On Round Optimal Secure Multiparty Computation from Minimal Assumptions

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Abstract

We study the problem of constructing secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols in the standard broadcast communication model from minimal assumptions. We focus on security in the plain model against malicious adversaries who may corrupt any majority of parties. In this setting, we first identify $k$-round “bidirectional” oblivious transfer (OT) as the minimal assumption for $k$-round MPC. In a bidirectional OT, each round consists of messages from both the OT sender and receiver (as opposed to alternating-message OT, where a round consists of a message from only one of the parties).

Since four rounds are necessary for MPC, we next investigate the possibility of constructing $k$-round MPC for every $k \geq 4$ from minimal assumptions. We provide a nearly full resolution:

- We construct four round MPC based on any four round bidirectional OT and injective one-way functions.
- For any $k > 4$, we construct $k$-round MPC based on any $k$-round bidirectional OT.

Our second result is optimal and the first result is nearly optimal. Previously, four round MPC protocols were only known based on stronger assumptions, and five or more round MPC protocols were known based on alternating-message OT.

1 Introduction

The ability to securely compute on private datasets of individuals has wide applications of tremendous benefits to society. Secure multiparty computation (MPC) \cite{Yao86, GMW87} provides a solution to the problem of computing on private data by allowing a group of parties to jointly evaluate any function over their private inputs in such a manner that no one learns anything beyond the output of the function.

Since its introduction nearly three decades ago, MPC has been extensively studied along two fundamental lines: necessary assumptions \cite{GMW87, Kil88, IPS08}, and round complexity \cite{GMW87, BMR90, KOS03, KO04, Pas04, PW10, Wee10, Goy11, GMPP16, ACJ17, BHP17, COSV17b, COSV17a}. We focus on security against a dishonest majority of malicious corruptions in the plain model. In this setting, both of these topics, individually, are by now pretty well understood:

- It is well known that oblivious transfer (OT) is both necessary and sufficient \cite{Kil88, IPS08} for MPC.
- A recent sequence of works have established that four rounds are both necessary \cite{GMPP16} and sufficient \cite{ACJ17, BHP17, BGJ+18, HHPV18} for MPC (with respect to black-box simulation). However, the assumptions required by these works are far from optimal, ranging from sub-exponential hardness assumptions \cite{ACJ17, BHP17} to polynomial hardness of specific forms of encryption schemes \cite{HHPV18} or specific number-theoretic assumptions \cite{BGJ+18}.
In this work, we consider the goal of simultaneously minimizing the round complexity and the necessary assumptions for MPC. Namely, we ask the following question:

Can we construct round optimal MPC from minimal assumptions?

**On the Minimal Assumption.** We study MPC in the standard broadcast communication model, where in each round, every party broadcasts a message to the other parties. In this model, $k$-round MPC with dishonest majority implies $k$-round (malicious-secure) OT where each round consists of messages from both the OT sender and the receiver, i.e., bidirectional OT. In particular, it does not necessarily imply $k$-round OT in the two-party alternating message model, where each round consists of a message from only one of the two parties. In other words, the minimal assumption for $k$-round MPC is $k$-round bidirectional OT. As such the above question can be re-stated as whether there exists four round MPC from four round bidirectional OT?

Interestingly, while we focus on the case of $k = 4$, $k$-round MPC is not known from $k$-round bidirectional OT even for the case of $k > 4$. A recent work of [BL18] constructed $k$-round MPC from any $k$-round OT with alternating messages; however, their work does not extend to the case of bidirectional OT. This leaves open the following fundamental question:

Does there exist $k$-round MPC based on $k$-round bidirectional OT?

### 1.1 Our Results

We provide a nearly full resolution of the above question. Our main result is a four round MPC protocol in the plain model based on any four round bidirectional OT and injective one-way functions (OWFs).

**Theorem 1.** Assuming the existence of four round bidirectional OT and injective OWFs, there exists a four round MPC protocol for any efficiently computable functionality in the plain model.

While OT implies one-way functions, we do not know whether it also implies injective OWFs. As such, the main remaining problem left open by our work is removing the use of injective OWFs from our result.

We next consider the case of $k > 4$. Here, we provide an optimal result by constructing $k$-round MPC based only on $k$-round bidirectional OT.

**Theorem 2.** For any $k > 4$, assuming the existence of $k$-round bidirectional OT, there exists a $k$-round MPC protocol for any efficiently computable functionality in the plain model.

We note that while a $k$-round OT with alternating messages is also a $k$-round bidirectional OT, it is unknown whether a $k$-round bidirectional OT implies $k$-round OT with alternating messages. Indeed, using $k$-round bidirectional OT in the design of $k$-round MPC leads to new challenges. See Section 1.2 for discussion.

In the sequel, unless mentioned otherwise, we refer to bidirectional OT as simply OT.

### 1.2 Technical Overview

In this section, we provide an overview of the main ideas underlying our results. We first focus on four round MPC based on four round OT and injective one-way functions. In Section 1.3, we describe how we can omit the use of injective one-way functions to obtain $k$-round MPC for $k > 4$ based only on $k$-round OT.
How to Enforce Honest Behavior? We start by highlighting the main challenge in the design of four-round MPC. In any candidate four-round protocol, a rushing adversary may always choose to abort after receiving the messages of honest parties in the last round. At this point, the adversary has already received enough information to obtain the output of the function being computed. This suggests that we must enforce “honest behavior” on the protocol participants within the first three rounds in order to achieve security against malicious adversaries. Indeed, without any such safeguard, a malicious adversary may be able to learn the inputs of the honest parties, e.g., by acting maliciously so as to change the functionality being computed to the identity function.

Zero knowledge (ZK) proofs [GMR89] are a standard tool for enforcing honest behavior on the participants of a protocol. However, ZK proofs (with black-box simulation) are known to be impossible in three rounds [GK96b]. Indeed, for this reason, all recent works on four-round MPC devise non-trivial strategies that only utilize weaker notions of ZK (that are achievable in three or less rounds) to enforce honest behavior within the first three rounds. However, all these approaches end up relying on assumptions that are far from optimal: [ACJ17] and [BHP17] use super-polynomial time hardness assumptions, [HHPV18] use Zaps [DN00] and affine-homomorphic encryption schemes, and [BGJ18] use a new notion of promise ZK together with three-round strong WI [JKKR17], both of which require specific number-theoretic assumptions.

A Deferred Verification Approach. We devise a different approach to address the above challenge. We do not require the parties to explicitly prove honest behavior within the first three rounds. Of course, this immediately opens up the possibility for an adversary to cheat in the first three rounds in such a manner that by observing the messages of the honest parties in the fourth round, it can completely break privacy. To prevent such an attack, we require the parties to “encrypt” their last round message in such a manner that it can only be decrypted by using a “witness” that establishes honest behavior in the first three rounds. In other words, the verification check for honest behavior is deferred to the fourth round.

This raises two immediate questions: what constitutes a valid witness, and how can we implement such a conditional decryption mechanism? Let us start by addressing the first question. A natural idea is to set the input and randomness of a party $i$ used in the first three rounds of the protocol as its witness for establishing honest behavior. However, consider the case where the number of parties is $n > 2$, and the number of corrupted parties is at least $t = 2$. In this case, it is not sufficient for a “decryptor” $i$ to establish its own honest behavior in the first three rounds. Indeed, in this case, a corrupted party who behaved honestly during the first three rounds would be able to decrypt the honest party messages in the fourth round even when another corrupted party behaved maliciously. Therefore, a valid witness must certify honest behavior by all the parties as opposed to a single party. One such witness is simply the input and randomness of all the parties. However, it is not clear how an individual decryptor can obtain such a witness without trivially violating privacy. Indeed, we need a “public” witness that can be obtained by all the parties.

We look towards ZK proof systems to address this issue. Suppose that we require each party to give a four-round ZK proof of honest behavior. If the ZK proof is delayed-input, it can be parallelized with the rest of the protocol such that the last round of ZK proof occurs in the last round of the MPC protocol. Now, let us set the witness to be the last round messages of all the ZK proofs. This witness can be obtained by any party in the last round, who can then use it for decryption. Indeed, this idea can be made to work if we implement the conditional decryption mechanism using witness encryption [GGSW13]. However, presently witness encryption is only known from non-standard assumptions (let alone OT and injective OWFs).

We, instead, use garbled circuits [Yao86] and four-round OT to implement the conditional decryption mechanism. Namely, each party $i$ garbles a circuit that contains hardwired the entire
transcript of the first three rounds as well the fourth message of party $i$. Upon receiving as input a witness $w = w_1, \ldots, w_n$, where $w_j$ is a witness for honest behavior of party $j$, it outputs the fourth round message. Each party $j$ can encode its witness $w_j$ in the OT receiver messages, and then release its randomness used inside OT in the fourth round so that any other party $j'$ can use it to compute the output of the OT, thereby learning the necessary wire labels for evaluating the garbled circuit sent by party $i$.

A problem with the above approach is that in a four round OT, the receiver’s input must fixed in the third round. This means that we can no longer use four round ZK proofs, and instead must use three round proofs to create public witnesses of honest behavior. But which three round proofs must we use? Towards this, we look to the weaker notion of promise ZK introduced by [BGJ+18] suffices. Roughly, promise ZK only achieves ZK property against malicious verifiers who do not abort. Importantly, unlike standard ZK, distributional promise ZK can be achieved in only three rounds with black-box simulation in the bidirectional message model. This raises two questions – is promise ZK sufficient for our purposes, and what assumptions are required for three round promise ZK?

**Promise ZK Under the Hood.** Let us start with the first question. An immediate challenge with using promise ZK is that it provides no security in the case where the verifier always aborts. In application to four round MPC, this corresponds to the case where the (rushing) adversary always aborts in the third round. Since the partial transcript up to third round already contains inputs of honest parties, we still need to argue security in this case. The work of [BGJ+18] addressed this problem by using a “hybrid” ZK protocol that achieves promise ZK property when adversary is non-aborting, and strong witness-indistinguishability (WI) property against aborting adversaries. The idea is that by relying on strong WI property (only in the case where adversary aborts in the third round), we can switch from using real inputs of honest parties to input 0. However, three round strong WI is only known based on specific number-theoretic assumptions [JKKR17].

To minimize our use of assumptions, we do not use strong WI, and instead “mimic” its affect by using promise ZK under the hood. Specifically, since we use the third round prover message of promise ZK as a witness for conditional decryption, it is not given in the clear, but is instead “encrypted” inside the OT receiver messages in the third round. This has the positive effect of “shielding” promise ZK from the case where the adversary always aborts in the third round. In particular, we can use the following strategy for arguing security against aborting adversaries: we first switch from using promise ZK third round prover message to simply using 0’s as the OT receiver’s inputs. Now, we can replace the honest parties’ inputs with 0 inputs by relying on the security of the sub-protocols used within the first three rounds. Next, we can switch back to using honestly computed promise ZK third round prover message as the OT receiver’s inputs.

Let us now consider the second question, namely, the assumptions required for three round promise ZK. The work of [BGJ+18] used specific number-theoretic assumptions to construct three round (distributional) promise ZK. However, we only wish to rely on the use of injective OWFs. Towards this, we note that the only ingredient in the construction of promise ZK by [BGJ+18] that relies on the use of specific number-theoretic assumptions is a three round rewind-secure WI proof system. Roughly, this is a proof system where the WI property holds even against verifiers who can rewind the prover an a priori bounded number of times. A very recent work of [GR19] provides a construction of such a rewind-secure WI only based on injective OWFs. By using their result, we can obtain three round promise ZK based on injective OWFs. For completeness, we describe the construction of [GR19] in Appendix A.

**Implementing the Strategy.** While the above ideas form the basis of our approach, we run into
several additional challenges during implementation. In order to explain these challenges and our solution ideas, we first describe the high-level template of our four round MPC protocol based on the ideas discussed so far. To narrow the focus of the discussion on the challenges unique to the present work, we ignore several important details for now and discuss them later.

We devise a compiler from a specific four round delayed semi-malicious [BL18, ACJ17] MPC to a four round malicious-secure MPC protocol. Roughly speaking, a $k$-round MPC protocol is delayed semi-malicious if in the second last round, a corrupted party is required to output (on a special tape) a witness (namely, its input and randomness) that establishes its honest behavior in all the rounds so far. We use the four round delayed semi-malicious protocol obtained by plugging in a four-round malicious-secure (which implies delayed semi-malicious security) OT in the $k$-round semi-malicious MPC protocol of [GS18, BL18] based on $k$-round semi-malicious OT. A useful property of this protocol is that it consists only of OT messages in the first $k-2$ rounds. Further, we also rely upon the random self-reducibility of OT, which implies that the first two rounds do not depend on the OT receiver’s input, and the first three rounds do not depend on the sender’s input.\footnote{We note that this property was also used by [BL18] in their construction of $k$-round malicious-secure MPC.}

To achieve malicious security, our compiler uses several building blocks, e.g., a three-round extractable commitment scheme that is executed in parallel with the first three rounds of the delayed semi-malicious MPC. The extractable commitment scheme is used by the parties to commit to their inputs and randomness. This allows the simulator for our protocol to extract the adversary’s inputs (and randomness) by rewinding the second and third rounds, and then use it to simulate the delayed semi-malicious MPC.

**Rewind-Secure OT.** The above template poses an immediate challenge in proving security of the protocol. Since the simulator rewinds the second and third rounds in order to extract the adversary’s inputs, this means that the second and third round messages of the delayed semi-malicious MPC also get rewound. For this reason, we can not rely upon delayed semi-malicious security of the MPC. Instead, we need the MPC protocol to achieve rewinding security. More specifically, since we are using an MPC protocol where the first two rounds only consist of OT messages, we need a four round rewinding-secure OT protocol. We need the following forms of rewinding security from the OT: (1) An adversarial sender cannot determine the input bit used by the receiver even if it can rewind the receiver an a priori bounded number of times during the second and third round. (2) The protocol achieves simulation-security even against corrupted receivers who can rewind the sender an a priori bounded number of times during the second and third round. We emphasize that we need rewinding security for both sender and receiver since we are using bidirectional OT.\footnote{Indeed, in a $k$-round OT with alternating messages, rewinding in the $k-2$ and $k-1$ rounds only affects security of the receiver since the $k-1$ round does not contain any message from the sender. In contrast, in a $k$-round bidirectional OT, each round contains a message from both the sender and receiver, and therefore necessitates rewinding security for both the parties. Indeed, this is why the malicious-secure MPC construction of [BL18] does not extend to the case of bidirectional OT.}

Of course, standard OT protocols do not guarantee rewinding security. We provide a generic construction of a four round rewinding secure OT starting from any four round OT, which may be of independent interest. Our transformation proceeds in two steps: first, we transform any four round OT into one that achieves rewinding security for honest receivers. Next, we transform this protocol into one that also achieves rewinding security for honest senders. Our transformation is in fact more general and works for any $k \geq 4$ round OT, when rewinding is restricted to rounds $k-2$ and $k-1$. For simplicity, we describe our ideas for the case where we need security against one rewinding; our transformation easily extends to handle more rewinds.

A first idea to achieve one-rewinding security for receivers is the following: run two copies of an OT protocol in parallel for the first $k-2$ rounds. In round $k-1$, the receiver randomly chooses
one of the two copies and only continues that OT execution, while the sender continues both the OT executions. In the last round, the parties only complete the OT execution that was selected by the receiver in round $k - 1$. Now, suppose that an adversarial sender rewinds the receiver in rounds $k - 2$ and $k - 1$. Then, if the receiver selects different OT copies on the “main” execution thread and the “rewound” execution thread, we can easily reduce one-rewind security of this protocol to stand-alone security of the underlying OT.

The above idea suffers from a subtle issue. Note that the above strategy for dealing with rewrites is inherently biased, namely, the choice made by the receiver on the rewound thread is not random, and is instead correlated with its choice on the main thread. If we use this protocol in the design of our MPC protocol, it leads to the following issue during simulation: consider an adversary who chooses a random $z$ and then always aborts if the receiver selects the $z$-th OT copy. Clearly, this adversary only aborts with probability $1/2$ in an honest execution. Now, consider the high-level simulation strategy for our MPC protocol discussed earlier, where the simulator rewinds the second and third rounds to extract the adversary’s inputs. In order to ensure rewind security of the OT, this simulator, with overall probability $1/2$, will select the $z$-th OT copy on all the rewound execution threads. However, in this case, the simulator will always fail in extracting the adversary’s inputs no matter how many times it rewinds.

We address the above problem via a secret-sharing approach. Instead of simply running two copies of OT, we run $\ell \cdot n$ copies in parallel during the first $k - 2$ rounds. These $\ell \cdot n$ copies can be divided into $n$ tuples, each consisting of $\ell$ copies. In round $k - 1$, the receiver selects a single copy from each of the $n$ tuples at random. It then uses $n$-out-of-$n$ secret sharing to divide its input bit $b$ into $n$ shares $b_1, \ldots, b_n$, and then uses share $b_i$ in the OT copy selected from the $i$-th tuple. In the last round, sender now additionally sends a garbled circuit (GC) that contains its input $(x_0, x_1)$ hardwired. The GC takes as input all the bits $b_1, \ldots, b_n$, reconstructs $b$ and then outputs $x_b$. The sender uses the labels of the GC as its inputs in the OT executions. Intuitively, by setting $\ell$ appropriately, we can ensure that for at least one tuple $i$, the OT copies randomly selected by the receiver on the main thread and the rewound threads are different, which ensures that $b_i$ (and thereby, $b$) remains hidden.

To achieve rewind security for honest senders, we once again use a secret-sharing approach, albeit in the opposite direction. Crucially, we are able to show that our transformation preserves the rewind security of receivers, while also achieving rewind security of senders. We refer the reader to the technical section for more details.

**Proofs Of Proofs.** We now describe another challenge in implementing our template of four round MPC. As discussed earlier, we use a three round extractable commitment scheme to enable extraction of the adversary’s inputs and randomness. For technical reasons, we use an extractable commitment scheme where the third round message of the committer is not “verifiable”, namely, the committer may be able to send a malformed message without being detected by the receiver.\(^4\)

Further, we require each party to prove the “well-formedness” of its commitment via promise ZK. This, however, poses the following challenge during simulation: since the third round prover message of promise ZK is encrypted inside OT receiver message, the simulator doesn’t know whether the adversary’s commitment is well-formed or not. In particular, if the adversary’s commitment is not well-formed, the simulator may end up running forever, in its attempt to extract the adversary’s input via rewinding.

One natural idea to deal with this issue is to first extract adversary’s promise ZK message from the OT executions via rewinding, and then decide whether or not to attempt extracting the

\(^4\)This property is crucially used to achieve rewind-security, which in turn is required in the security proof of our MPC protocol for similar reasons as discussed for the case of OT.
adversary’s input. However, since we are using an arbitrary (malicious-secure) OT, we do not know in advance the number of re-winds required for extracting the receiver’s input. This in turns means that we cannot correctly set the rewind security of the sub-protocols used in our final MPC protocol appropriately in advance.

We address this issue via the following strategy. We use another three round (delayed-input) extractable commitment scheme [PRS02] as well as another copy of promise ZK. This copy of promise ZK proves honest behavior in the first three rounds, and its third message is committed inside the extractable commitment. Further, the third round message of the extractable commitment is such that it allows for polynomial-time extraction (with the possibility of “over-extraction”). This, however, comes at the cost that this extractable commitment does not achieve any rewind security. Interestingly, stand-alone security of this scheme suffices for our purposes since we only use it in the case where the adversary always aborts in the third round (and therefore, no re-winds are performed).

The main idea is that by using such a special-purpose extractable commitment scheme, we can ensure that an a priori fixed constant number of re-winds are sufficient for extracting the committed value, namely, the promise ZK third round prover message, with noticeable probability. This, in turn, allows us to set the rewind security of other sub-protocols used in our MPC protocol in advance to specific constants.

Of course, the adversary may always choose to commit to malformed promise ZK messages within the extractable commitment scheme. In this case, our simulator may always decide not to extract adversary’s input, even if the adversary was behaving honestly otherwise. To address this issue, we use a proofs of proofs strategy. Namely, we require the first copy of promise ZK, which is encrypted inside OT, to prove that the second copy of promise ZK is “accepting”. In this case, if the adversary commits malformed promise ZK messages within the extractable commitment, the promise ZK message inside OT will not be accepting. This, in turn, means that due to the security of garbled circuits, the fourth round messages of the parties will become “opaque”.

Other Challenges. The above discussion ignores several additional challenges that arise in fully implementing our template for four round MPC. This includes issues such as malleability of promise ZK as well as malleability across different sub-protocols used inside our protocol. We handle many of these issues by adapting ideas from [BGJ+18]. For example, similar to [BGJ+18], we use the specific three-round non-malleable commitment scheme of [GPR16] with a pseudorandom third message. Further, we also use different “levels” of rewinding security for our sub-protocols in order to achieve non-malleability across different sub-protocols. We also carefully use the analysis of [GK96a] to ensure that our simulator runs in expected polynomial time.

Finally, we note that we use promise ZK in a non-black-box manner. That is, we directly use all of its building blocks inside our MPC protocol, and rely on their security properties separately.

1.3 $k$-round MPC for $k > 4$

We now briefly discuss how our four round MPC protocol can be adapted to obtain $k$-round MPC from any $k$-round OT for $k > 4$.

We first note that the only reason why our four round protocol relies on injective OWFs is because of the use of non-interactive commitments inside the constructions of (rewind-secure) extractable commitments, non-malleable commitments and rewind-secure WI. By using two round statistically binding commitment schemes based on one-way functions, we can easily obtain a five round MPC protocol based only on five round OT. The first round of this protocol consists only of the first round messages of the two round commitment scheme used within the aforementioned
sub-protocols, and the first round messages of five round OT. The remaining four rounds are similar to the four round MPC protocol.

Next, the above five round protocol can be extended to obtain any $k > 5$ round MPC based on $k$-round OT. The first $k - 5$ rounds of the protocol consist only of the first $k - 5$ round messages of the OTs. The remaining five rounds are similar to the five round MPC protocol.

1.4 Related Work

The round complexity of MPC has been extensively studied over the years in a variety of models. Here, we provide a short survey of malicious-secure MPC protocols in the plain model. We refer the reader to [BGJ$^+$18] for a more comprehensive survey.

Beaver et al. [BMR90] initiated the study of constant round MPC in the honest majority setting. Several follow-up works subsequently constructed constant round MPC against dishonest majority (which is the focus of the present work) [KOS03, Pas04, PW10, Wee10, Goy11]. Garg et al. [GMPP16] established a lower bound of four rounds for MPC. They constructed five and six round MPC protocols using indistinguishability obfuscation and LWE, respectively, together with three-round robust non-malleable commitments.

The first four round MPC protocols were constructed independently by Ananth et al. [ACJ17] and Brakerski et al. [BHP17] based on different sub-exponential-time hardness assumptions. [ACJ17] also constructed a five round MPC protocol based on polynomial-time hardness assumptions. Ciampi et al. constructed four-round protocols for multiparty coin-tossing [COSV17b] and two-party computation [COSV17a] from polynomial-time assumptions. Benhamouda and Lin [BL18] gave a general transformation from any $k$-round OT with alternating messages to $k$-round MPC, for $k > 5$. More recently, independent works of Badrinarayanan et al. [BGJ$^+$18] and Halevi et al. [HHPV18] constructed four round MPC protocols for general functionalities based on different polynomial-time assumptions. Specifically, [BGJ$^+$18] rely on DDH (or QR or $N$-th Residuosity), and [HHPV18] rely on Zaps, affine-homomorphic encryption schemes and injective one-way functions (which can all be instantiated from QR).

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Secure Multiparty Computation

We provide the definition of MPC against malicious adversaries as well as (delayed) semi-malicious adversaries. Parts of this section have been taken verbatim from [Gol04].

A multi-party protocol is cast by specifying a random process that maps pairs of inputs to pairs of outputs (one for each party). We refer to such a process as a functionality. The security of a protocol is defined with respect to a functionality $f$. In particular, let $n$ denote the number of parties. A non-reactive $n$-party functionality $f$ is a (possibly randomized) mapping of $n$ inputs to $n$ outputs. A multiparty protocol with security parameter $\lambda$ for computing a non-reactive functionality $f$ is a protocol running in time $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ and satisfying the following correctness requirement: if parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ with inputs $(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ respectively, all run an honest execution of the protocol, then the joint distribution of the outputs $y_1, \ldots, y_n$ of the parties is statistically close to $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$.

A reactive functionality $f$ is a sequence of non-reactive functionalities $f = (f_1, \ldots, f_\ell)$ computed in a stateful fashion in a series of phases. Let $x_i^j$ denote the input of $P_i$ in phase $j$, and let $s_i^j$ denote the state of the computation after phase $j$. Computation of $f$ proceeds by setting $s_0$ equal to the empty string and then computing $(y_1^j, \ldots, y_n^j, s_j) \leftarrow f_j(s_i^{j-1}, x_1^j, \ldots, x_n^j)$ for $j \in [\ell]$, where $y_i^j$
denotes the output of $P_i$ at the end of phase $j$. A multi-party protocol computing $f$ also runs in $\ell$ phases, at the beginning of which each party holds an input and at the end of which each party obtains an output. (Note that parties may wait to decide on their phase-$j$ input until the beginning of that phase.) Parties maintain state throughout the entire execution. The correctness requirement is that, in an honest execution of the protocol, the joint distribution of all the outputs \{y'_{1}, \ldots, y'_{n}\}_{j=1} of all the phases is statistically close to the joint distribution of all the outputs of all the phases in a computation of $f$ on the same inputs used by the parties.

**Defining Security.** We assume that readers are familiar with standard simulation-based definitions of secure multi-party computation in the standalone setting. We provide a self-contained definition for completeness and refer to [Gol04] for a more complete description. The security of a protocol (with respect to a functionality $f$) is defined by comparing the real-world execution of the protocol with an ideal-world evaluation of $f$ by a trusted party. More concretely, it is required that for every adversary $A$, which attacks the real execution of the protocol, there exist an adversary $\text{Sim}$, also referred to as a simulator, which can achieve the same effect in the ideal-world. Let’s denote $\vec{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$.

**The real execution** In the real execution of the $n$-party protocol $\pi$ for computing $f$ is executed in the presence of an adversary $A$. The honest parties follow the instructions of $\pi$. The adversary $A$ takes as input the security parameter $k$, the set $I \subset [n]$ of corrupted parties, the inputs of the corrupted parties, and an auxiliary input $z$. $A$ sends all messages in place of corrupted parties and may follow an arbitrary polynomial-time strategy.

The interaction of $A$ with a protocol $\pi$ defines a random variable $\text{REAL}_{\pi,A}(z), I(k, \vec{x})$ whose value is determined by the coin tosses of the adversary and the honest players. This random variable contains the output of the adversary (which may be an arbitrary function of its view) as well as the outputs of the uncorrupted parties. We let $\text{REAL}_{\pi,A}(z), I$ denote the distribution ensemble \{REAL$_{\pi,A}(z), I(k, \vec{x})$\}$k \in \mathbb{N}, (\vec{x}, z) \in \{0,1\}^\ast$.

**The ideal execution – security with abort**. In this second variant of the ideal model, fairness and output delivery are no longer guaranteed. This is the standard relaxation used when a strict majority of honest parties is not assumed. In this case, an ideal execution for a function $f$ proceeds as follows:

- **Send inputs to the trusted party:** As before, the parties send their inputs to the trusted party, and we let $x'_i$ denote the value sent by $P_i$. Once again, for a semi-honest adversary we require $x'_i = x_i$ for all $i \in I$.

- **Trusted party sends output to the adversary:** The trusted party computes $f(x'_1, \ldots, x'_n) = (y_1, \ldots, y_n)$ and sends $\{y_i\}_{i \in I}$ to the adversary.

- **Adversary instructs trust party to abort or continue:** This is formalized by having the adversary send either a continue or abort message to the trusted party. (A semi-honest adversary never aborts.) In the latter case, the trusted party sends to each uncorrupted party $P_i$ its output value $y_i$. In the former case, the trusted party sends the special symbol $\bot$ to each uncorrupted party.

- **Outputs:** $\text{Sim}$ outputs an arbitrary function of its view, and the honest parties output the values obtained from the trusted party.

The interaction of $\text{Sim}$ with the trusted party defines a random variable $\text{IDEAL}_{f_{\bot,A}(z), I(k, \vec{x})}$ as above, and we let \{IDEAL$_{f_{\bot,A}(z), I(k, \vec{x})}$\}$k \in \mathbb{N}, (\vec{x}, z) \in \{0,1\}^\ast$ where the subscript "$\bot$" indicates that the adversary can abort computation of $f$. 
Having defined the real and the ideal worlds, we now proceed to define our notion of security.

**Definition 1.** Let \( k \) be the security parameter. Let \( f \) be an \( n \)-party randomized functionality, and \( \pi \) be an \( n \)-party protocol for \( n \in \mathbb{N} \).

1. We say that \( \pi \) \( t \)-securely computes \( f \) in the presence of malicious (resp., semi-honest) adversaries if for every PPT adversary (resp., semi-honest adversary) \( A \) there exists a PPT adversary (resp., semi-honest adversary) \( \text{Sim} \) such that for any \( I \subset [n] \) with \( |I| \leq t \) the following quantity is negligible:

\[
|\Pr[\text{REAL}_{\pi, A(z), I}(k, \overrightarrow{x}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{IDEAL}_{f, A(z), I}(k, \overrightarrow{x}) = 1]|.
\]

where \( \overrightarrow{x} = \{x_i\}_{i \in [n]} \in \{0, 1\}^* \) and \( z \in \{0, 1\}^* \).

2. Similarly, \( \pi \) \( t \)-securely computes \( f \) with abort in the presence of malicious adversaries if for every PPT adversary \( A \) there exists a polynomial time adversary \( \text{Sim} \) such that for any \( I \subset [n] \) with \( |I| \leq t \) the following quantity is negligible:

\[
|\Pr[\text{REAL}_{\pi, A(z), I}(k, \overrightarrow{x}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{IDEAL}_{f \perp, A(z), I}(k, \overrightarrow{x}) = 1]|.
\]

**Security Against (Delayed) Semi-Malicious Adversaries** We also define security against semi-malicious adversaries that are stronger than semi-honest adversaries. A semi-malicious adversary is modeled as an interactive Turing machine (ITM) which, in addition to the standard tapes, has a special witness tape. In each round of the protocol, whenever the adversary produces a new protocol message \( \text{msg} \) on behalf of some party \( \mathbb{P}_k \), it must also write to its special witness tape some pair \((x, r)\) of input \( x \) and randomness \( r \) that explains its behavior. More specifically, all of the protocol messages sent by the adversary on behalf of \( \mathbb{P}_k \) up to that point, including the new message \( m \), must exactly match the honest protocol specification for \( \mathbb{P}_k \) when executed with input \( x \) and randomness \( r \). Note that the witnesses given in different rounds need not be consistent. Also, we assume that the attacker is rushing and hence may choose the message \( m \) and the witness \((x, r)\) in each round adaptively, after seeing the protocol messages of the honest parties in that round (and all prior rounds). Lastly, the adversary may also choose to abort the execution on behalf of \( \mathbb{P}_k \) in any step of the interaction.

A delayed semi-malicious adversary [BL18] is similar to semi-malicious adversary, except that it only needs to output the witness (i.e., a defense of honest behavior) in the second last round of the protocol. We refer the reader to [BL18] for a more detailed discussion.

**Definition 2.** We say that a protocol \( \pi \) securely realizes \( f \) for (delayed) semi-malicious adversaries if it satisfies Definition 1 when we only quantify over all (delayed) semi-malicious adversaries \( A \).

