Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/081

Practical Group-Signatures with Privacy-Friendly Openings

Stephan Krenn and Kai Samelin and Christoph Striecks

Abstract: Group signatures allow creating signatures on behalf of a group, while remaining anonymous. To prevent misuse, there exists a designated entity, named the opener, which can revoke anonymity by generating a proof which links a signature to its creator. Still, many intermediate cases have been discussed in the literature, where not the full power of the opener is required, or the users themselves require the power to claim (or deny) authorship of a signature and (un-)link signatures in a controlled way. However, these concepts were only considered in isolation. We unify these approaches, supporting all these possibilities simultaneously, providing fine-granular openings, even by members. Namely, a member can prove itself whether it has created a given signature (or not), and can create a proof which makes two created signatures linkable (or unlinkable resp.) in a controlled way. Likewise, the opener can show that a signature was not created by a specific member and can prove whether two signatures stem from the same signer (or not) without revealing anything else. Combined, these possibilities can make full openings irrelevant in many use-cases. This has the additional benefit that the requirements on the reachability of the opener are lessened. Moreover, even in the case of an involved opener, our framework is less privacy-invasive, as the opener no longer requires access to the signed message. Our provably secure black-box CCA-anonymous construction with dynamic joins requires only standard building blocks. We prove its practicality by providing a performance evaluation of a concrete instantiation, and show that our non-optimized implementation is competitive compared to other, less feature-rich, notions.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography /

Original Publication (with minor differences): 14th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2019)

Date: received 24 Jan 2019, last revised 26 Feb 2020

Contact author: stephan krenn at ait ac at, kaispapers at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200226:152531 (All versions of this report)

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