum query lower bound for the problem of distinguishing the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction \(\text{LR}_4\) from random permutations \(\text{RP}\), in the case that all round functions are truly random functions.
Theorem 3. Let $q$ be a positive integer. Let $A$ be an adversary that makes at most $q$ quantum queries. Then,

$$\text{Adv}_{LR_4}^{\text{PRP}}(A) \leq O\left(\sqrt{\frac{q^3}{2^{n/2}}}\right)$$

holds.

Since we can efficiently simulate truly random functions against efficient quantum algorithms [33], the following corollary follows from Theorem 3.

Corollary 1. Let $f_i$ be a quantumly secure PRF for each $1 \leq i \leq 4$. Then, the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction $LR_4(f_1, f_2, f_3, f_4)$ is a quantumly secure PRP.

To the end of this section, we assume that all round functions in the Luby-Rackoff constructions are truly random functions, and we focus on the number of queries when we consider computational resources of adversaries. To have a good intuition on our proof in the quantum setting, it would be better to intuitively capture how $LR_3$ is proven to be secure against classical CPAs, how the quantum attack on $LR_3$ works, and what problem will be hard even for quantum adversaries. Thus, before giving a formal proof for the above theorem, in what follows we give some observations about these things, and then explain where to start.

An overview of a classical security proof for $LR_3$. Here we give an overview of a classical proof for the security of $LR_3$ against chosen plaintext attacks in the classical setting. For simplicity, we consider a proof for PRF security of $LR_3$.

Let $\text{bad}_2$ be the event that an adversary makes two distinct plaintext queries $(x_{0L}, x_{0R}) \neq (x'_{0L}, x'_{0R})$ to the real oracle $LR_3$ such that the corresponding inputs $x_{1L}$ and $x'_{1L}$ to the second round function $f_2$ are equal, i.e., inputs to $f_2$ collide. In addition, let $\text{bad}_3$ be the event that inputs to $f_3$ collide, and define $\text{bad} := \text{bad}_2 \lor \text{bad}_3$.

If $\text{bad}_2$ (resp., $\text{bad}_3$) does not occur, then the right-half (resp., left-half) $n/2$ bits of $LR_3$’s outputs cannot be distinguished from truly random $n/2$-bit strings. Thus, unless the event $\text{bad}$ occurs, adversaries cannot distinguish $LR_3$ from random functions.

If the number of queries of an adversary $A$ is at most $q$, we can show that the probability that the event $\text{bad}$ occurs when $A$ runs relative to the oracle $LR_3$ is in $O(q^2/2^{n/2})$. Thus we can deduce that $LR_3$ is indistinguishable from a random function up to $O(2^{n/4})$ queries.

Quantum chosen plaintext attack on $LR_3$. Next, we give an overview of the quantum chosen plaintext attack on $LR_3$ by Kuwakado and Morii [19]. Note that we consider the setting that adversaries can make quantum superposition queries. The attack distinguishes $LR_3$ from a random permutation with only $O(n)$ queries.
Fix $\alpha_0 \neq \alpha_1 \in \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ and for $i = 0, 1$, define $g_i : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ by $g_i(x) = (LR_3(\alpha_i, x))_R \oplus \alpha_i$, where $(LR_3(\alpha_i, x))_R$ denote the right half $n/2$-bits of $LR_3(\alpha_i, x)$. In addition, define $G : \{0,1\} \times \{0,1\}^{n/2} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ by $G(b, x) = g_b(x)$. Then, it can be easily confirmed that $g_0(x) = g_1(x \oplus s)$ holds for any $x \in \{0,1\}^{n/2}$, where $s = f_1(\alpha_0) \oplus f_1(\alpha_1)$. Thus $G(b, x) = G((b, x) \oplus (1, s))$ holds for any $b$ and $x$, i.e., the function $G$ has the period $(1, s)$.

If we can make quantum superposed queries to $G$, then we can find the period $(1, s)$ by using Simon’s period finding algorithm, making $O(n)$ queries to $G$. In fact $G$ can be implemented on an oracle-querying quantum circuit $C^{LR_3}$ by making $O(1)$ queries to $LR_3$.\footnote{Here we have to implement truncation of outputs of $O$ without destroying quantum states, which is pointed out to be non-trivial in the quantum setting. However, it has been shown that this “truncation” issue can be overcome by using a technique observed in \cite{14}.}

Roughly speaking, Simon’s algorithm outputs the periods with a high probability by making $O(n)$ queries if applied to periodic functions, and outputs the result that “this function is not periodic” if applied to functions without periods.

If we are given the oracle of a random permutation $RP$, the circuit $C^{RP}$ will implement an almost random function, which does not have any period with a high probability. Thus, if we run Simon’s algorithm on $C^{RP}$, with a high probability, it does not output any period. Therefore, we can distinguish $LR_3$ from $RP$ by checking if Simon’s period finding algorithm outputs a period.

**Observation: Why the classical proof does not work?** Here we give an observation about the reason why quantum adversaries can distinguish $LR_3$ from random permutations even though $LR_3$ is proven to be indistinguishable from a random permutation in the classical setting.

We observe that quantum adversaries can make the event $bad_0$ occur: Once we find the period $1 \| s = 1 \| f_1(\alpha_0) \oplus f_2(\alpha_1)$ given the real oracle $LR_3$, we can force collisions on the input of $f_2$. Concretely, take $x \in \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ arbitrarily and set $(x_{0L}, x_{0R}) := (\alpha_0, x)$, $(x'_{0L}, x'_{0R}) := (\alpha_1, x \oplus s)$. Then the corresponding inputs to $f_2$ become $f_1(\alpha_0) \oplus x$ for both plaintexts. Thus the classical proof idea does not work in the quantum setting.

**Quantum security proof for $LR_4$: The idea.** As we explained above, the essence of the quantum attack on $LR_3$ is finding collisions for inputs to the second round function $f_2$. On the other hand, it seems difficult to make collisions for inputs to the third round function $f_3$ even for quantum (chosen-plaintext) query adversaries.

Having these observations, our idea is that it would be hard even for quantum adversaries to notice that the third state update $(x_{2L}, x_{2R}) \mapsto (x_{2R} \oplus f_3(x_{2L}), x_{2L})$ of $LR_3$ is modified as $(x_{2L}, x_{2R}) \mapsto (F(x_{2L}, x_{2R}), x_{2L})$, where $F : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \times \{0,1\}^{n/2} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ is a random function. We denote this modified function by $LR'_3$ (see Fig.\footnote{Here we have to implement truncation of outputs of $O$ without destroying quantum states, which is pointed out to be non-trivial in the quantum setting. However, it has been shown that this “truncation” issue can be overcome by using a technique observed in \cite{14}.}), and begin with showing that it is hard to distinguish $LR'_3$ from $LR_3$.\footnote{Here we have to implement truncation of outputs of $O$ without destroying quantum states, which is pointed out to be non-trivial in the quantum setting. However, it has been shown that this “truncation” issue can be overcome by using a technique observed in \cite{14}.}
We will show it by combining the classical proof idea and our compressed oracle technique with errors. Roughly speaking, we define “bad” databases to be the ones that contain “collisions at inputs to the third round function”. Then we show that the probability that we measure bad databases is very small, and that adversaries cannot distinguish $LR'_3$ from $LR_3$ when databases are not bad.

Next, let $\text{FamP}(\{0,1\}^{n/2})$ be the set of functions $F : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \times \{0,1\}^{n/2} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ such that $F(x, \cdot)$ is a permutation for each $x$. If $P$ is chosen uniformly at random from $\text{FamP}(\{0,1\}^{n/2})$, we say that $P$ is a family of random permutations, or shortly FRP. Then, we intuitively see that it is hard to distinguish FRP from a random function RF from $\{0,1\}^n$ to $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ (i.e., an optimal strategy would be finding a kind of collision for RF, which requires $\approx (2^{n/2})^{1/3} = 2^{n/6}$ queries for quantum adversaries).

Once we show the above two properties, i.e.,
1. $LR'_3$ is hard to distinguish from $LR_3$, and
2. FRP is hard to distinguish from RF,
we can prove Theorem 3 with simple and easy arguments. In other words, showing those two properties are technically the most difficult parts in our proof for Theorem 3.

Organization of the rest of Section 4. Section 4.1 shows that $LR'_3$ is hard to distinguish from $LR_3$. Section 4.2 shows that FRP is hard to distinguish from RF. Section 4.3 proves Theorem 3 by combining the results in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.

### 4.1 Hardness of Distinguishing $LR'_3$ from $LR_3$

Here we show the following proposition.

**Proposition 2.** Let $q$ be a positive integer. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary that makes at most $q$ quantum queries. Then,

$$
\text{Adv}_{\text{dist}}^{LR_3, LR'_3} (\mathcal{A}) \leq O \left( \sqrt[3]{\frac{q^3}{2^{n/2}}} \right)
$$

holds.

First, let us discuss the behavior of the quantum oracles of $LR_3$ and $LR'_3$. 


Quantum oracle of LR₃. Let \( O_{f_i} \) denote the quantum oracle of each round function \( f_i \). In addition, let us define the unitary operator \( O_{\text{UP},i} \) that computes the state update of the \( i \)-th round by

\[
O_{\text{UP},i} : |x_{(i-1)L}, x_{(i-1)R}| |y_L, y_R\rangle \\
\quad \mapsto |x_{(i-1)L}, x_{(i-1)R}| ((y_L, y_R) \oplus (f_i(x_{(i-1)L}) \oplus x_{(i-1)R}, x_{(i-1)L})) \rangle.
\]

\( O_{\text{UP},i} \) can be implemented by making one query to \( f_i \) (see Fig. 4).

\[
\begin{aligned}
|y_R\rangle & \quad |y_R \oplus x_{(i-1)y}\rangle \\
|y_L\rangle & \quad |y_L \oplus f_i(x_{(i-1)L}) \oplus x_{(i-1)y}\rangle \\
|x_{(i-1)L}\rangle & \quad |x_{(i-1)L}\rangle \\
|x_{(i-1)y}\rangle & \quad |x_{(i-1)y}\rangle
\end{aligned}
\]

Fig. 4. Implementation of \( O_{\text{UP},i} \). \( f_i \) will be implemented by using the compressed standard oracle with errors.

Now \( O_{LR_3} \) can be implemented as follows by using \( \{O_{\text{UP},i}\}_{1 \leq i \leq 3} \):

1. Take \( |x\rangle |y\rangle = |x_{0L}, x_{0R}\rangle |y_L, y_R\rangle \) as an input.
2. Compute the state \( (x_{1L}, x_{1R}) \) by querying \( |x_{0L}, x_{0R}\rangle |0^n\rangle \) to \( O_{\text{UP},1} \), and obtain

\[
|x_{0L}, x_{0R}\rangle |y_L, y_R\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle.
\] (20)

3. Compute the state \( (x_{2L}, x_{2R}) \) by querying \( |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle |0^n\rangle \) to \( O_{\text{UP},2} \), and obtain

\[
|x_{0L}, x_{0R}\rangle |y_L, y_R\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle \otimes |x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle.
\] (21)

4. Query \( |x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle |y_L, y_R\rangle \) to \( O_{\text{UP},3} \), and obtain

\[
|x\rangle |y \oplus LR_3(x)\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle \otimes |x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle.
\] (22)

5. Uncompute Steps 2 and 3 to obtain

\[
|x\rangle |y \oplus LR_3(x)\rangle.
\] (23)

6. Return \( |x\rangle |y \oplus LR_3(x)\rangle \).

The above implementation is illustrated in Fig. 5.

Quantum oracle of LR′₃. The quantum oracle of LR′₃ is implemented in the same way as LR₃, except that the third round state update oracle \( O_{\text{UP},3} \) is replaced with another oracle \( O'_{\text{UP},3} \) defined as

\[
O'_{\text{UP},3} : |x_{2L}, x_{2R}| |y_L, y_R\rangle \mapsto |x_{2L}, x_{2R}| ((y_L, y_R) \oplus (F(x_{2L}, x_{2R}) \oplus x_{2R}, x_{2L}))\rangle.
\]
Fig. 5. Implementation of LR\(_3\).

Fig. 6. Implementation of \(O'_{\text{UP},3}\). \(F\) will be implemented by using the compressed standard oracle with errors.

\(O'_{\text{UP},3}\) is implemented by making one query to \(O_F\), i.e., the quantum oracle of \(F\) (see Fig. 6).

Below, we show the claim of the proposition by applying the compressed oracle technique with errors to \(f_1, f_2, f_3,\) and \(F\). We consider that the oracles of these functions are implemented as the compressed standard oracles with errors, and we use \(D_1, D_2, D_3,\) and \(D_F\) to denote (valid) databases for \(f_1, f_2, f_3,\) and \(F,\) respectively. In particular, after the \(i\)-th query of an adversary to \(LR_3,\) the joint quantum states of the adversary and functions can be described as

\[
\sum_{xyzD_1D_2D_3} a_{xyzD_1D_2D_3} |xyz\rangle \otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2\rangle |D_3\rangle
\]

for some complex numbers \(a_{xyzD_1D_2D_3}\) such that \(\sum_{xyzD_1D_2D_3} |a_{xyzD_1D_2D_3}|^2 = 1.\) Here, \(x, y,\) and \(z\) correspond to the adversary’s query, answer, and output registers, respectively. (If the oracle is \(LR_3'\), then the registers \(|D_3\rangle,\) which corresponds to \(f_3,\) are replaced with \(|D_F\rangle,\) which corresponds to \(F\).)

Next, we define good and bad databases for \(LR_3\) and \(LR_3'.\) Intuitively, we say that a tuple \((D_1, D_2, D_3)\) (resp., \((D_1, D_2, D_F)\)) for \(LR_3\) (resp., \(LR_3'\)) is bad if and only if it contains the information that some inputs to \(f_3\) (resp., the left halves of some inputs to \(F\)) collide. Roughly speaking, we define good and bad databases in such a way that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between good databases for \(LR_3\) and those for \(LR_3',\) so that adversaries will not be able to distinguish \(LR_3'\) from \(LR_3\) as long as databases are good.

**Good and bad databases for LR\(_3\).** Here we introduce the notion of *good* and *bad* for each tuple \((D_1, D_2, D_3)\) of valid database for \(LR_3.\) We say that
that a state vector \( |\psi\rangle \) is good if, for each entry \((x_{2L}, \gamma) \in D_3\), there exists exactly one pair \((x_{0L}, \alpha), (x_{1L}, \beta) \) \(\in D_1 \times D_2\) such that \(\beta \oplus x_{0L} = x_{2L}\). We say that \((D_1, D_2, D_3)\) is bad if it is not good.

**Good and bad databases for LR'.** Next we introduce the notion of good and bad for each tuple \((D_1, D_2, D_F)\) of valid database for LR'. We say that a valid database \(D_F\) is without overlap if each pair of distinct entries \((x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \gamma)\) and \((x_{2L}', x_{2R}', \gamma')\) in \(D_F\) satisfies \(x_{2L} \neq x_{2L}'\). We say that \((D_1, D_2, D_F)\) is good if \(D_F\) is without overlap, and for each entry \((x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \gamma) \in D_F\), there exists exactly one pair \(((x_{0L}, \alpha), (x_{1L}, \beta)) \in D_1 \times D_2\) such that \(\beta \oplus x_{0L} = x_{2L}\) and \(x_{2R} = x_{1L}\). We say that \((D_1, D_2, D_F)\) is bad if it is not good.

**Compatibility of \(D_F\) with \(D_3\).** Let \(D_F\) be a valid database for \(F\) without overlap, and \(D_3\) be a valid database for \(f_3\). We say that \(D_F\) is compatible with \(D_3\) if the following conditions are satisfied:

1. If \((x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \gamma) \in D_F\), then \((x_{2L}, x_{2R} \oplus \gamma) \in D_3\).
2. If \((x_{2L}, \gamma) \in D_3\), there is a unique \(x_{2R}\) and \((x_{2L}, x_{2R}, x_{2R} \oplus \gamma) \in D_F\).

