Abstract

Proactive security is the notion of defending a distributed system against an attacker who compromises different devices through its lifetime, but no more than a threshold number of them at any given time. The emergence of threshold wallets for more secure cryptocurrency custody warrants an efficient proactivization protocol tailored to this setting. While many proactivization protocols have been devised and studied in the literature, none of them have communication patterns ideal for threshold wallets. In particular a \((t,n)\) threshold wallet is designed to have \(t\) parties jointly sign a transaction (of which only one may be honest) whereas even the best current proactivization protocols require at least an additional \(t\) honest parties to come online simultaneously to refresh the system.

In this work we formulate the notion of refresh with offline devices, where any \(t\) parties (no honest majority) may proactivize the system at any time and the remaining \(n-t\) offline parties can non-interactively “catch up” at their leisure. However due to the inherent unfairness of dishonest majority MPC, many subtle issues arise in realizing this pattern. We discuss these challenges, yet give a highly efficient protocol to upgrade a number of standard \((2,n)\) threshold signature schemes to proactive security with offline refresh. Our approach involves a threshold signature internal to the system itself, carefully interleaved with the larger threshold signing. We design our protocols so that they can augment existing implementations of threshold wallets for immediate use– we show that proactivization does not have to interfere with their native mode of operation.

Our proactivization technique is compatible with Schnorr, EdDSA, and even sophisticated ECDSA protocols, while requiring no extra assumptions. By implementation we show that proactivizing two different recent \((2,n)\) ECDSA protocols incurs only 14% and 24% computational overhead respectively, less than 200 bytes, and no extra round of communication.

1 Introduction

Threshold Signatures as conceived by Desmedt [13] allow the ability to sign messages under a public key to be delegated to a group of parties instead of a single one. In particular, a subset of these parties greater than a certain threshold must collaborate in order to sign a message. This primitive finds application in many scenarios, but more recently it has seen interest from the blockchain community as a method to manage...
private keys effectively. From multi-factor authentication to distribution of spending authority, threshold signature schemes allow cryptocurrency wallets to build resilience against compromise of up to a threshold number of devices. This is because threshold signature protocols never physically reconstruct the signing key at a single location, and so an attacker who compromises fewer devices than the signing threshold learns no useful information to forge signatures.

A long line of works has constructed threshold versions of common signature schemes [22, 1, 36]. Despite the non-linearity of the ECDSA signing equation making its thresholdization challenging, recent works have seen even threshold ECDSA schemes [21, 30, 15, 11] enter the realm of practicality. This has immediate implications for users of the many cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc.) that have adopted ECDSA as their canonical signature algorithm. Besides ECDSA, Schnorr [35] and other Schnorr-like signature schemes (eg. EdDSA [5]) are seeing an increase in interest from the cryptocurrency community, of which many employ threshold-friendly signing equations.

However threshold signature schemes by themselves do not address a number of security concerns that arise in real-world deployment. Indeed, all privacy/unforgeability guarantees of such a system are completely and irreparably voided if an adversary breaks into even one device more than the threshold throughout the lifetime of the system. A natural question to ask is instead of assuming that an adversary is threshold-limited to the same devices essentially forever, whether it is meaningful to consider a threshold-limited adversary with mobility across devices in time. In more detail an attacker may break into different devices in the system (possibly all of them in its lifetime) however at any given point in time, not more than a threshold number of them are compromised. This question was first considered by Ostrovsky and Yung [33] who devised the notion of a mobile adversary, which may change which devices are compromised at marked epochs in time. They found that the trick to thwarting such an adversary is to have each party proactively re-randomize its secret state between epochs. This technique ensures that the views of different parties at different epochs in time are independent, and can not be combined to reveal any meaningful information about shared secrets by a mobile attacker.

1.1 Proactivizing Threshold Signatures

Proactive Secret Sharing (PSS) as it has come to be known, has seen a number of realizations for different ranges of parameters since the introduction of the mobile adversary model [33]. In fact, even proactive signature schemes themselves have been studied directly [1, 19]. A naïve adaptation of any off-the-shelf PSS scheme to the threshold signature setting would in many cases yield proactive threshold signature schemes immediately. However, heavy use of an honest majority by most PSS schemes would already rule out many practical applications of such an approach. Moreover all such solutions will have communication patterns that require every party in the system to be online at pre-defined times, at the close of every epoch, in order to keep the system proactivized and moving forward.

To see why requiring all parties to be online simultaneously is not reasonable especially for threshold wallets, consider the following scenarios:

- **Cold storage:** Alice splits her signing key between her smartphone and laptop and has them execute a threshold signing protocol when a message is to be signed. However if for any number of operational reasons one of the devices (say her smartphone) malfunctions, the secret key is lost forever and any funds associated with the corresponding public key are rendered inaccessible. In order to avoid this situation, Alice stores a third share of the signing key in a secure cold storage server. While this third share does not by itself leak the signing key, along with the laptop it can aid in the restoration of the smartphone’s key share when required. In this scenario it would be quite inconvenient (and also defeat the purpose of two-party signing) if the cold storage server has to participate in the proactivization every time the system needs to be re-randomized; it would be much more reasonable to have the smartphone and laptop proactivize when required, and “mail” updates to the server.

- **(2,3)-factor authentication:** Alice now splits her signing key across her smartphone, laptop, and tablet so that she must use any two of them to sign a message. Even in this simple use case, having all
of her devices online and active simultaneously (possibly multiple times a day) just so that they can refresh would be cumbersome. Ideally every time she uses two of them to sign a message, they also refresh their key shares and leave an update package for the offline device to catch up at its leisure.

- **Concurrent use:** Alice, Bob, Carol, and Dave are executives at a corporation, and at least two of them must approve a purchase funded by the company account. This is enforced by giving each of them a share of the signing key, so that any two may collaborate to approve a transaction. Requiring them all to be online simultaneously is impractical given their schedules; it would be much more convenient to have any two of them refresh the system when they meet to sign, and mail updates to the others.

- **Correlated Risks:** Beyond convenience, there are qualitative security implications for the current de-facto pattern of proactivization. In particular, the validity of the assumption that an adversary controls only up to a threshold number of devices hinges on the risk of compromise of each device being independent. However having all devices in the system come online at frequent pre-specified points in time and connect to each other to refresh may significantly correlate their risk of compromise. Instead it would be preferable that only the minimal number of devices (i.e. the signing threshold) interact with each other in the regular mode of operation, and enable the system to non-interactively refresh itself.

The ideal communication pattern alluded to in the above examples is the following: in a \((2,n)\) proactive threshold signature scheme, any two parties are able to jointly produce all the necessary components to refresh the system, and mail the relevant information to offline parties. When an offline party wakes up, it reads its mailbox and is able to “catch up” to the latest sharing of the secret.

### 1.2 Challenges in Realizing this Pattern

While this communication pattern sounds ideal, a whole host of subtle issues arise in potential realizations. For instance, in the Cold Storage case, how does the server know that the updates it receives are “legitimate”? An attacker controlling Alice’s smartphone could spoof an update message and trick the server into deleting its key share and replacing it with junk.

Due to the inherent unfairness of two-party MPC protocols, an adversary can obtain the output of the computation while depriving honest parties of it. In this spirit, the smartphone (acting for the attacker) could work with the laptop until it obtains the “update” message to mail to the server, but abort the computation before the laptop gets it. Now the attacker has the ability to convince the server to delete its old share by using this message, whereas the laptop has no idea whether the attacker will actually do this (and therefore doesn’t know whether to replace its own key share).

An approach where the server relies on messages received from both devices will quickly get complicated; each device will have to prove to the other that it has mailed an update message to the server, and that this message will allow the server to retrieve its new key share, while simultaneously hiding the payload of this message itself so that only the server can decrypt it. Implicit in many of these scenarios is the problem of safe deletion:

How can we design a proactivization protocol in which the adversary can not convince an honest party to prematurely erase its secret key share?

In the \((2,2)\) case even a network adversary (who does not control either party) can induce premature deletion by simply dropping a message in the protocol. Moreover is it possible to restrain such a proactivization procedure to be *minimally invasive* to the threshold wallet? i.e. native to usage patterns and protocol structures of threshold wallets.

### 1.3 Our Contributions

In this work we study the most fundamental setting for dishonest majority offline-refresh, i.e. \((2,n)\) threshold signature schemes as motivated by the applications discussed earlier. We show how to upgrade any \((2,n)\) threshold ECDSA or Schnorr-like signature scheme to proactive security tailored for use with a threshold
wallet. Our refresh protocol adds very little overhead as compared to running the threshold signature itself, and exactly matches the ideal communication pattern outlined in the previous section.

While there are significant hurdles to overcome before achieving general \((t,n)\) proactivization, the techniques we introduce for \((2,n)\) show how to solve a number of problems inherent in the offline-refresh setting, and so can be seen as progress toward a general solution.

**Defining Offline Refresh** We formalize the notion of offline refresh for threshold protocols in the Universal Composability (UC) framework [8]. Our starting point is the definition of Almansa et al. [1] which we build on to capture that all parties need not be in agreement about which epoch they are in, and that an adversary can change corruptions while other parties are offline. Intuitively previous definitions have had an inherent synchrony in the progress of the system, which we remove in ours and show how to capture that parties may refresh at different rates.

**Fighting Unfairness** We devise a novel approach to working around the fact that two-party computation is inherently unfair, by using the fact that threshold wallets are already posting signatures to a public ledger (i.e. signed transactions). We do not in any way modify the transactions posted on the ledger themselves. Instead we carefully interleave the threshold protocol used to sign this transaction, with a proactivization of the secret shares in such a way that each transaction that appears on the blockchain has the potential to trigger a refresh. As fundamental results regarding dishonest majority MPC preclude guaranteed proactivization, our approach is to make it impossible for an adversary to derive utility from the wallet without allowing it to refresh.

**Proactive Multipliers** Threshold ECDSA protocols are much more sophisticated than threshold Schnorr/EdDSA, requiring the use of more advanced cryptographic primitives that bring with them their own persistent state that must be proactivized. As a stepping stone to proactivizing threshold ECDSA protocols, we show how to proactivize oblivious tranfer (OT) based secure two party multiplication efficiently. We design a refresh protocol which is “public coin” (i.e. randomness for refresh is public), which when plugged into the infrastructure we build for delivering updates safely to offline parties, results in a fully proactivized two-party multiplier.

**Cost and assumptions** Our refresh protocol requires only a few bytes to be exchanged by the online refreshing parties and just as many to be mailed to offline parties, who are able to catch up almost instantly upon waking up. The refresh protocol adds no additional assumptions (i.e. only Discrete Logarithm in the same curve) while being compatible with all recent \((2,n)\) threshold ECDSA protocols [21, 30, 15] and the folklore threshold Schnorr protocol and its derivatives.

**Proof-of-concept Implementation** We provide a proof of concept implementation and we show through experiments (Section 10) that the overhead incurred in computational time of our refresh procedure is roughly 24% for the ECDSA protocol of Doerner et al. [15] and 14% in the case of Gennaro and Goldfeder [21], while the communication round overhead is zero in both cases.

**1.4 On the Use of a Ledger**

We note that given access to a ledger functionality, the theoretical feasibility of the task at hand is easy to establish; any off-the-shelf proactivization protocol that simply runs on the ledger is likely to work. However, the goal for our proactivization procedure is to augment a threshold wallet without interacting with its context; this immediately rules out publishing any more content on the ledger than the wallet already does, or even modifying the content that the wallet does send to the ledger. The reason behind this requirement is to be compatible with essentially any threshold wallet— the only assumption we wish to make is that when the system is not infected, the threshold protocol produces signatures which ultimately reach the ledger.
As our protocols adhere to this requirement, they can be used to augment existing implementations of threshold wallets for standard cryptocurrencies. This would not be the case for a generic approach of simply running a proactivization protocol on the ledger.

1.5 Our Approach

We take advantage of the fact that threshold wallets already rely on posting signatures to a public ledger in order to coordinate refreshes. Let each party $P_i$ own point $f(i)$ on a shared polynomial $f$ where $f(0) = sk$ (i.e. standard Shamir sharing of the secret key $sk$). We have parties generate a candidate refresh polynomial $f'$ when they sign a message, associate each signature with $f'$, and “apply” the refresh (i.e. replace $f(i)$ with $f'(i)$) when the corresponding signature appears on the blockchain. While this handles the coordination part, the major issue of verifiably communicating $f'(j)$ to offline party $P_j$ remains a challenge. To solve this, we have the online refreshing parties jointly generate a local threshold signature authenticating $f'$ when communicated to each offline party; such a signature can only be produced by two parties working together, so any candidate $f'$ received in one’s mailbox must have been created with the approval of an honest party.