### 2.2 Extractable Commitment Scheme

We will use a variant of a simple challenge-response based extractable statistically-binding string commitment scheme \( \langle C, R \rangle \) that has been used in several prior works, most notably [PRS02, Ros04]. We note that in contrast to [PRS02] where a multi-slot protocol was used, here (similar to [Ros04]), we only need a one-slot protocol.

**Protocol \( \langle C, R \rangle \).** Let \( \text{com}(\cdot) \) denote the commitment function of a non-interactive perfectly binding string commitment scheme which requires the assumption of injective one-way functions for its construction. Let \( n \) denote the security parameter. The commitment scheme \( \langle C, R \rangle \) is described as follows.

**Commit Phase:**
1. To commit to a string $\text{str}$, $C$ chooses $k = \omega(\log(n))$ independent random pairs $\{\alpha_{i,0}, \alpha_{i,1}\}_{i=1}^{k}$ of strings such that $\forall i \in [k]$, $\alpha_{i,0} \oplus \alpha_{i,1} = \text{str}$; and commits to all of them to $R$ using $\text{com}$. Let $B \leftarrow \text{com}(\text{str})$, and $A_{i}^{0} \leftarrow \text{com}(\alpha_{i,0})$, $A_{i}^{1} \leftarrow \text{com}(\alpha_{i,1})$ for every $i \in [k]$.

2. $R$ sends $k$ uniformly random bits $v_{1}, \ldots, v_{n}$.

3. For every $i \in [k]$, if $v_{i} = 0$, $C$ opens $A_{i}^{0}$, otherwise it opens $A_{i}^{1}$ to $R$ by sending the appropriate decommitment information.

**Open Phase:** $C$ opens all the commitments by sending the decommitment information for each one of them.

For our construction, we require a modified extractor for the extractable commitment scheme. The standard extractor returns the value $\text{str}$ that was committed to in the scheme. Instead, we require that the extractor return $i$, and the openings of $A_{i}^{0}$ and $A_{i}^{1}$. This extractor can be constructed easily, akin to the standard extractor for the extractable commitment scheme.

This completes the description of $(C, R)$.

### 2.3 Rewinding Secure Extractable Commitments

In this section, we describe a three round extractable commitment protocol $\text{RECom} = (S, R)$. While several constructions of three round extractable commitment schemes are known in the literature (see, e.g., [PRS02, Ros04]), the commitment scheme satisfies a “bounded-rewinding security” property, which roughly means that the value committed by a sender in an execution of the commitment protocol remains hidden even if a malicious receiver can rewind the sender back to the start of the second round of the protocol an a priori bounded $B_{\text{recom}}$ number of times. In our application, we set $B_{\text{recom}} = 4$; however, our construction also supports larger values of $B_{\text{recom}}$. For technical reasons, we don’t define or prove $B_{\text{recom}}$-rewinding security property and reusability property for our extractable commitment protocol. Instead, this is done inline in the our four round MPC protocol.

**Construction.** Let $\text{Com}$ denote a non-interactive perfectly binding commitment scheme based on injective one-way functions. Let $N$ and $B_{\text{recom}}$ be positive integers such that $N - B_{\text{recom}} - 1 \geq N_{2} + 1$. For $B_{\text{recom}} = 4$, it suffices to set $N = 12$.

The three round extractable commitment protocol $\text{RECom}$ is described in Figure 1.

**Well-Formedness of recom Transcripts.** We now define a “well-formedness” property of an execution transcript of $\text{RECom}$. Roughly, we say that a transcript $(\text{recom}_{1}^{S \rightarrow R}, \text{recom}_{2}^{R \rightarrow S}, \text{recom}_{3}^{S \rightarrow R})$ is well-formed w.r.t. an input $x$ and randomness $r$ if:

- $N - 1$ out of the $N$ tuples $\text{recom}_{3,\ell}^{S \rightarrow R} = (\alpha_{\ell}, \beta_{\ell})$ (where $\ell \in [N]$) are “honestly” computed using randomness $r = (\{p_{i}\}_{i=1}^{N}, \{r_{i}\}_{i=1}^{N})$ in the sense that: each $\alpha_{\ell}$ is a one-time pad of $x$ w.r.t. the key $p_{\ell}(0)$ where $p_{\ell}$ is a polynomial committed (using randomness $r_{\ell}$) in the first round message $\text{recom}_{1}^{S \rightarrow R}$, and each $\beta_{\ell}$ is a correct evaluation of the polynomial $p_{\ell}$ over the “challenge” value $z_{\ell}$ contained in $\text{recom}_{2}^{R \rightarrow S}$.

We now proceed to formally define the well-formedness property. For any set $T$, let $T[i]$ denote the $i^{th}$ element of $T$.

**Definition 3 (Well-Formed Transcripts).** An execution transcript $(\text{recom}_{1}^{S \rightarrow R}, \text{recom}_{2}^{R \rightarrow S}, \text{recom}_{3}^{S \rightarrow R})$ of $\text{recom}$ is said to be well-formed with respect to an input $x$ and randomness $r = (\{p_{i}\}_{i=1}^{N}, \{r_{i}\}_{i=1}^{N})$ if there exists an index set $I$ of size $N - 1$ such that the following holds:

- For every $j \in |I|$, $\text{recom}_{1, I[j]}^{S \rightarrow R} = \text{Com}(p_{I[j]}; r_{I[j]})$ (AND)
Sender $S$ has input $x$.

**Commitment Phase:**

1. **Round 1:**
   - $S$ does the following:
     - Pick $N$ random degree $B$-recom polynomials $p_1, \ldots, p_N$ over $\mathbb{Z}_q$, where $q$ is a prime larger than $2^\lambda$.
     - Compute $\text{recom}^{S \rightarrow R}_{1, \ell} \leftarrow \text{Com}(p_\ell; r_\ell)$ using a random string $r_\ell$, for every $\ell \in [N]$.
     - Send $\text{recom}^{S \rightarrow R}_{1} = (\text{recom}^{S \rightarrow R}_{1, 1}, \ldots, \text{recom}^{S \rightarrow R}_{1, N})$ to $R$.

2. **Round 2:**
   - $R$ does the following:
     - Pick random values $z_\ell \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ for every $\ell \in [N]$.
     - Send $\text{recom}^{R \rightarrow S}_{2} = (z_1, \ldots, z_N)$ to $S$.

3. **Round 3:**
   - $S$ does the following:
     - Compute $\text{recom}^{S \rightarrow R}_{3, \ell} \leftarrow (x \oplus p_\ell(0), p_\ell(z_\ell))$ for all $\ell \in [N]$.
     - Send $\text{recom}^{S \rightarrow R}_{3} = (\text{recom}^{S \rightarrow R}_{3, 1}, \ldots, \text{recom}^{S \rightarrow R}_{3, N})$ to $R$.

**Decommitment Phase:**

1. $S$ outputs $p_1, \ldots, p_N$ together with the randomness $r_1, \ldots, r_N$ used in the first round commitments.

2. $R$ first verifies the following:
   - For each $\ell \in [N]$, $\text{recom}^{S \rightarrow R}_{1, \ell} = \text{Com}(p_\ell; r_\ell)$.
   - Parse $\text{recom}^{S \rightarrow R}_{3, \ell} = (\alpha_\ell, \beta_\ell)$. Verify that $\beta_\ell = p_\ell(z_\ell)$.
   - For each $\ell \in [N]$, compute $x_\ell = p_\ell(0) \oplus \alpha_\ell$. Verify that all the $x_\ell$ values are equal.

If any of the above verifications fail, $R$ outputs $\perp$. Otherwise, $R$ outputs $x$.

---

**Figure 1:** Extractable Commitment Scheme recom.

- For every $j \in [I]$, $\text{recom}^{S \rightarrow R}_{3, I[j]} = (x \oplus p_{I[j]}(0), p_{I[j]}(z_{I[j]}))$, where $\text{recom}^{R \rightarrow S}_{2} = (z_1, \ldots, z_N)$

We remark that the above well-formedness property is “weak” in the sense that we only require $N - 1$ out of the $N$ tuples $\text{recom}^{S \rightarrow R}_{3, \ell} = (\alpha_\ell, \beta_\ell)$ to be honestly generated (instead of requiring that all $N$ tuples are honestly generated). This relaxation is crucial to establishing the $B_{\text{recom}}$-rewinding-security property for recom.

We now define an “admissibility” property for any input to the extractor.

**Definition 4 (Admissible Inputs).** An input set $(\text{recom}_1, \{\text{recom}_{I[j]}^j\}_{I[j] \in [B_{\text{recom}} + 1]}^{B_{\text{recom}} + 1})$ is said to be admissible if for every $i, j \in [B_{\text{recom}} + 1]$ s.t. $i \neq j$ and every $\ell \in [N]$, we have that $z^i_\ell \neq z^j_\ell$, where $\text{recom}^i_{2} = (z^i_1, \ldots, z^i_N)$.

**Extractor Ext_{recom}.** The extractor algorithm Ext_{recom} is described in Figure 2.\(^5\)

\(^5\)An admissible input set consisting of $(B_{\text{recom}} + 1)$ “well-formed” execution transcripts of recom that share the
Lemma 1. There exists a PPT extractor algorithm $\text{Ext}_{\text{recom}}$ such that, given a set of $(B_{\text{recom}} + 1)$ “well-formed” and “admissible” execution transcripts of RECom where each transcript consists of the same first round sender message, the extractor successfully extracts the value committed in each transcript, except with negligible probability.

**Input:** An admissible set $(\text{recom}_{1}, \{\text{recom}_{i}^{2}, \text{recom}_{i}^{3}\}_{i=1}^{B_{\text{recom}}+1})$ where $\forall i$, $(\text{recom}_{1}, \text{recom}_{i}^{2}, \text{recom}_{i}^{3})$ is well-formed w.r.t. some value $x_{i}$.

1. For every $i \in [B_{\text{recom}} + 1]$, parse $\text{recom}_{i}^{2} = (z_{i}^{1}, \ldots, z_{N}^{i})$ and $\text{recom}_{i}^{3} = (\text{recom}_{3,1}^{i}, \ldots, \text{recom}_{3,N+2}^{i})$.
2. For each $\ell \in [N]$:
   - Parse $\text{recom}_{3,\ell}^{i} = (\alpha_{\ell}^{i}, \beta_{\ell}^{i})$.
   - Using polynomial interpolation, compute a degree $B_{\text{recom}}$ polynomial $p_{\ell}$ over $\mathbb{Z}_{q}$ such that on point $z_{\ell}^{i}$, $p_{\ell}(z_{\ell}^{i}) = \beta_{\ell}^{i}$.
   - Compute $x_{\ell}^{i} = (\alpha_{\ell}^{i} \oplus p_{\ell}(0))$.
3. For every $i \in [B_{\text{recom}}]$, let $x^{i}$ be the value that equals a majority of the values in the set $\{x_{1}^{i}, \ldots, x_{N}^{i}\}$. If no such $k^{i}$ value exists, set $x_{i} = \bot$.
4. Output $(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{B_{\text{recom}}})$.

![Figure 2: Strategy of algorithm $\text{Ext}_{\text{recom}}$.](image)

**Proof.** We now analyze the extraction algorithm. Recall that for every $i \in [B_{\text{recom}}+1]$, the transcript $(\text{recom}_{1}, \text{recom}_{i}^{2}, \text{recom}_{i}^{3})$ is well-formed w.r.t. some value $x_{i}$. By the definition of well-formedness, we have that for every $i$, there exists at most one $j \in [N]$ such that $\text{recom}_{3,j}^{i}$ was not computed correctly and consistently with the other $\text{recom}_{3,j'}^{i}$. This means that overall, across all $i \in [B_{\text{recom}}+1]$ execution transcripts, there exists at most $(B_{\text{recom}} + 1)$ values of $\text{recom}_{3,j}^{i}$ that were not computed correctly. This implies that for at least $(N - B_{\text{recom}} - 1)$ values of $j$, the values $\text{recom}_{3,j}^{i}$ were computed correctly in all $B_{\text{recom}} + 1$ transcripts. This means that for every $i \in [B_{\text{recom}}+1]$, $(N - B_{\text{recom}} - 1)$ out of $N$ values $\{k_{1}^{i}, \ldots, k_{N}^{i}\}$ computed by the extractor are the same. Then, since $N - B_{\text{recom}} - 1 \geq \frac{N}{2} + 1$, we have that the extractor computes the correct values $k^{i}$ and $x_{i}$ for every $i \in [B_{\text{recom}}]$. \(\blacksquare\)

2.4 Non-Malleable Commitments

We start with the definition of non-malleable commitments by Pass and Rosen [PR05] and further refined by Lin et al [LPV08] and Goyal [Goy11]. (All of these definitions build upon the original definition of Dwork et al. [DDN91]).

In the real experiment, a man-in-the-middle adversary MIM interacts with a committer $C$ in the left session, and with a receiver $R$ in the right session. Without loss of generality, we assume same first round sender message can be obtained from a malicious sender via an expected PPT rewinding procedure. The expected PPT simulator in our application performs the necessary rew windings to obtain such transcripts and then feeds them to the extractor $\text{Ext}_{\text{recom}}$. 


that each session has identities or tags, and require non-malleability only when the tag for the left session is different from the tag for the right session.

At the start of the experiment, the committer $C$ receives an input $\text{val}$ and MIM receives an auxiliary input $z$, which might contain a priori information about $\text{val}$. Let $\text{MIM}_{(C,R)}(\text{val}, z)$ be a random variable that describes the value $\tilde{\text{val}}$ committed by MIM in the right session, jointly with the view of MIM in the real experiment.

In the ideal experiment, a PPT simulator $S$ directly interacts with MIM. Let $\text{Sim}_{(C,R)}(1^\lambda, z)$ denote the random variable describing the value $\tilde{\text{val}}$ committed to by $S$ and the output view of $S$.

In either of the two experiments, if the tags in the left and right interaction are equal, then the value $\tilde{\text{val}}$ committed in the right interaction, is defined to be $\bot$.

We define a strengthened version of non-malleable commitments for use in this paper.

**Definition 5 (Special Non-malleable Commitments).** A three round commitment scheme $\langle C, R \rangle$ is said to be special non-malleable if:

- For every synchronizing PPT MIM, there exists a PPT simulator $S$ such that the following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:

  \[
  \{ \text{MIM}_{(C,R)}(\text{val}, z) \}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}, \text{val} \in \{0,1\}^\lambda, z \in \{0,1\}^*} \quad \text{and} \quad \{ \text{Sim}_{(C,R)}(1^\lambda, z) \}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}, \text{val} \in \{0,1\}^\lambda, z \in \{0,1\}^*}
  \]

- $\langle C, R \rangle$ is delayed-input, that is, correctness holds even when the committer obtains his input only in the last round.

- $\langle C, R \rangle$ satisfies last-message pseudorandomness, that is, for every non-uniform PPT receiver $R^*$, it holds that $\{ \text{REAL}_0^{R^*}(1^\lambda) \}_\lambda$ and $\{ \text{REAL}_1^{R^*}(1^\lambda) \}_\lambda$ are computationally indistinguishable, where for $b \in \{0,1\}$, the random variable $\text{REAL}_b^{R^*}(1^\lambda)$ is defined via the following experiment.

  1. Run $C(1^\lambda)$ and denote its output by $(\text{Com}_1, \sigma)$, where $\sigma$ is its secret state, and $\text{Com}_1$ is the message to be sent to the receiver.

  2. Run the receiver $R^*(1^\lambda, \text{Com}_1)$, who outputs a message $\text{Com}_2$.

  3. If $b = 0$, run $C(\sigma, \text{Com}_2)$ and send its message $\text{Com}_3$ to $R^*$. Otherwise, if $b = 1$, compute $\text{Com}_3 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^m$ and send it to $R^*$. Here $m = m(\lambda)$ denotes $|\text{Com}_3|$.

  4. The output of the experiment is the output of $R^*$.

- $\langle C, R \rangle$ satisfies $2$-extractability.

Goyal et al. [GPR16] construct three-round special non-malleable commitments satisfying Definition 5 based on injective OWFs.

**Imported Theorem 1 ([GPR16]).** Assuming injective one-way functions, there exists a three round non-malleable commitment satisfying Definition 5.

### 2.5 Trapdoor Generation Protocol

This section, taken verbatim from [BGJ+18], discusses and constructs a Trapdoor Generation Protocol. In such a protocol, a sender $S$ (a.k.a. trapdoor generator) communicates with a receiver $R$. The protocol satisfies two properties: (i) Sender security, i.e., no cheating PPT receiver can

---

6A synchronizing adversary is one that sends its message for every round before obtaining the honest party’s message for the next round.
learn a valid trapdoor, and (ii) Extraction, i.e., there exists an expected PPT algorithm (a.k.a. extractor) that can extract a trapdoor from an adversarial sender via rewinding.

We construct a three-round trapdoor generation protocol where the first message sent by the sender determines the set of valid trapdoors, and in the next two rounds the sender proves that indeed it knows a valid trapdoor. Such schemes are known in the literature based on various assumptions [PRS02, Ros04, COSV17b]. Here, we consider trapdoor generation protocols with a stronger sender security requirement that we refer to as 1-rewinding security. Below, we formally define this notion and then proceed to give a three-round construction based on one-way functions. Our construction is a minor variant of the trapdoor generation protocol from [COSV17b].

**Syntax.** A trapdoor generation protocol

\[
\text{TDGen} = (\text{TDGen}_1, \text{TDGen}_2, \text{TDGen}_3, \text{TDOut}, \text{TDValid}, \text{TDExt})
\]

is a three round protocol between two parties - a sender (trapdoor generator) \(S\) and receiver \(R\) that proceeds as below.

1. **Round 1 - TDGen}_1(\cdot):**
   \(S\) computes and sends \(td_1^{S\rightarrow R} \leftarrow \text{TDGen}_1(r_S)\) using a random string \(r_S\).

2. **Round 2 - TDGen}_2(\cdot):**
   \(R\) computes and sends \(td_2^{R\rightarrow S} \leftarrow \text{TDGen}_2(td_1^{S\rightarrow R}; r_R)\) using randomness \(r_R\).

3. **Round 3 - TDGen}_3(\cdot):**
   \(S\) computes and sends \(td_3^{S\rightarrow R} \leftarrow \text{TDGen}_3(td_2^{R\rightarrow S}; r_S)\)

4. **Output - TDOut(\cdot):**
   The receiver \(R\) outputs \(\text{TDOut}(td_1^{S\rightarrow R}, td_2^{R\rightarrow S}, td_3^{S\rightarrow R})\).

5. **Trapdoor Validation Algorithm - TDValid(\cdot):**
   Given input \((t, td_1^{S\rightarrow R})\), output a single bit 0 or 1 that determines whether the value \(t\) is a valid trapdoor corresponding to the message \(td_1\) sent in the first round of the trapdoor generation protocol.

In what follows, for brevity, we set \(td_1\) to be \(td_1^{S\rightarrow R}\). Similarly we use \(td_2\) and \(td_3\) instead of \(td_2^{S\rightarrow R}\) and \(td_3^{S\rightarrow R}\), respectively. Note that the algorithm \(\text{TDValid}\) does not form a part of the interaction between the trapdoor generator and the receiver. It is, in fact, a public algorithm that enables public verification of whether a value \(t\) is a valid trapdoor for a first round message \(td_1\).

**Extraction.** There exists a PPT extractor algorithm \(\text{TDExt}\) that, given a set of values \({td_1, \{td_2^i, td_3^i\}_{i=1}^3}\) such that \(td_1, td_2, td_3\) are distinct and \(\text{TDOut}(td_1, td_2^i, td_3^i) = 1\) for all \(i \in [3]\), outputs a trapdoor \(t\) such that \(\text{TDValid}(t, td_1) = 1\).

**1-Rewinding Security.** We define the notion of 1-rewinding security for a trapdoor generation protocol \(\text{TDGen}\). Consider the following experiment between a sender \(S\) and any (possibly cheating) receiver \(R^*\).

**Experiment E:**

---

\(^7\)These values can be obtained from the malicious sender via an expected PPT rewinding procedure. The expected PPT simulator in our applications performs the necessary rew windings and then feeds these values to the extractor \(\text{TDExt}\).
\( R^* \) interacts with \( S \) and completes one execution of the protocol \( \text{TDGen} \). \( R^* \) receives values \((td_1, td_3)\) in rounds 1 and 3 respectively.

- Then, \( R^* \) rewinds \( S \) to the beginning of round 2.

- \( R^* \) sends \( S \) a new second round message \( td^*_2 \) and receives a message \( td^*_3 \) in the third round.

- At the end of the experiment, \( R^* \) outputs a value \( t^* \).

\textbf{Definition 6} (1-Rewinding Security). A trapdoor generation protocol \( \text{TDGen} = (\text{TDGen}_1, \text{TDGen}_2, \text{TDGen}_3, \text{TDOut}, \text{TDValid}) \) achieves 1-rewinding security if, for every non-uniform PPT receiver \( R^* \) in the above experiment \( E \),

\[ \Pr[\text{TDValid}(t^*, td_1) = 1] = \text{negl}(\lambda), \]

where the probability is over the random coins of \( S \), and where \( t^* \) is the output of \( R^* \) in the experiment \( E \), and \( td_1 \) is the message from \( S \) in round 1.

\subsection*{2.5.1 Construction}

We now describe a three round trapdoor generation protocol based on one way functions.

Let \( S \) and \( R \) denote the sender and the receiver, respectively. Let \( \lambda \) denote the security parameter. Let \((\text{Gen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Vf})\) be a signature scheme that is existentially unforgeable against chosen-message attacks. Such schemes are known based on one-way functions [GMR88].

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
1. \textbf{Round 1} - \text{TDGen}_1(\sigma_S): \\
\hline
\quad S does the following: \\
\hline
\quad \quad Generate \((sk, vk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\sigma_S)\). \\
\hline
\quad \quad Send \( td_{S \rightarrow R}^1 = vk \) to \( R \). \\
\hline
2. \textbf{Round 2} - \text{TDGen}_2(td_{S \rightarrow R}^1); \\
\hline
\quad R sends a random string \( m \) as the message \( td_{R \rightarrow S}^2 \) to \( S \). \\
\hline
3. \textbf{Round 3} - \text{TDGen}_3(td_{S \rightarrow R}^1, td_{R \rightarrow S}^2, \sigma_S); \\
\hline
\quad S computes and sends \( td_{S \rightarrow R}^3 = \text{Sign}(sk, m; r_m) \) where \( r_m \) is randomly chosen. \\
\hline
4. \textbf{Output:} - \text{TDOut}(td_{S \rightarrow R}^1, td_{R \rightarrow S}^2, td_{S \rightarrow R}^3) \\
\quad The receiver \( R \) outputs 1 if \( \text{Vf}(td_{S \rightarrow R}^1, m, td_{S \rightarrow R}^3) = 1 \). \\
\hline
5. \textbf{Trapdoor Validation Algorithm} - \text{TDValid}(t, td_1); \\
\hline
\quad Given input \((t, td_1)\), the algorithm does the following: \\
\hline
\quad \quad Let \( t = \{m_i, \sigma_i\}_{i=1}^3 \). \\
\hline
\quad \quad Output 1 if \( m_1, m_2, m_3 \) are distinct and \( \text{Vf}(td_1, m_i, \sigma_i) = 1 \) for all \( i \in [3] \). \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Trapdoor Generation Protocol \( \Pi^{\text{TD}} \).}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Theorem 3.} Assuming the existence of one way functions, the protocol \( \Pi^{\text{TD}} \) described in Figure 3 is a 1-rewinding secure trapdoor generation protocol.
In this section, we describe delayed-input interactive arguments. In this section, we define three round delayed-input witness indistinguishable argument with \( B_{rwi} \) -rewinding security, where the same statement is proven across all the renews.

**Definition 7** (Delayed-Input Interactive Arguments). An \( n \)-round delayed-input interactive protocol \((P, V)\) for deciding a language \( L \) is an argument system for \( L \) that satisfies the following properties:

- **Delayed-Input Completeness.** For every security parameter \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \), and any \((x, w) \in R_L\) such that \( |x| \leq 2^\lambda \),

  \[
  \Pr[(P, V)(1^\lambda, x, w) = 1] = 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)(\lambda).
  \]

  where the probability is over the randomness of \( P \) and \( V \). Moreover, the prover’s algorithm initially takes as input only \( 1^\lambda \), and the pair \((x, w)\) is given to \( P \) only in the beginning of the \( n \)’th round.

- **Delayed-Input Soundness.** For any PPT cheating prover \( P^* \) that chooses \( x^* \) (adaptively) after the first \( n - 1 \) messages, it holds that if \( x^* \notin L \) then

  \[
  \Pr[(P^*, V)(1^\lambda, x^*) = 1] = \text{negl}(\lambda)(\lambda).
  \]

  where the probability is over the random coins of \( V \).

**2.7 WI with Bounded Rewinding Security**

In this section, we define three round delayed-input witness indistinguishable argument with \( B_{rwi} \) -rewinding security, where the same statement is proven across all the renews.
**Definition 8** (3-Round Delayed-Input WI with Non-Adaptive Fixed Statement Bounded Rewinding Security). Fix a positive integer $B_{rwi}$. A delayed-input 3-round interactive argument (as defined in Definition 7) for an NP language $L$, with an NP relation $R_L$ is said to be WI with Non-Adaptive Fixed Statement $B_{rwi}$-Rewinding Security if for every non-uniform PPT interactive Turing Machine $V^*$, it holds that $\{\text{REAL}_{b,\lambda}^V(1^\lambda)\}_\lambda$ and $\{\text{REAL}_{0,\lambda}^V(1^\lambda)\}_\lambda$ are computationally indistinguishable, where for $b \in \{0,1\}$ the random variable $\text{REAL}_{b,\lambda}^V(1^\lambda)$ is defined via the following experiment. In what follows we denote by $P_1$ the prover’s algorithm in the first round, and similarly we denote by $P_3$ his algorithm in the third round.

**Experiment $\text{REAL}_{b,\lambda}^V(1^\lambda)$**:

1. Run $P_1(1^\lambda)$ and denote its output by $(\text{rw}_1, \sigma)$, where $\sigma$ is its secret state, and $\text{rw}_1$ is the message to be sent to the verifier.

2. Run the verifier $V^*(1^\lambda, \text{rw}_1)$, who outputs $(x, w_0, w_1)$ and a set of messages $\{\text{rw}_2^i\}_{i \in [B_{rwi}]}$.

3. For each $i \in [B_{rwi}]$, run $P_3(\sigma, \text{rw}_2^{i, x, w_b})$, where $P_3$ is the (honest) prover’s algorithm for generating the third message of the WI protocol, and send its message $P_3$ to $V^*$.

4. The output of the experiment is the output of $V^*$.

The following theorem is proven in [GR19]. For completeness, we provide a full description of their construction in Appendix A.

**Theorem 4.** Assuming injective one way functions, for every (polynomial) rewinding parameter $B$, there exists a three round delayed-input witness-indistinguishable argument system with $B$-rewinding security.

### 2.8 Garbled Circuits

**Definition 9** (Garbling Scheme). A garbling scheme for circuits is a tuple of PPT algorithms $\text{GC} := (\text{Gen, Garble, Eval})$ such that

- $\{\text{lab}_w^{w, b}\}_{w \in \text{inp}, b \in \{0, 1\}} \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{inp})$: Garble takes the security parameter $1^\lambda$ and length of input for the circuit as input and outputs a set of input labels $\{\text{lab}_w^{w, b}\}_{w \in \text{inp}, b \in \{0, 1\}}$.

- $\tilde{C} \leftarrow \text{Garble}(C, \{\text{lab}_w^{w, b}\}_{w \in \text{inp}, b \in \{0, 1\}})$: Garble takes as input a circuit $C : \{0, 1\}^{\text{inp}} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{out}}$ and a set of input labels $\{\text{lab}_w^{w, b}\}_{w \in \text{inp}, b \in \{0, 1\}}$ and outputs the garbled circuit $\tilde{C}$.

- $y \leftarrow \text{Eval}(\tilde{C}, \text{lab}^x)$: Eval takes as input the garbled circuit $\tilde{C}$, input labels $\text{lab}^x$ corresponding to the input $x \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{inp}}$ and outputs $y \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{out}}$.

This garbling scheme satisfies the following properties:

1. **Correctness:** For any circuit $C$ and input $x \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{inp}}$,

\[
\Pr[C(x) = \text{Eval}(\tilde{C}, \text{lab}^x)] = 1
\]

where $\{\text{lab}_w^{w, b}\}_{w \in \text{inp}, b \in \{0, 1\}} \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{inp})$ and $\tilde{C} \leftarrow \text{Garble}(C, \{\text{lab}_w^{w, b}\}_{w \in \text{inp}, b \in \{0, 1\}})$.

2. **Selective Security:** There exists a PPT simulator $\text{Sim}_{\text{GC}}$ such that, for any PPT adversary $A$, there exists a negligible function $\mu(\cdot)$ such that,

\[
|\Pr[\text{Experiment}_{A, \text{Sim}_{\text{GC}}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Experiment}_{A, \text{Sim}_{\text{GC}}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \mu(1^\lambda)
\]

where the experiment $\text{Experiment}_{A, \text{Sim}_{\text{GC}}}(1^\lambda, b)$ is defined as follows:
(a) The adversary \( A \) specifies the circuit \( C \) and an input \( x \in \{0,1\}^{\text{inp}} \) and gets \( \tilde{C} \) and \( \text{lab}^\gamma \), which are computed as follows:

- If \( b = 0 \):
  - \( \{\text{lab}^{w,b}\}_{w \in \text{inp}, b \in \{0,1\}} \) ← Gen\((1^\lambda, \text{inp})\)
  - \( \tilde{C} \) ← Garble\((C, \{\text{lab}^{w,b}\}_{w \in \text{inp}, b \in \{0,1\}})\)

- If \( b = 1 \):
  - \( (\tilde{C}, \text{lab}^\gamma) \) ← Sim\(_C\)(\(1^\lambda, C, x\))

(b) The adversary outputs a bit \( b' \), which is the output of the experiment.

### 2.9 Rewind Secure Oblivious Transfer

**Definition 10.** A rewind secure oblivious transfer (OT) is a tuple of polynomial time interactive Turing machines \( \text{OT} = (\text{OT}_S, \text{OT}_R) \) where \((t, x) = (\text{OT}_S(s_0, s_1; \rho_0), \text{OT}_R(b; \rho'))\) is the pair composed of the transcript \( t \) and the output of \( x \) after the interaction between the sender \( \text{OT}_S \) with inputs \( s_0, s_1 \in \{0,1\} \) and randomness \( \rho \) while receiver \( \text{OT}_R \) has input \( b \) and randomness \( \rho' \) satisfying the following properties:

- **Correctness.** For any selection bit \( b \), for any messages \( s_0, s_1 \in \{0,1\} \), for any \( \rho, \rho' \in \{0,1\}^\gamma \) it holds that
  \[
  \Pr\left[ s_b = s : \rho, \rho' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\gamma; (t, x) = (\text{OT}_S(s_0, s_1; \rho_0), \text{OT}_R(b; \rho')) \right] = 1
  \]

- **Security against Malicious Sender with \( B \) rewinds.** Here, we require indistinguishability security against a malicious receiver where the receiver uses input \( b[k] \) in the \( k \)-th rewound execution of the second and third round. Specifically, the consider the experiment described below. \( \forall \{b^0[k], b^1[k]\}_{k \in [B]} \in \{0,1\} \) where **Experiment** \( \mathcal{E}^a \):
  1. Run \( \text{OT}_R \) to obtain \( \text{ot}_{1,R} \) which is independent of its input. Send to \( A \) that returns \( \text{ot}_{1,S} \).
  2. Run \( \text{OT} \) on input \( \text{ot}_{1,S} \) and \( \text{ot}_{1,R} \) to obtain \( \text{ot}_{2,R} \) which is independent of its input. This is then sent to \( A \).
  3. \( A \) then returns \( \{\text{ot}_{2,S}^j\}_{j \in [B]} \) messages.
  4. For each \( j \in [B] \), run \( \text{OT}_R \) on \((\text{ot}_{1,S}, \text{ot}_{2,S}^j, b^a[j])\) and send the response to \( A \).
  5. Run \( \text{OT}_R \) on \( \text{ot}_{3,S}^1 \) to obtain the completed transcript for a single thread.
  6. The output of the experiment is the entire transcript.