For each valid \(D_F\) without overlap, there exists the unique valid database for \(f_3\), which we denote by \([D_F]\_3\).

**Remark 1.** For each good database \((D_1, D_2, D_3)\) for LR_3, there exists a unique \(D_F\) without overlap such that \([D_F]\_3 = D_3\) and \((D_1, D_2, D_F)\) is a good database for LR', by definition of good databases. Similarly, for each good database \((D_1, D_2, D_F)\) for LR', \((D_1, D_2, [D_F]\_3)\) becomes a good database for LR_3.

Next we define regular and irregular quantum states for the oracles \(O_{LR_3}\) and \(O_{LR}\). Roughly speaking, we will treat irregular states as some small error terms, and focus on regular states.

**Regular and irregular states of oracles.** Recall that, in addition to database registers, the quantum oracle \(O_{LR_3}\) uses ancillary 2n-qubit registers to compute intermediate state after the first and second rounds (see [21] and [22]). We say that a state vector \(|D_1\rangle |D_2\rangle |D_3\rangle |x_1 \rangle \otimes |x_2 \rangle\) for \(O_{LR_3}\), where \(|x_1 \rangle \otimes |x_2 \rangle\) is the ancillary 2n qubits, is irregular if \(x_1 \neq 0^n \vee x_2 \neq 0^n\) holds, or at least one of the three databases, \(D_1\), \(D_2\), or \(D_3\), is invalid. We say that the state vector is regular if it is not irregular. We define regular and irregular states for \(O_{LR}\) similarly.

Next we define some modified versions of LR_3 and LR', which we denote by LR_3-det and LR'-det, respectively (“det” is an abbreviation of “detection of bad database”).
The oracles $LR_3$-det and $LR'_3$-det. The oracle $LR_3$-det is defined in the same way as $LR_3$, except that the oracle checks whether the database is bad (or the state of the oracle is irregular) after each query, and writes the result to an additional qubit. Note that we define regular and irregular states for $LR_3$-det in the same way as for $LR_3$. Additional qubits are prepared before an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ runs ($q$ additional qubits are sufficient if $\mathcal{A}$ is a $q$ query adversary). If $i \neq j$, the results of “detection of bad database” for the $i$-th and $j$-th queries are written in distinct qubits.

Intuitively, $LR_3$-det behaves as follows when $\mathcal{A}$ makes the $i$-th query:

1. Check if the $j$-th additional qubit is 1 for $1 \leq j \leq i - 1$ (i.e., check if the database has been bad before the $i$-th query). If so, do nothing. If not, go to the next step.
2. Make a query to $O_{LR_3}$.
3. Check if the database is bad, or the quantum state of $O_{LR_3}$ is irregular. If so, flip the $i$-th additional qubit.

Next, we formally explain how the above procedures can be realized as a unitary operator. Let $\Pi_{bad}$ be the projection to the space spanned by the vectors of bad databases, and irregular state vectors. In addition, let $\Pi_{flipped}^{i-1}$ be the projection onto the space spanned by the vectors such that the $j$-th additional qubit is 1 for some $1 \leq j \leq i - 1$, and irregular state vectors.

Formally, for the $i$-th query, the behavior of the quantum oracle of $LR_3$-det is described by the unitary operator

\[
O_{LR_3\text{-det}} := (\Pi_{bad} \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes X + (I - \Pi_{bad}) \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes I_1) \cdot (O_{LR_3} \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes I_1) \cdot ((I - \Pi_{flipped}^{i-1}) \otimes I_1)
\]

\[
+ \Pi_{flipped}^{i-1} \otimes I_1,
\]

where $I_{i-1}$ is the identity operator which acts on the first $(i-1)$ additional qubits, in addition that $I_1$ and $X$ are the identity operator and the operator such that $X|0\rangle = |1\rangle$ and $X|1\rangle = |0\rangle$, respectively, which act on the $i$-th additional qubit.

$LR'_3$-det is constructed from $LR'_3$ in the same way as $LR_3$-det is constructed from $LR_3$-det as above. The behaviors of the oracles of $LR'_3$-det and $LR_3$-det depend on $i$, though for simplicity, we always use the notations $O_{LR'_3\text{-det}}$ and $O_{LR_3\text{-det}}$ without $i$.

Below we first show that $LR_3$-det is hard to distinguish from $LR'_3$-det, and second show that $LR_3$-det (resp., $LR'_3$-det) is hard to distinguish from $LR_3$ (resp., $LR'_3$).

Hardness of distinguishing $LR_3$-det from $LR'_3$-det. Let $|\psi_i\rangle$ and $|\psi'_i\rangle$ be the state just before the $i$-th query to $LR_3$-det and $LR'_3$-det, respectively. By abuse of notation, we let $|\psi_{(q+1)}\rangle$, $|\psi'_{(q+1)}\rangle$ denote the quantum states $(U_q \otimes I)O_{LR_3\text{-det}}|\psi_q\rangle$ and $(U_q \otimes I)O_{LR'_3\text{-det}}|\psi'_q\rangle$, respectively.

We need the following lemma. Intuitively, the lemma claims that any adversary cannot distinguish $LR_3$-det from $LR'_3$-det if databases are “good”.

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Lemma 1. For each $j$, let $|\psi_j^{\text{good}}\rangle$ and $|\psi_j^{\prime\text{good}}\rangle$ denote $(I - \Pi_{\text{flipped}}^{[i-1]} ) |\psi_j\rangle$ and $(I - \Pi_{\text{flipped}}^{[i]}) |\psi_j'\rangle$, respectively. Let $\text{tr}_{D_{123}}$ and $\text{tr}_{D_{12F}}$ denote the partial trace over databases and additional qubits for LR$_3$-det and LR$_3'$-det, respectively. Then, $\text{tr}_{D_{123}} (|\psi_j^{\text{good}}\rangle \langle \psi_j^{\text{good}}|) = \text{tr}_{D_{12F}} (|\psi_j^{\prime\text{good}}\rangle \langle \psi_j^{\prime\text{good}}|)$ holds for $1 \leq i \leq q + 1$.

Proof intuition. Lemma 1 can be shown by straightforward algebraic calculations using the strict formulas of the second and third properties in Proposition 1. The equality holds owing to the one-to-one correspondences between good databases for LR$_3$ and those for LR$_3'$ (see Remark 1). A complete proof of Lemma 1 is given in Section B in the appendix.

We also need the following lemma, which intuitively claims that “good” states change to “bad” states only with a negligible probability.

Lemma 2. For each $j$, $\| \Pi_{\text{bad}} \cdot O_{LR_3} |\psi_j^{\text{good}}\rangle \| \text{ and } \| \Pi_{\text{bad}} \cdot O_{LR_3'} |\psi_j^{\prime\text{good}}\rangle \|$ are in $O(\sqrt{j}/2^{n/2})$.

Proof intuition. Here we give a proof intuition for LR$_3$. Owing to the second and third properties of Proposition 1 with errors, we can use classical lazy-sampling intuition (see explanations below Proposition 1). Roughly speaking, good databases change to bad if and only if a fresh query is made to $f_1$ or $f_2$, and the corresponding input to $f_3$ collides with some existing record in the database for $f_3$.

Since each database of $|\psi_j^{\text{good}}\rangle$ has at most $(j - 1)$ entries and outputs of $f_1$ and $f_2$ are $(n/2)$-bits, the input to $f_3$ that corresponds to a fresh input to $f_1$ or $f_2$ collides with one of the existing records in $D_3$ with a probability at most $O(j/2^{n/2})$. This corresponds to the claim that $\| \Pi_{\text{bad}} \cdot O_{LR_3} |\psi_j^{\text{good}}\rangle \|^2 \leq O(j/2^{n/2})$ holds. This argument actually ignores some errors, but the errors will be in $O(\sqrt{j}/2^{n/2})$ due to Proposition 1. The claim for LR$_3'$ can be shown in a similar way. A complete proof of Lemma 2 is given in Section C in the appendix.

The following proposition guarantees that it is hard to distinguish LR$_3$-det from LR$_3'$-det.

Proposition 3. Adv$^{\text{dist}}_{LR_3\text{-det},LR_3'\text{-det}} (A)$ is in $O\left(\sqrt{q^3/2^{n/2}}\right)$.

Proof intuition. Due to Lemma 1, $\mathcal{A}$ cannot distinguish LR$_3$-det from LR$_3'$-det as long as databases are good. Thus, intuitively, the distinguishing advantage is upper bounded by the square root of the probability that databases become bad while $\mathcal{A}$ makes $q$ queries, which is further upper bounded by $\sum_{1 \leq j \leq q} \| \Pi_{\text{bad}} \cdot O_{LR_3\text{-det}} |\psi_j^{\text{good}}\rangle \| + \sum_{1 \leq j \leq q} \| \Pi_{\text{bad}} \cdot O_{LR_3'\text{-det}} |\psi_j^{\prime\text{good}}\rangle \|$. From Lemma 2, this can be upper bounded by $\sum_{1 \leq j \leq q} O(\sqrt{j}/2^{n/2}) + \sum_{1 \leq j \leq q} O(\sqrt{j}/2^{n/2}) = O(\sqrt{q^3/2^{n/2}})$. A complete proof of Proposition 3 is given in Section D in the appendix.
Hardness of distinguishing $LR_3^3$-det and $LR_3^3$-det from $LR_3$ and $LR_3'$.

The following proposition guarantees that it is hard to distinguish $LR_3^3$-det and $LR_3^3$-det from $LR_3$ and $LR_3'$, respectively.

**Proposition 4.** $\text{Adv}^{\text{dist}}_{LR_3,LR_3^3\text{-det}}(A)$ and $\text{Adv}^{\text{dist}}_{LR_3',LR_3^3\text{-det}}(A)$ are in $O\left(\sqrt{q^3/2^{n/2}}\right)$.

*Proof intuition.* We give a proof intuition for $LR_3$-det and $LR_3'$. Since the databases of round functions for $LR_3$-det are the same as those for $LR_3$, $A$ cannot distinguish $LR_3$-det from $LR_3$-det as long as databases are good. Thus, roughly speaking, the distinguishing advantage is upper bounded by the square root of the probability that databases become bad while $A$ makes $q$ queries. Owing to Lemma 2, we can show the claim in the same way as the proof intuition for Proposition 3. The claim for $LR_3'$-det and $LR_3'$ can be shown in a similar way. A proof of Proposition 4 is given in Section E in the appendix.

**Proof of Proposition 2.** Finally, we show Proposition 2.

**Proof (of Proposition 2).** $\text{Adv}^{\text{dist}}_{LR_3,LR_3^3\text{-det}}(A)$ is upper bounded by $\text{Adv}^{\text{dist}}_{LR_3',LR_3^3\text{-det}}(A)$ + $\text{Adv}^{\text{dist}}_{LR_3^3\text{-det},LR_3^3\text{-det}}(A)$ + $\text{Adv}^{\text{dist}}_{LR_3^3\text{-det},LR_3\text{-det}}(A)$. Thus, the claim of Proposition 2 follows from Proposition 3 and Proposition 4.

### 4.2 Hardness of Distinguishing FRP from RF

Recall that $\text{FamP}(\{0,1\}^{n/2})$ is the set of functions $F : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \times \{0,1\}^{n/2} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ such that $F(x, \cdot)$ is a permutation for each $x$, and if $P$ is chosen uniformly at random from $\text{FamP}(\{0,1\}^{n/2})$, we say that $P$ is a *family of random permutations*, or shortly FRP.

The following proposition claims that it is hard to distinguish FRP from RF.

**Proposition 5.** For any quantum adversary $A$ that makes at most $q$ quantum queries, $\text{Adv}^{\text{dist}}_{\text{FRP},RF}(A) \leq O\left(\sqrt{q^3/2^{n/2}}\right)$ holds.

*Proof intuition.* Suppose that we are given an oracle access to $F$, which is either of FRP or RF. If we find $(x_L,x_R)$ and $(x'_L,x'_R)$ such that $x_L = x'_L \land x_R \neq x'_R \land F(x_L,x_R) = F(x'_L,x'_R)$, then we can tell that $F$ is RF. Thus it suffices to show that finding such a pair $((x_L,x_R),(x'_L,x'_R))$ for RF is difficult. Below we call such a pair a *half-collision* of $F$. We call a database for $F$ is bad if it contains a half-collision. Roughly speaking, we show that (1) a database becomes bad with a probability at most $O(q^3/2^{n/2})$, and (2) if databases are good, then the probability that $A$ finds a half-collision of $F$ is negligible.\(^{11}\)

\(^{11}\) Our arguments for the claim (1) is the same as those to prove hardness of finding (multi)collisions of random functions in 36 and 21. However, these two previous works only show that the probability that we measure “bad” databases are small, and do not care about claims like our second claim (2). On the other hand, in Section F, we also rigorously prove the claim (2).
For the claim (1), first we show that “a good database changes to a bad database at the $j$-th query with probability at most $O(j/2^{n/2})$”, in the same way as we showed Lemma 2. Then we can deduce that, roughly speaking, the square root of the probability that databases becomes bad while making $q$ queries is upper bounded by

$$\sum_{1 \leq j \leq q} O(\sqrt{j/2^{n/2}}) = O(q\sqrt{q/2^{n/2}}) = O(q^{3/2}/2^{n/2}).$$

The claim (2) can be shown by using the first property of Proposition 1.

A thorough proof of Proposition 5 is given in Section F in the appendix.

4.3 Proof of Theorem 3

This subsection finishes our proof of Theorem 3 by using the results given in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.

Proof (of Theorem 3). First, let us modify $LR_4$ in such a way that the state updates of the third and fourth rounds are replaced with

$$(x_{2L}, x_{2R}) \mapsto (x_{3L}, x_{3R}) := (F(x_{2L}, x_{2R}), x_{2L})$$

and

$$(x_{3L}, x_{3R}) \mapsto (x_{4L}, x_{4R}) := (F'(x_{3L}, x_{3R}), x_{3L}),$$

respectively, where $F, F': \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \times \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \to \{0, 1\}^{n/2}$ are random functions. Let us denote the modified function by $LR_4'$. In addition, by $LR_2'(F, F')$ we denote the function defined by $(x_L, x_R) \mapsto (F'(F(x_L, x_R), x_L), F(x_L, x_R))$ (see Fig. 7).

Then, by applying Proposition 2 twice we can show that

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{dist}}_{LR_4, LR_4'}(q) \leq O\left(\sqrt[3]{q^3/2^{n/2}}\right)$$

(26)

holds.

Let us modify $LR_2'(F, F')$ in such a way that $F$ is replaced with a family of random permutations $P$, and denote the resulting function by $LR_2'(P, F')$. Then,
from Proposition 5 it follows that $\text{Adv}^{\text{dist}}_{\text{LR}''_2(F,F')}_{\text{LR}''_2(P,F')}(q) \leq O(\sqrt{q^3/2^n})$ holds. Next, let us define a function $G$ by $G(x_L,x_R) = F'(x_L,x_R)\|P(x_L,x_R)$, where $F'$ is a random function and $P$ is a family of random permutations (see Fig. 8). Then, the function distribution of $\text{LR}''_2(P,F')$ is the same as that of $G$.

(\text{Note that } P(x_L,x_R) \neq P(x'_L,x'_R) \text{ always holds if } x_R \neq x'_R. \text{ Thus, if } (x_L,x_R) \neq (x'_L,x'_R), \text{ the corresponding inputs to } F' \text{ will be distinct.}) \text{ Therefore we have that } \text{Adv}^{\text{dist}}_{\text{LR}''_2(P,F'),G}(q) = 0 \text{ holds. Moreover, from Proposition 5 } \text{Adv}^{\text{dist}}_{\text{LR}''_2(P,F'),G}(q) \leq O\left(\sqrt{q^3/2^n}\right) \text{ holds. Therefore } \text{Adv}^{\text{dist}}_{\text{LR}''_2(P,F'),\text{RF}}(q) \leq O\left(\sqrt{q^3/2^n}\right) \text{ follows, which implies that}

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{dist}}_{\text{LR}''_2,P\text{RF}}(q) \leq O\left(\sqrt{q^3/2^n}\right)$$

holds.

