Nonmalleable Digital Lockers for Efficiently Sampleable Distributions

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Abstract

An obfuscated program reveals nothing about its design other than its input/output behavior. A digital locker is an obfuscated program that outputs a stored cryptographic key if and only if a user enters a previously stored password. A digital locker provides an adversary no information on either with high probability. An ideal digital locker also detects if an adversary mauls one obfuscation into a valid obfuscation of related values. Such a primitive is achievable in the random oracle model or using general purpose non-interactive zero knowledge proofs of knowledge (NIZKPoK) in the common random string (CRS) model. However, there are no known standard model constructions of nonmalleable digital lockers.

Komargodski and Yogev (Eurocrypt, 2018) constructed a simpler primitive: a nonmalleable point function. Security relies on variants of the strong and power DDH assumptions.

This work describes the first nonmalleable digital locker without resorting to generic NIZKPoKs. This construction is built in three steps:

1. We construct a nonmalleable digital locker for short keys from any sufficiently nonmalleable point function.

2. We introduce a new primitive called stocky lockers that augments this primitive to retain security if composed with the same password and maintain pseudorandomness. We show Komargodski and Yogev’s construction suffices to build stocky lockers under the average-case variants of the same assumptions. This composed construction is nonmalleable with respect to the password.

3. We extend to polynomial length keys that additionally provides nonmalleability over the stored key. This extension combines the digital locker for short keys, nonmalleable codes, and seed-dependent condensers. The seed for the condenser must be public and not tampered.

The third step can be achieved in the CRS model. The password distribution can depend on the condenser’s seed as long as it is efficiently sampleable. We view this as a midpoint in removing the CRS. Prior works on nonmalleable hashes/one-way functions/extractors also assume a public random object that is not tampered by the adversary. The other steps in our construction do not require a CRS.

Nonmalleability for the password is ensured for functions that can be represented as low degree polynomials. Key nonmalleability is inherited from the class of functions prevented by the nonmalleable code.

Keywords: Digital lockers; Point obfuscation; Virtual black-box obfuscation; Nonmalleable codes; Seed-dependent condensers; Nonmalleability

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1 Introduction

Obfuscation hides the implementation of a program from all users of the program. This work is concerned with virtual black-box obfuscation, where an obfuscator creates a program that reveals nothing about the program other than its input and output behavior \cite{BGIM1, BGIM11}. Barak et al. showed that a virtual black-box obfuscator cannot exist for all polynomial time circuits \cite{BGIM1}. However, this leaves open the possibility of virtual black-box obfuscators for interesting classes of programs \cite{CD+08, BC+10, CRV+10, WZ17, BR17}. We do not consider indistinguishability obfuscation in this work \cite{GGH+13, GGH+16, SW14, PST14, GLSW15, AJ15}.

Digital Lockers

Our focus is on digital lockers. A digital locker obfuscator inputs a value, \text{val}, and key, \text{key}. The output is a program unlock_{\text{val}, \text{key}}(\cdot) which outputs \text{key} if and only if the input is \text{val}. Privacy says unlock_{\text{val}, \text{key}} should reveal nothing about \text{val} or \text{key} if the adversary cannot guess \text{val}. A digital locker is also known as a multi-bit point obfuscation \cite{CD+08, BC+10}. Digital lockers have applications in passwords \cite{Can97} and biometric authentication \cite{CFP+16, ABC+18}.

A simpler object to construct is a point function unlockPoint_{\text{val}}. Upon creation, unlockPoint_{\text{val}} stores \text{val}, and from then on indicates when \text{val} exactly is inputted to it. An obfuscated point function only needs to hide \text{val} \cite{Can97}. It is possible to compose point functions to build a digital locker (if the point function retains security when composed) \cite{CD+08}. Traditionally, digital lockers have been constructed using the real-or-random construction. It works as so: For each bit of the key, either a random point (corresponding to a 0 in \text{key}) or \text{val} (corresponding to a 1) is obfuscated producing unlockPoint_{yi}. When running the program, the user runs each unlockPoint_{yi}, and the program will either fail when a random point was obfuscated or succeed when the true point was obfuscated.

Nonmalleability

A desirable property of an obfuscated program is nonmalleability. A nonmalleable obfuscator detects if an adversary attempts to tamper the obfuscation into a related program \cite{CV09}, where being related is defined by some family of functions \mathcal{F}. For example, it is desirable to prevent unlockPoint_{\text{val}} from being mauled to unlockPoint_{f(\text{val})}. In the random oracle model, designing nonmalleable digital lockers and point functions is easy: For a random oracle RO one outputs the program RO(\text{val}) \oplus (\text{key} | RO(\text{key})), where RO(\text{key}) is truncated.

While such nonmalleable objects are obvious in some models, Komargodski and Yogev constructed the first nonmalleable point obfuscator in the standard model \cite{KY18}. Their construction follows. Let \text{g} be a fixed group generator. To obfuscate the point \text{val}, the obfuscator computes a random \text{r} and outputs

\[
\mathcal{O}(\text{val}) = (r, r^{g_{h(\text{val})}}), \text{ where } h(z) = z^4 + z^3 + z^2 + z.
\]

Note the nonstandard use of double exponentiation, \text{g}_{h(\text{val})} is first computed and interpreted as an exponent for the base group in which \text{r} resides. The function \text{h} is designed specifically to prevent mauling. Bartusek, Ma, and Zhandry \cite{BMZ18} also showed a nonmalleable point function using random \text{a}, \text{b}, \text{c}:

\[
\mathcal{O}(\text{val}) = a, g^{a_{\text{val}}} + (\text{val})^2 + (\text{val})^3 + (\text{val})^4 + (\text{val})^5, b, g^{b_{\text{val}}} + (\text{val})^6, c, g^{c_{\text{val}}} + (\text{val})^7.
\]

Both constructions rely on strong non-standard variants of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption \cite{DH76}. Bartusek, Ma, and Zhandry \cite{BMZ18} show security of their assumptions in the auxiliary input generic group model \cite{CDG18}. In both constructions, \text{g} is assumed to be fixed; this means that the distribution \text{val} may depend on generator \text{g}. For an obfuscated point \text{val}, these constructions detect if the
adversary creates an obfuscation of $f(val)$ from an obfuscation of $val$ for polynomials $f$ of degree related to the assumed hardness in the DDH assumptions.

The goal of this work is to construct nonmalleable digital lockers. A first attempt applies the real-or-random construction using nonmalleable point functions like those above. However, that approach does not ensure nonmalleability over the bits of $key$. It is easy to permute bits of $key$ by reordering group elements and to set individual bits of $key$ to 0 by replacing a group element by a random group element. Furthermore, these constructions are not known to be composable, and they require strong DDH variants for one-time security. Consider a case when a user encrypts their files with $key$. If the adversary can create $lock_{val, key}()$, the user may use some cryptographic key that is known to the adversary or susceptible to cryptanalytic attack [BCM11].

1.1 Our Contribution

We construct nonmalleable digital lockers in three steps:

Section 3 We show nonmalleable point obfuscators can be converted to nonmalleable digital lockers with a single bit output $b$ (in Theorem 3.1). Let $b$ be the bit key; we obfuscate $lock_{Point}(2 \cdot val + b)$. Opening proceeds by running $unlock_{Point}$ with both values of $b$. This object is nonmalleable for $val$ as long as the tampering family $F$ is closed under multiplication by $2, 2^{-1}$ and addition and subtraction of 1 (Theorem 3.1). We introduce this new construction for two reasons:

1. With the real-or-random construction, an adversary can easily force an obfuscation of a random point. This ensures that each point has only two points that evaluate to useful outputs.
2. It may be possible to extend the construction to longer keys. The real-or-random model cannot be extended to other alphabets. In Section 5, we present a construction that supports log bits in a pair of group elements.

Section 4 Ideally, one could compose a single bit digital locker to build a full digital locker. Unfortunately, obfuscation is not generically composable. Instead, we introduce a new type of nonmalleable digital locker we call stocky lockers. A stocky locker augments a nonmalleable digital locker with a short output with the following properties:

1. It is composable (soundness and nonmalleability hold) as long as the same $val$ is used as input in each invocation.
2. A vector of obfuscations of $val$ is indistinguishable from a vector of pseudorandom values.

Stocky lockers make no attempt to provide nonmalleability over $key$.

We show the construction of Komargodski and Yogev [KY18] directly yields a 1-bit stocky locker. The core of the argument is showing nonmalleability for $val$ when the adversary is given multiple copies of $stockLock(val, 0)$ and $stockLock(val, 1)$.

Unfortunately, the construction of Bartusek et al. [BMZ18] is not composable for the same $val$, as all the higher order terms can be removed by dividing two instances. That is, given $a_1, g_1 = g^{a_1 x^2 + x^3 + x^4 + x^5}$ and $a_2, g_2 = g^{a_2 x + x^2 + x^3 + x^4 + x^5}$ one can easily compute $g^{(a_1 - a_2) x} = g_1 / g_2$ and $g^x = (g_1 / g_2)^{a_1 - a_2}$. The hardness of finding $g^x$ is the underlying assumption used to show nonmalleability [BMZ18, Assumption 4]. It is an open question if the construction of Bartusek et al. can be modified to be self-composable.

As mentioned above, we present a second stocky locker in Section 5 under similar assumptions. This construction supports logarithmic length keys. Nonmalleability for this construction also relies on a
power type DDH assumptions. The essence of the nonmalleability argument is arguing that an unseen val lies in a linearly independent space so it is hard to predict. However, since the adversary may have access to more points (corresponding to different key) the points they “see” form a higher dimensional space. To overcome this problem in our new construction we replace \( h \) with a new function where for each val, different values of key lie in a low dimensional subspace. Let \( \tau = |\text{key}| \), the new \( h \) is:

\[
h(\text{val}, \text{key}) = \left( \sum_{i=\tau}^{4+\tau} (\text{val} + 2)^i \right) + \left( \sum_{i=0}^{\tau-1} \text{key}_j \cdot (\text{val} + 2)^i \right).
\]

Section 6 We present a generic construction of a nonmalleable digital locker from a stocky locker. This construction ensures nonmalleability over both val and key. This step uses several cryptographic tools and requires a public random object. We make no requirement that the distribution of key or val is independent of this object but it must be public, random, and not modified. These guarantees can be achieved in the common random string (CRS) model. We remark on the model below and then explain the used cryptographic techniques.

Remark: A nonmalleable digital locker can be constructed from a digital locker using generic non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (NIZKPoK) in the common random string (CRS) model. Boldyreva et al. considered this idea to build a nonmalleable hash function [BCFW09]. A nonmalleable hash function is a family of functions \( h \in \mathcal{H} \) such that an adversary given \( h(x) \) (sampled \( h \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \)) cannot find \( h(f(x)) \) for \( f \) in some function class \( \mathcal{F} \). Subsequent constructions removed general purpose non-interactive zero-knowledge [BFS11] [CQZ+16]. Several of these works claim to be “standard model” but all require \( h \) is random and not tampered by the adversary. Similar issues arise with nonmalleable extractors [DW09] [CRS14].

Importantly, our construction does not assume independence of distributions from the random object or any programmability in the proof. Furthermore, nonmalleable digital lockers have more stringent security definitions than nonmalleable hashes (such as leaking no partial information). We view our construction as a midpoint towards removing the CRS. We also stress the CRS is only necessary for preventing tampering of key. The stocky locker construction is in the standard model.

Key authentication Composing stocky lockers enable a construction of a digital locker that places each bit of key in a separate stocky locker. This approach does not detect mauling of key. One could prove knowledge of key to keep the adversary from modifying the program. Alternatively, one could append a nonmalleable hash, obfuscating \( \text{key}' = \text{key} || h(\text{key} || \text{val}) \). However, there are two concerns with this approach:

1. This approach assumes that the function instance \( h \) is assumed to random and independently sampled from key and val.
2. Any information leaked by \( h(\text{key} || \text{val}) \) makes it more difficult to show security of the digital locker.