Working Around Unfairness Note that this approach is still vulnerable to attacks where the adversary withholds the threshold signature from an honest party in the protocol; if an online signing protocol aborts, how does an honest party know if its (possibly malicious) signing counterparty mailed $f'$ and the corresponding signature to offline parties? This is an issue that stems from the inherent unfairness of two-party computation. While this is impossible to solve in general, we observe that most threshold ECDSA/Schnorr signature protocols are simulatable so the signing nonce $R$ is leaked, but the signature itself stays hidden until the final round. We exploit this fact to bind each $f'$ to $R$ instead of the signature itself; so our proactive version of threshold ECDSA/Schnorr will proceed as follows:

1. Run the first half of threshold ECDSA/Schnorr to obtain $R$.
2. Sample candidate $f'$, bind it to $R$, threshold-sign these values and mail them to offline parties.
3. Continue with threshold ECDSA/Schnorr to produce the signature itself.

Correspondingly when any signature under $R$ appears on the blockchain, each party searches for a bound $f'$ that it can apply. With overwhelming probability there will never be two independently generated signatures that share the same $R$ nonce throughout the lifetime of the system.

Leaking the Difference Polynomial We observe that any proactivization protocol where an adversary corrupts $t$ parties has the following property: define $f_\delta(i) = f'(i) - f(i)$, i.e. the polynomial that encodes the difference between old and new shares. Given $f(i), f'(i)$ for any $t$ values of $i$ (which the adversary has by virtue of corrupting $t$ parties) one can compute $f_\delta(x)$ for any $x$. This is because $f_\delta(0) = 0$ (as $f(0) = f'(0)$) and $f_\delta$ is a degree $t$ polynomial of which one now has $t + 1$ points. We make use of this property by having the sampling procedure for $f'$ simply be a public sampling of $f_\delta$ (since the adversary was going to learn this value anyway). This is not an issue in the $(2,n)$ setting as the adversary will ‘miss’ at least one sampling of $f_\delta$ when changing corruptions.

Threshold ECDSA and Multipliers Threshold ECDSA protocols require use of a secure two-party multiplication functionality $\mathbb{F}_{\text{MUL}}$ (or equivalent protocol) for this reason. Indeed, recent works \cite{21,30,15} have constructed practical threshold ECDSA protocols that make use of multipliers that can be instantiated with either Oblivious Transfer or Paillier encryption. Using these multipliers is significantly more efficient in the offline-online model where parties run some kind of preprocessing in parallel with key generation, and make use of this preprocessed state for efficient $\mathbb{F}_{\text{MUL}}$ invocation when signing a message (this is done by all cited works). However as this preprocessed state is persistent across $\mathbb{F}_{\text{MUL}}$ invocations, it becomes an additional target to defend from a mobile adversary. We show how to efficiently re-randomize this preprocessed state for OT-based instantiations of $\mathbb{F}_{\text{MUL}}$ and therefore get offline-refresh proactive security for $(2,n)$ threshold
ECDSA in its entirety. Our proactivization of \( F_{\text{MUL}} \) makes novel use of the classic technique of Beaver [1] to preprocess oblivious transfer, in combination with the mechanism we build to deliver updates securely.

1.6 Organization

We first discuss related work in Section 2 and present the definitions we use in Section 3. The blockchain model we assume is described in Section 4. We then give our formalization of mobile adversaries and offline refresh in Section 5, following which we detail our threshold signature abstraction in Section 6. We begin by introducing the protocol to coordinate simple \((2,2)\) key refresh in Section 7 and then give the extension to \((2,n)\) proactive threshold signatures in Section 8. Following this, we show how to proactivize every component of the more sophisticated recent ECDSA protocols in Section 9. Finally we demonstrate the practicality of our protocols by implementation to augment two different ECDSA protocols, the results of which we present in Section 10.

2 Related Work

The notion of mobile adversaries with a corresponding realization of proactive MPC was first introduced by Ostrovsky and Yung [33]. Herzberg et al. [24] devise techniques for proactive secret sharing, subsequently adapted for use in proactive signature schemes by Herberg et al. [23]. Cachin et al. [7] show how to achieve proactive security for a shared secret over an asynchronous network. Maram et al. [31] construct a proactive secret sharing scheme that supports dynamic committees, with a portion of the communication done through a blockchain. For a more comprehensive survey, we refer the reader to the works of Maram et al. [31] and Nikov and Nikova [32].

As discussed earlier, every previous work assumes an honest majority of parties collaborate in order to proactivize the system (or that corruptions are passive). Additionally they require this honest majority of parties to come online simultaneously at pre-specified points in time to run the refresh protocol. As the entire premise of the \((2,n)\) threshold signature setting is that only two parties need be online simultaneously to use the system, we impose a strict requirement that only two parties be sufficient to proactivize the system. Consequently as it is meaningless to have an honest majority among two parties, we can not directly apply techniques from previous works to our setting. To our knowledge the conceptual core of our protocol—a threshold signature (internal to the system) interleaved with a threshold signature that appears on the blockchain, is novel.

3 Preliminaries

Throughout this paper, we fix the corruption threshold as \( t = 1 \) and hence formulate all of our definitions assuming one malicious adversarial corruption.

**Network Model** We assume a synchronous network, as already required by recent threshold signature schemes [21, 30, 13]. For the blockchain model, we follow the synchronous functionality of Kiayias et al. [27]. In this functionality, the blockchain only progresses after all parties finish their current round, therefore parties are always synchronized during the protocol run. We formally define the blockchain model in Section 4.

Additionally, we assume a functionality \( F_{\text{Mail}} \) that acts as a “mailbox” for anyone to leave messages for offline parties. We give a formal description later in this section.

**Protocol Input/Output Notation** Most of the protocols in this paper are described for any pair of parties indexed by \( i, j \in [n] \). In particular, any two parties \( P_i, P_j \) out of a group of \( n \) parties \( \mathcal{P} \) can run a protocol \( \pi \) with private inputs \( x_i, x_j \) to get their private outputs \( y_i, y_j \) respectively. For ease of notation since
all of our protocols have the same instructions for each party, we choose to describe them as being run by \( P_b \) with \( P_{1−b} \) as the counterparty. The general format will be

\[
y_b ← \pi(1−b, x_b)
\]

to denote that \( P_b \) gets output \( y_b \) by running protocol \( \pi \) with input \( x_b \) and counterparty \( P_{1−b} \). For instance if \( \pi \) is run between \( P_2 \) and \( P_6 \), the protocol as described from the point of view of \( P_6 \) is interpreted with \( b \equiv 6 \) and \( 1−b \equiv 2 \).

### Ideal Functionalities

We assume access to a number of standard ideal functionalities: \( F_{\text{Com}} \) (commitment), \( F_{\text{Com}-ZK} \) (commit proof of knowledge of discrete logarithm), \( F_{\text{Coin}} \) (coin tossing), \( F_{\text{MUL}} \) (two-party multiplication) all which we describe here for completeness.

\( F_{\text{Mail}} \) This functionality is used to leave messages for offline parties to read upon waking up.

**Functionality 1: \( F_{\text{Mail}} \)**

This functionality is parameterized by the party count \( n \).

1. For each \( i \in [n] \) initialize \( \text{mailbox}_i = \emptyset \)
2. Upon receiving \((\text{send}, i, \text{msg})\) from party \( P_j \), append \( \text{msg} \) to \( \text{mailbox}_i \)
3. Upon receiving \((\text{read})\) from party \( P_i \), respond with \((\text{mailbox}_i)\) and subsequently set \( \text{mailbox}_i = \emptyset \)

The functionality \( F_{\text{Mail}} \) could be realized in any number of ways, for instance by a forward-secure messaging service such as the Signal protocol [2].

\( F_{\text{Com}-ZK} \) The commitment functionality allows a party \( P_i \) to commit to a value \( X \in G \) and reveal it to parties \( \{P_j\} \) at a later point if desired, along with a proof that that \( P_i \) knows \( x \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) such that \( x \cdot G = X \).

**Functionality 2: \( F_{\text{Com}-ZK} \)**

The functionality is parameterized by the group \( G \) of order \( q \) generated by \( G \), and runs with a group of parties \( \vec{P} \).

**Commit Proof** On receiving \((\text{commit-proof}, \text{id}^{\text{com-zk}}, x, X_i)\) from \( P_i \), where \( x \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) and \( X_i \in G \), store \((\text{id}^{\text{com-zk}}, x, X_i)\) and send \((\text{committed}, i)\) to all parties.

**Decommit Proof** On receiving \((\text{decom-proof}, \text{id}^{\text{com-zk}})\) from \( P_i \),

1. If \( X = x \cdot G \), send \((\text{decommitted}, \text{id}^{\text{com-zk}}, i)\) to each \( P_j \in \vec{P} \)
2. Otherwise send \((\text{fail}, \text{id}^{\text{com-zk}}, i)\) to each \( P_j \in \vec{P} \)

Note that multiple parties \( P_j \) may participate.

This is a standard functionality that can be instantiated in the random oracle model to obtain folklore commitments, along with Schnorr’s sigma protocol plugged into either the Fiat-Shamir [17] or Fischlin [18] transformations to obtain a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of discrete logarithm. It is easy to see that the usual commitment functionality \( F_{\text{Com}} \) can be obtained by omitting a few components of \( F_{\text{Com}-ZK} \).
This is a coin tossing functionality, which allows any pair of parties to publicly sample a uniform \( Z_q \) element.

**Functionality 3: \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{Coin}} \)**

This functionality is run with two parties \( P_0, P_1 \).

On receiving \((\text{sample-element}, \text{id}^{\text{coin}}, q)\) from both \( P_0, P_1 \), sample \( x \leftarrow Z_q \) uniformly and send \((\text{id}^{\text{coin}}, x)\) to both parties as adversarially delayed output.

Realizing this functionality is easy in the \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{Com}} \)-hybrid model: \( P_0 \) samples \( x_0 \leftarrow Z_q \) and sends it to \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{Com}} \), following which \( P_1 \) samples \( x_1 \leftarrow Z_q \) and sends it to \( P_0 \). Finally \( P_0 \) instructs \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{Com}} \) to release \( x_0 \) and the output is defined as \( x = x_0 + x_1 \).

**Functionality 4: \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{MUL}} \)**

Secure two party multiplication functionality, in simplified form.

This functionality is run with two parties \( P_0, P_1 \).

On receiving \((\text{input}, \text{id}^{\text{coin}}, x_0)\) from \( P_0 \) and \((\text{input}, \text{id}^{\text{coin}}, x_1)\) from \( P_1 \) such that \( x_0, x_1 \in Z_q \), sample a uniform \((t_0, t_1) \leftarrow Z_2^q\) conditioned on \( t_0 + t_1 = x_0 \cdot x_1 \)

and send \( t_0 \) to \( P_0 \) and \( t_1 \) to \( P_1 \) as adversarially delayed output.

For a more nuanced functionality that can be efficiently instantiated, along with such an instantiation based on Oblivious Transfer (which we describe how to proactivize in this work), we refer the reader to the work of Doerner et al. [15].

**Adversarial Model**

We prove our protocols secure in the Universal Composability (UC) framework of Canetti [8]. We give the specifics of our modelling in Section 5.

### 3.1 Miscellaneous

We use \((G, G, q)\) to denote a curve group; the curve \( G \) is generated by \( G \) and is of order \( q \). Throughout the paper we use multiplicative notation for curve group operations.

**Lagrange Coefficients** \( \lambda^i_j(x), \lambda^j_i(x) \) are the Lagrange coefficients for interpolating the value of a degree-1 polynomial \( f \) at location \( x \) using the evaluation of \( f \) at points \( i \) and \( j \). In particular,

\[
\lambda^i_j(x) \cdot f(i) + \lambda^j_i(x) \cdot f(j) = f(x) \quad \forall x, i, j \in Z_q
\]

Each \( \lambda^i_j(x) \) is easy to compute once \( i, j, x \) are specified.

**Signature format**

A signature under public key \( \text{pk} \) comprises of \((R, \sigma)\) where \( R \in G \) and \( \sigma \in Z_q \). Note that in practice, some ECDSA/Schnorr implementations will only contain the \( x \)-coordinate of \( R \) instead of the whole value. This is only done for efficiency reasons with no implications for security, and does not affect compatibility with our protocols.
4 Blockchain Model

In this section we detail the relevant aspects of the underlying blockchain system that is required for our protocol.