Hence, from (26) and (27), it follows that $\text{Adv}^{\text{dist}}_{\text{LR}''_4,\text{RF}}(q) \leq O\left(\sqrt{q^3/2^n}\right)$ holds for any quantum adversary $A$ that makes at most $q$ quantum queries. In addition, $\text{Adv}^{\text{dist}}_{\text{RP},\text{RF}}(A) \leq O(q^3/2^n)$ holds by the quantum version of the PRP-PRF switching lemma \cite{24} Thm. 2. Therefore

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{dist}}_{\text{LR}''_4,\text{RP}}(A) \leq O\left(\sqrt{q^3/2^n}\right)$$

follows, for any quantum adversary $A$ that makes at most $q$ quantum queries, which completes the proof of the theorem. \hfill $\Box$

Remark 2. In the above proof, we went back and forth between random functions and (families of) random permutations, which may seem unnatural. Our proof strategy was motivated to avoid complex arguments that are specific to the quantum setting as much as possible. For example, it may be possible to prove the hardness of distinguishing $\text{RF}''_2(F,F')$ from $\text{RF}$ directly by using the compressed oracle technique with errors, but such a direct proof would be much more complex than the proof of the hardness of distinguishing $\text{FRP}$ from $\text{RF}$ (Proposition 5): We would have to treat quantum entanglements of two independent compressed database registers when we apply the compressed oracle technique with errors to $\text{RF}''_2(F,F')$, while the proof of Proposition 5 requires only one compressed database register.
5 A Matching Attack

We show that the bound given in the previous section is tight by showing that there exists a matching attack. Again, we consider the case that all round functions of LR₄ are truly random functions, and show the following theorem.

**Theorem 4.** There exists a quantum algorithm A that makes \( O(2^{n/6}) \) quantum queries and satisfies \( \text{Adv}^\text{qPRP}_{LR_4}(A) = \Omega(1) \).

**Proof intuition.** Intuitively, our distinguishing attack is just a quantum version of a classical collision-finding-based distinguishing attack [27]. Classical attack distinguishes LR₄ from a random permutation by finding a collision of a function that takes values in \( \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \), which requires \( O(\sqrt{2^{n/2}}) = O(2^{n/4}) \) queries in the quantum setting. However, finding a collision of the function requires only \( O(\sqrt[3]{2^{n/2}}) = O(2^{n/6}) \) queries in the quantum setting, which enables us to make a \( O(2^{n/6}) \)-query quantum distinguisher. (Note that, in general, we can find a collision of random functions from \( \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \) to \( \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \) with \( O(\sqrt[3]{2^{n/2}}) = O(2^{n/6}) \) quantum queries [34].) A complete proof is given in Section G in the appendix.

6 Concluding Remarks

This paper showed that \( \Omega(2^{n/6}) \) quantum queries are required to distinguish the \((n\text{-bit block}) \) 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction from a random permutation by qCPAs. In particular, the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction becomes a quantumly secure PRP against qCPAs if round functions are quantumly secure PRFs. We also showed the bound is tight, i.e., we gave a qCPA that distinguishes the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction with \( O(2^{n/6}) \) quantum queries. To give security proofs, we modified the compressed oracle technique by Zhandry and applied it.

It would be interesting to see if the provable security bound improves when we increase the number of rounds. Also, analyzing the security of the Luby-Rackoff constructions against qCCAs is left as an interesting open question. It would be a challenging problem since we have to treat inverse (decryption) queries to quantum oracles. Oracles that allow inverse quantum queries are usually much harder to deal with than the ones that allow only forward quantum queries, and some entirely new techniques would be required for the analysis.

References

A Proof of Proposition

This section gives a proof of Proposition.
Proof (of Proposition 1). Recall that \text{CstOE} is decomposed as
\begin{align}
\text{CstOE} = (I \otimes \text{CH}) \cdot (I \otimes U_{\text{toggle}}) \cdot (I \otimes \text{IH}) \cdot \text{stO} (I \otimes \text{IH}^*) \cdot (I \otimes U_{\text{toggle}}^*) \cdot (I \otimes \text{CH}^*),
\end{align}
and that each \(D\) is described as a bit string \((b_0||\alpha_0)||\cdots||(b_{2^m-1}||\alpha_{2^m-1})\), where
\(b_x \in \{0, 1\}\) and \(\alpha_x \in \{0, 1\}^n\) for each \(x \in \{0, 1\}^m\).

We begin with showing the first property. Let \(\alpha\) be an \(n\)-bit string, and
\(U_{\text{toggle}} := (I_1 \otimes |0^n\rangle \langle 0^n| + X \otimes (I_n - |0^n\rangle \langle 0^n|))\). Then
\begin{align}
(I_1 \otimes H^{\otimes n}) \cdot U_{\text{toggle}} \cdot CH |1||\alpha\rangle \\
= (I_1 \otimes H^{\otimes n}) \cdot U_{\text{toggle}} \left( \sum_{u \in \{0, 1\}^n} \frac{(-1)^{\alpha \cdot u}}{\sqrt{2^n}} |1||u\rangle \right) \\
= (I_1 \otimes H^{\otimes n}) \left( \sum_{u \in \{0, 1\}^n} \frac{(-1)^{\alpha \cdot u}}{\sqrt{2^n}} |0||u\rangle \right) \\
+ (I_1 \otimes H^{\otimes n}) \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} (|1||0^n\rangle - |0||0^n\rangle) \right) \\
= |0||\alpha\rangle + |e\rangle
\end{align}
holds, where \(|e\rangle := (I_1 \otimes H^{\otimes n}) \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} (|1||0^n\rangle - |0||0^n\rangle) \right)\), and
\begin{align}
(I_1 \otimes H^{\otimes n}) \cdot U_{\text{toggle}} \cdot CH |0||0^n\rangle = \sum_{y \in \{0, 1\}^n} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^n}} |0||y\rangle
\end{align}
holds. Since \(U_{\text{enc}}^* = ((I_1 \otimes H^{\otimes n}) \cdot U_{\text{toggle}} \cdot CH)^{\otimes 2^m}\) holds by definition of \(U_{\text{enc}}^*\), we have that
\begin{align}
U_{\text{enc}}^* |D\rangle = \bigotimes_{j=0}^{2^m-1} |\eta_j\rangle
\end{align}
holds, where
\begin{align}
|\eta_j\rangle = \begin{cases}
|0||\alpha_j\rangle + |e\rangle & \text{if } b_j = 1, \\
\sum_{y \in \{0, 1\}^n} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^n}} |0||y\rangle & \text{if } b_j = 0.
\end{cases}
\end{align}
Without loss of generality, we assume that \(b_j = 1\) for \(0 \leq j \leq i - 1\) and \(b_j = 0\) for \(j \geq i\). Let us define \(|\eta\rangle := \bigotimes_{j=i}^{2^m-1} \left( \sum_{y \in \{0, 1\}^n} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^n}} |0||y\rangle \right)\). Then we have
\begin{align}
U_{\text{enc}}^* |D\rangle &= \bigotimes_{j=0}^{i-1} \left( |0||\alpha_j\rangle + |e\rangle \right) \otimes |\eta\rangle \\
&= \bigotimes_{j=0}^{i-1} |0||\alpha_j\rangle \otimes |\eta\rangle
\end{align}
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\[ + \sum_{0 \leq k \leq i - 1} \left( \bigotimes_{j=0}^{k} |0||\alpha_j\rangle \right) \otimes |\epsilon\rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{j=k+2}^{i-1} (|0||\alpha_j\rangle + |\epsilon\rangle) \right) \otimes |\eta\rangle \]
\[ = \sum_{f \in \text{comp}(D)} \frac{1}{|\text{comp}(D)|} (f) + |\epsilon'\rangle, \quad (33) \]

where \(|\epsilon'\rangle = \sum_{0 \leq k \leq i - 1} (\bigotimes_{j=0}^{k} |0||\alpha_j\rangle) \otimes |\epsilon\rangle (\bigotimes_{j=k+2}^{i-1} (|0||\alpha_j\rangle + |\epsilon\rangle)) \otimes |\eta\rangle \). Because \(||\epsilon\rangle|| = \sqrt{1/2^{n-1}}\), \(||\epsilon'\rangle|| is in \(O(i\sqrt{1/2^n}) = O(\sqrt{i^2/2^n})\). Thus the first property holds.

Next, we show the second property. Since now the operator CstOE does not affect the registers of entry of \(x'\) in \(D\) for \(x' \neq x\), it suffices to show that the claim holds for the case that \(D\) is empty. In addition, without loss of generality, we can assume that \(x = 0^n\). Now \(D \cup (x, \alpha)\) corresponds to the bit string \((1||\alpha||0||0^n|| \cdots ||0||0^n)\). We have that \(U^*_{\text{enc}} = IH^*U^*_{\text{toggle}}CH^* = IHU^*_{\text{toggle}}CH\) and

\[ U^*_{\text{enc}} |D \cup (x, \alpha)\rangle = IHU^*_{\text{toggle}} \left( \sum_{u \in \{0,1\}^n} \left( \frac{(-1)^{\alpha-u}}{\sqrt{2^n}} |1||u\rangle \right) \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0||0^n\rangle \right) \right) \]
\[ = IH \left( \sum_{u \in \{0,1\}^n} \left( \frac{(-1)^{\alpha-u}}{\sqrt{2^n}} |0||u\rangle \right) \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0||0^n\rangle \right) \right) \]
\[ + IH \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} (|1||0^n\rangle - |0||0^n\rangle) \right) \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0||0^n\rangle \right) \]
\[ = |0||\alpha\rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0||0^n\rangle \right) + |\epsilon_1\rangle, \quad (34) \]

where \(|\widehat{0^n}\rangle := H^\otimes_n |0^n\rangle\) and \(|\epsilon_1\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} (|1\rangle - |0\rangle) |\widehat{0^n}\rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle |\widehat{0^n}\rangle \right)\). Thus we have that

\[ \text{stO} \left( I \otimes U^*_{\text{enc}} \right) |x, y\rangle \otimes |D \cup (x, \alpha)\rangle \]
\[ = |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \otimes |0||\alpha\rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle |\widehat{0^n}\rangle \right) + \text{stO}(|x, y\rangle \otimes |\epsilon_1\rangle). \quad (35) \]

Note that, from (34) it follows that

\[ U_{\text{enc}} \left( |0||\alpha\rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle |\widehat{0^n}\rangle \right) + |\epsilon_1\rangle \right) = |D \cup (x, \alpha)\rangle. \quad (36) \]

Therefore

\[ (I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}) \text{stO} \left( I \otimes U^*_{\text{enc}} \right) |x, y\rangle \otimes |D \cup (x, \alpha)\rangle \]

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\[
(I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}) \left( |x, y \oplus \alpha \rangle \otimes |0\rangle_0 \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle_i |0^n\rangle_0 \right) + \text{stO}(|x, y \rangle \otimes |\epsilon_1\rangle) \right)
\]

\[
= \left( I \otimes U_{\text{enc}} \right) \left( |x, y \oplus \alpha \rangle \otimes |0\rangle_0 \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle_i |0^n\rangle_0 \right) + |x, y \oplus \alpha \rangle \otimes |\epsilon_1\rangle \right)
\]

\[
- \left( I \otimes U_{\text{enc}} \right) (|x, y \oplus \alpha \rangle \otimes |\epsilon_1\rangle) + \left( I \otimes U_{\text{enc}} \right) \text{stO}(|x, y \rangle \otimes |\epsilon_1\rangle)
\]

\[
= |x, y \oplus \alpha \rangle \otimes |D \cup (x, \alpha) \rangle + |\epsilon_2\rangle
\]

holds, where \(|\epsilon_2\rangle = - (I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}) (|x, y \oplus \alpha \rangle \otimes |\epsilon_1\rangle) + (I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}) \text{stO}(|x, y \rangle \otimes |\epsilon_1\rangle)\). Now we have that

\[
(I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}) \text{stO}(|x, y \rangle \otimes |\epsilon_1\rangle)
\]

\[
= \left( I \otimes CH \cdot U_{\text{toggle}} \cdot \text{IH} \right) \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes (|1\rangle - |0\rangle)
\]

\[
\otimes |\gamma\rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle_i |0^n\rangle_0 \right)
\]

\[
= \left( I \otimes CH \cdot U_{\text{toggle}} \right) \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma, \delta} \frac{(-1)^{\gamma \cdot \delta}}{2^n} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes (|1\rangle - |0\rangle)
\]

\[
\otimes |\delta\rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle_i |0^n\rangle_0 \right)
\]

\[
= \left( I \otimes CH \right) \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma, \delta} \frac{(-1)^{\gamma \cdot \delta}}{2^n} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes (|0\rangle - |1\rangle) \otimes |\delta\rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle_i |0^n\rangle_0 \right)
\]

\[
+ \left( I \otimes CH \right) \frac{2}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{2^n} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes (|1\rangle - |0\rangle) \otimes |0^n\rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle_i |0^n\rangle_0 \right)
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes (|0\rangle \otimes (H^{\otimes n} |\gamma\rangle) - |1\rangle \otimes |\gamma\rangle) \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle_i |0^n\rangle_0 \right)
\]

\[
+ \frac{2}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{2^n} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes (|1\rangle \otimes (H^{\otimes n} |0^n\rangle) - |0\rangle \otimes |0^n\rangle) \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle_i |0^n\rangle_0 \right)
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes |0\rangle \otimes (H^{\otimes n} |\gamma\rangle) \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle_i |0^n\rangle_0 \right)
\]

\[
- \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes |1\rangle \otimes |\gamma\rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle_i |0^n\rangle_0 \right)
\]

\[
+ \frac{2}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{2^n} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes \left( \sum_{\delta} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x, \delta) \rangle - |D\rangle \right)
\]

\[
33
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes |0 \rangle \otimes \left( \sum_{\delta} \frac{(-1)^{\gamma \cdot \delta}}{\sqrt{2^n}} |\delta \rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2m-1} |0 \rangle |0^n \rangle \right) \right) \\
- \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes |1 \rangle \otimes |\gamma \rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2m-1} |0 \rangle |0^n \rangle \right) \\
+ \frac{2}{2^n} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes \left( \sum_{\delta} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x, \delta) \rangle - |D \rangle \right) \\
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes |0 \rangle \otimes \left( \sum_{\delta \neq 0^n} \frac{(-1)^{\gamma \cdot \delta}}{\sqrt{2^n}} |\delta \rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2m-1} |0 \rangle |0^n \rangle \right) \right) \\
+ \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes |0 \rangle \otimes \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |0^n \rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2m-1} |0 \rangle |0^n \rangle \right) \right) \\
- \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes |1 \rangle \otimes |\gamma \rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2m-1} |0 \rangle |0^n \rangle \right) \\
+ \frac{2}{2^n} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes \left( \sum_{\delta} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x, \delta) \rangle - |D \rangle \right) \\
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes |D^\mathit{invalid} \rangle \\
+ \frac{1}{2^n} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes |D \rangle \\
- \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes |D \cup (x, \gamma) \rangle \\
+ \frac{2}{2^n} |x \rangle |\widehat{0}^n \rangle \otimes \left( \sum_{\delta} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x, \delta) \rangle - |D \rangle \right) \\
= - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma \rangle \otimes (|D \cup (x, \gamma) \rangle - |D^\mathit{invalid} \rangle) \\
+ \frac{1}{2^n} |x \rangle |\widehat{0}^n \rangle \otimes \left( 2 \sum_{\delta} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x, \delta) \rangle - |D \rangle \right), \\
\text{(38)}
\]

where $|D^\mathit{invalid} \rangle$ is a superposition of invalid databases for each $\gamma$.