Our strategy is to use a nonmalleable code [DPW10] to ensure an adversary can only tamper to independent values and a seed-dependent condenser [DRV12] to ensure an independent value is unlikely to authenticate. In more detail:

1. We compute \( \text{cond} (\text{val}; \text{seed}) \) where \( \text{cond} \) is a seed-dependent condenser. A seed-dependent condenser has a high entropy output even if the distribution over val is adversarially dependent on the randomness seed. Seed-dependent condensers for efficiently sampleable distributions are instantiable
using collision-resistant hash functions [DRV12, Theorem 4.1]. We note that val can be correlated to seed as long as it is efficiently sampleable. Importantly, seed does need to be randomly sampled and be publicly known.

We then compute \( s = \text{key} || \text{cond}(\text{val}; \text{seed}) \). An adversary outputting any fixed \( \tilde{s} \) that does not depend on the received obfuscated programs is unlikely to match the output of the condenser.

2. To ensure that an adversary is limited to “independent” tampering, we use a nonmalleable code. Let \( \mathcal{F} \) be some function class. A nonmalleable code is a pair \( \text{Enc} \) and \( \text{Dec} \) where for functions \( f \in \mathcal{F} \) the value \( \tilde{s} = \text{Dec}(f(\text{Enc}(s))) \) is independent of \( s \). We set

\[
\text{Enc}(s) = \text{Enc}(\text{key} || \text{cond}(\text{val}; \text{seed})).
\]

In a nonmalleable code, the adversary specifies the tampering function before seeing any information about \( \text{Enc}(s) \). In our setting, the adversary sees obfuscations correlated to \( \text{Enc}(s) \) before deciding how to tamper. We show that nonmalleable codes can be used in a nonstandard way where the tampering function is chosen after seeing the obfuscated values.

Nonmalleable codes provide guarantees when the adversary tampers “obliviously.” We show a technical result that the adversary’s success probability when given the obfuscations does not deviate from oblivious tampering. This also provides obvious modularity in choosing a code.

Constructions using nonmalleable extractors [DW09, CRS14] or one-way hashes [BCFW09, BFS11, CQZ+16] (in place of the nonmalleable code) seem possible. In our approach, the only public randomness required is for seed of the condenser. Using a nonmalleable extractor or hash seems to require a second public value (the extractor seed or hash function description). Furthermore, security definitions for these primitives do not consider the case when the distribution of val depends on the description of the function.

**Bitwise nonmalleable codes** We recommend using a nonmalleable code that detects at least permutations [AGM+15a, AGM+15b]. This is important for ensuring nonmalleability of key, as permutations are otherwise easily computable in polynomial time. One concern about nonmalleable codes is that the adversary is necessarily restricted to low complexity classes, not including the code’s encoding and decoding functions. Note, the construction encodes and decodes the code “in the clear” while the adversary is tampering “in the exponent.”

**Nonmalleable codes with manipulation detection** Recently, Kiayias et al. [KLT18] introduced nonmalleable codes with manipulation detection. Here, the adversary has low probability of producing any codeword \( \tilde{c} \) that successfully decodes. (Clearly, the class of tampering functions cannot contain constant functions.) Kiayias et al. constructed a nonmalleable code with manipulation detection, but their construction requires each symbol of the code to come from a polynomial-sized alphabet or equivalently for each symbol to have logarithmic length. We show in Section 5 a new stocky locker with multiple output bits. With this strengthened object our construction does not need the seed-dependent condenser. However, Kiayias et al.’s construction does not exclude functions which are efficiently computable against our construction such as permutations. If stronger nonmalleable codes with manipulation detection are discovered, we recommend using such codes. Such a result would yield a fully nonmalleable digital locker in the standard model.
**Open Questions**  We present two main open questions resulting from this work. The first is whether stocky lockers can be generically constructed from nonmalleable point functions. The second is whether the CRS can be removed from the full construction.

## 2 Preliminaries

For random variables $X_i$ over some alphabet $Z$ we denote by $X = X_1,...,X_n$ the tuple $(X_1,...,X_n)$. For a set of indices $J$, $X_J$ is the restriction of $X$ to the indices in $J$. The *minentropy* of $X$ is $H_\infty(X) = -\log(\max_x \Pr[X = x])$, and the *average (conditional) minentropy* \cite[Section 2.4]{DORS08} of $X$ given $Y$ is

$$\bar{H}_\infty(X|Y) = -\log \left( \mathbb{E}_{y \in Y} \max_x \Pr[X = x|Y = y] \right).$$

The *statistical distance* between random variables $X$ and $Y$ with the same domain is

$$\Delta(X,Y) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_x |\Pr[X = x] - \Pr[Y = x]|.$$

For a distinguisher $D$, the *computational distance* between $X$ and $Y$ is $\delta^D(X,Y) = |\mathbb{E}[D(X)] - \mathbb{E}[D(Y)]|$ (we extend it to a class of distinguishers $D$ by taking the maximum over all distinguishers $D \in D$). We denote by $D_s$ the class of randomized circuits which output a single bit and have size at most $s$. Logarithms are base 2. In general, capitalized letters are used for random variables and the corresponding lowercase letters for their samples. We say that two circuits, $C$ and $C'$, with inputs in $\{0,1\}^\lambda$ are equivalent if $\forall x \in \{0,1\}^\lambda, C(x) = C'(x)$. We denote this as $C \equiv C'$.

**Definition 2.1.** An ensemble of joint distributions $(X,Y) = \{X_\lambda,Y_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, where $X_\lambda$ is over $\{0,1\}^\lambda$, is average case well-spread if

1. It is efficiently and uniformly samplable. That is, there exists a PPT algorithm given $1^\lambda$ as input whose output is identically distributed as $(X_\lambda,Y_\lambda)$.

2. For all large enough $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, it has super-logarithmic conditional minentropy. Namely, $\bar{H}_\infty(X_\lambda|Y_\lambda) = \omega(\log \lambda)$.

## 3 Nonmalleable Obfuscation Definitions

All obfuscation definitions include a requirement of *polynomial slowdown*, which is omitted for space considerations. Running time of our constructions can be easily verified. For all definitions, we include a tampering function $\mathcal{F}$. The traditional definition can be achieved by taking $\mathcal{F} = \emptyset$. We directly adapt the definition of nonmalleability from Komargodski and Yogev. We do note their definition requires the adversary that is performing the mauling to output the mauling function $f$. See Komargodski and Yogev for definitional considerations \cite{KY18}.

The following definitions use virtual grey-box obfuscation, which means the simulator is allowed unbounded time but a limited number of queries. Bitanski and Canetti \cite{BC10} showed virtual grey-box obfuscation and virtual black-box obfuscation are equivalent for digital lockers and point functions. Frequently in this work, we use distributional versions of soundness, which are also equivalent for point functions and digital lockers \cite{Can97}.

Our constructions require that the challenger can recognize a legitimate obfuscation.
Definition 3.1 (Verifier). Let $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ be a security parameter. Let $O$ be a program that takes inputs $x \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$ and outputs a program $P$. A PPT algorithm $V_O$ for program class $O$ is called a verifier if all $x \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$, it holds that $\Pr[V_O(P) = 1 | P \leftarrow O(x)] = 1$, (prob. over the randomness of $V$ and $O$).

Our constructions consist of tuples of group elements and strings. As such, the obvious verifier suffices.

Point Obfuscators A point function is a function $I_{val} : \{0,1\}^n \mapsto \{0,1\}$ that outputs 1 on input $x$ and 0 elsewhere. An obfuscator preserves functionality while hiding the point $val$ if $val$ is not provided as input to the program.

Definition 3.2 (Nonmalleable Point Function). For security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, let $F : \{0,1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$ be a family of functions, let $X$ be a family of distributions over $\{0,1\}^\lambda$. A $(F,X)$-non malleable point function obfuscation $lockPoint$ is a PPT algorithm that inputs a point $val \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$, and outputs a circuit $unlockPoint$. Let $V$ be a verifier for $lockPoint$ as defined in Definition 3.1. The following properties must hold:

1. Completeness: For all $val \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$, it holds that
   $$\Pr[unlockPoint(\cdot) \equiv I_{val}(\cdot) | unlockPoint \leftarrow lockPoint(val)] = 1 - ngl(\lambda),$$
   where the probability is over the randomness of $lockPoint$.

2. Soundness: For every PPT $A$ and any polynomial function $p$, there exists a (possibly inefficient) simulator $S$ and a polynomial $q(\lambda)$ such that, for all large enough $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, all $val \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$ and for any predicate $P : \{0,1\}^\lambda \mapsto \{0,1\}$,
   $$\left| \Pr[A(lockPoint(val)) = P(val)] - \Pr[S_{I_{val}(\cdot)}^\lambda(1^\lambda) = P(val)] \right| \leq \frac{1}{p(\lambda)},$$
   where $S$ is allowed $q(\lambda)$ oracle queries to $I_{val}$ and the probabilities are over the internal randomness of $A$ and $lockPoint$, and of $S$, respectively. Here $I_{val}(\cdot)$ is an oracle that returns 1 when provided input $x$ and 0 otherwise.

3. Nonmalleability For any $X \in X$, for any PPT $A$, there exists $\epsilon = ngl(\lambda)$, such that:
   $$\Pr_{val \leftarrow X} \left[ V(C) = 1, f \in F, (I_{f(val)} \equiv C) | (C, f) \leftarrow A(lockPoint(val)) \right] \leq \epsilon.$$

Single Bit Digital Locker We introduce a new primitive in order to create nonmalleable digital lockers. We will build a (nonmalleable) single bit digital locker: $I_{val,b} : \{0,1\}^n \mapsto \{\bot, 0, 1\}$. Here $I_{val,b}(val) = b$ and $I_{val,b}(val') = \bot$ for all other points $val' \neq val$.

Definition 3.3 (Single Bit Digital Locker). For security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, let $F : \{0,1\}^{\lambda-1} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda-1}$ be a family of functions, let $X$ be a family of distributions over $\{0,1\}^{\lambda-1}$. A $(F,X)$-nonmalleable single bit digital locker $lock$ is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that inputs a point $val \in \{0,1\}^{\lambda-1}$ and bit $b \in \{0,1\}$ and outputs a circuit $unlock$. Let $V$ be a verifier for $lock$ as defined in Definition 3.2. The following conditions must be met:

1. Completeness: For all $val \in \{0,1\}^{\lambda-1}, b \in \{0,1\}$ it holds that
   $$\Pr[unlock(\cdot) \equiv I_{val,b}(\cdot) | unlock \leftarrow lock(val, b)] \geq 1 - ngl(\lambda),$$
   where the probability is over the randomness of $lock$. 


2. **Soundness:** For every PPT $A$ and any polynomial function $p$, there exists a (possibly inefficient) simulator $S$ and a polynomial $q(\lambda)$ such that, for all large enough $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, for any $\text{val} \in \{0,1\}^{\lambda-1}, b \in \{0,1\}$, and for any $P : \{0,1\}^\lambda \mapsto \{0,1\}$,

$$\left| \Pr[A(\text{lock}(\text{val}, b)) = P(\text{val}, b)] - \Pr[S^{I_{\text{val},b}(1)}(\lambda) = P(\text{val}, b)] \right| \leq \frac{1}{p(\lambda)},$$

where $S$ is allowed $q(\lambda)$ oracle queries to $I_{\text{val},b}$ and the probabilities are over the internal randomness of $A$ and lock, and of $S$, respectively. Here $I_{\text{val},b}$ is an oracle that returns $b$ when provided input $\text{val}$ and $I_{\text{val},b}$ outputs $\bot$ otherwise.

3. **Nonmalleability** For any distribution $X \in \mathcal{X}$, for any PPT $A$, there exists $\epsilon = \text{ngl}(\lambda)$ such that:

$$\Pr_{\text{val} \leftarrow X} \left[ \forall \{C \subseteq \mathcal{F} : I_{f(\text{val})} q \equiv C \lor I_{f(\text{val})} q \equiv C \} : (C, f) \leftarrow A(\text{lock}(\text{val})) \right] \leq \epsilon.$$

As stated in the introduction, we present a new generic construction of a nonmalleable single bit digital locker from a nonmalleable point function (assuming a rich enough tampering class).