We say that the scheme is secure against malicious senders with \( B \) rewinds if the experiments \( \mathcal{E}^0 \) and \( \mathcal{E}^1 \) are indistinguishable.

- **Security against Malicious Receiver with \( B \) rewinds.** For this we achieve a stronger notion of simulation security against a corrupted receiver. Specifically, we consider the standard notion ideal/real notion for a malicious sender. But additionally allow for the receiver to rewind the sender up to \( B_{\text{OT}} \)-times. We say that the scheme is secure against malicious senders with \( B \) rewinds if there is an ideal world simulator \( S \) such that the following quantity is negligible:
  \[
  \left| \Pr[\text{REAL}_{\text{OT}, A(z), f}(k, \bar{x}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{IDEAL}_{f, S(z), f}(k, \bar{x}) = 1] \right|
  \]
  where \( \bar{x} = \{(s_0, s_1), b\} \) and \( z \in \{0,1\}^\ast \). Where \( f \) is the ideal functionality computing \( \text{OT} \).
Remark 1. Even though we define this stronger notion of bounded-rewind secure OT, for our construction it in fact suffices to have security against delayed semi honest receivers.

3 Four Round MPC

Components. We list below the components of our protocol.

- TDGen = (TDGen₁, TDGen₂, TDGen₃, TDOut, TDDVal, TDExt) is a three round trapdoor generation protocol based on one-way functions.
  - TDOut computes the receiver’s output.
  - TDDVal determines whether an input trapdoor value is valid with respect to the first round of the protocol transcript.
  - TDExt computes a valid trapdoor given \( B_{td} \) distinct protocol transcripts that share the same first message. Here \( B_{td} \) is set to be 3.

- WI = (WI₁, WI₂, WI₃, WI₄) is a three round delayed-input witness indistinguishable proof system, where WI₄ is used to compute the decision of the verifier. Such schemes are known from injective one-way functions [LS91].

- RWI = (RWI₁, RWI₂, RWI₃, RWI₄) is a three round delayed-input witness-indistinguishable proof with \( B \)-rewinding security, where RWI₄ is used to compute the decision of the verifier. For the rewinding security to be non-adaptive, the verifier generates the second round challenges independent of the third round responses. We will require two instances of the protocol in our construction. Such schemes were constructed in [BGJ⁺18] from injective one-way functions. Their construction can be parameterized by multiple values of \( B \), but we set \( B_{rw} \) to be some polynomial.

- NMCom = (NMCom₁, NMCom₂, NMCom₃) is a three round special non-malleable commitment scheme of [GPR16] satisfying Definition 5. It is based on injective one-way functions. Let Ext_{NMCom} denote the PPT extractor associated with the 2-extraction property satisfied by NMCom.

- OT = (OT₁, OT₂, OT₃, OT₄) is a four round oblivious transfer protocol. We abuse notation slightly and use this as implementing parallel OT executions where the receiver’s input is a string of length \( \ell \) and the sender now has \( \ell \) pairs of inputs. We require indistinguishability security against a malicious sender. In addition, we require extraction of the receiver’s input bit.

- RECom = (RECom₁, RECom₂, RECom₃, Ext_{RECom}) is the three round delayed-input extractable commitment based on injective one-way functions constructed in [BGJ⁺18]. For completeness, we have reproduced the protocol in Section 2.3. The rewinding parameter \( B_{recom} \) is set to be 4. Ext_{RECom} is the extractor associated with RECom.

- Ecom = (Ecom₁, Ecom₂, Ecom₃, Ext_{Ecom}) is the three round delayed-input extractable commitment scheme based on statistically binding commitment schemes which in turn can be based on injective one-way functions. These have been used in several prior works, most notably in [PRS02]. They satisfy the 2-extraction property.
- An input delayed semi-malicious MPC \( \Pi \) satisfying the following properties, where we denote by \( \text{msg}_k \) the messages of all parties output in the \( k \)-th round by \( \Pi \).

1. **Property 1**: \( \text{msg}_1 \) and \( \text{msg}_2 \) of \( \Pi \) contain only instances of \( S - \text{OT} \).
2. **Property 2**: \( \text{msg}_1 \) and \( \text{msg}_2 \) of \( \Pi \) do not depend on the input. The input is used only in the computation of \( \text{msg}_3 \) and \( \text{msg}_4 \).
3. **Property 3**: The simulator \( S \) simulates the honest parties' messages \( \text{msg}_1 \) and \( \text{msg}_2 \) via \( S_1 \) and \( S_2 \) by simply running the honest \( S - \text{OT} \) sender and receiver algorithms.

The \( S - \text{OT} \) is an oblivious transfer protocol satisfying bounded rewind security, defined and constructed in Section 4. The recent works of [GS18, BL18] guarantee that the protocol remains secure as long as the \( S - \text{OT} \) maintain their bounded rewind security. In addition they satisfy the above properties.

- \( \text{GC} = (\text{Garble, Eval}) \) is a secure garbling scheme. We denote the labels \( \{\text{lab}_i,0,\text{lab}_i,1\}_{i \in [L]} \) by \( \text{lab} \).

For primitives with bounded rewind security, we require
\[
B_{\text{rwi}}, B_{\text{rwi}}, B_{S - \text{OT}} > B_{\text{recom}} > B_{\text{td}}
\]
where they denote the total number of rewinds (including the main thread) that they are secure against. In addition, we require all of them to be larger than the number of threads required to extract from \( \text{NMCom} \) and \( \text{Ecom} \) which are both 2-extractable. i.e. two threads are sufficient to extract from these primitives. For the primitives picked, we have, \( B_{\text{rwi}} = B_{\text{rwi}} = \text{poly}(\lambda), B_{S - \text{OT}} = 6, B_{\text{recom}} = 4 \) and \( B_{\text{td}} = 2 \) thus satisfying our requirements.

**NP languages.** The proofs are associated with the following languages.

- Language \( L_a \) is characterized by the following relation \( R_a \):

  **Statement**: \( \text{st} := (\{\text{recom}_i^j\}_{i \in [3], j \in [n]}, \text{Trans}_2, \{\text{msg}_i\}_{i \in [3]}, \{\text{nmcom}_i\}_{i \in [3]}; \text{td}_1) \)

  **Witness**: \( \text{w} := (\text{inp}, r, \{\text{r}_{\text{recom}}^j\}_{j \in [n]}, t, \text{r}_{\text{nmcom}}) \)

  \( R_a(\text{st}, \text{w}) = 1 \) if and only if:

  1. for every \( j \), \( (\text{recom}_1^j, \text{recom}_2^j, \text{recom}_3^j) \) is a well-formed transcript of \( \text{RECom} \) with respect to the input \( \text{inp}, r \) and randomness \( r^j_{\text{recom}} \), and \( \text{msg}_3 \) is an honestly computed third round message in the protocol \( \Pi \) with respect to input \( \text{inp}, r \) and first two round protocol transcript \( \text{Trans}_2 \) (OR)
  2. \( (\text{nmcom}_1, \text{nmcom}_2, \text{nmcom}_3) \) is a transcript of a non-malleable commitment of \( \text{NMCom} \) with respect to the input \( t \) and randomness \( r_{\text{nmcom}} \) and \( t \) is a valid trapdoor with respect to \( \text{td}_1 \)

Formally, \( R_a(\text{st}, \text{w}) = 1 \) if and only if:

\[
- \forall j \in [n], \text{recom}_1^j = \text{RECom}_1(r^j_{\text{recom}}) \text{ AND} \\
- \forall j \in [n], \text{recom}_2^j = \text{RECom}_2((\text{inp}, r), \text{recom}_1^j, \text{recom}_2^j; r^j_{\text{recom}}) \text{ AND}
\]

21
- \( \forall j \in [n], \left( \text{recom}_1^j, \text{recom}_2^j, \text{recom}_3^j \right) \) is well-formed with respect to input \((\text{inp}, r)\) and randomness \(r_{\text{recom}}^j\) AND
- \( \text{msg}_1 = \Pi_1(r) \) AND
- \( \text{msg}_2 = \Pi_2(\text{Trans}_1; r) \) AND
- \( \text{msg}_3 = \Pi_3(\text{inp}, \text{Trans}_2; r) \)

(OR)

- \( \text{TDValid}(\text{td}_1, t) = 1 \) AND
- \( \text{nmcom}_1 = \text{NMCom}_1(t_{\text{nmcom}}) \) AND
- \( \text{nmcom}_3 = \text{NMCom}_3(t, \text{nmcom}_1, \text{nmcom}_2 t_{\text{nmcom}}) \)

In our protocol, the language \( L_a \) will be used for the first instance of the bounded-rewinding secure delayed-input RWI proofs. When we consider proofs between prover \( P_i \) and verifier \( P_j \), we denote the language as \( L_{a}^{i \rightarrow j} \).

- Language \( L_b \) is characterized by the following relation \( R_b \):

Statement:

\[
\text{st} := \left\{ \left( \text{recom}_1^i, \text{eocom}_2^i, \text{nmcom}_3^i \right) \right\}_{i \in [3], j \in [n]}, \text{Trans}_2, \left\{ \text{msg}_i \right\}_{i \in [3]}, \left\{ \text{rwi}_1^i \right\}_{i \in [2], j \in [n]}, \left\{ \text{nmcom}_i \right\}_{i \in [3]}, \text{td}_1
\]

Witness: \( w := \left\{ \left( r_{\text{recom}}^j \right)_{j \in [n]}, t, r_{\text{nmcom}} \right\} \)

\( R_b(\text{st}, w) = 1 \) if and only if

1. \( \forall j \in [n], \left( \text{eocom}_1^j, \text{eocom}_2^j, \text{eocom}_3^j \right) \) is a well-formed transcript of \( \text{Ecom} \) with respect to the input \( \left\{ \text{rwi}_1^j \right\}_{k \in [n]} \) and randomness \( r_{\text{recom}}^j \), and \( \forall k, \left\{ \text{rwi}_1^k \right\}_{i \in [3]} \) is an accepting transcript for \( L_a \) (OR)

2. \( (\text{nmcom}_1, \text{nmcom}_2, \text{nmcom}_3) \) is a transcript of a non-malleable commitment of \( \text{NMCom} \) with respect to the input \( t \) and randomness \( r_{\text{nmcom}} \) and \( t \) is a valid trapdoor with respect to \( \text{td}_1 \).

Formally, \( R_b(\text{st}, w) = 1 \) if and only if

- \( \forall j \in [n], \text{eocom}_1^j = \text{Ecom}_1(r_{\text{recom}}^j) \) AND
- \( \forall j \in [n], \text{eocom}_3^j = \text{Ecom}_3(\left\{ \text{rwi}_3^k \right\}_{k \in [n]}, \text{eocom}_1^j, \text{eocom}_2^j, r_{\text{recom}}^j) \) AND
- \( \forall j \in [n], \left( \text{eocom}_1^j, \text{eocom}_2^j, \text{eocom}_3^j \right) \) is well-formed with respect to input \( \left\{ \text{rwi}_3^k \right\}_{k \in [n]} \) and randomness \( r_{\text{recom}}^j \) AND
- \( \forall j \in [n], \text{Wl}_4(\text{rwi}_1^j, \text{rwi}_2^j, \text{rwi}_3^j, \text{st}^j) = 1 \) where

\[
\text{st}^j := \left\{ \left( \text{recom}_1^i \right)_{i \in [3]}, \text{Trans}_2, \left\{ \text{msg}_i \right\}_{i \in [3]}, \left\{ \text{nmcom}_i \right\}_{i \in [3]}, \text{td}_1 \right\}
\]

(OR)
In our protocol, the language $L_b$ will be used for the second instance of the bounded-rewinding secure delayed-input RWI proofs. When we consider proofs between prover $P_i$ and verifier $P_j$, we denote the language as $L_b^{i \rightarrow j}$.

Language $L_c$ is characterized by the following relation $R_c$:

Statement:

$$st := \left\{ \{\text{msg}_i, \text{nmcom}_i\}_{i \in [3]}, \{\text{recom}^j_i\}_{i \in [3], j \in [n]}, \{\text{rwi}^j_i\}_{i \in [2], j \in [n]}, \text{Trans}_3, \{\text{ot}^j_i\}_{i \in [4], j \in [n]}, \text{td}_1, \{\text{st}^j\}_j\right\} \cup \tilde{C}$$

Witness: $w := \left( \text{inp}, r, \{\text{r}_{\text{recom}}^j\}_{j \in [n]}, r_{\text{gc}}, \{\text{r}_{\text{ot}}^j\}_{j \in [n]}, t, r_{\text{nmcom}} \right)$

$R_c(st, w) = 1$ if and only if

1. for every $j$, $(\text{recom}^j_1, \text{recom}^j_2, \text{recom}^j_3)$ is a well-formed transcript of RECom with respect to the input $(\text{inp}, r)$ and randomness $r_{\text{recom}}^j$. The garbled circuit $\tilde{C}$ is computed correctly with randomness $r_{\text{gc}}$ and embeds $\text{msg}_{\text{sd}}$, the honestly computed fourth round message in the protocol II with respect to input $\text{inp}$, randomness $r$ and first three round protocol transcript $\text{Trans}_2$ (OR)

2. $(\text{nmcom}_1, \text{nmcom}_2, \text{nmcom}_3)$ is a transcript of a non-malleable commitment of NMCom with respect to the input $t$ and randomness $r_{\text{nmcom}}$ and $t$ is a valid trapdoor with respect to $\text{td}_1$

Formally, $R_c(st, w) = 1$ if and only if:

- $\forall j \in [n], \text{recom}^j_1 = \text{RECom}_1(r_{\text{recom}}^j) \text{ AND}$
- $\forall j \in [n], \text{recom}^j_2 = \text{RECom}_3((\text{inp}, r), \text{recom}^j_1, \text{recom}^j_2; r_{\text{recom}}^j) \text{ AND}$
- $\forall j \in [n], (\text{recom}_1, \text{recom}_2, \text{recom}_3)$ is well-formed with respect to input $(\text{inp}, r)$ and randomness $r_{\text{recom}}$ AND
- $\text{msg}_1 = \Pi_1(r) \text{ AND}$
- $\text{msg}_2 = \Pi_2(\text{Trans}_1; r) \text{ AND}$
- $\text{msg}_3 = \Pi_3(\text{inp}, \text{Trans}_2; r) \text{ AND}$
- $\text{msg}_4 = \Pi_4(\text{inp}, \text{Trans}_3; r) \text{ AND}$
- $(\tilde{C}, \text{lab}) := \text{Garble} \left( C \left\{ \text{msg}_4, \{r_{\text{rwi}}^j\}_{i \in [2], j \in [n]}, \{\text{st}^j\}_j \right\} \cup r_{\text{gc}} \right)$ where $C$ in Figure 4 AND
- for all $j \in [n]$, $\text{ot}^j_i \leftarrow \text{OT}_4(\text{lab}_{ij}, \text{ot}^j_1, \text{ot}^j_2, \text{ot}^j_3; r_{\text{ot}}^j)$.

(OR)

- $\text{TDValid}(\text{td}_1, t) = 1 \text{ AND}$
Input: \( \{ rwi_{j \rightarrow i} \} \) for every \( j \in [n] \setminus \{i\} \)

- If \( \forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\} \)

\[
RWI_4 \left( rwi_{1 \rightarrow i}, rwi_{2 \rightarrow i}, rwi_{3 \rightarrow i}, st_{j \rightarrow i} \right) = 1
\]

then output \( msg_{4,i} \);

- Else, output \( \bot \).

Figure 4: Circuit C

\[ C \left[ i, \text{msg}_{4,i}, \left\{ rwi_{j \rightarrow i}^{\ell} \right\} : \ell \in [2], j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}, \left\{ st_{j \rightarrow i}^{\ell} \right\} : j \in [n] \setminus \{i\} \right] \]

\(-\) \( \text{nmcom}_1 = \text{NMCom}_1(\text{rncom}) \) AND
\(-\) \( \text{nmcom}_3 = \text{NMCom}_3(t, \text{nmcom}_1, \text{nmcom}_2f_{\text{nmcom}}) \)

In our protocol, the language \( L_c \) will be used for the delayed-input WI proofs. When we consider proofs between prover \( P_i \) and verifier \( P_j \), we denote the language as \( L_c^{i \rightarrow j} \).

### 3.1 The Protocol

We now describe our four round protocol between \( n \) players \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \). The input of party \( P_i \) is denoted as \( x_i \).

**Round 1:** \( P_i \) does the following:

1. Compute the first round message of the underlying protocol \( \Pi \),

\[
\text{msg}_{1,i} := \Pi_1 (r_i)
\]

using randomness \( r_i \). Recall that the first two messages of \( \Pi \) are independent of the party’s input.

2. Compute the first round of the trapdoor generation phase \( \text{TDGen} \),

\[
\text{td}_{1,i} := \text{TDGen}_1 (r_{td,i})
\]

using randomness \( r_{td,i} \).

3. Compute first round of the three input delayed witness indistinguishable proof systems. Specifically, \( \forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\} \), compute

- first round of the input-delayed witness indistinguishable proof system

\[
\text{wi}_{1 \rightarrow j}^{1} \leftarrow \text{WI}_1 \left( 1^\lambda \right)
\]

- first round of the input-delayed rewinding secure witness indistinguishable proof system

for \( L_a \)

\[
\text{rwi}_{a,1}^{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{RWI}_1 \left( 1^\lambda \right)
\]
first round of the input-delayed rewinding secure witness indistinguishable proof system for $L_b$

$$\text{rwi}_{b,1}^i \leftarrow \text{RWI}_1 \left( 1^\lambda \right)$$

4. Compute first round of the three commitment schemes. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, compute

- first round of the extractable commitment scheme:

$$\text{ecom}_{1}^{i \rightarrow j} := \text{Ecom}_1 \left( r_{\text{ecom}}^{i \rightarrow j} \right)$$

using the randomness $r_{\text{ecom}}^{i \rightarrow j}$.

- first round of the rewinding-secure extractable commitment scheme:

$$\text{recom}_{1}^{i \rightarrow j} := \text{RECom}_1 \left( r_{\text{recom}}^{i \rightarrow j} \right)$$

using the randomness $r_{\text{recom}}^{i \rightarrow j}$.

- first round of non-malleable commitment scheme:

$$\text{nmcom}_{1}^{i \rightarrow j} := \text{NMCom}_1 \left( r_{\text{nmcom}}^{i \rightarrow j} \right)$$

using the randomness $r_{\text{nmcom}}^{i \rightarrow j}$.

5. The first round of the OT scheme, where $P_i$ is the receiver. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, compute

$$\text{ot}_{1}^{j \rightarrow i} := \text{OT}_1 \left( r_{\text{ot}}^{j \rightarrow i} \right)$$

using the randomness $r_{\text{ot}}^{j \rightarrow i}$. Here the superscript $j \rightarrow i$ indicates that the OT message is for the instances where $P_i$ is the receiver.

6. Broadcast

$$\left( \text{msg}_{1,i}, \text{td}_{1,i}, \left\{ \text{wi}_{1}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{rwi}_{a,1}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{rwi}_{b,1}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{ecom}_{1}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{recom}_{1}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{nmcom}_{1}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{ot}_{1}^{j \rightarrow i} \right\} \right)_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}$$

to all other parties.

**Round 2:** $P_i$ does the following:

1. Compute the second round message of the underlying protocol $\Pi$,

$$\text{msg}_{2,i} := \Pi_2 \left( \text{Trans}_1; r_i \right)$$

using randomness $r_i$ and the transcript obtained so far.

2. Compute the second round of the trapdoor generation phase $\text{TDGen}$, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$

$$\text{td}_{2}^{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{TDGen}_2 \left( \text{td}_{1,j} \right)$$

using randomness $r_{\text{td},i}$

3. Compute second round of the three input delayed witness indistinguishable proof systems, where $P_i$ takes the role of the verifier. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, compute
– second round of the input-delayed witness indistinguishable proof system

\[ w_{i_2}^{j \rightarrow i} \leftarrow W_{i_2} \left( w_{i_1}^{j \rightarrow i} \right) \]

– second round of the input-delayed rewinding secure witness indistinguishable proof system for \( L_a \)

\[ r_{a,2}^{j \rightarrow i} \leftarrow RW_{i_2} \left( r_{a,1}^{j \rightarrow i} \right) \]

– second round of the input-delayed rewinding secure witness indistinguishable proof system for \( L_b \)

\[ r_{b,2}^{j \rightarrow i} \leftarrow RW_{i_2} \left( r_{b,1}^{j \rightarrow i} \right) \]

Note that the superscript \( j \rightarrow i \) denotes that \( P_i \) is computing the second round message of the proof where \( P_j \) is the prover and \( P_i \) is the verifier.

4. Compute second round of the three commitment schemes. Specifically, \( \forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\} \), compute

– second round of the extractable commitment scheme:

\[ e_{com,j_2}^{j \rightarrow i} \leftarrow E_{com_2} \left( e_{com_1}^{j \rightarrow i} \right) \]

– second round of the rewinding-secure extractable commitment scheme:

\[ e_{recom,j_2}^{j \rightarrow i} \leftarrow RE_{com_2} \left( e_{recom_1}^{j \rightarrow i} \right) \]

– second round of non-malleable commitment scheme:

\[ e_{nmcom,j_2}^{j \rightarrow i} \leftarrow N_{com_2} \left( e_{nmcom_1}^{j \rightarrow i} \right) \]

As in the case of the proofs, the superscript \( j \rightarrow i \) denotes that \( P_i \) is the receiver in the commitment from \( P_j \).

5. The second round of the OT scheme, where \( P_i \) is the sender. Specifically, \( \forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\} \), compute

\[ e_{ot,j_2}^{i \rightarrow j} := OT_{i_2} \left( e_{ot,j_1}^{i \rightarrow j}; r_{i,ot}^{i \rightarrow j} \right) \]

Here the superscript \( i \rightarrow j \) indicates that the OT message is for the instances where \( P_i \) is the sender.

6. Broadcast

\[ \left( \text{msg}_{2,i}; \left\{ t_{d_2}^{i \rightarrow j}, w_{i_2}^{j \rightarrow i}, r_{a,2}^{j \rightarrow i}, r_{b,1}^{j \rightarrow i}, e_{com_2}^{j \rightarrow i}, e_{recom_2}^{j \rightarrow i}, e_{nmcom_2}^{j \rightarrow i}, e_{ot_2}^{i \rightarrow j} \right\} \right)_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}} \]

to all other parties.

**Round 3:** \( P_i \) does the following:

1. Compute the third round message of the underlying protocol \( \Pi \),

\[ \text{msg}_{3,i} := \Pi_3 \left( x_i, Trans_2; r_i \right) \]

using \( P_i \)'s input \( x_i \), randomness \( r_i \) and the transcript obtained so far. This is the first step in the protocol that \( P_i \) is using its input \( x_i \).
2. Compute the second round of the trapdoor generation phase TDGen. Let \( \text{td}_{2,i} \coloneqq (\text{td}_{2,1}^{i_1} || \cdots || \text{td}_{2,i}^{i_i}) \), compute

\[
\text{td}_{3,i} \leftarrow \text{TDGen}_3 (\text{td}_{1,i}, \text{td}_{2,i}; r_{\text{td},i}) .
\]

3. Compute the third round of the non-malleable commitment scheme to commit to \( \bot \). Specifically, \( \forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\} \), compute

\[
\text{nmcom}_{3}^{i_j} \leftarrow \text{NMCom}_3 \left( \bot, \text{nmcom}_{1}^{i_j}, \text{nmcom}_{3}^{i_j}, r_{\text{nmcom}}^{i_j} \right)
\]

using the randomness \( r_{\text{nmcom}}^{i_j} \).

4. Compute the third round of the rewinding-secure extractable commitment scheme to commit to \((x_i, r_i)\). Specifically, \( \forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\} \), compute

\[
\text{recom}_{3}^{i_j} \leftarrow \text{RECom}_3 \left( (x_i, r_i), \text{recom}_{1}^{i_j}, \text{recom}_{2}^{i_j}, i_j \right)
\]

using the randomness \( r_{\text{recom}}^{i_j} \).

5. Compute the third round of the input-delayed rewinding secure witness indistinguishable proof system for \( L_a \). Specifically, \( \forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\} \), set

\[
\text{st}_{a}^{i_j} := \left( \{ \text{recom}_{\ell}^{i_j}, \text{nmcom}_{\ell}^{i_j} \}_{\ell \in [3]}, j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}, \{ \text{msg}_{\ell, i} \}_{\ell \in [3]} \text{ Trans}_2, \text{td}_{1,j} \right)
\]

\[
\text{w}_{a}^{i_j} := \left( x_i, r_i, \{ r_{\text{recom}}^{i_j} \}_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}, \bot, \bot \right)
\]

and compute

\[
\text{rw}_{a,3}^{i_j} \leftarrow \text{RWI}_3 \left( \text{st}_{a}^{i_j}, \text{w}_{a}^{i_j}, \text{rw}_{a,1}^{i_j}, \text{rw}_{a,2}^{i_j} \right).
\]

6. Compute the third round of the extractable commitment scheme to commit to the third round proof \( \text{rw}_{a,3}^{i_j} \). Specifically, \( \forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\} \), compute

\[
\text{ecom}_{3}^{i_j} \leftarrow \text{Ecom}_3 \left( \text{rw}_{a,3}^{i_j}, \text{ecom}_{1}^{i_j}, \text{ecom}_{3}^{i_j}, i_j \right)
\]

using the randomness \( r_{\text{ecom}}^{i_j} \).

7. Compute the third round of the input-delayed rewinding secure witness indistinguishable proof system for \( L_b \). Specifically, \( \forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\} \), set

\[
\text{st}_{b}^{i_j} := \left( \{ \text{recom}_{\ell}^{i_j}, \text{ecom}_{\ell}^{i_j}, \text{nmcom}_{\ell}^{i_j} \}_{\ell \in [3], j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}, \{ \text{nmcom}_{\ell}^{i_j}, \text{msg}_{\ell, i} \}_{\ell \in [3]} \{ \text{rw}_{b,\ell}^{i_j} \}_{\ell \in [2]} \text{ Trans}_2, \text{td}_{1,j} \right)
\]

\[
\text{w}_{b}^{i_j} := \left( \{ i_j \}_{\text{ecom}}, j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}, \bot, \bot \right)
\]

and compute

\[
\text{rw}_{b,3}^{i_j} \leftarrow \text{RWI}_3 \left( \text{st}_{b}^{i_j}, \text{w}_{b}^{i_j}, \text{rw}_{b,1}^{i_j}, \text{rw}_{b,2}^{i_j} \right).
\]
8. Compute the third round of the OT scheme, where $P_i$ is the receiver. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, compute

$$ot_3^{i\rightarrow j} \leftarrow OT_3 \left( \{ \text{rwi}_{3,j}^{i\rightarrow j}, ot_1^{i\rightarrow j}, ot_2^{i\rightarrow j}, r_{i,ot}^{i\rightarrow j} \} \right).$$

Here the superscript $j \rightarrow i$ indicates that the OT message is for the instances where $P_i$ is the receiver.

9. Broadcast

$$\left( \text{msg}_{3,i}, \text{td}_{3,i}, \{ \text{ecom}_{3}^{i\rightarrow j}, \text{recom}_{3}^{i\rightarrow j}, \text{nmcom}_{3}^{i\rightarrow j}, ot_3^{i\rightarrow j} \} \right)_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}$$

to all other parties.

**Round 4:** $P_i$ does the following:

1. If $\exists j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, such that

$$\text{TDValid}(\text{td}_{1,j}, \text{td}_{2,j}, \text{td}_{3,j}) \neq 1$$

where $\text{td}_{2,j}$ is computed as earlier, **abort**.

2. Compute the second round message of the underlying protocol $\Pi$,

$$\text{msg}_{4,i} := \Pi_3 (x_i, \text{Trans}_3; r_i)$$

using $P_i$'s input $x_i$, randomness $r_i$ and the transcript obtained so far. This is the first step in the protocol that $P_i$ is using its input $x_i$.

3. Compute the garbled circuits containing $\text{msg}_{4,i}$. Specifically,

$$\left( \tilde{C}_i, \tilde{\text{lab}}_i \right) := \text{Garble} \left( C \left[ i, \text{msg}_{4,i}, \{ \text{rwi}_{b,i}^{j\rightarrow i} \}_{\ell \in [2], j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}, \{ \text{st}_{b}^{j\rightarrow i} \}_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}} \right], r_{gc,i} \right)$$

where $\text{st}_{b}^{j\rightarrow i}$ is computed as above.

4. Compute the second round of the OT scheme, where $P_i$ is the receiver. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, compute

$$ot_4^{i\rightarrow j} \leftarrow OT_4 \left( \{ \text{lab}_{1,j}, \text{ot}_{1}^{i\rightarrow j}, ot_2^{i\rightarrow j}, ot_3^{i\rightarrow j}, r_{i,ot}^{i\rightarrow j} \} \right).$$

Here the superscript $i \rightarrow j$ indicates that the OT message is for the instances where $P_i$ is the sender. Where $\text{lab}_{1,j}$ indicates the labels corresponding to the input wire of $P_j$'s input.

5. Reveal the randomness used in OT executions where $P_i$ is the receiver. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$ reveal $r_{i,ot}^{i\rightarrow j}$.

6. Compute the third round of the input-delayed rewinding secure witness indistinguishable proof system for $L_c$. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, set

$$\text{st}_{c}^{i\rightarrow j} := \{ \{ \text{msg}_{c,i}, \text{nmcom}_{c}^{i\rightarrow j} \}_{\ell \in [3]}, \{ \text{recom}_{c}^{i\rightarrow j} \}_{\ell \in [3], j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}, \{ \text{rwi}_{\ell}^{i\rightarrow j} \}_{\ell \in [2], j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}, \{ \text{st}_{c}^{j\rightarrow i} \}_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}, \text{Trans}_3, \{ \text{ot}_{\ell}^{i\rightarrow j} \}_{\ell \in [4], j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}, \text{td}_{1,j}, \tilde{C}_i \}$$

$$\text{w}_{c}^{i\rightarrow j} := \{ x_i, r_i, \{ \text{rrecom}_{j} \}_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}, \text{r}_{gc,i}, \{ \text{r}_{i,ot}^{j\rightarrow i} \}_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}, \bot, \bot \}$$

and compute

$$\text{w}_{3}^{i\rightarrow j} \leftarrow W_3 \left( \text{st}_{c}^{i\rightarrow j}, \text{w}_{c}^{i\rightarrow j}, \text{w}_{1}^{i\rightarrow j}, \text{w}_{2}^{i\rightarrow j} \right).$$
7. Broadcast

\[
\left( \tilde{C}_i, \left\{ w_{i3}^{j \rightarrow i}, ot_4^{i \rightarrow j}, r_{i, ot}^{j \rightarrow i} \right\} \right)_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}
\]

to all other parties.

