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Paper 2019/1236
Single-Trace Vulnerability of Countermeasures against Instruction-related Timing Attack
Bo-Yeon Sim and Dong-Guk Han
Abstract
In this paper, we propose that countermeasures against instruction-related timing attack would be vulnerable to single-trace attacks, which are presented at ISPEC 2017 and CHES 2019. The countermeasures use determiner to make operations, which leak timing side-channel information, perform in a constant-time. Since determiner is divided into two groups according to secret credentials, it is possible to recover secret credentials by clustering determiner into two groups.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Side-Channe AttacksTiming Attack CountermeasuresSingle-Trace AttackClustering
- Contact author(s)
- qjdusls @ kookmin ac kr,christa @ kookmin ac kr
- History
- 2019-10-23: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/1236
- License
-
CC BY