**Theorem 3.1.** Let $\text{lockPoint}$ be $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{point}}, \mathcal{X})$-nonmalleable point function obfuscator where $\mathcal{X}$ is the set of all $X$ such that $H_\infty(X) \geq \omega(\log \lambda)$. Then for $\text{lock}(x, b) = \text{lockPoint}(x \mid b)$ is a $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{point}}, \mathcal{X})$-nonmalleable single bit digital locker if $\mathcal{F}_{\text{point}}$ is closed under multiplication by 2, 2$^{-1}$ and addition and subtraction of 1.

**Proof.** We separately argue completeness, soundness, and nonmalleability. We substitute $\text{val}$ for $x$ for legibility.

**Completeness** First note that $2x + b$ is injective in both variables. Completeness immediately follows.

**Soundness** Note no distribution is assumed on the bit $b$. Fix some $b \in \{0,1\}$. Let $Z_\lambda$ be the set of distributions $Z$ over $\{0,1\}^\lambda$ where $H_\infty(Z) = \omega(\log \lambda)$ and similarly define the set of distributions $X_\lambda$ as the set of distributions $Z_\lambda$ where $H_\infty(z) = \omega(\log \lambda)$. Lastly, define the set of distributions $\mathcal{Y} = \{2x + b \mid x \in X_\lambda\}$ where we understand $2x + b$ to be a distribution created by sampling $x \leftarrow X$ and computing $2x + b$. Then $\mathcal{Y} \subseteq Z_\lambda$. That is, for each distribution that lock is intended to secure it is contained in the set of distributions that lockPoint’ is intended to secure.

We show soundness by contradiction. First assume that the construction described lockPoint($x$) is sound. That is, for all $c \in Z_\lambda$ there exists some $\lambda_{p,c}$ such that for $\lambda > \lambda_{p,c}$ for all PPT $A_p$, there exists a simulator $S_p$ such that:

$$\Pr_{x \in \{0,1\}^\lambda} [A_p(\text{lockPoint}(x)) = 1] - \Pr_{x \in \{0,1\}^\lambda} [S_p^{I_x}(1) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{\lambda^c}.$$

In addition, suppose lock$(x, b) = \text{lockPoint}(2x + b)$ is insecure, that is, there exists some $c \in Z_\lambda$ such that for all $\lambda_{c,dl}$ there exists a $\lambda > \lambda_{c,dl}$ such that there exists a PPT $A_{dl}$ where for all $S_{dl}$ using a polynomial number of queries

$$\Pr_{x \in \{0,1\}^\lambda} [A_{dl}(\text{lock}(x, b)) = 1] - \Pr_{x \in \{0,1\}^\lambda} [S_{dl}^{I_x,b}(1 \lambda^*) = 1] > \frac{1}{\lambda^c}.$$ 

For a fixed $c \in Z_\lambda$, denote by $\lambda_{\text{max},c} = \max\{\lambda_{p,c}, \lambda_{c,dl,c}\}$. There must exist some $\lambda > \lambda_{\text{max},c}$ where the distance between $A_p$ and $S_p$ is less than $1/\lambda^c$ while there exists some $A_{dl}$ such that for all $S_{dl}$ the
distance between $A_{dl}$ and $S_{dl}$ is greater than $1/\lambda^c$. Denote by $A_{dl}^*$ one such adversary, that is for $A_{dl}^*$ and all $S_{dl}$ making a polynomial number of queries their statistical distance is at least $1/\lambda^c$. With the goal of arriving at a contradiction we use $A_{dl}^*$ to construct an adversary $A_p^*$ for lockPoint that cannot be effectively simulated.

This adversary $A_p^*$ works as follows, on input lockPoint($x$) where $x \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$, $A_p^*$ initializes $A_{dl}^*$ with input lockPoint($x$). Note this is equivalent to initializing $A_{dl}^*$ with input lock($x'$, $b$) = lockPoint($x$) for $x = x'|b$. Any predicate $P(x'|b) = P(x)$ output by $A_{dl}^*$ is a valid predicate on on $x$. So, this predicate can be immediately output. Thus, $A_{dl}^*$ implies the existence of an $A_p^*$ that outputs 1 with the same probability. That is,

$$\Pr[A_p^*(\text{lockPoint}(x)) = 1] = \Pr[A_{dl}^*(\text{lock}(x', b)) = 1].$$

By assumption for each $A_p$ there exists $S_p$ such that for $\lambda > \lambda_{\text{max},c}$,

$$\left| \Pr_{x \in \mathbb{Z}^\lambda} [A_p(\text{lockPoint}(x)) = P(x)] - \Pr_{x \in \mathbb{Z}^\lambda} [S_p^I(x^*) (1^\lambda) = P(x)] \right| \leq \frac{1}{\lambda^c}.$$

This $S_p$ implies the existence of an $S_{dl}$ that computes any predicate $P$ on $(x', b)$. $S_{dl}$ initializes $S_p$ and for every query from $S_p$ it drops the last bit and asks its oracle the query. It only returns a match to $S_p$ if the returned bit matches the last bit of $S_p$’s query. A formal description is in Algorithm 1. So, the existence of $S_p$ directly leads to the simulator $S_{dl}$ that computes a 1 with the same probability. That is,

$$\Pr[S_p^I(x^*) (1^\lambda) = 1] = \Pr[S_{dl}^I(x^*, b^*) (1^\lambda) = 1].$$

These three equations allow us to state:

$$\left| \Pr_{x \leftarrow X^\lambda} [A_{dl}^*(\text{lock}(x, b)) = 1] - \Pr_{x \leftarrow X^\lambda} [S_{dl}^I(x^*, b^*) (1^\lambda) = 1] \right| \leq \frac{1}{\lambda^c}.$$

This is a contradiction and completes the argument of soundness.

**Nonmalleability** We proceed by contradiction assuming that there exists some ensemble $X'_\lambda$ where $H_\infty(X_\lambda) = \omega(\log \lambda)$, some $A_{dl}$, and some bit $b \in \{0,1\}$ such that there exists some $c$ where

$$\Pr_{x' \leftarrow X'_\lambda} \left[ (\text{lock}', f) \leftarrow A_{dl}(\text{lock}(x', b)) \quad \forall (\text{lock}') = 1, f \in F, (I_f(x'), 0) \equiv \text{lock}' \lor I_f(x'), 1 \equiv \text{lock}' \right] > 1/\lambda^c$$

We build an mauling adversary for the original obfuscation lockPoint. We consider the ensemble of distributions $Z_b = X_\lambda|b$, that is the distribution of $X_\lambda$ with the bit $b$ appended. Note that this is a valid ensemble for the obfuscator lockPoint. We design $A_p$ as follows:
1. Receive lockPoint(x) as input (equivalently receive lock(x’ , b) where x = 2x’ + b).
2. Initialize \( \mathcal{A}_d \) with lock(x’ , b).
4. Set \( f_0(x) = 2^{-1}(x - b) \) and \( f_2(x) = 2 \cdot (x) \). Compute \( f_3 = f_2 \circ f \circ f_0 \).
5. Flip \( r \) \( \xrightarrow{\$} \) \( \{0, 1\} \). Set \( f’ = f_3 + r \).
6. Output lock’, f’.

\( \mathcal{A}_p \) is trying to produce a tampering function on \( x \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda \), while \( \mathcal{A}_d \) is tampering on \( x’ \) contained in \( x’||b \). The manipulations \( f_0 \) and \( f_2 \) are to create a valid tampering function on \( x \) ignoring the last bit. Secondly, \( \mathcal{A}_p \) output a new \( x^* = f(x)||b^* \) where \( b^* \in \{0, 1\} \). Since \( \mathcal{A}_p \) does not know if the last bit of \( x^* \) it outputs each possibility with probability \( 1/2 \). Together these facts allow us to conclude:

\[
\Pr_{x \leftarrow Z_\lambda} \left[ \Pr[R = r] \Pr_{x \leftarrow X_\lambda} \left[ \Pr[(\text{lockPoint}', f) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_p(\text{lockPoint}(x))] \right] = 1, f \in \mathcal{F}, (I_{f(x)} \equiv \text{lockPoint}') \right] = \Pr[R = r] \Pr_{x \leftarrow X_\lambda} \left[ \Pr[(\text{lockPoint}', f) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_p(\text{lockPoint}(x'))] \right] = 1, f \in \mathcal{F}, (I_{f(x')}, 0 \equiv \text{lockPoint}) \right] \geq \frac{1}{2^{n}}.
\]

This contradicts the nonmalleability of lockPoint and completes the proof of nonmalleability. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.

\[ \square \]

### 3.1 Stocky Lockers and full nonmalleable digital lockers

We now present our two main building blocks, an augmented digital locker for short keys that we call a stocky locker and a full digital locker. Our notation for digital lockers is nonstandard as we add an additional step to check if the key should be accepted. Towards this, we introduce a verifier for the output key of the digital locker called the key checker:

**Definition 3.4 (Key Checker).** Let \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \) be a security parameter and let \( n = n(\lambda) \) be a parameter. Let \( \mathcal{O} \) be a program that takes inputs \( x \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda \), \( y \in \{0, 1\}^k \) and outputs a program \( \mathcal{P} \). A PPT algorithm \( \mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{O}} \) (with inputs in \( \{0, 1\}^{\lambda + n} \) and outputs in \( \{0, 1\}^k \)) for program class \( \mathcal{O} \) is called a key checker if it holds that

\[
\Pr[\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{O}}(x, z) \neq \bot \mid \mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{O}(x, y), z \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(x)] = 1,
\]

Where the probability is over the randomness of \( \mathcal{K} \) and \( \mathcal{O} \).

We introduce the digital locker first. The nonmalleable definition appeared in Canetti and Dakdouk [CD08].

**Definition 3.5 (Nonmalleable Digital Locker).** For security parameter \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \), Let \( \mathcal{F} : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \to \{0, 1\}^\lambda \), \( \mathcal{G} : \{0, 1\}^n \to \{0, 1\}^n \) be families of functions and \( \mathcal{X} \) be a family of distributions over \( \{0, 1\}^\lambda \). A \( (\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{X}) \)-nonmalleable digital locker \( \text{lock} \) is a PPT algorithm that inputs a point \( \text{val} \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda \) and
string key ∈ \{0,1\}^n. Let \( V \) be a verifier for lockPoint and let KC be a key checker for lockPoint. The following conditions must be met:

1. **Completeness:** For a circuit unlock define the circuit \( \text{unlock}'(x) = \text{KC}(x, \text{unlock}(x)) \). For all \( \text{val} \in \{0,1\}^\lambda \), \( \text{key} \in \{0,1\}^n \) it holds that
   \[
   \Pr[\text{unlock}'(\cdot) \equiv I_{\text{val, key}}(\cdot) | \text{unlock}(\cdot) \rightleftharpoons \text{lock(\cdot, key)}] \geq 1 - \text{ngl}(\lambda),
   \]
   where the probability is over the randomness of lock.

2. **Soundness:** For every PPT \( A \) and any polynomial function \( p \), there exists a (possibly inefficient) simulator \( S \) and a polynomial \( q(\lambda) \) such that, for all large enough \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \), all \( \text{val} \in \{0,1\}^\lambda \), all \( \text{key} \in \{0,1\}^n \), and for any \( \mathcal{P} : \{0,1\}^{\lambda+n} \rightarrow \{0,1\} \),
   \[
   \left| \Pr[A(\text{lock}(\text{val}, \text{key})) = \mathcal{P}(\text{val}, \text{key})] - \Pr[S^{I_{\text{val, key}}}(1^\lambda) = \mathcal{P}(\text{val}, \text{key})] \right| \leq \frac{1}{p(\lambda)},
   \]
   where \( S \) is allowed \( q(\lambda) \) oracle queries to \( I_{\text{val, key}} \) and the probabilities are over the internal randomness of \( A \) and lock, and of \( S \), respectively. Here \( I_{\text{val, key}} \) is an oracle that returns \( \text{key} \) when provided input \( \text{val} \), otherwise \( I_{\text{val, key}} \) returns \( \perp \).

3. **Nonmalleability** For any distribution \( X \in \mathcal{X} \), for any PPT \( A \), for any \( \text{key} \in \{0,1\}^n \), there exists \( \epsilon = \text{ngl}(\lambda) \) such that:
   \[
   \Pr_{\text{val} \sim X} \left[ \begin{array}{l}
   \forall(C) = 1, f \in \mathcal{F}, g \in \mathcal{G}, y = C(f(\text{val})), \\
   g(y) = g(\text{unlock}(f(\text{val}))), (C, f, g) \leftarrow A(\text{lock}(\text{val}))
   \end{array} \right| \leq \epsilon.
   \]
   where at most one of \( f \) and \( g \) may be the identity function.