**Output Computation:** \( P_i \) does the following:

1. If \( \exists j \in [n] \setminus \{i\} \), such that

\[
WL_4 \left( st_c^{j \rightarrow i}, w_{i1}^{j \rightarrow i}, w_{i2}^{j \rightarrow i}, w_{i3}^{j \rightarrow i} \right) \neq 1
\]

where \( st_c^{j \rightarrow i} \) is computed as earlier, then output \( \perp \) and **abort**.

2. Open the OT messages using the randomness broadcast by other parties. Specifically, \( \forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}, \forall k \in [n] \setminus \{i,j\} \)

\[
\tilde{lab}_{j|k} = \text{OTEval} \left( ot_1^{j \rightarrow k}, ot_2^{j \rightarrow k}, ot_3^{j \rightarrow k}, ot_4^{j \rightarrow k}, r_{k, ot}^{j \rightarrow k} \right)
\]

3. Evaluate the garbled circuit with the labels obtained above. \( \forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\} \)

\[
\tilde{lab}_j = \left( \tilde{lab}_{j|1} || \cdots || \tilde{lab}_{j|n} \right)
\]

and evaluate

\[
\tilde{msg}_{4,j} := \text{Eval} \left( C_j, \tilde{lab}_j \right).
\]

If any of the evaluations return \( \perp \), then output \( \perp \) and **abort**.

4. Compute output

\[
y_i := \text{OUT} (x_i, Trans_4; r_i)
\]

where \( Trans_4 \) is the four round transcript derived by combining all the \( \tilde{msg}_{4,j} \) obtained above with \( Trans_3 \).

### 3.2 Security

Consider a malicious non-uniform PPT adversary \( A \) who corrupts \( t < n \) parties. Let \( p(\lambda) \) be a polynomial such that \( p(\lambda) \) denotes the total length of the input and randomness of each party \( P_i \) in the underlying protocol \( \Pi \), i.e., \( |(x_i, r_i)| = p(\lambda) \).

#### 3.2.1 Description of the simulator

**Simulator Sim.**

**Step 1 - Check Abort:**

1. **Round 1:** Compute the first round message of all honest parties of the underlying protocol \( \Pi \),

\[
\{ msg_{1,j} \}_{P_i \in \mathcal{H}} := S_1 \left( 1^\lambda, r_S \right)
\]

where \( \mathcal{H} \) denotes the set of honest parties. Recall that this is done as just the honest execution of the first round on behalf of the honest players \( P_i \) using randomness \( r_S := \{r_i\}_{P_i \in \mathcal{H}} \).

For each honest party \( P_i \), Sim follows the honest party protocol in the first round. Specifically,
(a) Compute the first round of the trapdoor generation phase $TDGen$,

$$td_{1,i} := TDGen_1 (r_{td,i})$$

using randomness $r_{td,i}$.

(b) Compute first round of the three input delayed witness indistinguishable proof systems. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, compute

- first round of the input-delayed witness indistinguishable proof system

$$wi_{i\rightarrow j} \leftarrow WI_1 \left( 1^\lambda \right)$$

- first round of the input-delayed rewinding secure witness indistinguishable proof system for $L_a$

$$rwi_{a,1} \leftarrow RWI_1 \left( 1^\lambda \right)$$

- first round of the input-delayed rewinding secure witness indistinguishable proof system for $L_b$

$$rwi_{b,1} \leftarrow RWI_1 \left( 1^\lambda \right)$$

(c) Compute first round of the three commitment schemes. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, compute

- first round of the extractable commitment scheme:

$$ecom_{i\rightarrow j} := Ecom_1 \left( r_{ecom}^{i\rightarrow j} \right)$$

using the randomness $r_{ecom}^{i\rightarrow j}$.

- first round of the rewinding-secure extractable commitment scheme:

$$recom_{i\rightarrow j} := RECom_1 \left( r_{recom}^{i\rightarrow j} \right)$$

using the randomness $r_{recom}^{i\rightarrow j}$.

- first round of non-malleable commitment scheme:

$$nmcom_{i\rightarrow j} := NMCom_1 \left( r_{nmcom}^{i\rightarrow j} \right)$$

using the randomness $r_{nmcom}^{i\rightarrow j}$.

(d) The first round of the OT scheme, where $P_i$ is the receiver. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, compute

$$ot_{j\rightarrow i} \leftarrow OT_1 \left( r_{ot}^{j\rightarrow i} \right)$$

using the randomness $r_{ot}^{j\rightarrow i}$. Here the superscript $j \rightarrow i$ indicates that the OT message is for the instances where $P_i$ is the receiver.

(e) Send

$$\left( \text{msg}_{1,i}, td_{1,i}, \{ wi_{i\rightarrow j}^{1\rightarrow j}, rwi_{a,1}^{i\rightarrow j}, rwi_{b,1}^{i\rightarrow j}, ecom_{1}^{i\rightarrow j}, recom_{1}^{i\rightarrow j}, \text{nmcom}_{1}^{i\rightarrow j}, ot_{1}^{j\rightarrow i} \}_j \in \{n\}\setminus\{i\} \right)$$

to $A$. 

30
2. Round 2:

For the second round too, Sim follows the honest strategy since the inputs of the honest parties are not required up until the third round of the protocol. Compute the second round message of all honest parties of the underlying protocol \( \Pi \),

\[
\{ \text{msg}_{2,i} \}_{P_i \in \mathcal{H}} := S_2(\text{Trans}_1; r_S)
\]

using the transcript obtained so far. Where \( \mathcal{H} \) denotes the set of honest parties. Recall that this is done as just the honest execution of the second round on behalf of the honest players \( P_i \) using randomness \( r_S := \{ r_i \}_{P_i \in \mathcal{H}} \).

(a) Compute the second round of the trapdoor generation phase \( \text{TDGen} \), \( \forall j \in [n] \setminus \{ i \} \)

\[
\text{td}^{j \rightarrow i}_{2} := \text{TDGen}_2(\text{td}^{j \rightarrow i}_{1})
\]

using randomness \( r_{\text{td,}i} \)

(b) Compute second round of the three input delayed witness indistinguishable proof systems, where \( P_i \) takes the role of the verifier. Specifically, \( \forall j \in [n] \setminus \{ i \} \), compute

– second round of the input-delayed witness indistinguishable proof system

\[
\text{wi}^{j \rightarrow i}_{2} := \text{WI}_2(\text{wi}^{j \rightarrow i}_{1})
\]

– second round of the input-delayed rewinding secure witness indistinguishable proof system for \( L_a \)

\[
\text{rwi}^{j \rightarrow i}_{a,2} := \text{RWI}_2(\text{rwi}^{j \rightarrow i}_{a,1})
\]

– second round of the input-delayed rewinding secure witness indistinguishable proof system for \( L_b \)

\[
\text{rwi}^{j \rightarrow i}_{b,2} := \text{RWI}_2(\text{rwi}^{j \rightarrow i}_{b,1})
\]

Note that the superscript \( j \rightarrow i \) denotes that \( P_i \) is computing the second round message of the proof where \( P_j \) is the prover and \( P_i \) is the verifier.

(c) Compute second round of the three commitment schemes. Specifically, \( \forall j \in [n] \setminus \{ i \} \), compute

– second round of the extractable commitment scheme:

\[
\text{ecom}^{j \rightarrow i}_{2} := \text{Ecom}_2(\text{ecom}^{j \rightarrow i}_{1})
\]

– second round of the rewinding-secure extractable commitment scheme:

\[
\text{recom}^{j \rightarrow i}_{2} := \text{RECom}_2(\text{recom}^{j \rightarrow i}_{1})
\]

– second round of non-malleable commitment scheme:

\[
\text{nmcom}^{j \rightarrow i}_{2} := \text{NMCom}_2(\text{nmcom}^{j \rightarrow i}_{1})
\]

As in the case of the proofs, the superscript \( j \rightarrow i \) denotes that \( P_i \) is the receiver in the commitment from \( P_j \).
(d) The second round of the OT scheme, where $P_i$ is the sender. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, compute

$$\text{ot}^{i\rightarrow j}_2 := \text{OT}_2\left(\text{ot}^{i\rightarrow j}_1; r_{i,\text{ot}}^j\right).$$

Here the superscript $i \rightarrow j$ indicates that the OT message is for the instances where $P_i$ is the sender.

(e) Send

$$\left(\text{msg}_{2,i}, \left\{\text{td}^{i\rightarrow j}_2, \text{wi}^{i\rightarrow j}_{a,2}, \text{rw}^{i\rightarrow j}_{a,1}, \text{ecom}^{i\rightarrow j}_2, \text{recom}^{i\rightarrow j}_2, \text{nmcom}^{i\rightarrow j}_2, \text{ot}^{i\rightarrow j}_2\right\}_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}\right)$$

to $A$.

3. Round 3:

For round 3, $\text{Sim}$ generates the third round messages honestly using input 0.

(a) Compute the third round message of the underlying protocol $\Pi$,

$$\text{msg}_{3,i} := \Pi_3(0, \text{Trans}_2; r_i)$$

using input 0, randomness $r_i$ and the transcript obtained so far.

(b) Compute the second round of the trapdoor generation phase $\text{TDGen}$. Let $\text{td}_{2,i} := (\text{td}^{i\rightarrow i}_2 || \cdots || \text{td}^{i\rightarrow i}_2)$, compute

$$\text{td}_{3,i} \leftarrow \text{TDGen}_3(\text{td}_{1,i}, \text{td}_{2,i}; r_{\text{td},i}).$$

(c) Compute the third round of the non-malleable commitment scheme to commit to $\bot$. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, compute

$$\text{nmcom}^{i\rightarrow j}_3 \leftarrow \text{NMCom}_3\left(\bot, \text{nmcom}^{i\rightarrow j}_1, \text{nmcom}^{i\rightarrow j}_3; r^{i\rightarrow j}_{\text{nmcom}}\right)$$

using the randomness $r^{i\rightarrow j}_{\text{nmcom}}$.

(d) Compute the third round of the rewinding-secure extractable commitment scheme to commit to $(0, r_i)$. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, compute

$$\text{recom}^{i\rightarrow j}_3 \leftarrow \text{RECom}_3\left((0, r_i), \text{recom}^{i\rightarrow j}_1, \text{recom}^{i\rightarrow j}_2; r^{i\rightarrow j}_{\text{recom}}\right)$$

using the randomness $r^{i\rightarrow j}_{\text{recom}}$.

(e) Compute the third round of the input-delayed rewinding secure witness indistinguishable proof system for $L_a$. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, set

$$\text{st}^{i\rightarrow j}_a := \left\{\text{recom}^{i\rightarrow j}_a, \text{nmcom}^{i\rightarrow j}_a\right\}_{\ell \in [3], j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}, \left\{\text{msg}_{\ell, i}\right\}_{\ell \in [3]} \text{Trans}_2, \text{td}_{1,j}\right)$$

$$\text{w}^{i\rightarrow j}_a := \left(0, r_i, \left\{\text{recom}_j\right\}_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}, \bot, \bot\right)$$

and compute

$$\text{rwi}^{i\rightarrow j}_{a,3} \leftarrow \text{RWI}_3\left(\text{st}^{i\rightarrow j}_a, \text{w}^{i\rightarrow j}_a, \text{rw}^{i\rightarrow j}_{a,1}, \text{rw}^{i\rightarrow j}_{a,2}\right).$$
(f) Compute the third round of the extractable commitment scheme to commit to the third round proof $rwi_{i \rightarrow j}$. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, compute

$$ecom_{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow Ecom_{3} \left( rwi_{i \rightarrow j}^{1}, ecom^{i \rightarrow j}_{1}, ecom^{i \rightarrow j}_{3} ; r_{ecom}^{i \rightarrow j} \right)$$

using the randomness $r_{ecom}^{i \rightarrow j}$.

(g) Compute the third round of the input-delayed rewinding secure witness indistinguishable proof system for $L_{b}$. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, set

$$st_{b}^{i \rightarrow j} := \left\{ \left\{ \{ \{ \{ \{ recom^{i \rightarrow j}_{\ell}, ecom^{i \rightarrow j}_{\ell}, nmcom^{i \rightarrow j}_{\ell} \} \}_{\ell \in [3], j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}, \{ \{ \{ nmcom^{i \rightarrow j}_{\ell}, msg_{\ell, i} \} \}_{\ell \in [3]} \{ \{ rwi_{b, \ell}^{i \rightarrow j} \} \}_{\ell \in [2]} \right\} \right\}$$

and compute

$$rw_{b}^{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow RWI_{3} \left( st_{b}^{i \rightarrow j}, w_{b}^{i \rightarrow j}, rw_{b, 1}^{i \rightarrow j}, rw_{b, 2}^{i \rightarrow j} \right).$$

(h) Compute the third round of the OT scheme, where $P_{i}$ is the receiver. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, compute

$$ot_{3}^{j \rightarrow i} \leftarrow OT_{3} \left( rwi_{b, 3}^{i \rightarrow j}, ot_{1}^{j \rightarrow i}, ot_{2}^{j \rightarrow i}; r_{ot}^{j \rightarrow i} \right).$$

Here the superscript $j \rightarrow i$ indicates that the OT message is for the instances where $P_{i}$ is the receiver.

(i) Send

$$\left( \text{msg}^{3}_{3, i}, \text{td}_{3, i}, \left\{ \left\{ \{ \{ ecom^{i \rightarrow j}_{3}, recom^{i \rightarrow j}_{3}, nmcom^{i \rightarrow j}_{3}, ot_{3}^{i \rightarrow j} \} \}_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}} \right\} \right\}$$

to $A$.

4. Check Abort Condition:

$Sim$ now checks whether $A$ aborted in the third round. This happens if $A$ doesn’t send its third round messages, or if every honest party aborts if the trapdoor condition does not verify. Let $H$ denote the set of honest parties. Then check $\forall P_{i} \in H$, $\exists P_{j} \in A$,

$$\text{if TDOut} \left( \text{td}_{1, j}, \text{td}_{2, j}, \text{td}_{3, j} \right) = 1$$

then $Sim$ outputs the partial view generated so far and stops. Otherwise, we say that “Check Abort” succeeded and we proceed.

5. Check Implicit Abort: We run a look ahead threads to extract the RWI proofs for $L_{a}$ from each malicious party $P_{j}$. These are extracted from $Ecom$. We check if all the extracted RWI proofs verify. This ensures that on the given thread, the malicious parties exhibit honest behavior. If for even a single malicious party $P_{j}$ the proofs don’t verify, then we take evasive action as mentioned in Step 1.5. We denote the “Check Abort” thread as GOOD if the adversary doesn’t abort explicitly or implicitly.
Remark 2. We use a specific property of $\text{Ext}_{\text{ecom}}$, namely that since it's input delayed, the commitment in the first round is to a mask $\text{mask}$ and the input delayed property is achieved by masking the input with $\text{mask}$. In fact, $\text{mask}$ is statistically determined by the first round of $\text{Ecom}$. Thus, to extract from multiple instances of the input-delayed extractable commitment with a single shared first message that potentially commit to different inputs, it suffices to extract $\text{mask}$ in a single instance and using $\text{mask}$ to unmask, and thus retrieve, other inputs. Since the $\text{mask}$ is extracted by decommitments, it’s easy to verify that the extracted value $\text{mask}$ is indeed correct.

Step 1.5 - Evasive Action for Implicit Abort: We run this step only if there is an implicit abort. Since we cannot do an explicit abort on behalf of the honest parties, we want to continue the main thread from Step 1 but garble the $C_\perp$ circuit in the fourth round since we’re sure that adversary will not be able to evaluate the garbled circuit to produce any other output. But in order to do this, we will need to extract the trapdoor to prove the WI statement for $L_c$ claiming that the garbled circuit was computed honestly. We can do this because the adversary did not cause an explicit abort, and the extracted trapdoor can be publicly checked. Specifically,

1. Create look-ahead threads running rounds 2 and 3 as before, and extract trapdoor $t_j$ for ever adversarial player $P_j$ by running the TDExt on the look-ahead threads.

2. Compute the garbled circuit as $(C_i, \text{lab}_i) := \text{Garble}(C_\perp; r_{gc,i})$ where $C_\perp$ is the circuit that always outputs $\perp$, but has the same topology as $C_i$.

3. The OT messages are computed as before.

Step 2 - Rewinding:

1. $\text{Sim}$ now rewinds $A$ to the end of round 1 and freezes the main thread at this point. Then, $\text{Sim}$ creates a set of $T$ (to be determined later) look-ahead threads, where on each thread, only rounds 2 and 3 of the protocol are executed in the following manner:

(a) Round 2:
   
   In every look-ahead thread, for each honest party $P_i$ and for each $j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, $\text{Sim}$ executes the same strategy as in round 2 of step 1, using fresh randomness each time.

(b) Round 3:
   
   In every look-ahead thread, for each honest party $P_i$ and for each $j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, $\text{Sim}$ executes the same strategy as in round 3 of step 1, using fresh randomness each time.

2. For each look-ahead thread, define a thread to be GOOD with respect to $P_i$ if for all malicious parties $P_j$:
   
   - $P_j$ doesn’t send its third round messages.
   - if $\text{TDOut}(td_{1,j}, td_{2,j}, td_{3,j}) = 1$ where $td_{2,j}$ is as computed in round 3.
   - The extracted RWI proofs for $L_a$ where $P_j$ is the prover are all accepting. We use $\text{mask}$ obtained in Step 1 to do the extractions by simply unmasking the commitment in $\text{Ecom}$.

3. The number of threads $T$ created is such that at least $(12 \cdot \lambda)$ GOOD threads exists. That is, $\text{Sim}$ keeps running till it obtains $(12 \cdot \lambda)$ GOOD threads.
Step 3 - Input and Trapdoor Extraction:

Sim does the following:

1. Select 5 threads that are GOOD with respect to some honest party $P_{i^*}$. In each GOOD thread, we know $\exists$ honest party $P_i$ such that for all malicious parties $P_j$, the adversary does not cause $P_i$ to abort. Since $(12 \cdot \lambda) > (5 \cdot n)^8$, there must exist one honest party $P_{i^*}$ corresponding to a set of 5 GOOD threads.

2. Trapdoor Extraction: For every corrupted party $P_j$, extract a trapdoor $t_j$ by running the trapdoor extractor $TDExt$ on input the transcript of the trapdoor generation protocol with $P_j$ playing the role of the trapdoor generator from any 3 GOOD threads. Specifically, compute

$$t_j \leftarrow TDExt \left( \text{td}_1, \{ \text{td}_{2,k}, \text{td}_{3,k} \}_{k \in [3]} \right)$$

where $(\text{td}_1, \text{td}_{2,k}, \text{td}_{3,k})$ denotes the transcript of the trapdoor generation protocol with $P_j$ as the sender of the $k$-th GOOD thread.

3. Input Extraction: For every corrupted party $P_j$, extract the mask for the input and randomness pair $(x_j, r_j)$ by running the extractor $Ext_{RECom}$ on input the transcript of the extractable commitment protocol between $P_j$ and $P_{i^*}$ from the 5 GOOD threads picked above. That is, compute

$$\text{mask}^{j \rightarrow i^*} \leftarrow Ext_{RECom} \left( \text{recom}^{j \rightarrow i^*}_1, \{ \text{recom}^{j \rightarrow i^*}_{2,k}, \text{recom}^{j \rightarrow i^*}_{3,k} \}_{k \in [5]} \right)$$

where $\text{recom}^{j \rightarrow i^*}_1, \text{recom}^{j \rightarrow i^*}_{2,k}, \text{recom}^{j \rightarrow i^*}_{3,k}$ denotes the transcript of the extractable commitment protocol between $P_j$ and $P_{i^*}$ on the $k$-th GOOD thread.

4. Proof Extraction: Since we’ve already extracted the proofs in Step 1, by Remark 2 we can extract the proofs in each thread without having to rewind, by just unmasking with the extracted mask from Step 1.

5. Output $\bot_{\text{extract}}$ if any of steps 2 or 3 fail.

Step 4 - Abort Probability Estimation:

Set $\epsilon' = \frac{12 \lambda}{T}$ as the probability that the adversary doesn’t abort.

Step 5 - Re-sampling the Main Thread:

Sim sets a counter to value 0. Now Sim attempts to force the following transcript in the main thread until it accepts, or the counter reaches the cut-off point.

1. Round 2:

   Run exactly as done in Step 1.

2. Round 3:

   There are some key differences from the threads generated in the previous steps:

---

\[^8]{\text{without loss of generality, assume the number of parties } n = \lambda}
The non-malleable commitment from an honest party $P_i$ to a malicious party $P_j$ now contains the extracted trapdoor $t_j$.

The witness indistinguishable proofs use the “trapdoor witness”.

The third round of the MPC is generated by the simulator for the underlying protocol.

In more detail. Firstly, compute the second round message of all honest parties of the underlying protocol $\Pi$,

$$\{\text{msg}_{3,i}\}_{i \in H} := S_3(\text{Trans}_2; r_S)$$

using the transcript obtained so far. Where $H$ denotes the set of honest parties. In addition, for each honest $P_i$, Sim does the following:

(a) Compute the third round of the trapdoor generation phase $\text{TDGen}$. Let $td_{2,i} := (td_{2,i}^{1 \rightarrow i} || \cdots || td_{2,i}^{i \rightarrow i})$,

(b) Compute the third round of the non-malleable commitment scheme to commit to the extracted trapdoor. Specifically, for each honest $P_i$,

(c) Compute the third round of the rewinding-secure extractable commitment scheme to commit to 0. Specifically, for each honest $P_i$,

(d) Compute the third round of the input-delayed rewinding secure witness indistinguishable proof system for $L_a$. Specifically, for each honest $P_i$,

(e) Compute the third round of the extractable commitment scheme to commit to the third round proof $rwi_{a,3}^{i \rightarrow j}$. Specifically, for each honest $P_i$,
(f) Compute the third round of the input-delayed rewinding secure witness indistinguishable proof system for \( L_b \). Specifically, \( \forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\} \), set

\[
\text{st}_{b}^{i\rightarrow j} := \left\{ \text{recom}_{\ell}^{i\rightarrow j}, \text{ecom}_{\ell}^{i\rightarrow j}, \text{nmcom}_{\ell}^{i\rightarrow j} \right\}, \quad \ell \in [3], j \in [n] \setminus \{i\},
\]

\[
\text{w}_{b}^{i\rightarrow j} := (\bot, t_j, r_{i\rightarrow j}^{\text{nmcom}})
\]

and compute

\[
\text{rwi}_{b,3}^{i\rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{RWI}_3 \left( \text{st}_{b}^{i\rightarrow j}, \text{w}_{b}^{i\rightarrow j}, \text{rwi}_{b,1}^{i\rightarrow j}, \text{rwi}_{b,2}^{i\rightarrow j} \right).
\]

(g) Compute the third round of the OT scheme, where \( P_i \) is the receiver. Specifically, \( \forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\} \), compute

\[
\text{ot}_{3}^{j\rightarrow i} \leftarrow \text{OT}_3 \left( \text{rwi}_{b,3}^{i\rightarrow j}, \text{ot}_{1}^{j\rightarrow i}, \text{ot}_{2}^{j\rightarrow i}, r_{i\rightarrow i}^{j\rightarrow i} \right).
\]

Here the superscript \( j \rightarrow i \) indicates that the OT message is for the instances where \( P_i \) is the receiver.

(h) Send

\[
\left( \text{msg}_{3,i}, \text{td}_{3,i}, \left\{ \text{ecom}_{3}^{i\rightarrow j}, \text{recom}_{3}^{i\rightarrow j}, \text{nmcom}_{3}^{i\rightarrow j}, \text{ot}_{3}^{j\rightarrow i} \right\}\right)_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}
\]

to \( A \).

3. Abort Condition:

(a) If the adversary doesn’t send its third round message or \( \forall P_i \in \mathcal{H}, \exists P_j \in \mathcal{A} \),

\[
\text{if } \text{TDOut}(\text{td}_{1,j}, \text{td}_{2,j}, \text{td}_{3,j}) = 1
\]

or the extracted proofs for \( L_a \) from \( P_j \) do not accept, increment counter by 1.

(b) If \( \text{Sim}'s \) running time is \( 2^\lambda \). Abort.

(c) If the counter value was not increased, then the adversary did not abort in the third round. We can proceed to Step 7.

(d) Else, if the counter value is less than \( \frac{\lambda^2}{2^\epsilon} \), rewind back to the beginning of round 2 in Step 6 and re-sample the main thread. Otherwise, Abort.

Step 6 - Query the Ideal Functionality:

1. \( \text{Sim} \) queries the ideal functionality with the set of values \( \{x_j\} \) where \( x_j \) is the input of adversarial party \( P_j \) that was extracted in the previous step using mask obtained through extraction by rewinding. This is done in this manner since the adversary may use a different input in each thread, and we want to use the input it uses on the main thread. Since the adversary commits to its input only on completion of the third round on the main thread.

2. \( \text{Sim} \) receives output \( y \) from the ideal functionality.

Step 7 - Finishing the Main Thread:
1. Round 4:

- Compute the simulated fourth round message of $\Pi$
  \[
  \text{msg}_{4,i} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_4 \left( y, \{x_j, r_j\}_{P_j \in H}, \text{Trans}_3, r_S \right)_i
  \]
  where $i$ on the right hand side indexes the $i$-th component of the output. Note that $\mathcal{S}_4$ will not be called unless there is an honest party $P_i$ that receives all accepting RWI proof for $L_a$.

- Compute the garbled circuit using the simulated fourth round message
  \[
  (C_i, \text{lab}_i) := \text{Garble} \left( C \left[ i, \text{msg}_{4,i}, \{\text{rw}_b^{i-j}\}_\ell \in [2], j \in [n] \{i\}, \{\text{st}_c^{i-j}\}_j \in [n] \{i\}, \{\text{ot}_\ell^{i-j}\}_\ell \in [4], j \in [n] \{i\}, \text{td}_{1,j}, \tilde{C}_i \right] ; r_{gc,i} \right)
  \]

- Compute the third round of the input-delayed rewinding secure witness indistinguishable proof system for $L_b$. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n] \{i\}$, set
  \[
  \text{st}_c^{i-j} := \left( \{\text{msg}_{\ell,i}, \text{nmcom}_{\ell}^{i-j}\}_\ell \in [3], \{\text{recom}_{\ell}^{i-j}\}_\ell \in [3], j \in [n] \{i\}, \{\text{st}_b^{i-j}\}_j \in [n] \{i\}, \text{Trans}_3, \{\text{ot}_\ell^{i-j}\}_\ell \in [4], j \in [n] \{i\}, \text{td}_{1,j}, \tilde{C}_i \right)
  \]

  and compute
  \[
  \text{w}_b^{i-j} := (\bot, t_j, i_{\text{nmcom}}^{i-j})
  \]

- Send
  \[
  (C_i, \{\text{w}_3^{i-j}, \text{w}_1^{i-j}, \text{w}_2^{i-j}\}_j \in [n] \{i\})
  \]
  to $A$.

2. Output Computation:

In the main thread, for each honest party $P_i$, $\text{Sim}$ does the following:

- If $\exists j \in [n] \{i\}$, such that
  \[
  \text{Wl}_3 \left( \text{st}_c^{i-j}, \text{w}_c^{i-j}, \text{w}_1^{i-j}, \text{w}_2^{i-j} \right) \neq 1
  \]
  where $\text{st}_c^{i-j}$ is computed as earlier then abort. Also abort if any adversarial party did not send the fourth round message.

If there is no abort, instruct the ideal functionality to deliver output to the honest parties.
3.2.2 Hybrids

Assume by contradiction that there is an adversary $A$ that distinguishes the real and ideal worlds with some non-negligible probability $\mu$. $\mu$ will be used to set certain parameters in the hybrids.

$\text{Hyb}_{\text{REAL}}$: **Real World:** The hybrid is the same as the real world execution. We consider a simulator $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ that plays the role of the honest parties.

$\text{Hyb}_0$: **Determining Abort in the 3rd Round an Extraction:** In this hybrid, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ makes the following changes:

1. $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ executes the first 3 rounds of the protocol using the honest parties’ strategy. If the adversary causes an abort, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ outputs only the view of the adversary and stops. The rest of the hybrid is skipped in this case.

2. If the “Check Abort” step succeeds, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ checks if there is an implicit abort by extracting the RWI proofs. If there is an implicit abort, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ extracts only the trapdoor in the subsequent step and all hybrids up until the change to the garbled circuit are skipped.

3. If there is no implicit abort, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ rewinds back to after the completion of round 1 of the protocol and freezes the main thread. $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ creates a set of $\lambda \mu$ look ahead threads as described in Step 2 of $\text{Sim}$. Which is to say that in all the threads, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ uses the honest parties’ inputs and follows the protocol.

4. $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ now extracts the input, trapdoors and proofs from the created look-ahead threads. Specifically, it runs the “Input and Trapdoor Extraction” phase described in step 3 of the description of $\text{Sim}$ using the first 5 look-ahead threads that are GOOD with respect to some honest party $P_1$.

5. $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ outputs $\bot_{\text{extract}}$ if the above step fails.

6. $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ continues the execution of the main thread it had previously frozen. It does this as in the honest execution of $\text{Hyb}_{\text{REAL}}$. If the adversary causes an abort, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ rewinds to the end of round 1 and re-samples the main thread honestly. This process is repeated at most $A / \mu$.

Since $\mu$ is noticeable, we are guaranteed that $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ will run in polynomial in this hybrid, and subsequent hybrids, when performing this check.

$\text{Hyb}_1$: **Using input 0 in the Aborti ng Step:** In this hybrid, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ does the “Check Abort” step using the input 0 instead of the real honest party inputs. If the adversary does cause an abort, then $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ just outputs the view of the adversary and stops. Else, it proceeds as in $\text{Hyb}_0$. This is done using a sequence of sub-hybrids. We only describe changes made in each sub-hybrid, with the remaining execution identical to the previous hybrid.

$\text{Hyb}_{1,0}$: **Change OT receiver input to 0:** In this sub-hybrid, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ only modifies the third round to replace the OT receiver input for all honest parties with 0. In $\text{Hyb}_0$, the receiver input to the OT was the third message of the RWI proof for $L_b$.

$\text{Hyb}_{1,1}$: **Change Ecom input to 0:** In this sub-hybrid, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ only modifies the third round to replace the Ecom input for all honest parties with 0. In $\text{Hyb}_{1,0}$, the input to Ecom was the third message of the RWI proof for $L_a$. 

39
Hyb_{1.2}: **Change RECom input to 0:** In this sub-hybrid, Sim_{Hyb} only modifies the third round to replace the RECom input for all honest parties with \((0, r_i)\). In Hyb_{1.1}, the input to Ecom for an honest party \(P_i\) was its input and randomness \((x_i, r_i)\) for the underlying protocol \(\Pi\).

Hyb_{1.3}: **Change \(\Pi\) input to 0:** In this sub-hybrid, Sim_{Hyb} only modifies the third round to replace the \(\Pi\) input for all honest parties with 0. In Hyb_{1.2}, the input to \(\Pi\) for an honest party \(P_i\) in the third round was \(x_i\).

Hyb_{1.4}: **Change Ecom input to RWI:** In this sub-hybrid, Sim_{Hyb} only modifies the third round to replace the Ecom input for all honest parties with the correctly computed third message of the RWI proof for \(L_a\) using input 0. In Hyb_{1.3}, the input to Ecom was 0.

Hyb_{1.5}: **Change OT receiver input to RWI:** In this sub-hybrid, Sim_{Hyb} only modifies the third round to replace the OT receiver input for all honest parties with the correctly computed third message of the RWI proof for \(L_b\) using. In Hyb_0, the receiver input to the OT was 0.

