


Efficient Ratcheting: Almost-Optimal Guarantees for Secure Messaging

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Abstract. In the era of mass surveillance and information breaches, privacy of Internet communication, and messaging in particular, is a growing concern. As secure messaging protocols are executed on the not-so-secure end-user devices, and because their sessions are long-lived, they aim to guarantee strong security even if secret states and local randomness can be exposed.

The most basic security properties, including forward secrecy, can be achieved using standard techniques such as authenticated encryption. Modern protocols, such as Signal, go one step further and additionally provide the so-called backward secrecy, or healing from state exposures. These additional guarantees come at the price of a slight efficiency loss (they require public-key primitives).

On the opposite side of the spectrum is the work by Jaeger and Stepanovs and by Poettering and Roesler, which characterizes the optimal security a secure-messaging scheme can achieve. However, their proof-of-concept constructions suffer from an extreme efficiency loss compared to Signal. Moreover, this caveat seems inherent.

In this paper, we explore the area in between. That is, our starting point are the basic, efficient constructions. We then ask the question: how far can we go towards the optimal security without losing too much efficiency? We present a construction with guarantees much stronger than those achieved by Signal, and slightly weaker than optimal, yet its efficiency is closer to that of Signal (we only use standard public-key cryptography). On a technical level, achieving optimal guarantees inherently requires key-updating public-key primitives, where the update information is allowed to be public. We consider secret update information instead. Since a state exposure temporally breaks confidentiality, we carefully design such secretly-updatable primitives whose security degrades gracefully if the supposedly secret update information leaks.

1 Introduction and Motivation

1.1 Motivation

The goal of a secure-messaging protocol is to allow two parties, which we from now on call Alice and Bob, to securely exchange messages over asynchronous

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communication channels in any arbitrary interleaving, without an adversary being able to read, alter, or inject new messages.

Since mobile devices have become a ubiquitous part of our lives, secure-messaging protocols are almost always run on such end-user devices. It is generally known, however, that such devices are often not very powerful and vulnerable to all kinds of attacks, including viruses which compromise memory contents, corrupted randomness generators, and many more [15, 14]. What makes it even worse is the fact that the sessions are usually long-lived, which requires storing the session-related secret information for long periods of time. In this situation it becomes essential to design protocols that provide some security guarantees even in the setting where the memory contents and intermediate values of computation (including the randomness) can be exposed.

The security guarantee which is easiest to provide is *forward secrecy*, which, in case of an exposure, protects confidentiality of previously exchanged messages. It can be achieved using symmetric primitives, such as stateful authenticated encryption [2].

Further, one can consider *healing* (also known as post-compromise recovery or backward secrecy). Roughly, this means that if after a compromise the parties manage to exchange a couple of messages, then the security is restored.¹ Providing this property was the design goal for some modern protocols, such as OTR [6] and Signal [1]. The price for additional security is a loss of efficiency: in both of the above protocols the parties regularly perform a Diffie-Hellman key exchange (public-key cryptography is necessary for healing). Moreover, the above technique does not achieve optimal post-compromise recovery (in particular, healing takes at least one full round-trip). The actual security achieved by Signal was recently analyzed by Cohn-Gordon et al. [8].

This raises a more conceptual question: what security guarantees of secure messaging are even possible to achieve? This question was first formulated by Bellare et al. [5], who abstract the concept of *ratcheting* and formalize the notions of ratcheted key exchange and communication. However, they only consider a very limited setting, where the exposures only affect the state of one of the parties. More recently, Jaeger and Stepanovs [13], and Poettering and Rösler [16] both formulate the optimal security guarantees achievable by secure messaging. To this end, they start with a utopian definition, which cannot be satisfied by any correct scheme. Then, one by one, they disable all generic attacks, until they end with a formalization for which they can provide a proof-of-concept construction. (One difference between the two formalizations is that [13] considers exposing intermediate values used in the computation, while [16] does not.) The resulting optimal security implies many additional properties, which were not considered before. For example, it requires *post-impersonation security*, which concerns messages sent after an active attack, where the attacker uses an exposed state to impersonate a party (we will say that the partner of the impersonated party is *hijacked*).

¹ Of course, for the healing to take effect, the adversary must remain passive and not immediately use the compromised state to impersonate a party.