If nonmalleability is not a requirement a traditional digital locker can be obtained by adding keycheck as part of unlock.

**Stocky Lockers** A stocky locker is a digital locker with a short key, that is composable with the same \( \text{val} \), provides nonmalleability over \( \text{val} \), and produces obfuscations that are indistinguishable from obfuscations of random points.

**Definition 3.6** (Stocky Locker). For security parameter \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \), let \( \mathcal{F} : \{0,1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda \) be a family of functions, let \( \mathcal{X} \) be a family of distributions over \( \{0,1\}^\lambda \). A \((\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{X}, \rho, \tau)\)-nonmalleable stocky locker stockLock is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that inputs a point \( \text{val} \in \{0,1\}^\lambda \) and string \( \text{key} \in \{0,1\}^\tau \) and outputs a circuit stockUnlock. Let \( V \) be a verifier for lock. The following conditions must be met:

1. **Completeness:** For all \( \text{val} \in \{0,1\}^\lambda \), \( \text{key} \in \{0,1\}^\tau \) it holds that
   \[
   \Pr[\text{stockUnlock}(\cdot) \equiv I_{\text{val, key}}(\cdot) | \text{stockUnlock}(\cdot) \rightleftharpoons \text{stockLock(\cdot, key)}] \geq 1 - \text{ngl}(\lambda),
   \]
   where the probability is over the randomness of stockLock.
2. **Soundness**: For every PPT \( A \) and any polynomial function \( p \), there exists a (possibly inefficient) simulator \( S \) and a polynomial \( q(\lambda) \) such that, for all large enough \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \), for any \( x \in \{0,1\}^{\lambda} \), \{key, \{0,1\}^{\lambda}\}_{i=1}^{\lambda+\rho} \mapsto \{0,1\}^{\lambda+\rho} \), and for any \( \mathcal{P} : \{0,1\}^{\lambda+\rho} \mapsto \{0,1\}^{\lambda+\rho} \),

\[
\left| \Pr[A(\{stock\text{Lock}(val, key_i)\}_{i=1}^{\lambda}) = \mathcal{P}(val, \{key_i\}_{i=1}^{\lambda})] - \Pr[S(\{I_{val, key_i}\}_{i=1}^{\lambda}) = \mathcal{P}(val, \{key_i\}_{i=1}^{\lambda})] \right| \leq \frac{1}{p(\lambda)},
\]

where \( S \) is allowed \( q(\lambda) \) (overall) oracle queries to \( I_{val, key_i} \) and the probabilities are over the internal randomness of \( A \) and lock, and of \( S \), respectively. Here \( I_{val, key_i} \) is an oracle that returns \( key_i \) when provided input \( val \), otherwise \( I_{val, key_i} \) returns \( \perp \).

3. **Nonmalleability** For any distribution \( X \in \mathcal{X} \), for any PPT \( A \), there exists \( \epsilon = ng1(\lambda) \) such that:

\[
\Pr_{val \leftarrow X}[\forall(C) = 1, f \in \mathcal{F}, \exists y \in \{0,1\}^r, I_f(val), y \equiv C| (C, f) \leftarrow A(\{stock\text{Lock}(val, key_i)\}_{i=1}^{\lambda})] \leq \epsilon.
\]

where \( f \) is not the identity function.

4. **Pseudorandomness** Let \( U_{\lambda} \) be the uniform distribution. For any distribution \( X \in \mathcal{X} \), for all \( x \in X \), \{key, \{0,1\}^r\}_{i=1}^{\lambda} \) and any PPT \( D \), there exists \( \epsilon = ng1(\lambda) \) such that:

\[
\Pr_{x \leftarrow X} [D(\text{lock}(x, key_i)) = 1] - \Pr_{y_i \leftarrow U_{\lambda}^r} [D(\text{lock}(y_i, key_i)) = 1] \leq \epsilon.
\]

4 Building Stocky Lockers from Komargodski and Yogev [KY18]

In this section, we show that Komargodski and Yogev’s point function obfuscator suffices to build a stocky locker. Our assumptions are slightly modified to use average minentropy. That is, we assume the adversary may have some side information \( Y \) that is correlated with \( val \). This modification is made because the distribution of \( val \) that depends on a seed of a seed-dependent condenser still has average minentropy conditioned on the output (see Section 6).

Construction 4.1. Let \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \) be a security parameter and let \( \{0,1\}^{\lambda} \) be the domain. Let \( \mathcal{F}_{t,poly} \) be the ensemble of all functions that can be computed by polynomials of degree at most \( t \) except constant and identity functions. Let \( \Gamma = \{G_{\lambda}\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) be a group ensemble with efficient representation and operations where each \( G_{\lambda} \) is a group of prime order \( p \) in \( (2^\lambda, 2^{\lambda+1}) \). We assume that for every \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \) there is a canonical and efficient mapping between the elements of \( \{0,1\}^\lambda \) to \( G_{\lambda} \). Let \( g \) be a generator of a group \( G_{\lambda} \). For known generator \( g \in G_{\lambda} \) our single bit digital locker gets an element \( val \in \{0,1\}^{\lambda-1}, b \in \{0,1\} \) and randomness \( r \in G_{\lambda} \). It then outputs:

\[
\text{lock}(val, b; r) \overset{def}{=} (r, r^g(2val+b)^4 + (2val+b)^3 + (2val+b)^2 + (2val+b)).
\]

Given a program unlock consisting of two group elements \( r', y' \) for test password \( val' \), the user computes:

\[
\text{unlock}(val', 0) = \left( (r')^g(2val'+b')^4 + (2val'+b')^3 + (2val'+b')^2 + (2val'+b') \right)^{\equiv y'}. \]

\[
\text{unlock}(val', 1) = \left( (r')^g(2val'+1+b')^4 + (2val'+1+b')^3 + (2val'+1+b')^2 + (2val'+1+b') \right)^{\equiv y'}. \]

If unlock(val', b) outputs 1 (for either \( b = 0 \) or \( b = 1 \)), then the user outputs \( b \). Otherwise, \( \perp \) is the output.
Throughout our discussion we use $h(z) = z^4 + z^3 + z^2 + z$ as shorthand for the polynomial being computed in the exponent. We now introduce the relevant hardness assumptions. We consider an ensemble of groups with efficient operations where $\mathbb{G}_\lambda$ is a group of prime order $p \in (2^\lambda, 2^{\lambda+1})$.

The first assumption we will use is the $t$-strong vector DDH introduced by Bitanski and Canetti [BC10]. This strengthens the DDH assumption in two ways. First, the exponents are not drawn from uniform powers but rather from a well spread distribution. Second, the adversary is given multiple samples $x_1, \ldots, x_t$, each from correlated distributions $\mathcal{X}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{X}_t$. The only guarantee is on the marginal distribution of each $\mathcal{X}_i$; nothing is guaranteed about the joint distribution. As an example, each distribution could be identically distributed. Here we introduce a new variant of this assumption where each distribution has average minentropy. Note this change is largely syntactic, as the probability of the worst case minentropy being classically distributed. Here we introduce a new variant of this assumption where each distribution has average minentropy.

**Assumption 4.1 (t-Strong Average Vector DDH).** Let $t = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ be a parameter and let $\mathbb{G}_\lambda$ be an ensemble of groups with efficient representation and operations. We say that the $t$-strong average vector decision Diffie-Hellman assumption holds if for any vector $X, Y$ (we elide the subscript $\lambda$) where $X$ is a vector in $(\mathbb{Z}_p^*)^t$ and each $X_i$ is average-case well-spread (conditioned on $Y$), it holds that for every $s_{\sec} = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ there exists some $\epsilon = \text{ngl}(\lambda)$ such that:

$$\delta^{s_{\sec}}(((g_1, g_1^{x_1}, y_1, \ldots, g_t, g_t^{x_t}, y_t), (g_1, g_1^{u_1}, y_1, \ldots, g_t, g_t^{u_t}, y_t)) \leq \epsilon.$$ 

Where $((x_1, y_1), \ldots, (x_t, y_t)) \leftarrow (X, Y)$ and $u_i$ is sampled uniformly from $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$.

The second assumption we will consider is a variant of the power DDH assumption. The $t$-strong entropic power DDH assumption (introduced by Komargodski and Yogev [KY18]) says that increasing powers of a single element $x$ are indistinguishable from a coordinate wise well-spread distribution.

**Assumption 4.2 (t-Strong Entropic Power DDH).** The $t$-strong average DDH assumption is said to hold for an ensemble of groups $\mathbb{G}_\lambda$ with associated generator $g$ if for any average-case well-spread distribution ensemble $X, Y$ (we elide the subscript $\lambda$), there exists a family of independent distributions $Z_{1,y}, \ldots, Z_{t,y}$ giving rise to independent distributions $(Z_i, Y)$ that are average-case well-spread (Definition 2.7), such that for every $s_{\sec} = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ there exists $\epsilon = \text{ngl}(\lambda)$ such that

$$\delta^{s_{\sec}}((g, g^X, g^{X^2}, \ldots, g^{X^t}, Y), (g, g^{Z_1}, g^{Z_2}, \ldots, g^{Z_t}, Y)) \leq \epsilon.$$ 

where the distribution $(X, Y)$ is jointly sampled and $Z_i$ are sampled conditioned on $y \leftarrow Y$.

We now show that Construction 4.1 is a stocky locker. There are two things that could go wrong when an adversary receives single bit digital lockers on correlated points: 1) seeing obfuscations with $b = 0$ and $b = 1$ may allow the adversary to maul, and 2) having multiple samples of points under different randomness may break privacy. To detect tampering, we show security against an adversary that obtains $g^{h(2\text{val})}$ and $g^{h(2\text{val}+1)}$. That is, we don’t rely on the generators $r_i$ in providing any protection against tampering. This argument has two parts (relying on the entropic power assumption): First, predicting polynomials of degree greater than 1 predicts an unseen power and can thus distinguish between powers and random group elements. Then, predicting linear polynomials corresponds to finding a value that is outside the linear span of provided values (which is information theoretically hard in the random case). To show that soundness and pseudorandomness are preserved, we rely on the $t$-strong vector DDH assumption.

**Theorem 4.1.** Suppose that
1. The \( n \)-strong vector DDH assumption holds,

2. The \( 4t \)-entropic power DDH assumption holds,

3. The selected prime \( p \notin \{2, 3, 5, 11, 17\} \). (As \( G_\lambda \) increases these primes will never be selected.)

4. \( X \) is a distribution over \( \{0, 1\}^{\lambda - 1} \) such that \( H_\infty(X) = \omega(\log \lambda) \).

Then Construction 4.1 is a \((\mathcal{F}, X, n, 1)\)-nonmalleable stocky locker, where \( \mathcal{F} = \{f|f \text{ is a polynomial, } \deg(f) \leq t\} \) (excluding constant polynomials and the identity polynomial).

**Proof.** We separately consider completeness, soundness, pseudorandomness and nonmalleability under composition. We substitute \( x \) for \( \text{val} \) for legibility.

**Completeness** This is a direct extension of completeness for underlying point function and the generic transform that is shown in Theorem 3.1 (The crucial fact is that \( g^{h(2x+b)} \) is a one-to-one function.)

**Soundness and Pseudorandomness** Define the random variables \( \bar{X} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{X_i = (X||\text{key}_i)\}_{i=1}^n \). Since \( X \) is distribution where \( H_\infty(X) = \omega(\log \lambda) \), \( \bar{X} \) is a average-case well spread distribution (according to Definition 2.1). Since the function 

\[
 f(x, b) = g^{(2x+b)^4 + (2x+b)^3 + (2x+b)^2 + (2x+b)}
\]

is one-to-one it is also true that \( g^{h(X)} \) is average-case well spread. A one-to-one function can be applied before obfuscation without affecting privacy [KY18, Claim 3.1]. This proof directly carries over to the single bit digital locker setting. The strong vector DDH assumption then says that \( \{r_i, r_i^X\}_{i=1}^n \approx \{r_i, u_i\}_{i=1}^n \) for uniform group elements \( u_i \). This means the construction satisfies a weaker notion called distributional indistinguishability [BC10, Definition 5.3], which says no adversary can tell between obfuscations of related points and independent uniform points. Bitanski and Canetti [BC10] show that this definition implies composition for virtual-grey box obfuscation. (Their proof is for point obfuscators but can be modified for this setting.) Overall virtual black box security then follows using arguments from [CD08]. This argument also suffices to show that obfuscations are pseudorandom.

