

# Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Set Membership: Efficient, Succinct, Modular

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**Abstract.** We consider the problem of proving in zero knowledge that an element of a public set satisfies a given property without disclosing the element, i.e. that for some  $u$ , “ $u \in S$  and  $P(u)$  holds”. This problem arises in many applications (anonymous cryptocurrencies, credentials or whitelists) where, for privacy or anonymity reasons, it is crucial to hide certain data while ensuring properties of such data. We design new *modular* and *efficient* constructions for this problem through new *commit-and-prove zero-knowledge systems for set membership*, i.e. schemes proving  $u \in S$  for a value  $u$  that is in a public commitment  $c_u$ . Being commit-and-prove, our solutions can act as plug-and-play modules in statements of the form “ $u \in S$  and  $P(u)$  holds” (by combining our set membership system with any other commit-and-prove scheme for  $P(u)$ ). Also, they work with Pedersen commitments over prime order groups which makes them compatible with popular systems such as Bulletproofs or Groth16. Both public parameters and proofs in our solutions have constant-size (i.e., independent of the size of the sets). Compared to previous work that achieves similar properties—Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (CRYPTO 2002) and the clever techniques combining zkSNARKs and Merkle Trees in Zcash—our protocols offer more flexibility and  $2.5\times$  faster proving time for a set of size  $2^{60}$ .

## 1 Introduction

The problem of proving set membership—that a given element  $x$  belongs to some set  $S$ —arises in many applications, including governmental white-lists to prevent terrorism or money-laundering, voting and anonymous credentials, among others. More recently, this problem also appears at the heart of currency transfer and identity systems over blockchains. In this setting, parties can first publicly commit to sets of data (through the blockchain itself) and then, by proving set membership, can claim ownership of assets or existence of identity attributes.

A naive approach to verifying that an element is in a set is that of going through all its entries. The complexity of this direct approach, however, is unacceptable in many scenarios. This is especially true for blockchains, where most of the parties (the verifiers) should run quickly.

*How to efficiently verify set membership then?* Cryptographic *accumulators* [Bd94] provide a nice solution to this problem. They allow a set of elements to be compressed into a short value (the accumulator) and to generate membership proofs that are short and fast to verify. As a security guarantee they require it should be computationally infeasible to generate a false membership proof.

As of today, we can divide constructions for accumulators into three main categories: Merkle Trees [Mer88]; RSA-based [BP97, CL02, LLX07, BBF18]; pairing-based [Ngu05, DT08, CKS09, ZKP17]. Approaches based on Merkle Trees <sup>1</sup> allow for short (i.e.,  $O(1)$ ) public parameters and accumulator values, whereas the witness for membership proofs is of size  $\log(n)$ , where  $n$  is the size of the set. In RSA-based constructions both the accumulator and the witness are each a single

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<sup>1</sup> We can include under this class currently known lattice-based accumulators such as [PSTY13, LLNW16].

element in a relatively large hidden-order group  $\mathbb{G}^2$ , and thus of constant-size. Schemes that use pairings in elliptic curves such as [Ngu05, CKS09] offer small accumulators and small witnesses (which can each be a single element of a prime order bilinear group, e.g., 256 bits) but require large parameters (approximately  $O(n)$ ) and a trusted setup.

In anonymous cryptocurrencies, e.g. Zerocash [BCG<sup>+</sup>14] (but also in other applications such as anonymous Credentials [Cha85] and whitelists), we also require *privacy*. That is, parties in the system would not want to disclose *which* element in the set is being used to prove membership. Phrased differently, one desires to prove that  $u \in S$  without revealing  $u$ , or: the proof should be *zero-knowledge* [GMR89] for  $u$ . As an example, in Zerocash users want to prove that a coin is unspent (i.e. belongs to the set of all unspent coins) without revealing which coin it is that they are spending.

It is common in practice that this privacy requirement goes beyond proving membership. In fact, these applications often require proving further properties about the accumulated elements, e.g., that for some element  $u$  in the set, property  $P(u)$  holds. And this without leaking any more information about  $u$  other than what is entailed by  $P$ . In other words, we desire zero-knowledge for the statement  $R^*(S, u) := “u \in S \text{ and } P(u)”$ .

One way to solve the problem, as done in Zerocash, is to directly apply general-purpose zero-knowledge proofs for  $R^*$ , e.g., [PHGR13, Gro16]. This approach, however, tends to be expensive and ad-hoc. One of the questions we aim to tackle is that of providing a more efficient proof systems for set membership relations, that can also be modular.

Specifically, as observed in [CFQ19] the design of practical proof systems can benefit from a more modular vision. A modular framework such as the one in [CFQ19] not only allows for separation of concerns, but also increases reusability and compatibility in a plug-and-play fashion: the same proof system is designed once and can be reused for the same sub-problem regardless of the context<sup>3</sup>; it can be replaced with a component for the same sub-problem at any time. Also, as [CFQ19] shows, this can have a positive impact on efficiency since designing a special-purpose proof system for a specific relation can lead to significant optimizations. Finally, this compositional approach can also be leveraged to build general-purpose proofs.

In this work we focus on applying this modular vision to designing *succinct zero-knowledge proofs for set membership*. Following the abstract framework in [CFQ19] we investigate how to apply commit-and-prove techniques [CLOS02] to our setting. Our approach uses commitments for composability as follows. Consider an efficient zero-knowledge proof system  $\Pi$  for property  $P(u)$ . Let us also assume it is commit-and-prove, i.e. the verifier can test  $P(u)$  by simply holding a commitment  $c(u)$  to  $u$ . Such  $\Pi$  could be for example a commit-and-prove NIZK such as Bulletproofs [BBB<sup>+</sup>18] or a commit-and-prove zkSNARK such as LegoGroth from [CFQ19] that are able to operate on Pedersen commitments  $c(\cdot)$  over elliptic curves. In order to obtain a proof gadget for set membership, all one needs to design is a commit-and-prove scheme for the relations “ $u \in S$ ” where *both*  $u$  and  $S$  are committed:  $u$  through  $c(u)$  and  $S$  through some other commitment for sets, such as an accumulator.

Our main contribution is to propose a formalization of this approach and new constructions of succinct zero-knowledge commit-and-prove systems for set membership. In particular, for our

<sup>2</sup> The group  $\mathbb{G}$  is typically  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$  where  $N$  is an RSA modulus. The size of an element in this group for a standard 128-bit security parameter is of 3072 bits.

<sup>3</sup> For instance, one can plug a proof system for matrix product  $C = A \cdot B$  in any larger context of computation involving matrix multiplication. This regardless of whether, say, we then hash  $C$  or if  $A, B$  are in turn the output of a different computation

constructions we focus on designing schemes where  $c(u)$  is a Pedersen commitment in a prime order group  $\mathbb{G}_q$ . We focus on linking with Pedersen commitments as these can be (re)used in some of the best state-of-the-art zero-knowledge proof systems for general-purpose relations that offer for example the shortest proofs and verification time (see, e.g., [Gro16] and its efficient commit-and-prove variant [CFQ19]), or transparent setup and logarithmic-size proofs [BBB<sup>+</sup>18].

Before describing our results in more detail, we review existing solutions and approaches to realize commit-and-prove zkSNARKs for set membership.

**Existing Approaches for Proving Set Membership for Pedersen Commitments.** The accumulator of Nguyen [Ngu05], by the simple fact of having a succinct pairing-based verification equation, can be combined with standard zero-knowledge proof techniques (e.g., Sigma protocols or the celebrated Groth-Sahai proofs [GS08]) to achieve a succinct system with reasonable proving and verification time. The main drawbacks of using [Ngu05], however, are the large public parameters (i.e. requiring as many prime group elements as the elements in the set) and a high cost for updating the accumulator to the set, in order to add or remove elements (essentially requiring to recompute the accumulator from scratch).

By using general-purpose zkSNARKs one can obtain a solution with constant-size proofs based on Merkle Trees: prove that there exists a valid path which connects a given leaf to the root; this requires proving correctness of about  $\log n$  hash function computations (e.g., SHA256). This solution yields a constant-size proof and requires  $\log n$ -size public parameters if one uses preprocessing zkSNARKs such as [PHGR13, Gro16]. On the other hand, often when proving a relation such as  $R^*(S, u) := "u \in S \text{ and } P(u)"$  the bulk of the work stems from the set membership proof. This is the case in ZCash or Filecoin<sup>4</sup> where the predicate  $P(\cdot)$  is sufficiently small.

Finally, another solution that admits constant-size public parameters and proofs is the protocol of [CL02]. Specifically, Camenisch and Lysyanskaya showed how to prove in zero-knowledge that an element  $u$  committed in a Pedersen commitment over a prime order group  $\mathbb{G}_q$  is a member of an RSA accumulator. In principle this solution would fit the criteria of the gadget we are looking for. Nonetheless, its concrete instantiations show a few limitations in terms of efficiency and flexibility. The main problem is that, for its security to hold, we need a prime order group (the commitment space) and the primes (the message space) to be quite large, for example<sup>5</sup>  $q > 2^{519}$ . But having such a large prime order group may be undesirable in practice for efficiency reasons. In fact the group  $\mathbb{G}_q$  is the one that used to instantiate more proof systems that need to interact and be linked with the Pedersen commitment.

## 1.1 Our Contributions

We investigate the problem of designing commit-and-prove zero-knowledge systems for set membership that can be used in a modular way and *efficiently* composed with other zero-knowledge proof systems for potentially arbitrary relations. Our main results are the following.

Building upon the view of recent works on composable proofs [AGM18, CFQ19], we define a formal framework for commit-and-prove zkSNARKs for set membership. The main application of this framework is a compiler that, given a CP-SNARK  $\text{CP}_{\text{mem}}$  for set membership and any other

<sup>4</sup> <https://filecoin.io>

<sup>5</sup> More specifically: the elements of a set need to be prime numbers in a range  $(A, B)$  such that  $q/2 > A^2 - 1 > B \cdot 2^{2\lambda_{st}+2}$ . If aiming at 128 bits of security level one can meet this constraint by choosing for example  $A = 2^{259}$ ,  $B = 2^{260}$  and  $q > 2^{519}$ .

CP-SNARK  $\text{CP}_R$  for a relation  $R$ , yields a CP-SNARK  $\text{CP}$  for the composed relation “ $u \in S \wedge \exists \omega : R(u, \omega)$ ”. As a further technical contribution, our framework extends the one in [CFQ19] in order to work with commitments from multiple schemes (including set commitments, e.g.: accumulators).

We propose new efficient construction of commit-and-prove zkSNARKs for set membership, in which elements of the accumulated set can be committed with a Pedersen commitment in a prime order group  $\mathbb{G}_q$ —a setting that, as argued before, is of practical relevance due to the widespread use of these commitments and of proof systems that operate on them. More in detail, we propose two schemes that enjoy constant-size public parameters that are based on RSA accumulators for committing to sets, and a third scheme over pairings that has public parameters linear in the size of the set, but where the set can remain hidden.

**RSA-based constructions.** Our first scheme, a CP-SNARK for set membership based on RSA accumulators, supports a large domain for the set of accumulated elements, represented by binary strings of a given length  $\eta$ . Our second scheme, also based on RSA accumulators, supports elements that are prime numbers of exactly  $\mu$  bits (for a given  $\mu$ ). Neither scheme requires an a-priori bound on the cardinality of the set. Both schemes improve the proof-of-knowledge protocol by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL02]: (i) we can work with a prime order group  $\mathbb{G}_q$  of “standard” size, e.g., 256 bits, whereas [CL02] needs a much larger  $\mathbb{G}_q$  (see above). We note that the size of  $\mathbb{G}_q$  affects not only the efficiency of the set membership protocol but also the efficiency of any other protocol that needs to interact with commitments to alleged set members; (ii) we can support flexible choices for the size of set elements. For instance, in the second scheme, we could work with primes of about 50 or 80 bits, which in practice captures virtually unbounded sets and can make the accumulator operations 4–5× faster compared to using  $\approx 256$ -bits primes as in [CL02].

**HIGH-LEVEL IDEA OF THE CONSTRUCTION.** Our main technique involves a new way to link a proof of membership for RSA accumulators to a Pedersen commitment in a prime order group, together with a careful analysis showing this can be secure under parameters *not requiring a larger prime order group*. This construction essentially allows us to prove an arbitrary relation using a SNARK, while optimizing in a modular way the proof of set membership. See Section 3 for further details.

**PRELIMINARY EFFICIENCY ESTIMATION.** The work reported in this submission is still in progress; in particular we are currently implementing our schemes with the goal of making them publicly available and also to have full fledged system that can be used for “apples-to-apples” comparisons. In what follows, we give an initial estimate of the efficiency gains of our protocol as compared to the Merkle tree based solution for proving set membership using zkSNARK.

From a local benchmark, we conclude that for accumulated primes of size 256-bits, a single RSA exponentiation takes about 3.5 milliseconds. Given that our proof of set membership involves three different proofs (RSA root, commitment equality and knowledge of opening), we estimate as a maximum bound that there are 15 RSA exponentiations involved in generating the three proofs. This entails a total of about 350 milliseconds to generate the (non-SNARK) proofs. Since our construction requires either a range-proof or a proof of hash computation, we can add about 0.7 seconds to compute the SNARK proof (note that using Bulletproofs for the range-proof would make the membership proof considerably faster), for a SHA256 hash. Thus we conclude that to prove membership for a single accumulated value, we would take about 1.05s using SHA256. Note that this estimate considers that the RSA witnesses for the accumulated values have been pre-generated.

In terms of the Merkle tree proof, we use the state-of-the-art computation based on Pedersen hashes, as optimized by the Zcash team in the Sapling protocol <sup>6</sup>. The pedersen hash has been optimized to cost 1.68 constraints per hashed bit, where the input is a concatenation of two 256-bit group elements, getting to about 869 constraints in total. Adding some extra constraints needed for each Merkle Tree layer, the total number of constraints gets 1380. For a Merkle Tree of about  $2^{60}$  elements (i.e. depth 60), we would have about 82800 constraints. From a local benchmark done on the Bellman library (that uses the [Gro16] SNARK), we have that computing a proof of about 100,000 constraints takes 3 seconds. This yields a final cost of 2.48 seconds to compute the whole merkle tree for set membership. On the other hand if we combine our protocol with the same SNARK for the BLAKE2 hash (in the same curve) we get a proving time of about 0.96s, since our protocol requires only one hash computation in the SNARK.

In light of this analysis, we conclude that the larger the set of elements to be accumulated, the greater the performance difference is between the two methods. This is because the merkle tree proof is directly dependent on the number of leaves. In the case of the RSA accumulator construction, the proof running time is independent of the accumulated set. It is clear that using a SNARK generates a more succinct proof. However our solution can save in proving time. Also, note that in contrast to the Zcash solution our estimations do not consider any optimizations and we expect to improve the gain.

**Pairing-based construction.** Our third scheme supports set elements in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ , where  $q$  is the order of bilinear groups, while the sets are arbitrary subsets of  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  of cardinality less than a fixed a-priori bound  $n$ . This scheme has the disadvantage of having public parameters linear in  $n$ , but has other advantages in comparison to previous schemes with a similar limitation (and also in comparison to the RSA-based schemes above). First, the commitment to the set can be hiding and untrusted for the verifier, i.e., the set can be kept hidden and it is not needed to check the opening of the commitment to the set; this makes it composable with proof systems that could for example prove global properties on the set, i.e., that  $P(S)$  holds. Second, the scheme entirely works in bilinear groups, i.e., no need of operating over expensive RSA groups<sup>7</sup>. The main technical contribution is a technique to turn the EDRAx vector commitment [CPZ18] into an accumulator admitting efficient zero-knowledge membership proofs.

	Assumption	Set-Hiding?	Commit-and-Prove	Parameters Size	Proof Size <sup>8</sup>
<b>RSA Constructions</b>	Strong-RSA	No	Yes	$O(1)$	$O(1)$
<b>Pairing-Based Construction</b>	Strong DDH + Power-KoE	Yes	Yes	$O(N)$	$O(\log(N))$

Table 1: Summary of constructions in this work. Above,  $N$  is the cardinality of the set.

<sup>6</sup> Find the specification online at <https://github.com/zcash/zips/blob/master/protocol/protocol.pdf>

<sup>7</sup> Estimating the concrete gains of bilinear groups over RSA groups between these constructions is currently work in progress.

<sup>8</sup> Although we show only asymptotic behaviour in the table, we estimate that proofs of the pairing construction can concretely be of lower size for sets of size  $N \leq 2^{20}$ .

## 1.2 Applications

We now discuss some of the applications for which our constructions are suitable.

The following two application scenarios concern sets that are public (both to the verifier of the proof and to anyone with access to the accumulator):

1. Any application which *does not* require to keep the underlying data to be private. This is to say that the underlying data being accumulated,  $X$ , is indeed the set of arbitrary length binary strings,  $U$ ;  $X = U$ . For example, in the context of *blockchain-based asset transfers*, there may be a set of rules,  $X$  (where a **rule** =  $(pk, [a, b])$ ), defining which entities (public keys) are allowed to issue which assets (defined by a range of *asset types*), forming an “issuance whitelist”. When one of those issuers wants to issue a new asset, they need to prove that their public key belongs to the issuance whitelist, which entails set membership, as well as prove that the asset type they issued is within the allowed range of asset types (as defined in the original rule). In this case, the accumulated set of rules is public to all, and this public information may also include a mapping between rules and prime numbers. Our second RSA-based scheme for sets of primes (Section 4.3) suits this scenario in particular.
2. Any application which *does* require to keep the underlying data private, such as in anonymous cryptocurrencies like Zerocash. In this scenario, the public set of elements to be accumulated,  $U$ , can derive from creating a commitment to the underlying data,  $X$ , e.g.,  $u = COMM(x)$ . Specifically, for the Zerocash protocol, the data that defines the amount and ownership of the unspent coin must be kept private to all the network, and hence must be hidden by using a commitment.

Another specific application of our RSA-based constructions is that of solving the security vulnerability of the implementation of the Zerocoin protocols [MGGR13] used in the Zcoin cryptocurrency [Yap19]. The vulnerability in a nutshell: when proving equality of values committed under the RSA commitment and the prime-order group commitment, the equality may not hold over the integers, and hence one could easily produce collisions in the prime order group. Our work can provide different ways to solve this problem by providing a proof of equality over the integers, while at the same time improves the proof size at least  $6\times$ . We leave it as future work to figure out the most efficient solution.

## 1.3 Organization

We give basic definitions in Section 2. We formalize commit-and-prove zkSNARKs for set membership in Section 3 and describe our main construction based on RSA accumulators in Section 4. In section 5 out pairing-based construction.

## 2 Preliminaries

**Notation.** We denote the security parameter with  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$  and its unary representation with  $1^\lambda$ . Throughout the paper we assume that all the algorithms of the cryptographic schemes take as input  $1^\lambda$ , which is thus omitted from the list of inputs. If  $D$  is a distribution, we denote by  $x \leftarrow D$  the process of sampling  $x$  according to  $D$ . An ensemble  $\mathcal{X} = \{X_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$  is a family of probability distributions over a family of domains  $\mathcal{D} = \{D_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ , and we say that two ensembles  $\mathcal{D} = \{D_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$  and  $\mathcal{D}' = \{D'_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$  are statistically indistinguishable (denoted by  $\mathcal{D} \approx_s \mathcal{D}'$ ) if  $\frac{1}{2} \sum_x |D_\lambda(x) -$

$D'_\lambda(x) | < \text{negl}(\lambda)$ . If  $\mathcal{A} = \{\mathcal{A}_\lambda\}$  is a (possibly non-uniform) family of circuits and  $\mathcal{D} = \{D_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$  is an ensemble, then we denote by  $\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D})$  the ensemble of the outputs of  $\mathcal{A}_\lambda(x)$  when  $x \leftarrow D_\lambda$ . We say two ensembles  $\mathcal{D} = \{D_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$  and  $\mathcal{D}' = \{D'_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$  are computationally indistinguishable (denoted by  $\mathcal{D} \approx_c \mathcal{D}'$ ) if for every non-uniform polynomial time distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$  we have  $\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D}) \approx_s \mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D}')$ .

We use  $[n]$  to denote the set of integers  $\{1, \dots, n\}$ , and  $[0, n]$  for  $\{0, 1, \dots, n\}$ . We denote by  $(u_j)_{j \in [\ell]}$  the tuple of elements  $(u_1, \dots, u_\ell)$ .

We denote  $\text{Primes} := \{e \in \mathbb{N} : e \text{ is prime}\}$  the set of all positive integers  $e > 1$  such that they do not have non-trivial (i.e. different than  $e$  and 1) factors. More specifically, given two positive integers  $A, B > 0$  such that  $A < B$ , we denote with  $\text{Primes}(A, B)$  the subset of  $\text{Primes}$  of numbers lying in the interval  $(A, B)$ , i.e.,  $\text{Primes}(A, B) := \{e \in \mathbb{Z} : e \text{ is prime} \wedge A < e < B\}$ . According to the well known prime number theorem  $|\text{Primes}(1, B)| = O(\frac{B}{\log B})$  which results to  $|\text{Primes}(A, B)| = O(\frac{B}{\log B}) - O(\frac{A}{\log A})$ .

## 2.1 RSA Groups

We say that  $N = pq$  is an RSA modulus for some primes  $p, q$ , such that  $|p| = |q|$ . We further say that  $N$  is a strong RSA modulus if there are primes  $p', q'$  such that  $p = 2p' + 1, q = 2q' + 1$ . We call  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$  for an RSA modulus an RSA group. With  $\phi : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$  we denote the Euler's totient function,  $\phi(N) := |\mathbb{Z}_N^*|$ . In particular for RSA modulus  $\phi(N) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$ . An RSA Group generator  $N \leftarrow_s \text{GenSRSAmoD}(1^\lambda)$  is a probabilistic algorithm that outputs a strong RSA modulus  $N$  of bit-length  $\ell(\lambda)$  for an appropriate polynomial  $\ell(\cdot)$ .

For any  $N$  we denote by  $\text{QR}_N := \{Y : \exists X \in \mathbb{Z}_N^* \text{ such that } Y = X^2 \pmod{N}\}$ , the set of all the quadratic residues modulo  $N$ .  $\text{QR}_N$  is a subgroup (and thus closed under multiplication) of  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$  with order  $|\text{QR}_N| = |\mathbb{Z}_N^*|/2$ . In particular for a strong RSA modulus  $|\text{QR}_N| = \frac{4p'q'}{2} = 2p'q'$ .

**Computational Assumptions in RSA Groups.** The most fundamental assumption for RSA groups is the factoring assumption which states that given an RSA modulus  $N \leftarrow \text{GenSRSAmoD}(1^\lambda)$  it is hard to compute its factors  $p$  and  $q$ . We further recall the Discrete Logarithm, RSA and strong RSA [BP97] assumptions:

**Definition 2.1 (DLOG Assumption for RSA groups).** *We say that the Discrete Logarithm (DLOG) assumption holds for  $\text{GenSRSAmoD}$  if for any PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ :*

$$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} N \leftarrow \text{GenSRSAmoD}(1^\lambda) \\ G \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_N^*; x \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z} \\ Y \leftarrow G^x \pmod{N} \\ x' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathbb{Z}_N^*, G, Y) \end{array} : G^{x'} = Y \pmod{N} \right] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

**Definition 2.2 ( $\mathcal{D}_N$ -RSA assumption).** *We say that the RSA assumption holds with respect to  $\text{GenSRSAmoD}$  and a family of distributions  $\{\mathcal{D}_N \text{ over } \mathbb{Z}_N^*\}_{N \in \mathbb{N}}$  if for any PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ :*

$$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} N \leftarrow \text{GenSRSAmoD}(1^\lambda) \\ U^e = G : G \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_N^*; e \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_N \text{ s.t. } \gcd(e, N) = 1 \\ U \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathbb{Z}_N^*, G) \end{array} \right] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

**Definition 2.3 (Strong-RSA Assumption [BP97]).** We say that the strong RSA assumption holds for  $\text{GenSRSAmoD}$  if for any PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ :

$$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} N \leftarrow \text{GenSRSAmoD}(1^\lambda) \\ U^e = G : G \leftarrow_{\mathcal{S}} \mathbb{Z}_N^* \\ (U, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathbb{Z}_N^*, G) \end{array} \right] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

## 2.2 Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge (NIZK)

We recall the definition of zero-knowledge non-interactive arguments of knowledge (NIZKs, for short).

**Definition 2.4 (NIZK).** A NIZK for  $\{\mathcal{R}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$  is a tuple of three algorithms  $\Pi = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Prove}, \text{VerProof})$  that work as follows and satisfy the notions of completeness, knowledge soundness and (composable) zero-knowledge defined below.