Unfortunately, these strong guarantees come at a high price. Both constructions [13, 16] use very inefficient primitives, such as hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) [11, 12]. Moreover, it seems that an optimally-secure protocol would in fact imply HIBE.

This leads to a wide area of mostly unexplored trade-offs with respect to security and efficiency, raising the question how much security can be obtained at what efficiency.

1.2 Contributions

In this work we contribute to a number of steps towards characterizing the area of sub-optimal security. We present an efficient secure-messaging protocol with almost-optimal security in the setting where *both* the memory and the intermediate values used in the computation can be exposed.

Unlike the work on optimal security [13, 16], we start from the basic techniques, and gradually build towards the strongest possible security. Our final construction is based on standard digital signatures and CCA-secure public-key encryption. The ciphertext size is constant, and the size of the secret state grows linearly with the number of messages sent since the last received message (one can prove that this size cannot be constant). We formalize the precise security guarantees achieved using the game-based approach.

Intuitively, the almost-optimal security comes short of optimal in that in two specific situations we do not provide post-impersonation security. The first situation concerns exposing the randomness of one of *two* specific messages,² and in the second, the secret states of both parties must be exposed at almost the same time. The latter scenario seems rather contrived: if the parties were exposed at *exactly* the same time, then any security would anyway be impossible. However, one could imagine that the adversary suddenly loses access to one of the states, making it possible to restore it. Almost-optimal guarantees mean that the security need not be restored in this case.

It turns out that dealing with exposures of the computation randomness is particularly difficult. In particular, certain subtle issues made us rely on a circularly-secure encryption scheme. Hence, we present our overall proof in the random oracle model. We stress, however, that the random oracle assumption is only necessary to provide additional guarantees when the randomness can leak.

1.3 Further Related Work

Recently, in concurrent and independent work, Durak and Vaudenay [10] also present a very efficient asynchronous communication protocol with sub-optimal security. However, their setting, in contrast to ours, explicitly excludes exposing intermediate values used in computation, in particular, the randomness. Allowing exposure of the randomness seems much closer to reality. Why would we assume that the memory of a device can be insecure, but the sampled randomness is

² Namely, the messages sent right before or right after an active impersonation attack.

perfect? Our construction provides strong security if the randomness fully leaks, while [10] gives no guarantees even if a very small amount of partial information is revealed. In fact, it is not clear how to modify the construction of [10] to work in the setting with randomness exposures.

We note that the proof of [10], in contrast to ours, is in the standard model. On the other hand, we only need the random oracle to provide the additional guarantees not considered in [10].

2 Towards Optimal Security Guarantees

In this section we present a high-level overview of the steps that take us from the basic security properties (for example, those provided by Signal) towards the almost-optimal security, which we later implement in our final construction. We stress that all constructions use only standard primitives, such as digital signatures and public-key encryption. The security proofs are in the random oracle model.

2.1 Authentication

We start with the basic idea of using digital signatures and sequence numbers. These simple techniques break down in the presence of state exposures: once a party's signing key is exposed, the adversary can inject messages at any time in the future. To prevent this and guarantee healing in the case where the adversary remains passive, we can use the following idea. Each party samples a fresh signing and verification key with each message, sends along the new (signed) verification key, and stores the fresh signing key to be used for the next message. If either of the parties' state gets exposed, say Alice's, then Eve obtains her current signing key that she can use to impersonate Alice towards Bob at this point in time. If, however, Alice's next message containing a fresh verification key has already been delivered, then the signing key captured by the adversary becomes useless thereby achieving the healing property.

The above technique already allows to achieve quite meaningful guarantees: in fact, it only ignores post-impersonation security. We implement this idea and formalize the security guarantees of the resulting construction in [Section 3](#).

2.2 Confidentiality

Assume now that all communication is authentic, and that none of the parties gets impersonated (that is, assume that the adversary does not inject messages when he is allowed to do so). How can we get forward secrecy and healing?

Forward secrecy itself can be achieved using standard forward-secure authenticated encryption in each direction (this corresponds to Signal's symmetric ratcheting layer). However, this technique provides no healing.