4.1 A Transaction Ledger Functionality

A transaction ledger can be seen as a public bulletin board where users can post and read transactions from the ledger. As it was shown in [29], a ledger functionality must intuitively guarantee the properties of persistence and liveness, that we informally discuss next.

- **Persistence**: Once a honest user in the system announces a particular transaction as final, all of the remaining users when queried will either report the transaction in the same position in the ledger or will not report any other conflicting transaction as stable.
- **Liveness**: If any honest user in the system attempts to include a certain transaction into their ledger, then after the passing of some time, all honest users when queried will report the transaction as being stable.

The functionality $G_{\text{Ledger}}$ is inspired by the functionality of [27] and for ease of presentation it is highly synchronous. However, we note that partially synchronous [16] ledgers that take into account an unknown network delay do exist [12, 10], and can be easily employed by our protocol with no changes due to how we define the corruption model, where the adversary “waits” for a full refresh between changing corruptions. Without loss of generality we assume that every transaction that is included in the chain becomes final and therefore will not be rolled-back. For a more complete and detailed functionality we refer the reader to [3]. We give a formal definition of the ledger functionality below.

**Functionality 5: $G_{\text{Ledger}}$**

The functionality $G_{\text{Ledger}}$ is globally available to all participants. The functionality is parameterized by a function Blockify, a predicate Validate, a constant $T$, and variables chain, slot, clockTick and buffer, and a set of parties $P$. Initially set $\text{chain} := \varepsilon$, $\text{buffer} := \varepsilon$, $\text{slot} := 0$ and $\text{clockTick} := 0$.

- Upon receiving $(\text{Register}, \text{id})$ from a party $P$, set $\mathcal{P} := \{P\} \cup P$ and if $P$ was not registered before set $d_P := 0$. Send $(\text{Register}, \text{id}, P)$ to $A$.
- Upon receiving $(\text{ClockUpdate}, \text{id})$ from some party $P_i \in P$ set $d_i := 1$ and forward $(\text{ClockUpdate}, \text{id}, P_i)$ to $A$. If $d_P = 1$ for all $P \in P$ then set $\text{clockTick} := \text{clockTick} + 1$, reset $d_P := 0$ for all $P \in P$ and execute **Chain extension**.
- Upon receiving $(\text{Submit}, \text{id}, \text{tx})$ from a party $P$, If $\text{Validate}(\text{chain}, (\text{buffer}, \text{tx})) = 1$ then set $\text{buffer} := \text{buffer}||\text{tx}$.
- Upon receiving $(\text{Read}, \text{id})$ from a party $P \in \{A \cup P\}$, If $P$ is honest then set $b := \text{chain}$ else set $b := (\text{chain}, \text{buffer})$. Then return the message $(\text{Read}, \text{id}, b)$ to party $P$.
- Upon receiving $(\text{Permute}, \text{id}, \pi)$ from $A$ apply permutation $\pi$ to the elements of $\text{buffer}$.

**Chain extension**: If $|\text{clockTick} - (T \cdot \text{slot})| > T$ then set $\text{chain} := \text{chain}||\text{Blockify}(\text{slot}, \text{buffer})$ and $\text{buffer} := \varepsilon$, and subsequently send $(\text{ChainExtended}, \text{id})$ to $A$.

The functionality $G_{\text{Ledger}}$ is parameterised by a set $\mathcal{P}$ of participants $P$; for a new participant to join the protocol it must send a message Register to the $G_{\text{Ledger}}$ functionality. We parameterise $G_{\text{Ledger}}$ by a constant $T$ that denotes the gap in clock tick units between two subsequent slots in the ledger. Without loss of generality, one could assume the existence of a function Tick2Time that maps clock ticks to physical time, in the same spirits of [27]. For concreteness, in such a case, the value of $T$ would be 10 minutes in Bitcoin.
The functionality \( \mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}} \) is synchronous, and the clockTick variable is incremented only after all the parties send a message \( \text{ClockUpdate} \) to \( \mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}} \). A new block is created and appended to the chain only after \( T \) clock ticks have elapsed since the last block creation; in the meantime, parties can submit new transactions to the ledger with the message \( \text{Submit} \), and read all the contents of the ledger with the message \( \text{Read} \). The adversary \( A \) can permute the contents of the current transaction buffer, which translates to rearranging the order of the transactions that will be included in the next block.

We define the predicate \( \text{Validate} \) that validates the transactions contents and format against the current chain before including it in the transactions buffer. In existing systems such as Bitcoin, the \( \text{Validate} \) predicate checks the signature of the user spending funds. The function \( \text{Blockify} \), as in [27], handles the processing of the transaction buffer and “packs” it nicely into blocks.

### Global Functionality

The simulator for our protocol will not be able to act on behalf of \( \mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}} \). In particular the simulator is only able to use the functionality with the same privileges as a party running the real protocol.

## 5 Formalizing Mobile Adversaries and the Offline Refresh Setting

We build on the definition of Almansa et al. [1] to a notion of mobile adversaries that accommodates ‘offline’ parties. We do this by having each party maintain a counter \( \text{epoch} \) written on a special tape, and define the state of the system relative to these \( \text{epoch} \) values. While in our definition the adversary \( Z \) may choose to activate parties in sequences that leave them in different epochs, the definition of Almansa et al. does not permit this. In particular their definition requires all honest parties to first agree that they have all successfully reached the latest epoch before the adversary is permitted to change corruptions.

### Epochs

Each party has a special “epoch tape” on which it writes an integer \( \text{epoch} \). At the start of the protocol, this tape contains the value 0 for all honest parties. We use the term “system epoch” to refer to the largest \( \text{epoch} \) value written on any honest party’s tape.

### Operations

There are two kinds of commands that the environment \( Z \) can send to a party: \( \text{operate} \) and \( \text{refresh} \). Intuitively \( \text{operate} \) corresponds to use of the system’s service, and \( \text{refresh} \) the rerandomization of parties’ private state. The \( \text{operate} \) command will be issued to two parties simultaneously (in any realization this will require them to interact) and \( \text{refresh} \) will be non-interactive in its realization.

### Non-degeneracy

Upon being given the \( \text{refresh} \) command, an honest party must write the current system epoch on its epoch tape. In order to rule out degenerate realizations, we also require that if any two honest parties are given the \( \text{operate} \) command, the next \( \text{refresh} \) command sent to an honest party \( P \) will result in the system epoch being incremented.

### Corruptions

At any given time, there can be only one party controlled by \( Z \) (i.e. one malicious corruption \(^1\)). Mobility of corruptions must adhere to the following rule: \( Z \) may decide to “uncorrupt” a party \( P \) at any time, however before corrupting a new party \( P' \in \mathcal{P} \) it must first “leave” \( P \), then send \( \text{operate} \) to any two parties, and finally \( \text{refresh} \) to \( P' \) before being given its internal state (and full control over subsequent actions). Note that omitting this final \( \text{refresh} \) message (i.e. allowing \( Z \) to corrupt \( P' \) before it has refreshed) will give \( Z \) the views of both \( P \) and \( P' \) from the same system epoch, in which case the system will be fully compromised. This is implied by any standard definition of proactive security. In fact, our revised definition grants \( Z \) more power than that of Almansa et al. [1], as here not every party need refresh before \( Z \) changes corruptions.

---

\(^1\)We let the adversary corrupt only one party in this definition for ease of exposition as this paper focuses on the \((2, n)\) setting. However it is easy to generalize this definition to \( t \) corruptions.
Crucially we allow the system epoch to be pushed forward by any two parties, i.e. consecutive epoch increments may be enabled by completely non-overlapping pairs of parties. This captures our notion of “offline refresh” where not all parties in the system need be online to move the system forward; any two parties can keep the epoch counter progressing while the others catch up at their own speed.

Offline-refresh must be non-interactive A direct implication of our definition is that one cannot wait for offline parties to respond before incrementing the epoch counter. This inherently rules out standard verifiable secret sharing (VSS) approaches where parties ‘complain’ if an adversary tries to cheat them. Previous proactive secret sharing protocols can be viewed as implementing such a VSS between epochs (either explicitly by complaints against misbehaviour, or implicitly by voting for ‘good’ sharings), and so a fundamentally different approach is required for the offline-refresh setting.

Mappings in our protocol In our protocols we map the operate command issued to a pair of parties $P_i, P_j$ to the command $(\text{sign}, m, i, j)$, i.e. parties $P_i$ and $P_j$ are instructed to collaborate to sign a message $m$. Our protocols in fact achieve an even stronger notion than non-degeneracy, which is meaningful for the threshold signature setting. Specifically when $Z$ sends $(\text{sign}, m, i, j)$ to $P_i$ where the counterparty $P_j$ is malicious and $m$ has not previously been signed, even if $P_i$ receives no output, if $Z$ is able to output a signature $\sigma$ on $m$, then the system epoch will progress upon the next refresh command. Put differently, if $Z$ would like a new message signed then it must allow the system to refresh itself, even if it makes $P_j$ cheat arbitrarily in the signing protocol. Note that regular non-degeneracy guarantees nothing in the case that $P_j$ is corrupt.

6 Threshold Signature Abstraction

A threshold signature scheme [13] allows the power of producing a digital signature to be delegated to multiple parties, so that a threshold number of them must work together in order to produce a signature. Specifically a $(t, n)$ signature scheme is a system in which $n$ parties hold shares of the signing key, of which any $t$ must collaborate to sign a message. In this work we focus on $(2, n)$ threshold versions of the ECDSA [28] and Schnorr [35] Signature schemes. As our techniques are general and not specific to any one threshold signature scheme, we use an abstraction of such protocols for ease of exposition.

6.1 Abstraction

We assume that a $(2, n)$ threshold signature over group $(\mathbb{G}, G, q)$ can be decomposed in a triple of algorithms $(\pi_{\text{DKG}}, \pi_{\text{RSign}}, \pi_{\text{Sign}})$ of the following formats:

- $(sk_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q, pk \in \mathbb{G}) \leftarrow \pi_{\text{DKG}}^{\text{Setup}}(\kappa)$
  
  This protocol is run with $n$ parties and has each honest party $P_i$ obtain public output $pk$ and private output $sk_i$. In addition to this, there must exist a degree-1 polynomial $f$ over $\mathbb{Z}_q$ such that $\forall i \in [n], sk_i = f(i)$.

- $(R \in \mathbb{G}, state_b \in \{0, 1\}^*) \leftarrow \pi_{\text{RSign}}^{\text{Setup}}(pk, sk_b, 1 - b, m)$
  
  Run by party $P_b$ with $P_{1 - b}$ as counterparty, to sign message $m$. Both parties output the same $R$ when honest, with private state $state_b$.

- $(\sigma \in \mathbb{Z}_q) \leftarrow \pi_{\text{Sign}}^{\text{Setup}}(state_b)$
  
  Complettes the signature started by $\pi_{\text{RSign}}^{\text{Setup}}$ when both parties are honest, i.e. $\sigma$ verifies as a signature on message $m$ with $R$ as the public nonce and $pk$ as the public key.

Note that $\pi_{\text{DKG}}^{\text{Setup}}$ captures a specific kind of secret sharing, i.e. the kind where the signing key is Shamir-shared among the parties. Multiplicative shares for instance are not captured by this abstraction. The $(2,2)$ threshold ECDSA protocols of Lindell [29] and Castagnos et al. [9] are not captured by our abstraction for
this reason. Additionally signature schemes that do not have randomized signing algorithms such as BLS \cite{broadway2019publicly} can not be decomposed as per this abstraction.

Finally these protocols must realize the relevant threshold signature functionality. In particular let $\text{Sign} \in \{\text{Sign}^H_{\text{ECDSA}}, \text{Sign}^H_{\text{Schnorr}}\}$ where

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Sign}^H_{\text{ECDSA}}(sk, k, m) &= \frac{H(m) + sk \cdot r_x}{k} \\
\text{Sign}^H_{\text{Schnorr}}(sk, k, m) &= H(R|m) \cdot sk + k
\end{align*}
\]

where $r_x$ is the $x$-coordinate of $k \cdot G$ in the ECDSA signing equation. We therefore define functionality $F_{\text{Sign}}^{n,2}$ to work as follows:

**Functionality 6: $F_{\text{Sign}}^{n,2}$**

This functionality is parameterized by the party count $n$, the elliptic curve $(C, G, q)$, a hash function $H$, and a signing algorithm $\text{Sign}$. The setup phase runs once with $n$ parties, and the signing phase may be run many times between (varying) subgroups of parties indexed by $i, j \in [n]$.