- $\text{KeyGen}(R) \rightarrow (\text{ek}, \text{vk})$  takes the security parameter  $\lambda$  and a relation  $R \in \mathcal{R}_\lambda$ , and outputs a common reference string consisting of an evaluation and a verification key.
- $\text{Prove}(\text{ek}, x, w) \rightarrow \pi$  takes an evaluation key for a relation  $R$ , a statement  $x$ , and a witness  $w$  such that  $R(x, w)$  holds, and returns a proof  $\pi$ .
- $\text{VerProof}(\text{vk}, x, \pi) \rightarrow b$  takes a verification key, a statement  $x$ , and either accepts ( $b = 1$ ) or rejects ( $b = 0$ ) the proof  $\pi$ .

**Completeness.** For any  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $R \in \mathcal{R}_\lambda$  and  $(x, w)$  such that  $R(x, w)$ , it holds  $\Pr[(\text{ek}, \text{vk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(R), \pi \leftarrow \text{Prove}(\text{ek}, x, w) : \text{VerProof}(\text{vk}, x, \pi) = 1] = 1$ .

**Knowledge Soundness.** Let  $\mathcal{RG}$  be a relation generator such that  $\mathcal{RG}_\lambda \subseteq \mathcal{R}_\lambda$ .  $\Pi$  has computational knowledge soundness for  $\mathcal{RG}$  and auxiliary input distribution  $\mathcal{Z}$ , denoted  $\text{KSND}(\mathcal{RG}, \mathcal{Z})$  for brevity, if for every (non-uniform) efficient adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  there exists a (non-uniform) efficient extractor  $\mathcal{E}$  such that  $\Pr[\text{Game}_{\mathcal{RG}, \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}}^{\text{KSND}} = 1] = \text{negl}$ . We say that  $\Pi$  is knowledge sound if there exists benign  $\mathcal{RG}$  and  $\mathcal{Z}$  such that  $\Pi$  is  $\text{KSND}(\mathcal{RG}, \mathcal{Z})$ .

$\text{Game}_{\mathcal{RG}, \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}}^{\text{KSND}} \rightarrow b$

$(R, \text{aux}_R) \leftarrow \mathcal{RG}(1^\lambda) ; \text{crs} := (\text{ek}, \text{vk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(R)$   
 $\text{aux}_Z \leftarrow \mathcal{Z}(R, \text{aux}_R, \text{crs}) ; (x, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(R, \text{crs}, \text{aux}_R, \text{aux}_Z)$   
 $w \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(R, \text{crs}, \text{aux}_R, \text{aux}_Z) ; b = \text{VerProof}(\text{vk}, x, \pi) \wedge \neg R(x, w)$

**Composable Zero-Knowledge.** A scheme  $\Pi$  satisfies composable zero-knowledge for a relation generator  $\mathcal{RG}$  if there exists a simulator  $\mathcal{S} = (\mathcal{S}_{\text{kg}}, \mathcal{S}_{\text{prv}})$  such that both following conditions hold:

**KEYS INDISTINGUISHABILITY** For all adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$

$$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} (R, \text{aux}_R) \leftarrow \mathcal{RG}(1^\lambda) \\ \text{crs} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(R) \\ \mathcal{A}(\text{crs}, \text{aux}_R) = 1 \end{array} \right] \approx \Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} (R, \text{aux}_R) \leftarrow \mathcal{RG}(1^\lambda) \\ (\text{crs}, \text{td}_k) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{\text{kg}}(R) \\ \mathcal{A}(\text{crs}, \text{aux}_R) = 1 \end{array} \right]$$



PROOF INDISTINGUISHABILITY For all adversaries  $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$

$$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} (R, \text{aux}_R) \leftarrow \mathcal{RG}(1^\lambda) \\ (\text{crs}, \text{td}_k) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{\text{kg}}(R) \\ (x, w, \text{st}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(\text{crs}, \text{aux}_R) : R(x, w) \\ \pi \leftarrow \text{Prove}(\text{ek}, x, w) \\ \mathcal{A}_2(\text{st}, \pi) = 1 \end{array} \right] \approx \Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} (R, \text{aux}_R) \leftarrow \mathcal{RG}(1^\lambda) \\ (\text{crs}, \text{td}_k) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{\text{kg}}(R) \\ (x, w, \text{st}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(\text{crs}, \text{aux}_R) : R(x, w) \\ \pi \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{\text{prv}}(\text{crs}, \text{td}_k, x) \\ \mathcal{A}_2(\text{st}, \pi) = 1 \end{array} \right]$$

**Definition 2.5 (zkSNARKs).** A NIZK  $\Pi$  is called zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (*zkSNARK*) if  $\Pi$  is a NIZK as per Definition 2.4 enjoying an additional property, succinctness, i.e., if the running time of  $\text{VerProof}$  is  $\text{poly}(\lambda + |x| + \log |w|)$  and the proof size is  $\text{poly}(\lambda + \log |w|)$ .

*Remark 2.1 (On Knowledge-Soundness).* In the NIZK definition above we use a non black-box notion of extractability. Although this is virtually necessary in the case of zkSNARKs [GW11], NIZKs can also satisfy stronger (black-box) notions of knowledge-soundness.

### 2.3 Type-Based Commitments

We recall the notion of Type-Based Commitment schemes introduced by Escala and Groth [EG14]. In brief, a Type-Based Commitment scheme is a normal commitment scheme with the difference that it allows one to commit to values from different domains. More specifically, the  $\text{Commit}$  algorithm (therefore the  $\text{VerCommit}$  algorithm also) depends on the domain of the input, while the commitment key remains the same. For example, as in the original motivation of [EG14], the committer can use the same scheme and key to commit to elements that may belong to two different groups  $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$  or a field  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ . In our work we use type-based commitments. The main benefit of this formalization is that it can unify many commitment algorithms into one scheme. In our case this is useful to formalize the notion of commit-and-prove NIZKs that work with commitments from different groups and schemes.

More formally, a Type-Based Commitment is a tuple of algorithms  $\text{Com} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Commit}, \text{VerCommit})$  that works as a Commitment scheme defined above with the difference that  $\text{Commit}$  and  $\text{VerCommit}$  algorithms take an extra input  $\mathbf{t}$  that represent the type of  $u$ . All the possible types are included in the type space  $\mathcal{T}^9$ .

**Definition 2.6.** A type-based commitment scheme for a set of types  $\mathcal{T}$  is a tuple of algorithms  $\text{Com} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Commit}, \text{VerCommit})$  that work as follows:

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow \text{ck}$  takes the security parameter and outputs a commitment key  $\text{ck}$ . This key includes  $\forall \mathbf{t} \in \mathcal{T}$  descriptions of the input space  $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbf{t}}$ , commitment space  $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbf{t}}$  and opening space  $\mathcal{O}_{\mathbf{t}}$ .
- $\text{Commit}(\text{ck}, \mathbf{t}, u) \rightarrow (c, o)$  takes the commitment key  $\text{ck}$ , the type  $\mathbf{t}$  of the input and a value  $u \in \mathcal{D}_{\mathbf{t}}$ , and outputs a commitment  $c$  and an opening  $o$ .
- $\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathbf{t}, c, u, o) \rightarrow b$  takes as a type  $\mathbf{t}$ , a commitment  $c$ , a value  $u$  and an opening  $o$ , and accepts ( $b = 1$ ) or rejects ( $b = 0$ ).

Furthermore, the security properties depend on the type, in the sense that binding and hiding should hold with respect to a certain type.

<sup>9</sup> Normally  $\mathcal{T}$  is finite and includes a small number of type, e.g.  $\mathcal{T} = \{\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{Z}_p\}$ .

**Definition 2.7.** Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a set of types, and  $\text{Com}$  be a type-based commitment scheme for  $\mathcal{T}$ . Correctness,  $\mathfrak{t}$ -Type Binding and  $\mathfrak{t}$ -Type Hiding are defined as follows:

**Correctness.** For all  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$  and any input  $(\mathfrak{t}, u) \in (\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{D}_{\mathfrak{t}})$  we have:

$$\Pr[\text{ck} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda), (c, o) \leftarrow \text{Commit}(\text{ck}, \mathfrak{t}, u) : \text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathfrak{t}, c, u, o) = 1] = 1.$$

**$\mathfrak{t}$ -Type Binding.** Given  $\mathfrak{t} \in \mathcal{T}$ , for every polynomial-time adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ :

$$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} \text{ck} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\ (c, u, o, u', o') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{ck}, \mathfrak{t}) \end{array} : \begin{array}{l} u \neq u' \wedge \text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathfrak{t}, c, u, o) = 1 \\ \wedge \text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathfrak{t}, c, u', o') = 1 \end{array} \right] = \text{negl}$$

In case  $\text{Com}$  is  $\mathfrak{t}$ -Type Binding for all  $\mathfrak{t} \in \mathcal{T}$  we will say that it is Binding.

**$\mathfrak{t}$ -Type Hiding.** Given a  $\mathfrak{t} \in \mathcal{T}$ , for  $\text{ck} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  and every pair of values  $u, u' \in \mathcal{D}_{\mathfrak{t}}$ , the following two distributions are statistically close:  $\text{Commit}(\text{ck}, \mathfrak{t}, u) \approx \text{Commit}(\text{ck}, \mathfrak{t}, u')$ .

In case  $\text{Com}$  is  $\mathfrak{t}$ -Type Hiding for all  $\mathfrak{t} \in \mathcal{T}$  we say it is Hiding.

**Composing Type-Based Commitments.** For simplicity we now define an operator that allows to compose type-based commitment schemes in a natural way.

**Definition 2.8.** Let  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{C}'$  be two commitment schemes respectively for (disjoint) sets of types  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{T}'$ . Then we denote by  $\mathcal{C} \bullet \mathcal{C}'$  the commitment scheme  $\bar{\mathcal{C}}$  for  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{T}'$  such as:

- $\bar{\mathcal{C}}.\text{Setup}(\text{secpa}, \text{secpa}') \rightarrow \bar{\text{ck}} : \text{compute } \text{ck} \leftarrow \mathcal{C}.\text{Setup}(\text{secpa}) \text{ and } \text{ck}' \leftarrow \mathcal{C}'.\text{Setup}(\text{secpa}'); \bar{\text{ck}} := (\text{ck}, \text{ck}')$ .
- $\bar{\mathcal{C}}.\text{Commit}(\bar{\text{ck}} := (\text{ck}, \text{ck}'), \mathfrak{t}, u) : \text{If } \mathfrak{t} \in \mathcal{T} \text{ then output } \mathcal{C}.\text{Commit}(\text{ck}, \mathfrak{t}, u); \text{ otherwise return } \mathcal{C}'.\text{Commit}(\text{ck}', \mathfrak{t}, u)$ .
- $\bar{\mathcal{C}}.\text{VerCommit}(\bar{\text{ck}} := (\text{ck}, \text{ck}'), \mathfrak{t}, c, u, o) : \text{If } \mathfrak{t} \in \mathcal{T} \text{ then return } \mathcal{C}.\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathfrak{t}, c, u, o); \text{ otherwise return } \mathcal{C}'.\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}', \mathfrak{t}, c, u, o)$ .

The following property of  $\bullet$  follows immediately from its definition.

**Lemma 2.1.** Let  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{C}'$  be two commitment schemes with disjoint sets of types. For all types  $t$  if  $\mathcal{C}$  or  $\mathcal{C}'$  is  $t$ -hiding (resp.  $t$ -binding) then  $\mathcal{C} \bullet \mathcal{C}'$  is  $t$ -hiding (resp.  $t$ -binding).

*Remark 2.2.* We observe that a standard non type-based commitment scheme with input space  $\mathcal{D}$  induces directly a type-based commitment scheme with the same input space and  $\mathbb{T}[\mathcal{D}]$  as a type.

## 2.4 Commit-And-Prove NIZKs

We give the definition of *commit-and-prove NIZKs* (CP-NIZKs). We start from the definition given in [CFQ19, BCF19] and we extend it to type-based commitments. The main benefit of such extension is that we can formalize CP-NIZKs working with commitments over different domains. In a nutshell, a CP-NIZK is a NIZK that can prove knowledge of  $(x, w)$  such that  $R(x, w)$  holds with respect to a witness  $w = (u, \omega)$  such that  $u$  opens a commitment  $c_u$ . As done in [CFQ19], we explicitly considers the input domain  $\mathcal{D}_u$  at a more fine grained-level splitting it over  $\ell$  subdomains. We

call them *commitment slots* as each of the  $\mathcal{D}_i$ -s intuitively corresponds to a committed element<sup>10</sup>. The description of the splitting is assumed part of  $R$ 's description.

In the remainder of this work we use the following shortcut definition. If  $\mathbf{C}$  is a type-based commitment scheme over set of types  $\mathcal{T}$ , we say that a relation  $R$  over  $(\mathcal{D}_1 \times \dots \times \mathcal{D}_\ell)$  is  $\mathcal{T}$ -compatible if for all  $j \in [\ell]$  it holds that  $\mathbb{T}[\mathcal{D}_j] \in \mathcal{T}$ . We say a relation family  $\mathcal{R}$  is  $\mathcal{T}$ -compatible if every  $R$  in  $\mathcal{R}$  is  $\mathcal{T}$ -compatible; a relation generator  $\mathcal{RG}$  is  $\mathcal{T}$ -compatible if  $\text{Range}(\mathcal{RG})$  is  $\mathcal{T}$ -compatible.

**Definition 2.9 (CP-NIZKs [CFQ19]).** *Let  $\{\mathcal{R}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$  be a family of relations  $R$  over  $\mathcal{D}_x \times \mathcal{D}_u \times \mathcal{D}_\omega$  such that  $\mathcal{D}_u$  splits over  $\ell$  arbitrary domains  $(\mathcal{D}_1 \times \dots \times \mathcal{D}_\ell)$  for some arity parameter  $\ell \geq 1$ . Let  $\mathbf{C} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Commit}, \text{VerCommit})$  be a commitment scheme (as per Definition 2.6) over set of types  $\mathcal{T}$  such that  $\{\mathcal{R}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$  is  $\mathcal{T}$ -compatible. A commit and prove NIZK for  $\mathbf{C}$  and  $\{\mathcal{R}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$  is a NIZK for a family of relations  $\{\mathcal{R}_\lambda^{\mathbf{C}}\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$  such that:*

- every  $\mathbf{R} \in \mathcal{R}^{\mathbf{C}}$  is represented by a pair  $(\text{ck}, R)$  where  $\text{ck} \in \mathbf{C}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  and  $R \in \mathcal{R}_\lambda$ ;
- $\mathbf{R}$  is over pairs  $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{w})$  where the statement is  $\mathbf{x} := (x, (c_j)_{j \in [\ell]}) \in \mathcal{D}_x \times \mathcal{C}^\ell$ , the witness is  $\mathbf{w} := ((u_j)_{j \in [\ell]}, (o_j)_{j \in [\ell]}, \omega) \in \mathcal{D}_1 \times \dots \times \mathcal{D}_\ell \times \mathcal{O}^\ell \times \mathcal{D}_\omega$ , and the relation  $\mathbf{R}$  holds iff

$$\bigwedge_{j \in [\ell]} \text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathbb{T}[\mathcal{D}_j], c_j, u_j, o_j) = 1 \wedge R(x, (u_j)_{j \in [\ell]}, \omega) = 1$$

We denote knowledge soundness of a CP-NIZK for commitment scheme  $\mathbf{C}$  and relation and auxiliary input generators  $\mathcal{RG}$  and  $\mathcal{Z}$  as  $\text{CP-KSND}(\mathbf{C}, \mathcal{RG}, \mathcal{Z})$ .

We denote a CP-NIZK as a tuple of algorithms  $\text{CP} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Prove}, \text{VerProof})$ . For ease of exposition, in our constructions we adopt the following explicit syntax for  $\text{CP}$ 's algorithms.

- $\text{KeyGen}(\text{ck}, R) \rightarrow \text{crs} := (\text{ek}, \text{vk})$
- $\text{Prove}(\text{ek}, x, (c_j)_{j \in [\ell]}, (u_j)_{j \in [\ell]}, (o_j)_{j \in [\ell]}, \omega) \rightarrow \pi$
- $\text{VerProof}(\text{vk}, x, (c_j)_{j \in [\ell]}, \pi) \rightarrow b \in \{0, 1\}$

## 2.5 Commit-and-Prove NIZKs with Partial Opening

We now define a variant of commit-and-prove NIZKs with a weaker notion of knowledge-soundness. In particular we consider the case where part of the committed input is not assumed to be extractable (or hidden)<sup>11</sup>, i.e., such input is assumed to be opened by the adversary. This models scenarios where we do not require this element to be input of the verification algorithm (the verifier can directly use a digest to it).

The motivation to define and use this notion is twofold. First, in some constructions commitments on sets are compressing but not knowledge-extractable. Second, in many applications this definition is sufficient since the set is public (e.g., the set contain the valid coins).

The definition below is limited to a setting where the adversary opens only one input in this fashion<sup>12</sup>. We will assume, as a convention, that in a scheme with partial opening this special input is always the first committed input of the relation, i.e. the one denoted by  $u_1$  and corresponding to  $\mathcal{D}_1$ . We note that the commitment to  $u_1$  does not require hiding for zero-knowledge to hold.

<sup>10</sup> Each of the “open” elements in the  $\mathcal{D}_i$ -s (together with any auxiliary opening information) should also be thought of as the witness to the relation as we require them to be extractable. On the other hand, the commitments themselves are part of the public input.

<sup>11</sup> This is reminiscent of the soundness notions considered in [FFG<sup>+</sup>16]

<sup>12</sup> We can easily generalize the notion for an adversary opening an arbitrary subset of the committed inputs.

**Definition 2.10 (CP-NIZK with Partial Opening).** A commit and prove NIZK with partial opening for  $\mathbf{C}$  and  $\{\mathcal{R}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$  is a NIZK for a family of relations  $\{\mathcal{R}_\lambda^{\mathbf{C}}\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$  (defined as in Definition 2.9) such that the property of knowledge soundness is replaced by knowledge soundness with partial opening below.

**Knowledge Soundness with Partial Opening.** Let  $\mathcal{RG}$  be a relation generator such that  $\mathcal{RG}_\lambda \subseteq \mathcal{R}_\lambda$ .  $\Pi$  has knowledge soundness with partial opening for  $\mathbf{C}$ ,  $\mathcal{RG}$  and auxiliary input distribution  $\mathcal{Z}$ , denoted  $\text{CP-poKSND}(\mathbf{C}, \mathcal{RG}, \mathcal{Z})$  for brevity, if for every (non-uniform) efficient adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  there exists a (non-uniform) efficient extractor  $\mathcal{E}$  such that  $\Pr[\text{Game}_{\mathbf{C}, \mathcal{RG}, \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}}^{\text{CP-poKSND}} = 1] = \text{negl}$ . We say that  $\Pi$  is knowledge sound for  $\mathbf{C}$  if there exists benign  $\mathcal{RG}$  and  $\mathcal{Z}$  such that  $\Pi$  is  $\text{CP-poKSND}(\mathbf{C}, \mathcal{RG}, \mathcal{Z})$ <sup>13</sup>.

$\text{Game}_{\mathbf{C}, \mathcal{RG}, \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}}^{\text{CP-poKSND}} \rightarrow b$

---

$\text{ck} \leftarrow \mathbf{C}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda); (R, \text{aux}_R) \leftarrow \mathcal{RG}(1^\lambda); \mathbf{R} := (\text{ck}, R)$   
 $\text{crs} := (\text{ek}, \text{vk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\mathbf{R})$   
 $\text{aux}_Z \leftarrow \mathcal{Z}(\mathbf{R}, \text{aux}_R, \text{crs})$   
 $(x, (c_j)_{j \in [\ell]}, u_1, o_1, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{R}, \text{crs}, \text{aux}_R, \text{aux}_Z)$   
 $((u_j)_{j \in [\ell]}, (o_j)_{j \in [\ell]}, \omega) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(\mathbf{R}, \text{crs}, \text{aux}_R, \text{aux}_Z)$   
 $b = \text{VerProof}(\text{vk}, x, (c_j)_{j \in [\ell]}, \pi) \wedge$   
 $\neg \left( \bigwedge_{j \in [\ell]} \mathbf{C}.\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathbb{T}[\mathcal{D}_j], c_j, u_j, o_j) = 1 \wedge R(x, (u_j)_{j \in [\ell]}, \omega) = 1 \right)$

*Remark 2.3 (On Weaker ZK in the Context of Partial Opening).* The notion of zero-knowledge for CP-NIZKs with partial opening that is implied by our definition above implies that the simulator does not have access to the opening of the first input (as it is the case in zero-knowledge for CP-NIZKs in general). Since this first commitment is opened, in principle one could also consider and define a weaker notion of zero-knowledge where the simulator has access to the first opened input. We leave it as an open problem to investigate if it can be of any interest.

*Remark 2.4 (Full Extractability).* If a CP-NIZK has an empty input  $u_1$  opened by the adversary in the game above, then we say that it is *fully extractable*. This roughly corresponds to the notion of knowledge soundness in Definition 2.4.

**Composition Properties of Commit-and-Prove Schemes** In [CFQ19] Campanelli et al. show a compiler for composing commit-and-prove schemes that work for the same commitment scheme in order to obtain CP systems for conjunction of relations. In this section we generalize their results to the case of typed relations and type-based commitments. This generalization in particular can model the composition of CP-NIZKs that work with different commitments, as is the case in our constructions for set membership in which one has a commitment to a set and a commitment to an element.

We begin by introducing the following compact notation for an augmented relation generator.

<sup>13</sup> We point out that, although in the game below we make explicit the commitment opening in the relation, this is essentially the same notion of knowledge soundness as in CP-NIZKs (i.e. Definition 2.4) where the only tweak is that the adversary gives explicitly the first input in the commitment slot. We make commitments explicit hoping for the definition to be clearer. This is, however, in contrast to the definition of CP-NIZKs where the commitment opening is completely abstracted away inside the relation.

**Definition 2.11 (Augmented Relation Generator).** Let  $\mathcal{RG}$  be a relation generator and  $\mathcal{F}(1^\lambda)$  an algorithm taking in input a security parameter. Then we denote by  $\mathcal{RG}[\mathcal{F}]$  the relation generator returning  $(R, (\text{aux}_R, \text{out}_{\mathcal{F}}))$  where  $\text{out}_{\mathcal{F}} \leftarrow \mathcal{F}(1^\lambda)$  and  $(R, \text{aux}_R) \leftarrow \mathcal{RG}(1^\lambda)$ .

The next lemma states that we can (with certain restrictions) trivially extend a CP-NIZK for commitment scheme  $C$  to an extended commitment scheme  $C \bullet C'$ .

**Lemma 2.2 (Extending to Commitment Composition).** Let  $C, C'$  be commitment schemes defined over disjoint type sets  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{T}'$ . If CP is  $\text{CP-poKSND}(C, \mathcal{RG}[C.\text{Setup}], \mathcal{Z})$  for some relation and auxiliary input generators  $\mathcal{RG}, \mathcal{Z}$ . Then CP is  $\text{CP-poKSND}(C \bullet C', \mathcal{RG}[C.\text{Setup}], \mathcal{Z})$  if  $\mathcal{RG}$  is  $\mathcal{T}$ -compatible.

We now define relation generators and auxiliary input generators for our composition constructions.