Note that Hyb_{1.5} \(\equiv\) Hyb_1

Hyb_2: **Using input 0 in the look-ahead threads:** In this hybrid, Sim_{Hyb} modifies each look-ahead thread to follow the protocol but replacing the honest player inputs with 0. This is done in a sequence of hybrids, where in each sequence we only modify a single look ahead thread. Since the number of threads are \(T\), we do the following:

\(\forall k \in [T]\) the following changes are made only to the \(k\)-th thread:

Hyb_{2,k,0}: **Change NMCom on \(k\)-th thread:** In this sub-hybrid, Sim_{Hyb} only modifies the third round of the \(k\)-th thread to commit in the NMCom to the trapdoor. In Hyb_1, NMCom was a commitment to \(\bot\). Specifically, for every honest party \(P_i\) and every malicious party \(P_j\), Sim_{Hyb} modifies the third round NMCom message to be

\[\text{nmcom}_{3}^{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{NMCom}_{3} \left(t_j, \text{nmcom}_{1}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{nmcom}_{3}^{i \rightarrow j}, r_{nmcom}^{i \rightarrow j}\right)\]

where \(t_j\) is a valid trapdoor extracted from the other look-ahead threads as in Hyb_1.

Hyb_{2,k,1}: **Switch RWI proofs for \(L_a\) on the \(k\)-th thread:** In this sub-hybrid, Sim_{Hyb} only modifies the third round of the \(k\)-th thread to switch to the “trapdoor witness” in the RWI proofs for \(L_a\). Specifically, for every honest party \(P_i\) and every malicious party \(P_j\), Sim_{Hyb} does the following

\[\text{st}_{a}^{i \rightarrow j} := \left(\{\text{recom}_{\ell}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{msg}_{\ell,i}, \text{nmcom}_{\ell}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{\ell \in [3]}\right), \text{Trans}_2, \text{td}_{1,j}\]

\[\text{w}_{a}^{i \rightarrow j} := (\bot, \bot, \bot, t_j, r_{nmcom}^{i \rightarrow j})\]

and compute

\[\text{rwi}_{a}^{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{RWI}_{3} \left(\text{st}_{a}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{w}_{a}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{rwi}_{a}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{rwi}_{a}^{i \rightarrow j}\right)\].

Hyb_{2,k,2}: **Switch RWI proofs for \(L_b\) on the \(k\)-th thread:** In this sub-hybrid, Sim_{Hyb} only modifies the third round of the \(k\)-th thread to switch to the “trapdoor witness” in the RWI
proofs for $L_b$. Specifically, for every honest party $P_i$ and every malicious party $P_j$, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ does the following

$$
st_b^{i \rightarrow j} := \left( \left\{ \text{recom}_{\ell}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{ecom}_{\ell}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{msg}_{\ell,i}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{nmcom}_{\ell}^{i \rightarrow j} \right\}_{\ell \in [3]}, \left\{ \text{rw}_{b,\ell}^{i \rightarrow j} \right\}_{\ell \in [2]} \right) \text{ Trans}_{2, t_{d,1,j}}$
$$

and compute

$$
\text{rw}_{b,3}^{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{RWI}_3 \left( st_b^{i \rightarrow j}, w_b^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{rw}_{b,1}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{rw}_{b,2}^{i \rightarrow j} \right).
$$

$\text{Hyb}_{2,k,3}$: Change RECom input to 0 on the $k$-th thread: In this sub-hybrid, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ only modifies the third round of the $k$-th thread to replace the RECom input for all honest parties with $(0, r_i)$. In $\text{Hyb}_{2,2}$, the input to Ecom for an honest party $P_i$ was its input and randomness $(x_i, r_i)$ for the underlying protocol $\Pi$. This is done by a sequence of sub-hybrids given below.

$\text{Hyb}_{2,k,3,0}$: Change Com sender’s message on main thread: In this hybrid, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ changes the Com commitment inside the RECom in the first round of the protocol. Specifically, for every honest party $P_i$ and malicious party $P_j$ and for all $\ell \in [N]$, compute $\text{recom}_{1,\ell} \leftarrow \text{Com}(0)$.

$\text{Hyb}_{2,k,3,1}$: Change polynomial in third round: In this hybrid, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ picks a new polynomial $q$ to change the RECom third round messages. Specifically, for every honest party $P_i$ and malicious party $P_j$ do the following:

- for every $\ell \in [N]$, pick a new degree 4 polynomial $q_{\ell}$ such that $(x_i \oplus p_{\ell}(0)) = (0 \oplus q_{\ell}(0))$.
- compute $\text{recom}_{3,\ell}$ as $(0 \oplus q_{\ell}(0), q_{\ell}(z_{\ell}))$.

$\text{Hyb}_{2,k,3,2}$: Commit to new polynomial: In this hybrid, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ changes the Com commitment inside the RECom in the first round of the protocol. Specifically, for every honest party $P_i$ and malicious party $P_j$ and for all $\ell \in [N]$, compute $\text{recom}_{1,\ell} \leftarrow \text{Com}(q_{\ell})$.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{2,k,3,2} \equiv \text{Hyb}_{2,k,3}$

$\text{Hyb}_{2,k,4}$: Change $\Pi$ input to 0 on the $k$-th thread: In this sub-hybrid, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ only modifies the third round of the $k$-th thread to replace the $\Pi$ input for all honest parties with 0. In $\text{Hyb}_{2,3}$, the input to $\Pi$ for an honest party $P_i$ in the third round was $x_i$.

$\text{Hyb}_{2,k,5}$: Switch RWI proofs for $L_b$ on the $k$-th thread: In this sub-hybrid, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ only modifies the third round of the $k$-th thread to switch back to the “honest witness” in the RWI proofs for $L_b$. Specifically, for every honest party $P_i$ and every malicious party $P_j$, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ does the following

$$
st_b^{i \rightarrow j} := \left( \left\{ \text{recom}_{\ell}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{ecom}_{\ell}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{msg}_{\ell,i}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{nmcom}_{\ell}^{i \rightarrow j} \right\}_{\ell \in [3]}, \left\{ \text{rw}_{b,\ell}^{i \rightarrow j} \right\}_{\ell \in [2]} \right) \text{ Trans}_{2, t_{d,1,j}}$
$$

and compute

$$
\text{rw}_{b,3}^{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{RWI}_3 \left( st_b^{i \rightarrow j}, w_b^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{rw}_{b,1}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{rw}_{b,2}^{i \rightarrow j} \right).
$$

41
Hyb\(_{2,k,6}\): Switch RWI proofs for \(L_a\) on the \(k\)-th thread: In this sub-hybrid, Sim\(_{Hyb}\) only modifies the third round of the \(k\)-th thread to switch back to the “honest witness” in the RWI proofs for \(L_a\). Specifically, for every honest party \(P_i\) and every malicious party \(P_j\), Sim\(_{Hyb}\) does the following

\[
\begin{align*}
st_{i,j}^a & := \left( \{ \text{recom}_{\ell}^{i,j}, \text{msg}_{\ell,i}, \text{nmcom}_{\ell}^{i,j} \} \right)_{\ell \in \{3\}}, \text{Trans}_2, \text{td}_{1,j} \\
w_{i,j}^a & := (0, r_i, r_{\text{recom}}, \perp, \perp)
\end{align*}
\]

and compute

\[
\text{rwi}_{i,j}^a,3 \leftarrow \text{RWI}_3 \left( st_{i,j}^a, w_{i,j}^a, \text{rwi}_{i,j}^a,1, \text{rwi}_{i,j}^a,2 \right).
\]

Hyb\(_{2,k,7}\): Change NMCom on \(k\)-th thread: In this sub-hybrid, Sim\(_{Hyb}\) only modifies the third round of the \(k\)-th thread to commit in the NMCom to \(\perp\). Specifically, for every honest party \(P_i\) and every malicious party \(P_j\), Sim\(_{Hyb}\) modifies the third round NMCom message to be

\[
nmcom_{i,j}^3 \leftarrow \text{NMCom}_3 \left( \perp, nmcom_{i,j}^1, nmcom_{i,j}^3, r_{nmcom}^{i,j} \right).
\]

Note that Hyb\(_{2,T,7} \equiv \text{Hyb}_2\).

Hyb\(_3\): Change NMCom on main thread: In this hybrid, Sim\(_{Hyb}\) only modifies the third round of the main thread to commit in the NMCom to the trapdoor. In Hyb\(_2\), NMCom was a commitment to \(\perp\). Specifically, for every honest party \(P_i\) and every malicious party \(P_j\), Sim\(_{Hyb}\) modifies the third round NMCom message to be

\[
nmcom_{i,j}^3 \leftarrow \text{NMCom}_3 \left( t_j, nmcom_{i,j}^1, nmcom_{i,j}^3, r_{nmcom}^{i,j} \right)
\]

where \(t_j\) is a valid trapdoor extracted from the look-ahead threads as in Hyb\(_2\).

Hyb\(_4\): Switch RWI proofs for \(L_a\) on the main thread: In this hybrid, Sim\(_{Hyb}\) only modifies the third round of the main thread to switch to the “trapdoor witness” in the RWI proofs for \(L_a\). Specifically, for every honest party \(P_i\) and every malicious party \(P_j\), Sim\(_{Hyb}\) does the following

\[
\begin{align*}
st_{i,j}^a & := \left( \{ \text{recom}_{\ell}^{i,j}, \text{msg}_{\ell,i}, \text{nmcom}_{\ell}^{i,j} \} \right)_{\ell \in \{3\}}, \text{Trans}_2, \text{td}_{1,j} \\
w_{i,j}^a & := (\perp, \perp, \perp, t_j, r_{nmcom})
\end{align*}
\]

and compute

\[
\text{rwi}_{i,j}^a,3 \leftarrow \text{RWI}_3 \left( st_{i,j}^a, w_{i,j}^a, \text{rwi}_{i,j}^a,1, \text{rwi}_{i,j}^a,2 \right).
\]

Hyb\(_5\): Switch RWI proofs for \(L_b\) on the main thread: In this hybrid, Sim\(_{Hyb}\) only modifies the third round of the main thread to switch to the “trapdoor witness” in the RWI proofs for \(L_b\). Specifically, for every honest party \(P_i\) and every malicious party \(P_j\), Sim\(_{Hyb}\) does the following

\[
\begin{align*}
st_{i,j}^b & := \left( \{ \text{recom}_{\ell}^{i,j}, \text{ecom}_{\ell}^{i,j}, \text{msg}_{\ell,i}, \text{nmcom}_{\ell}^{i,j} \} \right)_{\ell \in \{3\}}, \left\{ \text{rwi}_{b,\ell}^{i,j} \right\}_{\ell \in \{2\}}, \text{Trans}_2, \text{td}_{1,j} \\
w_{i,j}^b & := (\perp, t_j, r_{nmcom})
\end{align*}
\]

42
and compute
\[ rwi_{b, 3}^{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{RWI}_3 \left( st_{b}^{i \rightarrow j}, w_{b}^{i \rightarrow j}, rwi_{b, 1}^{i \rightarrow j}, rwi_{b, 2}^{i \rightarrow j} \right). \]

**Hyb\(_6\): Switch WI proofs for \( L_c \) on the main thread:** In this hybrid, \( \text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}} \) only modifies the fourth round of the main thread to switch to the “trapdoor witness” in the WI proofs for \( L_c \).

Specifically, for every honest party \( P_i \) and every malicious party \( P_j \), \( \text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}} \) does the following
\[
\begin{align*}
st_{c}^{i \rightarrow j} &:= \{ \text{recom}_{\ell}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{msg}_{\ell,i}^{\rightarrow j}, \text{nmcom}_{\ell}^{i \rightarrow j} \}, \\
w_{c}^{i \rightarrow j} &:= \{ \text{rw}_{b, \ell}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{Trans}_3, \{ \text{ot}_{\ell}^{i \rightarrow j} \}, \text{td}_{1,j}, C_i \}
\end{align*}
\]
and compute
\[ w_{i}^{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{WI}_3 \left( st_{c}^{i \rightarrow j}, w_{c}^{i \rightarrow j}, w_{1}^{i \rightarrow j}, w_{2}^{i \rightarrow j} \right). \]

**Hyb\(_7\): Change RECom input to 0 on the main thread:** In this hybrid, \( \text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}} \) only modifies the third round of the \( k \)-th thread to replace the RECom input for all honest parties with \((0, r_i)\). In Hyb\(_6\), the input to Ecom for an honest party \( P_i \) was its input and randomness \((x_i, r_i)\) for the underlying protocol \( \Pi \).

**Hyb\(_8\): Change GC on main thread:** In this hybrid \( \text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}} \) only modifies the garbled circuits of honest parties \( P_i \) if there is an implicit abort in Step 1. Specifically, if there is an implicit abort, the garbled circuit for each honest party \( P_i \) is computed as:
\[
(C_i, \text{lab}_i) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(C_\bot)
\]
where \( C_\bot \) is the circuit with the same topology as \( C \) but always outputs \( \bot \). We note that even in the case of an implicit abort, we’re able to extract the trapdoor, but not necessarily the witness.

**Hyb\(_9\): Simulate \( \Pi \) on main thread:** In this hybrid \( \text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}} \) only modifies the transcript of the underlying protocol \( \Pi \). Specifically, \( \text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}} \) does the following:

1. Due to the fact that the first two simulated rounds of \( \Pi \) are honest computations, we do not make any changes to the first two rounds but refer to the collective first round honest inputs as the output of \( S_1 \) with randomness \( r_S := \{r_i\}_{P_i \in \mathcal{H}} \). Likewise for the second round messages.
2. Compute the third round messages of all honest parties in the underlying protocol \( \Pi \)
\[
\{ \text{msg}_{3,i} \}_{P_i \in \mathcal{H}} := S_3(\text{Trans}_2; r_S)
\]
using the transcript obtained so far and randomness \( r_S \) as defined above.
3. Compute the third round messages of all honest parties in the underlying protocol \( \Pi \)
\[
\{ \text{msg}_{4,i} \}_{P_i \in \mathcal{H}} \leftarrow S_4 \left( y, \{x_j, r_j\}_{P_j \in \mathcal{H}}, \text{Trans}_3; r_S \right)
\]
where \( i \) on the right hand side indexes the \( i \)-th component of the output. Note that \( S_4 \) will not be called unless there is an honest party \( P_i \) that receives all accepting \( \text{RWI} \) proof for \( L_a \). And for honest parties \( P_i \) whose garbled circuit is being simulated, we won’t need their corresponding \( \text{msg}_{4,i} \).
Hyb_{IDEAL}: Run the actual probability estimation: In this hybrid, the number of look-ahead threads is increased from \( \frac{5\cdot \mu \cdot \lambda}{\mu} \) to as many as needed to estimate the probability of the adversary not aborting − \( \varepsilon' \).

Additionally, at this point, Sim_{Hyb} doesn’t re-sample the main thread \( \frac{1}{\mu} \) times. Instead, Sim_{Hyb} resamples the main thread for \( \min\left( 2^\lambda, \frac{\lambda^2}{\varepsilon} \right) \) times as in the ideal world. This hybrid corresponds exactly to the ideal world.

### 3.2.3 Indistinguishability of Hybrids

We will maintain the following invariant across the hybrids.

**Definition 11 (Invariant).** Consider any malicious party \( P_j \) and any honest party \( P_i \). \( td_{1,i} \) denotes the first message of the trapdoor generation protocol with \( P_i \) as the trapdoor generator. The tuple \( (\text{nmcom}_{1}^{j\rightarrow i}, \text{nmcom}_{2}^{j\rightarrow i}, \text{nmcom}_{3}^{j\rightarrow i}) \) denotes the messages of the non-malleable commitment with \( P_j \) as the committer.

Consider the following event \( E \) which occurs if \( \exists (j, i, t_i, r_{\text{nmcom}}^{j\rightarrow i}) \) such that

1. \( \text{nmcom}_{1}^{j\rightarrow i} = \text{NMCom}_{1}(t_{i}^{j\rightarrow i}) \) (AND)

2. \( \text{nmcom}_{3}^{j\rightarrow i} = \text{NMCom}_{3}(t_i, \text{nmcom}_{1}^{j\rightarrow i}, \text{nmcom}_{2}^{j\rightarrow i}; r_{\text{nmcom}}^{j\rightarrow i}) \) (AND)

3. \( \text{TDValid}(td_{1,i}, t_i) \)

That is, the event \( E \) occurs if any corrupted party \( P_j \) commits to a valid trapdoor \( t_i \) (corresponding to the trapdoor generation protocol where \( P_i \) was the trapdoor generator) in the non-malleable commitment protocol with \( P_i \).

The invariant is

\[
\Pr[\text{Event } E \text{ occurs}] \leq \negl(\lambda)
\]

**Claim 1.** Assuming the “1-rewinding security” of the trapdoor generation protocol \( \text{TDGen} \) and the existence of an extractor \( \text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}} \) for the non-malleable commitment scheme \( \text{NMCom} \), the invariant holds in \( \text{Hyb_{REAL}} \).

**Proof.** This is proven by contradiction. Assume that the invariant doesn’t hold in \( \text{Hyb_{REAL}} \). Then there exists an adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) such that for some honest party \( P_i \) and malicious party \( P_j \), \( \mathcal{A} \) causes event \( E \) to occur with non-negligible probability. We will use this adversary to create an adversary \( \mathcal{A}_{\text{TDGen}} \) that breaks the “1-rewinding security” of the trapdoor generation protocol \( \text{TDGen} \) with non-negligible probability.

We now describe the working of \( \mathcal{A}_{\text{TDGen}} \) which interacts with the challenger \( \mathcal{C}_{\text{TDGen}} \). \( \mathcal{A}_{\text{TDGen}} \) picks randomly an honest party \( P_i \) and a random malicious party \( P_j \). All messages other than the trapdoor messages are computed in the same manner as \( \text{Sim}_{Hyb} \). The trapdoor messages for \( P_i \) are exposed to the external challenger. Specifically, in round 1, set \( td_{1,i} = td_1 \) where \( td_1 \) is received from \( \mathcal{C}_{\text{TDGen}} \). On receiving all the values \( td_1^{j\rightarrow i}, \ldots, td_{n}^{j\rightarrow i} \), including the value \( td_2^{j\rightarrow i} \) from \( \mathcal{A} \) in round 2, \( \mathcal{A}_{\text{TDGen}} \) sets \( td_{2,i} := (td_2^{j\rightarrow i}| \cdot \cdot \cdot |td_{n}^{j\rightarrow i}) \) and this is the value forwarded to \( \mathcal{C}_{\text{TDGen}} \) as the second round response. Set \( td_{3,i} = td_3 \) where \( td_3 \) is received from \( \mathcal{C}_{\text{TDGen}} \) and compute the rest of the third round messages for \( \mathcal{A} \). At this point, \( \mathcal{A}_{\text{TDGen}} \) rewinds \( \mathcal{A} \) back to the beginning of round 2 to enable extraction from the \( \text{NMCom} \). Specifically, \( \mathcal{A}_{\text{TDGen}} \) creates a look ahead thread that runs only the second and third round. As in the main thread, the trapdoor messages are received from
Claim 2. The invariant holds in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathsf{REAL}}$.

Proof. Since there is no difference in the main thread in the first 3 rounds between $\text{Hyb}_{\mathsf{REAL}}$ and $\text{Hyb}_0$, the invariant continues to hold.

Claim 3. $\text{Hyb}_0$ is indistinguishable from $\text{Hyb}_{\mathsf{REAL}}$ except with probability at most $\frac{\mu}{4} + \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Proof. This is argued in two cases depending on the probability with which the adversary abort.

Case 1: $\Pr[\text{not abort}] \geq \frac{\mu}{4}$:
Suppose the adversary doesn’t cause an abort with probability greater than $\frac{\mu}{4}$. Let us analyze the probability with which $\bot_{\mathsf{extract}}$ is output by $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$. By the Chernoff bound, in $\text{Hyb}_0$, except with negligible probability, in the set of $\frac{5n\lambda}{j}$ threads, there will be at least 5 GOOD threads with respect to some honest party $P_i$. Now all that’s left to argue is that $\text{Ext}_{\mathsf{RECom}}$ and $\text{TDExt}$ fail to extract with negligible probability.

From the definition of $\text{RECom}$, algorithm $\text{Ext}_{\mathsf{RECom}}$ is successful except with negligible probability if given as input $\left(\text{recom}_1, \{\text{recom}_2^k, \text{recom}_3^k\}_{k \in [5]}\right)$ such that $\left(\text{recom}_1, \text{recom}_2^k, \text{recom}_3^k\right)$ constitute “well-formed” and “admissible” rewinding secure extractable commitment messages. “Admissibility” follows trivially since $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ picks random challenges $z$ for the extractable commitment. From the above claim, we’ve proved that the invariant holds in $\text{Hyb}_0$, and thus from the soundness of $\text{RWI}$ and $\text{WI}$, in each GOOD thread with respect to some honest party $P_i$, the following holds: for every malicious $P_j$ and every honest $P_i$, $\left(\text{recom}_1^{j\rightarrow i}, \text{recom}_2^{j\rightarrow i}, \text{recom}_3^{j\rightarrow i}\right)$ is a “well formed” tuple of $\text{RECom}$. Thus $\text{Ext}_{\mathsf{RECom}}$ fails only with negligible probability.

From the definition of $\text{TDEGen}$, algorithm $\text{TDExt}$ is successful except with negligible probability if given as input $\left(\text{td}_1, \{\text{td}_2^k, \text{td}_3^k\}_{k \in [3]}\right)$ where $\text{td}_1$ is the first message of the protocol $\text{TDEGen}$ and $\text{td}_2^k, \text{td}_3^k$ denote the second and third round message of the $k$-th execution of $\text{TDEGen}$ using the same first round message. Since there are 5 GOOD threads, we can extract every malicious party’s trapdoor except with negligible probability.
Finally, from the Chernoff bound, in the set of $\frac{\lambda}{\mu}$ re-sampled main threads, there will be at least one completed execution. Thus, the adversary’s view in Hyb_{REAL} and Hyb_0 is indistinguishable.

**Case 2:** $\Pr[\text{not abort}] < \frac{\mu}{4}$:

Suppose the adversary doesn’t cause an abort with probability smaller than $\frac{\mu}{4}$. Then, in both hybrids, Sim_Hyb aborts at the end of the “Check Abort” step except with probability $\frac{\mu}{4}$. Thus, in this case, the adversary’s view in Hyb_{REAL} and Hyb_0 is indistinguishable except with probability at most $\frac{\mu}{4} + \operatorname{negl}(\lambda)$.

**Claim 4.** The invariant holds in Hyb_{1,0}.

**Proof.** Since there is no difference in the main thread in the first 3 rounds between Hyb_{1,0} and Hyb_0, the invariant continues to hold.

**Claim 5.** Assuming the hiding property of OT against malicious senders, Hyb_{1,0} is indistinguishable from Hyb_0.

**Proof.** The only difference between the two hybrids is when the “Check Abort” step doesn’t succeed. In that case, in Hyb_0, Sim_Hyb uses as input to OT the third round message for the RWI proof for $L_b$, while in Hyb_{1,0}, Sim_Hyb uses input 0 for the third round of OT. This is in fact done by a sequence of hybrids, wherein only a single instance of the honest party’s input to the OT is changed. There are $< n^2$ instances where an honest party is the receiver, and thus at most $n^2$ intermediate hybrids. Suppose there is an adversary $D$ that can distinguish between any two adjacent hybrids, we will create an adversary $A_{OT}$ that breaks the hiding of the OT scheme. Recall that this is only in the setting that “Check Abort” doesn’t succeed and hence the fourth round messages of the honest party are not sent.

We now describe the working of $A_{OT}$ which interacts with the challenger $C_{OT}$. Let the change in these adjacent hybrids be made for an honest party $P_i$ to a party $P_j$. All messages other than those of the chosen OT are computed as in the same manner as Sim_Hyb. First, set $ot_{i \rightarrow i}^1 := ot_1$ where $ot_1$ is sent by $C_{OT}$. On receiving/computing message $ot_{i \rightarrow i}^1$, send this along with $(rwi_{b,3}^{i \rightarrow j}, 0)$ to $C_{OT}$. Where $rwi_{b,3}^{i \rightarrow j}$ is computed as in the previous hybrid by Sim_Hyb. $C_{OT}$ then chooses as input one of the two values at random and sends $ot_3$. $A_{OT}$ sets $ot_{j \rightarrow i}^3 := ot_3$. The view generated is then given to the adversary $D$, wherein depending on the choice of $C_{OT}$, the view corresponds to one of the two adjacent hybrids. The output from $D$ is set to be the output of $A_{OT}$.

By our assumption, views of adjacent hybrids are distinguishable with non-negligible probability $\varepsilon$. Therefore, with the same probability $\varepsilon A_{OT}$ can break the hiding property of OT. Thus, it must be the case that $\varepsilon$ is negligible. Since there are at most $n^2$ intermediate hybrids, the two end hybrids, Hyb_{1,0} and Hyb_0, remain indistinguishable except with negligible probability.

**Claim 6.** The invariant holds in Hyb_{1,1}.

**Proof.** Since there is no difference in the main thread in the first 3 rounds between Hyb_{1,1} and Hyb_{1,0}, the invariant continues to hold.

**Claim 7.** Assuming the hiding property of Ecom, Hyb_{1,1} is indistinguishable from Hyb_{1,0}.

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9Since the OT sender in question may in fact be an honest party.
Proof. The proof works in the same way as the proof in the above claim. The only difference between the two hybrids is when the “Check Abort” step doesn’t succeed. In that case, in $\text{Hyb}_{1,0}$, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ uses as input to $\text{Ecom}$ the third round message for the RWI proof for $L_a$, while in $\text{Hyb}_{1,1}$, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ uses input 0 for the third round of $\text{Ecom}$. This is in fact done by a sequence of hybrids, wherein only a single instance of the honest party’s input to the $\text{Ecom}$ is changed. There are $< n^2$ instances where an honest party is the committer, and thus at most $n^2$ intermediate hybrids. Suppose there is an adversary $A$ that can distinguish between any two adjacent hybrids, we will create an adversary $A_{\text{RECom}}$ that breaks the hiding of the $\text{Ecom}$ scheme.

We now describe the working of $A_{\text{RECom}}$ which interacts with the challenger $C_{\text{Ecom}}$. Let the change in these adjacent hybrids be made for an honest party $P_i$ to a party $P_j$. All messages other than those of the chosen $\text{Ecom}$ are computed as in the same manner as $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$. First, set $\text{ecom}_{1}^{i \rightarrow j} := \text{recom}_1$ where $\text{ecom}_1$ is sent by $C_{\text{recom}}$. On receiving/computing message $\text{ecom}_{1}^{i \rightarrow j}$, send this along with $(\text{rw}_{1a,3}^i, 0)$ to $C_{\text{Ecom}}$. Where $(\text{rw}_{1a,3}^i)$ is computed as in the previous hybrid by $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$. $C_{\text{Ecom}}$ then commits to one of the two values at random and sends $\text{recom}_3$. $A_{\text{Ecom}}$ sets $\text{ecom}_{1}^{i \rightarrow j} := \text{ecom}_3$. The view generated is then given to the adversary $A$, wherein depending on the choice of $C_{\text{Ecom}}$, the view corresponds to one of the two adjacent hybrids. The output from $A$ is set to be the output of $A_{\text{Ecom}}$.

By our assumption, views of adjacent hybrids are distinguishable with non-negligible probability $\varepsilon$. Therefore, with the same probability $\varepsilon A_{\text{Ecom}}$ can break the hiding property of $\text{Ecom}$. Thus, it must be the case that $\varepsilon$ is negligible. Since there are at most $n^2$ intermediate hybrids, the two end hybrids, $\text{Hyb}_{1,1}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{1,0}$, remain indistinguishable except with negligible probability. 

Claim 8. The invariant holds in $\text{Hyb}_{1,2}$.

Proof. Since there is no difference in the main thread in the first 3 rounds between $\text{Hyb}_{1,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{1,1}$, the invariant continues to hold.

Claim 9. Assuming the hiding property of $\text{RECom}$, $\text{Hyb}_{1,2}$ is indistinguishable from $\text{Hyb}_{1,1}$.

Proof. The proof works in the same way as the proof in the above claim. The only difference between the two hybrids is when the “Check Abort” step doesn’t succeed. In that case, in $\text{Hyb}_{1,1}$, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ uses as input to $\text{RECom}$ $(x_i, r_i)$, while in $\text{Hyb}_{1,2}$, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ uses input 0 for the third round of $\text{RECom}$. This is in fact done by a sequence of hybrids, wherein only a single instance of the honest party’s input to the $\text{RECom}$ is changed. There are $< n^2$ instances where an honest party is the committer, and thus at most $n^2$ intermediate hybrids. Suppose there is an adversary $A$ that can distinguish between any two adjacent hybrids, we will create an adversary $A_{\text{RECom}}$ that breaks the hiding of the $\text{RECom}$ scheme.

We now describe the working of $A_{\text{RECom}}$ which interacts with the challenger $C_{\text{RECom}}$. Let the change in these adjacent hybrids be made for an honest party $P_i$ to a party $P_j$. All messages other than those of the chosen $\text{RECom}$ are computed as in the same manner as $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$. First, set $\text{recom}_1^{i \rightarrow j} := \text{recom}_1$ where $\text{recom}_1$ is sent by $C_{\text{recom}}$. On receiving/computing message $\text{recom}_1^{i \rightarrow j}$, send this along with $((x_i, r_i), 0)$ to $C_{\text{RECom}}$. Where $(x_i, r_i)$ is the input and randomness of $P_i$ computed as in the previous hybrid by $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$. $C_{\text{RECom}}$ then commits to one of the two values at random and sends $\text{recom}_3$. $A_{\text{RECom}}$ sets $\text{recom}_3^{i \rightarrow j} := \text{recom}_3$. The view generated is then given to the adversary $A$, wherein depending on the choice of $C_{\text{RECom}}$, the view corresponds to one of the two adjacent hybrids. The output from $A$ is set to be the output of $A_{\text{RECom}}$.

By our assumption, views of adjacent hybrids are distinguishable with non-negligible probability $\varepsilon$. Therefore, with the same probability $\varepsilon A_{\text{RECom}}$ can break the hiding property of $\text{RECom}$. Thus,

47
it must be the case that $\varepsilon$ is negligible. Since there are at most $n^2$ intermediate hybrids, the two end hybrids, $\text{Hyb}_{1,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{1,1}$, remain indistinguishable except with negligible probability.

\textbf{Claim 10.} The invariant holds in $\text{Hyb}_{1,3}$.

\textit{Proof.} Since there is no difference in the main thread in the first 3 rounds between $\text{Hyb}_{1,3}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{1,2}$, the invariant continues to hold.

\textbf{Claim 11.} Assuming the indistinguishability of the first round of $\Pi$, $\text{Hyb}_{1,3}$ is indistinguishable from $\text{Hyb}_{1,2}$.

\textit{Proof.} The proof works in a similar way as the proof in the above claim. The only difference between the two hybrids is when the “Check Abort” step doesn’t succeed. In that case, in $\text{Hyb}_{1,2}$, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ uses as input to the third round of $\Pi$ \footnote{This is the first round of $\Pi$ that uses the input.} $(x_i, r_i)$ for all honest parties $P_i$, while in $\text{Hyb}_{1,3}$, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ uses as input to the third round of $\Pi$ $(0, r_i)$ for all honest parties $P_i$. This is in fact done by a sequence of hybrids, wherein only a single instance of the honest party’s input to the $\Pi$ is changed. There are $< n$ parties, and thus at most $n^2$ intermediate hybrids. Suppose there is an adversary $D$ that can distinguish between any two adjacent hybrids, we will create an adversary $A_{\Pi}$ that breaks the indistinguishability of $\Pi$.