**Nonmalleability** We first recall that we use \( h(x) \) to denote \( x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x \). In order to prove nonmalleability is preserved, we will show how, given an adversary that can maul our obfuscation given two distinct obfuscations with the same point \( x \), we can create an algorithm that can break the Strong Power DDH assumption. We assume that \( \text{key} \) is a value known to both the reduction and the adversary. (That is, we do not rely on any uncertainty with respect to \( \text{key} \).) That is, we assume that there exists some \( \text{key} \) and a PPT \( \mathcal{A} \) such that for all negligible functions \( \epsilon \):

\[
 \Pr_{x \leftarrow X} \left[ \Pr_{\text{unlock}', f} \left( \text{unlock}', f \right) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}((\text{lock}(\text{val}, \text{key}))) \right) \right. = 1, f \in \mathcal{F}, \exists \text{key}' \in \{0, 1\}^n \land (I(f(\text{val}), \text{key}') \equiv C) \right] > \epsilon.
\]

We show how to construct \( \mathcal{A}' \) that breaks the \( \tau = 4t \) entropic power DDH assumption (Assumption 4.2). Suppose we receive a sequence \( \{g, g^z_1, g^z_2, ..., g^z_\tau\} \) where each \( z_i \) either equals \( x^t \) (sampled \( x \leftarrow X \) where \( X \in \{0, 1\}^{\lambda - 1} \)) or a random group element \( r_i \). We first compute two values:

\[
 y_0 = g^{16z_4 + 8z_3 + 4z_2 + 2z_1} = g^{16z_4} \cdot g^{8z_3} \cdot g^{4z_2} \cdot g^{2z_1},
 y_1 = g^{16z_4 + 40z_3 + 40z_2 + 20z_1 + 4}.
\]
input : $g, g^{z_1}, ..., g^{z_r}$
output: $P(x)$

1. Sample $\text{key} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$.
2. Compute $y_0 = g^{16z_4 + 8z_3 + 4z_2 + 2z_1}$ and $y_1 = g^{16z_4 + 40z_3 + 40z_2 + 20z_1 + 4}$.
3. Compute $\{r_i \leftarrow G, r_i^{\text{key}_i}\}_{i=1}^n$.
4. Run $(f, \{r_{A,i}, w_{A,i}\}_{i=1}^n) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\{r_i, r_i^{\text{key}_i}\}_{i=1}^n)$. If the output is not a function followed by $2n$ group elements output 0.
5. Compute coefficients $\alpha_i$ of $h(2f(x))$ and $\beta_i$ of $h(2 * f(x) + 1)$.
6. For $i = 1$ to $n$
   a. Check if $w_{A,i} \equiv r_{A,i}^{(\sum_{i=0}^r \alpha_i z_i)}$ or $w_{A,i} \equiv r_{A,i}^{(\sum_{i=0}^r \beta_i z_i)}$.
   b. If neither check is true, output 0.
7. Output 1.

**Algorithm 2:** Construction of $\mathcal{A}'$ from $\mathcal{A}$

$\mathcal{A}'$ then computes a vector based on these values:

$$\{r_i \leftarrow G, r_i^{\text{key}_i}\}_{i=1}^n$$

Then $\mathcal{A}$ is initialized based on these values and outputs a function $f$ and a $2n$ vector of group elements $\{r_{A,i}, w_{A,i}\}_{i=1}^n$. We assume $f$ is specified by coefficients (if not, these coefficients can be interpolated using points from the distribution $X$, see [KY18]). We can then use the $f$ provided by $\mathcal{A}$ to check if each point in the vector is a valid single bit digital locker of $f(x)$ and a bit 0 or 1. Details for this check are in Algorithm 2. We proceed to analyze the success of this algorithm in both the real case $z_i = x^i$ and the random case $z_i = r_i$.

The real case In the real case the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ sees pairs $(r_{A,i}, r_{A,i}^{g^h(2x_i + \text{key}_i)})$. This is exactly the distribution expected by $\mathcal{A}$. Furthermore, $\mathcal{A}'$ outputs 1 when the mauled obfuscation is a valid obfuscation of $x$ on some key'. Thus, given the real distribution $\mathcal{A}'$ outputs 1 with probability at least $\epsilon$.

The random case We now assume that each $z_i$ is a uniform and randomly distributed $s_i$ for $1 \leq i \leq \tau$. We assume that the adversary is computationally unbounded and is provided with two points $c_0 = 16s_4 + 8s_3 + 4s_2 + 2s_1$ and $c_1 = 16s_4 + 40s_3 + 40s_2 + 20s_1 + 4$. (We can provide the adversary also with the values $r_i$.) That is, we give the adversary direct access to the value in the exponent. Its clear if no adversary can win in this game, then no adversary can win in the original game.

In order for $\mathcal{A}$ to succeed she needs to compute $c_\alpha = \sum_{i=0}^r \alpha_i s_i$ or $c_\beta = \sum_{i=0}^r \beta_i s_i$ (the vectors $\vec{\alpha}$ and $\vec{\beta}$ are defined in Algorithm 2). If the degree of the polynomial $f$ is greater than 1 this requires computing a linear combination with some $s_i$ where $i > 4$ that is independent of the adversary’s view. In this case, both the distribution of both random variables $C_\alpha$ and $C_\beta$ has entropy $\log |G_\lambda| = \lambda$ conditioned on the
adversary’s view \[ \text{KY18} \text{ Claim 4.4}. \] By a union bound the probability of matching either \( C_\alpha \) or \( C_\beta \) for some \( i \) is at most \( \Pr[\text{success}] \leq \frac{2}{2^x} = \frac{1}{2^{x-r}}. \)

We now move to the case where the polynomial \( f \) is of degree 1. That is, \( f(x) = \mu x + \nu. \) If the function \( f \) is a linear one, then we will show how an accurate obfuscation of \( h(2f(x') + b) \) cannot be formed from the inputs. To do this, we will look at what information about the points that the adversary receives. The adversary receives a multiple linear combinations of \( s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4. \)

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
16 & 8 & 4 & 2 & 0 \\
16 & 40 & 40 & 20 & 4 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1
\end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix}
s_1 \\
s_2 \\
s_3 \\
s_4
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
c_0 \\
c_1 \\
c_2 \\
1
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

The first row of the above matrix corresponds to the linear combination used when \( \text{key}_i = 1 \), the second row when \( \text{key}_i = 0 \) and the last row is the constant group element. As stated, the function \( f \) can be rewritten as \( f(x) = \mu \ast x' + \nu. \) By substituting and simplifying, \( f \) can finally be rewritten as:

\[
2f(x) + b' = 2 \ast (\mu x + \nu) + b' = 2\mu x + 2\nu + b' = 2ax + b
\]

for some \( b \in \{0,1\} \) and \( a \) is a field element. Note we consider this as an existential argument so \( a = (\mu x + \nu)x^{-1} = \mu + \nu x^{-1} \) is a valid assignment for \( a \). We can write the desired linear combination as follows:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
16a^4 \\
32a^3b + 8a^3 \\
20a^2b^2 + 16a^2b + 4a^2 \\
6ab^3 + 6ab^2 + 6ab + 2a \\
b^3 + b^3 + b^2 + b
\end{bmatrix}^T \begin{bmatrix}
s_1 \\
s_2 \\
s_3 \\
s_4
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
c_0 \\
c_1 \\
c_2 \\
1
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

We now show that even for an unbounded \( \mathcal{A} \), this value is information theoretically hidden (given \( c_0, c_1, 1 \)).

**Lemma 4.1.** Let \( S_1, S_2, S_3, S_4 \) be uniformly distributed in \( \mathbb{G}_{5\lambda} \) then define \( C_0 = 16S_1 + 8S_2 + 4S_3 + 2S_4 \mod G_{5\lambda} \) and \( C_1 = 16S_1 + 40S_2 + 40S_3 + 20S_4 + 4 \mod G_{5\lambda} \) Define for \( a \in \mathbb{G}_{5\lambda}, b \in \{0,1\}, \)

\[
C_{a,b} = 16a^4S_1 + (32a^3b + 8a^3)S_3 + (20a^2b^2 + 16a^2b + 4a^2)S_2
+ (6ab^3 + 6ab^2 + 6ab + 2a)S_1 + (b^4 + b^3 + b^2 + b).
\]

Then the value \( H_\infty(C_{a,b} | C_0, C_1) \geq \lambda - 1 \) if \( a \neq 0, 1 \) and \( p \not\in \{2, 3, 5, 11, 17\} \).

**Proof of Lemma 4.1.** We first show that when \( a \neq 0, 1 \), the value \( c_{a,b} \) is linearly independent of the values \( c_0, c_1, 1 \). That is, we show the following system has no solutions \( a_0c_0 + a_1c_1 + a_2c_2 = c_{a,b} \). Since \( \mathcal{A} \) only has access to linear combinations of these variables in order for \( \mathcal{A} \) to properly output some correct mauled obfuscation, they must find a solution to the following:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
16 & 8 & 4 & 2 & 0 \\
16 & 40 & 40 & 20 & 4 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1
\end{bmatrix}^T \begin{bmatrix}
\alpha_0 \\
\alpha_1 \\
\alpha_2
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
16a^4 \\
32a^3b + 8a^3 \\
20a^2b^2 + 16a^2b + 4a^2 \\
6ab^3 + 6ab^2 + 6ab + 2a \\
b^4 + b^3 + b^2 + b
\end{bmatrix}.
\]
where \( \alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2 \) are field elements. Because \( b \) is a single bit (i.e. either 0 or 1), we will examine the existence of solutions under these two possibilities. In both cases we assume that the adversary can exactly solve the last equation using \( \alpha_2 \) as a free variable and consider the following reduced system:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
16 & 16 \\
40 & 8 \\
40 & 4 \\
20 & 2
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
\alpha_0 \\
\alpha_1
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
16a^4 \\
32a^3b + 8a^3 \\
20a^2b^2 + 16a^2b + 4a^2 \\
6ab^3 + 6ab^2 + 6ab + 2a
\end{bmatrix}
\]

**Case 1: \( b = 0 \)** Considering the two by two system formed by the second and third equation yields that:

\[
\begin{align*}
40\alpha_0 &= 8a^2 - 8a^3, \\
4\alpha_1 &= 8a^3 - 4a^2.
\end{align*}
\]

Substituting these values into the fourth equation yields a quadratic for \( a \):

\[4a^2 - 2a = 0\]

This has solutions of \( a = 0, 2^{-1} \). Substituting the solutions for \( \alpha_0, \alpha_1 \) into the constraint from the first equation yields the quartic:

\[16a^4 - (32 + 16 \times 5^{-1})a^3 + (16 - 16 \times 5^{-1})a^2 = 0\]

This equation is consistent with the solutions where \( a = 0 \). However, when \( a = 2^{-1} \), the first equation is only satisfied when \( 3 \equiv 0 \mod p \). Thus, it suffices for \( p \neq 3 \). Since the solution when \( a = 0 \) is considered trivial, nontrivial solutions exist in this case only when \( p = 3 \).

**Case 2: \( b = 1 \)** Again starting with the second and third linear constraints we have that:

\[
\begin{align*}
\alpha_0 &= 2a^2 - a^3, \\
\alpha_1 &= 10a^3 - 10a^2.
\end{align*}
\]

Substituting these values into the fourth equation yields \( 180a^3 - 160a^2 - 20a = 0 \). Which has the trivial solutions of \( a = 0, 1 \) and nontrivial solution \( a = -1 \times 9^{-1} \). However, when \( a = -1 \times 9^{-1} \), the first equation is only satisfied when \( 11968 \equiv 0 \mod p \). Thus, it suffices for \( p \not\in \{2, 11, 17 \} \). Since the solution when \( a = 0 \) is considered trivial, nontrivial solutions exist only when \( p \in \{2, 11, 17 \} \).