$\begin{array}{l} \hline \text{Aux}^{\mathcal{RG}}(1^\lambda) : \\ (R_1, \text{aux}_R^{(1)}) \leftarrow \mathcal{RG}_1(1^\lambda) \\ (R_2, \text{aux}_R^{(2)}) \leftarrow \mathcal{RG}_2(1^\lambda) \\ \text{return } (R_b, \text{aux}_R^{(b)})_{b \in \{1,2\}} \\ \\ \hline \mathcal{RG}^*(1^\lambda) : \\ (R_b, \text{aux}_R^{(b)})_{b \in \{1,2\}} \leftarrow \text{Aux}^{\mathcal{RG}}(1^\lambda) \\ \text{return } (R_{R_1, R_2}^\wedge, (\text{aux}_R^{(b)})_{b \in \{1,2\}}) \\ \\ \hline \overline{\mathcal{RG}}_b(1^\lambda) : \\ (R_b, \text{aux}_R^{(b)})_{b \in \{1,2\}} \\ \leftarrow \text{Aux}^{\mathcal{RG}}(1^\lambda) \\ \text{return } (R_b, \overline{\text{aux}}_R^{(b)}) \\ := (R_{3-b}, (\text{aux}_R^{(b)})_{b \in \{1,2\}}) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{l} \hline \text{Aux}^{\mathcal{Z}}(\text{ck}, (\text{crs}_b, R_b, \text{aux}_R^{(b)})_{b \in \{1,2\}}) : \\ \text{aux}_Z^{(1)} \leftarrow \mathcal{Z}_1(\text{ck}, R_1, \text{crs}_1, \text{aux}_R^{(1)}) \\ \text{aux}_Z^{(2)} \leftarrow \mathcal{Z}_2(\text{ck}, R_2, \text{crs}_2, \text{aux}_R^{(2)}) \\ \text{return } (\text{aux}_Z^{(b)})_{b \in \{1,2\}} \\ \\ \hline \mathcal{Z}^*((\text{ck}, R_{R_1, R_2}^\wedge), (\text{ek}^*, \text{vk}^*), (\text{aux}_R, \text{aux}'_R)) : \\ (\text{aux}_Z^{(b)})_{b \in \{1,2\}} \\ \leftarrow \text{Aux}^{\mathcal{Z}}(\text{ck}, (\text{crs}_b, R_b, \text{aux}_R^{(b)})_{b \in \{1,2\}}) \\ \text{return } (\text{aux}_Z^{(b)})_{b \in \{1,2\}} \\ \\ \hline \overline{\mathcal{Z}}_b(\text{ck}, R_b, \text{crs}_b, \overline{\text{aux}}_R^{(b)}) : \\ \text{Parse } \overline{\text{aux}}_R \text{ as } (R_{3-b}, (\text{aux}_R^{(b)})_{b \in \{1,2\}}) \\ \text{crs}_{3-b} \leftarrow \text{CP}_{3-b}.\text{KeyGen}(\text{ck}, R_{3-b}) \\ (\text{aux}_Z^{(b)})_{b \in \{1,2\}} \leftarrow \text{Aux}^{\mathcal{Z}}(\text{ck}, \dots \\ \dots, (\text{crs}_b, R_b, \text{aux}_R^{(b)})_{b \in \{1,2\}}) \\ \overline{\text{aux}}_Z^{(b)} := (\text{crs}_{3-b}, (\text{aux}_Z^{(b)})_{b \in \{1,2\}}) \\ \text{return } \overline{\text{aux}}_Z^{(b)} \end{array}$
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Fig. 1: Relation and Auxiliary Input Generators for AND Composition Construction

The following lemma shows how we can compose CP-NIZKs even when one of them is fully extractable but the other is not. We are interested in the conjunction  $R_{\text{asym}}^\wedge$  of relations of type  $R_1(x_1, (u_0, u_1, u_3), \omega_1)$  and  $R_2(x_2, (u_2, u_3), \omega_2)$  where

$$R_{\text{asym}}^\wedge(x_1, x_2, (u_0, u_1, u_2, u_3), \omega_1, \omega_2) := R_1(x_1, (u_0, u_1, u_3), \omega_1) \wedge R_2(x_2, (u_2, u_3), \omega_2)$$

**Lemma 2.3 (Composing Conjunctions (with asymmetric extractability)).** Let  $C$  be a computationally binding commitment scheme. If  $\text{CP}_1$  is  $\text{CP-poKSND}(C, \overline{\mathcal{RG}}_1, \overline{\mathcal{Z}}_1)$  and  $\text{CP}_2$  is  $\text{KSND}(C, \overline{\mathcal{RG}}_2, \overline{\mathcal{Z}}_2)$  (where  $\overline{\mathcal{RG}}_b, \overline{\mathcal{Z}}_b$  are defined in terms of  $\mathcal{RG}_b, \mathcal{Z}_b$  in Figure 1 for  $b \in \{1, 2\}$ ), then the scheme  $\text{CP}_{\text{asym}}^\wedge$  in Figure 2 is  $\text{CP-poKSND}(C, \mathcal{RG}^*, \mathcal{Z}^*)$  where  $\mathcal{RG}^*, \mathcal{Z}^*$  are as defined in Figure 1.




Fig. 2: CP-NIZK construction for AND composition (asymmetric case)




Fig. 3: CP-NIZK construction for AND composition (symmetric case)

The following lemma is a symmetric variant of Lemma 2.3, i.e. the CP-NIZKs we are composing are both secure over the same commitment scheme and support partial opening, that is they both handle relations with and adversarially open input  $u_0$ . This time we are interested in the conjunction  $R_{sym}^{\wedge}$  of relations of type  $R_1(x_1, (u_0, u_1, u_3), \omega_1)$  and  $R_2(x_2, (u_0, u_2, u_3), \omega_2)$  where

$$R_{sym}^{\wedge}(x_1, x_2, (u_0, u_1, u_2, u_3), \omega_1, \omega_2) := R_1(x_1, (u_0, u_1, u_3), \omega_1) \wedge R_2(x_2, (u_0, u_2, u_3), \omega_2)$$

**Lemma 2.4 (Composing Conjunctions (symmetric case)).** *Let  $\mathcal{C}$  be a (type-based) computationally binding commitment scheme. If  $\text{CP}_b$  is  $\text{CP-poKSND}(\mathcal{C}, \overline{\mathcal{RG}}_b, \overline{\mathcal{Z}}_b)$  (where  $\overline{\mathcal{RG}}_b, \overline{\mathcal{Z}}_b$  are defined in terms of  $\mathcal{RG}_b, \mathcal{Z}_b$  in Figure 1) for  $b \in \{1, 2\}$ , then the scheme  $\text{CP}_{sym}^{\wedge}$  in Figure 3 is  $\text{CP-poKSND}(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{RG}^*, \mathcal{Z}^*)$  where  $\mathcal{RG}^*, \mathcal{Z}^*$  are as defined in Figure 1.*

### 3 CP-SNARKs for Set Membership

In this section we discuss a specialization of CP-SNARKs for the specific NP relation that models membership of an element in a set, formally defined below.

**Set Membership Relations.** Let  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}}$  be some domain for set elements, and let  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{set}} \subseteq 2^{\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}}}$  be a set of possible sets over  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}}$ . We define the set membership relation  $R_{\text{mem}} : \mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}} \times \mathcal{D}_{\text{set}}$  as

$$R_{\text{mem}}(U, u) = 1 \iff u \in U$$

This is the fundamental relation that we deal with in the rest of this work.

**CP-SNARKs for set membership.** Intuitively, a commit-and-prove SNARK for set membership allows one to commit to a set  $U$  and to an element  $u$ , and then to prove in zero-knowledge that  $R_{\text{mem}}(U, u) = 1$ . More formally, let  $R_{\text{mem}} : \mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}} \times \mathcal{D}_{\text{set}}$  be a set membership relation as defined above where  $\mathbb{T}[\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}}] = \mathbf{t}_{\text{elm}}$  and  $\mathbb{T}[\mathcal{D}_{\text{set}}] = \mathbf{t}_{\text{set}}$ , and let  $\text{Com}_{\text{mem}}$  be a type-based commitment scheme for  $\mathcal{T}$  such that  $\mathbf{t}_{\text{set}}, \mathbf{t}_{\text{elm}} \in \mathcal{T}$ . Basically,  $\text{Com}_{\text{mem}}$  allows one to either commit an element of  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}}$  or to a set of values of  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}}$ . Then a CP-SNARK for set membership is a CP-SNARK for the family of relations  $\{\mathcal{R}_{\lambda}^{\text{mem}}\}$  and a type-based commitment scheme  $\text{Com}_{\text{mem}}$ . It is deduced from definition 2.9 that this is a zkSNARK for the relation:

$$\mathbf{R} = (\text{ck}, R_{\text{mem}}) \text{ over } (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{w}) = ((x, c), (u, o, \omega)) := ((\emptyset, (c_U, c_u)), ((U, u), (o_U, o_u), \emptyset))$$

and  $\mathbf{R}$  holds iff:

$$R_{\text{mem}}(U, u) = 1 \wedge \text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathbf{t}_{\text{set}}, c_U, U, o_U) = 1 \wedge \text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathbf{t}_{\text{elm}}, c_u, u, o_u) = 1$$

Notice that for the relation  $R_{\text{mem}}$  it is relevant for the proof system to be succinct so that proofs can be at most polylogarithmic (or constant) in the size of the set (that is part of the witness). This is why for set membership we are mostly interested in designing CP-SNARKs.

**Proving Arbitrary Relations Involving Set Membership.** As discussed in the introduction, a primary motivation of proving set membership in zero-knowledge is to prove additional properties about an alleged set member. In order to make our CP-SNARK for set membership a reusable gadget, we discuss a generic and simple method for composing CP-SNARKs for set membership (with partial opening) with other CP-SNARKs (with full extractability) for arbitrary relations. More formally, let  $R_{\text{mem}}$  be the set membership relation over pairs  $(U, u) \in \mathbb{X} \times \mathcal{D}_u$  as  $R$  be an arbitrary relation over pairs  $(u, \omega)$ , then we define as  $R^*$  the relation:

$$R^*(U, u, \omega) := R_{\text{mem}}(U, u) \wedge R(u, \omega)$$

The next corollary (direct consequence of Lemmas 2.2, 2.3) states we can straightforwardly compose a CP-SNARK for set membership with a CP-SNARK for an arbitrary relation on elements of the set.

**Corollary 3.1 (Extending Relations with Set membership).** *Let  $\text{C}_{\text{mem}}, \text{C}_u$  be two computationally binding commitment schemes defined over disjoint type sets  $\mathcal{T}_{\text{mem}}$  and  $\mathcal{T}_u$ . Let  $\text{CP}_{\text{mem}}, \text{CP}_u$  be two CP-SNARKs and  $R_{\text{mem}}, \mathcal{RG}_u$  (resp.  $\mathcal{Z}_{\text{mem}}, \mathcal{Z}_u$ ) be two relation (resp. auxiliary input) generators. If  $\text{CP}_{\text{mem}}$  is CP-poKSND( $\text{C}_{\text{mem}} \bullet \text{C}_u, R_{\text{mem}}, \mathcal{Z}_{\text{mem}}$ ) and  $\text{CP}_u$  is KSND( $\text{C}_u, \mathcal{RG}_u, \mathcal{Z}_u$ ) then there exists a CP\* that is CP-poKSND( $\text{C}_{\text{mem}} \bullet \text{C}_u, \mathcal{RG}^*, \mathcal{Z}^*$ ) where  $\mathcal{RG}^*, \mathcal{Z}^*$  are as defined in Figure 1.*

**CP-SNARKs for set membership from Accumulators with Proofs of Knowledge.** As discussed in the introduction, the notion of CP-SNARKs for set membership can be seen as another way to interpret accumulators that have a protocol for proving in zero-knowledge that a committed value is in the accumulator (i.e., it is in the set succinctly represented by the accumulator). To strengthen this intuition in Appendix B we formally show that a CP-SNARK for set membership can be constructed from an accumulator scheme that has a zero-knowledge proof for committed values. This allows us to capture existing schemes such as [CL02] and [Ngu05].

In the next two sections we show new constructions of CP-SNARK for set membership that improve over previous work.

## 4 A CP-SNARK for Set Membership with Short Parameters

In this section we describe CP-SNARKs for set membership in which the elements of the sets can be committed using a Pedersen commitment scheme defined in a prime order group, and the sets are committed using an RSA accumulator. The advantage of having elements committed with Pedersen in a prime order group is that our CP-SNARKs can be composed with any other CP-SNARK for Pedersen commitments and relations  $R$  that take set elements as inputs. The advantage of committing to sets using RSA accumulators is instead that the public parameters (i.e., the CRS) of the CP-SNARKs presented in this section are *short*, virtually independent of the size of the sets. Since RSA accumulators are not extractable commitments, the CP-SNARKs presented here are secure in a model where the commitment to the set is assumed to be checked at least once, namely they are knowledge-soundness with partial opening of the set commitment.

A bit more in detail, we propose two CP-SNARKs. Our first scheme, called  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{RSA}}$ , works for set elements that are arbitrary strings of length  $\eta$ , i.e.,  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}} = \{0, 1\}^\eta$ , and for sets that are any subset of  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}}$ , i.e.,  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{set}} = 2^{\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}}}$ . Our second scheme,  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{RSAPrm}}$ , instead works for set elements that are prime numbers of exactly  $\mu$  bits, and for sets that are any subset of such prime numbers. This second scheme is a simplified variant of the first one that requires more structure on the set elements (they must be prime numbers) but in exchange of that offers better efficiency. So it is preferable in those applications that can work with prime representatives.

**An High-Level Overview of Our Constructions.** We provide the main idea behind our scheme, and to this end we use the simpler scheme  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{RSAPrm}}$  in which set elements are prime numbers in  $(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$ . The commitment to the set  $P = \{e_1, \dots, e_n\}$  is an RSA accumulator [Bd94, BP97] that is defined as  $\text{Acc} = G^{\prod_{e_i \in P} e_i}$  for a random quadratic residue  $G \in \text{QR}_N$ . The commitment to a set element  $e$  is instead a Pedersen commitment  $c_e = g^e h^{r^q}$  in a group  $\mathbb{G}_q$  of prime order  $q$ , where  $q$  is of  $\nu$  bits and  $\mu < \nu$ . For public commitments  $\text{Acc}$  and  $c_e$ , our scheme allows to prove in zero-knowledge the knowledge of  $e$  committed in  $c_e$  such that  $e \in P$  and  $\text{Acc} = G^{\prod_{e_i \in P} e_i}$ . A public coin protocol for this problem was proposed by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL02]. Their protocol however requires various restrictions. For instance, the accumulator must work with at least  $2\lambda$ -bit long primes, which slows down accumulation time, and the prime order group must be more than  $4\lambda$ -bits (e.g., of 512 bits), which is undesirable for efficiency reasons, especially if this prime order group is used to instantiate more proof systems to create other proofs about the committed element. In our scheme the goal is instead to keep the prime order group of “normal” size (say,  $2\lambda$  bits), so that it can be for example a prime order group in which we can efficiently instantiate another CP-SNARK that could be composed with our  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{RSAPrm}}$ . And we can also allow flexible choices of the primes size that can be tuned to the application so that applications



that work with moderately large sets can benefit in efficiency. In order to achieve these goals, our idea to create a membership proof is to compute the following:

- An accumulator membership witness  $W = G^{\prod_{e_i \in P \setminus \{e\}} e_i}$ , and an integer commitment to  $e$  in the RSA group,  $C_e = G^e H^r$ .
- A ZK proof of knowledge  $\text{CP}_{\text{Root}}$  of a committed root for  $\text{Acc}$ , i.e. a proof of knowledge of  $e$  and  $W$  such that  $W^e = \text{Acc}$  and  $C_e = G^e H^r$ . Intuitively, this gives that  $C_e$  commits to an integer that is accumulated in  $\text{Acc}$  (at this point, however, the integer may be a trivial root, i.e., 1).
- A ZK proof  $\text{CP}_{\text{modEq}}$  that  $C_e$  and  $c_e$  commit to the same value modulo  $q$ .
- A ZK proof  $\text{CP}_{\text{Range}}$  that  $c_e$  commits to an integer in the range  $(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$ .

From the combination of the above proofs we would like to conclude that the integer committed in  $c_e$  is in  $P$ . Without further restrictions, however, this may not be the case; in particular, since for the value committed in  $C_e$  we do not have a strict bound it may be that the integer committed in  $c_e$  is another  $e_q$  such  $e = e_q \pmod{q}$  but  $e \neq e_q$  over the integers. In fact, the proof  $\text{CP}_{\text{Root}}$  does not guarantee us that  $C_e$  commits to a single prime number  $e$ , but only that  $e$  divides  $\prod_{e_i \in P} e_i$ , namely  $e$  might be a product of a few primes in  $P$  or the corresponding negative value, while its residue modulo  $q$  may be some value that is not in the set—what we call a “collision”. We solve this problem by taking in consideration that  $e_q$  is guaranteed by  $\pi_{\text{Range}}$  to be in  $(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$  and by enhancing  $\pi_{\text{Root}}$  to also prove a bound on  $e$ : roughly speaking  $|e| < 2^{2\lambda_s + \mu}$  for a statistical security parameter  $\lambda_s$ . Using this information we develop a careful analysis that bounds the probability that such collisions can happen for a malicious  $e$  (see Section 4.2 for more intuition).

In the following section we formally describe the type-based commitment scheme supported by our CP-SNARK, and a collection of building blocks. Then we present the  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{RSA}}$  and  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{RSAPrm}}$  CP-SNARKs in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively, and finally we give instantiations for some of our building blocks in Section 4.4.

#### 4.1 Preliminaries and Building Blocks

**Notation.** Given a set  $U = \{u_1, \dots, u_n\} \subset \mathbb{Z}$  of cardinality  $n$  we denote compactly with  $\text{prod}_U := \prod_{i=1}^n u_i$  the product of all its elements. We use capital letters for elements in an RSA group  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ , e.g.,  $G, H \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ . Conversely, we use small letters for elements in a prime order group  $\mathbb{G}_q$ , e.g.,  $g, h \in \mathbb{G}_q$ . Following this notation, we denote a commitment in a prime order group as  $c \in \mathbb{G}_q$ , while a commitment in an RSA group as  $C \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ .

**Commitment Schemes.** Our first CP-SNARK, called  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{RSA}}$ , is for a family of relations  $R_{\text{mem}} : \mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}} \times \mathcal{D}_{\text{set}}$  such that  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}} = \{0, 1\}^\eta$ ,  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{set}} = 2^{\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}}}$ , and for a type-based commitment scheme that is the canonical composition  $\text{SetCom}_{\text{RSA}} \bullet \text{PedCom}$  of the two commitment schemes given in Fig. 4.  $\text{PedCom}$  is essentially a classical Pedersen commitment scheme in a group  $\mathbb{G}_q$  of prime order  $q$  such that  $q \in (2^{\nu-1}, 2^\nu)$  and  $\eta < \nu$ .  $\text{PedCom}$  is used to commit to set elements and its type is  $\text{t}_q$ .  $\text{SetCom}_{\text{RSA}}$  is a (non-hiding) commitment scheme for sets of  $\eta$ -bit strings, that is built as an RSA accumulator [Bd94, BP97] to a set of  $\mu$ -bit primes, each derived from an  $\eta$ -bit string by a deterministic function  $\text{H}_{\text{prime}} : \{0, 1\}^\eta \rightarrow \text{Primes}(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$ .  $\text{SetCom}_{\text{RSA}}$  is computationally binding under the factoring assumption<sup>14</sup> and the collision resistance of  $\text{H}_{\text{prime}}$ . Its type for sets is  $\text{t}_U$ .

<sup>14</sup> Here is why: finding two different sets of primes  $P, P', P \neq P'$  such that  $G^{\text{prod}_P} = \text{Acc} = G^{\text{prod}_{P'}}$  implies finding an integer  $\alpha = \text{prod}_P - \text{prod}_{P'} \neq 0$  such that  $G^\alpha = 1$ . This is known to lead to an efficient algorithm for factoring  $N$ .

<p><b>Setup</b>(<math>1^\lambda</math>): Choose a prime order group <math>\mathbb{G}_q</math> of order <math>q \in (2^{\nu-1}, 2^\nu)</math> and generators <math>g, h \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_q</math>. Return <math>\text{ck} := (\mathbb{G}_q, g, h)</math>.</p> <p><b>Commit</b>(<math>\text{ck}, t_q, u</math>): sample <math>r \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_q</math>; return <math>(c, o) := (g^u h^r, r)</math>.</p> <p><b>VerCommit</b>(<math>\text{ck}, t_q, c, u, r</math>): Output 1 if <math>c = g^u h^r</math>; output 0 otherwise.</p>	<p><b>Setup</b>(<math>1^\lambda, 1^\mu</math>): Let <math>N \leftarrow \text{GenSRSAMod}(1^\lambda)</math>, <math>F \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*</math>, and <math>\mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}} \leftarrow \mathcal{H}</math>; compute <math>G \leftarrow F^2 \bmod N \in \text{QR}_N</math>. Return <math>\text{ck} := (N, G, \mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}})</math>.</p> <p><b>Commit</b>(<math>\text{ck}, t_U, U</math>): compute <math>P := \{\mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}(u) \mid u \in U\}</math>, <math>\text{Acc} \leftarrow G^{\text{prod}_P}</math>. Return <math>(c, o) := (\text{Acc}, \emptyset)</math>.</p> <p><b>VerCommit</b>(<math>\text{ck}, t_U, \text{Acc}, U, \emptyset</math>): compute <math>P := \{\mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}(u) \mid u \in U\}</math> and return 1 iff <math>\text{Acc} = G^{\text{prod}_P} \bmod N</math>.</p>
(a) PedCom	(b) SetCom <sub>RSA</sub>

Fig. 4: RSA Accumulator and Pedersen commitment schemes for RSAHashmem.

**Hashing to primes.** The problem of mapping arbitrary values to primes in a collision-resistant manner has been studied in the past, see e.g., [GHR99, CMS99, CS99], and in [FT14] a method to generate random primes is presented. Although the main idea of our scheme would work with any instantiation of  $\mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}$ , for the goal of significantly improving efficiency, our construction considers a specific class of  $\mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}$  functions that work as follows. Let  $\mathbf{H} : \{0, 1\}^\eta \times \{0, 1\}^\iota \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\mu-1}$  be a collision-resistant function, and define  $\mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}(u)$  as the function that starting with  $j = 0$ , looks for the first  $j \in [0, 2^\iota - 1]$  such that the integer represented by the binary string  $1|\mathbf{H}(u, j)$  is prime. In case it reaches  $j = 2^\iota - 1$  it failed to find a prime and outputs  $\perp$ <sup>15</sup>. We consider two main candidates of such function  $\mathbf{H}$  (and thus  $\mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}$ ):

- Pseudorandom function. Namely  $\mathbf{H}(u, j) := \mathbf{F}_\kappa(u, j)$  where  $\mathbf{F}_\kappa : \{0, 1\}^{\eta+\iota}$  is a PRF with public seed  $\kappa$  and  $\iota = \lceil \log \mu \lambda \rceil$ . Due to the density of primes, the corresponding  $\mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}$  runs in the expected running time  $O(\mu)$  and  $\perp$  is returned with probability  $\leq \exp(-\lambda) = \text{negl}(\lambda)$ .<sup>16</sup> Under the random oracle heuristic,  $\mathbf{F}$  can be instantiated with a hash function like SHA256.
- Deterministic map.  $\mathbf{H}(u, j) := f(u) + j$  with  $u > 2^{\eta-1}$  and  $j \in (f(u), f(u+1))$ , where  $f(u) := \frac{2(u+2) \log_2(u+1)^2}{\log_2(u+1)}$ . The corresponding function  $\mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}(u)$  is essentially the function that maps to the next prime after  $f(u)$ . This function is collision-free (indeed it requires to take  $\mu > \eta$ ) and generates primes that can be smaller (in expectation) than the function above. Cramer’s conjecture implies that the interval  $(f(u), f(u+1))$  contains a prime when  $u$  is sufficiently large.

**CP-NIZK for  $\mathbf{H}$  computation and PedCom.** We use a CP-NIZK  $\text{CP}_{\text{HashEq}}$  for the relation  $R_{\text{HashEq}} : \{0, 1\}^\mu \times \{0, 1\}^\eta \times \{0, 1\}^\iota$  defined as

$$R_{\text{HashEq}}(u_1, u_2, \omega) = 1 \iff u_1 = (1|\mathbf{H}(u_2, \omega))$$

and for the commitment scheme PedCom. Essentially, with this scheme one can prove that two commitments  $c_e$  and  $c_u$  in  $\mathbb{G}_q$  are such that  $c_e = g^e h^{r_e}$ ,  $c_u = g^u h^{r_u}$  and there exists  $j$  such that  $e = (1|\mathbf{H}(u, j))$ . As it shall become clear in our security proof, we do not have to prove all the iterations of  $\mathbf{H}$  until finding  $j$  such that  $(1|\mathbf{H}(u, j)) = \mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}(u)$  is prime, which saves significantly on the complexity of this CP-NIZK.

**Integer Commitments.** We use a scheme for committing to arbitrarily large integer values in RSA groups introduced by Fujisaki and Okamoto [FO97] and later improved in [DF02]. We briefly recall the commitment scheme. Let  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$  be an RSA group. The commitment key consists of two randomly

<sup>15</sup> For specific instantiations of  $\mathbf{H}$ ,  $\iota$  can be set so that  $\perp$  is returned with negligible probability.

<sup>16</sup> We assume for simplicity that the function never outputs  $\perp$ , though it can happen with negligible probability.

chosen generators  $G, H \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ ; to commit to any  $x \in \mathbb{Z}$  one chooses randomly an  $r \leftarrow_{\$} [1, N/2]$  and computes  $C \leftarrow G^x H^r$ ; the verifier checks whether or not  $C = \pm G^x H^r$ . This commitment scheme is statistically hiding and computationally binding under the assumption that factoring is hard in  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ . Furthermore, a proof of knowledge of an opening was presented in [DF02], its knowledge soundness was based on the strong RSA assumption, and later found to be reducible to the plain RSA assumption in [CPP17]. We denote this commitment scheme as `IntCom`.