We now describe the working of $A_{\Pi}$ which interacts with the challenger $C_{\Pi}$. Let the change in these adjacent hybrids be made for an honest party $P_i$. All messages other than those of the chosen $\Pi$ are computed as in the same manner as $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$. First, set $\text{msg}_{1,i} := \text{msg}_1$ where $\text{msg}_1$ is sent by $C_{\text{recom}}$. On receiving and computing message $\text{msg}_{1,j}$ for all other parties $P_j$, send this to $C_{\Pi}$. Set $\text{msg}_{2,i} := \text{msg}_2$ where $\text{msg}_2$ is sent by $C_{\text{recom}}$. On receiving and computing message $\text{msg}_{2,j}$ for all other parties $P_j$, send this to $C_{\Pi}$ along with $((x_i, r_i), (0, r_i))$. Where $(x_i, r_i)$ is the input and randomness of $P_i$ computed as in the previous hybrid by $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$. $C_{\Pi}$ then uses one of the two values at random and sends $\text{msg}_3$. $A_{\Pi}$ sets $\text{msg}_{3,i} := \text{msg}_3$. The view generated is then given to the adversary $D$, wherein depending on the choice of $C_{\Pi}$, the view corresponds to one of the two adjacent hybrids. The output from $D$ is set to be the output of $A_{\Pi}$.

By our assumption, views of adjacent hybrids are distinguishable with non-negligible probability $\varepsilon$. Therefore, with the same probability $\varepsilon$ $A_{\Pi}$ can break the input indistinguishability property of $\Pi$. Thus, it must be the case that $\varepsilon$ is negligible. Since there are at most $n$ intermediate hybrids, the two end hybrids, $\text{Hyb}_{1,3}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{1,2}$, remain indistinguishable except with negligible probability.

This gives us that $\text{Hyb}_1$ and $\text{Hyb}_0$ are indistinguishable other than with negligible probability.

We now prove claims for all $k \in [T]$, where we set $\text{Hyb}_{2,0,7} \equiv \text{Hyb}_1$.

We note that we will argue that the invariant holds even in the look ahead thread that we’re making changes in. Initially, since all the look ahead threads are identical to the main thread, by 10 we know that the invariant holds in each of them. The invariant is useful since we will argue that if the invariant holds true, the probability of the extracted RWI accepting cannot change with noticeable probability. This guarantees that, with the change, we’re still successfully extracting from the adversary with the same probability.

\textbf{Claim 12.} Assuming $\text{NMCom}$ is a secure non-malleable commitment scheme, the invariant holds in $\text{Hyb}_{2,k,0}$.
Proof. First, observe that if the number of GOOD look-ahead threads is less than 5 with respect to every honest party, then SimHyb outputs ⊥extract is both hybrids and they’re identical. Therefore, suppose we have 5 GOOD look-ahead threads in both hybrids with respect to some honest party \( P_i \).

We know that the invariant holds \( Hyb_{2,k-1.7} \), the only difference between \( Hyb_{2,k-1.7} \) and \( Hyb_{2,k,0} \) is that the simulator commits to the trapdoor in the \( k \)-th look ahead thread. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that the invariant doesn’t hold in \( Hyb_{2,k,0} \). Then there exists an adversary \( A \) such that for some honest party \( P_i \) and malicious party \( P_j^* \), \( A \) causes event \( E \) to occur with non-negligible probability. We will use this adversary to create an adversary \( ANMCom \) that breaks the security of the non-malleable commitment scheme \( NMCom \) with non-negligible probability.

We now describe the working of \( ANMCom \) which interacts with the challenger \( C_{NMCom} \). \( ANMCom \) picks randomly an honest party \( P_i \) and a random malicious party \( P_j \). All messages other than the chosen \( NMCom \) messages are computed in the same manner as \( Sim_{Hyb} \). The \( NMCom \) messages from \( P_i \) to \( P_j \) are exposed to the external challenger. Specifically, in round 1, set \( nmcom^{i\rightarrow j}_1 := nmcom^{i}_1 \) where \( nmcom^{i}_1 \) is received from \( C_{NMCom} \) for the left execution. On receiving \( nmcom^{j\rightarrow i}_1 \) from \( A \), \( ANMCom \) forwards this to \( C_{NMCom} \) as its first round message on the right hand side.

\( ANMCom \) creates a set of 5 look-ahead threads, in each of which, it runs rounds 2 and 3 of the protocol alone. In each look-ahead thread, \( ANMCom \) computes \( nmcom^{j\rightarrow i}_3 \) as a commitment to \( ⊥ \). From the definition of the \( NMCom \) scheme, \( ANMCom \) can do this even without knowing the randomness used to generate \( nmcom^{i\rightarrow j}_1 \). These 5 threads are all GOOD with respect to some party \( H \) with noticeable probability. With the 5 threads, \( ANMCom \) can successfully run the input and trapdoor extraction phase.

On the \( k \)-th thread \( ANMCom \) receives \( nmcom^{R}_{2} \) from \( C_{NMCom} \) as the second round message on the right side which it sets as the value \( nmcom^{\rightarrow i}_{2} \). On receiving \( nmcom^{i\rightarrow j}_2 \) in the \( k \)-th thread, \( ANMCom \) sends this to \( C_{NMCom} \) as its second round message on the left side along with the pair of values \((⊥, t_j)\) where \( t_j \) was obtained during the extraction phase.

\( ANMCom \) receives a third round message \( nmcom^{j\rightarrow i}_3 \) which is either a commitment to \( ⊥ \) or \( t_j \). This is sent to \( A \) as the value \( nmcom^{i\rightarrow j}_3 \) in the \( k \)-th thread. On receiving \( nmcom^{j\rightarrow i}_3 \) from \( A \) in the main thread, \( ANMCom \) sends it to \( C_{NMCom} \) as its third round message in the right thread. Depending on the value committed to by \( C_{NMCom} \), we are either in \( Hyb_{2,k-1.7} \) or \( Hyb_{2,k,0} \).

By our assumption, since the invariant doesn’t hold, the adversary \( P_j^* \) commits to a valid trapdoor \( t_i^* \) for the trapdoor generation messages of the honest party \( P_i \) with non-negligible probability \( ε \). With probability at least \( \frac{1}{n^2} \), where \( n \) is the total number of players, this corresponds to honest party \( P_i \) and malicious party \( P_j \). Therefore, with non-negligible probability \( \frac{ε}{n^2} \), the adversary \( P_j \), using the non-malleable commitment, commits to a valid trapdoor \( t_i^* \) for the trapdoor generations messages of the honest party \( P_i \). Therefore, with non-negligible probability \( \frac{ε}{n^2} \), \( ANMCom \) commits to a valid trapdoor \( t_i^* \).

Therefore, when the value committed to by the honest party in the left execution changed, the value committed to by the adversary in the right execution changed with noticeable probability. This breaks the security of \( NMCom \), which is a contradiction. Thus the invariant must also hold for \( Hyb_{2,k,0} \).

\[ \square \]

Claim 13. Assuming hiding of \( NMCom \), \( Hyb_{2,k-1.7} \) is indistinguishable from \( Hyb_{2,k,0} \)

Proof. Since we’re only making changes in a look-ahead thread, all we need to do is argue that the extraction continues to succeed. i.e. \( Sim_{Hyb} \) does not output \( ⊥extract \) in the extraction phase of one
hybrid and not the other. The only difference between $\text{Hyb}_{2,k-1,7}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{2,k,0}$ is that the simulator commits to the trapdoor in the $k$-th look ahead thread.

Since we’ve already established that the variant holds in each look-ahead thread independently, we want to use the fact that the probability that the RWI proof for $L_a$ is accepting cannot change with noticeable probability if the invariant is true. If this were the case, the probability $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ outputs $\bot_{\text{extract}}$ will not change in the extraction phase of the two hybrids, since $L_a$ proves honest behavior of the first 3 rounds of the protocol.

Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that this isn’t true. Then there exists an adversary $A$ such that for some honest party $P_i$, and malicious party $P_j$, $A$ commits RWI proofs for $L_a$ in $\text{Ecom}$ such that the probability of accept in the two cases in non-negligible. We will use this adversary to create an adversary $A_{\text{NMCom}}$ that breaks the hiding of the non-malleable commitment scheme $\text{NMCom}$ with non-negligible probability.

We now describe the working of $A_{\text{NMCom}}$ which interacts with the challenger $\mathcal{C}_{\text{NMCom}}$. $A_{\text{NMCom}}$ picks randomly an honest party $P_i$ and a random malicious party $P_j$. All messages other than the chosen $\text{NMCom}$ messages are computed in the same manner as $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$. The $\text{NMCom}$ messages from $P_i$ to $P_j$ are exposed to the external challenger. Specifically, in round 1, set $\text{nmcom}^{i \rightarrow j}_1 \equiv \text{nmcom}_1$ where $\text{nmcom}_1$ is received from $\mathcal{C}_{\text{NMCom}}$.

$A_{\text{NMCom}}$ creates a set of 5 look-ahead threads, in each of which, it runs rounds 2 and 3 of the protocol alone. In each look-ahead thread, $A_{\text{NMCom}}$ computes $\text{nmcom}^{i \rightarrow j}_3$ as a commitment to $\bot$. From the definition of the $\text{NMCom}$ scheme, $A_{\text{NMCom}}$ can do this even without knowing the randomness used to generate $\text{nmcom}^{i \rightarrow j}_1$. These 5 threads are all GOOD with respect to some party $H$ with noticeable probability. With the 5 threads, $A_{\text{NMCom}}$ can successfully run the input and trapdoor extraction phase.

On receiving $\text{nmcom}^{i \rightarrow j}_3$, $A_{\text{NMCom}}$ forwards it to $\mathcal{C}_{\text{NMCom}}$ along with pair of values $(\bot, t_j)$ where $t_j$ was obtained during the extraction phase.

$A_{\text{NMCom}}$ receives a third round message $\text{nmcom}^{i \rightarrow j}_5$ which is either a commitment to $\bot$ or $t_j$. This is sent to $A$ as the value $\text{nmcom}^{i \rightarrow j}_3$ on the $k$-th thread. On receiving the third round messages from $A$, from 2 GOOD look ahead threads with respect to $P_i$, extract $\text{rwi}^{j \rightarrow i}_{a,3}$ from $\text{Ecom}$\footnote{The extraction in fact does not require further rewinds since mask already extracted in the “Check Abort” phase. But for simplicity, we ignore this point for now.}. From the definition of $\text{Ecom}$, the extracted value can be verified to be correctly extracted. $A_{\text{NMCom}}$ now checks if

$$\text{RWI}_i \left( \text{st}^{j \rightarrow i}_a, \text{rwi}^{j \rightarrow i}_{a,1}, \text{rwi}^{j \rightarrow i}_{a,2}, \text{rwi}^{j \rightarrow i}_{a,3} \right) = 1.$$  

If so, it guesses that the commitment was to $\bot$. Otherwise, it guesses that the commitment was to $t_j$. Let us define $\text{Trap}$ as the event that the commitment was to the trapdoor and $\overline{\text{Trap}}$ as the even that the commitment was to $\bot$. From the challenge game, we know $\Pr \left[ \text{Trap} \right] = \Pr \left[ \overline{\text{Trap}} \right] = \frac{1}{2}$

$$\begin{align*}
\Pr \left[ \text{guess correct} \right] &= \Pr \left[ \text{guess correct} \mid \text{Trap} \right] \cdot \Pr \left[ \text{Trap} \right] + \Pr \left[ \text{guess correct} \mid \overline{\text{Trap}} \right] \cdot \Pr \left[ \overline{\text{Trap}} \right] \\
&= \Pr \left[ \text{guess correct} \mid \text{Trap} \right] \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \Pr \left[ \text{guess correct} \mid \overline{\text{Trap}} \right] \cdot \frac{1}{2} \\
&= \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left( \Pr \left[ \text{RWI proof accepts} \mid \text{Trap} \right] + \Pr \left[ \text{RWI proof rejects} \mid \overline{\text{Trap}} \right] \right) \\
&= \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left( \Pr \left[ \text{RWI proof accepts} \mid \text{Trap} \right] + 1 - \Pr \left[ \text{RWI proof accepts} \mid \overline{\text{Trap}} \right] \right) \\
&= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left( \Pr \left[ \text{RWI proof accepts} \mid \text{Trap} \right] - \Pr \left[ \text{RWI proof accepts} \mid \overline{\text{Trap}} \right] \right)
\end{align*}$$
By our assumption, the adversary \( P_{j^*} \)'s acceptance probability of the RWI proof for \( L_a \) to \( P_{j^*} \) differs non-negligible probability \( \varepsilon \). With probability at least \( \frac{1}{n^2} \), where \( n \) is the total number of players, this corresponds to honest party \( P_i \) and malicious party \( P_j \) picked randomly by \( A_{\text{NMCom}} \). Therefore, \( P_{j^*} \)'s acceptance probability of the RWI proof for \( L_a \) to \( P_{j^*} \) differs non-negligible probability \( \varepsilon' \). Now, by the 2-extractability property, given the messages of the extractable commitment in 2 threads, the extractor \( \text{Ext}_{\text{Ecom}} \) is successful with some non-negligible probability \( \varepsilon' \). Therefore, with non-negligible advantage \( \frac{\varepsilon \cdot \varepsilon'}{n^2} \), \( A_{\text{NMCom}} \) wins the challenge game with \( C_{\text{NMCom}} \) which breaks the hiding property of NMCom. Thus, \( \varepsilon \) must be negligible, and thus the views are indistinguishable. \( \square \)

**Claim 14.** Assuming that RWI is a bounded rewinding secure protocol, and the existence of an extractor \( \text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}} \), the invariant holds in Hyb_{2, k, 1}.

**Proof.** We know that the invariant holds Hyb_{2, k, 0}. The only difference between Hyb_{2, k, 0} and Hyb_{2, k, 1} is that the simulator switches the witness in the RWI for \( L_a \). Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that the invariant doesn't hold in Hyb_{2, k, 1}. Then there exists an adversary \( A \) such that for some honest party \( P_{j^*} \), and malicious party \( P_{j^*} \), \( A \) causes event \( E \) to occur with non-negligible probability. We will use this adversary to create an adversary \( A_{\text{RWI}} \) that breaks the bounded rewinding security of RWI with non-negligible probability.

We now describe the working of \( A_{\text{RWI}} \) which interacts with the challenger \( C_{\text{RWI}} \). \( A_{\text{RWI}} \) picks randomly an honest party \( P_i \) and a random malicious party \( P_j \). All messages other than the chosen RWI messages are computed in the same manner as \( \text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}} \). The RWI messages from \( P_i \) to \( P_j \) are exposed to the external challenger. Specifically, in round 1, set \( \text{rwi}^{i \rightarrow j}_{a, 1} := \text{rwi}_1 \) where \( \text{rwi}_1 \) is received from \( C_{\text{RWI}} \).

After receiving \( \text{rwi}^{i \rightarrow j}_{a, 2} \) from \( A \), \( A_{\text{RWI}} \) creates a set of 5 look-ahead threads, in each of which, it runs rounds 2 and 3 of the protocol alone. In each look-ahead thread, \( A_{\text{RWI}} \) on receiving \( \text{rwi}^{i \rightarrow j}_{a, 1} \) forwards it to \( C_{\text{RWI}} \) as its second round message. For each thread, \( A_{\text{RWI}} \) also sends the statement

\[
\text{st}^{i \rightarrow j}_a := \left\{ \text{recom}^{i \rightarrow j}_t, \text{msg}^{i \rightarrow j}_t, \text{nmcom}^{i \rightarrow j}_t \right\}_{t \in \{\text{Trans}_2, \text{td}_{1,j}\}}
\]

where the other values are generated as in Hyb_{2, k, 0}.

In the main thread, \( A_{\text{RWI}} \) also sends the pair of witnesses \( \left( x_i, r_i, \text{recom}^{i \rightarrow j}_t, \bot, \bot \right) \) and \( \left( \bot, \bot, \bot, t_j, \text{nmcom}^{i \rightarrow j}_t \right) \) where \( t_j \) is obtained in the input extraction phase. For the look-ahead threads for extraction, \( A_{\text{RWI}} \) sends the witness \( \left( x_i, r_i, \text{recom}^{i \rightarrow j}_t, \bot, \bot \right) \). For each thread, \( A_{\text{RWI}} \) receives \( \text{rwi}_3 \) which is set as \( \text{rwi}^{i \rightarrow j}_{a, 3} \).

Recall that RWI is secure even in the presence of 6 total threads. Now \( A_{\text{RWI}} \) runs the extractor \( \text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}} \) of the non-malleable commitment scheme using the message in both the threads that correspond to the non-malleable commitment from malicious party \( P_j \) to honest party \( P_i \). Let the output of \( \text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}} \) be \( t^* \). If \( \text{TDValid}(\text{td}_{1,i}, t^*) = 1 \), then \( A_{\text{RWI}} \) outputs case 2 indicating that the RWI was constructed using the second witness on the main thread. Else, it outputs case 1.

By our assumption, since the invariant doesn't hold, the adversary \( P_{j^*} \) commits to a valid trapdoor \( t_{i^*} \) for the trapdoor generation messages of the honest party \( P_{i^*} \) with non-negligible probability \( \varepsilon \). With probability at least \( \frac{1}{n^2} \), where \( n \) is the total number of players, this corresponds to honest party \( P_i \) and malicious party \( P_j \) picked randomly by \( A_{\text{RWI}} \). Therefore, with non-negligible probability \( \frac{\varepsilon}{n^2} \), the adversary \( P_j \), using the non-malleable commitment, commits to a valid trapdoor \( t_{i^*} \) for the trapdoor generations messages of the honest party \( P_i \). Since the invariant holds in Hyb_{2, k, 0}, by the 2-extractability property of the non-malleable commitment, when the extractor \( \text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}} \) outputs a valid trapdoor \( t^* \), it must be the case that we're in Hyb_{2, k, 1} with non-negligible probability. That is, when \( \text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}} \) outputs a valid trapdoor, it corresponds to \( A_{\text{RWI}} \) receiving
a proof using the trapdoor witness and otherwise it corresponds to \( A_{\text{RWI}} \) receiving a proof using the first witness. Thus, \( A_{\text{RWI}} \) breaks the bounded rewinding security of the scheme RWI which is a contradiction. Therefore, the invariant also holds for Hyb\(_{2,k,1}\).

**Claim 15.** Assuming the bounded rewinding witness indistinguishability RWI, Hyb\(_{2,k,0}\) is indistinguishable from Hyb\(_{2,k,1}\).

**Proof.** Since we're only making changes in a look-ahead thread, all we need to do is argue that the extraction continues to succeed. i.e. \( \text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}} \) does not output \( \bot_{\text{extract}} \) in the extraction phase of one hybrid and not the other. The only difference between Hyb\(_{2,k,0}\) and Hyb\(_{2,k,1}\) is that the simulator switches the witness in the RWI for \( L_a \).

Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that this isn't true. Then there exists an adversary \( A \) such that for some honest party \( P_i^* \) and malicious party \( P_j^* \), \( A \) commits RWI proofs for \( L_a \) in Ecom such that the probability of accept in the two cases in non-negligible. We will use this adversary to create an adversary \( A_{\text{RWI}} \) that breaks the bounded rewinding security of RWI with non-negligible probability.

The proof is similar to that of Claim 13 and Claim 14. We note that we use the fact that RWI is secure even in the presence of the 2 total threads used for extracting from Ecom.

**Claim 16.** Assuming that RWI is a bounded rewinding secure protocol, and the existence of an extractor \( \text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}} \), the invariant holds in Hyb\(_{2,k,2}\).

**Proof.** We know that the invariant holds Hyb\(_{2,k,1}\). The only difference between Hyb\(_{2,k,1}\) and Hyb\(_{2,k,2}\) is that the simulator switches the witness in the RWI for \( L_b \). Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that the invariant doesn’t hold in Hyb\(_{2,k,2}\). Then there exists an adversary \( A \) such that for some honest party \( P_i^* \) and malicious party \( P_j^* \), \( A \) causes event \( E \) to occur with non-negligible probability. We will use this adversary to create an adversary \( A_{\text{RWI}} \) that breaks the bounded rewinding security of RWI with non-negligible probability. The rest of the proof is similar to that of Claim 14.

**Claim 17.** Assuming the bounded rewinding witness indistinguishability RWI, Hyb\(_{2,k,1}\) is indistinguishable from Hyb\(_{2,k,2}\).

**Proof.** Since we’re only making changes in a look-ahead thread, all we need to do is argue that the extraction continues to succeed. i.e. \( \text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}} \) does not output \( \bot_{\text{extract}} \) in the extraction phase of one hybrid and not the other. The only difference between Hyb\(_{2,k,1}\) and Hyb\(_{2,k,2}\) is that the simulator switches the witness in the RWI for \( L_b \).

Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that this isn’t true. Then there exists an adversary \( A \) such that for some honest party \( P_i^* \) and malicious party \( P_j^* \), \( A \) commits RWI proofs for \( L_a \) in Ecom such that the probability of accept in the two cases in non-negligible. We will use this adversary to create an adversary \( A_{\text{RWI}} \) that breaks the bounded rewinding security of RWI with non-negligible probability.

The proof is similar to that of Claim 13 and Claim 14.

**Claim 18.** Assuming that \( \text{Com} \) is a secure commitment scheme, and the existence of an extractor \( \text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}} \), the invariant holds in Hyb\(_{2,k,3}\).

**Proof.** We prove this by a sequence of sub-claims.

**Sub-Claim 19.** Assuming that \( \text{Com} \) is a secure commitment scheme, and the existence of an extractor \( \text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}} \), the invariant holds in Hyb\(_{2,k,3,0}\).
Claim 22. Assuming that Com is a secure commitment scheme, Hyb_{2,k,2} is indistinguishable from Hyb_{2,k,3}.
**Proof.** Since we’re only making changes in a look-ahead thread, all we need to do is argue that the extraction continues to succeed, i.e. $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ does not output $\bot_{\text{extract}}$ in the extraction phase of one hybrid and not the other. The only difference between $\text{Hyb}_{2,k,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{2,k,3}$ is that the simulator switches commitment in $\text{RECom}$ to 0.

The proof is similar to that of Claim 13 and Claim 18. \hfill $\square$

**Claim 23.** Assuming that $\Pi$ is a rewinding secure protocol for the first three rounds, and the existence of an extractor $\text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}}$, the invariant holds in $\text{Hyb}_{2,k,4}$.

**Proof.** We know that the invariant holds $\text{Hyb}_{2,k,3}$. The only difference between $\text{Hyb}_{2,k,3}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{2,k,4}$ is that the simulator switches the input in $\Pi$ from $(x, r)$ to 0 for each honest party $P_i$. This is in fact done by a sequence of hybrids where only a single party’s input is changed at a time. For simplicity, we proceed with the assumption that in this hybrid, only a single party’s input was changed. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that the invariant doesn’t hold in $\text{Hyb}_{2,k,4}$. Then there exists an adversary $A$ such that for some honest party $P_i$ and malicious party $P_j$, $A$ causes event $E$ to occur with non-negligible probability. We will use this adversary to create an adversary $A_{\Pi}$ that breaks the bounded rewinding security of the first three round of $\Pi$ with non-negligible probability.

We now describe the working of $A_{\Pi}$ which interacts with the challenger $C_{\Pi}$. $A_{\Pi}$ picks randomly an honest party $P_i$ and a random malicious party $P_j$. All messages other than the chosen $\Pi$ messages for $P_i$ are computed in the same manner as $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$. The $\Pi$ messages for $P_i$ are exposed to the external challenger. Specifically, in round 1, set $\text{msg}_1 := \text{msg}_1$ where $\text{msg}_1$ is received from $C_{\Pi}$.

After generating/receiving $\text{Trans}_1$ from $A$, $A_{\Pi}$ creates a set of 5 look-ahead threads, in each of which, it runs rounds 2 and 3 of the protocol alone. In each look-ahead thread, $A_{\Pi}$ on receiving $\text{Trans}_1$ forwards it to $C_{\Pi}$.

In the main thread ($k$-th look-ahead thread), $A_{\Pi}$ also sends the pair of inputs $(x_i, r_i)$ and 0. For the look-ahead threads for extraction, $A_{\Pi}$ sends the input $(x_i, r_i)$. For each thread, $A_{\Pi}$ receives $\text{msg}_2$ which is set as $\text{msg}_2,i$. Depending on the input used by $C_{\Pi}$, we are either in $\text{Hyb}_{2,k,3}$ or $\text{Hyb}_{2,k,4}$.

Recall that $\Pi$ is secure even in the presence of 3 total threads. Now $A_{\Pi}$ runs the extractor $\text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}}$ of the non-malleable commitment scheme using the message in both the threads that correspond to the non-malleable commitment from malicious party $P_j$ to honest party $P_i$. Let the output of $\text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}}$ be $t^*$. If $\text{TDValid}(\text{td}, t^*) = 1$, then $A_{\text{RECom}}$ outputs case 2 indicating that the $\text{RECom}$ was constructed using input 0 on the main thread. Else, it outputs case 1.

By our assumption, since the invariant doesn’t hold, the adversary $P_j$ commits to a valid trapdoor $t^*$ for the trapdoor generation messages of the honest party $P_i$ with non-negligible probability $\varepsilon$. With probability at least $\frac{1}{n^2}$, where $n$ is the total number of players, this corresponds to honest party $P_i$ and malicious party $P_j$ picked randomly by $A_{\text{RWI}}$. Therefore, with non-negligible probability $\frac{1}{n^2}$, the adversary $P_j$, using the non-malleable commitment, commits to a valid trapdoor $t^*$ for the trapdoor generations messages of the honest party $P_i$. Since the invariant holds in $\text{Hyb}_{2,k,3}$, by the 2-extractability property of the non-malleable commitment, when the extractor $\text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}}$ outputs a valid trapdoor $t^*$, it must be the case that we’re in $\text{Hyb}_{2,k,4}$ with non-negligible probability. Thus, $A_{\Pi}$ breaks the bounded rewinding security of the first three round of $\Pi$ with non-negligible probability. Therefore, the invariant also holds for $\text{Hyb}_{2,k,4}$.

\hfill $\square$

**Claim 24.** Assuming that $\Pi$ is a rewinding secure protocol for the first three rounds, $\text{Hyb}_{2,k,3}$ is indistinguishable from $\text{Hyb}_{2,k,4}$.
Proof. Since we're only making changes in a look-ahead thread, all we need to do is argue that the extraction continues to succeed, i.e. \( \text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}} \) does not output \( \bot \) in the extraction phase of one hybrid and not the other. The only difference between \( \text{Hyb}_{2,k,3} \) and \( \text{Hyb}_{2,k,4} \) is that the simulator switches input to 0.

Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that this isn't true. Then there exists an adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) such that for some honest party \( P_i \) and malicious party \( P_j^* \), \( \mathcal{A} \) commits RWI proofs for \( L_a \) in \( \text{Ecom} \) such that the probability of accept in the two cases is non-negligible. We will use this adversary to create an adversary \( \mathcal{A}_{\text{RECom}} \) that breaks the bounded rewinding security of \( \text{RECom} \) with non-negligible probability.

The proof is similar to that of Claim 13 and Claim 23.

Claim 25. Assuming that RWI is a bounded rewinding secure protocol, and the existence of an extractor \( \text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}} \), the invariant holds in \( \text{Hyb}_{2,k,5} \).

Proof. Proof is identical to that of Claim 16.

Claim 26. Assuming the bounded rewinding witness indistinguishability RWI, \( \text{Hyb}_{2,k,4} \) is indistinguishable from \( \text{Hyb}_{2,k,5} \).

Proof. Proof is identical to that of Claim 17.

Claim 27. Assuming that RWI is a bounded rewinding secure protocol, and the existence of an extractor \( \text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}} \), the invariant holds in \( \text{Hyb}_{2,k,6} \).

Proof. Proof is identical to that of Claim 14.

Claim 28. Assuming the bounded rewinding witness indistinguishability RWI, \( \text{Hyb}_{2,k,5} \) is indistinguishable from \( \text{Hyb}_{2,k,6} \).

Proof. Proof is identical to that of Claim 15.

Claim 29. Assuming \( \text{NMCom} \) is a secure non-malleable commitment scheme, the invariant holds in \( \text{Hyb}_{2,k,7} \).

Proof. Proof is identical to that of Claim 12.

Claim 30. Assuming \( \text{NMCom} \) is a secure non-malleable commitment scheme, \( \text{Hyb}_{2,k,6} \) is indistinguishable from \( \text{Hyb}_{2,k,7} \).

Proof. Proof is identical to that of Claim 13.

Claim 31. Assuming \( \text{NMCom} \) is a secure non-malleable commitment scheme, the invariant holds in \( \text{Hyb}_{3} \).

Proof. Proof is identical to that of Claim 12.

Claim 32. Assuming \( \text{NMCom} \) is a secure non-malleable commitment scheme, \( \text{Hyb}_{3} \) is indistinguishable from \( \text{Hyb}_{2} \).
Proof. The only difference between $\text{Hyb}_3$ and $\text{Hyb}_2$ is that the simulator commits to the trapdoor in the main look-ahead thread.

Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that that the views are distinguishable. Then there exists an adversary $\mathcal{D}$ such that $\mathcal{D}$ can distinguish between $\text{Hyb}_3$ and $\text{Hyb}_2$ with non-negligible advantage. We will use this adversary to create an adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NMCom}}$ that breaks the hiding of the non-malleable commitment scheme $\text{NMCom}$ with non-negligible probability.

We now describe the working of $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NMCom}}$ which interacts with the challenger $\mathcal{C}_{\text{NMCom}}$. $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NMCom}}$ picks randomly an honest party $P_i$ and a random malicious party $P_j$. All messages other than the chosen $\text{NMCom}$ messages are computed in the same manner as $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$. The $\text{NMCom}$ messages from $P_i$ to $P_j$ are exposed to the external challenger. Specifically, in round 1, set $\text{nmcom}_{1}^{i\rightarrow j} := \text{nmcom}_{1}$ where $\text{nmcom}_{1}$ is received from $\mathcal{C}_{\text{NMCom}}$.

$\mathcal{A}_{\text{NMCom}}$ creates a set of 5 look-ahead threads, in each of which, it runs rounds 2 and 3 of the protocol alone. In each look-ahead thread, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NMCom}}$ computes $\text{nmcom}_{3}^{i\rightarrow j}$ as a commitment to $\bot$. From the definition of the $\text{NMCom}$ scheme, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NMCom}}$ can do this even without knowing the randomness used to generate $\text{nmcom}_{1}^{i\rightarrow j}$. These 5 threads are all GOOD with respect to some party $H$ with noticeable probability. With the 5 threads, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NMCom}}$ can successfully run the input and trapdoor extraction phase.

On receiving $\text{nmcom}_{1}^{i\rightarrow j}$, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NMCom}}$ forwards it to $\mathcal{C}_{\text{NMCom}}$ along with pair of values $(\bot, t_j)$ where $t_j$ was obtained during the extraction phase.

$\mathcal{A}_{\text{NMCom}}$ receives a third round message $\text{nmcom}_{5}^{i\rightarrow j}$ which is either a commitment to $\bot$ or $t_j$. This is sent to $\mathcal{A}$ as the value $\text{nmcom}_{3}^{i\rightarrow j}$ on the main thread. The rest of the messages are obtained in the same manner as $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$. Depending on which value was committed we are either in $\text{Hyb}_3$ or $\text{Hyb}_2$. On completion of the execution, the view is input to $\mathcal{D}$ and the output returned is the output of $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NMCom}}$.