**Putting things together** So, regardless of choice of \( b \), if \( a \) is nontrivial, the value \( c_{a,b} \) is linearly independent of \( c_0, c_1 \) and 1. Consider the following system of equations:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
16 & 16 & 0 \\
8 & 40 & 0 \\
1 & 40 & 0 \\
2 & 20 & 0 \\
0 & 4 & 1
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
s_4 \\
s_3 \\
s_2 \\
s_1 \\
1
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
c_0 \\
c_1 \\
1 \\
c_{a,b}
\end{bmatrix}
\]

This system of equations is rank 4 (in the case when \( a \) is nontrivial). This means for any particular \( c_0, c_1 \) there are at least \( 2^\lambda \) tuples of \( S_1, S_2, S_3, S_4 \) that produce any particular value of \( c_{a,b} \). In particular, the probability that \( \Pr[C_{a,b} = c|C_0, C_1] = \frac{1}{2^\lambda} \). Since the adversary has to match one of two values by union bound they succeed with probability at most \( 2^{-\lambda+1} \). This completes the proof of Lemma 4.1. \( \square \)
Thus, in both random cases the probability of mauling is at most $2^{-(\lambda-1)}$. This allows us to state the distinguishing capability of $\mathcal{A}$:

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}({g^i}_{i=1}^\tau) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}({g^i}_{i=1}^\tau) = 1] \geq \epsilon - \frac{1}{2^{\lambda-1}}.$$  

This yields that $\mathcal{A}$ is a distinguisher between entropic powers and random exponents. This contradicts Assumption 4.2 and so completes Theorem 4.1.

5 A stocky locker with multiple key bits

We also construct a stocky locker that outputs a logarithmic number of bits using the same assumptions as the nonmalleable point function of Komargodski and Yogev [KY18]. Encoding a logarithmic number of bits at a time has important implications for ensuring nonmalleability of key (described next). Many nonmalleable primitives consider non-binary symbols.

Suppose that we wish to encode $\tau$ bit symbols in each group element. The most natural idea is to extend our first construction by computing $h(2^{\tau} \cdot \text{val} + \text{key}_i)$. As stated above, in the single bit case, nonmalleability requires showing that given $h(2\text{val})$ and $h(2\text{val}+1)$ it was difficult to compute $h(2\text{val}'+b')$. Under the entropic power DDH assumption (Assumption 4.2) this requires one to show that $h(2\text{val}'+b)$ is linearly independent of $h(2\text{val})$ and $h(2\text{val}+1)$. Roughly, this corresponds to an adversary being given $r_1 + r_2 + r_3 + r_4$ and being asked to predict a sum with different weights. Since there are only 4 $r_i$ with four (linearly independent) constraints, the adversary will be able to predict any value. To address this problem, we introduce a new hash function for symbols $y \in \{0,1\}^{\tau}$:

$$h(x, y) = \left(\sum_{i=\tau}^{4+\tau} (x+2)^i\right) + \left(\sum_{i=0}^{\tau-1} y_i \cdot (x+2)^i\right).$$

This construction ensures that all $2^{\tau}$ different values of $y$ span at most a $\tau$ dimensional subspace and cannot be used to predict the value of the hash function for any $x' \neq x$.

**Construction 5.1.** Let all variables be as in Construction 4.1, let $\text{key} \in \{0,1\}^n$ be some arbitrary value, and let $\tau = O(\log \lambda)$. Then define lock(val, key) as follows: for $i = 1$ to $n/\tau$ compute:

1. Sample $r_i \leftarrow G_{(6+\tau)\lambda}$.
2. Set $z = x + 2$.
3. Output $(r_i, (r_i)^g)^{x^{4+\tau} + x^{3+\tau} + x^{2+\tau} + x^{1+\tau} + x^{\tau} + \sum_{i=0}^{\tau-1} \text{key}_i z^i}.$

Define unlock(val) as follows: for $i = 1$ to $n/\tau$, input $r_i, y_i$ for each $v_j \in \{0,2^{\tau}\}$ compute:

$$P(x, v_j, i) = \left(r_i^{(x+2)^{1+\tau} + (x+2)^{3+\tau} + (x+2)^{2+\tau} + (x+2)^{1+\tau} + (x+2)^{\tau} + \sum_{j=0}^{\tau-1} v_j (x+2)^j} \equiv y_i \right).$$

If $P(x, v_j, i)$ outputs 1 then the user sets $\text{key}_i = v_j$. Otherwise output $\bot$.

There are a few notes about this new construction:
1. Opening checks each possible $y$ value, running time is proportional to $2^\tau$ making this construction efficient when $\tau = O(\log(\lambda))$.

2. Our single bit construction used a polynomial that included four nonzero powers. This construction has 5 powers that are not multiplied by part of $y$. If only 4 powers are not multiplied by a bit of $y$, there are three values of $\tau$ where nonmalleability is not guaranteed. This is because the choice of $\tau$ introduces a new degree of freedom to the linear system. The three values of $\tau$ are solutions to $\tau^3 - 15\tau^2 - 52\tau - 12 \equiv 0 \mod p$. It would be possible to avoid these $\tau$ by checking when $\tau$ is a solution for a particular $p$. Instead, our construction adds another power of $x$, which retains a single bad $\tau$ which is $\tau \equiv p - 5 \mod p$. This value of $\tau$ never occurs for logarithmic $\tau$.

3. To ensure the construction is correct and one-to-one, we restrict $x \in \{0, 1\}^{\lambda - 1}$ and compute powers of $x + 2$. We can think of the construction as taking a sum of a subset of powers of $x$, we need to manually exclude $x \in \{0, 1\}$ to ensure the function is one-to-one.

4. The group operations need to be in a group of size $(6 + \tau)\lambda$ to ensure that operations do not overflow. In the first construction this size is only $5\lambda$.

5. The construction allows a weaker vector DDH assumption at the cost of a stronger power DDH assumption. It thus allows a tradeoff between these two parameters.

6. In the theorem below we only consider nonmalleability over the locked val and assume no distribution over key.

**Theorem 5.1.** Suppose that

1. The $\frac{2^\tau}{\tau}$-Strong average vector DDH assumption holds,
2. The $(5 + \tau)t$-Strong entropic power DDH assumption holds,
3. The selected prime $p \not\in \{2, 31, 41, 73\}$. (As $G_\lambda$ increases these primes will never be selected. We include this condition as the proof does not apply if $p \in \{2, 31, 41, 73\}$.)
4. $X$ is a distribution over $\{0, 1\}^{\lambda - 1}$ such that $H_\infty(X) = \omega(\log \lambda)$.

Then the $(\text{lock}, \text{unlock})$ in Construction 5.1 is $n/\tau$-composable point obfuscation that is nonmalleable for $F = \{f \mid \deg(f) \leq t\}$ (excluding constant polynomials and the identity polynomial).

**Proof.** As before we separately consider completeness, soundness, and nonmalleability.

**Completeness** For completeness first note that

$$(x + 1)^{4+\tau} + (x + 1)^{3+\tau} + (x + 1)^{2+\tau} + (x + 1)^{1+\tau} + (x + 1)^\tau > \sum_{i=0}^{4+\tau} x^i$$

In particular, the binomial expansion of $(x + 1)^{4+\tau}$ has nonzero coefficients on every power $i \leq 4 + \tau$. This shows that for any key, $\text{key}' \in \{0, 1\}^\tau$ and any $x > x'$ it is true that

$$g(x+2)^{4+\tau} + (x+2)^{3+\tau} + (x+2)^{2+\tau} + (x+2)^{1+\tau} + (x+2)^\tau + \sum_{i=0}^{\tau - 1} \text{key}_i (x+2)^i \neq$$

$$g(x'+2)^{4+\tau} + (x'+2)^{3+\tau} + (x'+2)^{2+\tau} + (x'+2)^{1+\tau} + (x'+2)^\tau + \sum_{i=0}^{\tau - 1} \text{key}'_i (x'+2)^i.$$
That is, the value of key cannot cause the obfuscation to unlock on a different point. Furthermore, the function is one-to-one as long as $x \not\in \{0, 1\}$. These cases are avoiding by computing $x+2$ before computing the polynomial. Note that since $x \in \{0, 1\}^{\lambda-1}$ it always holds that $(x+2) \in \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}$.

**Soundness** The privacy argument for this construction is exactly the same as in Theorem 4.1 since the function

$$f(x, \text{key}_i) = g^{(x+2)^{4+i}+x^{3+i}+(x+2)^{2+i}+(x+2)^{1+i}+(x+2)^{0+i}+\sum_{j=0}^{\tau-1} \text{key}_{i,j}(x+2)^{x+j}}$$

is a one-to-one function.

**Nonmalleability** The analysis for the random case when the mauling function has degree greater than 1 are exactly the same as in Theorem 4.1. We focus on showing that the adversary cannot find a function linear $f$ using linear combinations of the known values. We can think of the adversary being given values of following type:

$$\begin{bmatrix}
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \text{key}_{0,0} & \ldots & \text{key}_{0,\tau-1} \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \text{key}_{0,0} & \ldots & \text{key}_{0,\tau-1} \\
\vdots \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \text{key}_{n/\tau,0} & \ldots & \text{key}_{n/\tau,\tau-1}
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
r_4^{\tau+1} \\
r_3^{\tau+1} \\
r_2^{\tau+1} \\
r_1^{\tau+1} \\
r_\tau \\
\vdots \\
r_{n/\tau}
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
c_0 \\
c_2 \\
\vdots \\
c_{n/\tau}
\end{bmatrix}$$

Without loss of generality, we assume that an adversary can perfectly set/predict the powers $x^j$ where $j < \tau$. However, to change the obfuscated point they will also need to change the higher order powers.

We can think of the adversary having to find $\alpha, \beta, \gamma$ such that

$$\sum_{i=0}^{4} (\alpha x + \beta)^{i+\tau} = \gamma \sum_{i=0}^{4} x^{i+\tau}.$$ 

We can write the desired linear combination as follows:

$$\begin{bmatrix}
\alpha^{4+\tau} \\
\alpha^{3+\tau} (\sum_{i=0}^{4} \binom{\tau+4}{i} \beta^{i}) \\
\alpha^{2+\tau} (\sum_{i=0}^{3} \binom{\tau+4}{i} \beta^{i}) \\
\alpha^{1+\tau} (\sum_{i=0}^{2} \binom{\tau+4}{i} \beta^{i}) \\
\alpha^{\tau} (\sum_{i=0}^{1} \binom{\tau+4}{i} \beta^{i})
\end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix}
r_4^{\tau+1} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & r_3^{\tau+1} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & r_2^{\tau+1} & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & r_1^{\tau+1} & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & r_\tau
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
r_4^{\tau+1} \\
r_3^{\tau+1} \\
r_2^{\tau+1} \\
r_1^{\tau+1} \\
r_\tau
\end{bmatrix}$$

Substituting, one has that

1. If $\beta = 0$ then this implies $\alpha^{\tau+4} = \alpha^{\tau+3} = \alpha^{\tau+2} = \alpha^{\tau+1} = \alpha^{\tau}$ which only has solutions if $\alpha = 0$ or $\alpha = 1$. These are both considered trivial solutions.
2. $\gamma = \alpha^{\tau+4}$ (using first equation),
3. $(\tau + 4)\beta + 1 = \alpha$ (using second equation),
4. $(\tau + 4)\beta = 2$ (using third equation, and relying on $\beta \neq 0$).
5. \( \alpha = 3 \) (substitution of third constraint into second equation)

6. \( \gamma = 81 \) (substitution of \( \alpha \) in first equation)

7. \( \tau = -5 \) or \( \tau = -114 \times 31^{-1} \) (solving fourth equation using prior constraints).

Thus, using the first four equations we are able rule out all solutions unless \( \tau = -5 \) or \( \tau = -114 \times 31^{-1} \).