**Strong-RSA Accumulators.** As observed earlier, our commitment scheme for sets is an RSA accumulator `Acc` computed on the set of primes  $P$  derived from  $U$  through the map to primes, i.e.,  $P := \{\mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}(s) | s \in U\}$ . In our construction we use the accumulator’s feature for computing succinct membership witnesses, which we recall works as follows. Given  $\text{Acc} = G^{\prod_{e_i \in P} e_i} := G^{\text{prod}_P}$ , the membership witness for  $e_k$  is  $W_k = G^{\prod_{e_i \in P \setminus \{e_k\}} e_i}$ , which can be verified by checking if  $W_k^{e_k} = \text{Acc}$ .

**Argument of Knowledge of a Root.** We make use of a zero-knowledge non-interactive argument of knowledge of a root of a public RSA group element  $\text{Acc} \in \text{QR}_N$ . This NIZK argument is called `CPRoot`. More precisely, it takes in an integer commitment to a  $e \in \mathbb{Z}$  and then proves knowledge of an  $e$ -th root of  $\text{Acc}$ , i.e., of  $W = \text{Acc}^{\frac{1}{e}}$ . More formally, `CPRoot` is a NIZK for the relation  $R_{\text{Root}} : (\mathbb{Z}_N^* \times \text{QR}_N \times \mathbb{N}) \times (\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}_N^*)$  defined as  $R_{\text{Root}}((C_e, \text{Acc}, \mu), (e, r, W)) = 1$  iff

$$C_e = \pm G^e H^r \pmod{N} \wedge W^e = \text{Acc} \pmod{N} \wedge |e| < 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 2}$$

where  $\lambda_z$  and  $\lambda_s$  are the statistical zero-knowledge and soundness security parameters respectively of the protocol `CPRoot`. `CPRoot` is obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform to a public-coin protocol that we propose based on ideas from the protocol of Camenisch and Lysysanskaya for proving knowledge of an accumulated value [CL02]. In [CL02], the protocol ensures that the committed integer  $e$  is in a specific range, different from 1 and positive. In our `CPRoot` protocol we instead removed these constraints and isolated the portion of the protocol that only proves knowledge of a root. We present the `CPRoot` protocol in Section 4.4; its interactive public coin version is knowledge sound under the RSA assumption and statistical zero-knowledge. Finally, we notice that the relation  $R_{\text{Root}}$  is defined for statements where  $\text{Acc} \in \text{QR}_N$ , which may not be efficiently checkable given only  $N$  if  $\text{Acc}$  is adversarially chosen. Nevertheless `CPRoot` can be used in larger cryptographic constructions that guarantee  $\text{Acc} \in \text{QR}_N$  through some extra information, as is the case in our scheme.

**Proof of Equality of Commitments in  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$  and  $\mathbb{G}_q$ .** Our last building block, called `CPmodEq`, proves in zero-knowledge that two commitments, a Pedersen commitment in a prime order group and an integer commitment in an RSA group, open to the same value modulo the prime order  $q = \text{ord}(\mathbb{G})$ . This is a conjunction of a classic Pedersen  $\Sigma$ -protocol and a proof of knowledge of opening of an integer commitment [DF02], i.e. for the relation

$$R_{\text{modEq}}((C_e, c_e), (e, e_q, r, r_q)) = 1 \text{ iff } e = e_q \pmod{q} \wedge C_e = \pm G^e H^r \pmod{N} \wedge c_e = g^{e_q} \pmod{q} h^{r_q} \pmod{q}$$

We present `CPmodEq` in Section 4.4.

## 4.2 Our CP-SNARK MemCP<sub>RSA</sub>

We are now ready to present our CP-SNARK `MemCPRSA` for set membership. The scheme is fully described in Figure 5 and makes use of the building blocks presented in the previous section.

<p> <math>\text{KeyGen}(\text{ck}, R^\epsilon)</math>: parse <math>\text{ck} := ((N, G, \text{H}_{\text{prime}}), (\mathbb{G}_q, g, h))</math> as the commitment keys of <math>\text{SetCom}_{\text{RSA}}</math> and <math>\text{PedCom}</math> respectively. Sample <math>\alpha \leftarrow \\$_{[N/2]}</math> and compute <math>H \leftarrow G^\alpha \pmod N \in \text{QR}_N</math>.  Generate <math>\text{crs}_{\text{HashEq}} \leftarrow \\$_{\text{CP}_{\text{HashEq}}}</math>. <math>\text{KeyGen}((\mathbb{G}_q, g, h), R_{\text{HashEq}})</math>, a crs for <math>\text{CP}_{\text{HashEq}}</math>.  Return <math>\text{crs} := (N, G, H, \text{H}_{\text{prime}}, \mathbb{G}_q, g, h, \text{crs}_{\text{HashEq}})</math>.  Given <math>\text{crs}</math>, one can define <math>\text{crs}_{\text{Root}} := (N, G, H)</math>, <math>\text{crs}_{\text{modEq}} := (N, G, H, \mathbb{G}_q, g, h)</math>. </p> <p> <math>\text{Prove}(\text{crs}, (C_U, c_u), (U, u), (\emptyset, r_u))</math>: <math>e \leftarrow \text{H}_{\text{prime}}(u) = (1 \text{H}(u, j))</math>, <math>(c_e, r_q) \leftarrow \text{Com}_1.\text{Commit}(\text{ck}, \text{t}_q, e)</math>.  <math>(C_e, r) \leftarrow \text{IntCom}.\text{Commit}((G, H), e)</math>; <math>P \leftarrow \{\text{H}_{\text{prime}}(u) : u \in U\}</math>, <math>W = G^{\prod_{e_i \in P \setminus \{e\}} e_i}</math>.  <math>\pi_{\text{Root}} \leftarrow \text{CP}_{\text{Root}}.\text{Prove}(\text{crs}_{\text{Root}}, (C_e, C_U, \mu), (e, r, W))</math>  <math>\pi_{\text{modEq}} \leftarrow \text{CP}_{\text{modEq}}.\text{Prove}(\text{crs}_{\text{modEq}}, (C_e, c_e), (e, e, r, r_q))</math>  <math>\pi_{\text{HashEq}} \leftarrow \text{CP}_{\text{HashEq}}.\text{Prove}(\text{crs}_{\text{HashEq}}, (c_e, c_u), (e, u), (r_q, r_u), j)</math>  Return <math>\pi := (C_e, c_e, \pi_{\text{Root}}, \pi_{\text{modEq}}, \pi_{\text{HashEq}})</math>. </p> <p> <math>\text{VerProof}(\text{crs}, (C_U, c_u), \pi)</math>: Return 1 iff <math>\text{CP}_{\text{Root}}.\text{VerProof}(\text{crs}_{\text{Root}}, (C_e, C_U, \mu), \pi_{\text{Root}}) = 1 \wedge</math>  <math>\text{CP}_{\text{modEq}}.\text{VerProof}(\text{crs}_{\text{modEq}}, (C_e, c_e), \pi_{\text{modEq}}) = 1 \wedge \text{CP}_{\text{HashEq}}.\text{VerProof}(\text{crs}_{\text{HashEq}}, (c_e, c_u), \pi_{\text{HashEq}}) = 1</math>. </p>
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Fig. 5: MemCP<sub>RSA</sub> CP-SNARK for set membership

The  $\text{KeyGen}$  algorithm takes as input the commitment key of  $\text{Com}_1$  and a description of  $R_{\text{mem}}$  and does the following: it samples a random generator  $H \leftarrow \$_{\text{QR}_N}$  so that  $(G, H)$  define a key for the integer commitment, and generate a CRS  $\text{crs}_{\text{HashEq}}$  of the  $\text{CP}_{\text{HashEq}}$  CP-NIZK.

For generating a proof, the ideas are similar to the ones informally described at the beginning of Section 4 for the case when set elements are prime numbers. In order to support sets  $U$  of arbitrary strings the main differences are the following: (i) we use  $\text{H}_{\text{prime}}$  in order to derive a set of primes  $P$  from  $U$ , (ii) given a commitment  $c_u$  to an element  $u \in \{0, 1\}^\eta$ , we commit to  $e = \text{H}_{\text{prime}}(u)$  in  $c_e$ ; (iii) we use the previously mentioned ideas to prove that  $c_e$  commits to an element in  $P$  (that is correctly accumulated), except that we replace the range proof  $\pi_{\text{Range}}$  with a proof  $\pi_{\text{HashEq}}$  that  $c_u$  and  $c_e$  commits to  $u$  and  $e$  respectively, such that  $\exists j : e = (1|\text{H}(u, j))$ .

*Remark 4.1 (On the support of larger  $\eta$ ).* In order to commit to a set element  $u \in \{0, 1\}^\eta$  with the  $\text{PedCom}$  scheme we require  $\eta < \nu$ . This condition is actually used for ease of presentation. It is straightforward to extend our construction to the case  $\eta \geq \nu$ , in which case every  $u$  should be split in blocks of less than  $\nu$  bits that can be committed using the vector Pedersen commitment.

The correctness of  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{RSA}}$  can be checked by inspection: essentially, it follows from the correctness of all the building blocks and the condition that  $\eta, \mu < \nu$ . For succinctness, we observe that the commitments  $C_U, c_u$  and all the three proofs have size that does not depend on the cardinality of the set  $U$ , which is the only portion of the witness whose size is not a-priori fixed.

**Proof of Security.** Recall that the goal is to prove in ZK that  $c_u$  is a commitment to an element  $u \in \{0, 1\}^\eta$  that is in a set  $U$  committed in  $C_U$ . Intuitively, we obtain the security of our scheme from the conjunction of proofs for relations  $R_{\text{Root}}, R_{\text{modEq}}$  and  $R_{\text{HashEq}}$ : (i)  $\pi_{\text{HashEq}}$  gives us that  $c_e$  commits to  $e_q = (1|\text{H}(u, j))$  for some  $j$  and for  $u$  committed in  $c_u$ . (ii)  $\pi_{\text{modEq}}$  gives that  $C_e$  commits to an integer  $e$  such that  $e \pmod q = e_q$  is committed in  $c_e$ . (iii)  $\pi_{\text{Root}}$  gives us that the integer  $e$  committed in  $C_e$  divides  $\text{prod}_P$ , where  $C_U = G^{\text{prod}_P}$  with  $P = \{\text{H}_{\text{prime}}(u_i) : u_i \in U\}$ .

By combining these three facts we would like to conclude that  $e_q \in P$  that, together with  $\pi_{\text{HashEq}}$ , should also guarantee  $u \in U$ . A first problem to analyze, however, is that for  $e$  we do not have guarantees of a strict bound in  $(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$ ; so it may in principle occur that  $e = e_q \pmod q$  but  $e \neq e_q$  over the integers. Indeed, the relation  $R_{\text{Root}}$  does not guarantee us that  $e$  is a single prime

number, but only that  $e$  divides the product of primes accumulated in  $C_U$ . Assuming the hardness of Strong RSA we may still have that  $e$  is the product of a few primes in  $P$  or even is a negative integer. We expose a simple attack that could arise from this: an adversary can find a product of primes from the set  $P$ , let it call  $e$ , such that  $e = e_q \pmod{q}$  but  $e \neq e_q$  over the integers. Since  $e$  is a legitimate product of members of  $P$ , the adversary can efficiently compute the  $e$ -th root of  $C_U$  and provide a valid  $\pi_{\text{Root}}$  proof. This is what we informally call a “collision”. Another simple attack would be that an adversary takes a single prime  $e$  and then commits to its opposite  $e_q \leftarrow -e \pmod{q}$  in the prime order group. Again, since  $e \in P$  the adversary can efficiently compute the  $e$ -th root of  $C_U$ ,  $W^e = C_U$ , and then the corresponding  $-e$ -th root of  $C_U$ ,  $(W^{-1})^{-e} = C_U$ . This is a second type of attack to achieve what we called “collision”. With a careful analysis we show that with appropriate parameters the probability that such collisions occur can be either 0 or negligible.

One key observation is that  $R_{\text{Root}}$  does guarantee a lower and an upper bound,  $-2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 2}$  and  $2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 2}$  respectively, for  $e$  committed in  $C_e$ . From these bounds (and that  $e \mid \text{prod}_P$ ) we get that an adversarial  $e$  can be the product of *at most*  $d = 1 + \lfloor \frac{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + 2}{\mu} \rfloor$  primes in  $P$  (or their corresponding negative product). Then, if  $2^{d\mu} \leq 2^{\nu-2} < q$ , or  $d\mu + 2 \leq \nu$ , we get that  $e < 2^{d\mu} < q$ . In case  $e > 0$  and since  $q$  is prime,  $e = e_q \pmod{q} \wedge e < q$  implies that  $e = e_q$  over  $\mathbb{Z}$ , namely no collision can occur at all. In the other case  $e < 0$  we have  $e > -2^{d\mu}$  and  $e = e_q \pmod{q}$  implies  $e = -q + e_q < -2^{\nu-1} + 2^\mu < -2^{\nu-1} + 2^{\nu-2} = -2^{\nu-2}$ . Therefore,  $-2^{d\mu} < -2^{\nu-2}$ , which is a contradiction since we assumed  $d\mu + 2 \leq \nu$ . So this type of collision cannot happen.

If on the other hand we are in a parameters setting where  $d\mu > \nu - 2$ , we give a concrete bound on the probability that such collisions occur. More precisely, for this case we need to assume that the integers returned by  $H$  are random, i.e.,  $H$  is a random oracle, and we also use the implicit fact that  $R_{\text{HashEq}}$  guarantees that  $e_q \in (2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$ . Then we give a concrete bound on the probability that the product of  $d$  out of  $\text{poly}(\lambda)$  random integers lies in a specific range  $(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$ , which turns out to be negligible when  $d$  is constant and  $2^{\mu-\nu}$  is negligible.

Since the requirements of security are slightly different according to the setting of parameters mentioned above, we state two separate theorems, one for each case.

**Theorem 4.1.** *Let  $\text{PedCom}$ ,  $\text{SetCom}_{\text{RSA}}$  and  $\text{IntCom}$  be computationally binding commitments,  $\text{CP}_{\text{Root}}$ ,  $\text{CP}_{\text{modEq}}$  and  $\text{CP}_{\text{HashEq}}$  be knowledge-sound NIZK arguments, and assume that the Strong RSA assumption hold, and that  $H$  is collision resistant. If  $d\mu + 2 \leq \nu$ , then  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{RSA}}$  is knowledge-sound with partial opening of the set commitments  $C_U$ .*

**Theorem 4.2.** *Let  $\text{PedCom}$ ,  $\text{SetCom}_{\text{RSA}}$  and  $\text{IntCom}$  be computationally binding commitments,  $\text{CP}_{\text{Root}}$ ,  $\text{CP}_{\text{modEq}}$  and  $\text{CP}_{\text{HashEq}}$  be knowledge-sound NIZK arguments, and assume that the Strong RSA assumption hold, and that  $H$  is collision resistant. If  $d\mu + 2 > \nu$ ,  $d = O(1)$  is a small constant,  $2^{\mu-\nu} \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$  and  $H$  is modeled as a random oracle, then  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{RSA}}$  is knowledge-sound with partial opening of the set commitments  $C_U$ .*

*Remark 4.2.* It is worth noting that Theorem 4.2 where we assume  $H$  to be a random oracle requires a random oracle assumption stronger than usual; this has to do with the fact that while we assume  $H$  to be a random oracle we also assume that  $\text{CP}_{\text{modEq}}$  can create proof about correct computations of  $H$ . Similar assumptions have been considered in previous works, see, e.g, [Val08, Remark 2].

Finally, we state the theorem about the zero-knowledge of  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{RSA}}$ .

**Theorem 4.3.** *Let  $\text{PedCom}$ ,  $\text{SetCom}_{\text{RSA}}$  and  $\text{IntCom}$  be statistically hiding commitments,  $\text{CP}_{\text{Root}}$ ,  $\text{CP}_{\text{modEq}}$  and  $\text{CP}_{\text{HashEq}}$  be zero-knowledge arguments. Then  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{RSA}}$  is zero-knowledge.*

**Proof** [sketch] The proof is rather straightforward, so we only provide a sketch. We define the simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  that takes as input  $(\text{crs}, C_U, c_u)$  and does the following:

- Parses  $\text{crs} := (N, G, H, \mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}, \mathbb{G}_q, g, h, \text{crs}_{\text{HashEq}})$ , from which it computes the corresponding  $\text{crs}_{\text{Root}} := (N, G, H)$  and  $\text{crs}_{\text{modEq}} := (N, G, H, \mathbb{G}_q, g, h)$ .
- Samples at random  $C_e^* \leftarrow_{\mathcal{S}} \mathbb{Z}_N^*$  and  $c_e^* \leftarrow_{\mathcal{S}} \mathbb{G}_q$ .
- Invokes  $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Root}}(\text{crs}_{\text{Root}}, C_e^*, C_U)$ ,  $\mathcal{S}_{\text{modEq}}(\text{crs}_{\text{modEq}}, C_e^*, c_e^*)$  and  $\mathcal{S}_{\text{HashEq}}(\text{crs}_{\text{HashEq}}, c_e^*, c_u)$  the corresponding simulators of  $\text{CP}_{\text{Root}}$ ,  $\text{CP}_{\text{modEq}}$  and  $\text{CP}_{\text{HashEq}}$  respectively. They output simulated proof  $\pi_{\text{Root}}^*$ ,  $\pi_{\text{modEq}}^*$  and  $\pi_{\text{HashEq}}^*$  respectively.
- $\mathcal{S}$  outputs  $(C_e^*, c_e^*, \pi_{\text{Root}}^*, \pi_{\text{modEq}}^*, \pi_{\text{HashEq}}^*)$ .

Let  $\pi := (C_e, c_e, \pi_{\text{Root}}, \pi_{\text{modEq}}, \pi_{\text{HashEq}}) \leftarrow \text{Prove}(\text{crs}, (C_U, c_u), (U, u), (\emptyset, r_u))$  be the output of a real proof. Since  $\text{IntCom}$  and  $\text{PedCom}$  are statistically hiding  $C_e^*$  and  $c_e^*$  are indistinguishable from  $C_e$  and  $c_e$  resp. Finally, since  $\text{CP}_{\text{Root}}$ ,  $\text{CP}_{\text{modEq}}$  and  $\text{CP}_{\text{HashEq}}$  are zero knowledge arguments  $\pi_{\text{Root}}^*$ ,  $\pi_{\text{modEq}}^*$  and  $\pi_{\text{HashEq}}^*$  are indistinguishable from  $\pi_{\text{Root}}$ ,  $\pi_{\text{modEq}}$  and  $\pi_{\text{HashEq}}$  resp.  $\square$

**NOTATION.** We introduce some notation that eases our proofs exposition. Let  $U = \{u_1, \dots, u_n\} \subset \mathbb{Z}$  be a set of cardinality  $n$ . We denote as  $\text{prod}$  a product of (an arbitrary number of) elements of  $U$ ,  $\text{prod} = \prod_{i \in I} u_i$ , for some  $I \subseteq [n]$ . Furthermore,  $\Pi_U = \{\text{prod}_1, \dots, \text{prod}_{2^n - 1}\}$  is the set of all possible products and more specifically  $\Pi_{U,d} \subseteq \Pi_U$  denotes the set of possible products of exactly  $d$  elements of  $U$ ,  $|I| = d$ , while for the degenerate case of  $d > n$  we define  $\Pi_{U,d} = \emptyset$ . We note that  $|\Pi_{U,d}| = \binom{n}{d}$  (except for the degenerate case where  $|\Pi_{U,d}| = 0$ ). For convenience, in the special case of  $\text{prod} \in \Pi_{U,|U|}$ , i.e. the (unique) product of all elements of  $U$ , we will simply write  $\text{prod}_U$ . Finally, for a  $J \subseteq [n]$  we let  $\Pi_{U,J} = \cup_{j \in J} \Pi_{U,j}$ ; for example  $\Pi_{U,[1,\dots,d]} = \cup_{j=1}^d \Pi_{U,j}$  is the set of all possible products of up to  $d$  elements of  $U$ . For all of the above we also denote with “ $-$ ” the corresponding set of the opposite element, e.g.  $-\Pi_U = \{-\text{prod}_1, \dots, -\text{prod}_{2^n - 1}\}$

**Proof** [of Theorem 4.1] Let a malicious prover  $\mathcal{P}^*$ , a PPT adversary of Knowledge Soundness with Partial Opening (see the definition in section 2.5) that on input  $(\text{ck}, R_{\text{mem}}, \text{crs}, \text{aux}_R, \text{aux}_Z)$  outputs  $(C_U, c_u, U, \pi)$  such that the verifier  $\mathcal{V}$  accepts, i.e.  $\text{VerProof}(\text{crs}, C_U, c_u, \pi) = 1$  and  $\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \text{t}_U, C_U, U, \emptyset) = 1$  with non-negligible probability  $\epsilon$ . We will construct a PPT extractor  $\mathcal{E}$  that on the same input outputs a partial witness  $(u, r_q)$  such that  $R_{\text{mem}}(U, u) = 1 \wedge \text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \text{t}_q, c_u, u, r_q) = 1$ .

For this we rely on the Knowledge Soundness of  $\text{CP}_{\text{Root}}$ ,  $\text{CP}_{\text{modEq}}$  and  $\text{CP}_{\text{HashEq}}$  protocols.  $\mathcal{E}$  parses  $\pi := (C_e, c_e, \pi_{\text{Root}}, \pi_{\text{modEq}}, \pi_{\text{HashEq}})$  and  $\text{crs} := (N, G, H, \mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}, \mathbb{G}_q, g, h, \text{crs}_{\text{HashEq}})$ , from which it computes the corresponding  $\text{crs}_{\text{Root}} := (N, G, H)$  and  $\text{crs}_{\text{modEq}} := (N, G, H, \mathbb{G}_q, g, h)$ . Then constructs an adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{Root}}$  for  $\text{CP}_{\text{Root}}$  Knowledge Soundness that outputs  $(C_e, C_U, \mu, \pi_{\text{Root}})$ . It is obvious that since  $\mathcal{V}$  accepts  $\pi$  then it also accepts  $\pi_{\text{Root}}$ , i.e.,  $\text{CP}_{\text{Root}} \cdot \text{VerProof}(\text{crs}_{\text{Root}}, (C_e, C_U, \mu), \pi_{\text{Root}}) = 1$ . From Knowledge Soundness of  $\text{CP}_{\text{Root}}$  we know that there is an extractor  $\mathcal{E}_{\text{Root}}$  that outputs  $(e, r, W)$  such that  $C_e = \pm G^e H^r \pmod{N} \wedge W^e = C_U \pmod{N} \wedge |e| < 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 2}$ . Similarly,  $\mathcal{E}$  constructs adversaries  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{modEq}}$  and  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{HashEq}}$  of protocols  $\text{CP}_{\text{modEq}}$  and  $\text{CP}_{\text{HashEq}}$  respectively. And similarly there are extractors  $\mathcal{E}_{\text{modEq}}$  and  $\mathcal{E}_{\text{HashEq}}$  that output  $(e', e_q, r', r_q)$  such that  $e' = e_q \pmod{q} \wedge C_{e'} = \pm G^{e'} H^{r'} \pmod{N} \wedge c_{e_q} = g^{e_q} \pmod{q} h^{r_q} \pmod{q}$  and  $(e'_q, u, r'_q, r_u, j)$  such that  $c_e = g^{e'_q} h^{r'_q} \wedge e'_q = (1 | \mathbf{H}(u, j))$  respectively.

From the Binding property of the integer commitment scheme we get that  $e = e'$  and  $r = r'$  (over the integers), unless with a negligible probability. Similarly, from the Binding property of the

Pedersen commitment scheme we get that  $e_q = e'_q \pmod{q}$  and  $r_q = r'_q \pmod{q}$ , unless with a negligible probability. So if we put everything together the extracted values are  $(e, r, W, e_q, r_q, u, r_u, j)$  such that:

$$W^e = C_U \pmod{N} \wedge |e| < 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 2} \wedge e = e_q \pmod{q} \wedge e_q = (1|\mathbf{H}(u, j))$$

and additionally

$$C_e = \pm G^e H^r \wedge c_e = g^{e_q \bmod q} h^{r_q \bmod q} \wedge \text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathbf{t}_q, c_u, u, r_u) = 1$$

From  $\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathbf{t}_U, C_U, U, \emptyset) = 1$  we infer that  $C_U = G^{\text{prod}_P}$ , where  $P := \{\mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}(u) \mid u \in U\}$ . From the strong RSA assumption since  $W^e = C_U = G^{\text{prod}_P} \pmod{N}$  we get  $e \in \Pi_P$  or  $e \in -\Pi_P$ , unless with a negligible probability (see appendix A.1).