In addition, we have that

\[
U_{\mathit{enc}} |\epsilon_1 \rangle = (CH U_{\mathit{toggk}} |H \rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} (|1 \rangle - |0 \rangle) |\widehat{0}^n \rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2m-1} |0 \rangle |\widehat{0}^n \rangle \right) \\
= CH \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} (|1 \rangle - |0 \rangle) |0^n \rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2m-1} |0 \rangle |0^n \rangle \right)
\]

34
\[
\begin{align*}
&= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} (|1\rangle |0^n\rangle - |0\rangle |0^n\rangle) \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle |0^n\rangle \right) \\
&= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x, \gamma)\rangle - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D\rangle
\end{align*}
\]

(39)

holds. Thus

\[
(I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}) |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \otimes |\epsilon_1\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \left( \left( \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x, \gamma)\rangle \right) - |D\rangle \right)
\]

(40)

holds. Therefore

\[
\text{CstOE} |x, y\rangle \otimes |D \cup (x, \alpha)\rangle = |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \otimes |\epsilon_1\rangle
\]

(41)

holds, and this proves the second property.

Finally, we show the third property. Since now the operator \( \text{CstOE} \) does not affect the registers of entry of \( x' \) in \( D \) for \( x' \neq x \), it suffices to show that the claim holds for the case that \( D \) has no entry. In addition, we can without loss of generality assume that \( x = 0^m \). Now \( D \) corresponds to the bit string \((0||0^n)||0^n\)\(\cdots||0^n\)), and we have that

\[
U_{\text{enc}}^* |D\rangle = \text{IH} U_{\text{toggle CH}} |D\rangle
\]

(42)

Hence it holds that

\[
\text{stO}(I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}^*) |x, y\rangle \otimes |D\rangle = \sum_{\alpha \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \otimes |\epsilon_1\rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle |0^n\rangle \right)
\]

(43)

In addition, we have that

\[
(I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}) \text{stO}(I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}^*) |x, y\rangle \otimes |D\rangle
\]

35
\[ = (I \otimes (CHU\text{toggle}I)) \left( \sum_{\alpha \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \otimes |0\rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^n-1} |0\rangle |0^n\rangle \right) \right) \]

\[ = (I \otimes (CHU\text{toggle}I)) \left( \sum_{\alpha \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \otimes \left( \sum_{u \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{(-1)^{\alpha \cdot u}}{\sqrt{2^n}} |0\rangle |u\rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^n-1} |0\rangle |0^n\rangle \right) \right) \right) \]

\[ + (I \otimes CH) \left( \sum_{\alpha \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \otimes \left( \sum_{u \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{(-1)^{\alpha \cdot u}}{\sqrt{2^n}} |1\rangle |u\rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^n-1} |0\rangle |0^n\rangle \right) \right) \right) \]

\[ = \sum_{\alpha \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \otimes |1\rangle |\alpha\rangle \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^n-1} |0\rangle |0^n\rangle \right) \]

\[ + \sum_{\alpha \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \otimes \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} (|0\rangle |0^n\rangle - |1\rangle |\hat{0}^n\rangle) \right) \otimes \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^n-1} |0\rangle |0^n\rangle \right) \]

\[ = \sum_{\alpha \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \otimes |D \cup (x, \alpha)\rangle \]

\[ + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x\rangle |\hat{0}^n\rangle \otimes \left( |D\rangle - \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x, \gamma)\rangle \right) \]

(44)

holds. Therefore the third property also holds. \(\square\)

**B  Proof of Lemma 1**

This section proves Lemma 1. First we show the following lemma, which shows that the behavior of \(O_{UP,3}^{\prime} \) for \(D_F\) without overlap is the same as that of \(O_{UP,3} \) for \([D_F]_3\). In this section we omit writing the additional qubits that are introduced to write detection results for \(LR_3\)-det and \(LR_3^{\prime}\)-det, and the 2n ancillary qubits that are used to compute the intermediate states after the first and second rounds (see (21) and (22)), as long as they are \(|0^n\rangle\) and \(|\hat{0}^{2n}\rangle\), respectively, for short.
Lemma 3. It holds that
\[
\langle x_{2L}', x_{2R}', y_L', y_R' \rangle \otimes \langle D_F' \mid O_{U^3} \mid x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L, y_R \rangle \otimes |D_F\rangle
\]
\[
= (x_{2L}', x_{2R}', y_L', y_R') \otimes ([D_F]'_3 \mid O_{U^3} \mid x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L, y_R) \otimes |[D_F]'_3\rangle
\]  
(45)
for any \(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L, y_R, x_{2L}', x_{2R}', y_L', y_R' \in \{0,1\}^{n/2}\) and any valid databases \(D_F\) and \(D_F'\) without overlap.

Proof. It suffices to consider the case that \(x_{2L}' = x_{2L}, x_{2R}' = x_{2R}, y_R' = y_R\). Since the database \(O_{U^3}^\prime\) affects only the entry of \((x_{2L}, x_{2R})\) in \(D_F\) when it acts on \(|x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L, y_R \rangle \otimes |D_F\rangle\), it suffices to show the claim for the cases that (1) \(D_F\) has only a single entry \((x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \alpha)\), or (2) \(D_F\) has no entry.

First we show the claim for the first case that \(D_F = \{(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \alpha)\}\). In this case, by Proposition 1 we have that
\[
O_{U^3}^\prime \mid x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L, y_R \rangle \otimes |D_F\rangle
\]
\[
= |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L + \alpha, y_R + x_{2L} \rangle \otimes |(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \alpha)\rangle
\]
\[
+ \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L + \alpha, y_R + x_{2L} \rangle \left( \langle \emptyset | - \left( \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \langle x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \gamma \rangle \right) \right)
\]
\[
- \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L + \gamma, y_R + x_{2L} \rangle \otimes |(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \gamma)\rangle
\]
\[
+ \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x_{2L}, x_{2R} \rangle \langle \emptyset^n | y_R + x_{2L} \rangle \otimes \left( 2 \sum_{\delta} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \langle x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \delta \rangle - \langle \emptyset \rangle \right)
\]
\[
+ |\text{invalid}\rangle
\]
holds, where \(\emptyset\) is the empty database and \(|\text{invalid}\rangle\) is a vector containing invalid databases. In addition, we have that \([D_F]'_3 = \{(x_{2L}, \alpha + x_{2R})\}\), and
\[
O_{U^3}^\prime \mid x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L, y_R \rangle \otimes |[D_F]'_3\rangle
\]
\[
= |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L + \alpha, y_R + x_{2L} \rangle \otimes |(x_{2L}, \alpha + x_{2R})\rangle
\]
\[
+ \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L + \alpha, y_R + x_{2L} \rangle \left( \langle \emptyset | - \left( \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \langle x_{2L}, \gamma \rangle \right) \right)
\]
\[
- \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L + \gamma, x_{2R} + y_{2L} \rangle \otimes |(x_{2L}, \gamma)\rangle
\]
\[
+ \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x_{2L}, x_{2R} \rangle \langle \emptyset^n | y_R + x_{2L} \rangle \otimes \left( 2 \sum_{\delta} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \langle x_{2L}, \delta \rangle - \langle \emptyset \rangle \right)
\]
\[
+ |\text{invalid}'\rangle
\]
\[
= |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L + \alpha, y_R + x_{2L} \rangle \otimes |([x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \alpha])_3\rangle
\]
\[
+ \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L + \alpha, y_R + x_{2L} \rangle \left( \langle \emptyset | - \left( \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \langle [x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \gamma + x_{2R}]_3 \rangle \right) \right)
\]
Next we show the following lemma, which shows that the behavior of $LR'_3$ for good databases is the same as that of $LR_3$.

**Lemma 4.** It holds that

$$
\langle x'_{0L}, x'_{0R}, y'_L, y'_R \rangle \otimes (D'_1, D'_2, D'_F) |O_{LR'_3} | x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R \rangle \otimes |D_1, D_2, D_F\rangle
$$

$$
= \langle x'_{0L}, x'_{0R}, y'_L, y'_R \rangle \otimes (D'_1, D'_2, [D'_F]_3) |O_{LR_3} | x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R \rangle \otimes |D_1, D_2, [D_F]_3\rangle
$$

(48)

for any $x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R, x'_{0L}, x'_{0R}, y'_L, y'_R \in \{0, 1\}^{n/2}$ and any valid and good databases $(D_1, D_2, D_F)$ and $(D'_1, D'_2, D'_F)$ for $LR'_3$.

**Proof.** Note that $O_{UP,i} = O_{UP,i}$ for $i = 1, 2,$ and recall that

$$O_{LR_3} = (O_{UP,2}O_{UP,1})^*O_{UP,3}(O_{UP,2}O_{UP,1})$$

and

$$O_{LR'_3} = (O_{UP,2}O_{UP,1})^*O'_{UP,3}(O_{UP,2}O_{UP,1})$$

hold (see Fig. 6). Since $O_{UP,1}$ and $O_{UP,2}$ do not affect the $D_3$ and $D_F$ registers, the claim follows from Lemma 4.

Next we show Lemma 4. Actually we prove a stronger claim below.

\[ \text{next we show Lemma 4. Actually we prove a stronger claim below.} \]
Lemma 5. For each $i$, there exists a complex number $a_{xyz}^{(i)}$ for each tuple $(x, y, z)$ (here $x$ and $y$ correspond to the query and answer registers of $A$, and $z$ corresponds to the remaining register of $A$), such that

$$
\sum_{x,y,z} |a_{xyz}^{(i)}|_{D_1D_2D_F}^2 \leq 1
$$

holds, in addition that

$$
|\psi_i^\text{good} \rangle = \sum_{xyz} a_{xyz}^{(i)} |x, y, z \rangle \otimes |D_1 \rangle |D_2 \rangle |D_F \rangle \quad (49)
$$

and

$$
|\psi_i^\text{good} \rangle = \sum_{xyz} a_{xyz}^{(i)} |x, y, z \rangle \otimes |D_1 \rangle |D_2 \rangle |[D_F]_3 \rangle \quad (50)
$$

hold. In particular,

$$
\text{tr}_{D_{123}} \left( |\psi_i^\text{good} \rangle \right) = \text{tr}_{D_{12F}} \left( |\psi_i^\text{good} \rangle \right) \quad (51)
$$

holds for $1 \leq i \leq q + 1$.

Proof. We show the claim by induction. Since all databases are empty before the first query, the claim holds for $i = 2$ (i.e., the claim holds for $|\psi_1^\text{good} \rangle$ and $|\psi_1^\text{good} \rangle$). Assume that the claim holds for $i$. We show the claim also holds for $(i + 1)$.

Recall that for each good database $(D_1, D_2, D_3)$ for LR$_3$, there exists a unique $D_F$ without overlap such that $[D_F]_3 = D_3$ and $(D_1, D_2, D_F)$ is a good database for LR$'_3$, by definition of good databases. Similarly, for each good database $(D_1, D_2, D_F)$ for LR$'_3$, $(D_1, D_2, [D_F]_3)$ becomes a good database for LR$_3$. Thus, there exists $a_{xyz}^{(i+1)}_{D_1D_2D_F}$ and $b_{xyz}^{(i+1)}_{D_1D_2D_F}$ for each tuple $(x, y, z)$ and good $(D_1, D_2, D_F)$ such that

$$
\sum_{x,y,z} |a_{xyz}^{(i+1)}_{D_1D_2D_F}|^2, \quad \sum_{x,y,z} |b_{xyz}^{(i+1)}_{D_1D_2D_F}|^2 \leq 1.
$$

holds, in addition that

$$
|\psi_{i+1}^\text{good} \rangle = \sum_{xyz} a_{xyz}^{(i+1)}_{D_1D_2D_F} |x, y, z \rangle \otimes |D_1 \rangle |D_2 \rangle |D_F \rangle \quad (52)
$$

and

$$
|\psi_{i+1}^\text{good} \rangle = \sum_{xyz} b_{xyz}^{(i+1)}_{D_1D_2D_F} |x, y, z \rangle \otimes |D_1 \rangle |D_2 \rangle |[D_F]_3 \rangle \quad (53)
$$

holds for $1 \leq i \leq q + 1$.
hold.
Since \( \psi'_{i+1}^{\text{good}} = (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \cdot O_{LR_3} |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\) holds, we have that

\[
a_{xyzD_1D_2D_F}^{(i+1)}(\psi_i^{\text{good}}) = \langle x, y, z | D_1, D_2, D_F | (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \cdot O_{LR_3} |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle
= \sum_{D_1', D_2', D_F'} a_{x'y'z'D_1'D_2'D_F'}^{(i)}(\psi_i^{\text{good}}) \langle x, y, z | D_1, D_2, D_F | O_{LR_3} |x', y', z'| D_1', D_2', D_F' \rangle
\]  

(54)

holds for good \((D_1, D_2, D_F)\). In addition, since \(\psi_{i+1}^{\text{good}} = (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \cdot O_{LR_3} |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\) holds, we have that

\[
b_{xyzD_1D_2D_F}^{(i+1)}(\psi_i^{\text{good}}) = \langle x, y, z | D_1, D_2, D_F | (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \cdot O_{LR_3} |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle
= \sum_{D_1', D_2', D_F'} b_{x'y'z'D_1'D_2'D_F'}^{(i)}(\psi_i^{\text{good}}) \langle x, y, z | D_1, D_2, D_F | O_{LR_3} |x', y', z'| D_1', D_2', D_F' \rangle
\]  

(55)

holds for good \((D_1, D_2, D_F)\).

From Lemma 4, the right hand side of (54) is equal to that of (55). Thus

\[
b_{xyzD_1D_2D_F}^{(i+1)} = \sum_{D_1', D_2', D_F'} a_{x'y'z'D_1'D_2'D_F'}^{(i+1)}(\psi_i^{\text{good}})
\]

holds for each \(x, y, z\) and each good \((D_1, D_2, D_F)\). Therefore the claim also holds for \((i + 1)\), which completes the proof.

\[\square\]

C Proof of Lemma 2

Proof (of Lemma 2). We show that the claim holds for \(LR_3\) and \(\psi_j^{\text{good}}\). The claim for \(LR_3'\) and \(\psi_j^{\text{good}}\) can be shown in a similar way. In this proof we omit writing the additional \(q\) qubits that are introduced to write detection results for \(LR_3\)-det and \(LR_3'\)-det, and the \(2n\) ancillary qubits that are used to compute the intermediate states after the first and second rounds (see (21) and (22)), as long as they are \(|0^q\rangle\) and \(|0^{2n}\rangle\), respectively, for short. Remember that the oracle of \(LR_3\) is decomposed as \(O_{LR_3} = O_{UP_1} \cdot O_{UP_2} \cdot O_{UP_3} \cdot O_{UP_2} \cdot O_{UP_1}\). Since the computational basis is the orthonormal basis, it suffices to show that the claim holds for the case \(|\psi_j^{\text{good}}\rangle = |x_0, y, z\rangle \otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2\rangle |D_3\rangle\) for each \(x = x_0L \parallel x_0R, y = yL \parallel yR, z\) (\(x\) and \(y\) correspond to \(A\)’s first and second \(n\)-qubit register, respectively, and \(z\) correspond to \(A\)’s remaining register), and each good database \((D_1, D_2, D_3)\). Note that \(|D_1|, |D_2| \leq 2(j - 1)\) and \(|D_3| \leq j - 1\) hold, since each query to the compressed oracle with errors \(\text{CstOE}\) affects only the qubits that correspond to a single entry of each database. Since \(O_{LR_3}\) does not affect the \(|z\rangle\) register, for simplicity, we omit writing it in this proof.