**Setup** On receiving $(\text{init})$ from all parties,

1. Sample and store the joint secret key, $sk \leftarrow Z_q$
2. Compute and store the joint public key, $pk := sk \cdot G$
3. Send $(\text{public-key}, pk)$ to all parties.
4. Store $(\text{ready})$ in memory.

**Signing** On receiving $(\text{sign}, id^i, (i, j), m)$ from both parties indexed by $i, j \in [n]$ ($i \neq j$), if $(\text{ready})$ exists in memory but $(\text{complete}, id^i)$ does not exist in memory, then

1. Sample $k \leftarrow Z_q$ and store it as the instance key.
2. Wait for $(\text{get-instance-key}, id^i)$ from both parties $P_i, P_j$.
3. Compute
   
   \[ R := k \cdot G \]

   and send $(\text{instance-key}, id^i, R)$ to parties $P_i, P_j$. Let $(r_x, r_y) = R$.
4. Wait for $(\text{proceed}, id^i)$ from both parties $P_i, P_j$.
5. Compute
   
   \[ \sigma := \text{Sign}^H(sk, k, m) \]
6. Send $(\text{signature}, id^i, \sigma)$ to both parties $P_i, P_j$ as adversarially-delayed private output.
7. Store $(\text{complete}, id^i)$ in memory.

To make concrete the role of each protocol $(\text{π}_{\text{DKG}}^{\text{R}}, \text{π}_{\text{R}}^{\text{Setup}}, \text{π}_{\text{R}}^{\text{Sign}}, \text{π}_{\text{Sign}}^R)$, we restrict access of their corresponding simulators $(S_{\text{DKG}}^{\text{R}}, S_{\text{Setup}}^{\text{R}}, S_{\text{Sign}}^{\text{R}})$ to $F_{\text{Sign}}^{n,2}$. Specifically $S_{\text{Setup}}^{\text{R}}$ can only send $(\text{init})$ on behalf of a corrupt party and receive $(\text{public-key}, pk)$ in response. The messages $(\text{sign}, id^i, (i, j), m)$ and $(\text{get-instance-key}, id^i)$ can be sent and $(\text{signature}, id^i, \sigma)$ received only by $S_{\text{Sign}}^{\text{R}}$. Finally $(\text{proceed}, id^i)$ can be sent and $(\text{signature}, id^i, \sigma)$ received only by $S_{\text{Sign}}^{\text{R}}$.

An implication of this restriction is that $\text{π}_{\text{R}}^{\text{Sign}}$ has to be simulatable without the signature $\sigma$, therefore it cannot leak any information about this value. (The approach of splitting the simulator into several simulators
to limit what kind of information can be leaked in different stages of the protocol has been used before e.g., in secret-sharing based MPC protocols to claim that the protocol does not leak any information about the output until the reconstruction phase performed in the last round of the protocol. This abstraction was chosen deliberately to enforce this property; one of our key techniques in this work (Section 8) relies on $\pi^R_{\text{Sign}}$ keeping $\sigma$ hidden.

**Threshold Schnorr** We recall a folklore instantiation of $\left[ F^R_{\text{Sign}} \right]$ for $\text{Sign}_{\text{Schnorr}}$ in Appendix A (note that this also works for EdDSA).

**Threshold ECDSA** We note that the recent protocols of Gennaro and Goldfeder [21] if required. However due to the non-linearity of $\text{Sign}_{\text{ECDSA}}$ the corresponding realization of $\left[ F^2_{\text{ECDSA}} \right]$ requires use of a multiplication functionality $\left[ F^2_{\text{MUL}} \right]$ (or equivalent protocol). Since $\left[ F^2_{\text{MUL}} \right]$ is expensive to instantiate for one-time use, these threshold ECDSA protocols run some preprocessing for $\left[ F^2_{\text{MUL}} \right]$ in parallel with $\pi^R_{\text{DKG SetUp}}$ and make use of this preprocessed state for more efficient online computation. As this adds additional persistent state to be protected against a mobile adversary, we need to deal with it carefully. We discuss this in further detail and give an efficient solution to this problem in Section 9.

### 7 Coordinating Two Party Refresh

As the final protocol combines two independent concepts: using the blockchain for synchronization, and authenticating communication to offline parties, we first present a base protocol for the former for a (2, 2) access structure and augment it with the latter to obtain a (2, n) protocol.

In this section, we describe the malicious secure protocol for two parties to coordinate an authenticated refresh of the secret key shares.

The (2, 2) protocol is described with Shamir secret shares (points on a polynomial) rather than just additive shares so as to allow for a smoother transition to the (2, n) setting.

**Intuition** The two parties begin by running the first half of the threshold signing protocol $\pi^R_{\text{Sign}}$ to obtain the signing nonce $R$ that will be used for the subsequent threshold signature itself. They then sample a new candidate (shared) polynomial $f'$ by publicly sampling the difference polynomial $f_b$ and store their local share $sk'_b = f'(b)$ tagged with $R$ and the epoch number epoch in a list $rpool$. Specifically $rpool$ is a list of $(R, sk'_b, \text{epoch})$ values that are indexed by $R$ as the unique identifying element. Following this, they complete the threshold signing by running $\pi^2_{\text{Sign}}$ and a designated party sends the resulting signature (and message) to $G_{\text{Ledger}}$, i.e. posts them to the public ledger.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocol 1: $\pi^{(2,2)}_{\text{rho-sign}}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parameters:</strong> Elliptic Curve Group $(\mathcal{G}, G, q)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parties:</strong> $P_b, P_{1-b}$ (recall $b \in {1, 2}$ is the index of the current party and $1-b$ is a shorthand for the index of the counterparty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideal Oracles:</strong> $\left[ F^R_{\text{Com}, 2k} \right], G_{\text{Ledger}}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inputs:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Common:</strong> Message to be signed $m \in {0, 1}^*$, public key $pk \in \mathcal{G}$, each party’s share in the exponent $pk_b = \lambda^{1-b}(0) \cdot F(b)$ where $F$ is the polynomial over $\mathcal{G}$ passing through $(0, pk)$ and $(b, f(b) \cdot G)$, epoch index epoch $\in \mathbb{Z}^+$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Private:</strong> Each party $P_b$ has private input $sk_b = \lambda^{1-b}(0) \cdot f(b) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Tag $R$ from Threshold Signature:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Run the first half of the threshold signing protocol $(R, state_b) \leftarrow \pi^R_{\text{Sign}} (sk_b, 1-b, m)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. **Sample New Polynomial:**
   i. Send \((\text{sample-element}, \text{id}^\text{coin}, q)\) to \(F_{\text{Coin}}\) and wait for response \((\text{id}^\text{coin}, \delta)\)
   ii. Define degree-1 polynomial \(f_\delta\) over \(\mathbb{Z}_q\) such that
   \[
f_\delta(0) = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad f_\delta(1) = \delta
   \]
   iii. Compute
   \[
sk'_b = sk_b + f_\delta(b)
   \]

3. **Store Tagged Refresh:**
   i. Retrieve Epoch index \(epoch\)
   ii. Append \((R, sk'_i, epoch)\) to \(rpool\)

4. Complete the threshold signature protocol by running \(\sigma \leftarrow \pi_{\text{Sign}}\)

5. If \(\sigma \neq \bot\) then set \(tx = (m, R, \sigma)\) and send \((\text{Submit}, \text{sid}, tx)\) to \(G_{\text{Ledger}}\)

Note that in Step 5 it is sufficient for only one party to send the transaction \(tx\) to the ledger.

While the above protocol generates candidate refresh polynomials, choosing which one to use from \(rpool\) (and when to delete old shares) is done separately. The idea is that when a new block is obtained from \(G_{\text{Ledger}}\) the parties each scan it to find signatures under their shared public key \(pk\). The signatures are cross-referenced with \(rpool\) tuples stored in memory by matching \(R\) (no two signatures will have the same \(R\)) and the ones without corresponding tuples are ignored. If any such signatures are found, the one occurring first in the block is chosen to signal the next refresh; in particular the corresponding \(sk'_i\) overwrites \(sk_b\) stored in memory, \(rpool\) is erased, and the \(epoch\) counter is incremented.

---

**Protocol 2:**

**Parameters:** Elliptic Curve Group \((G, G, q)\)

**Parties:** \(P_i\) (local refresh protocol)

**Ideal Oracles:** \(G_{\text{Ledger}}\)

**Inputs:** Epoch counter \(epoch\), a list \(rpool = \{(epoch, sk'_i, R)\}\), private key share \(sk_i\).

1. Send \((\text{Read})\) to \(G_{\text{Ledger}}\) and receive \((\text{Read}, b)\). Set \(BLK\) to be the latest block occurring in \(b\)
2. Search for the first signature \((\sigma, R)\) occurring in \(BLK\) under \(pk\) such that \(\exists (R, sk'_i, epoch) \in rpool\)
3. Overwrite \(sk_i = sk'_i\) and erase \(rpool\)
4. Set \(epoch = epoch + 1\)

It is clear that this protocol achieves all desired properties when both parties are honest. We give a proof of the extended \((2, n)\) protocol directly in the next section. However we make a few observations at this point that will aid in building the proof for the extended protocol.

**Before and after a refresh** the view of an adversary corrupting \(P_b\) when \(epoch = x\) is completely independent of the view when corrupting \(P_{1-b}\) after \(epoch = x + 1\). This is clear as polynomials \(f\) and \(f'\) are independently distributed, and so \(sk_b = f(b)\) can not be meaningfully combined with \(sk'_{1-b} = f'(1 - b)\).

**No two entries in rpool will have the same \(R\)** by virtue of each \(R\) being chosen uniformly for each entry, the likelihood of there being two entries with the same \(R\) value in \(rpool\) is negligible, with about \(q/2\) signatures having to be generated before a collision occurs.
8 \((2, n)\) Refresh With Two Online

In this section, we give the malicious secure protocol for two online parties to coordinate an authenticated refresh of the secret key for arbitrarily many offline parties.

We now describe how to ensure that offline parties can get up to speed upon waking up, crucially in a way that every party is in agreement about which polynomial to use so that \(sk_i\) erasures are always safe.

Goal

Observe that if every party is in agreement about \(rpool\), then the rest of the refresh procedure is deterministic and straightforward. Therefore it suffices to construct a mechanism to ensure that for each \((R, sk'_i, \text{epoch})\) tuple an online party \(P_b\) appends to its \(rpool\), each offline party \(P_i\) is able to append a consistent value \((R, sk'_i, \text{epoch})\) to its own \(rpool\). Here ‘consistent’ means that the points \((0, sk), (b, sk'_i), (i, sk'_i)\) are collinear.

An Attempt at a Solution

We first note that since either one of the online parties \(P_b\) may be malicious and therefore unreliable, it simplifies matters to design the refresh protocol so that they both mail the same message to an offline \(P_i\). The message itself should deliver \(f_{\delta}(i)\) (so that \(P_i\) can compute \(sk'_i\)) along with \(R\). Simultaneously it must be ensured that a malicious party is unable to spoof such a message and confuse \(P_i\).

In order to solve this problem, we take advantage of the fact that the parties already share a distributed key setup: as any two parties must be able to sign a message in a \((2, n)\) threshold signature scheme, we take advantage of this feature to authenticate mailed messages with threshold signatures internal to the protocol. In particular, when any \(P_b, P_{1-b}\) agree on an entry \((R, sk_b)\) to add to \(rpool\), they also produce a threshold signature \(z\) under the shared public key \(pk\) authenticating this entry. Each \(P_b\) is instructed to mail the new \(rpool\) entry accompanied by its signature \(z\) to every offline party. If at least one of \(P_b, P_{1-b}\) follows the protocol (note that only one may be corrupt), every offline party will find the new \(rpool\) entry in its mailbox when it wakes up. Additionally due to the same reason that \((2, n)\) signatures are unforgeable by an adversary corrupting a single party, such an adversary will be unable to convince any offline \(P_i\) to add an entry to \(rpool\) that was not approved by an honest party. An implication of this unforgeability feature is that an offline party can safely ignore messages in its mailbox that are malformed.