Since, all the elements of  $P$  are outputs of  $\mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}$  they have exactly bitlength  $\mu$ , that is  $2^{\mu-1} < e_i < 2^\mu$  for each  $e_i \in P$ . This means that  $e$  is a  $(\pm)$  product of  $\mu$ -sized primes. Let  $|e|$  be a product of  $\ell$  primes, meaning that  $2^{\ell(\mu-1)} < |e| < 2^{\ell\mu}$ , and  $d := \lfloor \frac{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 2}{\mu} \rfloor$ . From  $|e| < 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 2}$  we get that  $2^{\ell\mu} < 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 2} \Rightarrow \ell < d$  which means that  $e \in \Pi_{P, [1, \dots, d]}$  or  $e \in -\Pi_{P, [1, \dots, d]}$  (i.e.  $e$  is a  $(\pm)$  product of at most  $d$  primes).

First we show that  $e \in \Pi_P$ , i.e., that  $e$  cannot be negative. Let  $e \in -\Pi_{P, [1, \dots, d]}$ . We use the fact that  $e = e_q \pmod{q}$ , so  $e \leq -q + e_q < -2^{\nu-1} + 2^\mu < -2^{\nu-1} + 2^{\nu-2} = -2^{\nu-2}$ . Since  $-2^{d\mu} < e$  this leads to  $-2^{d\mu} < -2^{\nu-2}$  which contradicts the assumption  $d\mu + 2 \leq \nu$  (we used the fact that  $e_q = (1|\mathbf{H}(u, j))$  to conclude that  $2^{\mu-1} < e_q < 2^\mu$ , which comes from the definition of  $\mathbf{H}$ ). So  $e > 0$  or  $e \in \Pi_{P, [1, \dots, d]}$ .

Recall that  $e < 2^{d\mu}$ . From the assumption  $d\mu + 2 \leq \nu$  which means that  $e < 2^{d\mu} < 2^{\nu-2} < q \Rightarrow e < q$ . Since  $e = e_q \pmod{q}$  and  $e < q$  this means that  $e = e_q$  over the integers. Again we are using the fact that  $e_q = (1|\mathbf{H}(u, j))$  to conclude that  $2^{\mu-1} < e_q < 2^\mu$ , which comes from the definition of  $\mathbf{H}$ , and combined with  $e = e_q$  we get that  $2^{\mu-1} < e < 2^\mu$ . The last fact means that  $e \in \Pi_{P, \{1\}}$  (i.e.  $e$  is exactly one prime from  $P$ ) otherwise it would exceed  $2^\mu$ , so  $e \in P$ .

Finally,  $e = e_q = (1|\mathbf{H}(u, j)) = \mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}(u) \in P = \{\mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}(u_1), \dots, \mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}(u_n)\}$ , where  $U := \{u_1, \dots, u_n\}$ . This means that there is an  $i$  such that  $\mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}(u) = \mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}(u_i)$ . From collision resistance of  $\mathbf{H}_{\text{prime}}$  we infer that  $u = u_i$ . So we conclude that  $u \in U$  or  $R_{\text{mem}}(U, u) = 1$  and as shown above  $\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathbf{t}_q, c_u, u, r_u) = 1$ .  $\square$

**Collision Finding Analysis** For the second theorem we cannot count on the formula  $d\mu + 2 \leq \nu$  that ensures that the extracted integer  $e$  lies inside  $[0, q - 1]$ . As explained above, we can only rely on the randomness of each prime to avoid the described "collisions". First, we formally define what a "collision" is through a probabilistic experiment, `CollisionFinding`, and then we compute a concrete bound for the probability that this event happens, i.e. the experiment outputs 1. Finally, we state a theorem that shows this probability is asymptotically negligible under the assumption that  $2^{\mu-\nu}$  is a negligible value (and  $d$  is a constant).

$$\text{CollisionFinding}(\mu, d, \mathbb{G}_q, n)$$

Let  $P \subseteq \text{Primes}(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$  be a randomly chosen set of cardinality  $n$ , i.e. each  $e \in P$  is chosen uniformly at random,  $e_i \leftarrow_s \text{Primes}(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$  meaning that:

1.  $e_i$  is prime.
2.  $2^{\mu-1} \leq e_i \leq 2^\mu$
3.  $\Pr[e_i = x] = \frac{\mu}{2^\mu} + \text{negl}(\lambda)$  for each  $x \in \text{Primes}(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$

The output of the experiment is 1 iff there exists  $\text{prod} \in (\Pi_{P,[2,d]} \cup -\Pi_{P,[2,d]})$  such that  $(\text{prod} \bmod q) \in (2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$

**Lemma 4.1.** *Let  $\mathbb{G}_q$  be a prime order group of order  $q \in (2^{\nu-1}, 2^\nu)$  and  $\mu$  such that  $\mu < \nu$  then  $\Pr[\text{CollisionFinding}(\mu, d, \mathbb{G}_e, n) = 1] \leq 2 \cdot \sum_{j=2}^d \frac{\binom{n}{j} 2^{(j+1)\mu-j-\nu} (2^j-1)}{\frac{2^{j\mu-j}}{(\mu-1)^j} - \binom{n}{j}}$*

**Proof** First we will prove it for positive products, that is we bound the probability  $\Pr[\text{CollisionFinding}(\mu, d, \mathbb{G}_e, n) = 1 | \text{prod} \in \Pi_{P,[2,d]}]$ . Let  $\text{prod} = q_1 \dots q_j$  be a product of exactly  $j$  primes for a  $2 \leq j \leq d$ . Since  $q_i \in (2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$  we get  $\text{prod} = q_1 \dots q_j \in (2^{j\mu-j}, 2^{j\mu})$ . Also  $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$  is cyclic so we know that at most

$$\left\lceil \left| \frac{(2^{j\mu-j}, 2^{j\mu})}{q} \right| \right\rceil = \left\lceil \frac{2^{j\mu} - 2^{j\mu-j}}{q} \right\rceil = \left\lceil \frac{2^{j\mu-j} \cdot (2^j - 1)}{q} \right\rceil \leq 2^{j\mu-j-\nu+1} \cdot (2^j - 1)$$

integers in  $(2^{j\mu-j}, 2^{j\mu})$  are equal to  $c$  modulo  $q$ , for any  $c \in \{0, 1, \dots, q-1\}$ .

We are interested in the interval  $(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$  modulo  $q$ . From the previous we get that at most  $2^{j\mu-j-\nu+1} \cdot (2^j - 1) \cdot |(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)| = 2^{j\mu-j-\nu+1} \cdot (2^j - 1) \cdot 2^{\mu-1} = 2^{(j+1)\mu-j-\nu} (2^j - 1)$  integers in the range of  $(2^{j\mu-j}, 2^{j\mu})$  are “winning” integers for the adversary, meaning that after modulo  $q$  they are mapped to the winning interval  $(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$ .

From the distribution of primes we know that the number of primes in  $(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$  is approximately  $\frac{2^{\mu-1}}{\mu-1}$ . So there are (approximately)  $\left(\frac{2^{\mu-1}}{\mu-1}\right)^j = \frac{2^{j\mu-j}}{(\mu-1)^j}$  different products of  $j$  primes from  $\text{Primes}(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$  in  $(2^{j\mu-d}, 2^{j\mu})$ . This leads us to the combinatorial experiment of choice of  $B = \frac{2^{j\mu-j}}{(\mu-1)^j}$  “balls”, with  $T = 2^{(j+1)\mu-j-\nu} (2^j - 1)$  “targets” and  $X = \binom{n}{j}$  “tries” without replacement, where “balls” are all possible products, “targets” are the ones that go to  $(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$  modulo  $q$  (the winning ones) and tries are the number of products (for a constant  $j$ ) that the adversary can try. The “without replacement” comes from the fact that all products are different. The final winning probability is:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{prod} \bmod q \in (2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu) \wedge \text{prod} \in \Pi_{P,j}] &\leq \frac{T}{B} + \frac{T}{B-1} + \frac{T}{B-2} + \dots + \frac{T}{B-X} \\ &\leq X \cdot \frac{T}{B-X} \\ &= \frac{\binom{n}{j} 2^{(j+1)\mu-j-\nu} (2^j - 1)}{\frac{2^{j\mu-j}}{(\mu-1)^j} - \binom{n}{j}} \end{aligned}$$



By applying the union bound for all  $j$ 's we get:

$$Pr[\text{prod mod } q \in (2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu) \wedge \text{prod} \in \Pi_{P,[2,d]}] \leq \sum_{j=2}^d \frac{\binom{n}{j} 2^{(j+1)\mu-j-\nu} (2^j - 1)}{\frac{2^{j\mu-j}}{(\mu-1)^j} - \binom{n}{j}}$$

By using the same arguments for negative products we would conclude that

$$Pr[\text{prod mod } q \in (2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu) \wedge \text{prod} \in -\Pi_{P,[2,d]}] \leq \sum_{j=2}^d \frac{\binom{n}{j} 2^{(j+1)\mu-j-\nu} (2^j - 1)}{\frac{2^{j\mu-j}}{(\mu-1)^j} - \binom{n}{j}}$$

Therefore

$$\begin{aligned} Pr[\text{CollisionFinding}(\mu, d, \mathbb{G}_e, n) = 1] &= Pr[\text{CollisionFinding}(\mu, d, \mathbb{G}_e, n) = 1 \wedge \text{prod} \in \Pi_{P,[2,d]}] + \\ &\quad + Pr[\text{CollisionFinding}(\mu, d, \mathbb{G}_e, n) = 1 \wedge \text{prod} \in -\Pi_{P,[2,d]}] = \\ &\leq 2 \cdot \sum_{j=2}^d \frac{\binom{n}{j} 2^{(j+1)\mu-j-\nu} (2^j - 1)}{\frac{2^{j\mu-j}}{(\mu-1)^j} - \binom{n}{j}} \end{aligned}$$

□

**Theorem 4.4.** Let  $\mathbb{G}_q$  be a prime order group of order  $q \in (2^{\nu-1}, 2^\nu)$ ,  $\mu$  such that  $2^{\mu-\nu} \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$ ,  $d$  constant and  $n = \text{poly}(\lambda)$  then  $Pr[\text{CollisionFinding}(\mu, d, \mathbb{G}_q, n) = 1] \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$

**Proof** Now  $n = \text{poly}(\lambda)$  so the set  $P$  is polynomially bounded. Due to lemma 4.1 it is straightforward that  $Pr[\text{CollisionFinding}(\mu, d, \mathbb{G}_q, n) = 1] \leq \sum_{j=2}^d \frac{\binom{n}{j} 2^{(j+1)\mu-j-\nu} (2^j - 1)}{\frac{2^{j\mu-j}}{(\mu-1)^j} - \binom{n}{j}}$ . Since  $d$  is constant, for any  $j \in [2, d]$   $\binom{n}{j} = O(n^j)$  and we get:

$$\begin{aligned} 2 \cdot \frac{\binom{n}{j} 2^{(j+1)\mu-j-\nu} (2^j - 1)}{\frac{2^{j\mu-j}}{(\mu-1)^j} - \binom{n}{j}} &= 2 \cdot \frac{O(n^j) 2^{(j+1)\mu-j-\nu} (2^j - 1)}{\frac{2^{j\mu-j}}{(\mu-1)^j} - O(n^j)} \\ &= 2 \cdot \frac{O(n^j) (2^j - 1) (\mu - 1)^j}{\frac{2^{j\mu-j}}{2^{(j+1)\mu-j-\nu}} - \frac{O(n^j) (\mu - 1)^j}{2^{(j+1)\mu-j-\nu}}} \end{aligned}$$

$O(n^j) (2^j - 1) (\mu - 1)^j = \text{poly}(\lambda)$  and  $\frac{O(n^j) (\mu - 1)^j}{2^{(j+1)\mu-j-\nu}} = \text{negl}(\lambda)$ . Also  $\frac{2^{j\mu-j}}{2^{(j+1)\mu-j-\nu}} = 2^{\nu-\mu}$ , therefore for  $j$  we get a probability bounded by  $\frac{\text{poly}(\lambda) 2^{\mu-\nu}}{1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) 2^{\mu-\nu}} = \text{negl}(\lambda)$  by assumption.

Finally,  $Pr[\text{CollisionFinding}(\mu, d, \mathbb{G}_q, n) = 1] \leq (d - 1) \cdot \text{negl}(\lambda) = \text{negl}(\lambda)$ . □

*Remark 4.3.* For the sake of generality, in `CollisionFinding` we do not specify how the random primes are generated. In practice in our scheme they are outputs of the hash function  $H_{\text{prime}}$  that we model as a random oracle.

Now we are ready to give the proof of theorem 4.2:

**Proof** [of theorem 4.2] The proof is almost the same as the one of Theorem 4.1 except for the next-to-last paragraph, i.e. the justification of  $e \in \Pi_{P,\{1\}}$ . Since  $d\mu + 2 > \nu$  we cannot use the same arguments to conclude to it. However, still  $e \in (\Pi_{P,[1,\dots,d]} \cup -\Pi_{P,[1,\dots,d]})$ .

Let  $e \in (\prod_{P,[1,\dots,d]} \cup -\prod_{P,[1,\dots,d]})$ , it is straightforward to reduce this case to the collision finding problem. Assume that the adversary  $\mathcal{P}^*$  made  $q_H$  random oracle queries to  $H$  and let  $Q_H$  be the set of answers she received. Further assume that exactly  $q_{H_{\text{prime}}}$  of the them are primes and let  $Q_{H_{\text{prime}}}$  be the set of them. We note that  $P \subseteq Q_{H_{\text{prime}}}$ , unless a collision happened in  $H$ .

Now let  $Q_{H_{\text{prime}}}$  be the set of the  $\text{CollisionFinding}(\mu, d, \mathbb{G}_q, |Q_{H_{\text{prime}}}|)$  experiment. It satisfies all three conditions since each  $e_i \in Q_{H_{\text{prime}}}$  is an output of  $H_{\text{prime}}$ . Therefore  $e_i$  is prime,  $2^{\mu-1} < e_i < 2^\mu$  and since  $H$  is modeled as a random oracle the outputs of  $H_{\text{prime}}$  are uniformly distributed in  $\text{Primes}(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$ . Then for the extracted  $e$ , we know that  $e = e_q \pmod{q} \in (2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$  and from the assumption  $e \in (\prod_{P,[1,\dots,d]} \cup -\prod_{P,[1,\dots,d]})$ , which (as noted above) means that  $e \in (\prod_{Q_{H_{\text{prime}}}, [2,\dots,d]} \cup -\prod_{Q_{H_{\text{prime}}}, [2,\dots,d]})$ . So  $\text{CollisionFinding}(\mu, d, \mathbb{G}_q, |Q_{H_{\text{prime}}}|) = 1$ . Since the adversary is PPT  $|Q_{H_{\text{prime}}}| = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ . Also,  $d = O(1)$  and  $2^{\mu-\nu} \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$  (from the assumptions of the theorem) so the previous happens with a negligible probability according to theorem 4.4. So we conclude that, unless with a negligible probability,  $e \in \prod_{P,\{1\}}$ .  $\square$

### 4.3 Our CP-SNARK for Set Membership for Primes Sets

In this section we show a CP-SNARK for set membership  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{RSAP}_{\text{rm}}}$  that supports set elements that are prime numbers of exactly  $\mu$  bits, i.e.,  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}} = \text{Primes}(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$ , and  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{set}} = 2^{\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}}}$ .  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{RSAP}_{\text{rm}}}$  works for a type-based commitment scheme  $\text{Com}_2$  that is the canonical composition  $\text{SetCom}_{\text{RSA}'} \bullet \text{PedCom}$  where  $\text{SetCom}_{\text{RSA}'}$  is in Fig. 6 (it is essentially a simplification of  $\text{SetCom}_{\text{RSA}}$  since elements are already primes).

<p><math>\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^\mu)</math> : Sample an RSA modulus <math>N \leftarrow \text{GenSRSAMod}(1^\lambda)</math>, a generator <math>F \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*</math>, compute <math>G \leftarrow F^2 \pmod{N} \in \text{QR}_N</math>. Return <math>\text{ck} := (N, G)</math>.</p> <p><math>\text{Commit}(\text{ck}, t_U, U)</math> : compute <math>\text{Acc} \leftarrow G^{\text{prod}_P}</math>. Return <math>(c, o) := (\text{Acc}, \emptyset)</math>.</p> <p><math>\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, t_U, \text{Acc}, U, \emptyset)</math> : Return 1 if for all <math>e_i \in P</math> <math>e_i \in \text{Primes}(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)</math> and <math>\text{Acc} = G^{\text{prod}_P} \pmod{N}</math>, and 0 otherwise.</p>
---

Fig. 6:  $\text{SetCom}_{\text{RSA}'}$  Commitment to Sets.

The scheme  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{RSAP}_{\text{rm}}}$  is described in figure 7. Its building blocks are the same as the ones for  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{RSA}}$  except that instead of a CP-NIZK for proving correctness of a map-to-prime computation, we use a CP-NIZK for range proofs. Namely, we let  $\text{CP}_{\text{Range}}$  be a NIZK for the following relation on  $\text{PedCom}$  commitments  $c$  and two given integers  $A < B$ :

$$R_{\text{Range}}((c_e, A, B), (e, r_q)) = 1 \text{ iff } c = g^e h^{r_q} \wedge A < e_q < B$$

The idea behind the security of the scheme is similar to the one of the  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{RSA}}$  scheme. The main difference is that here we rely on the range proof  $\pi_{\text{Range}}$  in order to “connect” the Pedersen commitment  $c_e$  to the accumulator. In particular, in order to argue the absence of possible collisions here we assume that  $d\mu + 2 \leq \nu$  holds, namely we argue security only for this setting of parameters. It is worth noting that in applications where  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}}$  is randomly chosen subset of  $\text{Primes}(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$ ,

**KeyGen**( $\text{ck}, R^\epsilon$ ) : parse  $\text{ck} := ((N, G), (\mathbb{G}_q, g, h))$  as the commitment keys of  $\text{SetCom}_{\text{RSA}'}$  and  $\text{PedCom}$  respectively. Sample  $\alpha \leftarrow_{\$} [N/2]$  and compute  $H \leftarrow G^\alpha \pmod N \in \text{QR}_N$ .  
 Generate  $\text{crs}_{\text{Range}} \leftarrow_{\$} \text{CP}_{\text{Range}}.\text{KeyGen}((\mathbb{G}_q, g, h), R_{\text{Range}})$ , a crs for  $\text{CP}_{\text{Range}}$ .  
 Return  $\text{crs} := (N, G, H, \mathbb{G}_q, g, h, \text{crs}_{\text{Range}})$ .  
 Given  $\text{crs}$ , one can define  $\text{crs}_{\text{Root}} := (N, G, H)$ ,  $\text{crs}_{\text{modEq}} := (N, G, H, \mathbb{G}_q, g, h)$ .

**Prove**( $\text{crs}, (C_P, c_e), (P, e), (\emptyset, r_q)$ ) :  
 $(C_e, r) \leftarrow \text{IntCom.Commit}((G, H), e)$   
 $W = G^{\prod_{e_i \in P \setminus \{e\}} e_i}$   
 $\pi_{\text{Root}} \leftarrow \text{CP}_{\text{Root}}.\text{Prove}(\text{crs}_{\text{Root}}, (C_e, C_P, \mu), (e, r, W))$   
 $\pi_{\text{modEq}} \leftarrow \text{CP}_{\text{modEq}}.\text{Prove}(\text{crs}_{\text{modEq}}, (C_e, c_e), (e, e, r, r_q))$   
 $\pi_{\text{Range}} \leftarrow \text{CP}_{\text{Range}}.\text{Prove}(\text{crs}_{\text{Range}}, (2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu), c_e, e, r_q)$   
 Return  $\pi := (C_e, \pi_{\text{Root}}, \pi_{\text{modEq}}, \pi_{\text{Range}})$ .

**VerProof**( $\text{crs}, (C_P, c_e), \pi$ ) : Return 1 iff  
 $\text{CP}_{\text{Root}}.\text{VerProof}(\text{crs}_{\text{Root}}, (C_e, C_P, \mu), \pi_{\text{Root}}) = 1 \wedge \text{CP}_{\text{modEq}}.\text{VerProof}(\text{crs}_{\text{modEq}}, (C_e, c_e), \pi_{\text{modEq}}) = 1 \wedge$   
 $\text{CP}_{\text{Range}}.\text{VerProof}(\text{crs}_{\text{Range}}, c_e, \pi_{\text{Range}}) = 1$ .

Fig. 7: MemCP<sub>RSA'rm</sub> CP-SNARK for set membership

we could argue security even when  $d\mu + 2 > \nu$ , in a way similar to Theorem 4.2. We omit the analysis of this case from the paper.

**Theorem 4.5.** *Let PedCom, SetCom<sub>RSA'</sub> and IntCom be computationally binding commitments, CP<sub>Root</sub>, CP<sub>modEq</sub> and CP<sub>Range</sub> be knowledge-sound NIZK arguments, and assume that the Strong RSA assumption hold. If  $d\mu + 2 \leq \nu$ , then MemCP<sub>RSA'rm</sub> is knowledge-sound with partial opening of the set commitments  $c_P$ . Furthermore, if PedCom, SetCom<sub>RSA'</sub> and IntCom are statistically hiding commitments, and CP<sub>Root</sub>, CP<sub>modEq</sub> and CP<sub>Range</sub> be zero-knowledge, then MemCP<sub>RSA'rm</sub> is zero-knowledge.*

**Proof** [of Theorem 4.5] **KNOWLEDGE SOUNDNESS WITH PARTIAL OPENING OF  $C_P$ :** the proof is similar to the one of theorem 4.1 except for some minor parts.

Let a malicious prover  $\mathcal{P}^*$ , a PPT adversary of Knowledge Soundness with Partial Opening (see the definition in section 2.5) that on input  $(\text{ck}, R_{\text{mem}}, \text{crs}, \text{aux}_R, \text{aux}_Z)$  outputs  $(C_P, c_e, P, \pi)$  such that the verifier  $\mathcal{V}$  accepts, i.e.  $\text{VerProof}(\text{crs}, C_P, c_e), \pi) = 1$  and  $\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, t_U, C_P, P, \emptyset) = 1$  with non-negligible probability  $\epsilon$ . We will construct a PPT extractor  $\mathcal{E}$  that on the same input outputs a partial witness  $(e, r)$  such that  $R_{\text{mem}}(P, e) = 1 \wedge \text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, t_q, c_e, e, r) = 1$ .

For this we rely on the Knowledge Soundness of CP<sub>Root</sub>, CP<sub>modEq</sub> and CP<sub>Range</sub> protocols.  $\mathcal{E}$  parses  $\pi := (C_e, \pi_{\text{Root}}, \pi_{\text{modEq}}, \pi_{\text{Range}})$  and  $\text{crs} := (N, G, H, \mathbb{H}_{\text{prime}}, \mathbb{G}_q, g, h, \text{crs}_{\text{Range}})$ , from which it computes the corresponding  $\text{crs}_{\text{Root}} := (N, G, H)$  and  $\text{crs}_{\text{modEq}} := (N, G, H, \mathbb{G}_q, g, h)$ . Then constructs an adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{Root}}$  for CP<sub>Root</sub> Knowledge Soundness that outputs  $(C_e, C_P, \mu, \pi_{\text{Root}})$ . It is obvious that since  $\mathcal{V}$  accepts  $\pi$  then it also accepts  $\pi_{\text{Root}}$ , i.e.,  $\text{CP}_{\text{Root}}.\text{VerProof}(\text{crs}_{\text{Root}}, (C_e, C_P, \mu), \pi_{\text{Root}}) = 1$ . From Knowledge Soundness of CP<sub>Root</sub> we know that there is an extractor  $\mathcal{E}_{\text{Root}}$  that outputs  $(e, r, W)$  such that  $C_e = \pm G^e H^r \pmod N \wedge W^e = C_P \pmod N \wedge e < 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 2}$ . Similarly,  $\mathcal{E}$  constructs adversaries  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{modEq}}$  and  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{Range}}$  of protocols CP<sub>modEq</sub> and CP<sub>Range</sub> respectively. And similarly there are extractors  $\mathcal{E}_{\text{modEq}}$  and  $\mathcal{E}_{\text{Range}}$  that output  $(e', e_q, r', r_q)$  such that  $e' = e_q \pmod q \wedge C_{e'} = \pm G^{e'} H^{r'} \pmod N \wedge c_{e_q} = g^{e_q} \pmod q h^{r_q} \pmod q$  and  $(e'_q, r'_q)$  such that  $c_e = g^{e'_q} h^{r'_q} \wedge 2^{\mu-1} < e'_q < 2^\mu$  respectively.