We consider three separate cases I, II, and III, and study how the quantum state will change when \(O_{UP_1}, O_{UP_2}, O_{UP_3}, O_{UP_2}, O_{UP_1}\), and \(\Pi_{\text{bad}}\) act on
$|\psi_j^{\text{good}}\rangle$, in a sequential order. Case I is the one that $(x_{0L}, \alpha) \in D_1$ and $(x_{0R} \oplus \alpha, \beta) \in D_2$ for some $\alpha$ and $\beta$. Case II is the one that $(x_{0L}, \alpha) \in D_1$ for some $\alpha$ and there is no entry of $x_{0R} \oplus \alpha$ in $D_2$. Case III is the one that there is no entry of $x_{0L}$ in $D_1$.

\textbf{Remark 3.} Intuitively, Case I is the case that the queries to $f_1$ and $f_2$ are not fresh. Case II is the one that the query to $f_1$ is not fresh but the query to $f_2$ is fresh. Case III is the one that the query to $f_1$ is fresh.

\textbf{Case I:} $(x_{0L}, \alpha) \in D_1$ and $(x_{0R} \oplus \alpha, \beta) \in D_2$ for some $\alpha$ and $\beta$.

In this case, after the first query to $O_{\text{UP,2}}$, by Proposition [1] the whole quantum state becomes

$$
|x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R\rangle \otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2\rangle |D_3\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle \otimes |x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle ,
$$

with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. Here $x_{1L} = x_{0R} \oplus \alpha$, $x_{1R} = x_{0L}$, $x_{2L} = x_{1R} \oplus \beta$, and $x_{2R} = x_{1L}$. We further separate Case I into two sub-cases Case I-i and Case I-ii.

\textbf{Case I-i:} $(x_{2L}, \gamma) \in D_3$ for some $\gamma$.

Let $x_{3L} := x_{2R} \oplus \gamma$ and $x_{3R} := x_{2L}$. Then, after the final query to $O_{\text{UP,1}}$, by Proposition [1] the whole quantum state becomes

$$
|x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L \oplus x_{3L}, y_R \oplus x_{3L}\rangle \otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2\rangle |D_3\rangle
$$

with errors in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. In particular, the database remains good with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. Therefore $\Pi_{\text{bad}} \cdot O_{\text{R}_3} |\psi_j^{\text{good}}\rangle = 0$ with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$, which implies that the claim holds for this Case I-i.

\textbf{Case I-ii: There is no entry of $x_{2L}$ in $D_3$.}

In this case, after the query to $O_{\text{UP,3}}$, by Proposition [1] the whole quantum state becomes

$$
\sum_{\gamma} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L \oplus (x_{2R} \oplus \gamma), y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle
$$

$$
\otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2\rangle |D_3 \cup (x_{2L}, \gamma)\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle |x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle
$$

with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. Thus, after the final query to $O_{\text{UP,1}}$, each normalized summand of (58) becomes

$$
|x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L \oplus (x_{2R} \oplus \gamma), y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2\rangle |D_3 \cup (x_{2L}, \gamma)\rangle
$$

with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. In particular, the database of (59) remains good. Therefore (59) becomes 0 with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$ after the operation of $\Pi_{\text{bad}}$, with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. Since the summands of (58) are orthogonal to each other, $\Pi_{\text{bad}} \cdot O_{\text{R}_3} |\psi_j^{\text{good}}\rangle = 0$ with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$, which implies that the claim holds for this Case I-ii.
Case II: \((x_{0L}, \alpha) \in D_1\) for some \(\alpha\) and there is no entry of \(x_{0R} \oplus \alpha\) in \(D_2\).

Again, let \(x_{1L} := x_{0R} \oplus \alpha\) and \(x_{1R} := x_{0L}\). In this case, after the first query to \(O_{UP, 2}\), by Proposition 1 the whole quantum state becomes

\[
\sum_{\beta} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R\rangle \\
\otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3\rangle |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle |\beta \oplus x_{1R}, x_{2R}\rangle
= \sum_{\beta: \exists \text{an entry of } \beta \oplus x_{1R} \in D_3} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R\rangle \\
\otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3\rangle |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle |\beta \oplus x_{1R}, x_{2R}\rangle \\
+ \sum_{\beta: \exists \text{an entry of } \beta \oplus x_{1R} \in D_3} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R\rangle \\
\otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3\rangle |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle |\beta \oplus x_{1R}, x_{2R}\rangle ,
\]

where \(x_{2R} = x_{1L}\), with an error in \(O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})\). Below we further separate Case II into sub-cases Case II-i and Case II-ii. Case II-i is the case that there exists an entry of \(\beta \oplus x_{1R}\) in \(D_3\), which corresponds to the term \(60\). Case II-ii is the case that there exists no entry of \(\beta \oplus x_{1R}\) in \(D_3\), which corresponds to the term \(61\).

Case II-i: \((\beta \oplus x_{1R}, \gamma) \in D_3\) for some \(\gamma\).

Let us denote the term \(60\) by \(|\text{II-i}\rangle\). Then, since \(|D_3| \leq j - 1\) holds,

\[
|\{\beta| \exists \text{an entry of } \beta \oplus x_{1R} \in D_3\}| \leq j - 1
\]

follows. In addition, since the summands of \(60\) are orthogonal to each other, \(\| |\text{II-i}\rangle \|^2 \leq O(j/2^{n/2})\) holds. Therefore \(\| |\text{II-i}\rangle \| \leq O(\sqrt{j/2^{n/2}})\) follows.

Case II-ii: There is no entry of \(\beta \oplus x_{1R}\) in \(D_3\).

After the operation of \(O_{UP, 3}\), by Proposition 1 each normalized summand of the term \(61\) becomes

\[
\sum_{\gamma} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L \oplus (x_{2R} \oplus \gamma), y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \\
\otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3 \cup (x_{2L}, \gamma)\rangle \\
\otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle |x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle
\]

with an error in \(O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})\), where \(x_{2L} = \beta \oplus x_{1R}\). Thus, after the last operations of \(O_{UP, 2}\) and \(O_{UP, 1}\), each normalized summand of the term \(62\) becomes

\[
|x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L \oplus (x_{2R} \oplus \gamma), y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3 \cup (x_{2L}, \gamma)\rangle
\]

with an error in \(O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})\). In particular, the database of the term \(63\) is good with an error in \(O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})\), which implies that the term \(63\) becomes 0 with
an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$ after the operation of $\Pi_{bad}$. Hence, due to orthogonality of each summands, the term (62) will be 0 after the operations of $O_{UP, 2}$, $O_{UP, 1}$, and $\Pi_{bad}$, with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. Therefore, due to orthogonality of each summands, the term (61) will be 0 after the operations of $O_{UP, 3}$, $O_{UP, 2}$, $O_{UP, 1}$, and $\Pi_{bad}$, with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$.

Combining analyses of Cases II-i and II-ii,

$$\left\| \Pi_{bad} \cdot O_{LR, j} \right\| \leq O\left(\sqrt{\frac{j}{2^{n/2}}}\right)$$

(64)

follows in Case II.

**Case III: there is no entry of $x_{0L}$ in $D_1$.**

In this case, after the first query to $O_{UP, 1}$, by Proposition 1 the whole quantum state becomes

$$\sum_\alpha \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} \ket{x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R} \otimes \ket{D_1 \cup (x_{0L}, \alpha)} \ket{D_2} \ket{D_3} \otimes \ket{x_{0R} \oplus \alpha, x_{0L}}$$

$$= \sum_{\alpha : \exists (\alpha \oplus x_{0R})-entry in D_2} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} \ket{x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R}$$

$$\otimes \ket{D_1 \cup (x_{0L}, \alpha)} \ket{D_2} \ket{D_3} \otimes \ket{x_{0R} \oplus \alpha, x_{0L}}$$

(65)

$$+ \sum_{\alpha : \nexists (\alpha \oplus x_{0R})-entry in D_2} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} \ket{x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R}$$

$$\otimes \ket{D_1 \cup (x_{0L}, \alpha)} \ket{D_2} \ket{D_3} \otimes \ket{x_{0R} \oplus \alpha, x_{0L}}$$

(66)

with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$.

Below we further separate Case III into sub-cases Case III-i and Case III-ii. Case III-i is the case that there exists an entry of $\alpha \oplus x_{0R}$ in $D_2$, which corresponds to the term (65). Case III-ii is the case that there exists no entry of $\alpha \oplus x_{0R}$ in $D_2$, which corresponds to the term (66).

**Case III-i:** $(\alpha \oplus x_{0R}, \beta) \in D_2$ for some $\beta$.

Since $|D_2| \leq 2(j - 1)$, we have that

$$\left\| \sum_{\alpha : \exists (\alpha \oplus x_{0R})-entry in D_2} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} \ket{x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R}$$

$$\otimes \ket{D_1 \cup (x_{0L}, \alpha)} \ket{D_2} \ket{D_3} \otimes \ket{x_{0R} \oplus \alpha, x_{0L}} \right\|^2$$

$$= \frac{1}{2^{n/2}} \cdot |\{\alpha : \exists \beta \text{ s.t. } (\alpha \oplus x_{0R}, \beta) \in D_2\}| \leq O\left(\frac{j}{2^{n/2}}\right)$$

(67)

holds. Hence the norm of (65) is upper bounded by $O(\sqrt{j/2^{n/2}})$. 
Case III-ii: There is no entry of \((\alpha \oplus x_{0R})\) in \(D_2\).

Let \(x_{1L} := x_{0R} \oplus \alpha\) and \(x_{1R} := x_{0L}\). After the operation of \(O_{\text{UP},2}\), each normalized summand of (66) changes to

\[
\sum_{\beta} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R \rangle
\begin{array}{l}
\otimes |D_1 \cup (x_{0L}, \alpha)\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3 \rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle \langle x_{1R} \oplus \beta, x_{1L}\rangle
\end{array}
\begin{eqnarray}
= \sum_{\beta:3(\beta \oplus x_{1R})-\text{entry in } D_3} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R \rangle
\begin{array}{l}
\otimes |D_1 \cup (x_{0L}, \alpha)\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3 \rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle \langle x_{1R} \oplus \beta, x_{1L}\rangle
\end{eqnarray}
\begin{eqnarray}
+ \sum_{\beta:3(\beta \oplus x_{1R})-\text{entry in } D_3} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R \rangle
\begin{array}{l}
\otimes |D_1 \cup (x_{0L}, \alpha)\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3 \rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle \langle x_{1R} \oplus \beta, x_{1L}\rangle.
\end{array}
\end{eqnarray}
\begin{eqnarray}
(68)
\end{eqnarray}
Since \(|D_3| \leq j - 1\), we can show that the norm of (68) is in \(O(\sqrt{j/2^{n/2}})\), in the same way as we showed the norm of \((65)\) is in \(O(\sqrt{j/2^{n/2}})\).

Next we focus on the term (69). After the operation of \(O_{\text{UP},3}\), each normalized summand of (69) becomes

\[
\sum_{\gamma} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L \oplus (\gamma \oplus x_{2R}), y_R \oplus x_{2L} \rangle
\begin{array}{l}
\otimes |D_1 \cup (x_{0L}, \alpha)\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3 \cup (x_{2L}, \gamma)\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle \langle x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle.
\end{array}
\begin{eqnarray}
(70)
\end{eqnarray}
where \(x_{2L} = x_{1R} \oplus \beta\) and \(x_{2R} = x_{1L}\). Note that the database of each summand of (70) is good. Thus, after the operations of \(O_{\text{UP},2}, O_{\text{UP},1}, \) and \(\Pi_{\text{bad}}\), each summand of (70) becomes 0 with an error in \(O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})\), by Proposition 1. Therefore, since the summands of (70) are orthogonal to each other, (70) becomes 0 with an error in \(O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})\) after the operations of \(O_{\text{UP},2}, O_{\text{UP},1}\), and \(\Pi_{\text{bad}}\). Hence it follows that (69) becomes 0 with an error in \(O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})\) after the operations of \(O_{\text{UP},3}, O_{\text{UP},2}, O_{\text{UP},1}\), and \(\Pi_{\text{bad}}\), since the summands of (69) are orthogonal to each other.

From analyses of Cases III-i and III-ii, it follows that

\[
\left\| \Pi_{\text{bad}} \cdot O_{\text{R},3} \mid \psi_{\text{good}}^j \right\| \leq O \left( \sqrt{\frac{j}{2^{n/2}}} \right)
\begin{eqnarray}
(71)
\end{eqnarray}
also holds in Case III. \(\square\)
D Proof of Proposition 3

Proof (of Proposition 3). Recall that $|\psi_i\rangle$ and $|\psi'_i\rangle$ are the states just before the $i$-th query to $LR_3$-det and $LR'_3$-det, respectively. By abuse of notation, we let $|\psi_{(q+1)}\rangle$, $|\psi'_{(q+1)}\rangle$ denote the quantum states $(U_q \otimes I)O_{LR_3\text{-det}} |\psi_q\rangle$ and $(U_q \otimes I)O_{LR'_3\text{-det}} |\psi'_q\rangle$, respectively. Moreover, let $|\phi_{(q+1)}\rangle$, $|\phi'_{(q+1)}\rangle$ be the states just before the final measurements for the cases that the adversary $A$ runs relative to $LR_3$-det and $LR'_3$-det, respectively. Since now we are considering that the random functions $f_1$, $f_2$, $f_3$, $F$ are implemented by the compressed standard oracle with errors, there are unitary operators $U^{123}_{\text{FinDec}}$ and $U^{12F}_{\text{FinDec}}$ that acts on database registers such that $|\phi_{q+1}\rangle = (I \otimes U^{123}_{\text{FinDec}}) |\psi_{q+1}\rangle$ and $|\phi'_{q+1}\rangle = (I \otimes U^{12F}_{\text{FinDec}}) |\psi'_{q+1}\rangle$.

First, we have that

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{LR}_3\text{-det,LR}'_3\text{-det}}^\text{dist} (A) \leq td \left( \text{tr} \left[ D_{123} \right] (|\phi_{(q+1)}\rangle), \text{tr} \left[ D_{12F} \right] (|\phi'_{(q+1)}\rangle) \right)$$

holds. Moreover, since $(U_{A1} \otimes I)\rho(U_{A1} \otimes I)^* = (U_{A1} \otimes I)(I \otimes \rho(I \otimes (I - I))^* U_{A2} \otimes I)^*$ holds, it follows that

$$\text{tr} \left[ D_{12} \right] (|\phi_{(q+1)}\rangle), \text{tr} \left[ D_{12F} \right] (|\phi'_{(q+1)}\rangle)$$

holds for any pure state $|\psi\rangle$ of $\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B$.

Proof. First, we have that

$$\text{tr} \left[ D_{12} \right] (|\phi_{(q+1)}\rangle), \text{tr} \left[ D_{12F} \right] (|\phi'_{(q+1)}\rangle)$$

holds. Moreover, since $(U_{A1} \otimes I)\rho(U_{A2} \otimes (I - I))^* = (U_{A1} \otimes I)(I \otimes (I - I))^* U_{A2} \otimes I)^*$ holds, it follows that

$$\text{tr} \left[ D_{12} \right] (|\phi_{(q+1)}\rangle), \text{tr} \left[ D_{12F} \right] (|\phi'_{(q+1)}\rangle)$$

holds.
= U_{A1} \text{tr}_B (I \otimes (\Pi \cdot (I - \Pi)) \rho) U_{A2}^* \\
= 0, \quad (76)

and similarly we have that

$$\text{tr}_B ((U_{A2} \otimes (I - \Pi)) \rho (U_{A1} \otimes \Pi)^*) = 0.$$  \quad (77)

The claim follows from (75), (76), and (77).