A Subtle Attack

Again the inherent unfairness of two-party computation stands in the way of achieving a consistent \(rpool\). In particular an adversary corrupting \(P_b^*\) may choose to abort the computation the moment she receives the internal threshold signature \(z\), denying the online honest party \(P_{1-b}\) this value and therefore removing its ability to convince its offline friends to add the new \(rpool\) entry. This is a dangerous situation, as \(P_b^*\) now has the power to control whether the offline parties update \(rpool\) or not, i.e. by choosing whether or not to mail the new \(rpool\) entry (which it can convince offline parties to use as it has \(z\)). While this will not immediately constitute a breach of privacy, the fact that honest parties do not agree on \(rpool\) could induce unsafe deletion; at best this requires all honest parties to come online to re-share the secret, and at worst this could mean that the secret key is lost forever (e.g. in the (2,3) cold storage use case).

Our Solution

This is where it is crucial that the first half of the threshold signing protocol \((\pi_{\text{Sign}}^R)\) is simulatable without the signature \(\sigma\) itself; in fact it is the entire reason for this choice of abstraction. Assume that \(P_{1-b}\) updates its \(rpool\) with the new value before even producing \(z\). Following this, \(P_{1-b}\) will refuse to instruct \([\frac{F_{\text{Sign}}}{2}]\) to reveal the signature \(\sigma\) until it is in possession of the local threshold signature \(z\) to mail to offline parties. There are now two choices that \(P_b^*\) has when executing the attack described above:

- Update \(rpool\) of offline parties: i.e. the adversary chooses to add \((R, f_{\delta})\) to the \(rpool\) of some/all offline parties. In this case, in order to actually exploit the inconsistency between \(rpool\) of different honest parties, the adversary must trigger a refresh that produces different outcomes for different \(rpool\). Specifically, the signature \(\sigma\) under public key \(pk\) and the nonce \(R\) must appear on the blockchain; i.e. the same \(R\) that \(P_b\) interrupted signing with \(P_{1-b}\) but mailed to offline parties. However since protocol \(\pi_{\text{Sign}}^R\) by itself keeps \(\sigma\) completely hidden and \(P_{1-b}\) does not continue with \(\pi_{\text{Sign}}^z\), the task
the adversary is essentially to produce $\sigma$ under a specific uniformly chosen $R$ (of unknown discrete logarithm). We show that this amounts to solving the discrete logarithm problem in the curve $\mathcal{G}$.

- **Do not update $rpool$ of offline parties**: All honest parties have the same $rpool$ anyway, and there is no point of concern.

Therefore instead of using complicated mechanisms (e.g., forcing everyone to come online, extra messages on the blockchain, etc.) to ensure that every honest party agrees on the same $rpool$, we design our protocol so that any inconsistencies in $rpool$ are inconsequential.

We present the protocol below, which includes some optimizations and notation omitted from the above explanation.

### Protocol 3

**Parameters:** Elliptic Curve Group $(\mathcal{G}, G, q)$

**Parties:** $P_b$ for $b \in [n]$

**Ideal Oracles:** $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}, \text{random oracle RO}$

**Inputs:**

- **Common:** Message to be signed $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, public key $pk \in \mathcal{G}$, each party’s share in the exponent $pk_b = \lambda_b^{-1}(0) \cdot F(b)$ where $F$ is the polynomial over $\mathcal{G}$ passing through $(0, pk)$ and $(b, f(b) \cdot G)$, epoch index $epoch \in \mathbb{Z}^+$

- **Private:** Each party $P_b$ has private input $sk_b = \lambda_b^{-1}(0) \cdot f(b) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$

1. **Tag $R$ from Threshold Signature:** (identical to $\pi_{\text{[2]} \cdot \text{sign}}$)

2. **Sample New Polynomial:** (identical to $\pi_{\text{[2]} \cdot \text{sign}}$)

3. **Store Tagged Refresh:**
   - i. Append $(R, sk_b', epoch)$ to $rpool$
   - ii. Establish common nonce $K \in \mathcal{G}$ along with an additive sharing of its discrete logarithm:
     - a. Sample $k_b \leftarrow \mathcal{G}$, set $K_b = k_b \cdot G$ and send $(\text{com-proof}, id_{com}, k_b, K_b)$ to $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Com-ZK}}$
     - b. Upon receiving $(\text{committed}, 1 - b, id_{com}^{-b})$ from $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Com-ZK}}$, send $(\text{open}, id_{com}^{-b})$ to $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Com-ZK}}$
     - c. Wait to receive $(\text{decommitted}, 1 - b, id_{com}^{-b}, K_{1 - b}) \in \mathcal{G}$ from $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Com-ZK}}$
     - d. Set $K = K_b + K_{1 - b}$
   - iii. Compute
     \[
     e = \text{RO}(R||K||b||epoch),
     \]
     \[
     z_b = e \cdot sk_b + k_b
     \]
   - iv. Send $z_b$ to $P_{1 - b}$ and wait for $z_{1 - b}$, upon receipt verifying that
     \[
     z_{1 - b} \cdot G = e \cdot pk_{1 - b} + K_{1 - b}
     \]
   - v. Set $msg = (R, epoch, \delta, K, z)$
   - vi. For each $i \in [n] \setminus \{b, 1 - b\}$, send $(\text{send}, i, msg)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Mail}}$

4. Complete the threshold signature protocol by running $\sigma \leftarrow \pi_{\text{Sign}}^\mathcal{G}$

5. If $\sigma \neq \bot$ then set $tx = (m, R, \sigma)$ and send $(\text{Submit}, sid, tx)$ to $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$

We now specify the refresh procedure for a party $P_i$ to read its mailbox, reconstruct $rpool$, and shift to the latest shared polynomial. This refresh procedure is general so that parties who were offline for a number of epochs can catch up.
Protocol 4: \( \pi_{(2,n)^i\text{-update}} \)

**Parameters:** Elliptic Curve Group \((G, G, q)\)

**Parties:** \(P_i\) (local refresh protocol)

**Ideal Oracles:** \(G\text{Ledger}\)

**Inputs:** Epoch counter \(\text{epoch}\), a list \(\text{rpool} = \{(\text{epoch}, sk'_i, R)\}\), public key \(pk\), private key share \(sk_i\) (define \(pk_i = sk_i \cdot G\)).

1. For each unique \(\text{msg}\) received from \(\mathcal{F}_{\text{Mail}}\) do the following:
   i. Parse \((R, \text{epoch}', \delta, K, z) \leftarrow \text{msg}\) and if \(\text{epoch}' < \text{epoch}\) ignore this \(\text{msg}\)
   ii. Compute \(e = RO(R||K||\delta||\text{epoch}')\) and verify that
   \[ z \cdot G = e \cdot pk + K \]
   iii. Define degree-1 polynomial \(f_\delta\) over \(\mathbb{Z}_q\) such that
   \[ f_\delta(0) = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad f_\delta(1) = \delta \]
   and interpolate \(\delta_i = f_\delta(i)\)
   iv. If \(\text{epoch}' = \text{epoch}\), compute
   \[ sk'_i = sk_i + \delta_i \]
   and append \((R, sk'_i, \text{epoch})\) to \(\text{rpool}\)
   v. Otherwise \(\text{epoch}' > \text{epoch}\) so append \((\text{epoch}', \delta_i, R)\) to \(\text{fpool}\)

2. Send \((\text{Read})\) to \(G\text{Ledger}\) and receive \((\text{Read}, b)\) in response. Set \(\text{BLK}\) to be the latest blocks occurring in \(b\) since last awake, and in sequence from the earliest block, for each \((\sigma, R)\) under \(pk\) encountered do the following:
   i. Find \((R, sk'_i, \text{epoch})\) \(\in \text{rpool}\) (match by \(R\)), ignore \(\sigma\) if not found
   ii. Overwrite \(sk_i = sk'_i\), set \(\text{epoch} = \text{epoch} + 1\), and set \(\text{rpool} = \emptyset\)
   iii. For each \((\text{epoch}, \delta_i, R)\) \(\in \text{fpool}\) (i.e. matching current \(\text{epoch}\)) do:
      (i) Set \(sk'_i = sk_i + \delta_i\)
      (ii) Append \((R, sk'_i, \text{epoch})\) to \(\text{rpool}\)
      (iii) Remove this entry from \(\text{fpool}\)

In the above refresh protocol \(\pi_{(2,n)^i\text{-update}}\), the set \(\text{rpool}\) will always be consistent across honest parties (except for inconsequential differences) and \(\text{fpool}\) will be empty by the end. This is due to the fact that \(\text{fpool}\) contains candidate refresh values intended for \(\text{epoch}\) values further than the one “caught up with” so far; no honest party will approve a candidate with a higher \(\text{epoch}\) counter than its own, and every honest party reaches the same \(\text{epoch}\) value upon refresh. Further details can be found in the section addressing non-degeneracy of the protocol in the proof that follows.

**Theorem 8.1.** If \((\pi_{\text{DKG}}^\text{Setup}, \pi_{\text{R}}^\text{Sign}, \pi_{\text{Sign}}^\text{Sign})\) is a threshold signature scheme for signing equation \(\text{Sign}\), and the discrete logarithm problem is hard in \(G\), then \(\pi_{\text{DKG}}^\text{Setup}, \pi_{(2,n)^i\text{-update}}^\text{R}\) UC-realizes \(\mathcal{F}_{\text{Com,ZK}}\) in the \((G\text{Ledger}, F_{\text{IoU}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{Mail}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{Mail}})\)-hybrid model in the presence of a mobile adversary corrupting one party, with offline refresh.

**Proof.** (Sketch) The protocol \(\pi_{\text{DKG}}^\text{Setup}\) can be simulated the standard way, with the corrupt party \(P_i\)'s key share \(sk_i\) remembered as output. We now describe the simulator \(S_{\text{r-sign}}^{(2,n)}\) for protocol \(\pi_{(2,n)^i\text{-sign}}\). This simulator is given \(sk_i\) as input, and outputs \((R, sk'_i)\).
**Simulator 1: \( S^{(2,n)}_{\rho \text{-sign}} \)**

**Parameters:** Elliptic Curve Group \((\mathbb{G}, G, q)\)

**Ideal Oracles Controlled:** \( F_{\text{Com-ZK}} \) random oracle RO

**Ideal Oracles Not Controlled:** \( \mathcal{G}_{\text{ledger}} \)

**Inputs:**

- **Common:** Message to be signed \( m \in \{0, 1\}^* \), public key \( \text{pk} \in \mathbb{G} \), each party’s share in the exponent \( F(b) = f(b) \cdot G \), epoch index \( \text{epoch} \in \mathbb{Z}^+ \)
- **Private:** \( P_b \)’s key share \( \text{sk}_b = f(b) \in \mathbb{Z}_q \)

1. **Tag \( R \) from Threshold Signature:**
   
   i. Simulate the first half of the threshold signing protocol
      
      \[(R, \text{state}_b) \leftarrow S^{\mathbb{G}}_{\text{Sign}}(\text{sk}_b, 1 - b, m)\]

   **relaying** (get-instance-key, id^{\mathbb{G}}) and (instance-key, id^{\mathbb{G}}, R) between \( S^{\mathbb{G}}_{\text{Sign}} \) and \( F_{\text{Sign}}^{\mathbb{G}} \) when required.

2. **Sample New Polynomial:** *(identical to \( F_{\text{Com}}^{(2,2)} \))
   
   i. Sample \( \delta \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) and send (id^{coin}, \( \delta \)) to \( P_b \) on behalf of \( F_{\text{Coin}} \)
   ii. Define degree-1 polynomial \( f_b \) over \( \mathbb{Z}_q \) such that
      \[f_b(0) = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad f_b(1) = \delta\]
   iii. Compute
      \[\text{sk}_b' = \text{sk}_b + f_b(b)\]

3. **Store Tagged Refresh:**

   i. Simulate a signature \( R, \delta, \text{epoch} \) under \( \text{pk}_{1-b} \):
      
      a. Sample \( z_{1-b} \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) and \( e \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) uniformly at random
      b. Compute
         \[K = z \cdot G - e \cdot \text{pk}_{1-b}\]
      c. Program RO(R||K||\( \delta ||\text{epoch} \)) = \( e \)
   ii. Establish common nonce \( K \in \mathbb{G} \):
      
      a. Send (committed, \( 1 - b, \text{id}^{\text{com-zk}}_{1-b} \)) to \( P_b^* \) on behalf of \( F_{\text{Com-ZK}}^{\mathbb{G}} \)
      b. Receive (com-proof, \text{id}^{\text{com-zk}}_{1-b}, K_b, K_h) on behalf of \( F_{\text{Com-ZK}}^{\mathbb{G}} \)
      c. Set \( K_{1-b} = K - K_b \)
      d. Send (decommitted, \( 1 - b, \text{id}^{\text{com-zk}}_{1-b}, K_{1-b} \in \mathbb{G} \)) to \( P_b^* \) on behalf of \( F_{\text{Com-ZK}}^{\mathbb{G}} \)
      e. Wait for (open, \text{id}^{\text{com-zk}}_{1-b}) from \( P_b \), upon receipt sending \( z_{1-b} \) in response
   iii. Wait for \( z_b \), upon receipt verifying that
      \[z_b = e \cdot \text{sk}_b + K_b\]

4. Simulate the rest of the threshold signature protocol by running \( S^\mathbb{G}_{\text{Sign}}(\text{state}_b) \) relaying (proceed, id^{\mathbb{G}}) and (signature, id^{\mathbb{G}}, \sigma) between \( P_b^* \) and \( F_{\text{Sign}}^{\mathbb{G}} \) as necessary.

