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Paper 2018/999

A Refinement of ``A Key-recovery Attack on 855-round Trivium" From CRYPTO 2018

Ximing Fu and Xiaoyun Wang and Xiaoyang Dong and Willi Meier and Yonglin Hao and Boxin Zhao

Abstract

At CRYPTO 2018, we proposed a method to reduce the Boolean polynomial of 855-round Trivium. By multiplying a polynomial reduction factor, the output Boolean polynomial is simplified. Based on this method, a 855-round key-recovery attack on Trivium is introduced. In addition, we also give a practical attack on 721-round Trivium to show some rationality and evidence. However, Yonglin Hao et al. find some errors in the 721-round attack recently. As a correction, we propose some new right 721-round example attacks based on our method proposed at CRYPTO 2018.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
TriviumNullification TechniquePolynomial ReductionIV representation
Contact author(s)
fuxm07 @ foxmail com
xiaoyunwang @ tsinghua edu cn
xiaoyangdong @ tsinghua edu cn
willi meier @ fhnw ch
haoyonglin @ yeah net
History
2018-10-22: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/999
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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