Recall that \((I - \Pi_{\text{flipped}}^{(i - 1)}) | \psi_i \rangle\) and \((I - \Pi_{\text{flipped}}^{(i - 1)}) | \psi_i^{\text{good}} \rangle\) are denoted by \(| \psi_i^{\text{good}} \rangle\) and \(| \psi_i^{\text{good}} \rangle\), respectively. In addition, let us denote \(\Pi_{\text{flipped}}^{(i - 1)} | \psi_i \rangle\) and \(\Pi_{\text{flipped}}^{(i - 1)} | \psi_i^{\text{good}} \rangle\) by \(| \psi_i^{\text{flipped}} \rangle\) and \(| \psi_i^{\text{bad}} \rangle\), respectively. Since \(| \psi_i \rangle = U_{i - 1} \cdot O_{LR_3 \cdot \text{det}} | \psi_{i - 1} \rangle\) and

\[
O_{LR_3 \cdot \text{det}} = (\Pi_{\text{bad}} \otimes I_{i - 1} \otimes X + (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_{i - 1} \otimes I_1) \\
\cdot (O_{LR_3} \otimes I_{i - 1} \otimes I_1) \cdot ((I - \Pi_{\text{flipped}}^{(i - 1)}) \otimes I_1)
\]

holds, from the above claim it follows that

$$\text{tr}_{123} (| \psi_i \rangle) = \text{tr}_{123} \left( \left( U_{i - 1} \cdot (\Pi_{\text{bad}} \otimes X + (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1) \cdot O_{LR_3} \cdot | \psi_{i - 1}^{\text{good}} \rangle \right) \right)
\]

\[
+ \text{tr}_{123} \left( \left( U_{i - 1} \cdot | \psi_{i - 1}^{\text{bad}} \rangle \right) \right)
\]

\[
= \text{tr}_{123} \left( \left( U_{i - 1} \cdot (\Pi_{\text{bad}} \otimes X) \cdot O_{LR_3} \cdot | \psi_{i - 1}^{\text{good}} \rangle \right) \right)
\]

\[
+ \text{tr}_{123} \left( \left( U_{i - 1} \cdot | \psi_{i - 1}^{\text{bad}} \rangle \right) \right) + \rho + \rho^*, \quad (79)
\]

where

\[
\rho = \text{tr}_{123} \left( \left( U_{i - 1} \cdot (\Pi_{\text{bad}} \otimes X) \cdot O_{LR_3} \cdot | \psi_{i - 1}^{\text{good}} \rangle \cdot \langle \psi_{i - 1}^{\text{good}} \right) \cdot O_{LR_3} \cdot ((I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1) \cdot U_{i - 1}^* \right. \right) \cdot . \quad (80)
\]

Note that, for any Hilbert space \(L_1\) and \(L_2\), and any Hermite operator \(A\) on \(L_1 \otimes L_2\), \(\|\text{tr}_{L_2} (\rho)\|_\text{tr} = \|\rho\|_\text{tr}\) holds. In addition, \(\| \psi \langle \phi \|_\text{tr} \leq \| \psi \| \cdot \| \phi \|\) holds for any vectors \(\psi\) and \(\phi\). Thus we have that

\[
\| \rho \|_\text{tr} = \| \left( U_{i - 1} \cdot (\Pi_{\text{bad}} \otimes X) \cdot O_{LR_3} \cdot | \psi_{i - 1}^{\text{good}} \rangle \cdot \langle \psi_{i - 1}^{\text{good}} \right) \cdot O_{LR_3} \cdot ((I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1) \cdot U_{i - 1}^* \|_\text{tr}
\]

\[
\leq \left\| (\Pi_{\text{bad}} \otimes X) \cdot O_{LR_3} \cdot | \psi_{i - 1}^{\text{good}} \| \right\| \left\| ((I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1) \cdot O_{LR_3} \cdot | \psi_{i - 1}^{\text{good}} \| \right\|
\]

\[
\leq \left\| (\Pi_{\text{bad}} \otimes X) \cdot O_{LR_3} \cdot | \psi_{i - 1}^{\text{good}} \| \right\| \leq O \left( \sqrt{\frac{1}{2n/2}} \right), \quad (81)
\]

where we used the claim of Lemma \(\text{2}\) for the last inequality.
Similarly, for $|\psi_i'\rangle$ we have that

$$\text{tr}_{D_{123}} (|\psi_i'\rangle) = \text{tr}_{D_{123}} \left( U_{i-1} \cdot (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1 \cdot O_{LR_j} \cdot |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle \right)$$

$$\text{tr}_{D_{123}} (U_{i-1} \cdot (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1) \cdot O_{LR_j} \cdot |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle$$

$$+ \text{tr}_{D_{123}} (U_{i-1} \cdot |\psi_i^{\text{bad}}\rangle) + \rho' + \rho'^*,$$

where

$$\rho' = \text{tr}_{D_{123}} \left( U_{i-1} \cdot (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1 \cdot O_{LR_j} \cdot |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle \right)$$

$$\cdot O_{LR_j}^{*} \cdot ((I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1)^* \cdot U_{i-1}^*,$$

and

$$\|\rho'\|_{tr} \leq O \left( \sqrt{\frac{i}{2^n}} \right)$$

holds.

Now we have that

$$\text{td} (\text{tr}_{D_{123}} (|\psi_i\rangle), \text{tr}_{D_{123}} (|\psi_i'\rangle))$$

$$\leq \text{td} (\text{tr}_{D_{123}} \left( U_{i-1} \cdot (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1 \cdot O_{LR_j} \cdot |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle \right),$$

$$\text{tr}_{D_{123}} (U_{i-1} \cdot (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1) \cdot O_{LR_j} \cdot |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle)$$

$$+ \text{td} \left( \text{tr}_{D_{123}} (U_{i-1} \cdot (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1) \cdot O_{LR_j} \cdot |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle,\right.$$  

$$\text{tr}_{D_{123}} (U_{i-1} \cdot (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1) \cdot O_{LR_j} \cdot |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle)$$

$$+ \text{td} \left( \text{tr}_{D_{123}} \left( U_{i-1} |\psi_i^{\text{bad}}\rangle, \text{tr}_{D_{123}} (U_{i-1} |\psi_i^{\text{bad}}\rangle) \right)$$

$$+ \|\rho\|_{tr} + \|\rho'^*\|_{tr} + \|\rho'\|_{tr} + \|\rho'^*\|_{tr} \right).$$

(85)

In addition, since $U_{i-1}$ affects only $A$'s register, and $\text{td}$ is invariant under unitary transformations, we have that

$$\text{td} (\text{tr}_{D_{123}} (|\psi_i\rangle), \text{tr}_{D_{123}} (|\psi_i'\rangle))$$

$$\leq \text{td} (\text{tr}_{D_{123}} \left( ((I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1) \cdot O_{LR_j} \cdot |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle \right),$\n
$$\text{tr}_{D_{123}} ((I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1) \cdot O_{LR_j} \cdot |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle)$$

$$+ \text{td} \left( \text{tr}_{D_{123}} ((I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1) \cdot O_{LR_j} \cdot |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle,\right.$$  

$$\text{tr}_{D_{123}} ((I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1) \cdot O_{LR_j} \cdot |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle)$$

$$+ \text{td} \left( \text{tr}_{D_{123}} (|\psi_i^{\text{bad}}\rangle, \text{tr}_{D_{123}} (|\psi_i^{\text{bad}}\rangle) \right) + O \left( \sqrt{\frac{i}{2^n}} \right).$$

(86)
holds.
From Lemma 1 it follows that
\[
\text{tr}_{D_{123}} \left( |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle \right) = \text{tr}_{D_{12F}} \left( |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle \right) \tag{87}
\]
holds for any \(1 \leq i \leq q + 1\). Moreover, \(((I - II_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1) \cdot O_{LR_3} |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle = |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle\) and \(((I - II_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1) \cdot O_{LR_3} |\psi_{i-1}^{\text{good}}\rangle = |\psi_{i-1}^{\text{good}}\rangle\) hold. Thus
\[
\text{tr}_{D_{12F}} \left( ((I - II_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_1) \cdot O_{LR_3} |\psi_{i-1}^{\text{good}}\rangle \right) = 0 \tag{88}
\]
holds. In addition, from the claim in p. 43 it follows that
\[
\text{tr}_{D_{123}} \left( |\psi_{i-1}\rangle \right) = \text{tr}_{D_{123}} \left( |\psi_{i-1}^{\text{good}}\rangle \right) + \text{tr}_{D_{123}} \left( |\psi_{i-1}^{\text{bad}}\rangle \right)
\]
and
\[
\text{tr}_{D_{12F}} \left( |\psi_{i-1}^{\prime}\rangle \right) = \text{tr}_{D_{12F}} \left( |\psi_{i-1}^{\prime,\text{good}}\rangle \right) + \text{tr}_{D_{12F}} \left( |\psi_{i-1}^{\prime,\text{bad}}\rangle \right)
\]
hold, which implies that
\[
\text{tr}_{D_{123}} \left( |\psi_{i-1}\rangle \right), \text{tr}_{D_{12F}} \left( |\psi_{i-1}^{\prime}\rangle \right) = \text{tr}_{D_{123}} \left( |\psi_{i-1}^{\text{bad}}\rangle \right), \text{tr}_{D_{12F}} \left( |\psi_{i-1}^{\prime,\text{bad}}\rangle \right) \tag{89}
\]
holds.
From (86), (88), and (89), we can show that
\[
\text{td} \left( \text{tr}_{D_{123}} \left( |\psi_{i}\rangle \right), \text{tr}_{D_{12F}} \left( |\psi_{i}^{\prime}\rangle \right) \right) \\
\leq \text{td} \left( \text{tr}_{D_{123}} \left( (II_{\text{bad}} \otimes X) \cdot O_{LR_3} |\psi_{i-1}^{\text{good}}\rangle \right), \text{tr}_{D_{12F}} \left( (II_{\text{bad}} \otimes X) \cdot O_{LR_3} |\psi_{i-1}^{\prime,\text{good}}\rangle \right) \right) + O \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2n/2}} \right)
\]
\[
\leq \left\| \text{tr}_{D_{123}} \left( (II_{\text{bad}} \otimes X) \cdot O_{LR_3} |\psi_{i-1}^{\text{good}}\rangle \right) \right\|_{tr} + \left\| \text{tr}_{D_{12F}} \left( (II_{\text{bad}} \otimes X) \cdot O_{LR_3} |\psi_{i-1}^{\prime,\text{good}}\rangle \right) \right\|_{tr} + O \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2n/2}} \right)
\]
\[
\leq \text{td} \left( \text{tr}_{D_{123}} \left( |\psi_{i-1}\rangle \right), \text{tr}_{D_{12F}} \left( |\psi_{i-1}^{\prime}\rangle \right) \right) + O \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2n/2}} \right) \tag{90}
\]
holds, where we used the claim of Lemma 2 again for the last inequality. Therefore, by induction it follows that
\[
\text{td} \left( \text{tr}_{D_{123}} \left( |\psi_{i}\rangle \right), \text{tr}_{D_{12F}} \left( |\psi_{i}^{\prime}\rangle \right) \right) \leq \sum_{1 \leq j \leq i-1} O \left( \sqrt{\frac{j}{2n/2}} \right) \leq O \left( \sqrt{\frac{i^3}{2n/2}} \right) \tag{91}
\]
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for each $1 \leq i \leq q + 1$. The claim of the proposition follows from (72) and (91). □

E Proof of Proposition 4

Proof (of Proposition 4). We give a proof for LR$_3$ and LR$_3$-det. The claim for LR$'_3$ and LR$'_3$-det can be proven in the same way. Let $|\eta_i\rangle$ and $|\psi_i\rangle$ be the states just before $A$ makes the $i$-th query, when $A$ runs relative to LR$_3$ and LR$_3$-det, respectively. By abuse of notation, we let $|\eta_{q+1}\rangle$, $|\psi_{q+1}\rangle$ denote the quantum states $(U_q \otimes I)\hat{O}_{LR_3}\ket{\eta_q}$ and $(U_q \otimes I)\hat{O}_{LR_3\text{-det}}\ket{\psi_q}$, respectively. Then we have that $|\eta_1\rangle = |\psi_1\rangle$. Moreover, let $|\xi_{(q+1)}\rangle$, $|\phi_{(q+1)}\rangle$ be the states just before the final measurements for the cases that the adversary $A$ runs relative to LR$_3$ and LR$_3$-det, respectively. Since now we are considering that the random functions $f_1$, $f_2$, and $f_3$ are implemented by the compressed standard oracle with errors, there is a unitary operator $U_{\text{FinDec}}^{123}$ that acts on database registers such that $|\xi_{(q+1)}\rangle = (I \otimes U_{\text{FinDec}}^{123})|\eta_{(q+1)}\rangle$ and $|\phi_{(q+1)}\rangle = (I \otimes U_{\text{FinDec}}^{123})|\psi_{(q+1)}\rangle$.

In addition, let us define an operator $\hat{O}_{LR_3}$ by

$$\hat{O}_{LR_3} = (O_{LR_3} \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes I_1) \cdot ((I - \Pi_{\text{flipped}}^{[i-1]}) \otimes I_1) \cdot \Pi_{\text{flipped}}^{[i-1]} \otimes I_1,$$  

(92)

where $I_{i-1}$ is the identity operator on the first $(i - 1)$ additional qubits, and $I_1$ is one on the $i$-th additional qubit. The definition of this operator depends on $i$, but we use the same notation $\hat{O}_{LR_3}$ for all $i$, for simplicity. (Intuitively, $\hat{O}_{LR_3}$ is an intermediate operator between $O_{LR_3}$ and $O_{LR_3\text{-det}}$: Similarly to $O_{LR_3\text{-det}}$, the new operator $\hat{O}_{LR_3}$ does nothing if one of the first $(i - 1)$ additional qubits is 1. However, unlike $O_{LR_3\text{-det}}$, $O_{LR_3}$ does not flip the $i$-th additional qubit even if the database becomes bad, after each query.)

Assume that $A$ has $\ell$-qubit states, and the database register has $d$-qubits in total. Then, since the additional $q$ qubits are set to 0 at the beginning, it holds that

$$|\eta_i\rangle = (U_i \otimes I)\hat{O}_{LR_3} \cdots \hat{O}_{LR_3}(U_0 \otimes I)(|0^\ell\rangle \otimes |0^d\rangle \otimes |0^\ell\rangle)$$

(93)

and

$$|\psi_i\rangle = (U_i \otimes I)\hat{O}_{LR_3\text{-det}} \cdots \hat{O}_{LR_3\text{-det}}(U_0 \otimes I)(|0^\ell\rangle \otimes |0^d\rangle \otimes |0^\ell\rangle),$$

(94)

for each $i$ (we omit writing the $2n$ ancillary qubits that are used to compute the intermediate states after the first and second rounds).

Now we have that

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{LR}_3,\text{LR}_3\text{-det}}(A)$$

$$\leq \|\|\xi_{(q+1)}\rangle - |\phi_{(q+1)}\rangle\|$$

$$= \|\|\eta_{(q+1)}\rangle - |\psi_{(q+1)}\rangle\|$$

$$= \|\|U_q \otimes I)\hat{O}_{LR_3} \cdots \hat{O}_{LR_3}(U_0 \otimes I)(|0^\ell\rangle \otimes |0^d\rangle \otimes |0^\ell\rangle)\|$$

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holds.