5. If \( P_b^* \) asks \( F_{\text{Sign}}^{\mathbb{G}} \) to release \( \sigma \) to \( P_{1-b} \), then set \( tx = (m, R, \sigma) \) and send (Submit, sid, tx) to \( \mathcal{G}_{\text{ledger}} \)

6. Output \((R, \text{sk}_b')\)

Simulating \( S^{(2,n)}_{\rho \text{-sign}} \) is simple: every time the adversary \( Z \) sends a (sign, m, i, j) command to a pair of honest parties, the simulator obtains a signature \( R, \sigma \) from \( F_{\text{Sign}}^{\mathbb{G}} \), samples \( \delta \in \mathbb{Z}_q \), and simulates a local signature \( z \) under \( \text{pk} \) to authenticate \( R, \delta, \text{epoch} \) just as in Step 1 of Simulator \( S^{(2,n)}_{\rho \text{-sign}} \) above. It sets
msg = (R, epoch, δ, K, z) and makes msg available to the corrupt party upon its next query to 𝑓Mail.

We now sketch an argument that the distribution of the real protocol is computationally indistinguishable from the ideal one.

We can progressively substitute each instance of \( (2, n) \) run with honest parties belonging to an epoch with \( S_{\rho, \text{sign}}^{(2, n)} \) run with \( \mathcal{F}_{\rho, \text{sign}}^{(2, n)} \). The distinguishing advantage of \( \mathcal{Z} \) at each step is bounded by the advantage of a PPT adversary distinguishing \( (\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup}}^{\text{Dkg}}, \mathcal{R}^{\text{R}}, \pi^{\text{Sign}}_{R}^{\text{Run}}) \) from the corresponding ideal executions with \( \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup}}^{\text{Dkg}}, \mathcal{R}^{\text{R}}, \pi^{\text{Sign}}_{R}^{\text{Run}}} \), which is assumed to be negligible. In order to extend this strategy to a mobile adversary, it suffices to argue that the polynomials \( f, f' \) used to share \( sk \) appear independently distributed before and after a refresh. This follows immediately from the fact that an adversary who jumps from party \( P_i \) to \( P_j \) is given \( f(i) \) and \( f'(j) \) but does not see the difference \( f \) between \( f, f' \), just as discussed in the \((2,2)\) case in Section 7.

It remains to be argued that the protocol is not degenerate. The non-degeneracy property is achieved by fulfilling two important requirements:

**System Epoch Increments** When the parties executing \( (2, n) \) are honest, the system epoch will always increment upon the next refresh command, i.e. if \( (2, n) \) is run by honest parties with counter epoch, then every subsequent execution of \( (2, n) \) by any party in the system will result in a local epoch counter of at least epoch + 1. This is easy to see for this protocol, as honest parties executing \( (2, n) \) will always produce a signature \( \sigma \) which will subsequently appear on the blockchain (after delay \( T \) as per \( \sigma_{\text{ledger}} \)). Simultaneously every party will find a corresponding update to \( rpool \) in its mailbox, which will be applied by \( (2, n) \) when \( \sigma \) appears on the blockchain.

**Consistency** Every honest party outputs the same epoch counter upon executing \( (2, n) \) simultaneously. As alluded to earlier in Section 8 proving this amounts to showing that the state of \( rpool \) maintained by each honest party differs inconsequentially. In particular, let \( P_i \) and \( P_j \) be honest parties maintaining \( rpool_i \) and \( rpool_j \) respectively such that \( \exists (R, sk_i, \text{epoch}) \in rpool_i \) but \( \not\exists (R, sk_j, \text{epoch}) \in rpool_j \). First we claim that \((R, sk_i', \text{epoch}) \) can be traced to a unique execution of \( (2, n) \) between a corrupt party \( P_k^* \) and honest party \( P_{1-b} \). There are only two alternative events: (1) there is a collision in \( R \) values generated by two protocol instances (occurs with probability \(|\bar{m}|^2/2q \) where \(|\bar{m}| \) is the number of messages signed), or (2) \( P_i \) received \( z \) authenticating this entry without any honest party’s help in its creation; the exact same technique to prove (threshold) Schnorr signatures secure can be employed here to construct a reduction to the Discrete Logarithm problem in curve \( G \) (if this event occurs with probability \( \epsilon \) then there is a reduction to DLog successful with probability \( \epsilon/|\bar{m}| \)). Given that \((R, sk_i', \text{epoch}) \) can be traced to a unique execution of \( (2, n) \) between \( P_{k}^* \) and \( P_{1-b} \) it must be the case that \( P_{j}^* \) aborted the computation at Step [k] \( \text{i.e.} \) \( P_{j}^* \) received \( z \) to authenticate this entry but withheld this value from \( P_{1-b} \) (or else \( P_{j} \) would have received this entry in its mailbox as well due to \( P_{1-b} \)). Observe that this inconsistency in \( rpool_i, rpool_j \) is consequential only if \((\sigma, R) \) appears on \( \sigma_{\text{ledger}} \), despite the fact that \( P_{1-b} \) will not execute \( \pi_{\text{sign}}^{\text{Run}} \) to produce this value. We show that if this event happens with probability \( \epsilon \) then there is an adversary for the DLog problem successful with probability \( \epsilon/|\bar{m}| \). This is because \( R \) is chosen uniformly in \( \mathbb{G} \) for example, internally by \( R^{\text{Run}} \) as it realizes \( \mathcal{F}_{\pi_{\text{sign}}^{\text{Run}}}^{(2, n)} \) and the task of \( \mathcal{Z} \) is to produce \( \sigma \) that verifies under uniformly chosen nonce \( R \) and public key \( pk \). We can use such a \( \mathcal{Z} \) to solve the DLog problem in \( G \) as follows:

1. Receive \( X \in G \) from the DLog challenger.
2. Choose \( sk \leftarrow Z_q \), set \( pk = sk \cdot G \)
3. Run \( S_{\text{Setup}}^{\text{Dkg}} \) for \( \mathcal{Z} \) with \( pk \) programmed to be the public key.
4. For each message \( m \in \bar{m} \) except one, run \( S_{\rho, \text{sign}}^{(2, n)} \) as required to simulate \( \pi_{\rho, \text{sign}}^{(2, n)} \) while also acting on behalf of \( F_{\pi_{\text{sign}}^{\text{Run}}}^{(2, n)} \)
5. For one randomly chosen instance of \( \pi_{\rho, \text{sign}}^{(2, n)} \) use \( S_{\text{sign}}^{\text{Run}} \) to program \( X \) as the signing nonce \( R \).
6. If the correct instance of \( π^{(2,n)}_{\mathcal{RO}} \) is chosen, \( P_i^* \) will abort this protocol before the corresponding \( σ \) has to be released, and yet \( σ \) still appears on \( \mathcal{G}_\text{Ledger} \).

7. If \( σ \) is obtained from \( \mathcal{G}_\text{Ledger} \), solve for \( x \) such that \( x \cdot G = X \) as a function of \( σ, sk \) as per the signing equation \( \text{Sign} \). This is dependent on the equation \( \text{Sign} \) itself, but it is straightforward how to retrieve the instance key \( x \) given the secret key \( sk \) and signature \( σ \) as per \( \text{Sign}_{\text{ECDSA}} \) and \( \text{Sign}_{\text{ECDSA}} \).

The above reduction succeeds when \( Z \) induces this event (probability \( ε \)) and the correct instance of \( π^{(2,n)}_{\mathcal{RO}} \) is chosen (probability \( 1/|\vec{m}| \)) bringing the total success probability to \( ε/|\vec{m}| \).

As the simulated distribution is indistinguishable from the execution of the real protocol and the protocol is non-degenerate, this proves the theorem.

**An Optimization** We note that one can save a query to \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{Coin}} \) and a \( Z_q \) element from being mailed by defining \( δ = \mathcal{RO}(R||K||\text{epoch}) \) instead of computing it separately from the internal threshold signature \( z \). As the input to the random oracle has at least \( κ \) bits of entropy in each instantiation of the protocol (thanks to \( R, K \)) the resulting value of \( δ \) will be distributed uniformly just as it is currently.

### 9 Proactive Threshold ECDSA

Computing \((2,n)\) ECDSA signatures is significantly more difficult than Schnorr, due to the non-linear nature of the ECDSA signing equation. As a result, all such recent threshold ECDSA protocols \([21, 30, 14, 15]\) make use of a secure multiplication functionality (or equivalent protocol) \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{MUL}} \) in their signing phases. If \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{MUL}} \) were to be instantiated independently for each threshold ECDSA signature produced, we could just use the same strategy as in the previous section, since the \( \pi^t_{\text{ECDSA}} \) protocol would take only key shares as arguments. However \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{MUL}} \) is expensive to realize for individual invocations, and given that threshold signature protocols already need a “preprocessing” phase for key generation (ie. \( \mathcal{DKG} \)), all the cited works make use of this phase to also run some preprocessing for \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{MUL}} \) to make its invocation during signing cheaper. Therefore, we also need to change how we deal with proactively refreshing the shares. In a nutshell, the main technical challenge we address in this section is that now the parties, on top of their key shares, also include in their persistent storage some state information for the \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{MUL}} \) protocol and that this state is a new target for a mobile adversary. Therefore, the state needs to be refreshed as well.

We start by abstracting the two-party multiplication protocol \((\pi^t_{\text{Setup}}, \pi^t_{\text{Online}})\) used within ECDSA threshold protocols. The protocols are run by party \( P_i \) with \( P_j \) as the counterparty as follows,

- \((\text{state}_{j,i}^{t_{\text{MUL}}} ∈ \{0,1\}^*) ← \pi^t_{\text{Setup}}(j)\)
- \((t_i ∈ Z_q) ← \pi^t_{\text{Online}}(\text{state}_{j,i}^{t_{\text{MUL}}}, x_j)\)

The pair of protocols \((\pi^t_{\text{Setup}}, \pi^t_{\text{Online}})\) must realize \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{MUL}} \). As per the functionality specification, \( t_i + t_j = x_i \cdot x_j \) after \( \pi^t_{\text{Online}} \) is run, and this can be done arbitrarily many times for different inputs. Every pair of parties in the system shares an instantiation of \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{MUL}} \) and so \( P_i \) maintains \( \text{state}_{j,i}^{t_{\text{MUL}}} \) for each \( j ∈ \{n\} \setminus i \). Therefore in our abstraction for threshold ECDSA protocols \((\mathcal{DKG}, \pi^t_{\text{Setup}}, \pi^t_{\text{Online}}, \pi^t_{\text{ECDSA}}, \pi^t_{\text{ECDSA}})\) we include the state required by \( P_i \) for multiplication with \( P_j \) as an argument for online signing.

In particular, we assume the following threshold signature abstraction for threshold ECDSA protocols:

- \((\text{sk}_i ∈ Z_q, pk ∈ G) ← \mathcal{DKG}(\kappa) \ (\text{Unchanged from Section 6})\)
- \((\text{state}_{j,i}^{t_{\text{MUL}}} ∈ \{0,1\}^*) ← \pi^t_{\text{Setup}}(\text{state}_{j,i}^{t_{\text{MUL}}})\)

There should exist a corresponding \( \pi^t_{\text{MUL}} \) such that \((\pi^t_{\text{Setup}}, \pi^t_{\text{Online}})\) realizes \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{MUL}} \).
• The first part of the signing protocol

\[(R \in \mathbb{G}, \text{state}_b \in \{0, 1\}^*) \leftarrow \pi^R_{\text{Sign}}(pk_b, sk_b, 1 - b, \text{state}_{\text{MUL}}^{b, 1-b}, m)\]

is run by party \(P_b\) with 1\(\rightarrow\)b as counterparty, to sign message \(m\). Both parties output the same \(R\) when honest, with private state \(\text{state}_b\). Note that here, \(P_b\) also takes as input \(\text{state}_{\text{MUL}}^{b, 1-b}\) for its instantiation of \(\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUL}}\) with 1\(\rightarrow\)b.