Perfectly Interlocked Communication. The first, basic idea to guarantee healing is to use public-key encryption, with separate keys per direction, and constantly exchange fresh keys. The protocol is sketched in Figure 1. Note that instead of using a PKE scheme, we could also use a KEM scheme and apply the KEM-DEM principle, which is essentially what Signal does for its asymmetric ratcheting layer.

Let us consider the security guarantees offered by this solution. Assume for the moment that Alice and Bob communicate in a completely interlocked manner, i.e., Alice sends one message, Bob replies to that message, and so on. This situation is depicted in Figure 1. Exposing the state of a party, say Alice, right after sending a message (dk_A^1, ek_B^0 in the figure) clearly allows to decrypt the next message (m_2), which is unavoidable due to the correctness requirement. However, it no longer affects the confidentiality of any other messages. Further, exposing the state right after receiving a message has absolutely no effect (note that a party can delete its secret key immediately after decrypting, since it will no longer be used). Moreover, exposing the sending or receiving randomness is clearly no worse than exposing both the state right before and after this operation. Hence, our scheme obtains optimal confidentiality guarantees (including forward-secrecy and healing) when the parties communicate in such a turn-by-turn manner.




Fig. 1: Constantly exchanging fresh public-keys achieves optimal security when communication is authenticated and in a strict turn-by-turn fashion.

The Unidirectional Case. The problems with the above approach arise when the communication is not perfectly interlocked. Consider the situation when Alice sends many messages without receiving anything from Bob. The straightforward solution to encrypt all these messages with the same key breaks forward secrecy: Bob can no longer delete his secret key immediately after receiving a message, so exposing his state would expose many messages received by him in the past.

This immediately suggests using forward-secure public-key encryption [7], or the closely-related HIBE [11, 12] (as in the work by Jaeger et al. and Poettering et al.). However, we crucially want to avoid using such expensive techniques.

The partial solution offered by Signal is the symmetric ratcheting. In essence, Alice uses the public key once to transmit a fresh shared secret, which can then be used with forward-secure authenticated encryption. However, this solution offers very limited healing guarantees: when Alice’s state is exposed, all messages sent by her in the future (or until she receives a new public key from Bob) are exposed. Can we do something better?

The first alternative solution which comes to mind is the following. When encrypting a message, Alice samples a fresh key pair for a public-key encryption scheme, transmits the secret key encrypted along with the message, stores the public key and deletes the secret key. This public key is then used by Alice to send the next message. This approach is depicted in Figure 2.

However, this solution totally breaks if the sending randomness does leak. In essence, exposing Alice’s randomness causes a large part of Bob’s next state to be exposed, hence, we achieve roughly the same guarantees as Signal’s symmetric ratcheting.




Fig. 2: First attempt to handle asynchronous messages, where one party (here Alice) can send multiple messages in a row. This solution breaks totally when the randomness can leak.

Hence, our next approach will make the new decryption key depend on the previous decryption key, and not solely on the update information sent by Alice. We note that, for forward secrecy, we still rely on the update information being transmitted confidentially.³ This technique achieves optimal security up to impersonation (that is, we get the same guarantees as for simple authentication).

The solution is depicted in Figure 3. At a high level, we use the ElGamal encryption, where a key pair of Bob is (b_0, g^{b_0}) for some generator g of a cyclic group. While sending a message, Alice sends a new secret exponent b_1 encrypted

³ In fact, it seems that such a scheme with public updates would imply HIBE.

under g^{b_0} , the new encryption key is $g^{b_0}g^{b_1}$, and the new decryption key is $b_0 + b_1$.⁴ This idea is formalized in Section 4.




Fig. 3: Second attempt to handle asynchronous messages, where one party (here Alice) can send multiple messages in a row.

2.3 A First Efficient Scheme

Combining the solutions for authentication and confidentiality from the previous subsections already yields a very efficient scheme with meaningful guarantees. Namely, we only give up on the post-impersonation security. That is, we achieve the optimal guarantees up to the event that an adversary uses the exposed state of a party to inject a message to the other party.