Using the last equation we can almost always rule out this second possibility for \( \tau \). Namely, the fifth equation (recalling that \( \beta = 2/(\tau + 4) \))

\[
\left( \frac{\tau + 4}{4} \right)^4 + \left( \frac{\tau + 3}{3} \right)^3 + \left( \frac{\tau + 2}{2} \right)^2 + (\tau + 1) \frac{2}{\tau + 4} + 1 = 81
\]

This solution is only satisfied for \( \tau = -114 \times 31^{-1} \) if \( 191552 \equiv 0 \mod p \). Thus, it suffices to choose \( p \notin \{2, 31, 41, 73\} \). This allows us to conclude that the adversary’s value in the random case is linearly independent, which again leads to this value having entropy \( \lambda \). Since the adversary only has to match a single value for each index by union bound their overall probability may be as high as \( \tau/2^\lambda \). Thus, in both random cases the probability of mauling is at most \( \chi/2^\lambda \). We note that since \( \tau = O(\log \lambda) \) for large enough \( \lambda \) one can be sure that \( \tau \not\equiv -5 \mod 2^\lambda \). This allows us to state the distinguishing capability of \( \mathcal{A} \):

\[
Pr[\mathcal{A}(\{g^{x_i}\}_{i=1}^4) = 1] - Pr[\mathcal{A}(\{g^{r_i}\}_{i=1}^4) = 1] \geq \epsilon - \frac{\tau}{2^\lambda}.
\]

As in Theorem 4.1 this breaks the \( (5+\tau)e \)-Strong entropic power DDH assumption. This is a contradiction and so completes the proof of Theorem 5.1.

6 Nonmalleable digital lockers from stocky lockers

We now use stocky lockers to construct a nonmalleable digital locker. We combine nonmalleable codes and seed-dependent condensers to check if the adversary tampers over the key value. We use the locked point \( \text{val} \) as input to a seed-dependent condenser as part of the value encoded in the nonmalleable code. If the adversary tampers to an independent value they are unlikely to match the output of the condenser on the real \( \text{val} \). We introduce these tools and then our construction. We first present the notion of nonmalleable codes, introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs [DPW10].

**Definition 6.1.** A pair of algorithms \((\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})\) is called a coding scheme if \( \text{Enc} : \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}^n \) is randomized and \( \text{Dec} : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^k \cup \bot \) is deterministic and for each \( s \in \{0,1\}^k \) it holds that \( Pr[\text{Dec}(\text{Enc}(s)) = s] = 1 \).

**Definition 6.2.** A coding scheme \((\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})\) is called \((\epsilon_{nmc}, s_{nmc}, \mathcal{F})\)-nonmalleable if for each \( f \in \mathcal{F} \) and each \( s \in \{0,1\}^k \), there exists a distribution \( D_f() \) over \( \{0,1\}^k, \text{same} \) that is efficiently sampleable given oracle access to \( f \) such that the following holds:

\[
\delta^{s_{nmc}}(\{c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(s); \overline{c} \leftarrow f(c), \overline{s} = \text{Dec}(\overline{c}) : \text{Output} \overline{s} \}), \{\tilde{s} \leftarrow D_f, \text{Output} s \text{ if } \tilde{s} = \text{same else } \tilde{s} \}) \leq \epsilon_{nmc}.
\]

Seed-dependent condensers were introduced by Dodis, Ristenpart, and Vadhan [DRV12]. Their goal is similar to a traditional randomness extractor, except that the output only has to be statistical close to a distribution with minentropy rather than considering a uniform output. Importantly, it is possible to construct condensers where the adversary is allowed to output the chosen distribution after seeing the seed.
lock(val, key), input in \{0, 1\}^{λ+k}: 
1. Compute \( z = \text{cond}(\text{val}, \text{seed}) \).
2. Compute \( y = \text{Enc}(\text{key}||z) \).
3. Initialize \( \text{Out} = \bot \).
4. For \( i = 1 \) to \( n \) compute:
   \( r_i = \text{stockLock}(\text{val}, y_i) \),
   \( \text{append} \ \text{Out} = \text{Out}||r_i \).
5. Output \( \text{Out} \).

unlock(val), input in \{0, 1\}^{λ}:
1. For \( i = 1 \) to \( n \), input \( r_i \); compute:
   \( y_i = \text{stockUnlock}(r_i, \text{val}) \).
2. Output \( y \).

KC(val, z), input in \{0, 1\}^{λ+n}:
1. Compute \( z = \text{cond}(\text{val}, \text{seed}) \).
2. Run decode \( \text{key}' = \text{Dec}(y) \).
3. If \( \text{key}'_{k...k+n} \neq z \) output \( \bot \).
   Else output \( \text{key}'_{0...k−1} \).

Figure 1: Nonmalleable digital locker preventing tampering over both \( \text{val} \) and \( \text{key} \). A \( \text{seed} \) of a seed-dependent condenser must be public and global.

**Definition 6.3.** Let \( \text{cond} : \{0, 1\}^{λ} \times \{0, 1\}^{d} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{α} \) be a \((k, k', s, ε)\) seed-dependent condenser if for all probabilistic adversaries of size at most \( s \) who take a random seed \( \text{seed} \leftarrow U_d \) and output a distribution \( X_{\text{seed}} \leftarrow A(\text{seed}) \) of entropy \( H_\infty(X|\text{seed}) \geq k \), then for the joint distribution \((X, U_d)\) over \( X_{\text{seed}}\) arising from a random seed \( \text{seed} \leftarrow U_d \), there exists a distribution \( Y \) such that \( H_\infty(Y|U_d) \geq k' \) such that \( \Delta((Y, U_d), (\text{cond}(X; U_d), U_d)) \leq ε \).

Dodis, Ristenpart, and Vadhan showed that seed-dependent condensers can be constructed using collision resistant hash functions. Furthermore, this construction works for \( ε = 0 \). That is, the output has entropy instead of being close to a distribution with entropy. For our construction, we will require \( k' = ω(\log λ) \). Furthermore, for key-nonnatedness we require that \( H_\infty(X|\text{cond}(X; seed)) \geq ω(\log λ) \).

With all of this in mind, we now present the construction.

**Construction 6.1.** Let \((\text{stockLock}, \text{stockUnlock})\) be a stocky locker. Let \((\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})\) be a coding scheme where \( \text{Enc} : \{0, 1\}^{k+α} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n \). Let \( \text{cond} : \{0, 1\}^{λ} \times \{0, 1\}^{d} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{α} \) be a seed-dependent condenser. Define the algorithms \((\text{lock}, \text{unlock}, \text{KC})\) as in Figure 1.

**Theorem 6.1.** Let \( λ \in \mathbb{N} \) be a security parameter and let \( \{0, 1\}^{λ} \) be the domain. Let \((\text{stockLock}, \text{stockUnlock})\) be a \((\mathcal{F}_{\text{single}}, \mathcal{X}, ρ, τ)\)-nonmalleable stocky locker that is nonmalleable for \( \text{val} \).

1. Suppose for any \( s = \text{poly}(λ) \) there exists \( µ, β = ω(\log λ) \) such \( \text{cond} : \{0, 1\}^{λ} \times \{0, 1\}^{d} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{α} \) is a \((µ, β, s, 0)\)-seed-dependent condenser.
2. Let \( \text{seed} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{d} \) be a public parameter.
3. Let \( X \overset{\text{def}}{=} X(\text{seed}) \) be an \( s \)-sampleable distribution so \( H_\infty(X|\text{seed}, \text{cond}(\text{seed}, X)) \geq β \).
4. Let a description of \( G_{5λ} \), a generator \( g \) for \( G_{5λ} \) and \( \text{seed} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{d} \) be system parameters.
5. Let \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{nmc}} \) be a function class. Suppose for any \( s_{\text{nmc}} = \text{poly}(λ) \) there exists \( ε_{\text{nmc}} = \text{ngl}(λ) \) such that \((\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})\) is an \((ε_{\text{nmc}}, s_{\text{nmc}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{nmc}})\) nonmalleable code.

Then \((\text{lock}, \text{unlock})\) in Construction 6.1 is point nonmalleable for \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{single}} \) and key nonmalleable for \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{nmc}} \). In particular, \((\text{lock}, \text{unlock})\) is a \((\mathcal{F}_{\text{single}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{nmc}}, \mathcal{X})\)-nonmalleable digital locker.

**Proof.** Completeness and soundness follow from the underlying properties of the stocky locker. Suppose that \( ε_{\text{pr}} \) is the negligible function for the pseudorandomness condition of the stocky locker and \( ε_{\text{stock,nm}} \) is
the negligible function for the nonmalleable condition of the stocky locker. We will show that the overall malleability denoted by $\epsilon$ is at most

$$\epsilon \leq \epsilon_{pr} + \epsilon_{stock,nm} + 2^{-\beta} + \epsilon_{nmc}.$$  

Let $\mathcal{M}$ be a mauling adversary for the overall digital locker. Note that for $f$ output by $\mathcal{M}$ the probability that $f \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{single}}$ and $f$ is not the identity is at most $\epsilon_{stock,nm}$. Suppose not, then there is some $key^*$ where this is the case. One can construct a mauling adversary $\mathcal{M}'$ for stocky lockers by computing $y = \text{Enc}(key^* || z)$ where $z = \text{cond}(\text{val}, \text{seed})$, running $\mathcal{M}$ on the collection of stocky lockers and picking an arbitrary stocky locker that is output by $\mathcal{M}$ and forwarding the function $f$.

Thus, if the probability that $\mathcal{M}$ succeeds in breaking the nonmalleability condition is greater than $\epsilon$ this implies that it outputs $f$ that is the identity and $g \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{nmc}}$ and not the identity with probability greater than $\epsilon - \epsilon_{stock,pr} = \epsilon_{stock,pr} + 2^{-\beta} + \epsilon_{nmc}$.

We now show that this contradicts the security of the nonmalleable code. We show this through a theorem (which may be of independent interest) that allows us to use nonmalleable codes in a nontraditional way where the adversary is provided with pseudorandom information that is correlated to the encoded codeword before choosing which function $g \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{nmc}}$ to tamper with. We first define an adaptive tampering experiment as follows for arbitrary distributions $X,Y,Z$ and binary predicate $\text{Test}$:

$$\text{Experiment } \text{Exp}_{\text{ad,nmc}}^{X,Y,Z,A,\text{Test}} :$$
Sample $(x,y,z) \leftarrow (X,Y,Z)$
Sample $f \leftarrow A(x)$.
If $f \not\in \mathcal{F}_{\text{nmc}}$ output 0.
If $f(y) = y$ output 0.
If $\text{Test}(f(y),z)$ output 1.
Else output 0.

Theorem 6.2. Let $Z \in \{0,1\}^\alpha$ be a distribution such that $H_\infty(Z) \geq \beta$. Let $(\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be a $(\epsilon_{nmc}, s_{nmc}, \mathcal{F})$ nonmalleable code and $\text{Enc} : \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}^n$ where $k = \alpha + \gamma$. Let $key \in \{0,1\}^\gamma$, define the distribution $Y_{key}$ by sampling $z \leftarrow Z$ and computing $\text{Enc}(key, z)$. For inputs $y$ and $z$, define $\text{Test}(y,z) = 1$ if and only if $\text{Dec}(y)_{\gamma..(\gamma+\alpha-1)} = z$. Suppose that

1. For all $f \in \mathcal{F}$ it is possible to compute $f$ in a circuit of size at most $s_{\mathcal{F},\text{eval}}$.
2. It is possible to evaluate $\text{Test}$ using a circuit of size at most $|\text{Test}|$ and $s_{nmc} > |\text{Test}|$.
3. For a function $f$ it is possible to check if $f \in \mathcal{F}$ in size at most $s_{\mathcal{F},\text{check}}$. Furthermore, this check is correct with probability 1.
4. $X$ be an arbitrary distribution over $\mathcal{M}$ such that

$$\delta^{D_{pr}}((X,Y_{key},Z),(U_{\mathcal{M}},Y_{key},Z)) \leq \epsilon_{pr}.$$  

Then for all $A$ of size $s$ it holds that

$$\Pr\left[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{F},X,Y,Z,A}^{\text{ad,nmc}} = 1\right] \leq 2^{-\beta} + \epsilon_{nmc} + \epsilon_{pr}.$$  

Here $s = \min\{s_{pr} - |\text{Test}| - s_{\mathcal{F},\text{eval}} - s_{\mathcal{F},\text{check}}, s_{nmc}\}$.  

