You are looking at a specific version 20191122:182611 of this paper. See the latest version.

Paper 2019/1341

Succinct Non-Interactive Secure Computation

Andrew Morgan and Rafael Pass and Antigoni Polychroniadou

Abstract

We present the first maliciously secure protocol for succinct non-interactive secure two-party computation (SNISC): Each player sends just a single message whose length is (essentially) independent of the running time of the function to be computed. The protocol does not require any trusted setup, satisfies superpolynomial-time simulation-based security (SPS), and is based on (subexponential) security of the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption. We do not rely on SNARKs or "knowledge of exponent"-type assumptions. Since the protocol is non-interactive, the relaxation to SPS security is needed, as standard polynomial-time simulation is impossible; however, a slight variant of our main protocol yields a SNISC with polynomial-time simulation in the CRS model.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
secure computationtwo-party computationsuccinctnon-interactivequasi-polynomial simulation
Contact author(s)
asmorgan @ cs cornell edu,rafael @ cs cornell edu,antigonipoly @ gmail com
History
2020-02-20: revised
2019-11-22: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/1341
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.