• \((\sigma \in \mathbb{Z}_q) \leftarrow \pi^\sigma_{\text{Sign}}(\text{state}_b)\) (Unchanged from Section 6)

The same restrictions on the simulators for these protocols hold, see Section 6 for details. It is not hard to show that the recent protocols of Lindell et al. \cite{30}, Gennaro and Goldfeder \cite{21}, and Doerner et al. \cite{15} fit these characterizations. The inclusion of \{\text{state}_{\text{MUL}}^j\}_{j \in [n]} as persistent state that parties must maintain across signatures creates an additional target that must be defended from a mobile adversary. We show how here to refresh \{\text{state}_{\text{MUL}}^j\}_{j \in [n]} required by the OT-based instantiation of \(\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUL}}\) (as in Doerner et al. \cite{15}) and consequently upgrade compatible threshold ECDSA protocols \cite{15, 21, 30} to proactive security.

**Approach** The setup used by the multiplier of Doerner et al. consists of a number of base OTs which are “extended” for use online \cite{20}. These base OTs are the only component of their multiplier which requires each party to keep private state. Therefore re-randomizing these OTs in the interval between an adversary’s jump from one party to the other is sufficient to maintain security. The central idea to implement this re-randomization is to apply the approach introduced by Beaver \cite{4} of “adjusting” preprocessed OTs once inputs are known online.

### 9.1 Proactive Secure Multiplication

We begin by describing how two parties can re-randomize OT itself, and then describe how to apply this technique to re-randomize OT Extensions.

**Re-randomizing Oblivious Transfer** Assume that Alice has two uniform \(\kappa\)-bit strings \(r_0, r_1\), and Bob has a bit \(b\) and correspondingly the string \(r_b\). Let \(\text{rand} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\kappa+1}\) be a uniformly chosen string that is parsed into chunks \(r_0', r_1' \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa\) and \(b' \in \{0, 1\}\) by both parties. The re-randomization process for Alice (\text{Refresh\_OT}_A) and Bob (\text{Refresh\_OT}_B) is non-interactive (given \text{rand}) and proceeds as follows:

1. \text{Refresh\_OT}_A \((r_0, r_1, \text{rand})\): output \(r_0'' = r_0 \oplus r_0'\) and \(r_1'' = r_1 - b' \oplus r_1'\)
2. \text{Refresh\_OT}_B \((b, r_b, \text{rand})\): output \(b'' = b \oplus b'\) and \(r_0''' = r_b \oplus r_0''\)
3. Alice now holds \((r_0'', r_1'')\) and Bob holds \(b'', r_0''\).

It is clear to see that Alice and Bob learn nothing of each other’s private values, only the offsets \(r_0', r_1', b'\) between the new and old ones. Consider the view of a mobile adversary that jumps from one party to the other.

• Alice → Bob: \((r_0, r_1)\) before the refresh, and \((b'', r_0''\) after the refresh.
• Bob → Alice: \((b, r_b)\) before the refresh, and \((r_0'', r_1'')\) after the refresh.

Assuming that \(r_0', r_1', b'\) are hidden and that these values are uniformly chosen, in both the above cases the adversary’s view before and after the refresh are completely independent.

**Re-randomizing OT Extensions** The persistent state maintained by OT Extension protocols based on that of Ishai et al. \cite{25} consists of the result of a number of OTs performed during a preprocessing phase. Re-randomizing this state can be done by simply repeating the above protocol for each preprocessed OT instance. Indeed, the instantiation of OT Extension implemented by Doerner et al. is the protocol of Keller et al. \cite{20} which is captured by this framework.
Re-randomizing multipliers There is no further persistent state maintained across $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUL}}$ invocations by the protocol of Doerner et al. [15], and so we leave implicit the construction of $\text{state}_{\text{MUL}}' \leftarrow \text{Refresh}_{\text{MUL}}(\text{state}_{\text{MUL}}, \text{rand})$. The only missing piece is how $\text{rand}$ is chosen; in the context of the multipliers in isolation, this value can be thought of coming from a coin-tossing protocol that is invisible to the adversary (when neither party is corrupt).

### 9.2 Multiplier Refresh in $(2, n)$ ECDSA

The previous subsection describes how to realize $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUL}}$ with proactive security when a mechanism to agree on when/which $\text{rand}$ to use is available. Fortunately the protocol described in Section 8 provides exactly such a mechanism for the $(2, n)$ threshold signature setting. We briefly describe how to augment Protocol 8 to produce the randomness $\text{rand}$ required to proactively re-randomize multipliers in addition to the distributed key shares.

#### $(2, n)$ Offline Refresh

The two online parties $P_b, P_{1-b}$ engage in a coin-tossing protocol in the **Sample New Polynomial** phase to produce a uniform $\kappa$-bit value $\text{seed}$. In the **Store Tagged Refresh** phase they include $\text{seed}$ to be stored in $\text{rpool}$ along with corresponding $\text{epoch}, \text{sk}_b', R$ (and communicate $\text{seed}$ to offline parties along with these values). If the signature using $R$ is used to signal a refresh, then $\text{seed}$ is expanded by every pair of parties to produce $\text{rand}$ as necessary.

We give the full proactive ECDSA protocol below. It shares many similarities with $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ECDSA}}^{(2, n)}$ and so we underline changes in this protocol.

<table>
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<th>Protocol 5: $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ECDSA}}^{(2, n)}$</th>
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<td><strong>1. Tag $R$ from Threshold Signature:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>3. Store Tagged Refresh:</strong></td>
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b. Upon receiving \(\text{committed}, l - b, \text{id}_{1-b}^\text{com-zk}\) from \(\mathcal{F}_\text{Com-ZK}\), send \(\text{open}, \text{id}_b^\text{com-zk}\) to \(\mathcal{F}_\text{Com-ZK}\).

c. Wait to receive \(\text{decommitted}, l - b, \text{id}_{1-b}^\text{com-zk}, K_{1-b} \in \mathcal{G}\) from \(\mathcal{F}_\text{Com-ZK}\).

d. Set \(K = K_b + K_{1-b}\).

iii. Compute

\[
\begin{align*}
e & = \text{RO}(R||K||\text{seed}||\delta||\text{epoch}) \\
z_b & = e \cdot \text{sk}_b + k_b
\end{align*}
\]

iv. Send \(z_b\) to \(P_{1-b}\) and wait for \(z_{1-b}\), upon receipt verifying that

\[
z_{1-b} \cdot G = e \cdot \text{pk}_{1-b} + K_{1-b}
\]

and compute \(z = z_b + z_{1-b}\).

v. Set \(\text{msg} = (R, \text{epoch}, \delta, \text{seed}, K, z)\).

vi. For each \(i \in [n] \setminus \{b, 1-b\}\), send \((\text{send}, i, \text{msg})\) to \(\mathcal{F}_\text{Mail}\).

4. Complete the threshold signature protocol by running \(\sigma \leftarrow \pi_\text{signature}^\sigma\).

5. If \(\sigma \neq \perp\) then set \(\text{tx} = (m, R, \sigma)\) and send \((\text{Submit}, \text{sid}, \text{tx})\) to \(\mathcal{G}_\text{Ledger}\).

**Update:**

1. For each unique \(\text{msg}\) received from \(\mathcal{F}_\text{Mail}\) do the following:

   i. Parse \((R, \text{epoch}', \delta, \text{seed}, K, z)\) \(\leftarrow \text{msg}\) and if \(\text{epoch}' < \text{epoch}\) ignore this \(\text{msg}\).

   ii. Compute \(e = \text{RO}(R||K||\text{seed}||\delta||\text{epoch}')\) and verify that

   \[
z \cdot G = e \cdot \text{pk} + K
   \]

   iii. Define degree-1 polynomial \(f_\delta\) over \(\mathbb{Z}_q\) such that

   \[
f_\delta(0) = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad f_\delta(1) = \delta
   \]

   and interpolate \(\delta_i = f_\delta(i)\).

   iv. If \(\text{epoch}' = \text{epoch}\), compute

   \[
   \text{sk}_i' = \text{sk}_i + \delta_i
   \]

   and append \((R, \text{sk}_i', \text{seed}, \text{epoch})\) to \(\text{rpool}\).

   v. Otherwise \(\text{epoch}' > \text{epoch}\) so append \((\text{epoch}', \delta_i, \text{seed}, R)\) to \(\text{fpool}\).

2. Send \((\text{Read})\) to \(\mathcal{G}_\text{Ledger}\) and receive \((\text{Read}, b)\) in response. Set \(\text{BLK}\) to be the latest blocks occurring in \(b\) since last awake, and in sequence from the earliest block, for each \((\sigma, R)\) under \(\text{pk}\) encountered do the following:

   i. Find \((R, \text{sk}_i', \text{seed}, \text{epoch})\) \(\in \text{rpool}\) (match by \(R\)), ignore \(\sigma\) if not found.

   ii. Overwrite \(\text{sk}_i = \text{sk}_i'\), set \(\text{epoch} = \text{epoch} + 1\), and set \(\text{fpool} = \emptyset\).

   iii. For each \(j \in [n] \setminus i\) compute

   \[
   \text{rand}_{ij} = \text{RO}(i, j, \text{seed})
   \]

   and overwrite

   \[
   \text{state}_{\text{MUL}, ij} = \text{Refresh}_{\text{MUL}}(\text{state}_{\text{MUL}, ij}, \text{rand}_{ij})
   \]

   iv. For each \((\text{epoch}, \delta_i, \text{seed}, R)\) \(\in \text{fpool}\) (i.e. matching current \(\text{epoch}\)) do:

   (i) Set \(\text{sk}_i' = \text{sk}_i + \delta_i\).

   (ii) Append \((R, \text{sk}_i', \text{seed}, \text{epoch})\) to \(\text{rpool}\).

   (iii) Remove this entry from \(\text{fpool}\).
10 Performance and Implementation

We discuss here the concrete overhead our refresh protocol adds to existing state of the art threshold ECDSA schemes, as most cryptocurrencies today (Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc.) use ECDSA as their canonical signature scheme. As at this point we are discussing specific protocols, we make the following observation: In the protocols of Lindell et al. [30], Doerner et al. [15], and Gennaro and Goldfeder [21] the extra messages added by \( \pi^{(2,n)}_{\rho \text{-sign}} \) can be sent in parallel with the main ECDSA protocols. In particular, each \( \pi^{R}_{\text{ECDSA}} \) has at least two rounds which can be used to generate \( K \) and \( \delta \) in parallel, and each \( \pi^{\sigma}_{\text{ECDSA}} \) has at least one round before \( \sigma \) is released during which \( z \) can be constructed and verified.

10.1 Cost Analysis

In Table 1 we recall the costs of the \((\pi^{R}_{\text{ECDSA}}, \pi^{\sigma}_{\text{ECDSA}})\) combined protocols of Doerner et al. [15] and Lindell et al. [30] (OT-based) for perspective, and then give the overhead induced by \( \pi^{(2,n)}_{\rho \text{-sign}} \).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
<th>EC Mult.s</th>
<th>Comm.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lindell et al. [30]</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>195 KiB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doerner et al. [15]</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>118 KiB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \pi^{(2,n)}_{\rho \text{-sign}} )</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>192 Bytes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Overhead of applying \( \pi^{(2,n)}_{\rho \text{-sign}} \) to proactivize \((2, n)\) ECDSA protocols instantiated with 256-bit curves. Figures are per-party and do not include cost of implementing forward-secure channels (i.e. \( F_{\text{Mail}} \)) to communicate 160 bytes to each offline party every refresh.

Finally the update procedure \( \pi^{(2,n)}_{\rho \text{-update}} \) first requires reading the blockchain and scanning for signatures under the common public key since last awake—essentially the same operation as required to update balance of funds available in a wallet. Additionally one has to read one’s mailbox and perform two curve multiplications for each refresh missed.