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The above theorem says that providing an adversary with some information $X$ that may be correlated to the encoded codeword $Y$ is not harmful as long as $X$ is pseudorandom in the presence of $Y$. Crucially, it must be possible to test if the adversary tampers to an independent codeword. This necessitates the use of the auxiliary distribution $Z$ that is part of the value encoded in $Y$. (In our construction $Z$ is the output of a seed-dependent condenser applied to val.)

Before proving Theorem 6.2 we show how Theorem 6.1 follows from Theorem 6.2. Let $W$ be some distribution with entropy at least $\mu$. Set the random variables as follows:

$Z \overset{\text{def}}{=} \text{cond}(\text{seed}, W),$

$Y \overset{\text{def}}{=} \text{Enc}(\text{key}||Z),$

$X \overset{\text{def}}{=} \text{lock}(W, Y)$

Then by security of the seed dependent condenser $H_\infty(W|Y, Z) \geq H_\infty(W|\text{seed, cond}(\text{seed}, W)) \geq \beta$. Thus, the conditional distribution $W|Y, Z$ is in the class $\mathcal{X}$. By pseudorandomness of the stocky locker one has that for any $s = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ there exists some $\epsilon_{\text{stock, pr}} = \text{ngl}(\lambda)$ such that,

$$\delta^D((X, Y, Z), (U, Y, Z)) \leq \epsilon_{\text{stock, pr}}.$$ 

Thus, the assumptions of Theorem 6.2 are satisfied. One can then conclude that

$$\Pr \left[ \text{Exp}^{\text{ad-nmc}}_{F, X, Y, Z, A} = 1 \right] \leq 2^{-\beta} + \epsilon_{\text{nmc}} + \epsilon_{\text{pr}}.$$ 

It remains to show that

$$\Pr_{\text{val} \leftarrow X} \left[ \mathcal{V}(C) = 1, f \in \mathcal{F}, g \in \mathcal{G}, y = C(f(\text{val})),
\begin{array}{c}
g(y) = g(\text{unlock}(f(\text{val}))),
(C, f, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{lock}(\text{val}))
\end{array}
\right] \leq 2^{-\beta} + \epsilon_{\text{nmc}} + \epsilon_{\text{pr}},$$ 

when $f$ is the identity function and $g$ is not. Suppose that there exists some $\mathcal{A}$ that wins the above game with probability greater than $\epsilon' = 2^{-\beta} + \epsilon_{\text{nmc}} + \epsilon_{\text{pr}}$. Note that Test outputs 1 with the same probability as KC outputting a value other than $\bot$. Thus, we can build an adversary $\mathcal{A}'$ that breaks the conditions of Theorem 6.2 by running $\mathcal{A}$ on input $\text{lock}(\text{val})$ receiving the outputs $C, f, g$ and outputting just $g$. This adversary is a valid adversary for $\text{Exp}^{\text{ad-nmc}}_{F, X, Y, Z, A}$. This completes the proof of how Theorem 6.1 follows from Theorem 6.2. We now proceed to the proof of Theorem 6.2.

Proof of Theorem 6.2. We begin by defining a standard nonmalleable code experiment with a simulator for a function $f$ defined by a distribution $D_f(\cdot)$:

**Experiment $\text{Exp}^{\text{sim}}_{f, Z, D_f}$:**

Sample $\tilde{s} \leftarrow D_f(\cdot), z \leftarrow Z$

If $\tilde{s} = \text{same}$ output 0.

If Test($\tilde{s}, z) = 1$ output 1.

Else output 0.

**Lemma 6.1.** Suppose that $H_\infty(Z) \geq \beta$, for any $f$, $\Pr[\text{Exp}^{\text{sim}}_{f, Z, D_f}(k) = 1] \leq 2^{-\beta}$.

**Proof of Lemma 6.1.** We note that whenever $\tilde{s} = \text{same}$ the output of the experiment is 0. Thus, we can restrict our attention to cases when $\tilde{s} \neq \text{same}$. Then $\Pr[Z = \tilde{s}_{k-\alpha..k}] \leq 2^{-H_\infty(Z)} = 2^{-\beta}$. This completes the proof of Lemma 6.1.
We will now argue that the adversary in the adaptive adversary does not perform substantially better than in the simulated experiment. We use a hybrid argument with two intermediate games, $\text{Exp}^1_{F,Y,Z,A}$ and $\text{Exp}^2_{F,X,Y,Z,A}$. In moving from $\text{Exp}^{\text{ad-nmc}}_{F,X,Y,Z,A}$ to $\text{Exp}^1_{F,Y,Z,A}$ we will replace the distribution $X$ with a random distribution that is uncorrelated to $Y,Z$. In $\text{Exp}^2_{F,Y,Z}$ we will eliminate the uniform distribution as input and move from the adversary picking a function to defining the experiment for a particular function $f$. Finally in moving to $\text{Exp}^{\text{sim}}_{f,Z,D}(k)$ we will rely on the hardness of nonmalleable codes. The two experiments are described formally below.

**Experiment $\text{Exp}^1_{F,Y,Z,A}$:**
1. Sample $(y,z) \leftarrow (Y,Z)$
2. Sample $u \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$.
3. Sample $f \leftarrow A(u)$.
4. If $f \notin F$ output 0.
5. If $f(y) = y$ output 0.
6. Output $\text{Test}(f(y), z)$.

**Experiment $\text{Exp}^2_{f,Y,Z}$:**
1. Sample $(y,z) \leftarrow (Y,Z)$
2. If $f(y) = y$ output 0.
3. Output $\text{Test}(f(y), z)$.

We now show each of these games are computationally close.

**Lemma 6.2.** Suppose that
1. For each $f \in F$, the function $f$ is computable in size at most $s_F$.
2. For $f$ it is possible to correctly check $f \in F$ in size $s_{F,\text{check}}$.
3. That $\delta^{\text{pr}}((X,Y_{\text{key}},Z),(U_{\mathcal{M}},Y_{\text{key}},Z)) \leq \epsilon_{\text{pr}}$.

Then for $A$ of size at most $s_{\text{pr}} - |\text{Test}| - s_{F,\text{eval}} - s_{F,\text{check}}$,

$$|\Pr[\text{Exp}^{\text{ad-nmc}}_{F,X,Y,Z,A}(k) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}^1_{F,Y,Z,A}(k) = 1]| \leq \epsilon_{\text{pr}}.$$ 

**Proof of Lemma 6.2.** Suppose not. That is, suppose that there exists an $A$ of size at most $s_{\text{pr}} - |\text{Test}| - s_{F,\text{eval}} - s_{F,\text{check}}$ such that

$$|\Pr[\text{Exp}^{\text{ad-nmc}}_{F,X,Y,Z,A} = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}^1_{F,Y,Z,A} = 1]| > \epsilon_{\text{pr}}.$$ 

Then the following program $D$ (of size at most $s_{\text{pr}}$) is a distinguisher for $((X,Y,Z)$ and $(U_{\mathcal{M}},Y,Z))$:
1. On input $x,y,z$.
2. Run $f \leftarrow A(x)$.
3. If $f \notin F$ or $f(y) = y$ output 0.
4. Else output $\text{Test}(f(y), z)$.

That is,

$$|\Pr[D(X,Y,Z) = 1] - \Pr[D(U_{\mathcal{M}},Y,Z) = 1]|$$

$$= \left|\Pr[\text{Exp}^{\text{ad-nmc}}_{F,X,Y,Z,A} = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}^1_{F,Y,Z,A} = 1]\right| > \epsilon_{\text{pr}}.$$ 

This contradicts the pseudorandomness of $X|(Y,Z)$ and completes the proof of Lemma 6.2. \qed
Lemma 6.3. There exists some $f \in \mathcal{F}$ such that for any $A$ (here $A$ need not be computationally bounded):

$$\Pr[\text{Exp}^2_{f, Y, Z}(k) = 1] \geq \Pr[\text{Exp}^1_{f, Y, Z, A}(k) = 1].$$

Proof of Lemma 6.3. First we consider the circuits $A$ that always output $f \in \mathcal{F}$. Given any $A$ that outputs an $f \not\in \mathcal{F}$ we can design another $A'$ that runs $f \leftarrow \mathcal{F}$ and simply outputs a fixed $f' \in \mathcal{F}$ whenever $f \not\in \mathcal{F}$. This $A'$ does not perform worse in $\text{Exp}^1$ than $A$.

Now consider some $A$ that always outputs functions $f \in \mathcal{F}$. There is a distribution $D_A$ that outputs exactly the distribution that is output by $A$. Note that this distribution is independent of $y$. Note that

$$\Pr[\text{Exp}^1_{f, Y, Z, A}(k) = 1] = \sum_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \Pr[D_A = f] \Pr[(y, z) \leftarrow (Y, Z) \mid f(y) \neq y \land \text{Test}(y, z) = 1].$$

Now suppose that for all $f \in \mathcal{F}$,

$$\Pr[\text{Exp}^2_{f, Y, Z}(k) = 1] < \Pr[\text{Exp}^1_{f, Y, Z, A}(k) = 1].$$

Then one has

$$\Pr[\text{Exp}^1_{f, Y, Z, A}(k) = 1] = \sum_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \Pr[D_A = f] \Pr[(y, z) \leftarrow (Y, Z) \mid f(y) \neq y \land \text{Test}(y, z) = 1]$$

$$= \sum_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \Pr[D_A = f] \Pr[\text{Exp}^2_{f, Y, Z} = 1]$$

$$< \sum_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \Pr[D_A = f] \Pr[\text{Exp}^1_{f, Y, Z, A} = 1]$$

$$= \Pr[\text{Exp}^1_{f, Y, Z, A} = 1]$$

This is a contradiction and completes the proof of Lemma 6.3.

Before showing distinguishability of the last two games we consider the definition of nonmalleable codes where the encoded secret is drawn from a distribution instead of considering a single point:

Lemma 6.4. Let $(\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be a $(\epsilon_{nmc}, s_{nmc})$-nonmalleable code for functions in $\mathcal{F}$. Then for any distribution $Z$ over points in $\{0, 1\}^k$ it holds that

$$\delta^{D_{s_{nmc}}}(\{(c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(Z); \overline{c} \leftarrow f(c), \overline{s} = \text{Dec}(\overline{c}) : \text{Output } \overline{s}\}, Z),$$

$$\{(\tilde{s} \leftarrow D_f, \text{Output } Z \text{ if } \tilde{s} = \text{same else } \tilde{s}\}, Z)) \leq \epsilon_{nmc}.$$

Proof of Lemma 6.4. Suppose not, that is there exists some $Z$ for which the statement is not true. In particular, there must be some $z \in Z$ where $\Pr[Z = z] > 0$ such that there exists $D_{s_{nmc}},$

$$\delta^{D_{s_{nmc}}}(\{(c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(z); \overline{c} \leftarrow f(c), \overline{s} = \text{Dec}(\overline{c}) : \text{Output } \overline{s}\}, z),$$

$$\{(\tilde{s} \leftarrow D_f, \text{Output } z \text{ if } \tilde{s} = \text{same else } \tilde{s}\}, z)$$

$$> \epsilon_{nmc}.$$ 

This contradicts security of the nonmalleable code. 

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With this distributional version of security for nonmalleable codes we can turn to indistinguishability of the last two games.

**Lemma 6.5.** For every $f \in F$, if $s_{nmc} \geq |\text{Test}|$ then

$$\left| \Pr[\text{Exp}_{f, Z, D}^{\text{sim}}(k) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{f, Y, Z}^{2}(k) = 1] \right| \leq \epsilon_{nmc}.$$ 

**Proof of Lemma 6.5.** Suppose not, that is suppose that there exists some $f \in F$ such that

$$\left| \Pr[\text{Exp}_{f, Z, D}^{\text{sim}}(k) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{f, Y, Z}^{2}(k) = 1] \right| > \epsilon_{nmc}.$$ 

Then we have a distinguisher $D$ (of size $|\text{Test}|$) for the distributional version of nonmalleable code security guarantee 1) input $\tilde{s}, z$ and 2) Compute $\text{Test}(\tilde{s}, z)$. This completes the proof of Lemma 6.5. □

Combining Lemmas 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.5 completes the proof of Theorem 6.2 and completes the proof of Theorem 6.1. □

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**References**