By our assumption, $\mathcal{D}$ can distinguish between the two hybrids with noticeable probability $\varepsilon$. Therefore, with non-negligible advantage $\frac{\varepsilon}{n^2}$, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NMCom}}$ wins the challenge game with $\mathcal{C}_{\text{NMCom}}$ which breaks the hiding property of $\text{NMCom}$. Thus, $\varepsilon$ must be negligible, and thus the views are indistinguishable.

Claim 33. Assuming the bounded rewinding witness indistinguishability $\text{RWI}$, the invariant holds in $\text{Hyb}_4$.

Proof. Proof is identical to that of Claim 14.

Claim 34. Assuming the bounded rewinding witness indistinguishability $\text{RWI}$, $\text{Hyb}_4$ is indistinguishable from $\text{Hyb}_3$.

Proof. The only difference between $\text{Hyb}_4$ and $\text{Hyb}_3$ is that the simulator switches the witness in the $\text{RWI}$ for $L_a$.

Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that this isn’t true. Then there exists an adversary $\mathcal{D}$ can distinguish between $\text{Hyb}_4$ and $\text{Hyb}_3$ with non-negligible advantage. We will use this adversary to create an adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{RWI}}$ that breaks the bounded rewinding security of $\text{RWI}$ with non-negligible probability.

The proof is similar to that of Claim 32 and Claim 33.

Claim 35. Assuming the bounded rewinding witness indistinguishability $\text{RWI}$, the invariant holds in $\text{Hyb}_5$.

Proof. Proof is identical to that of Claim 16.
Claim 36. Assuming the bounded rewinding witness indistinguishability RWI, Hyb_5 is indistinguishable from Hyb_4.

Proof. The only difference between Hyb_5 and Hyb_4 is that the simulator switches the witness in the RWI for L_b.

Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that this isn’t true. Then there exists an adversary D that can distinguish between Hyb_5 and Hyb_4 with non-negligible advantage. We will use this adversary to create an adversary A_RWI that breaks the bounded rewinding security of RWI with non-negligible probability.

The proof is similar to that of Claim 32 and Claim 33.

Claim 37. The invariant holds in Hyb_6.

Proof. The claim is trivially true since the change is made only in the fourth round.

Claim 38. Assuming the witness indistinguishability WI, Hyb_6 is indistinguishable from Hyb_5.

Proof. The only difference between Hyb_6 and Hyb_5 is that the simulator switches the witness in the WI for L_c.

Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that this isn’t true. Then there exists an adversary D that can distinguish between Hyb_6 and Hyb_5 with non-negligible advantage. We will use this adversary to create an adversary A_WI that breaks the witness indistinguishability of WI with non-negligible probability.

The proof is similar to that of Claim 32 and Claim 33. We point out that since only the second round of WI overlaps with the rewinding rounds, we don’t need the external challenger to handle rewinds since the responses on the look-ahead threads, that are run only till the end of third round, are discarded.

Claim 39. Assuming that Com is a secure commitment scheme, and the existence of an extractor Ext_NMCom, the invariant holds in Hyb_7.

Proof. We prove that the invariant holds in the look-ahead threads that we make the changes in. We know that the invariant holds Hyb_6. The only difference between Hyb_6 and Hyb_7,2 is that the simulator commits to 0 in the third round of RECom. This is in fact done by a sequence of hybrids where only a single Com is changed at a time. For simplicity, we proceed with the assumption that in this hybrid, only a single commitment was changed. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that the invariant doesn’t hold in Hyb_7,2. Then there exists an adversary A such that for some honest party P_i* and malicious party P_j*, A causes event E to occur with non-negligible probability. We will use this adversary to create an adversary A_RECom that breaks the hiding property of RECom with bounded rewinds with non-negligible probability.

A_RECom sets recom_{1,ℓ} \rightarrow recom where recom is received from C_RECom and sends it A. After receiving recom_{2,ℓ} \rightarrow recom from A, A_RECom creates a set of 2 look-ahead threads, in each of which, it runs rounds 2 and 3 of the protocol alone. In each look-ahead thread, A_RECom on receiving recom_{2,ℓ} \rightarrow recom forwards it to C_RECom.

In the main thread, A_RECom also sends the pair of inputs \((x_i, r_i)\) and 0 where \((x_i, r_i)\) is the honest parties inputs. For the look-ahead threads for extraction, A_ECCom sends the witness \((x_i, r_i)\). For each thread, A_RECom receives recom \((x_i, r_i)\) which is set as recom_{3,ℓ} \rightarrow recom. Depending on the value committed by C_NMCom, we are either in Hyb_7_6 or Hyb_7_7.

Now A_ECCom runs the extractor Ext_NMCom of the non-malleable commitment scheme using the message in both the threads that correspond to the non-malleable commitment from malicious
party $P_j$ to honest party $P_i$. Let the output of $\text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}}$ be $t^*$. If $\text{TDValid}(t_{1,i}, t^*) = 1$, then $A_{\text{RECom}}$ outputs case 2 indicating that the $\text{RECom}$ was constructed using input 0. Else, it outputs case 1.

By our assumption, since the invariant doesn’t hold, the adversary $P_{j^*}$ commits to a valid trapdoor $t_{j^*}$ for the trapdoor generation messages of the honest party $P_{i^*}$ with non-negligible probability $\varepsilon$. With probability at least $\frac{1}{n^2}$, where $n$ is the total number of players, this corresponds to honest party $P_i$ and malicious party $P_j$ picked randomly by $A_{\text{Com}}$. Therefore, with non-negligible probability $\frac{\varepsilon}{n^2}$, the adversary $P_{j^*}$, using the non-malleable commitment, commits to a valid trapdoor $t_{j^*}$ for the trapdoor generations messages of the honest party $P_i$. Since the invariant holds in $\text{Hyb}_6$, by the 2-extractability property of the non-malleable commitment, when the extractor $\text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}}$ outputs a valid trapdoor $t^*$, it must be the case that we’re in $\text{Hyb}_{7,2}$ with non-negligible probability. Thus, $A_{\text{RECom}}$ breaks the bounded rewinding property of the scheme $\text{RECom}$ which is a contradiction. Therefore, the invariant also holds for $\text{Hyb}_{7,2}$. 

\textbf{Claim 40.} Assuming the rewinding security of $\text{RECom}$, $\text{Hyb}_{7}$ is indistinguishable from $\text{Hyb}_{6}$

\textit{Proof.} This is proved via a sequence of hybrids given below.

This is done by a sequence of hybrids mentioned below. We note that we separate the look-ahead threads into two separate types: (i) to extract trapdoor, (ii) to extract input. In our hybrids, we shall only make changes to type (ii) threads.

$\text{Hyb}_{7,0}$: Change main thread $\text{RECom}$ to random: In this hybrid, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ modifies the third round of the main thread to send “junk” responses. Specifically, for every honest party $P_i$ and malicious party $P_j$ do the following:

- for every $\ell \in [N]$, pick a new degree 4 polynomial $q_{\ell}$.
- compute $\text{recom}_{3,\ell}$ as $(0 \oplus q_{\ell}(0), q_{\ell}(z_{\ell})$.

Given that we changed our $\text{RECom}$ to random, we want to claim that the adversary’s input has not also become random.

\textbf{Claim 41.} Assuming the security of $\text{Com}$ and the 2-extractability property of $\text{NMCom}$, the invariant holds in $\text{Hyb}_{7,0}$.

\textit{Proof.} We prove that the invariant holds in the look-ahead threads that we make the changes in. We know that the invariant holds $\text{Hyb}_6$. The only difference between $\text{Hyb}_6$ and $\text{Hyb}_{7,0}$ is that the simulator uses random polynomials to compute the third round messages of $\text{RECom}$ on the main thread. An alternate way to think of this is that either the polynomials used inside $\text{Com}$ and that used to compute the third round of $\text{RECom}$ are the same, or they’re independently sample random polynomials. Thus we think of the change as $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ switching the commitment in $\text{Com}$ from polynomials $p$ to $q$ while using $p$ to compute the third round of $\text{RECom}$. This is in fact done by a sequence of hybrids where only a single $\text{Com}$ is changed at a time. For simplicity, we proceed with the assumption that in this hybrid, only a single commitment was changed. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that the invariant doesn’t hold in $\text{Hyb}_{7,0}$. Then there exists an adversary $A$ such that for some honest party $P_{i^*}$ and malicious party $P_{j^*}$, $A$ causes event $E$ to occur with non-negligible probability. We will use this adversary to create an adversary $A_{\text{Com}}$ that breaks the hiding property of $\text{Com}$ with non-negligible probability.

We now describe the working of $A_{\text{Com}}$ which interacts with the challenger $C_{\text{Com}}$. $A_{\text{Com}}$ picks randomly an honest party $P_i$ and a random malicious party $P_j$. All messages other than the chosen $\text{Com}$ messages are computed in the same manner as $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$. The $\text{Com}$ messages
from $P_i$ to $P_j$ are exposed to the external challenger. Specifically, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{Com}}$ sends two challenges $(p_\ell, q_\ell)$ to $C$. And sets $\text{recom}_{i,j}^{\ell} := \text{com}$ where $\text{com}$ is received from $C_{\text{Com}}$. Depending on the challenge used by $C_{\text{Com}}$, we are either in $\text{Hyb}_6$ or $\text{Hyb}_{7,0}$.

$\mathcal{A}_{\text{Com}}$ creates 2 look ahead threads where it runs rounds 2 and 3 of the protocol alone. Now $\mathcal{A}_{\text{Com}}$ runs the extractor $\text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}}$ of the non-malleable commitment scheme using the message in both the threads that correspond to the non-malleable commitment from malicious party $P_j$ to honest party $P_i$. Let the output of $\text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}}$ be $t^*$. If $\text{TDValid}((t_d,i), t^*) = 1$, then $\mathcal{A}_{\text{RECom}}$ outputs case 2 indicating that the $\text{RECom}$ was constructed using input $q$. Else, it outputs case 1.

By our assumption, since the invariant doesn’t hold, the adversary $P_j^*$ commits to a valid trapdoor $t_i^*$ for the trapdoor generation messages of the honest party $P_i^*$ with non-negligible probability $\epsilon$. With probability at least $\frac{1}{n^2}$, where $n$ is the total number of players, this corresponds to honest party $P_i$ and malicious party $P_j$ picked randomly by $\mathcal{A}_{\text{Com}}$. Therefore, with non-negligible probability $\frac{\epsilon}{n^2}$, the adversary $P_j$, using the non-malleable commitment, commits to a valid trapdoor $t_i^*$ for the trapdoor generation messages of the honest party $P_i$. Since the invariant holds in $\text{Hyb}_0$, by the 2-extractability property of the non-malleable commitment, when the extractor $\text{Ext}_{\text{NMCom}}$ outputs a valid trapdoor $t^*$, it must be the case that we’re in $\text{Hyb}_{7,2}$ with non-negligible probability. Thus, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{Com}}$ breaks the hiding property of the scheme $\text{Com}$ which is a contradiction. Therefore, the invariant also holds for $\text{Hyb}_{7,2}$. This works because as long as the number of threads created to extract from $\text{NMCom}$ is less than $B_{\text{recom}}$, which is in fact true, since otherwise, the “random” polynomial no longer appears random. It should be noted that we don’t need to extract the adversary’s input for the reduction, and thus no use of creating any Type (ii) threads.

Claim 42. Assuming the security of $\text{Com}$, $\text{Hyb}_{7,0}$ is indistinguishable from $\text{Hyb}_6$

Proof. Since we’re only making changes in a look-ahead thread, all we need to do is argue that the adversary doesn’t switch to “junk” commitments when we make the change. The only difference between $\text{Hyb}_0$ and $\text{Hyb}_{7,2}$ is that the simulator uses random polynomials to compute the third round messages of $\text{RECom}$ look-ahead threads.

Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that this isn’t true. Then there exists an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ such that for some honest party $P_i^*$ and malicious party $P_j^*$, $\mathcal{A}$ commits RWI proofs for $L_a$ in $\text{Ecom}$ such that the probability of accept in the two cases is non-negligible. We will use this adversary to create an adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{Com}}$ that breaks the security of $\text{Com}$ with non-negligible probability.

The proof is similar to that of Claim 13 and Claim 39.

$\text{Hyb}_{7,1}$: Create Type (ii) look-ahead thread: In this hybrid, $\text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}}$ creates Type (ii) threads that are identical to the main thread. These will be used to extract the adversary’s input. We create as many needed for the extraction of the adversary’s input.

Claim 43. Assuming the security of $\text{Com}$ and the 2-extractability property of $\text{NMCom}$, the invariant holds in $\text{Hyb}_{7,1}$.

Proof. This trivially follows from the fact that invariant holds in $\text{Hyb}_{7,0}$ are identical to the main thread.

Claim 44. Assuming the security of $\text{Com}$, $\text{Hyb}_{7,1}$ is indistinguishable from $\text{Hyb}_6$
Proof. This follows as in the proof of Claim 42. \hfill \square

Hyb\textsubscript{7,2}: **Change main thread RECom to 0:** In this hybrid, Sim\textsubscript{Hyb} modifies the third round of the main thread to commit to 0. Specifically, for every honest party P\textsubscript{i} and malicious party P\textsubscript{j} do the following:

- compute recom\textsubscript{3,ℓ} as \((0 \oplus p_ℓ(0), \text{poly}(\lambda)_ℓ(z_ℓ)).

where p_ℓ are the polynomials committed to in the first round.

Claim 45. Assuming the security of Com and the 2-extractability property of NMCom, the invariant holds in Hyb\textsubscript{7,2}.

Proof. The proof follows as in 41. \hfill \square

Claim 46. Assuming the security of Com, Hyb\textsubscript{7,2} is indistinguishable from Hyb\textsubscript{6}

Proof. The proof follows as in 42

Note that Hyb\textsubscript{7,2} \equiv Hyb\textsubscript{7}

Thus Hyb\textsubscript{7} is indistinguishable from Hyb\textsubscript{6}. \hfill \square

Claim 47. The invariant holds in Hyb\textsubscript{8}.

Proof. The claim is trivially true since the change is made only in the fourth round. \hfill \square

Claim 48. Assuming the security of GC and sender’s OT messages, Hyb\textsubscript{8} is indistinguishable from Hyb\textsubscript{7}

Proof. This is established by the creating the following sub-hybrids. Recall these changes are only made when there is an implicit abort.

Hyb\textsubscript{8,0}: **Change OT sender’s message on main thread:** In this hybrid, Sim\textsubscript{Hyb} changes how the sender OT is computed. We extract from \textit{ot} to obtain the adversary’s receiver message. Use the receiver value extracted from the \textit{ot} to change the sender OT to include only a single label of the garbled circuit. Specifically, \(\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\},\) compute

\[\text{ot}_{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{OT}_4\left((\text{lab}_{i,v|j}, \text{lab}_{i,v|j}), \text{ot}_{i \rightarrow j}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{ot}_{2}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{ot}_{3}^{i \rightarrow j}, \text{ot}_{i, \text{ot}}^{i \rightarrow j}\right).\]

where \(v\) is the extracted receiver string from \(\text{ot}_{i \rightarrow j}^{i \rightarrow j}.

Claim 49. Assuming the security of sender’s OT messages, Hyb\textsubscript{8,0} is indistinguishable from Hyb\textsubscript{7}

Proof. The only difference between Hyb\textsubscript{8,0} and Hyb\textsubscript{7} is that the simulator Sim\textsubscript{Hyb} switches the sender OT input to using the same label twice \(P_i\) if it receives a non-accepting RWI proof for \(L_a\).

Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that that the views are distinguishable. Then there exists an adversary \(D\) such that \(D\) can distinguish between Hyb\textsubscript{8,0} and Hyb\textsubscript{7} with non-negligible advantage. We will use this adversary to create an adversary \(A_{\text{OT}}\) that breaks the sender’s security in OT with non-negligible probability.
We now describe the working of $A_{OT}$ which interacts with the challenger $C_{OT}$. $A_{OT}$ picks randomly an honest party $P_i$ and a random malicious party $P_j$. All messages other than the chosen OT messages are computed in the same manner as $Sim_{Hyb}$. The OT messages from $P_i$ to $P_j$ are exposed to the external challenger. Specifically, in round 1, send to $C_{OT}$ the first round OT message $ot_{1\rightarrow j}^i$ sent by $A$. Receive $ot_2$ and set $ot_{2\rightarrow j}^i := ot_2$.

$A_{NMCom}$ creates a set of 5 look-ahead threads, in each of which, it runs rounds 2 and 3 of the protocol alone. In each look-ahead thread, $A_{OT}$ re-sends the same $ot_{2\rightarrow j}^i$ message in the second round. Only $ot_{3\rightarrow j}^i$ on the main thread is forwarded to $C_{OT}$. With the 5 threads, $A_{NMCom}$ can successfully run the extraction phase to extract the OT receiver bit from $P_j$ to be $v$. Send $((\tilde{lab}_1, i), (\tilde{lab}_1, j))$ and $((lab_i, v_1), (lab_i, v_2))$ to $C_{OT}$ as challenges.

The rest of the messages are obtained in the same manner as $Sim_{Hyb}$. Depending on pair was used as sender input we are either in $Hyb_8$ or $Hyb_7$. On completion of the execution, the view is input to $D$ and the output returned is the output of $A_{OT}$.

By our assumption, $D$ can distinguish between the two hybrids with noticeable probability $\varepsilon$. Therefore, with non-negligible advantage $\frac{\varepsilon}{m}$, $A_{OT}$ wins the challenge game with $C_{OT}$ which breaks the sender security of OT. Thus, $\varepsilon$ must be negligible, and thus the views are indistinguishable.

$Hyb_{8,1}$: **Simulate garbled circuit**: In this hybrid, $Sim_{Hyb}$ computes a garbled circuit to output $\bot$. Specifically,

$$(C_i, \tilde{lab}_i) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(C_\bot)$$

**Claim 50.** Assuming the security of GC, $Hyb_{8,1}$ is indistinguishable from $Hyb_{8,0}$

**Proof.** The only difference between $Hyb_{8,1}$ and $Hyb_7$ is that the simulator $Sim_{Hyb}$ switches the garbled circuit to a circuit for each $P_i$. Note that this is a functionally equivalent circuit given we're in the situation of implicit abort.

Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that the views are distinguishable. Then there exists an adversary $D$ such that $D$ can distinguish between $Hyb_{8,1}$ and $Hyb_{8,0}$ with non-negligible advantage. We will use this adversary to create an adversary $A_{GC}$ that breaks GC security with non-negligible probability.

We now describe the working of $A_{GC}$ which interacts with the challenger $C_{GC}$. $A_{GC}$ picks randomly an honest party $P_i$. All messages other than the garbled circuit are computed in the same manner as $Sim_{Hyb}$. The GC messages from $P_i$ are exposed to the external challenger. Specifically, in round four, it sends as challenges to $C_{GC}$ $C_\bot$ and $C_{\tilde{C}, i, msg, v, i}$,

$$(C, i, msg, v, i, \{rwi_{0, b, i}^{\rightarrow j}\}_{i}^{\rightarrow j} \{st_{b, i}^{\rightarrow j}\}_{i})$$

where $v$ is the concatenation of all extracted/generated receiver values for all parties other than $P_{i}$. $C_{GC}$ then returns a garbled circuit $\tilde{C}$ and labels $\tilde{lab}$. These are set as $\tilde{C}_i := \tilde{C}$ and $\tilde{lab}_i := \tilde{lab}$. The rest of the messages are obtained in the same manner as $Sim_{Hyb}$. Depending on challenge bit used by $C_{GC}$ we are either in $Hyb_8$ or $Hyb_7$. On completion of the execution, the view is input to $D$ and the output returned is the output of $A_{GC}$.

By our assumption, $D$ can distinguish between the two hybrids with noticeable probability $\varepsilon$. Therefore, with non-negligible advantage, $A_{OT}$ wins the challenge game with $C_{GC}$ which breaks the security of GC. Thus, $\varepsilon$ must be negligible, and thus the views are indistinguishable.

Note that $Hyb_{8,1} \equiv Hyb_8$.
Claim 51. Assuming that \( \Pi \) is a secure protocol instantiated with rewinding secure \( S - OT \), the invariant holds in \( \text{Hyb}_9 \).

Proof. Here, since the invariant only depends on the first three rounds, we need to prove that the invariant holds conditioned on the view of the first three rounds. The proof is similar to Claim 23. \( \square \)

Claim 52. Assuming that \( \Pi \) is a secure protocol instantiated with rewinding secure \( S - OT \), \( \text{Hyb}_9 \) is indistinguishable from \( \text{Hyb}_8 \).

Proof. The only difference between \( \text{Hyb}_9 \) and \( \text{Hyb}_8 \) is how the transcript of the underlying protocol \( \Pi \) is computed.

Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that that the views are distinguishable. Then there exists an adversary \( D \) such that \( D \) can distinguish between \( \text{Hyb}_9 \) and \( \text{Hyb}_8 \) with non-negligible advantage. We will use this adversary to create an adversary \( A_\Pi \) that breaks the indistinguishability of \( \Pi \) when instantiated with bounded rewinding secure \( S - OT \) with non-negligible probability. Essentially, we rely on the fact that if the \( S - OT \) is rewinding secure, then the transcript of \( \Pi \) for an honest and simulated transcript are indistinguishable.

We now describe the working of \( A_\Pi \) which interacts with the challenger \( C_\Pi \). All messages other than the \( \Pi \) messages are computed in the same manner as \( \text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}} \). The \( \Pi \) messages from are exposed to the external challenger. Specifically, in round 1, set \( \{ \text{msg}_{1,i} \}_{P_i \in H} := \overline{\text{msg}}_1 \) where \( \overline{\text{msg}}_1 \) is received from \( C_\Pi \). Send to \( C_\Pi \) \( \{ \text{msg}_{1,i} \}_{P_i \in H} \) that is sent by \( A \). The response from \( C_\Pi \), \( \overline{\text{msg}}_2 \) is parsed as \( \{ \text{msg}_{2,i} \}_{P_i \in H} := \overline{\text{msg}}_2 \).

\( A_\Pi \) creates a set of 5 look-ahead threads, in each of which, it runs rounds 2 and 3 of the protocol alone. In each look-ahead thread, \( A_\Pi \) forwards the \( \{ \text{msg}_{2,i} \}_{P_i \in H} \) sent by \( A \) in each look-ahead thread to \( C_\Pi \). These are simply \( S - OT \) messages and will be responded to by \( C_\Pi \). The response is likewise forwarded to \( A \). These 5 threads are all GOOD with respect to some party \( H \) with noticeable probability. With the 5 threads, \( A_\Pi \) can successfully run the extraction phase.

On completion of the extraction phase, prior to the third round on the main thread, \( A_\Pi \) sends to \( C_\Pi \) all parties inputs \( (\{x_i,r_i\}_{i \in [n]}, y) \) to \( C_\Pi \). \( C_\Pi \) then either responds with the simulated last message or the honest execution for the rest of the transcript. The rest of the messages are obtained in the same manner as \( \text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}} \). Depending on the choice of \( C_\Pi \) we are either in \( \text{Hyb}_9 \) or \( \text{Hyb}_8 \). On completion of the execution, the view is input to \( D \) and the output returned is the output of \( A_\Pi \).

By our assumption, \( D \) can distinguish between the two hybrids with noticeable probability \( \varepsilon \). Therefore, with non-negligible advantage \( \varepsilon \), \( A_\Pi \) wins the challenge game with \( C_\Pi \) which breaks the security of \( \Pi \) when rewinding security of \( S - OT \) is maintained. Thus, \( \varepsilon \) must be negligible, and thus the views are indistinguishable. \( \square \)

Claim 53. The invariant holds in \( \text{Hyb}_{\text{ideal}} \).

Proof. The claim is trivially true since the main thread remains unchanged. \( \square \)

Claim 54. \( \text{Hyb}_9 \) is indistinguishable from \( \text{Hyb}_{\text{ideal}} \) except with probability at most \( \frac{\lambda}{4} + \text{negl}(\lambda) \).

Proof. This is argued in two cases depending on the probability with which the adversary abort.

Case 1: \( \Pr[\text{not abort}] \geq \frac{\lambda}{4} \): Suppose the adversary doesn’t cause an abort with probability greater that \( \frac{\lambda}{4} \). Let us analyze the probability with which \( \bot_{\text{extract}} \) is output by \( \text{Sim}_{\text{Hyb}} \). By the Chernoff bound, in \( \text{Hyb}_{\text{ideal}} \), except with negligible probability, in the set of \( \frac{\lambda}{4} \) threads, there will be at least 5 GOOD
threads with respect to some honest party \( P \). Also in Hyb_{\text{IDEAL}}, Sim_{Hyb} will run an expected polynomial number of threads to get 12\( \lambda \) (which is greater than 5 \cdot n) \text{GOOD} threads. Thus the extractions will be successful in except with negligible probability.

Therefore the only difference between Hyb_{\text{REAL}} and Hyb_{10} is that in Hyb_{10}, after extraction, Sim_{Hyb} samples the main thread \( \frac{\lambda}{\mu} \) times while in Hyb_{\text{REAL}}, Sim_{Hyb} first estimates the probability of not aborting to be \( \varepsilon' \) and then re-samples the main thread \( \min(2^{\lambda}, \frac{\lambda^{2}}{\varepsilon'}) \) times.

The rest of the proof follows in a very similar manner to the proof of claim 5.8 in \cite{Lin16}. That is, we show that if “Check Abort” step succeeds, the simulator in Hyb_{\text{IDEAL}} fails only with negligible probability using the claim in \cite{Lin16}. Also, by a Markov argument, we know that Hyb_{10}, if the “Check Abort” step succeeds, the simulation successfully forces the output and hence, this completes the proof.

Case 2: \( \Pr[\text{not abort}] < \frac{\mu}{4} \):

Suppose the adversary doesn’t cause an abort with probability smaller than \( \frac{\mu}{4} \). Then, in both hybrids, Sim_{Hyb} aborts at the end of the “Check Abort” step except with probability \( \frac{\mu}{4} \). Thus, in this case, the adversary’s view in Hyb_{\text{IDEAL}} and Hyb_{10} is indistinguishable except with probability at most \( \frac{\mu}{4} + \text{negl}(\lambda) \).

We now calculate the probability that the adversary can distinguish between Hyb_{\text{REAL}} and Hyb_{\text{IDEAL}}.

Except in two cases, every pair of hybrids are indistinguishable except with negligible probability. In the two special cases, the hybrids are indistinguishable except with probability \( \frac{\mu}{4} + \text{negl}(\lambda) \). Thus, Hyb_{\text{REAL}} and Hyb_{\text{IDEAL}} are indistinguishable except with probability \( \frac{\mu}{4} + \text{negl}(\lambda) \). This contradicts our assumption that there must be an adversary \( A \) that can distinguish the REAL and IDEAL executions with probability at least \( \mu \).

4 Rewinding Secure Oblivious Transfer in the Simultaneous Message Model

We construct a rewinding secure Oblivious Transfer (OT) assuming the existence of four round OT protocol secure in the simultaneous message model. For an OT protocol to be rewind secure, we require security against an adversary who is allowed to re-execute the second and third round of the protocol multiple times. But the first and fourth round are executed only once.

4.1 Rewind Security against Malicious Senders

We describe below the protocol \( \Pi_{\text{rec}} \) which achieves rewind security against malicious senders. The Sender \( S \)'s input is \( s_{0}, s_{1} \in \{0, 1\} \) while the receiver \( R \)'s input is \( b \in \{0, 1\} \).

Components. We require the following two components:

- \( n \cdot B_{\text{OT}} \) instances of a 4 round OT protocol which achieves indistinguishability security against malicious senders.
- \( \text{GC} = (\text{Garble}, \text{Eval}) \) is a secure garbling scheme.

Protocol. The basic idea is to split the receiver input across multiple different OT executions such that during any rewind, a different set of OTs will be selected to proceed with the execution
thereby preserving the security of the receiver’s input. The sender constructs a garbled circuit which is used to internally recombine the various inputs shares and only return the appropriate output. The protocol is described below.

1. **Round 1** ($\Pi_{1,S}^{rec}, \Pi_{1,R}^{rec}$):  
   $S$ does the following:  
   - For $i \in [n], k \in [B_{OT}]$, computes $o_{1,S}^{i,k} := OT_{1,S}(1^\lambda; r_S)$ and send $\{o_{1,S}^{i,k}\}_{i \in [n], k \in [B_{OT}]}$ to $R$

   $R$ does the following:  
   - For $i \in [n], k \in [B_{OT}]$, computes $o_{1,R}^{i,k} \leftarrow OT_{1,R}(1^\lambda; r_R)$ and send $\{o_{1,R}^{i,k}\}_{i \in [n], k \in [B_{OT}]}$ to $S$

2. **Round 2** ($\Pi_{2,S}^{rec}, \Pi_{2,R}^{rec}$):  
   $S$ does the following:  
   - For $i \in [n], k \in [B_{OT}]$, computes $o_{2,S}^{i,k} := OT_{2,S}(o_{1,R}^{i,k}, r_S)$ and sends $\{o_{2,S}^{i,k}\}_{i \in [n], k \in [B_{OT}]}$ to $R$

   $R$ does the following:  
   - For $i \in [n], k \in [B_{OT}]$, computes $o_{2,R}^{i,k} \leftarrow OT_{2,R}(o_{1,S}^{i,k}, r_R)$ and send $\{o_{2,R}^{i,k}\}_{i \in [n], k \in [B_{OT}]}$ to $S$

3. **Round 3** ($\Pi_{3,S}^{rec}, \Pi_{3,R}^{rec}$):  
   $S$ does the following:  
   - For $i \in [n], k \in [B_{OT}]$, computes $o_{3,S}^{i,k} := OT_{3,S}(o_{1,R}^{i,k}, o_{2,R}^{i,k}, r_S)$ and sends $\{o_{3,S}^{i,k}\}_{i \in [n], k \in [B_{OT}]}$ to $R$

   $R$ does the following:  
   - Compute $n$ additive shares of $b$. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n - 1] b_j \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$, and set $b_n := b \bigoplus_{j=1}^{n-1} b_j$.
   - $\forall i \in [n], \sigma_i \leftarrow [B_{OT}]$.
   - For $i \in [n]$, compute $o_{3,R}^{i,\sigma_i} \leftarrow OT_{3,R}(b_i, o_{1,S}^{i,\sigma_i}, o_{1,R}^{i,\sigma_i}, r_R)$ and send $\{o_{3,R}^{i,\sigma_i}, \sigma_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ to $S$ for the OTs picked by $\sigma_i$.

4. **Round 4** ($\Pi_{4,S}^{rec}, \Pi_{4,R}^{rec}$): $S$ does the following:  
   - Compute the garbled circuits containing $s_0, s_1$. Specifically,
     
     $$(\overline{C}_{ot,lab}) := \text{Garble}(C_{ot}[s_0, s_1]; r_{gc,i})$$

   - For $i \in [n]$, computes $o_{4,S}^{i,\sigma_i} := OT_{4,S}(lab_{i,0}, lab_{i,1}, o_{1,R}^{i,\sigma_i}, o_{1,S}^{i,\sigma_i}, o_{2,R}^{i,\sigma_i}, o_{3,R}^{i,\sigma_i}, r_S)$ and sends $\{o_{4,S}^{i,\sigma_i}\}_{i \in [n]}$ to $R$.  