From the Binding property of the integer commitment scheme we get that  $e = e'$  and  $r = r'$  (over the integers), unless with a negligible probability. Similarly, from the Binding property of the Pedersen commitment scheme we get that  $e_q = e'_q \pmod{q}$  and  $r_q = r'_q \pmod{q}$ , unless with a negligible probability. So if we put everything together the extracted values are  $(e, r, W, e_q, r_q)$  such that:

$$W^e = C_P \pmod{N} \wedge e < 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 2} \wedge e = e_q \pmod{q} \wedge 2^{\mu-1} < e_q < 2^\mu$$

and additionally

$$C_e = \pm G^e H^r \wedge c_e = g^{e_q \pmod{q}} h^{r_q \pmod{q}}$$

From  $\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \text{t}_U, C_P, P, \emptyset) = 1$  we infer that  $C_P = G^{\text{prod}_P}$ , where for each  $e_i \in P$  it holds that  $e \in \text{Primes}(2^{\mu-1}, 2^\mu)$ . From the strong RSA assumption since  $W^e = C_P = G^{\text{prod}_P} \pmod{N}$  we get  $e \in \Pi_P$ , unless with a negligible probability (see appendix A.1).

The rest of the analysis that justifies  $e \in P$  is identical to the one of the proof of theorem 4.1. So  $e \in P$  and as shown above  $\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \text{t}_q, c_e, e_q, r_q) = 1$ .

**ZERO KNOWLEDGE:** For the Zero Knowledge Property we rely on similar techniques with the ones of the proof of theorem 4.3 except for the use of  $\mathcal{S}_{\text{HashEq}}$ . Here we use instead the simulator of the  $\text{CP}_{\text{Range}}$  protocol,  $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Range}}$ .  $\square$

#### 4.4 Proposed Instantiations of Protocols for $R_{\text{Root}}$ and $R_{\text{modEq}}$

Root protocol

On common reference string  $\text{crs} = (\mathbb{Z}_N^*, G, H)$

**Prove**( $\text{crs}, (C_e, \text{Acc}), (e, r, w)$ ) :

1. samples  $r_2, r_3 \leftarrow_{\$} (-\lfloor N/4 \rfloor, \lfloor N/4 \rfloor)$  and computes  $C_W \leftarrow WH^{r_2}, C_r \leftarrow G^{r_2} H^{r_3}$ .
2. Computes the non-interactive version of the above protocol
 
$$r_e \leftarrow_{\$} (-2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu}, 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu}), r_r, r_{r_2}, r_{r_3} \leftarrow_{\$} (-\lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s}, \lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s})$$

$$r_\beta, r_\delta \leftarrow_{\$} (-\lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu}, \lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu})$$

$$\alpha_1 \leftarrow G^{r_e} H^{r_r}, \alpha_2 \leftarrow G^{r_{r_2}} H^{r_{r_3}}, \alpha_3 \leftarrow C_W^{r_e} \left(\frac{1}{H}\right)^{r_\beta}, \alpha_4 \leftarrow C_r^{r_e} \left(\frac{1}{H}\right)^{r_\delta} \left(\frac{1}{G}\right)^{r_\beta}$$

$$c \leftarrow \text{H}(\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3, \alpha_4, C_e, \text{Acc})$$

$$s_e \leftarrow r_e - ce, s_r \leftarrow r_r - cr, s_{r_2} \leftarrow r_{r_2} - cr_2, s_{r_3} \leftarrow r_{r_3} - cr_{r_3}, s_\beta \leftarrow r_\beta - cer_2, s_\delta \leftarrow r_\delta - cer_3$$

Returns  $\pi \leftarrow (C_W, C_r, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3, \alpha_4, c, s_e, s_r, s_{r_2}, s_{r_3}, s_\beta, s_\delta)$

**VerProof**( $\text{crs}, (C_e, \text{Acc}), \pi$ ) : returns 1 iff  $\alpha_1 = C_e^e G^{s_e} H^{s_r} \wedge \alpha_2 = C_r^e G^{s_{r_2}} H^{s_{r_3}} \wedge \alpha_3 = \text{Acc}^c C_W^{s_e} \left(\frac{1}{H}\right)^{s_\beta} \wedge \alpha_4 = C_r^{s_e} \left(\frac{1}{H}\right)^{s_\delta} \left(\frac{1}{G}\right)^{s_\beta} \wedge s_e \in [-2^{\lambda + \lambda_s + \mu + 1}, 2^{\lambda + \lambda_s + \mu + 1}]$

Fig. 8

**Protocol  $\text{CP}_{\text{Root}}$ .** We first give a protocol  $\text{CP}_{\text{Root}'}$  for a simpler version of the Root relation in which the upper bound on  $e$  is removed; let us call  $R_{\text{Root}'}$  this relation.

Below is an interactive ZK protocol for  $R_{\text{Root}'}$ :

1. Prover computes a  $W$  such that  $W^e = Acc$  and  $C_W = WH^{r_2}, C_r = G^{r_2}H^{r_3}$  and sends to the verifier:

$$\underline{\mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V}} : C_W, C_r$$

2. Prover and Verifier perform a protocol for the relation:

$$R((C_e, C_r, C_W, Acc), (e, r, r_2, r_3, \beta, \delta)) = 1 \text{ iff}$$

$$C_e = G^e H^r \wedge C_r = G^{r_2} H^{r_3} \wedge Acc = C_W^e \left(\frac{1}{H}\right)^\beta \wedge 1 = C_r^e \left(\frac{1}{H}\right)^\delta \left(\frac{1}{G}\right)^\beta$$

Let  $\lambda_s$  be the size of the challenge space,  $\lambda_z$  be the statistical security parameter and  $\mu$  the size of  $e$ .

- Prover samples:

$$r_e \leftarrow_{\$} \left(-2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu}, 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu}\right)$$

$$r_r, r_{r_2}, r_{r_3} \leftarrow_{\$} \left(-\lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s}, \lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s}\right)$$

$$r_\beta, r_\delta \leftarrow_{\$} \left(-\lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu}, \lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu}\right)$$

and computes:

$$\alpha_1 = G^{r_e} H^{r_r}, \quad \alpha_2 = G^{r_{r_2}} H^{r_{r_3}}, \quad \alpha_3 = C_W^{r_e} \left(\frac{1}{H}\right)^{r_\beta}, \quad \alpha_4 = C_r^{r_e} \left(\frac{1}{H}\right)^{r_\delta} \left(\frac{1}{G}\right)^{r_\beta}$$

$$\underline{\mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V}} : (\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3, \alpha_4)$$

- Verifier samples the challenge  $c \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda_s}$

$$\underline{\mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}} : c$$

- Prover computes the response:

$$s_e = r_e - ce$$

$$s_r = r_r - cr, \quad s_{r_2} = r_{r_2} - cr_2, \quad s_{r_3} = r_{r_3} - cr_3$$

$$s_\beta = r_\beta - cer_2, \quad s_\delta = r_\delta - cer_3$$

$$\underline{\mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V}} : (s_e, s_r, s_{r_2}, s_{r_3}, s_\beta, s_\delta)$$

- Verifier checks if:

$$\alpha_1 \stackrel{?}{=} C_e^c G^{s_e} H^{s_r}, \quad \alpha_2 \stackrel{?}{=} C_r^c G^{s_{r_2}} H^{s_{r_3}}, \quad \alpha_3 \stackrel{?}{=} Acc^c C_W^{s_e} \left(\frac{1}{H}\right)^{s_\beta}, \quad \alpha_4 \stackrel{?}{=} C_r^{s_e} \left(\frac{1}{H}\right)^{s_\delta} \left(\frac{1}{G}\right)^{s_\beta}$$

**Theorem 4.6.** *Let  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$  be an RSA group  $U_N^{[2,4/\epsilon]}$ -RSA assumption holds, where  $U_N^{[a,b]}$  is the uniform distribution from  $[a, b]$ , then the above protocol is a correct, knowledge sound and honest-verifier zero knowledge protocol for  $R_{\text{Root}'}$ .*

The proof of the above is similar to the one of [CL02] where the more specific protocol was introduced, but implicitly was including a protocol for  $R_{\text{Root}'}$ , with a modification in the assumption that is derived from the later work of Couteau et. al. [CPP17]. Before proceeding to the proof we recall some properties related to RSA groups. First we expose two standard arguments. The first is that obtaining a multiple of  $\phi(N)$  is equivalent to factoring  $N$ . This directly allows us to argue that for any  $G \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ , if one is able to find an  $x \in \mathbb{Z}$  such that  $G^x = 1 \pmod{N}$  then under the factoring assumption  $x = 0$ , otherwise  $x$  is a multiple of  $\phi(N)$ . Secondly, finding any non-trivial solution of the equation  $\mu^2 = 1 \pmod{N}$  in  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$  (non-trivial means  $\mu \neq \pm 1$ ) is equivalent to factoring  $N$ .

**Proposition 4.1.** *Let  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$  be an RSA group with a modulus  $N$  and  $\text{QR}_N$  the corresponding group of quadratic residues modulo  $N$ .*

1. *Let  $G, H \leftarrow_{\S} \text{QR}_N$  two random generators of  $\text{QR}_N$  and a PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  outputting  $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$  such that  $G^\alpha H^\beta = 1$  then under the assumption that DLOG problem is hard in  $\text{QR}_N$  it holds that  $\alpha = \beta = 0$ .*
2. *Let  $A, B \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$  and a PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  outputting  $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$  such that  $A^y = B^x$  and  $y \mid x$  then under the assumption that factoring of  $N$  is hard it holds that  $A = \pm B^{\frac{x}{y}}$*

**Proof**

1. Since  $G, H \in \text{QR}_N$  there is an  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$  such that  $G = H^x \pmod{N}$  which leads to  $H^{x\alpha+\beta} = 1$ . As we discussed above under the assumption that factoring of  $N$  is hard,  $x\alpha + \beta = 0$ . If  $\alpha \neq 0$  then  $x \leftarrow -\frac{\beta}{\alpha}$  is a discrete logarithm of  $H$ , so assuming that DLOG is hard  $\alpha = 0$ . Similarly, there is an  $y \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$  such that  $G^y = H \pmod{N}$  and with a similar argument we can conclude that  $\beta = 0$ .
2. We discern two cases,  $y = \rho$  is odd or  $y = 2^v \rho$  is even (for an odd  $\rho$ ). In case  $y$  is odd then it is co-prime with  $\phi(N) = p'q'$  (otherwise if  $y = p'$  or  $y = q'$  we would be able to factor  $N$ ), so  $y^{-1} \pmod{N}$  exists and  $A = B^{\frac{x}{y}}$ . If  $y = 2^v \rho$  then  $\left(A^{-1}B^{\frac{x}{y}}\right)^y = 1 \Rightarrow \left(A^{-1}B^{\frac{x}{y}}\right)^{2^v \rho} = 1 \Rightarrow \left(A^{-1}B^{\frac{x}{y}}\right)^{2^v} = 1$ . From the second fact that we discussed above under the factoring assumption  $\left(A^{-1}B^{\frac{x}{y}}\right)^{2^{v-1}} = \pm 1$ . However for  $v > 1$  the left part of the equation is a quadratic residue so it cannot be  $-1$ , therefore  $\left(A^{-1}B^{\frac{x}{y}}\right)^{2^{v-1}} = 1$ . Using the same facts repeatedly we will eventually conclude that  $\left(A^{-1}B^{\frac{x}{y}}\right)^2 = 1$ , hence  $A^{-1}B^{\frac{x}{y}} = \pm 1 \Rightarrow A = \pm B^{\frac{x}{y}}$ . □

**Proof** [proof of theorem 4.6] Correctness is straightforward. Honest-verifier zero knowledge can be shown with standard arguments used in  $\Sigma$ -protocols and the fact that the commitments to  $C_e, C_W, C_r$  are statistically hiding. That is the simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  on input  $(C_e, Acc)$  samples  $C_W^* \leftarrow_{\S} \mathbb{Z}_N^*$  and  $C_r^* \leftarrow_{\S} \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ . Then samples

$$s_e^* \leftarrow_{\S} \left( -2^{\lambda_z+\lambda_s+\mu} - 2^{\lambda_z+\mu}, 2^{\lambda_z+\lambda_s+\mu} + 2^{\lambda_z+\mu} \right),$$

$$s_r^*, s_{r_2}^*, s_{r_3}^* \leftarrow_{\S} \left( -\lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_z+\lambda_s} - \lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_s}, \lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_z+\lambda_s} + \lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_s} \right),$$

$$s_\beta^*, s_\delta^* \leftarrow_{\S} \left( -\lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_z+\lambda_s+\mu} - \lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_s+\mu}, \lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_z+\lambda_s+\mu} + \lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_s+\mu} \right).$$

Finally it samples  $c^* \leftarrow_{\S} \{0, 1\}^{\lambda_s}$ . Then it sets  $\alpha_1^* \leftarrow C_e^c G^{s_e} H^{s_r}$ ,  $\alpha_2^* \leftarrow C_r^c G^{s_{r_2}} H^{s_{r_3}}$ ,  $\alpha_3^* \leftarrow Acc^c C_W^{s_e} \left(\frac{1}{H}\right)^{s_\beta}$  and  $\alpha_4^* \stackrel{?}{=} C_r^{s_e} \left(\frac{1}{H}\right)^{s_\delta} \left(\frac{1}{G}\right)^{s_\beta}$ .  $\mathcal{S}$  outputs  $\pi^* \leftarrow (C_W^*, C_r^*, \alpha_1^*, \alpha_2^*, \alpha_3^*, \alpha_4^*, c^*, s_e^*, s_r^*, s_{r_2}^*, s_{r_3}^*, s_\beta^*, s_\delta^*)$ . The distribution of  $\pi^*$  is identical to the one of a real proof  $\pi$ .

For the knowledge soundness, let an adversary of the knowledge soundness  $\mathcal{A}$  that is able to convince the verifier  $\mathcal{V}$  with a probability at least  $\epsilon$ . We will construct an extractor  $\mathcal{E}$  that extracts the witness  $(e, r, r_2, r_3, \beta, \delta)$ . Using rewinding  $\mathcal{E}$  gets two accepted transcripts

$$(C_W, C_r, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3, \alpha_4, c, s_e, s_r, s_{r_2}, s_{r_3}, s_\beta, s_\delta) \text{ and } (C_W, C_r, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3, \alpha_4, c', s_e', s_r', s_{r_2}', s_{r_3}', s_\beta', s_\delta')$$

on two different challenges  $c$  and  $c'$ . We denote  $\Delta c := c' - c$ ,  $\Delta s_e := s_e - s'_e$ ,  $\Delta s_r := s_r - s'_r$ ,  $\Delta s_{r_2} := s_{r_2} - s'_{r_2}$ ,  $\Delta s_{r_3} := s_{r_3} - s'_{r_3}$ ,  $\Delta s_\beta := s_\beta - s'_\beta$ ,  $\Delta s_\delta := s_\delta - s'_\delta$  then

$$C_e^{\Delta c} = G^{\Delta s_e} H^{\Delta s_r}, C_r^{\Delta c} = G^{\Delta s_{r_2}} H^{\Delta s_{r_3}}, Acc^{\Delta c} = C_W^{\Delta s_e} \left(\frac{1}{H}\right)^{\Delta s_\beta}, 1 = C_r^{\Delta s_e} \left(\frac{1}{H}\right)^{\Delta s_\delta} \left(\frac{1}{G}\right)^{\Delta s_\beta}$$

Define the (possibly rational) numbers  $\hat{e} := \frac{\Delta s_e}{\Delta c}$ ,  $\hat{r} := \frac{\Delta s_r}{\Delta c}$ ,  $\hat{r}_2 := \frac{\Delta s_{r_2}}{\Delta c}$ ,  $\hat{r}_3 := \frac{\Delta s_{r_3}}{\Delta c}$ . According to [CPP17], under the assumption that RSA problem is hard in  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ ,  $(\hat{e}, \hat{r})$  is a valid opening of  $C_e$  and  $(\hat{r}_2, \hat{r}_3)$  a valid opening of  $C_r$  (yet  $\hat{e}, \hat{r}, \hat{r}_2, \hat{r}_3$  are integers meaning that  $\Delta c$  divides  $\Delta s_e, \Delta s_r, \Delta s_{r_2}$  and  $\Delta s_{r_3}$ ). Therefore,  $C_e = \pm G^{\hat{e}} H^{\hat{r}}$  and  $C_r = \pm G^{\hat{r}_2} H^{\hat{r}_3}$ .

Now if we replace  $C_r$  in the fourth equation we get  $1 = (\pm 1)^{\Delta s_e} G^{\hat{r}_2 \Delta s_e} H^{\hat{r}_3 \Delta s_e} \left(\frac{1}{H}\right)^{\Delta s_\delta} \left(\frac{1}{G}\right)^{\Delta s_\beta}$  or  $(\pm 1)^{\Delta s_e} G^{\hat{r}_2 \Delta s_e - \Delta s_\beta} H^{\hat{r}_3 \Delta s_e - \Delta s_\delta} = 1$ . However,  $(\pm 1)^{\Delta s_e} = 1$  otherwise if  $(\pm 1)^{\Delta s_e} = -1$  then  $-G^{\hat{r}_2 \Delta s_e - \Delta s_\beta} H^{\hat{r}_3 \Delta s_e - \Delta s_\delta}$  would be a non-quadratic residue (since  $G, H$  are both in  $\text{QR}_N$  and  $\text{QR}_N$  is closed under multiplication) equal to 1 which is a quadratic residue and this would be a contradiction, hence  $G^{\hat{r}_2 \Delta s_e - \Delta s_\beta} H^{\hat{r}_3 \Delta s_e - \Delta s_\delta} = 1$ . According to the first point of proposition 4.1, under the factoring assumption  $\hat{r}_2 \Delta s_e - \Delta s_\beta = \hat{r}_3 \Delta s_e - \Delta s_\delta = 0$ , so  $\hat{r}_2 \Delta s_e = \Delta s_\beta$ .

Finally we replace  $\Delta s_\beta$  in the third equation and we get  $Acc^{\Delta c} = C_W^{\Delta s_e} \left(\frac{1}{H}\right)^{\hat{r}_2 \Delta s_e} \Rightarrow Acc^{\Delta c} = \left(\frac{C_W}{H^{\hat{r}_2}}\right)^{\Delta s_e}$ . As stated above  $\Delta c$  divides  $\Delta s_e$  so according to the second fact of proposition 4.1  $Acc = \pm \left(\frac{C_W}{H^{\hat{r}_2}}\right)^{\frac{\Delta s_e}{\Delta c}} = \pm \left(\frac{C_W}{H^{\hat{r}_2}}\right)^{\hat{e}}$ . We discern three cases:

- $Acc = + \left(\frac{C_W}{H^{\hat{r}_2}}\right)^{\frac{\Delta s_e}{\Delta c}}$ : Then  $\mathcal{E}$  sets  $\tilde{W} \leftarrow \frac{C_W}{H^{\hat{r}_2}}$  and  $\tilde{e} \leftarrow \hat{e} := \frac{\Delta s_e}{\Delta c}$   $\tilde{r} \leftarrow \hat{r} := \frac{\Delta s_r}{\Delta c}$  as above. It is clear that  $Acc = \tilde{W}^{\tilde{e}}$  and as stated above  $C_e = G^{\tilde{e}} H^{\tilde{r}}$ .
- $Acc = - \left(\frac{C_W}{H^{\hat{r}_2}}\right)^{\frac{\Delta s_e}{\Delta c}}$  and  $\frac{\Delta s_e}{\Delta c}$  odd: Then  $\mathcal{E}$  sets  $\tilde{W} \leftarrow -\frac{C_W}{H^{\hat{r}_2}}$  and  $\tilde{e} \leftarrow \hat{e} := \frac{\Delta s_e}{\Delta c}$   $\tilde{r} \leftarrow \hat{r} := \frac{\Delta s_r}{\Delta c}$  as above. It is clear that  $Acc = \tilde{W}^{\tilde{e}}$  and as stated above  $C_e = G^{\tilde{e}} H^{\tilde{r}}$ .
- $Acc = - \left(\frac{C_W}{H^{\hat{r}_2}}\right)^{\frac{\Delta s_e}{\Delta c}}$  and  $\frac{\Delta s_e}{\Delta c}$  even: this means that  $Acc$  is a non-quadratic residue, which is a contradiction since in the  $R_{\text{Root}'}$  relation we assume that  $Acc \in \text{QR}_N$ .

Finally the  $\mathcal{E}$  outputs  $(\tilde{e}, \tilde{r}, \tilde{W})$ . □

Notice in the above protocol that

$$\begin{aligned} -2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu} - 2^{\lambda_s + \mu} &\leq s_e \leq 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu} + 2^{\lambda_s + \mu} \Rightarrow \\ -2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 1} &\leq s_e \leq 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 1} \Rightarrow \\ -2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 2} &\leq \Delta s_e \leq 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 2} \Rightarrow \\ -2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 2} &\leq \hat{e} \leq 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 2} \Rightarrow \end{aligned}$$

so if we impose an additional verification check of honest  $s_e$  size, i.e.,  $s_e \in [-2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 1}, 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 1}]$ , we get that  $|\hat{e}| \leq 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 2}$ . The verifier performs an extra range check  $s_e \stackrel{?}{\in} [-2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 1}, 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 1}]$  and the resulting protocol is the  $\text{CP}_{\text{Root}}$  that except for proving of knowledge of an  $e$ -th root also provides a bound for the size of  $|e|$ :

$$R_{\text{Root}}((C_e, Acc, \mu), (e, r, W)) = 1 \text{ iff } C_e = \pm G^e H^r \pmod{N} \wedge W^e = Acc \pmod{N} \wedge |e| < 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu + 2}$$

**Protocol CP<sub>modEq</sub>.** Below we describe the public-coin ZK protocol for  $R_{\text{modEq}}$ . In Figure 9 we summarize the corresponding NIZK obtained after applying the Fiat-Shamir transform to it.

1. Prover samples:

$$\begin{aligned} r_e &\leftarrow \left(-2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu}, 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + \mu}\right) \\ r_r &\leftarrow \left(-\lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s}, \lfloor N/4 \rfloor 2^{\lambda_z + \lambda_s}\right) \\ r_{r_q} &\leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \end{aligned}$$

and computes:

$$\alpha_1 = G^{r_e} H^{r_r}, \quad \alpha_2 = g^{r_e \pmod{p}} h^{r_{r_q}}$$

$$\underline{\mathcal{P}} \rightarrow \underline{\mathcal{V}} : (\alpha_1, \alpha_2)$$

2. Verifier samples the challenge  $c \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda_s}$

$$\underline{\mathcal{V}} \rightarrow \underline{\mathcal{P}} : c$$

3. Prover computes the response:

$$\begin{aligned} s_e &= r_e - ce \\ s_r &= r_r - cr \\ s_{r_q} &= r_{r_q} - cr_q \pmod{q} \end{aligned}$$

$$\underline{\mathcal{P}} \rightarrow \underline{\mathcal{V}} : (s_e, s_r, s_{r_q})$$

4. Verifier checks if:

$$\alpha_1 \stackrel{?}{=} c_e^c g^{s_e} \pmod{q} h^{s_{r_q}}, \alpha_2 \stackrel{?}{=} \pm C_e^c G^{s_e} H^{s_r} \pmod{N}$$

**Theorem 4.7.** *Let  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$  be an RSA group  $U_N^{[2, 4/\epsilon]}$ -RSA assumption holds, where  $U_N^{[a, b]}$  is the uniform distribution from  $[a, b]$  and  $\mathbb{G}$  be a prime order group where DLOG assumption holds then the above protocol is a correct, knowledge sound and honest-verifier zero knowledge protocol for  $R_{\text{modEq}}$ .*

The proof is quite simple and is omitted.

## 4.5 Instantiations

We discuss the possible instantiations of our schemes MemCP<sub>RSA</sub> and MemCP<sub>RSA<sub>pr</sub></sub> that can be obtained by looking at applications' constraints and security parameters constraints.

**Parameters for  $d\mu + 2 \leq \nu$  and  $\mu \leq \nu - 2$ .** First we analyze possible parameters that satisfy the conditions  $d\mu + 2 \leq \nu \wedge \mu \leq \nu - 2$  that is used in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2; we recall  $d = 1 + \lfloor \frac{\lambda_z + \lambda_s + 2}{\mu} \rfloor$ , where  $\lambda_z$  and  $\lambda_s$  are statistical security parameters for zero-knowledge and soundness respectively of CP<sub>Root</sub>.

If the prime order group  $\mathbb{G}_q$  is instantiated with (pairing-friendly) elliptic curves, then the bitsize  $\nu$  of its order must be at least  $2\lambda$ . And recall that for correctness we need  $\mu < \nu$ .






Fig. 9

Considering these constraints, one way to satisfy  $d\mu + 2 \leq \nu$  is to choose  $\mu$  such that  $\nu - 1 > \mu > \lambda_z + \lambda_s + 2$ . More specifically, a choice that maximizes security is  $\nu = 2\lambda$ ,  $\mu = 2\lambda - 2$  and  $\lambda_z = \lambda - 3, \lambda_s = \lambda - 2$ . For the case of the MemCP<sub>RSA</sub> scheme, this choice yields an instantiation with nearly  $\lambda$  bits of security and where the function H does not necessarily need to be a random oracle (yet it must be collision resistant).

