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Paper 2019/1465

An optimist's Poisson model of cryptanalysis

Daniel R. L. Brown

Abstract

Simplistic assumptions, modeling attack discovery by a Poisson point process, lead to quantifiable statistical estimates for security assurances, supporting the wisdom that more independent effort spent on cryptanalysis leads to better security assurance, but hinting security assurance also relies significantly upon general optimism. The estimates also suggest somewhat better security assurance from compounding two independent cryptosystems, but perhaps not enough to outweigh the extra cost.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
foundationscryptanalysisstatisticsPoisson
Contact author(s)
danibrown @ blackberry com
History
2019-12-18: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/1465
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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