Let us again denote $\Pi_{\text{flipped}}^{[i-1]} |\psi_i\rangle$ by $|\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle$. Since

\begin{equation}
O_{\text{LR},3} \cdot det = (\Pi_{\text{bad}} \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes X + (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes I_1)
\cdot (O_{\text{LR},3} \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes I_1) \cdot ((I - \Pi_{\text{flipped}}^{[i-1]}) \otimes I_1)
+ \Pi_{\text{flipped}}^{[i-1]} \otimes I_1
\end{equation}

holds by definition of $O_{\text{LR},3} \cdot det$, and

\begin{equation}
\hat{O}_{\text{LR},3} = (\Pi_{\text{bad}} \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes I_1 + (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes I_1)
\cdot (O_{\text{LR},3} \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes I_1) \cdot ((I - \Pi_{\text{flipped}}^{[i-1]}) \otimes I_1)
+ \Pi_{\text{flipped}}^{[i-1]} \otimes I_1
\end{equation}

holds, we have that

\begin{equation}
\left\| \hat{O}_{\text{LR},3} |\psi_i\rangle - O_{\text{LR},3} \cdot det |\psi_i\rangle \right\|
= \left\| (\Pi_{\text{bad}} \otimes X)O_{\text{LR},3} |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle - (\Pi_{\text{bad}} \otimes I_1)O_{\text{LR},3} |\psi_i^{\text{good}}\rangle \right\|
\leq 2 \left\| (\Pi_{\text{bad}} \otimes I_1)O_{\text{LR},3} |\psi_i\rangle \right\|.
\end{equation}

From (96), (99), and Lemma 2 it follows that

\begin{equation}
\text{Adv}^\text{dist}_{\text{LR},3 \cdot \text{det}}(A) \leq \sum_{1 \leq j \leq q} O \left( \sqrt{\frac{j}{2^{n/2}}} \right) = O \left( \sqrt{\frac{q^3}{2^{n/2}}} \right)
\end{equation}

holds, which completes the proof.

\section{Proof of Proposition 5}

This section proves Proposition 5. Suppose that we are given an oracle access to $F : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \times \{0,1\}^{n/2} \to \{0,1\}^{n/2}$, which is either of FRP or RF. If we find
$(x_L, x_R)$ and $(x'_L, x'_R)$ such that $x_L = x'_L \land x_R \neq x'_R \land F(x_L, x_R) = F(x'_L, x'_R)$, then we can tell that $F$ is RF. Thus, if we find such $(x_L, x_R)$ and $(x'_L, x'_R)$, we can distinguish RF from FRP by making additional two queries. We call such a pair a half-collision of $F$. For a quantum query adversary $A$, let us define

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{RF}}^\text{half-coll}(A) := \Pr \left[ F \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Func}(\{0, 1\}^{n/2} \times \{0, 1\}^{n/2}), \quad \right.$$ 

$$\left. ((x_L, x_R), (x'_L, x'_R)) \leftarrow A^F() : x_L = x'_L \land x_R \neq x'_R \land F(x_L, x_R) = F(x'_L, x'_R) \right]$$

(101)

Then, it suffices to show that the following lemma holds to prove Proposition 5.

**Lemma 6.** For any quantum adversary $A$ that makes at most $q$ quantum queries,

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{RF}}^\text{half-coll}(A) \leq O\left(\frac{q^3}{2^{n/2}}\right)$$

(102)

**Proof.** For each $i$, let $|\phi_i\rangle$ and $|\psi_i\rangle$ be the whole quantum states before $A$ makes the $i$-th query, where we consider that random functions are implemented by the standard oracle and the compressed standard oracle with errors, respectively. Then $|\phi_i\rangle = (I \otimes U^*_{\text{enc}}) |\psi_i\rangle$ holds for each $i$. By abuse of notation, let us denote $|\phi_{q+1}\rangle := (U_q \otimes I) \cdot \text{stO} |\phi_q\rangle$ and $|\psi_{q+1}\rangle := (U_q \otimes I) \cdot \text{CstOE} |\psi_q\rangle$, respectively.

For simplicity, we consider that the first $(n + n)$ qubits of the state before the final measurement $|\phi_{q+1}\rangle$ corresponds to the final output of $A$ (e.g., when we measure the first $2n$-qubit of $|\phi_{q+1}\rangle$, we will obtain the output of $A$). Let $\Pi_{\text{coll}}$ be the projection onto the space spanned by the set of vectors

$$\{(x_L, x_R), (x'_L, x'_R), z) \otimes |F\rangle : x_L = x'_L \land x_R \neq x'_R \land F(x_L, x_R) = F(x'_L, x'_R)\},$$

where $x_L, x_R, x'_L, x'_R \in \{0, 1\}^{n/2}$ correspond to $A$’s output registers, $z$ corresponds to the remaining qubits of $A$, and $F$ is a function in $\text{Func}(\{0, 1\}^n, \{0, 1\}^n)$. Then

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{RF}}^\text{half-coll}(A) = \| \Pi_{\text{coll}} |\phi_{q+1}\rangle \|^2$$

(103)

holds. We say that a valid database $D$ is bad if there are $(x_L, x_R, y), (x'_L, x'_R, y') \in D$ such that $x_L = x'_L \land x_R \neq x'_R \land y = y'$, and good otherwise. Let $\Pi_{\text{bad}}$ be the projector onto the space which is spanned by bad databases and invalid databases. Then

$$\| \Pi_{\text{coll}} |\phi_{q+1}\rangle \| = \| \Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U^*_{\text{enc}}) |\psi_{q+1}\rangle \|

\leq \| \Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U^*_{\text{enc}}) (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) |\psi_{q+1}\rangle \| + \| \Pi_{\text{bad}} |\psi_{q+1}\rangle \|$$

(104)

holds.

Now we show the following claim. Intuitively, this claim shows that databases become bad (i.e., databases have a half-collision of $F$) with only a negligible probability.
Claim. For each $1 \leq i \leq q + 1$, $\|\Pi_{\text{bad}} |\psi_i\rangle\|$ is in $O(\sqrt{i^3/2^{n/2}})$.

Proof. We have that

$$\|\Pi_{\text{bad}} |\psi_i\rangle\| = \|\Pi_{\text{bad}} (U_{i-1} \otimes I) \text{CstOE} |\psi_{i-1}\rangle\|$$

$$\leq \|(U_{i-1} \otimes \Pi_{\text{bad}}) \text{CstOE} (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) |\psi_{i-1}\rangle\| + \|\Pi_{\text{bad}} \text{CstOE} \Pi_{\text{bad}} |\psi_{i-1}\rangle\|$$

$$\leq \|\Pi_{\text{bad}} \text{CstOE} (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) |\psi_{i-1}\rangle\| + \|\Pi_{\text{bad}} |\psi_{i-1}\rangle\|.$$

(105)

Now, there are some complex numbers $a_{(\alpha_L, \alpha_R)\beta\gamma D}$ such that

$$(I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) |\psi_{i-1}\rangle = \sum_{(\alpha_L, \alpha_R)\beta\gamma D : \text{good}} a_{(\alpha_L, \alpha_R)\beta\gamma D} |(\alpha_L, \alpha_R), \beta, \gamma\rangle \otimes |D\rangle$$

(106)

$$= \sum_{(\alpha_L, \alpha_R)\beta\gamma D : \text{good}} a_{(\alpha_L, \alpha_R)\beta\gamma D} |(\alpha_L, \alpha_R), \beta, \gamma\rangle \otimes |D\rangle$$

$$+ \sum_{(\alpha_L, \alpha_R)\beta\gamma D : \exists (\alpha_L, \alpha_R)-\text{entry in } D} a_{(\alpha_L, \alpha_R)\beta\gamma D} |(\alpha_L, \alpha_R), \beta, \gamma\rangle \otimes |D\rangle,$$

(107)

where $(\alpha_L, \alpha_R) \in \{0,1\}^{n/2} \times \{0,1\}^{n/2}$, $\beta \in \{0,1\}^{n/2}$, and $\gamma \in \{0,1\}^{\ell - (3n/2)}$ corresponds to $A$’s query, answer, and the remaining registers, respectively (here we assume that $A$ has $\ell$-qubit states). In addition, each $D$ satisfies $|D| \leq i - 2$, since each query to the compressed standard oracle with errors CstOE affects only the qubits that correspond to a single entry of each database.

Then, after the operation of CstOE, each normalized summand of (107) becomes

$$|(\alpha_L, \alpha_R), \beta \oplus y, \gamma\rangle \otimes |D\rangle$$

(108)

for some $y$ with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$, from Proposition 1. In particular, the database remains good. Thus, this term becomes 0 after the operation of $\Pi_{\text{bad}}$, with errors in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. Since the summands of (107) are orthogonal to each other, it follows that

$$\Pi_{\text{bad}} \text{CstOE} \left( \sum_{(\alpha_L, \alpha_R)\beta\gamma D : \text{good}} a_{(\alpha_L, \alpha_R)\beta\gamma D} |(\alpha_L, \alpha_R), \beta, \gamma\rangle \otimes |D\rangle \right) = 0$$

(109)

with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. 

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Next, after the operation of CstOE, each normalized summand
\[ |(\alpha_L, \alpha_R), \beta \oplus y, \gamma \rangle \otimes |D\rangle \]
of (106) becomes
\[ \sum_{\delta} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |(\alpha_L, \alpha_R), \beta \oplus \delta, \gamma \rangle \otimes |D \cup (\alpha_L, \alpha_R, \delta)\rangle \] (110)
with an error in \( O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}}) \). In addition,
\[ II_{\text{bad}} \left( \sum_{\delta} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |(\alpha_L, \alpha_R), \beta \oplus \delta, \gamma \rangle \otimes |D \cup (\alpha_L, \alpha_R, \delta)\rangle \right) \]
\[ = \sum_{\delta : \exists x_R \text{ s.t. } (\alpha_L, x_R, \delta) \in D} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |(\alpha_L, \alpha_R), \beta \oplus \delta, \gamma \rangle \otimes |D \cup (\alpha_L, \alpha_R, \delta)\rangle \] (111)
holds, which implies that
\[ \left\| II_{\text{bad}} \left( \sum_{\delta} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |(\alpha_L, \alpha_R), \beta \oplus \delta, \gamma \rangle \otimes |D \cup (\alpha_L, \alpha_R, \delta)\rangle \right) \right\|^2 \]
\[ = \frac{1}{2^{n/2}} |\{ \delta : \exists x_R \text{ s.t. } (\alpha_L, x_R, \delta) \in D\}| \leq O \left( \frac{i}{2^{n/2}} \right) \] (112)
holds, since \( |D| \leq i - 2 \). Thus, for each normalized summand \( |(\alpha_L, \alpha_R), \beta \oplus y, \gamma \rangle \otimes |D\rangle \) of (106),
\[ II_{\text{bad}} \text{CstOE} \left( |(\alpha_L, \alpha_R), \beta \oplus y, \gamma \rangle \otimes |D\rangle \right) = 0 \] (113)
with an error in \( O(\sqrt{i/2^{n/2}}) \). Therefore, since the summands of (106) are orthogonal to each other,
\[ II_{\text{bad}} \text{CstOE} \left( \sum_{(\alpha_L, \alpha_R) \beta \gamma} a_{(\alpha_L, \alpha_R) \beta \gamma} |(\alpha_L, \alpha_R), \beta, \gamma \rangle \otimes |D\rangle \right) = 0 \] (114)
with an error in \( O(\sqrt{i/2^{n/2}}) = O(\sqrt{i/2^{n/2}}) \).
From (106), (107), (109), and (114), it follows that
\[ \| II_{\text{bad}} \text{CstOE} (I - II_{\text{bad}}) |\phi_{i-1}\rangle \| \leq O \left( \sqrt{\frac{i}{2^{n/2}}} \right) \] (115)
holds.
Hence, from (105) and (115) it follows that

$$\|\Pi_{\text{bad}} | \phi_i \| \leq \|\Pi_{\text{bad}} | \phi_{i-1} \| + O \left( \sqrt{\frac{i}{2^{n/2}}} \right)$$

(116)

holds for each $i$. Thus

$$\|\Pi_{\text{bad}} | \phi_i \| \leq \sum_{1 \leq j \leq i-1} O \left( \sqrt{\frac{j}{2^{n/2}}} \right) = O \left( \sqrt{\frac{i^2}{2^{n/2}}} \right)$$

(117)

holds, which completes the proof of the claim (note that $\Pi_{\text{bad}} | \phi_1 = 0$ holds).

From the above claim and (104), it follows that

$$\|\Pi_{\text{coll}} | \phi_{q+1} \| \leq \|\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U^*_{\text{enc}}) (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) | \psi_{q+1} \|$$

$$+ O \left( \sqrt{\frac{q^3}{2^{n/2}}} \right)$$

(118)

holds.

Now, let us define projectors $\Pi_{\text{first}}, \Pi_{\text{second}}, \Pi_{\text{both}}, \Pi_{\text{none}}$ as the projection onto the spaces spanned by the sets of vectors

\[
\{(x_L, x_R), (x'_L, x'_R), z) \otimes |D\} : \exists (x_L, x_R)\text{-entry in } D \wedge \not\exists (x'_L, x'_R)\text{-entry in } D, \\
\{(x_L, x_R), (x'_L, x'_R), z) \otimes |D\} : \exists x_L, x_R)\text{-entry in } D \wedge \exists (x'_L, x'_R)\text{-entry in } D, \\
\{(x_L, x_R), (x'_L, x'_R), z) \otimes |D\} : \exists (x_L, x_R)\text{-entry in } D \wedge \not\exists (x'_L, x'_R)\text{-entry in } D, \\
\{(x_L, x_R), (x'_L, x'_R), z) \otimes |D\} : \not\exists (x_L, x_R)\text{-entry in } D \wedge \exists (x'_L, x'_R)\text{-entry in } D, \\
\{(x_L, x_R), (x'_L, x'_R), z) \otimes |D\} : \not\exists (x_L, x_R)\text{-entry in } D \wedge \not\exists (x'_L, x'_R)\text{-entry in } D, \\
\]

(119)

respectively (note that we assume that all databases are good in these definitions). Then we have that

$$\|\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U^*_{\text{enc}}) (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) | \psi_{q+1} \|$$

$$\leq \|\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U^*_{\text{enc}}) \Pi_{\text{first}}(I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) | \psi_{q+1} \|$$

$$+ \|\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U^*_{\text{enc}}) \Pi_{\text{second}}(I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) | \psi_{q+1} \|$$

$$+ \|\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U^*_{\text{enc}}) \Pi_{\text{both}}(I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) | \psi_{q+1} \|$$

$$+ \|\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U^*_{\text{enc}}) \Pi_{\text{none}}(I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) | \psi_{q+1} \|$$

(120)

holds.

Next we show the following claim. Intuitively, this claim shows that the probability that $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a half-collision of $F$ is negligible if databases do not contain half-collisions of $F$.

Claim. It holds that $\|\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U^*_{\text{enc}}) \Pi_{\text{first}}(I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) | \psi_{q+1} \|$, $\|\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U^*_{\text{enc}}) \Pi_{\text{second}}(I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) | \psi_{q+1} \|$, $\|\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U^*_{\text{enc}}) \Pi_{\text{both}}(I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) | \psi_{q+1} \|$, and $\|\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U^*_{\text{enc}}) \Pi_{\text{none}}(I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) | \psi_{q+1} \|$ are all in $O(\sqrt{q^3}/2^{n/2})$.
Proof. First, we show that the claim holds for $||\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}^*) \Pi_{\text{first}} (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) |\psi_{q+1}||$. It suffices to show that the claim holds for the case that

$$|\psi_{q+1} = |(x_L, x_R), (x'_L, x'_R), z) \otimes |D|,$$

where there is an $(x_L, x_R)$-entry in $D$ and there is no $(x'_L, x'_R)$-entry in $D$. In this case $\Pi_{\text{first}} (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) |\psi_{q+1} = |\psi_{q+1}$ holds, and from Proposition 1

$$\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}^*) |\psi_{q+1}$$

$$= \Pi_{\text{coll}} \left( |(x_L, x_R), (x'_L, x'_R), z) \otimes \sum_{F \in \text{comp}(D)} \sqrt{\frac{1}{|\text{comp}(D)|}} |F\right)$$

$$= |(x_L, x_R), (x'_L, x'_R), z) \otimes \sum_{F \in \text{comp}(D)} \sqrt{\frac{1}{|\text{comp}(D)|}} |F\right)\right)$$

holds with an error in $O(\sqrt{q^2/2^{n/2}})$. In addition,

$$\left\| |(x_L, x_R), (x'_L, x'_R), z) \otimes \sum_{F \in \text{comp}(D)} \sqrt{\frac{1}{|\text{comp}(D)|}} |F\right)\right\|^2$$

$$= \frac{1}{|\text{comp}(D)|} |\{F \in \text{comp}(D) | F(x_L, x_R) = F(x'_L, x'_R)\}| = \frac{1}{2^{n/2}}$$

holds. Thus we have that

$$||\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}^*) \Pi_{\text{first}} (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) |\psi_{q+1}|| = ||\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}^*) |\psi_{q+1}||$$

$$\leq O \left( \sqrt{\frac{q^2}{2^{n/2}}} \right) + O \left( \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} \right) \leq O \left( \sqrt{\frac{q^2}{2^{n/2}}} \right)$$

holds, which completes the proof of the claim for $||\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}^*) \Pi_{\text{first}} (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) |\psi_{q+1}||$.