Because of the constraint  $\mu > \lambda_z + \lambda_s + 2$ , we the choice above implies the use of large primes. This would be anyway the case if one instantiates the scheme with a collision-resistant hash function H (e.g., SHA256 or SHA3), e.g., because set elements are quite arbitrary. If on the other hand, one could support more specific set elements, one could use instead a deterministic map-to-primes or even use our scheme MemCP<sub>RSAPrm</sub> in which set elements themselves are primes. In this case one may wonder if it is possible to choose values of  $\mu$  smaller than  $2\lambda$ ; for example  $\mu \approx 30, 60, 80$ . The answer is positive although the characterization of such  $\mu$ 's require an involved analysis.

Let us fix  $\nu = 2\lambda$ , and say that the statistical security parameters  $\lambda_z, \lambda_s$  are such that  $\lambda_z + \lambda_s + 2 = 2\lambda - 2 - c$  for some constant  $c$  (for example  $c = 4$  if  $\lambda_z = \lambda_s = \lambda - 4$ ). We are essentially looking for  $\mu$  such that

$$\mu \leq 2\lambda - 2 - c \text{ and } \mu + \mu \left\lfloor \frac{2\lambda - 2}{\mu} - \frac{c}{\mu} \right\rfloor \leq 2\lambda - 2$$

$$\iff \mu \leq 2\lambda - 2 - c \text{ and } \left\lfloor \frac{2\lambda - 2}{\mu} - \frac{c}{\mu} \right\rfloor \leq \frac{2\lambda - 2}{\mu} - 1$$

From the fact  $x \pmod{y} = x - y \lfloor \frac{x}{y} \rfloor$ , we can reduce the above inequality into

$$\mu \leq 2\lambda - 2 - c \text{ and } 2\lambda - 2 - c \pmod{\mu} \geq \mu - c$$

that can admit solutions for  $c \geq 2$ .

For instance, if  $\lambda = 128$  and  $c = 4$ , then we get several options for  $\mu$ , e.g.,  $\mu = 32, 42, 63, 84, 126, 127$ .

**Parameters for  $d\mu + 2 > \nu$ .** This case concerns only MemCP<sub>RSA</sub> and Theorem 4.2 in particular. In this case, if one aims at maximizing security, say to get a scheme with  $\lambda$ -bits of security, then would have to set  $\mu \approx 2\lambda$  for collision resistance, and consequently select the prime order group

so that  $\nu \geq 3\lambda$ . This choice however is costly in terms of performance since the efficiency of all protocols that work in the prime order group degrades. Nevertheless, in our full paper we will analyze intermediate cases in which we can adjust the parameters in order to get some concrete security bounds that are still reasonable.

## 5 A CP-SNARK for Set Membership in Bilinear Groups

In this section we propose another CP-SNARK, called  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{VC}}$ , for the set membership relation that works in bilinear groups. Unlike the schemes of Section 4, the CP-SNARK given in this section does not have short parameters; specifically it has a CRS linear in the size of the sets to be committed. On the other hand, it enjoys other features that are not satisfied by our previous schemes (nor by other schemes in the literature): first, it works solely in Bilinear Groups without having to deal with RSA groups; second, it allows to commit the set in an hiding manner and, for the sake of soundness, does not need to be opened by the adversary. This is possible thanks to the fact that the set is committed in a way that (under a knowledge assumption) guarantees that the prover knows the set.

More in detail,  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{VC}}$  is a CP-SNARK for set membership where set elements are elements from the large field  $\mathbb{F} = \mathbb{Z}_q$  where  $q$  is the order of bilinear groups. So  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}} = \mathbb{F}$ . In terms of set it supports all the subsets of  $2^{\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}}}$  of cardinality bounded by  $n$ ,  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{set}} = \{U \in 2^{\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}}} : \#U \leq n\}$ , which we denote by  $\mathcal{S}_n$ ,  $\#$  symbol denotes the cardinality of a set. So  $U$  has elements in  $\mathbb{F}$  and is a subset of  $\mathcal{S}_n$ .

### 5.1 Preliminaries and Building Blocks

**Bilinear Groups.** A *bilinear group generator*  $\mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda)$  outputs  $(q, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$ , where  $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T$  are additive groups of prime order  $q$ , and  $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$  is an efficiently computable, non-degenerate, bilinear map. For ease of exposition we present our results with Type-1 groups where we assume that  $\mathbb{G}_1 = \mathbb{G}_2$ . Our results are under the  $(\ell + 1)d$ -Strong Diffie Hellman and the  $(d, \ell)$ -Extended Power Knowledge of Exponent assumptions, for which we refer the reader to [ZGK<sup>+</sup>17].

**A Polynomial-Pedersen Type-Based Commitment Scheme.** First we present  $\text{PolyCom}$ , a type-based commitment scheme which was introduced in [CFQ19] extracted from the verifiable polynomial delegation scheme of [ZGK<sup>+</sup>17]. The scheme has two types: one for  $\ell$ -variate polynomials  $f : \mathbb{F}^\ell \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  over  $\mathbb{F}$  of variable degree at most  $d$ , and one which is a standard Pedersen commitment for field elements. Let  $\mathcal{W}_{\ell, d}$  be the set of all multisets of  $\{1, \dots, \ell\}$  where the cardinality of each element is at most  $d$ . The scheme is described in figure 10.

**Theorem 5.1.** *Under the  $(\ell + 1)d$ -Strong Diffie Hellman and the  $(d, \ell)$ -Extended Power Knowledge of Exponent assumptions  $\text{PolyCom}$  is an extractable trapdoor commitment scheme.*

For the proof we refer to [CFQ19, ZGK<sup>+</sup>17].

**Input-Hiding CP-SNARK for Polynomial Evaluation** The main building block of our main protocol is a CP-SNARK  $\text{CP}_{\text{PolyEval}}$  for the type-based commitment  $\text{PolyCom}$ . Loosely speaking the idea is to commit to the input  $\mathbf{t}$  and the output  $y$  of a polynomial (with a Pedersen commitment), further commit to the polynomial  $f$  itself (with a polynomial commitment) and then prove that the




Fig. 10: PolyCom Commitment Scheme

opening of the committed polynomial evaluated on the opening of the committed input gives the committed output. The relation of the protocol is  $R_{\text{PolyEval}}((t_k)_{k \in [\ell]}, f, y) = 1$  iff  $f(t_1, \dots, t_\ell) = y$ :

$\mathbf{R} = (\text{ck}, R_{\text{PolyEval}})$  where  $\mathbf{R}$  is over

$$(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{w}) = ((x, c), (u, o, \omega)) = ((\emptyset, (c_y, (c_{t_k})_{k \in [\ell]}, c_f)), ((y, (t_k)_{k \in [\ell]}, f), (r_y, (r_{t_k})_{k \in [\ell]}, r_f), \emptyset))$$

We will present a CP-SNARK for this relation,  $\text{CP}_{\text{PolyEval}}$ , in section 5.3.  $\text{CP}_{\text{PolyEval}}$  is based on a similar protocol for polynomial evaluation given in [CFQ19] which was in turn based on the verifiable polynomial delegation scheme of zk-vSQL [ZGK<sup>+</sup>17]. In those protocols, however, the input  $\mathbf{t}$  is public whereas in ours we can keep it private and committed.

**Range Proof CP-NIZK.** We make use of  $\text{CP}_{\text{Range}}$ , a CP-NIZK for the following relation on PedCom commitments  $c$  and two given integers  $A < B$ :

$$R_{\text{Range}}((c_e, A, B), (e, r_q)) = 1 \text{ iff } c = g^e h^{r_q} \wedge A < e_q < B$$

$\text{CP}_{\text{Range}}$  can have various instantiations such as Bulletproofs [BBB<sup>+</sup>18].

**Multilinear Extensions of vectors.** Let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a field and  $n = 2^\ell$ . The multilinear extension of a vector  $\mathbf{a} = (a_0, \dots, a_{n-1})$  in  $\mathbb{F}$  is a polynomial  $f_{\mathbf{a}} : \mathbb{F}^\ell \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  with variables  $x_1, \dots, x_\ell$  defined as

$$f_{\mathbf{a}}(x_1, \dots, x_\ell) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i \cdot \prod_{k=1}^{\ell} \text{select}_{i_k}(x_k)$$

where  $i_\ell i_{\ell-1} \dots i_2 i_1$  is the bit representation of  $i$  and  $\text{select}_{i_k}(x_k) = \begin{cases} x_k, & \text{if } i_k = 1 \\ 1 - x_k, & \text{if } i_k = 0 \end{cases}$

A property of Multilinear extension of  $\mathbf{a}$  is that  $f_{\mathbf{a}}(i_1, \dots, i_\ell) = a_i$  for each  $i \in [n]$ .

**The type-based commitment scheme of MemCP<sub>VC</sub>.** We define the type-based commitment  $\text{C}_{\text{EdraxPed}}$  for our CP-SNARK MemCP<sub>VC</sub>. We recall we need a commitment that allows one to

commit to both elements and sets. We build this based on an hiding variant of EDRAx Vector Commitment [CPZ18], which in turn relies on a polynomial commitment. Therefore, we use a special case of PolyCom for polynomials of maximum variable degree  $d = 1$ . Let  $\ell := \lceil \log(n) \rceil$  and  $2^{[\ell]}$  be the powerset of  $[\ell] = \{1, \dots, \ell\}$  then  $\mathcal{W}_{\ell,1} = 2^{[\ell]}$ . Furthermore, for any  $n' \leq n$  let  $L : \mathcal{S}_{n'} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^{n'}$  be a function that maps a set of cardinality  $n'$  to its corresponding vector according to an ordering. The description of the scheme can be found in figure 11. Essentially the idea is to take the set, fix some ordering so that we can encode it with a vector, and then commit to such vector using the vector commitment of [CPZ18], which in turn commits to a vector by committing to its multilinear extension polynomial.




Fig. 11:  $C_{EdraxPed}$

## 5.2 CP-SNARK for Set membership using EDRAx Vector Commitment

Here we present a CP-SNARK for set membership that uses a Vector Commitment - an EDRAx [CPZ18] variant - to commit to a set. The idea is to transform a set to a vector (using for example lexicographical order) and then commit to the vector with a vector commitment. Then the set membership is proven with a zero knowledge proof of opening of the corresponding position of the vector. However to preserve zero knowledge we additionally need to hide the position of the element. For this we construct a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of an opening of a position that does not give out the position. Finally, since the position is hidden we additionally need to ensure that the prover is not cheating by providing a proof for a position that exceeds the length of the vector. For this we, also, need a proof of range for the position, i.e. that  $i < n$ .

In this section the domain of the elements is a field,  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}} := \mathbb{F}$ , and the domain of the set is all the subsets of  $2^{\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}}}$  of cardinality bounded by  $n$ ,  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{set}} = \{U \in 2^{\mathcal{D}_{\text{elm}}} : \#U \leq n\}$ , which we denote by  $\mathcal{S}_n$  (the  $\#$  symbol denotes the cardinality of a set). So  $U$  has elements in  $\mathbb{F}$  and is a subset of  $\mathcal{S}_n$ .

The type-based commitment of our scheme is  $C_{EdraxPed}$  (fig. 11) that is presented in the previous section, and the relation is

$\mathbf{R} = (\text{ck}, R_{\text{VCmem}})$  where  $\mathbf{R}$  is over

$$(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{w}) = ((x, c), (u, o, \omega)) = ((\#U, (c_y, (c_{i_k})_{k \in [\ell]}, c_U)), ((y, (i_k)_{k \in [\ell]}, U), (r_y, (r_{i_k})_{k \in [\ell]}, r_U), \emptyset))$$

$$R_{\text{VCmem}}(\#U, (y, (i_k)_{k \in [\ell]}, U)) = 1 \text{ iff } y = L(U)[i] \wedge i < \#U \wedge i = \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} i_k 2^{k-1}$$

Note that in the above the prover should normally give exactly  $\ell = \lceil \log(\#U) \rceil$  commitments. In case  $\ell < \lceil \log(\#U) \rceil$  the position is not fully hiding since it is implicit that  $i < 2^{\ell-1}$  so the verifier gets a partial information about the position.

For this we will compose a CP-SNARK  $\text{CP}_{\text{PolyEval}}$  and a CP-NIZK  $\text{CP}_{\text{Range}}$  for the relations  $R_{\text{PolyEval}}((i_k)_{k \in [\ell]}, f, y) = 1$  iff  $f(i_1, \dots, i_\ell) = y$  and  $R_{\text{Range}}(T, (i_k)_{k \in [\ell]}) = 1$  iff  $i < T$  respectively and the commitment scheme  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{EdraxPed}}$ . So  $\text{CP}_{\text{VCmem}}$  is a conjunction of the former, where the common commitments are  $(c_{i_k})_{k \in [\ell]}$ .




Fig. 12: MemCP<sub>VC</sub>

**Theorem 5.2.** *Let  $\text{CP}_{\text{PolyEval}}$  and  $\text{CP}_{\text{Range}}$  be zero knowledge CP-SNARKs for the relations  $R_{\text{PolyEval}}$  and  $R_{\text{Range}}$  respectively under the commitment scheme  $\text{PolyCom}$  then the above scheme is a zero knowledge CP-SNARK for the relation  $R_{\text{VCmem}}$  and the commitment scheme  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{EdraxPed}}$ . Further it is a CP-SNARK for  $R_{\text{mem}}$  under the same commitment scheme.*

**Proof** Zero Knowledge comes directly from the zero knowledge of  $\text{CP}_{\text{PolyEval}}$  and  $\text{CP}_{\text{Range}}$ .

For Knowledge Soundness, let an adversary  $\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{R}, \text{crs}, \text{aux}_R, \text{aux}_Z)$  outputting  $(x, c) := (\#U, (c_y, (c_{i_k})_{k \in [\ell]}), \mathcal{C}_U)$  and  $\pi$  such that  $\text{VerProof}(\text{vk}, \#U, (c_y, (c_{i_k})_{k \in [\ell]}), \mathcal{C}_U, \pi) = 1$ . We will construct an extractor  $\mathcal{E}$  that on input  $(\mathbf{R}, \text{crs}, \text{aux}_R, \text{aux}_Z)$  outputs a valid witness  $w := ((y, (i_k)_{k \in [\ell]}), (r_y, (r_{i_k})_{k \in [\ell]}), r_U, \emptyset)$ .

$\mathcal{E}$  uses the extractors of  $\mathcal{E}_{\text{PolyEval}}$ ,  $\mathcal{E}_{\text{Range}}$  of  $\text{CP}_{\text{PolyEval}}$  and  $\text{CP}_{\text{Range}}$ .  $\mathcal{E}_{\text{PolyEval}}$  outputs  $(y, (i_k)_{k \in [\ell]}), (r_y, (r_{i_k})_{k \in [\ell]}), r_f$  such that  $f(i_1, \dots, i_\ell) = y \wedge \text{PolyCom.VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathbf{t}_{\mathbb{F}[\mathbb{s}]}, \mathcal{C}_U, f, r_f) = 1 \wedge \text{PolyCom.VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathbf{t}_q, c_y, y, r_y) = 1 \wedge \bigwedge_{k=1}^\ell \text{PolyCom.VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathbf{t}_q, c_{i_k}, i_k, r_{i_k}) = 1$ . Further, from the Extended Power Knowledge of Exponent assumption we know that  $f$  is an  $\ell$ -variate polynomial of maximum variable degree 1. Therefore it corresponds to a multilinear extension of a unique vector  $\vec{U}$ , which is efficiently computable. The extractor computes the vector  $\vec{U}$  from  $f$  and the corresponding set  $U$ . It is clear that, since  $f$  is the multilinear extension of the  $U$  and  $\text{PolyCom.VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathbf{t}_{\mathbb{F}[\mathbb{s}]}, \mathcal{C}_U, f, r_f) = 1$ ,  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{EdraxPed}}.\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathbf{t}_U, \mathcal{C}_U, U, r_f) = 1$ .  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{EdraxPed}}.\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathbf{t}_q, c_y, y, r_y) = 1 \wedge \bigwedge_{k=1}^\ell \mathcal{C}_{\text{EdraxPed}}.\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathbf{t}_q, c_{i_k}, i_k, r_{i_k}) = 1$  is straightforward from the definition of the  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{EdraxPed}}$  commitment scheme for field elements type.

$\mathcal{E}$  uses the extractor of the commitment scheme  $\text{PolyCom}$ ,  $\mathcal{E}_{\text{PolyCom}}$ , that outputs for each  $k = 1, \dots, \ell$   $i_k, r_{i_k}$  such that  $c_{i_k,1} = g^{i_k} h^{r_{i_k}} \wedge e(c_{i_k,1}, g^\beta) = e(c_{i_k,2}, g)$  or  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{EdraxPed}}.\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, \mathbf{t}_q, c_{i_k}, r_{i_k}) =$

1.  $\mathcal{E}_{\text{Range}}$  outputs  $(i, r_i)$  such that  $i < \#U \wedge \text{PolyCom.VerCommit}(\text{ck}, t_q, c_i, i, r_i) = 1$  which means that  $c_{i,1} = g^i h^{r_i}$ . Since the proof  $\pi$  is verified then  $c_{i,1} = \prod_{k=1}^{\ell} (c_{i_k,1})^{2^{k-1}}$  or  $g^i h^{r_i} = g^{\sum_{k=1}^{\ell} i_k 2^{k-1}} h^{\sum_{k=1}^{\ell} r_{i_k} 2^{k-1}}$ . From the binding property of the Pedersen commitment we get that  $i = \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} i_k 2^{k-1}$  and  $r_i = \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} r_{i_k} 2^{k-1}$ .

Putting them together the extractor outputs  $((y, (i_k)_{k \in [\ell]}, U), (r_y, (r_{i_k})_{k \in [\ell]}, r_f), \emptyset)$  such that  $\text{C}_{\text{EdraxPed.VerCommit}}(\text{ck}, t_q, c_y, r_y) = 1 \wedge_{i=1}^{\ell} \text{C}_{\text{EdraxPed.VerCommit}}(\text{ck}, t_q, c_{i_k}, r_{i_k}) = 1 \wedge \text{C}_{\text{EdraxPed.VerCommit}}(\text{ck}, t_U, c_f, U, r_f) = 1$  and further  $y = L(U)[i] \wedge i < \#U \wedge i = \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} i_k 2^{k-1}$ . It is straightforward that  $y = L(U)[i] \wedge i < \#U$  means that  $y \in U$  which leads to  $R_{\text{mem}}(y, U) = 1$ .  $\square$

### 5.3 Input-hiding CP-SNARKs for Polynomial Evaluation

Here, we present an instantiation of a zero knowledge CP-SNARK for the relation  $R_{\text{PolyEval}}$  presented in section 5.1.

To give an intuition of the protocol we recall that zk-vSQL uses lemma 5.1 to prove the correct evaluation of the polynomial, that we recall below.

**Lemma 5.1 ([PST13]).** *Let  $f : \mathbb{F}^{\ell} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  be a polynomial of variable degree  $d$ . For all  $\mathbf{t} := (t_1, \dots, t_{\ell}) \in \mathbb{F}^{\ell}$  there exist efficiently computable polynomials  $q_1, \dots, q_{\ell}$  such that:  $f(\mathbf{z}) - f(\mathbf{t}) = \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} (z_i - t_i) q_i(\mathbf{z})$ .*

With this one can verify in time linear in the number of variables that  $f(\mathbf{t}) = y$  by checking iff  $g^{f(\mathbf{t})} g^{-y} = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} e(g^{s_i}, w_i)$ , given the values  $g^{f(\mathbf{s})}, \{g^{s_i}\}_{i=1}^{\ell}, \{w_i = g^{q_i(\mathbf{s})}\}_{i=1}^{\ell}$ . We are interested in the committed values of  $f, y = f(\mathbf{t})$  and  $\mathbf{t}, c_f, c_y, c_t$  respectively, that hide them. For this we will use instead the below equation for verification:

$$\begin{aligned} (f(\mathbf{z}) + r_f z_{\ell+1}) - (f(\mathbf{t}) + r_y z_{\ell+1}) &= \\ &= \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} (z_k - t_k) q_k(\mathbf{z}) + z_{\ell+1} (r_f - r_y) = \\ &= \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} (z_k - t_k) (q_k(\mathbf{z}) + r_k z_{\ell+1}) + z_{\ell+1} \left( r_f - r_y - \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} r_k (z_k - t_k) \right) = \\ &= \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} [z_k - (t_k + r_{t_k} z_{\ell+1})] \cdot [q_k(\mathbf{z}) + r_k z_{\ell+1}] + z_{\ell+1} \left( r_f - r_y - \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} r_k (z_k - t_k) + \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} r_{t_k} [q_k(\mathbf{z}) + r_k z_{\ell+1}] \right) \end{aligned}$$

The equation indicates us how to construct the protocol which we present in figure 13.

**Theorem 5.3.** *Under the  $(\ell + 1)d$ -Strong Diffie Hellmann and the  $(d, \ell)$ -Extended Power Knowledge of Exponent assumptions,  $\text{CP}_{\text{PolyEval}}$  is a Knowledge Extractable CP-SNARK for the relation  $R_{\text{PolyEval}}$  and the commitment scheme  $\text{PolyCom}$ .*

**Proof** Below is a proof sketch, which however is quite similar to the one of  $\text{CP}_{\text{poly}}$  in [CFQ19].

**KNOWLEDGE SOUNDNESS.** The proof comes directly from Evaluation Extractability of vSQL (see [ZGK<sup>+</sup>17]) with the difference that here  $t_k$  for each  $k \in [\ell]$  should also be extracted. However, its extraction is straightforward from the extractability of the commitment scheme.