   64
5. **Evaluation (OTEval')**: \( R \) does the following:

- For \( i \in [n] \), compute
  \[
  \tilde{lab}_i := \text{OTEval} \left( b_i, o_{1,i}^{\sigma_i}, o_{2,i}^{\sigma_i}, o_{3,i}^{\sigma_i}, o_{4,i}^{\sigma_i} ; r_R \right)
  \]

- Output \( s' := \text{Eval} \left( \tilde{C}_{ot}, \left\{ \tilde{lab}_i \right\}_{i \in [n]} \right) \)

**Security.** We prove security of our constructed protocol below.

**Lemma 2.** *Assuming receiver indistinguishability of OT against malicious senders, the receiver input in \( \Pi_{\text{rec}} \) remains indistinguishable under \( B_{\text{OT}} \)-rewinds.*

**Proof.** Suppose in experiment 0, the receiver uses inputs \( b_0^1[1], \ldots, b_0^1[B_{\text{OT}}] \) and in experiment 1, the receiver uses inputs \( b_1^1[1], \ldots, b_1^1[B_{\text{OT}}] \). Where \( b[j] \) is the receiver input in the \( j \)-th rewind. Then we want to show that an adversarial rewinding sender’s view is indistinguishable in both cases.

Suppose there is an adversarial sender \( A \) that can distinguish the two cases, then we construct an adversarial \( A_{\text{OT}} \) that breaks the indistinguishability security of OT. We now describe the working of \( A_{\text{OT}} \). Sample \( i^* \) randomly from \([n]\). If we consider the \( B_{\text{OT}} \) tuple corresponding to index \( i^* \) in the first round, with noticeable probability the \( \sigma_j^* \) picked for each rewind \( j \) will be distinct. This follows from the fact that there are \( B_{\text{OT}} \) distinct values that are picked \( B_{\text{OT}} \) times with \( B_{\text{OT}} \) being a constant. We will expose all the OTs in this tuple to an external OT receiver.

Specifically, on receiving \( B_{\text{OT}} \) independent \( ot_1 \) message from the external challenger denoted by \( ot_1^* \). Set the appropriate first round messages. This is done by setting \( \forall j \in [B_{\text{OT}}] \), \( o_{1,j}^* = ot_1^i \). All other \( o_{1,k}^* \) messages are computed honestly using fresh randomness by \( A_{\text{OT}} \). These messages are sent to \( A \). \( A \) responds with \( \left\{ ot_{2,j}^i \right\}_{i \in [n], k \in [B_{\text{OT}}]} \), where the relevant messages are forwarded to the external challenger. When the challenger sends its second round messages, we set appropriately as above and send to \( A \) who responds with \( \left\{ ot_{2,j}^i \right\}_{i \in [n], k \in [B_{\text{OT}}], j \in [B_{\text{OT}}]} \).

\[
\forall i \in [n], j \in [B_{\text{OT}}], \text{ sample } \sigma_j^i \leftarrow [B_{\text{OT}}]. \text{ If for } i^*, \left\{ \sigma_j^i \right\}_{j \in [B_{\text{OT}}]} \text{ are not distinct, we sample again. Sample } b_{i,j} \text{ as follows: } \forall i \in [n] \setminus \{i^*\}, j \in [B_{\text{OT}}] \text{ sample } b_{i,j} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}. \text{ Set the following: } \forall j \in [B_{\text{OT}}],
\]

\[
b_{0,i,j}^* = b_0^1[j] \bigoplus_{i \neq i^*} b_{i,j} \\
b_{1,i,j}^* = b_1^1[j] \bigoplus_{i \neq i^*} b_{i,j}
\]

Forward \( \left\{ ot_{3,j}^i \right\}_{j \in [B_{\text{OT}}]} \) as corresponding responses to the messages. Send this along with this the challenges \( \left\{ \left( b_{0,i,j}^*, b_{1,i,j}^* \right) \right\}_{j \in [B_{\text{OT}}]} \). The challenger picks a bit \( c \) and uses \( b_{c,i,j}^* \) for all \( j \). Depending on the value of \( c \) picked by the challenger, we’re in either experiment 0 or 1. Thus, if \( A \) can distinguish the two experiments with non-negligible probability \( \varepsilon \), \( A_{\text{OT}} \) wins the challenge with probability \( \varepsilon \cdot \frac{1}{m} \) where \( \frac{1}{m} \) is the probability that \( \sigma_j^i \) were all distinct. Here \( m \) is a constant since \( B_{\text{OT}} \) is a constant. Therefore \( A_{\text{OT}} \) wins the challenge with non-negligible probability. \( \square \)
Remark 3. We note that correctness is not guaranteed against a malicious sender since it might compute the garbled circuit incorrectly. In our applications, we will therefore have to prove that the messages of the protocol were in fact computed correctly.

4.2 Rewind Secure Oblivious Transfer

We describe below the protocol $\Pi'$ which achieves rewind security. The Sender $S$’s input is $s_0, s_1 \in \{0,1\}$ while the receiver $R$’s input is $b \in \{0,1\}$.

Components. For the constructed protocol, we only require $n \cdot B_{\text{OT}}$ instantiations of the above constructed $\Pi_{\text{rec}}$ protocol.

Protocol. The idea is to use $\Pi_{\text{rec}}$ in a black-box manner such that security against malicious senders is maintained from $\Pi_{\text{rec}}$ and we additionally get the strong notion of simulation security against a malicious rewinding receiver. We use a similar idea as the previous construction, but now the sender shares its input across multiple executions of $\text{OT}$, which are going to be implemented via $\Pi_{\text{rec}}$. Here, we rely on the fact that unless the receiver used the same bit in all executions of the $\text{OT}$, it cannot recover the correct output. Unlike the previous case, we don’t require the use of garbled circuits.

1. Round 1 ($\text{OT}_{1}'$):

   S does the following:
   - For $i \in [n], k \in [B_{\text{OT}}]$, computes $\pi_{1,S}^{i,k} := \Pi_{1,S}^{\text{rec}}(1^\lambda; r_S)$ and send $\{\pi_{1,S}^{i,k}\}_{i[n],k[B_{\text{OT}}]}$ to $R$

   R does the following:
   - For $i \in [n], k \in [B_{\text{OT}}]$, computes $\pi_{1,R}^{i,k} \leftarrow \Pi_{1,R}^{\text{rec}}(1^\lambda; r_R)$ and send $\{\pi_{1,R}^{i,k}\}_{i[n],k[B_{\text{OT}}]}$ to $S$

2. Round 2 ($\text{OT}_{2}'$):

   S does the following:
   - For $i \in [n], k \in [B_{\text{OT}}]$, computes $\pi_{2,S}^{i,k} := \Pi_{2,S}^{\text{rec}}(\pi_{1,R}^{i,k}, r_S)$ and sends $\{\pi_{2,S}^{i,k}\}_{i[n],k[B_{\text{OT}}]}$ to $R$

   R does the following:
   - For $i \in [n], k \in [B_{\text{OT}}]$, computes $\pi_{2,R}^{i,k} \leftarrow \Pi_{2,R}^{\text{rec}}(\pi_{1,S}^{i,k}, \pi_{2,S}^{i,k}; r_R)$ and send $\{\pi_{2,R}^{i,k}\}_{i[n],k[B_{\text{OT}}]}$ to $S$

3. Round 3 ($\text{OT}_{3}'$):

   S does the following:
   - $\forall i \in [n], \rho_i \leftarrow [B_{\text{OT}}]$.
   - For $i \in [n]$, computes $\pi_{3,S}^{i,\rho_i} := \Pi_{3,S}^{\text{rec}}(\pi_{1,R}^{i,\rho_i}, \pi_{2,R}^{i,\rho_i}; r_S)$ and sends $\{\pi_{3,S}^{i,\rho_i}\}_{i[n]}$ to $R$

   R does the following:
   - For $i \in [n], k \in [B_{\text{OT}}]$, compute $\pi_{3,R}^{i,k} \leftarrow \Pi_{3,R}^{\text{rec}}(b, \pi_{1,S}^{i,k}, \pi_{1,R}^{i,k}; r_R)$ and send $\{\pi_{3,R}^{i,k}\}_{i[n],k[B_{\text{OT}}]}$ to $S$ for the $\text{OT}$s picked by $\sigma_i$.  

66
4. Round 4 (OT$^i_4$): $S$ does the following:

- Compute $n$ additive shares of $s_0, s_1$. Specifically, $\forall j \in [n-1]$ $s_{0,j}, s_{1,j} \leftarrow \{0,1\}$, set $s_{0,n} := s_0 \bigoplus_{j=1}^{n-1} s_{0,j}$ and $s_{1,n} := s_1 \bigoplus_{j=1}^{n-1} s_{1,j}$.

- For $i \in [n]$, computes $\text{ot}_{4,S}^{i,\sigma_i} := \Pi^\text{rec}_{4,S} \left( s_{i,0}, s_{i,1}, \pi_{1,R}^{i,\sigma_i}, \pi_{2,R}^{i,\sigma_i}, \pi_{3,R}^{i,\sigma_i}, r_S \right)$ and sends $\left\{ \pi_{4,S}^{i,\sigma_i} \right\}_{i \in [n]}$ to $R$.

5. Evaluation (OTEval$'$): $R$ does the following:

- For $i \in [n]$, compute

$$s'_i := \text{OTEval} \left( b, \pi_{1,S}^{i,\sigma_i}, \pi_{2,S}^{i,\sigma_i}, \pi_{3,S}^{i,\sigma_i}, \pi_{4,S}^{i,\sigma_i}; r_R \right)$$

- Output $s' := \bigoplus_{i=1}^{n} s'_i$

Security. We now prove security of our construction.

**Lemma 3.** Assuming that $\Pi^\text{rec}$ is secure against malicious sender up to $B_{\text{OT}}$ rewinds, so is our above constructed protocol.

**Proof.** Suppose the receiver uses inputs $b^0$ in all $B_{\text{OT}} \cdot n$ executions of $B_{\text{OT}}$ and in experiment 1, the receiver uses inputs $b^1$ in all $B_{\text{OT}} \cdot n$ executions of $\Pi^\text{rec}$. Then we want to show that an adversarial rewinding sender’s view is indistinguishable in both cases. We do this by making a change in each of $B_{\text{OT}} \cdot n \Pi^\text{rec}$ one at a time and relying on the rewind security of a single execution of $\Pi^\text{rec}$.

Specifically, let $\text{Hyb}_b$ denote the hybrid that where we make a change in the $i$-th execution of $\Pi^\text{rec}$. Changing the receiver input from $b^0$ to $b^1$. We expose the $i$-th $\Pi^\text{rec}$ execution to the external receiver with challenge bits $b^0$ and $b^1$. All other $\Pi^\text{rec}$ executions are computed honestly. i.e. for $j < i$, we compute the $\Pi^\text{rec}$ execution with input $b^1$ and for $j > i$ the $\Pi^\text{rec}$ executions are with receiver input $b^0$.

When the sender attempts to rewind, we forwards its queries in the $i$-th $\Pi^\text{rec}$ execution to the external challenger. Other challenges are responded to internally. If the external challenger picks $b^0$, we’re in $\text{Hyb}_{b_{i-1}}$ else we’re in $\text{Hyb}_b$. Thus, if the sender’s view is distinguishable by some adversary $D$, we directly use $D$’s output to break the rewind security of the underlying $\Pi^\text{rec}$.

Since each hybrid is indistinguishable except with negligible probability, the views generated in the two experiments are indistinguishable.

**Claim 55.** Our constructed protocol achieves simulation security against a malicious rewinding receiver.

**Proof.** To prove this we construct a simulator as below. The simulator $S_{S-\text{OT}}$ against a malicious receiver $R$ behaves in the following manner. It internally uses the simulator against malicious (non-rewinding)

1. Pick $i^* \leftarrow [n]$. Sample the $\Pi^\text{rec}$ index picked in each rewind $j$. For all $j \in [B_{\text{OT}}]$

$$\rho_{i^*}[j] \leftarrow [B_{\text{OT}}]$$

Since $B_{\text{OT}}$ is a constant, with noticeable probability the sample $\rho_{i^*}[j]$ are all distinct. If not, we redo the process with fresh randomness, until we have such a set of distinct values $\left\{ \rho_{i^*}[j] \right\}_{j \in [B_{\text{OT}}]}$. We will expose all of the OTs in the tuple $i^*$ to the underlying simulator $S_{\text{rec}}$. Likewise, all messages in that tuple are passed from the underlying simulator to $R$. 

67
2. The remaining $\Pi^{\text{rec}}$ messages are generated honestly, and any queries by $R$ will be answered honestly, as in the re winds.

3. Since the rewind threads are only executed until the 3rd round, we don’t care about the sender’s inputs in these threads since the senders’ inputs are decided only in the fourth round.

4. Except for the $i^*$-th position, we sample shares for every other position to be used in the fourth round, i.e., $\forall j \neq i^* \text{ pick } s_j^0 \leftarrow \{0,1\}, s_j^1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}$.

5. When $R$ completes its third round, use $S_{\text{rec}}$ to extract the receiver input in the $i$-th tuple. This may rewind $R$. In such a case, behave honestly in all honestly computed instances of $\Pi^{\text{rec}}$. The $i^*$-tuple responses are handled by $S_{\text{rec}}$.

6. On completing the extraction, let $S_{\text{rec}}$ make a query $\tilde{b}$ to the ideal functionality. This corresponds to the input of $R$ in the $i^*$-th tuple. We take note, and pass this to the ideal functionality.

7. Let $\tilde{s}$ be the value returned by the ideal functionality.

8. Set $\tilde{s}_{i^*} := \tilde{s} \bigoplus_{i \neq i^*} \tilde{s}_i$ and send $\tilde{s}_{i^*}$ to $S_{\text{rec}}$. The final message generated by $S_{\text{rec}}$ for tuple $i^*$ is forwarded to $R$ along with honestly computed $\Pi^{\text{rec}}$ messages using inputs $(\tilde{s}_{i^*}, s_{i^*}^{1-\tilde{b}})$ with the order potentially being switched if $\tilde{b} = 1$.

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For completeness, we discuss the rewind secure delay-input witness indistinguishable proofs from the unpublished work of Goyal and Richelson [GR19]. This section is taken verbatim from their paper. Throughout, we let $\lambda$ denote the security parameter, and we write $\negl(\lambda)$ for functions which tend to zero faster than $\lambda^{-c}$ for any constant $c$.

### A.1 Preliminaries

**MPC-in-the-Head [IKOS07].** As in [BGJ+18], we make black-box use of a 3-round zero knowledge protocol (non delayed-input) with bounded rewinding security. The soundness error of the protocol would depend upon the rewinding parameter $B$.

**Definition 12 (3-Round ZK with Bounded Rewinding Security).** [BGJ+18] Fix a positive integer $B$. A delayed-input 3-round interactive argument (as defined in Definition 7) for an NP language $L$, with an NP relation $R_L$ is said to have $B$-Rewinding Security if there exists a simulator $\text{Sim}$ such that for every non-uniform PPT interactive Turing Machine $V^*$, it holds that $\{\text{REAL}^{V^*}(1^\lambda)\}_\lambda$ and $\{\text{IDEAL}^{V^*}(1^\lambda)\}_\lambda$ are computationally indistinguishable, where the random variable $\text{REAL}^{V^*}(1^\lambda)$ is defined via the following experiment. In what follows we denote by $P_1$ the prover’s algorithm in the first round, and similarly we denote by $P_3$ his algorithm in the third round.

**Experiment $\text{REAL}^{V^*}(1^\lambda)$** is defined as follows:

1. Run $P_1(1^\lambda, x, w; r)$ and obtain output $\text{rwi}_1$ to be sent to the verifier.
2. Run the verifier $V^*(1^\lambda, \text{rw}_i)$ and interpret its output as message $\text{rw}_i^2$.

3. Run $P_3(1^\lambda, \text{rw}_i^2, x, w; r)$, where $P_3$ is the (honest) prover’s algorithm for generating the third message of the WI protocol, and send its output $\text{rw}_i^3$ to $V^*$.

4. Set a counter $i = 0$.

5. If $i < B$, then set $i = i + 1$, and $V^*$ (given all the information so far) generates another message $\text{rw}_i^2$, and receives the (honest) prover’s message $P_3(\text{rw}_i^2, x, w; r)$. Repeat this step until $i = B$.

6. The output of the experiment is the view of $V^*$.

**Experiment** IDEAL$^{V^*}(1^\lambda)$ is the output of the experiment Sim$^{V^*}(1^\lambda, x; r)$.

**Imported Theorem 2.** [IKOS07, BGJ+18] Assume the existence of injective one-way functions. Then, for any (polynomial) rewinding parameter $B$, there exists a 3-round zero-knowledge protocol for proving NP statements that is simulatable under $B$-bounded rewinding according to 12.

If $B$ is a constant, the soundness error of the above protocol will be a constant. If $B = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, the soundness error $\epsilon \leq 1 - q(\lambda)$ where $q$ is also a polynomial.

### A.2 The Construction

**Building Blocks.** Our construction will make use of two crucial building blocks: the 3-round delayed-input WI protocol in [LS90], and, the bounded rewinding secure 3-round “MPC in the head” based 3-round protocol of [IKOS07].

**Theorem 5.** Assuming injective one-way functions, for every (polynomial) rewinding parameter $B$, there exists a three round delayed-input witness-indistinguishable proof system $\text{RWI}$ with $B$-rewinding security.

The soundness of our protocol depends upon the rewinding parameter $B$ and can be amplified via parallel repetition while preserving the WI property. Our protocol $\text{RWI}$ will consists of 4 algorithms ($\text{SWI}_1, \text{SWI}_2, \text{SWI}_3, \text{SWI}_4$) where the first 3 denote the algorithms used by the prover and verifier to send their messages and the last is the final verification algorithm. We use the protocol from [IKOS07]. We denote its algorithms by $\text{Head.ZK} = (z_k1, z_k2, z_k3, z_k4)$, where the first 3 denote the algorithms used by the prover and verifier to generate their messages, and the last is the final verification algorithm. The simulator of the protocol $\text{Head.ZK}$ is denoted by $S_{z_k}$.

We will also use the delayed-input WI protocol from [LS90] and denote its algorithms by $\text{DIWI} = (\text{DWI}_1, \text{DWI}_2, \text{DWI}_3, \text{DWI}_4)$, where the first 3 denote the algorithms used by the prover and verifier to generate their messages, and the last is the final verification algorithm.

Let $\lambda$ be the statistical security parameter. We define parameter $N = B^2\lambda^4$. 

72
Inputs: At the beginning of the third round, the prover $P$ gets as input $(x, w)$; $V$ gets only $x$.

1. **Round 1: Prover message:**
   - $P$ prepares and sends commitments $c_1, \ldots, c_N$ where $c_i = \text{Com}(0)$ for all $i$.
   - $P$ also prepares and sends a first round message $\text{hzk}_1^{P \rightarrow V}$ for a single instance of $\text{Head.ZK}$, using zk1. The statement for $\text{Head.ZK}$ is that each $c_i, i \in [N]$ is indeed a commitment to 0; $P$ uses the commitment openings as its witness.
   - $P$ also prepares and sends first round messages $\{\text{dwi}_{1,i}^{P \rightarrow V}\}_{i \in [N]}$ for $N$ separate instances of DIWI. The statements for these DIWI instances will come in the third round.

2. **Round 2: Verifier message:**
   - The verifier samples a challenge bit $ch$ and sends it to $P$.
   - If $ch = 0$, $V$ in addition executes zk2 to sample $\text{hzk}_2^{V \rightarrow P}$ and sends it to $V$.
   - If $ch = 1$, $V$ executes DW1 on $\{\text{dwi}_{1,i}^{P \rightarrow V}\}_{i \in [N]}$ to get $\{\text{dwi}_{2,i}^{V \rightarrow P}\}_{i \in [N]}$ and sends it to $P$.

3. **Round 3: Prover message:**
   If $ch = 0$, $P$ generates $\text{hzk}_3^{P \rightarrow V}$ by running zk3 and sends it to $P$. If $ch = 1$, $P$ proceeds as follows:
   - Following [IKOS07], emulate an MPC computation of the circuit representing the witness relation with $\lambda$ players. The input of each player will be a share of the witness $w$. Let the view of the $i$-th player be $V_i$. For $i \in [\lambda]$, compute $cv_i = \text{Com}(V_i)$ and send it to $V$.
   - Select a set of $\lambda(\lambda - 1)$ distinct random indices $\{k_{i,j} \in [N]\}_{i \neq j, i \in [\lambda], j \in [\lambda]}$. Represent these set of indices by $SI$ and send them to $V$.
   - Use $\{\text{dwi}_{1,i}^{P \rightarrow V}, \text{dwi}_{2,i}^{V \rightarrow P}\}_{i \in SI}$ and the algorithm DWI3 to generate $\{\text{dwi}_{3,i}^{P \rightarrow V}\}_{i \in SI}$ and send them to $V$. For each $k_{i,j} \in SI$, the message $\text{dwi}_{3,k_{i,j}}^{P \rightarrow V}$ prove that either (a) $c_{k_{i,j}}$ is a commitment to 1, or, (b) the views ($V_i, V_j$) are honest and “consistent” with each other. That is, there exist input ($w_i, r_i$) (resp. ($w_j, r_j$)) s.t. $V_i$ (resp. $V_j$) is computed and committed honestly using ($w_i, r_i$) (resp ($w_j, r_j$)). Furthermore, each outgoing message sent to the $j$-th player in $V_i$ is consistent with each incoming message from the $i$-th player in $V_j$, and, vice-versa. The honest prover $P$ uses the witness corresponding to (b) to compute $\text{dwi}_{3,k_{i,j}}^{P \rightarrow V}$.

4. **Verifier Output:**
   - If $ch = 0$, compute the output of the algorithm zk4 on $(\text{hzk}_1^{P \rightarrow V}, \text{hzk}_2^{V \rightarrow P}, \text{hzk}_3^{P \rightarrow V})$ and the private randomness of $V$. Output whatever zk4 outputs.
   - If $ch = 1$, for each $i \in SI$, execute the algorithm DWI4 on $(\text{dwi}_{1,i}^{P \rightarrow V}, \text{dwi}_{2,i}^{V \rightarrow P}, \text{dwi}_{3,i}^{P \rightarrow V})$. If all executions of DWI4 accept, then output accept and reject otherwise.

Figure 5: 3 round Bounded Rewinding Secure WI

### A.3 Security Analysis

**Proving Soundness.** We prove that our protocol RWI has soundness $\delta/2$ where $\delta$ is the soundness parameter of the $\text{Head.ZK}$ construction. Suppose $x \notin L$. Consider the following two cases:
1. **Case 1**: There exists \( i \in [N] \) s.t. \( c_i \neq \text{Com}(0) \). In this case, we claim that \( V \) will reject the execution with probability at least \( \delta/2 \). This is because with probability 1/2, the challenge \( ch \) will be 0. If so, by the soundness of \textit{Head.ZK}, \( V \) is guaranteed to reject the execution with probability at least \( \delta \).

2. **Case 2**: For all \( i \in [N] \), \( c_i \) is indeed a commitment to 0. Assume that the verifier accepts all \( \lambda(\lambda - 1) \) executions of the \textit{DIWI} protocol. Then with high probability, the prepared views \( V_1, \ldots, V_\lambda \) are such that each pair \( (V_i, V_j) \) is consistent. This follows from the soundness of \textit{DIWI} protocol (which has negligible soundness error). Since the underlying MPC construction has perfect correctness, it follows that \( x \in L \) which is a contradiction. Hence, w.h.p, the verifier must reject at least one execution of the \textit{DIWI} protocol.

Suppose the probability of Case 1 and Case 2 are \( p \) and \( 1 - p \) respectively. Then \textit{RWI} has soundness \( p\delta/2 + (1 - p) \cdot (1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)(\lambda)) \geq \delta/2 \).

**Witness Indistinguishability under \( B \) rewrites**: We will now prove that \textit{RWI} satisfies witness indistinguishability under \( B \) rewrites where \( B \) is the rewinding parameter of the \textit{Head.ZK} construction. Consider the following sequence of hybrid experiments.

**Hybrid \( H_0 \)**: This hybrid experiment corresponds to the honest protocol execution where the prover uses witnesses \( w^1, \ldots, w^B \) to prove the statements \( x^1, \ldots, x^B \) respectively in \( B \) rewound executions.

**Hybrid \( H_1 \)**: In this hybrid experiment, the prover starts using the simulator \( S_{zk} \) to simulate the execution of the protocol \textit{Head.ZK} across all executions. In more details, the prover runs \( S_{zk} \) to get the message \( \text{hzk}_i^{P \rightarrow V} \). Prover then prepares the first message of the protocol honestly except for using \( \text{hzk}_i^{P \rightarrow V} \) given by \( S_{zk} \) and sends it to \( V^* \). In all the \( B \) execution, the prover handles the messages of \textit{Head.ZK} as follows. If \( ch = 0 \), prover forwards the verifier message of \textit{Head.ZK} to \( S_{zk} \) and forwards the response back to \( V^* \). If \( ch = 1 \), the prover aborts this particular execution with \( S_{zk} \) since there will be no further message of \textit{Head.ZK} in this execution. All messages other than messages of \textit{Head.ZK} are computed honestly as in \( H_0 \).

By the zero-knowledge property of \textit{Head.ZK}, it follows that the view produced by \( S_{zk} \) across the \( B \) executions will be indistinguishable from that in \( H_0 \). Hence, the view of \( V^* \) in \( H_1 \) is indistinguishable from that in \( H_0 \).

**Hybrid \( H_2 \)**: The prover now selects a random set of \( \lambda(\lambda - 1) \) distinct indices (from \( N \) indices) for each of the \( B \) executions even before the protocol starts. Denote these sets by \( SI_1, \ldots, SI_B \). Define a set \( SU \) which consists of all the indices which appear in more than 1 of these \( B \) sets \( SI_1, \ldots, SI_B \). In hybrid \( H_2 \), the prover is identical to that in \( H_1 \) except that for each \( i \notin SU \), the prover sets \( c_i = \text{Com}(1) \). (The remaining commitments are commitments of 0 as before.)

The indistinguishability of this hybrid follows directly from the hiding property of \textit{Com}. Observe that in this experiment, the openings of the commitments \( c_1, \ldots, c_N \) are not being used by the prover in any of the \( B \) executions.

We also prove the following lemma.

**Lemma 4**: Suppose \( N = B^2 \lambda^4 \). Except with negligible probability over the random tape of the prover, \( |SU| \leq \frac{\lambda}{6} \).

**Proof**: Define \( T = B^2 \lambda^2 \). We consider the following experiment. First pick \( T \) independent and random indices from the set \( N \). The (multi)set of indices is denoted by \( ST \) and the indices themselves are denoted by \( E_1, \ldots, E_T \). Since the indices are picked independently, it is possible that some
of them maybe the same (and hence $ST$ is a multiset rather than a set). We now construct sets $SI_1, \ldots, SI_B$ from $ST$ as follows. $SI_1$ will simply consist of the first $\lambda(\lambda - 1)$ mutually distinct elements from $ST$ (starting with element $E_1$). $SI_2$ will consist of the second $\lambda(\lambda - 1)$ mutually distinct elements from $ST$, and so on. Note that for all $i$, all elements within $SI_i$ must be distinct. However, two sets $SI_i$ and $SI_j$ with $i \neq j$ may have non-zero intersection. To be able to successfully construct $SI_1, \ldots, SI_B$, it is sufficient (though not necessary) for $ST$ to have at least $B\lambda(\lambda - 1)$ distinct elements. The distribution of sets $SI_1, \ldots, SI_B$ constructed using this algorithm is identical to the distribution when $SI_1, \ldots, SI_B$ are picked at a time by randomly picking $\lambda(\lambda - 1)$ distinct indices out of $N$. We now prove that, in fact, most elements in $ST$ are distinct.

**Claim 56.** Multiset $ST$ has at least $T - \lambda/6$ distinct elements except with negligible probability.

*Proof.* Since all elements of $ST$ are picked independently and uniformly, the probability that the $i$-th element is identical to any other element in $ST$ is at most $\frac{\lambda}{N}$. Define random variable $X_i$ s.t. $X_i = 1$ if $\exists j \neq i$ s.t. $E_i = E_j$, and, $X_i = 0$ otherwise. Clearly, the expectation $E[X_i] \leq \frac{\lambda}{N}$. Denote $X = \sum_i X_i$. By linearity of expectation, $E[X] \leq \frac{\lambda^2}{N^2} = 1$.

Denote $E[X]$ by $\mu$. Set $\delta = \frac{\lambda}{6}$. By Chernoff bounds, we have that $\Pr[X > (1 + \delta)\mu] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)(\lambda)$. Thus, $\Pr[X > \frac{\lambda}{6}] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)(\lambda)$.

If $ST$ has $T$ elements and at least $T - \lambda/6$ are distinct, at most $\lambda/6$ elements appear multiple times in $ST$. This also means that at most $\lambda/6$ elements appear multiple times across the sets $SI_1, \ldots, SI_B$. Thus, $|SU| \leq \frac{\lambda}{6}$.

**Hybrid $H_3$:** This hybrid is identical to the previous except in the way prover computes $\{\text{dwi}_{3,i}^{3,i}V\}_{i \notin SU}$ in the last round. Note that if $i \notin SU$, $c_i = \text{Com}(1)$. Hence, the prover now has an alternative witness to prove the statement. The prover switches to using this witness to compute $\{\text{dwi}_{3,i}^{3,i}V\}_{i \notin SU}$ in all executions.

Now observe the following. By definition of $SU$, if $i \notin SU$, then the message $\{\text{dwi}_{3,i}^{3,i}V\}_{i \notin SU}$ is actually required to be sent in at most one execution. That is, if $i \notin SU$, the $i$-th parallel instance of DIWI is only executed at most once (without any rewinding). Hence, the indistinguishability of the view of $V^*$ between $H_2$ and $H_3$ follows from the witness indistinguishability of DIWI.

**Hybrid $H_4$:** We now define a set $S_{\text{leak}} \subset \lambda$ of the views as follows. Start with an empty $S_{\text{leak}}$. For all $k_{i,j} \in SU$, add $i$ and $j$ to $S_{\text{leak}}$. Clearly, since $|SU| \leq \frac{\lambda}{6}$, it follows that $|S_{\text{leak}}| \leq \frac{\lambda}{3}$.

This hybrid is identical to the previous except now for all $i \notin S_{\text{leak}}$, the prover sets $cv_i$ to be $\text{Com}(0)$ as opposed to $\text{Com}(V_i)$ (in all executions). Now observe that if $i \notin S_{\text{leak}}$, the opening of $cv_i$ was not being used as a witness in any DIWI execution. This is because any DIWI instance which could have used $V_i$ has already been switched to using the alternate witness. Thus, the indistinguishability of the view of $V^*$ between $H_3$ and $H_4$ directly follows from the hiding of the commitment scheme $\text{Com}$.

**Hybrid $H_5$:** This hybrid is identical to the previous one except in how the views are computed by the prover in the last round. We note that in each rewound execution, the prover only needs to construct a view $V_i$ if $i \in S_{\text{leak}}$. However since $|S_{\text{leak}}| \leq \frac{\lambda}{3}$, the prover needs to construct at most $\frac{\lambda}{3}$ views. The prover stops using the supplied witness at this point and instead starts using the MPC simulator to generate all the required views. Observe that we are using an MPC protocol with perfect correct and perfect security which is capable to simulating the view of up to $\frac{\lambda}{3}$ players. Thus, the indistinguishability of the view of $V^*$ between $H_4$ and $H_5$ follows from indistinguishability of
real and simulated views in the underlying MPC construction.

We now observe that in hybrid $H_5$, our prover is no longer using the supplied witnesses in any of the $B$ execution. Hence, our construction RWI is, in fact, zero-knowledge under $B$ rewinds. This in particular implies that our construction satisfies the notion of WI with bounded rewind security. We also note that although not necessary in our application, the parallel repetition of RWI can also be shown to have the proof of knowledge property.