10.2 Implementation

In order to demonstrate the compatibility and efficiency of our refresh procedure, we implemented it to augment two different recent threshold ECDSA protocols; specifically those of Doerner et al. [15] and Gennaro and Goldfeder [21]. We present the results in this section.

We ran both sets of experiments on Amazon’s AWS EC2 using a pair of t3.small machines located in the same datacenter for uniformity. However as the implementations of the base threshold ECDSA protocols came from different codebases, we stress that the important metric is the overhead added by our protocol in each case, and that comparison of the concrete times across the ECDSA protocols is not meaningful.

10.2.1 Proactivizing Doerner et al. [15]

As Doerner et al. natively utilize OT based multipliers, augmenting their threshold ECDSA signing with our refresh procedure yields a fully proactivized ECDSA wallet. We ran three experiments, during which we measured wall-clock time, including latency costs, collecting 100,000 samples and averaging them. We first ran their signing protocol unmodified, which took an average of 5.303ms to produce a signature. We then ran the same protocol augmented with our refresh generation procedure (i.e. \( \pi^{(2,n)}_{\rho \text{-sign}} \) and found it to take an average of 6.587ms, i.e. a 24.2% increase. Finally we measured the cost of applying an update upon waking up (i.e. \( \pi^{(2,n)}_{\rho \text{-update}} \)) to be 0.381ms. Note that this figure does not account for the costs of reading \( F_{\text{Mail}} \) or \( G_{\text{Ledger}} \) (which is done anyway to update one’s balance); the point of this benchmark is to demonstrate the efficiency of applying updates in isolation.
In order to understand the overhead added by the refresh procedure to the communication pattern of a different \((2,n)\) ECDSA based wallet, we implemented the protocol of Gennaro and Goldfeder \[21\] and augmented it with our refresh procedure during signing. Note their protocol makes use of a Paillier-based multiplier which we do not proactivize, and the cost of proactivizing an OT-based multiplier is negligible (0.381ms as shown previously). This is representative of the \((2,3)\) cold storage application where the multipliers need not be offline-refreshed. We refer to the original \((\pi_{ECDSA}^{R},\pi_{ECDSA}^{\sigma})\) as GG and the augmented \((\pi_{(2,n)}^{\rho-\text{sign}},\pi_{(2,n)}^{\rho-\text{update}})\) as GG’. We collected twenty samples for each configuration and found the average execution time of GG to be 1.433s and that of GG’ to be 1.635s. In particular, \(\pi_{(2,n)}^{\rho-\text{sign}}\) incurs a 14.09% overhead in computation. Note that this figure does not include network latency, but in the LAN setting the measurements were within margin of error.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiment</th>
<th>Mean (s)</th>
<th>Std. deviation (s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GG</td>
<td>1.433</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG’</td>
<td>1.635</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Computational overhead of proactivizing 256-bit key shares in the \((2,n)\) ECDSA protocol of Gennaro and Goldfeder \[21\], found to be about 14%

Finally we find that it costs roughly 100ms to process each missed update, which we report in Figure 1.

![Figure 1: Cost of \(\pi_{(2,n)}^{\rho-\text{update}}\) after having missed a number of refreshes](https://github.com/KZen-networks/multi-party-ecdsa/tree/gg_pss)

We note that the cost of \(\pi_{(2,n)}^{\rho-\text{sign}}\) and \(\pi_{(2,n)}^{\rho-\text{update}}\) will not go up with \(n\) (the number of parties). The only extra cost is that for each additional offline party, an online party must send an extra 160 bytes through \(\mathcal{F}_{\text{Mail}}\). The code can be found in [https://github.com/KZen-networks/multi-party-ecdsa/tree/gg_pss](https://github.com/KZen-networks/multi-party-ecdsa/tree/gg_pss)

11 Conclusion and Open Problems

With the increasing adoption of threshold wallets comes the need to defend them against mobile attackers. We define an “offline refresh” model for proactivizing threshold wallets, and point out that this optimal communication pattern is not realized by any of the works in the literature. Indeed we show that it is difficult to realize due to many subtle issues that stem from the inherent unfairness of dishonest majority MPC. Despite this we give an efficient protocol to proactivize many standard \((2,n)\) signature schemes with offline refresh, and implement it to show that it adds little overhead in practice.

A problem we leave open is extending our techniques to unique threshold signature schemes such as BLS \[6\]. Our protocol relies heavily on each threshold signing instance generating a unique nonce which will accompany the signature that appears on the blockchain. This poses a problem for threshold BLS, which does not even use a nonce.

We also leave open the problem of extending our scheme to proactivize \((t,n)\) threshold signatures for any choice of \(t \leq n\). Our current techniques do not yield such a protocol immediately, for the following intuitive reason: our protocol allows any previous state of a party to be retrieved as a linear combination of all update
messages and current state. As there may be only one honest party among the \( t \) who are online, the entire update message that has to be mailed to offline parties must be accessible to a single party. In the \((2,n)\) case the adversary must “miss” an update message to change corruptions so this is not an issue, but in the general \((t,n)\) case the adversary can always keep one party corrupt in the signing group to observe all update messages. However our technique of binding each refresh to a nonce (which will later accompany a signature on the ledger) is not inherent to the \((2,n)\) setting, and may form the conceptual core of even a general \((t,n)\) solution.

12 Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Jack Doerner for augmenting the Threshold ECDSA implementation from Doerner et al. [15] with our refresh procedure, and providing us with the benchmarks for that protocol reported in this paper.

References


A Realizing $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Sign}}^{0,2}$ for Schnorr

We recall below the folklore instantiation of threshold Schnorr signatures.

---

### Protocol 6: $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}}^{\text{URG}}$

**Parameters:** Elliptic Curve Group $(\mathbb{G}, G, q)$

**Parties:** $P_i$ for $i \in [n]$

**Ideal Oracles:** $F_{\text{Comm-ZK}}^{\text{URG}}$

**Outputs:**

- **Common:** Public key $pk \in \mathbb{G}$
- **Private:** Secret key share $sk_i$

1. Each party $P_i$ samples a random degree-1 polynomial $f_i$ over $\mathbb{Z}_q$.
2. For all pairs of parties $P_i$ and $P_j$, $P_i$ sends $f_i(j)$ to $P_j$ and receives $f_j(i)$ in return.
3. Each party $P_i$ computes its point
   \[
   f(i) := \sum_{j \in [1, n]} f_j(i)
   \]
4. Each $P_i$ computes
   \[
   T_i := f(i) \cdot G
   \]
   and sends $(\text{com-proof}, id_{\text{com-zk}}^i, f(i), T_i)$ to $F_{\text{Comm-ZK}}^{\text{URG}}$, using a fresh, unique value for $id_{\text{com-zk}}^i$.
5. Upon being notified of all other parties’ commitments, each party $P_i$ releases its proof by sending $(\text{decom-proof}, id_{\text{com-zk}}^i)$ to $F_{\text{Comm-ZK}}^{\text{URG}}$
6. Each party $P_i$ receives $(\text{accept}, id_{\text{com-zk}}^j, T_j)$ from $F_{\text{Comm-ZK}}^{\text{URG}}$ for each $j \in [1, n] \setminus \{i\}$ if $P_j$’s proof of knowledge is valid. $P_i$ aborts if it receives $(\text{fail}, id_{\text{com-zk}}^j)$ instead for any proof, or if there exists an index $x \in [3, n]$ such that
   \[
   \lambda_1^x(x) \cdot T_1 + \lambda_2^x(x) \cdot T_2 \neq T_x
   \]
7. The parties compute the shared public key as
   \[
   pk := \lambda_1^0(0) \cdot T_1 + \lambda_2^0(0) \cdot T_2
   \]
The above protocol is a reproduction of the distributed key generation protocol of Pedersen [34], adjusted for context.

**Protocol 7:**

$\pi_R^{\text{Schnorr}}(pk, sk_b, 1 - b, m)$

**Parameters:** Elliptic Curve Group $(G, G, q)$

**Parties:** $P_b, P_{1-b}$ for $b, 1 - b \in [n]$  

**Ideal Oracles:** $F_{\text{Com-ZK}}^{\text{Rand}}$

**Inputs:**

- **Common:** Message to be signed $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, public key $pk \in G$, each party’s share in the exponent $pk_b = \lambda_b^{1-b}(0) \cdot F(b)$ where $F$ is the polynomial over $G$ passing through $(0, pk)$ and $(b, f(b) \cdot G)$

- **Private:** Each party $P_b$ has private input $sk_b = \lambda_b^{1-b}(0) \cdot f(b) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$

**Outputs:**

- **Common:** Signing nonce $R \in G$

- **Private:** Each party $P_b$ has private output $state_b \in \mathbb{Z}_q$

1. Include all inputs in $state_b$
2. Sample $k_b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ and send $(\text{commit}, k_b, R_b = k_b \cdot G)$ to $F_{\text{Com-ZK}}^{\text{Rand}}$ with fresh identifier $id_{\text{com-2k}}$
3. Upon receiving $(\text{committed}, 1 - b, id_{\text{com-1-b}})$ from $F_{\text{Com-ZK}}^{\text{Rand}}$ instruct $F_{\text{Com-ZK}}^{\text{Rand}}$ to release $R_b$
4. Upon receiving $(\text{decommitted}, 1 - b, id_{\text{com-1-b}}, R_{1-b})$ from $F_{\text{Com-ZK}}^{\text{Rand}}$ if $R_{1-b} \in G$ then compute $R = R_b + R_{1-b}$
5. Include $k_b$ in $state_b$
6. Output $state_b, R$

**Protocol 8:**

$\pi_{\text{Schnorr}}^{\text{state_b}}$

**Parameters:** Elliptic Curve Group $(G, G, q)$

**Parties:** $P_b, P_{1-b}$ for $b, 1 - b \in [n]$  

**Ideal Oracles:** $F_{\text{Com-ZK}}^{\text{Rand}}$

**Inputs:** (Encoded in $state_b$)

- **Common:** Message to be signed $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, public key $pk \in G$

- **Private:** Each party $P_b$ has private input $sk_b = \lambda_b^{1-b}(0) \cdot f(b) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$

1. Parse $k_b, m, sk_b \leftarrow state_b$
2. Compute $\sigma_b = H(R|m) \cdot sk_b + k_b$

3. Upon receiving $\sigma_{1-b} \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ from $P_{1-b}$ compute

$$\sigma = \sigma_b + \sigma_{1-b}$$

and if $(\sigma, R)$ is a valid Schnorr signature under public key $pk$ then output $\sigma$
By the linearity of the Schnorr signing equation, it is easy to verify correctness as

$$\sigma = \sigma_b + \sigma_{1-b}$$

$$= (H(R||m) \cdot \lambda_{1-b}^1(0) \cdot sk_b + k_b)$$

$$+ (H(R||m) \cdot \lambda_{1-b}^1(0) \cdot sk_{1-b} + k_{1-b})$$

$$= H(R||m) \cdot (\lambda_{1-b}^1(0) \cdot sk_b + \lambda_{1-b}^1(0) \cdot sk_{1-b})$$

$$+ (k_b + k_{1-b})$$

$$= H(R||m) \cdot sk + k$$

**Theorem A.1.** *Informal* The protocol \(\pi_{\text{DKG Setup}}^{\text{R}} \pi_{\text{Schnorr R}}^{\text{R}} \pi_{\text{Schnorr}}^{\sigma} \) UC-realizes \(F_{\text{Com}}^{\text{R, F}_{\text{Com-ZK}}}^{\text{Sign}}\) for \(\text{Sign} = \text{Sign}_{\text{Schnorr}}\) in the \(F_{\text{Com}}^{\text{R, F}_{\text{Com-ZK}}}\) hybrid model.

The simulation strategy is straightforward: \(S_{\text{Schnorr R}}\) upon receiving \(R\) from the functionality sends \(R_{1-b} = R - R_b\) to \(P_b\) (on behalf of \(F_{\text{Com-ZK}}\)). The simulator \(S_{\text{Schnorr}}\) upon receiving \(\sigma\) from the functionality sends \(\sigma_{1-b} = \sigma - \sigma_b\) to \(P_b\) on behalf of \(P_{1-b}\). Note here that \(\sigma_b\) is computed by the simulator as instructed by Step 2 of \(\pi_{\text{Schnorr R}}^{\sigma}\) using the value \(k_b\) received on behalf of \(F_{\text{Com-ZK}}\) in Step 2 of \(\pi_{\text{Schnorr}}^{R}\).