CP-SNARK for  $R_{\text{PolyEval}}$

**KeyGen**( $\text{ck}, R_{\text{PolyEval}}$ ) : parses  $\text{ck} := (\text{bp}, \text{prk}, \text{prk}^\alpha, g^\alpha, g^\beta, h, h^\alpha, h^\beta)$  and computes  $\text{vrk} \leftarrow \{g^{s_1}, \dots, g^{s_\ell}\}$

Return  $(\text{ek}, \text{vk}) \leftarrow ((\text{bp}, \text{prk}, \text{prk}^\alpha, g^\alpha, g^\beta, h, h^\alpha, h^\beta), (\text{bp}, \text{vrk}, g^\alpha, g^\beta, h))$

**Prove**( $\text{ek}, \emptyset, (c_y, (c_{t_k})_{k \in [\ell]}, c_f), (y, (t_k)_{k \in [\ell]}, f), (r_y, (r_{t_k})_{k \in [\ell]}, r_f), \emptyset$ ) : let  $\text{ck} := (\text{bp}, \text{prk}, \text{prk}^\alpha, g^\alpha, g^\beta, h, h^\alpha, h^\beta) := ((g, g, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_T, e), \{g^{\prod_{i \in W} s_i} : W \in \mathcal{W}_{\ell, d}\}, \{g^{\alpha \cdot \prod_{i \in W} s_i} : W \in \mathcal{W}_{\ell, d}\}, g^\alpha, g^\beta, g^{s_{\ell+1}}, g^{\alpha s_{\ell+1}}, g^{\beta s_{\ell+1}})$  and

1. Sample  $r_1, \dots, r_\ell \leftarrow \mathbb{F}$  and compute  $q_1, \dots, q_\ell$  such that

$$(f(\mathbf{z}) + r_f z_{\ell+1}) - (f(\mathbf{t}) + r_y z_{\ell+1}) = \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} [z_k - (t_k + r_{t_k} z_{\ell+1})] \cdot [q_k(\mathbf{z}) + r_k z_{\ell+1}] + z_{\ell+1} \left( r_f - r_y - \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} r_k (z_k - t_k) + \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} r_{t_k} [q_k(\mathbf{z}) + r_k z_{\ell+1}] \right)$$

By using  $\text{prk} := \{g^{\prod_{i \in W} s_i} : W \in \mathcal{W}_{\ell, d}\}$  and  $h$  compute  $w_k = g^{q_k(\mathbf{s}) + r_k s_{\ell+1}}$  for each  $k = 1, \dots, \ell$  and  $w_{\ell+1} = g^{r_f - r_y - \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} r_k (s_k - t_k) + \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} r_{t_k} [q_k(\mathbf{s}) + r_k s_{\ell+1}]}$

2. By using  $\text{prk}^\alpha := \{g^{\alpha \cdot \prod_{i \in W} s_i} : W \in \mathcal{W}_{\ell, d}\}$  and  $h^\alpha$  compute  $w'_k = g^{\alpha \cdot (q_k(\mathbf{s}) + r_k s_{\ell+1})}$  for each  $k = 1, \dots, \ell$  and  $w'_{\ell+1} = g^{\alpha \cdot (r_f - r_y - \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} r_k (s_k - t_k) + \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} r_{t_k} [q_k(\mathbf{s}) + r_k s_{\ell+1}])}$

Return  $\pi = \{w_1, \dots, w_\ell, w_{\ell+1}, w'_1, \dots, w'_\ell, w'_{\ell+1}\}$

**VerProof**( $\text{vk}, \emptyset, (c_y, (c_{t_k})_{k \in [\ell]}, c_f), \pi$ ) : parse  $\pi := \{w_1, \dots, w_\ell, w_{\ell+1}, w'_1, \dots, w'_\ell, w'_{\ell+1}\}$ ,  $\text{vk} := (\text{bp}, \text{vrk}, g^\alpha, g^\beta, h)$  and  $c_y := (c_{y,1}, c_{y,2})$ ,  $c_{t_k} := (c_{t_k,1}, c_{t_k,2})$  for each  $k = 1, \dots, \ell$  and  $c_f := (c_{f,1}, c_{f,2})$

Return 1 iff

1.  $e(c_{y,1}, g^\beta) = e(c_{y,2}, g)$
2.  $e(c_{f,1}, g^\alpha) = e(c_{f,2}, g)$
3.  $e(c_{t_k,1}, g^\beta) = e(c_{t_k,2}, g)$  for all  $k = 1, \dots, \ell$
4.  $e(w_k, g^\alpha) = e(w'_k, g)$  for all  $k = 1, \dots, \ell, \ell + 1$
5.  $e(c_f \cdot c_y^{-1}, g) = \prod_{k=1}^{\ell} e(g^{s_k} c_{t_k}^{-1}, w_k) \cdot e(g^{s_{\ell+1}}, w_{\ell+1})$

Fig. 13

ZERO-KNOWLEDGE. Consider the following proof simulator algorithm

$\mathcal{S}_{\text{prv}}(\text{td}, c_f, (c_{t_k})_{k \in [\ell]}, c_y)$ :

- Use  $\text{td}$  to get  $\alpha$ .
- for  $k = 1$  to  $\ell$ , sample  $w_k \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{G}_1$ .
- compute  $w_{\ell+1}$  such that  $e(c_{f,1} \cdot c_{y,1}^{-1}, g) = \prod_{k=1}^{\ell} e(g^{s_k} c_{t_k,1}^{-1}, w_k) \cdot e(g^{s_{\ell+1}}, w_{\ell+1})$  holds
- Use  $\alpha$  to compute  $w'_k = w_k^{\alpha}$  for all  $k \in [\ell + 1]$
- Return  $\{w_1, \dots, w_{\ell}, w_{\ell+1}, w'_1, \dots, w'_{\ell}, w'_{\ell+1}\}$

It is straightforward to check that proofs created by  $\mathcal{S}_{\text{prv}}$  are identically distributed to the ones returned by  $\text{CP}_{\text{PolyEval}}.\text{Prove}$ .  $(w_k)_{k \in [\ell]}$ 's are uniformly distributed in both cases. For  $w_{\ell+1}$  there is a function  $W$  such that  $w_{\ell+1} = W(c_{f,1}, c_{y,1}, \mathbf{vk}, (c_{t_k,1})_{k \in [\ell]}, (w_k)_{k \in [\ell]})$  in both cases. Since the inputs are either identical or identically distributed, the outputs  $w_{\ell+1}$  are also identically distributed in the case of  $\mathcal{S}_{\text{prv}}$  and  $\text{CP}_{\text{PolyEval}}.\text{Prove}$ .  $\square$

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## A Accumulator Definitions

Below is the definition of Accumulators, following the definition of [FN02]. We insist on public key accumulators, meaning that after the key generation phase no party has access to the secret key.

**Definition A.1 (Accumulators).** *A static (non-Universal) Accumulator with domain  $\mathbb{X}$  is a tuple of 4-algorithms,  $\text{Acc} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Eval}, \text{Witness}, \text{VerWit})$*

$\text{Gen}(1^\lambda, t) \rightarrow (\text{sk}, \text{ek}, \text{vk})$  is a (probabilistic) algorithm that takes the security parameter  $\lambda$  and a parameter  $t$  for the upper bound of the number of elements to be accumulated. If  $t = \infty$  there is no upper bound. Returns a secret key  $\text{sk}$ , an evaluation key  $\text{ek}$  and a verification key  $\text{vk}$ .

$\text{Eval}(\text{ek}, \mathcal{X}) \rightarrow (\text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}}, \text{aux})$  takes the evaluation key and a set  $\mathcal{X}$  and in case  $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathbb{X}$  outputs the accumulated value  $\text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}}$  and some auxiliary information  $\text{aux}$ . If  $\mathcal{X} \not\subseteq \mathbb{X}$  outputs  $\perp$ .

$\text{Witness}(\text{ek}, x, \text{aux}) \rightarrow \text{wit}_x$  takes the evaluation key  $\text{ek}$ , the value  $x$  and the auxiliary information  $\text{aux}$  and outputs either a witness  $\text{wit}_x$  of  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  or  $\perp$  if  $x \notin \mathcal{X}$ .

$\text{VerWit}(\text{vk}, \text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}}, x, w) \rightarrow b$  takes the verification key  $\text{vk}$ , the accumulation value  $\text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}}$ , a value  $x$  and a witness  $w$  and outputs 1 if  $\text{wit}_x$  is a witness of  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  and 0 otherwise.

Further, we give the definition of Dynamic Accumulators, a notion that was introduced by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL02]. Dynamic Accumulators are Accumulators that additionally provide the ability to update the accumulated value and the witnesses when the set is updated, either on addition of a new element or on deletion.

**Definition A.2 (Dynamic Accumulators).** A Dynamic Accumulator  $\text{Acc}$  with domain  $\mathbb{X}$  is a static Accumulator that additionally provides three algorithms ( $\text{Add}$ ,  $\text{Delete}$ ,  $\text{WitUpdate}$ ).

$\text{Add}(\text{ek}, \text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}}, y, \text{aux}) \rightarrow (\text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}'}, \text{aux}')$  takes the evaluation key  $\text{ek}$ , the accumulated value  $\text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}}$ , the value to be added to the set  $y$  and the auxiliary information  $\text{aux}$ . If  $y \notin \mathcal{X} \wedge y \in \mathbb{X}$  outputs the new accumulation value for  $\mathcal{X}' = \mathcal{X} \cup \{y\}$ ,  $\text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}'}$  and a new auxiliary information  $\text{aux}'$ . In case  $y \in \mathcal{X}$  or  $y \notin \mathbb{X}$  outputs  $\perp$ .

$\text{Delete}(\text{ek}, \text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}}, y, \text{aux}) \rightarrow (\text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}'}, \text{aux}')$  takes the evaluation key  $\text{ek}$ , the accumulated value  $\text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}}$ , the value to be deleted from the set  $y$  and the auxiliary information  $\text{aux}$ . If  $y \in \mathcal{X} \wedge y \in \mathbb{X}$  outputs the new accumulation value for  $\mathcal{X}' = \mathcal{X} \setminus \{y\}$ ,  $\text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}'}$  and a new auxiliary information  $\text{aux}'$ . In case  $y \notin \mathcal{X}$  or  $y \notin \mathbb{X}$  outputs  $\perp$ .

$\text{WitUpdate}(\text{ek}, \text{wit}_x, y, \text{aux}) \rightarrow \text{wit}'_x$  takes the evaluation key  $\text{ek}$ , a witness  $\text{wit}_x$  to be updated, the value  $y$  that was either added or deleted from  $\mathcal{X}$  and the auxiliary information. In case  $x \in \mathcal{X}'$  outputs the updated witness  $\text{wit}'_x$ , otherwise outputs  $\perp$ .

Normally, we demand that update algorithms,  $\text{Add}$  and  $\text{Delete}$  are more efficient than recomputing the accumulation value from scratch with  $\text{Eval}$ . However in the publicly updatable setting this is not always possible, while it may be possible when the party holds the secret key. Still in this work we treat public key accumulators.

**Security Correctness.** For every  $t = \text{poly}(\lambda)$  and  $|\mathcal{X}| \leq t$ :

$$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} (\text{sk}, \text{ek}, \text{vk}) \leftarrow \text{GenAcc}(1^\lambda, t); \\ \text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}} \leftarrow \text{EvalAcc}(\text{ek}, \mathcal{X}); \quad : \text{VerWit}(\text{vk}, \text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}}, x, w) \\ w \leftarrow \text{Witness}(\text{ek}, \mathcal{X}, x) \end{array} \right] = 1$$

**Soundness.** A cryptographic accumulator is sound if for all  $t = \text{poly}(\lambda)$  and for all PPT adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$  there is a negligible function  $\text{negl}(\cdot)$  such that:

$$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} (\text{sk}, \text{ek}, \text{vk}) \leftarrow \text{GenAcc}(1^\lambda, t); (y^*, \text{wit}_y^*, \mathcal{X}^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{vk}); \\ \text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}^*} \leftarrow \text{EvalAcc}(\text{ek}, \mathcal{X}^*) : \text{VerWit}(\text{vk}, \text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}^*}, y^*, \text{wit}_y^*) = 1 \wedge y^* \in \mathcal{X}^* \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

### A.1 Dynamic Strong RSA Accumulators

We formally define Dynamic Strong RSA Accumulators [Bd94, BP97, CL02] described in section 4.1. It has domain  $\mathbb{X} = \text{Primes}$ .

$\text{Gen}(1^\lambda, \infty) \rightarrow (\text{sk}, \text{ek}, \text{vk})$  samples an RSA modulus  $(N, (q_1, q_2)) \leftarrow \text{GenSRSAMod}(1^\lambda)$  and a generator  $F \leftarrow_{\mathbb{Z}_N^*}$  and computes a quadratic residue  $G \leftarrow F^2 \pmod{N}$ .

Return  $(\text{sk}, \text{ek}, \text{vk}) \leftarrow ((q_1, q_2), (N, G), (N, G))$

$\text{Eval}(\text{ek}, \mathcal{X}) \rightarrow (\text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}}, \text{aux})$  parses  $\text{ek} := (N, G)$ . If  $\mathcal{X} \not\subseteq \text{Primes}$  return  $\perp$ , otherwise computes  $\text{prod}_{\mathcal{X}} := \prod_{x_i \in \mathcal{X}} x_i$  and

Return  $(\text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}}, \text{aux}) \leftarrow (G^{\text{prod}_{\mathcal{X}}} \pmod{N}, \mathcal{X})$

$\text{Witness}(\text{ek}, x, \text{aux}) \rightarrow \text{wit}_x$  parses  $\text{ek} := (N, G)$ ,  $\mathcal{X} := \text{aux}$  and computes  $\text{prod}_{\mathcal{X} \setminus \{x\}} := \prod_{x_i \in \mathcal{X} \setminus \{x\}} x_i$

Return  $\text{wit}_x \leftarrow G^{\text{prod}_{\mathcal{X} \setminus \{x\}}} \pmod{N}$

$\text{VerWit}(\text{vk}, \text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}}, x, w) \rightarrow b$  parses  $\text{vk} := (N, G)$

Return  $b \leftarrow (w^x = \text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}} \pmod{N})$

**Security of strong RSA Accumulator and Batch-Verification** Collision Freeness of the above Accumulator comes directly from strong RSA assumption. What is more interesting is that the same scheme allows for many memberships to be verified at the same time, what is called batch-verification. That is, given  $x_1, \dots, x_m \subseteq \text{Primes}$  one can compute a batch-witness  $W = G^{\text{prod}_{\mathcal{X} \setminus \{x_1, \dots, x_m\}}}$  and the verification will be  $b \leftarrow (W^{x_1 \dots x_m} = \text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}})$ . Again the security of the batch-verification comes from strong RSA assumption and it allows us argue that for any  $W, x$  if  $W^x = \text{acc}_{\mathcal{X}} := G^{\text{prod}_{\mathcal{X}}}$  then  $x \in \Pi_{\mathcal{X}}$ , meaning that  $x$  is a product of primes of the set  $\mathcal{X}$ .

## B Generic CP-SNARK for set membership from accumulators with proof of knowledge

We show here that any accumulator  $\text{Acc}$  scheme together with a zero knowledge proof of knowledge that a committed value is accumulated, with a commitment scheme  $\text{Com}$ , can generically construct a CP-SNARK for set membership. Let  $\text{CP}_{\text{AccWit}}$  be a zero knowledge proof for the relation  $R_{\text{AccWit}}((\text{Acc}, c_u), (\text{wit}, u, o)) = 1$  iff  $\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, c_u, u, o) = 1 \wedge \text{VerWit}(\text{vk}, \text{Acc}, u, \text{wit}) = 1$ . Consider a type commitment scheme that takes one type for sets that can be accumulated by  $\text{Acc}$  and one for elements of the domain of  $\text{Com}$ . So it is the canonical composition of  $\text{Com}_{\text{Acc}} \bullet \text{Com}$ , where  $\text{Com}_{\text{Acc}}$  is described in figure 14.

$\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, t)$  : computes  $(\text{sk}, \text{ek}, \text{vk}) \leftarrow \text{Acc.Gen}(1^\lambda, t)$  and returns  $\text{ck} := (\text{ek}, \text{vk})$ .  
 $\text{Commit}(\text{ck}, t_U, U)$  : parses  $\text{ck} := (\text{ek}, \text{vk})$ , computes  $(\text{Acc}, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \text{Eval}(\text{ek}, U)$  and returns  $(c, o) := (\text{Acc}, \emptyset)$ .  
 $\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, t_U, c, U, \emptyset)$  : parses  $\text{ck} := (\text{ek}, \text{vk})$ , computes  $(\text{Acc}, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \text{Eval}(\text{ek}, U)$  and return 1 iff  $c = \text{Acc}$ .

Fig. 14:  $\text{Com}_{\text{Acc}}$

Finally the generic CP-SNARK can be seen in figure 15.

$\text{KeyGen}(\text{ck}, R^\in)$  : Generate the  $\text{crs}_{\text{AccWit}} \leftarrow \text{CP}_{\text{AccWit}}.\text{KeyGen}(R_{\text{AccWit}})$   
 Return  $\text{crs} := \text{crs}_{\text{AccWit}}$ .  
 $\text{Prove}(\text{crs}, (c_U, c_u), (U, u), (\emptyset, o))$  : parse  $\text{ck} := ((\text{ek}_{\text{Acc}}, \text{vk}_{\text{Acc}}), \text{ck}_{\text{Com}})$  and compute  $\text{wit}_u \leftarrow \text{Acc.Witness}(\text{ek}, u, U)$ .  
 Then compute  $\pi_{\text{AccWit}} \leftarrow \text{CP}_{\text{AccWit}}.\text{Prove}(\text{crs}, (\text{Acc}, c_u), (\text{wit}, u, o))$   
 Return  $\pi := \pi_{\text{AccWit}}$   
 $\text{VerProof}(\text{crs}, (c_U, c_u), \pi)$  : Return 1 iff  $\text{CP}_{\text{AccWit}}.\text{VerProof}(\text{crs}_{\text{AccWit}}, (c_e, c_U), \pi_{\text{Root}}) = 1$ .

Fig. 15:  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{Acc}}$  CP-SNARK for set membership

**Theorem B.1.** *Let  $\text{Com}$  be a computationally binding commitment scheme,  $\text{Acc}$  a sound Accumulator scheme and  $\text{CP}_{\text{AccWit}}$  be a knowledge sound proof then  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{Acc}}$  is a knowledge-sound with partial opening of the set commitments  $c_U$  for the  $R_{\text{mem}}$  relation and the  $\text{Com}_{\text{Acc}}$  commitment*

scheme. Furthermore, if  $\text{Com}$  is statistically hiding commitments and  $\text{CP}_{\text{AccWit}}$  is zero-knowledge, then  $\text{MemCP}_{\text{Acc}}$  is zero-knowledge.

## C Vector Commitments

A vector commitment (VC) [LY10, CF13] is a primitive that allows one to commit to a vector  $\mathbf{v}$  of length  $n$  in such a way that it can later open the commitment at any position  $i \in [n]$ . In terms of security, a VC should be *position binding* in the sense that it is not possible to open a commitment to two different values at the same position. Also, what makes VC an interesting primitive is *conciseness*, which requires commitment and openings to be of fixed size, independent of the vector's length. Furthermore, a vector commitment can also support updates, meaning that updates in the underlying vector allow efficient updates of the commitment and the opening proofs. We note that in this case position binding should also hold with respect to updates.

### C.1 Definition

We follow the definition of a Vector Commitment Scheme and its security with respect to updates as defined in [CPZ18].

**Definition C.1.** A Vector Commitment Scheme is tuple of PPT algorithms,  $\text{VC} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Com}, \text{Prove}, \text{Ver}, \text{Update})$ .

$\text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda, n) \rightarrow (\text{prk}, \text{vrk}, \text{upk}_0, \dots, \text{upk}_{n-1})$  : given the security parameter  $\lambda$  and the size  $n$  of the committed vector it outputs a prover key  $\text{prk}$ , a verifier key  $\text{vrk}$  and update keys  $\text{upk}_0, \dots, \text{upk}_{n-1}$ .

$\text{Com}(\text{prk}, a_0, \dots, a_{n-1}) \rightarrow \text{dig}_{\mathbf{a}}$  : given prover key  $\text{prk}$  and vector  $\mathbf{a} = (a_0, \dots, a_{n-1})$ , it outputs a digest  $\text{dig}_{\mathbf{a}}$  of vector  $\mathbf{a}$ .

$\text{Prove}(\text{prk}, i, \mathbf{a}) \rightarrow (a_i, \pi_i)$  : given prover key  $\text{prk}$ , a vector  $\mathbf{a} = (a_0, \dots, a_{n-1})$  and an index  $i$ , it outputs the element  $a_i$  in the  $i$ -th position of the vector and a proof  $\pi_i$ .

$\text{Ver}(\text{vrk}, \text{dig}, i, a, \pi) \rightarrow b$  : given the verifier key  $\text{prk}$ , a digest  $\text{dig}$ , an index  $i$ , a value  $a$  and a proof  $\pi$  it outputs 1 iff  $\pi$  is a valid proof that  $a$  is in the  $i$ -th position of the vector that is committed in  $\text{dig}$ .

$\text{UpdateCom}(\text{dig}, i, \delta, \text{upk}_i) \rightarrow \text{dig}'$  : given a digest  $\text{dig}$ , an index  $i$ , an update  $\delta$  and an update key of  $i$ -th position it outputs an updated digest  $\text{dig}'$  of a vector the same as before but with value  $a + \delta$  (instead of  $a$ ) in the  $i$ -th position.

$\text{UpdateProof}(\pi, i, \delta, \text{upk}_i) \rightarrow \pi'$  : given a digest  $\text{dig}$ , an index  $i$ , an update  $\delta$  and an update key of  $i$ -th position it outputs an updated proof that  $a + \delta$  (instead of  $a$ ) is in the  $i$ -th position of the vector.

**Soundness** A Vector Commitment Scheme  $\text{VC}$  is sound if for all PPT adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$  the below probability is  $\text{negl}(\lambda)$

$$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} (n, \text{state}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A} \\ (\text{prk}, \text{vrk}, \text{upk}_0, \dots, \text{upk}_{n-1}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda, n) \\ \mathbf{a} \leftarrow \mathcal{A} \\ \text{dig} \leftarrow \text{Com}(\text{prk}, \mathbf{a}) \\ \text{for } k = 1, \dots, t = \text{poly}(\lambda) \\ \quad (j, \delta) \leftarrow \mathcal{A} \\ \quad \text{dig} \leftarrow \text{UpdateCom}(\text{dig}, j, \delta, \text{upk}_j) \\ \text{endfor} \\ (i, a, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A} \end{array} \right] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

$\text{Ver}(\text{vrk}, \text{dig}, i, a, \pi) = 1$   
 $\wedge a \neq a_i$

## C.2 EDRAX - A Vector Commitment from multilinear extensions

**Multilinear Extension of vectors** Let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a field and  $n = 2^\ell$ . Multilinear Extension of a vector  $\mathbf{a} = (a_0, \dots, a_{n-1})$  in  $\mathbb{F}$  is a polynomial  $f_{\mathbf{a}} : \mathbb{F}^\ell \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  with variables  $x_1, \dots, x_\ell$

$$f_{\mathbf{a}}(x_1, \dots, x_\ell) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i \cdot \prod_{k=1}^{\ell} \text{select}_{i_k}(x_k)$$

where  $i_\ell i_{\ell-1} \dots i_2 i_1$  is the bit representation of  $i$  and  $\text{select}_{i_k}(x_k) = \begin{cases} x_k, & \text{if } i_k = 1 \\ 1 - x_k, & \text{if } i_k = 0 \end{cases}$

A property of Multilinear extension of  $\mathbf{a}$  is that  $f_{\mathbf{a}}(i_1, \dots, i_\ell) = a_i$  for each  $i \in [n]$ .

**Vector Commitment Scheme** We describe the EDRAX Vector Commitment:

**Definition C.2.** Let a bilinear group  $\text{bp} = (q, g, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{RG}(1^\lambda)$  generated by a group generator. Let  $n = 2^\ell$  be the length of the vector and  $2^{[\ell]}$  be the powerset of  $[\ell] = \{1, \dots, \ell\}$

$\text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda, n) \rightarrow (\text{prk}, \text{vrk}, \text{upk}_0, \dots, \text{upk}_{n-1})$  : samples random  $s_1, \dots, s_\ell \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{F}$  and computes  $\text{prk} \leftarrow \{g^{\prod_{i \in S} s_i} : S \in 2^{[\ell]}\}$  and  $\text{vrk} \leftarrow \{g^{s_1}, \dots, g^{s_\ell}\}$ . For each  $i = 0, \dots, n-1$  computes the update key  $\text{upk}_i \leftarrow \{g^{\prod_{k=1}^{\ell} \text{select}_{i_k}(s_k)} : t = 1, \dots, \ell\} := \{\text{upk}_{i,t} : t = 1, \dots, \ell\}$ .

$\text{Com}(\text{prk}, a_0, \dots, a_{n-1}) \rightarrow \text{dig}_{\mathbf{a}}$  : let  $\mathbf{a} := (a_0, \dots, a_{n-1})$ . Computes  $\text{dig}_{\mathbf{a}} \leftarrow g^{f_{\mathbf{a}}(s_1, \dots, s_\ell)}$  where  $f_{\mathbf{a}}$  is the multilinear extension of vector  $\mathbf{a}$  as described above.

$\text{Prove}(\text{prk}, i, \mathbf{a}) \rightarrow (a_i, \pi_i)$  : let  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_\ell)$  be an  $\ell$ -variable. Compute  $q_1, \dots, q_\ell$  such that  $f_{\mathbf{a}}(\mathbf{x}) - f_{\mathbf{a}}(i_1, \dots, i_\ell) = \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} (x_k - i_k) q_k(\mathbf{x})$  and  $\pi_i \leftarrow \{g^{q_1(\mathbf{s})}, \dots, g^{q_\ell(\mathbf{s})}\}$  (where  $g^{q_i(\mathbf{s})}$  is evaluated by using  $\text{prk} := \{g^{\prod_{i \in S} s_i} : S \in 2^{[\ell]}\}$  without  $\mathbf{s}$ ).

$\text{Ver}(\text{vrk}, \text{dig}, i, a, \pi) \rightarrow b$  : parse  $\pi := (w_1, \dots, w_\ell)$  and outputs 1 iff  $e(\text{dig}/g^a, g) = \prod_{k=1}^{\ell} e(g^{s_k - i_k}, w_k)$

$\text{UpdateCom}(\text{dig}, i, \delta, \text{upk}_i) \rightarrow \text{dig}'$  : computes  $\text{dig}' \leftarrow \text{dig} \cdot \left[ g^{\prod_{k=1}^{\ell} \text{select}_{i_k}(s_k)} \right]^\delta := \text{dig} \cdot [\text{upk}_{i,\ell}]^\delta = g^{(a_i + \delta) \cdot \prod_{k=1}^{\ell} \text{select}_{i_k}(s_k) + \sum_{j=0, j \neq i}^{n-1} a_j \cdot \prod_{k=1}^{\ell} \text{select}_{j_k}(s_k)}$

$\text{UpdateCom}(\pi, i, a', \text{upk}_i) \rightarrow \pi'$  : Parses  $\pi := (w_1, \dots, w_\ell)$  and computes  $w'_k \leftarrow w_k \cdot g^{\Delta_k(\mathbf{s})}$  for each  $k = 1, \dots, \ell$ , where  $\Delta_k(\mathbf{x})$  are the delta polynomials computed by the DELTAPOLYNOMIALS algorithm (for more details about the algorithm and its correctness we refer to [CPZ18]).

The above scheme is proven in [CPZ18] to satisfy the Soundness property under the  $q$ -Strong Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.