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Paper 2018/990

QuisQuis: A New Design for Anonymous Cryptocurrencies

Prastudy Fauzi and Sarah Meiklejohn and Rebekah Mercer and Claudio Orlandi

Abstract

Despite their usage of pseudonyms rather than persistent identifiers, most existing cryptocurrencies do not provide users with any meaningful levels of privacy. This has prompted the creation of privacy-enhanced cryptocurrencies such as Monero and Zcash, which are specifically designed to counteract the tracking analysis possible in currencies like Bitcoin. These cryptocurrencies, however, also suffer from some drawbacks: in both Monero and Zcash, the set of potential unspent coins is always growing, which means users cannot store a concise representation of the blockchain. In Zcash, furthermore, users cannot deny their participation in anonymous transactions. In this paper, we address both of these limitations. By combining a technique we call updatable keys with efficient zero-knowledge arguments, we propose a new cryptocurrency, QuisQuis, that achieves provably secure notions of anonymity while still allowing users to deny participation and store a relatively small amount of data.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
anonymitycryptocurrencies
Contact author(s)
orlandi @ cs au dk
History
2019-09-16: last of 2 revisions
2018-10-22: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/990
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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