The claim for $||\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}^*) \Pi_{\text{second}} (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) |\psi_{q+1}||$ can be shown in the same way.

Next we show the claim for $||\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}^*) \Pi_{\text{none}} (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) |\psi_{q+1}||$. It suffices to show that the claim holds for the case that

$$|\psi_{q+1} = |(x_L, x_R), (x'_L, x'_R), z) \otimes |D|,$$

where there is no $(x_L, x_R)$-entry and no $(x'_L, x'_R)$-entry in $D$. Similarly to the proof for $||\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}^*) \Pi_{\text{first}} (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) |\psi_{q+1}||$, we can show that

$$||\Pi_{\text{coll}} (I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}^*) \Pi_{\text{none}} (I - \Pi_{\text{bad}}) |\psi_{q+1}||$$

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\[
\| (x_L, x_R, (x'_L, x'_R), z) \otimes \sum_{F \in \text{comp}(D)} \sqrt{\frac{1}{|\text{comp}(D)|}} |F\rangle \| \\
\leq \sqrt{\frac{1}{|\text{comp}(D)|} \sum_{F \in \text{comp}(D)} |\{ F \in \text{comp}(D) \mid F(x_L, x_R) = F(x'_L, x'_R) \}|} + O \left( \sqrt{\frac{q^2}{2^n/2}} \right)
\]
where $\left\langle O(0^{n/2}, x) \right\rangle_R$ is the right half $n/2$ bits of $O(0^{n/2}, x)$. We can implement $G^O$ by making $O(1)$ queries.

When $O$ is the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction LR$_4$, we have that $G^O(x) = f_2(f_2(x \oplus f_1(0^{n/2})) \oplus f_1(0^{n/2}))$ holds. Thus, if all round functions of LR$_4$ are truly random functions, the function distribution of $G^O$ will be the same as that of the composition of two independent random functions $RF \circ RF$. On the other hand, when $O$ is a random permutation from $\{0, 1\}^n$ to $\{0, 1\}^n$, the function distribution of $G^O$ will be almost the same as that of the truly random function $RF$ from $\{0, 1\}^{n/2}$ to $\{0, 1\}^{n/2}$.

Since $RF \circ RF$ has twice as many collisions as $RF$ has, we can distinguish LR$_4$ from a truly random permutation by making $O((2^{n/2})^{1/2}) = O(2^{n/4})$ queries to $G^O$.

Conversion of the classical attack to a quantum attack. Next we explain how to convert the classical attack above to a quantum attack that makes $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries, and prove Theorem 3. The following lemma is crucial, which shows that we can distinguish $RF \circ RF$ from $RF$ by making $O((2^{n/2})^{1/3}) = O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries.

**Lemma 7.** Let us denote the composition of two independent random functions from $\{0, 1\}^{n/2}$ to $\{0, 1\}^{n/2}$ by $RF \circ RF$. Then, there exists a quantum algorithm $B$ that makes $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries and satisfies $Adv_{RF \circ RF}^{qPRF}(B) = \Omega(1)$. That is, there exists an algorithm that distinguishes $RF \circ RF$ from a random function with a constant probability, by making $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries.

**Proof.** We use the following fact that is shown by Ambainis [2].

**Fact 1 (Theorem 3 in [2]).** Let $X$ and $Y$ be finite sets, and $F : X \to Y$ be a function. Then there is a quantum algorithm that judges if there exist distinct elements $x_1, x_2 \in X$ such that $F(x_1) = F(x_2)$ with bounded error by making $O(|X|^{2/3})$ quantum queries to $F$.

Let $[N] \subset \{0, 1\}^{n/2}$ denote the subset $\{0, 1, \ldots, N - 1\}$ for each integer $1 \leq N \leq 2^{n/2}$. By using the above fact, we can deduce that for $1 \leq N \leq 2^{n/2}$ there exists a quantum algorithm $D_N$ such that, given oracle access to a function $F : \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \to \{0, 1\}^{n/2}$, it outputs 1 if there exist distinct elements $x_1, x_2 \in [N]$ such that $F(x_1) = F(x_2)$, and outputs 0 otherwise, with an error that is smaller than 1/30, by making $O(|N|^{2/3})$ quantum queries. (We can make such $D_N$ by iteratively running Ambainis’ algorithm $O(1)$ times for $F|_{[N]} : [N] \to \{0, 1\}^{n/2}$, which is the restriction of $F$ to $[N]$.)

Here we give an analysis of the qPRF advantage of $D_N$ on $RF \circ RF$, for each $N$. For a function $F : \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \to \{0, 1\}^{n/2}$ and a subset $Z \subset \{0, 1\}^{n/2}$, let $\text{coll}_Z^F$ denote the event that $F$ has a collision in $Z$, i.e., there are distinct $x_1, x_2 \in Z$ such that $F(x_1) = F(x_2)$. Then, we have that

$$\Pr[F \left[ \neg \text{coll}_Z^F \right] = \left(1 - \frac{1}{2^{n/2}}\right) \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{2^{n/2}}\right) \cdots \left(1 - \frac{N-1}{2^{n/2}}\right)$$

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holds, where $F$ is chosen from $\text{Func}(|0,1|^{n/2}, |0,1|^{n/2})$ uniformly at random. In addition, when $F_1$ and $F_2$ are chosen from $\text{Func}(|0,1|^{n/2}, |0,1|^{n/2})$ uniformly at random, we have that

$$
Pr_{F_1,F_2} \left[ \neg \text{coll}_{[N]}^{F_2 \circ F_1} \right] = Pr_{F_1} \left[ \neg \text{coll}_{[N]}^{F_1} \right] \cdot Pr_{F_2} \left[ \neg \text{coll}_{[N]}^{F_2} \right] = \left( Pr_{F} \left[ \neg \text{coll}_{[N]}^{F} \right] \right)^2.
$$

(131)

Now we have that

$$
\text{Adv}_{\text{RF} \circ \text{RF}}^{\text{PRF}}(D_N) = \text{Adv}_{\text{RF} \circ \text{RF}}^{\text{dist}}(D_N)
= \left| Pr_{F} \left[ D_{F_2 \circ F_1}^F () \rightarrow 1 \right] - Pr_{F_1,F_2} \left[ D_{F_2 \circ F_1}^F () \rightarrow 1 \right] \right|
\geq Pr_{F} \left[ \text{coll}_{[N]}^{F} \right] - Pr_{F_1,F_2} \left[ \text{coll}_{[N]}^{F_2 \circ F_1} \right] - \frac{2}{30}
$$

(132)

where we used the property that the error of $D_N$ is smaller than $1/30$. In addition, from (131) it follows that

$$
\left| Pr_{F} \left[ \text{coll}_{[N]}^{F} \right] - Pr_{F_1,F_2} \left[ \text{coll}_{[N]}^{F_2 \circ F_1} \right] \right|
= Pr_{F_1,F_2} \left[ \text{coll}_{[N]}^{F_2 \circ F_1} \right] - Pr_{F} \left[ \text{coll}_{[N]}^{F} \right]
= \left( 1 - \left( Pr_{F} \left[ \neg \text{coll}_{[N]}^{F} \right] \right)^2 \right) - \left( 1 - Pr_{F} \left[ \neg \text{coll}_{[N]}^{F} \right] \right)
= Pr_{F} \left[ \neg \text{coll}_{[N]}^{F} \right] \left( 1 - Pr_{F} \left[ \neg \text{coll}_{[N]}^{F} \right] \right)
$$

(133)

holds. Therefore we have that

$$
\text{Adv}_{\text{RF} \circ \text{RF}}^{\text{PRF}}(D_N) \geq Pr_{F} \left[ \neg \text{coll}_{[N]}^{F} \right] \left( 1 - Pr_{F} \left[ \neg \text{coll}_{[N]}^{F} \right] \right) - \frac{2}{30}
$$

(134)

holds. Now we show the following claim.

**Claim.** There exists a parameter $N_0$ which is in $O(2^{n/4})$ and

$$
\frac{3}{5} \geq \prod_{j=1}^{N_0-1} \left( 1 - \frac{j}{2^{n/2}} \right) \geq \frac{1}{5}
$$

(135)

holds for sufficiently large $n$. 

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Proof. First, let us denote \( p_N := \prod_{j=1}^{N-1} \left( 1 - \frac{j}{2^{n/2}} \right) \). For each \( 1 \leq N \leq \frac{2^n}{2} \), we have that
\[
\prod_{j=1}^{N-1} \left( 1 - \frac{j}{2^{n/2}} \right) \geq \left( 1 - \frac{N}{2^{n/2}} \right)^N = \left( 1 - \frac{N}{2^{n/2}} \right)^{\frac{2^n/2}{2^{n/2}}} - \frac{N^2}{2^{n/2}} \quad (136)
\]
holds, in addition that
\[
\prod_{j=1}^{N-1} \left( 1 - \frac{j}{2^{n/2}} \right) \leq \prod_{j=1}^{N-1} \left( e^{\frac{j}{2^{n/2}}} \right) = e^{\frac{N(N-1)}{2^{n/2}}} \quad (137)
\]
holds. Thus
\[
e^{-\frac{N(N-1)}{2^{n/2}}} \geq p_N \geq \left( 1 - \frac{N}{2^{n/2}} \right)^{\frac{2^n/2}{2^{n/2}}} - \frac{N^2}{2^{n/2}} \quad (138)
\]
holds.

Next, let us put \( N_0 := 2^{n/4} \cdot \sqrt{2 \log 2} \). Then
\[
e^{-\frac{N_0(N_0-1)}{2^{n/2}}} = e^{-\frac{N_0N_0}{2^{n/2}}} + \left( e^{-\frac{N_0(N_0-1)}{2^{n/2}}} - e^{-\frac{N_0N_0}{2^{n/2}}} \right)
= \frac{1}{2} + \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) \frac{N_0}{2^{n/2}} - \frac{1}{2} \quad (139)
\]
holds, and thus \( e^{-\frac{N_0(N_0-1)}{2^{n/2}}} \leq 3/5 \) holds for sufficiently large \( n \). In addition, since the function \( f(x) = (1 - x)^{-1/x} \) increases as \( x \) increases for \( 0 < x < 1 \) and \( \lim_{x \to 0} f(x) = e \) holds, we have that
\[
\left( 1 - \frac{N_0}{2^{n/2}} \right)^{\frac{2^n/2}{2^{n/2}}} \leq e + \frac{1}{10} \quad (140)
\]
holds for sufficiently large \( n \). Thus
\[
\left( 1 - \frac{N_0}{2^{n/2}} \right)^{\frac{N_0^2}{2^{n/2}}} \geq \left( e + \frac{1}{10} \right)^{\frac{N_0^2}{2^{n/2}}} = \left( e + \frac{1}{10} \right)^{-2 \log 2} \geq \frac{1}{5} \quad (141)
\]
holds for sufficiently large \( n \).

Therefore, if we put \( N_0 := 2^{n/4} \cdot \sqrt{2 \log 2} \),
\[
\frac{3}{5} \geq p_{N_0} \geq \frac{1}{5} \quad (142)
\]
holds for sufficiently large \( n \). Hence the claim follows. \( \square \)
From the above claim and (130), there exists a parameter $N_0$ which is in $O(2^{n/4})$, and

$$3 \geq \Pr[F \left[ -\mathsf{coll}[F_{N_0}] \right] \geq \frac{1}{5}$$  \tag{143}

holds for sufficiently large $n$. Hence, from (132) we have that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{qPRF}}_{\mathcal{D}_{N_0}}(B) \geq \frac{1}{5} \left( 1 - \frac{3}{5} \right) - \frac{2}{30} = \frac{17}{75} \geq \Omega(1).$$  \tag{144}

Therefore, if we put $B := \mathcal{D}_{N_0}$, this $B$ satisfies the claim of the lemma, since (144) holds and $\mathcal{D}_{N_0}$ makes at most $O((N_0)^{2/3}) = O((2^{n/4})^{2/3}) = O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries. \hfill $\square$

Next we show the following proposition.

**Proposition 6.** There exists a quantum algorithm $A$ that makes $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries and satisfies $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{qPRF}}_{\mathcal{L} \mathcal{R}_4}(A) = \Omega(1)$.

**Proof.** Suppose that we are given an oracle access to $O$, which is either the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction $\mathcal{L} \mathcal{R}_4$ or a random function from $\{0,1\}^n$ to $\{0,1\}^n$. Recall that the function $G^O : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ is defined by

$$G^O(x) := \left( O(0^{n/2}, x) \right)_R \oplus x,$$  \tag{145}

where $\left( O(0^{n/2}, x) \right)_R$ is the right half $n/2$ bits of $O(0^{n/2}, x)$. We can implement a quantum circuit that computes $G^O$ by making $O(1)$ queries.

Now we define a quantum algorithm $A$ as the following procedures.

1. Let $B$ be the same algorithm in Lemma 7.
2. Run $B$ relative to $G^O$.
3. If $B$ returns 1, output 1. If $B$ returns 0, output 0.

Here we give an analysis of $A$. When $O$ is the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction $\mathcal{L} \mathcal{R}_4$, we have that $G^O(x) = f_1(f_2(x \oplus f_1(0^{n/2})) \oplus f_1(0^{n/2})$ holds. Since we are considering the case that all round functions of $\mathcal{L} \mathcal{R}_4$ are truly random functions, the function distribution of $G^O$ will be the same as that of $\mathsf{RF} \circ \mathsf{RF}$. On the other hand, when $O$ is a random function from $\{0,1\}^n$ to $\{0,1\}^n$, the function distribution of $G^O$ will be the same as that of the truly random function from $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ to $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$. Thus, from Lemma 7 we have that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{qPRF}}_{\mathcal{L} \mathcal{R}_4}(A) = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{qPRF}}_{\mathsf{RF} \circ \mathsf{RF}}(B) = \Omega(1)$$  \tag{146}

holds. In addition, since $B$ makes at most $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries and $G$ makes only $O(1)$ queries to $O$, $A$ makes at most $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries. Therefore the claim of the proposition holds. \hfill $\square$

12 Here we have to implement truncation of $O$’s outputs by using a technique observed in [14].
Finally we prove Theorem 4.

Proof (of Theorem 4). Let $\mathcal{A}$ be the same algorithm as in Proposition 6. Then, from Proposition 6 it follows that

$$\text{Adv}_{qPRP}^{LR_4}(\mathcal{A}) \geq \text{Adv}_{qPRF}^{LR_4}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{\text{dist},RF}^{LR_4}(\mathcal{A}) \geq \Omega(1) - O(1/2^{n/2}) = \Omega(1),$$

(147)

where we used the fact that, for any quantum adversary $\mathcal{A}'$ that makes at most $q$ queries, the distinguishing advantage $\text{Adv}_{\text{dist},RF}^{LR_4}(\mathcal{A}')$ is upper bounded by $O(q^3/2^n)$ for a random function and a random permutation from $\{0,1\}^n$ to $\{0,1\}^n$. Thus the claim of the theorem holds. \qed