One may argue that such a construction is in fact the one that should be used in practice. Indeed, the only guarantees we can hope for after such an active impersonation concern the party that gets impersonated, say Alice, towards the other one, say Bob: Alice should not accept any messages from Bob or the adversary anymore, and the messages she sends should remain confidential. Observe that the former guarantee potentially enables Alice to detect the attack by the lack of replies to her messages. However, providing those guarantees to their full extent seems to inherently require very inefficient tools, such as HIBE, in contrast to the quite efficient scheme outlined above.

In the next subsections we make further steps towards our final construction, which provides some, but not all, after-impersonation guarantees, thereby compromising between efficiency and security.

2.4 Post-Impersonation Authentication

Consider the situation where the adversary exposes the state of Alice and uses it to impersonate her towards Bob (that is, he hijacks Bob). Clearly, due to the

⁴ Looking ahead, it turns out that in order to prove the security of this construction, we need circular-secure encryption. We achieve this in the random oracle model.

correctness requirement, the adversary can now send further messages to Bob. For the optimal security, we would require that an adversary cannot make Alice accept any messages from Bob anymore, even given Bob’s state exposed at any time after the impersonation.

Note that our simple authentication scheme from [Section 2.1](#) does not achieve this property, as Bob’s state contains the signing key at this point. It does not even guarantee that Alice does not accept messages sent by the honest Bob anymore. The latter issue we can easily fix by sending a hash of the communication transcript along with each message. That is, the parties keep a value h (initially 0), which Alice updates as $h \leftarrow \text{Hash}(h \parallel m)$ with every message m she sends, and which Bob updates accordingly with every received message. Moreover, Bob accepts a message only if it is sent together with a matching hash h .

To achieve the stronger guarantee against an adversary obtaining Bob’s state, we additionally use ephemeral signing keys. With each message, Alice generates a new signing key, which she securely sends to Bob, and expects Bob to sign his next message with. Intuitively, the adversary’s injection “overwrites” this ephemeral key, rendering Bob’s state useless. Note that for this to work, we need the last message received by Bob before hijacking to be confidential. This is not the case, for example, if the sending randomness leaks.⁵ For this reason, we do not achieve optimal security. In the existing optimal constructions [[16](#), [13](#)] the update information can be public, which, unfortunately, seems to require very strong primitives, such as forward-secure signatures.

2.5 Post-Impersonation Confidentiality

In this section we focus on the case where the adversary impersonates Alice towards Bob (since this is only possible if that Alice’s state exposed, we now consider her state to be a public value).

Consider once more the two approaches to provide confidentiality in the unidirectional case, presented in [Section 2.2](#) ([Figures 2](#) and [3](#)). Observe that if we assume that the randomness cannot be exposed, then the first solution from [Figure 2](#), where Alice sends (encrypted) a fresh decryption key for Bob, already achieves very good guarantees. In essence, during impersonation the adversary has to choose a new decryption key (consider the adversary sending $[m_3, \bar{dk}_B^3]_{ek_B^2}$ in the figure), which overwrites Bob’s state. Hence, the information needed to decrypt the messages sent by Alice from this point on (namely, dk_B^2) is lost.⁶ In contrast, the second solution from [Figure 3](#) provides no guarantees for post-impersonation messages: after injecting a message and exposing Bob’s state, the adversary can easily compute Bob’s state from right before the impersonation and use it to decrypt Alice’s messages sent after the attack.

⁵ Note that this also makes the choice of abstraction levels particularly difficult, as we need confidentiality, in order to obtain authentication.

⁶ We can assume that Alice sends this value confidentially. It makes no sense to consider Bob’s state being exposed, as this would mean that both parties are exposed at the same time, in which case, clearly, we cannot guarantee any security.

While the former idea has been used in [10] to construct an efficient scheme with almost-optimal security for the setting the randomness generator is perfectly protected, we aim at also providing guarantees in the setting where the randomness can leak. Hence, we combine the two approaches, using both updating keys according to the latter scheme and ephemeral keys according to the former one, in a manner analogous to how we achieved post-impersonation authentication. A bit more concretely, Alice now sends (encrypted), in addition to the exponent, a fresh ephemeral decryption key, and stores the corresponding encryption key, which she uses to additionally encrypt her next message. Now the adversary’s injected message causes the ephemeral decryption key of Bob to be overwritten.

As was the case for authentication, this solution does not provide optimal security, since we rely on the fact that the last message, say c , received before impersonation, is confidential. Moreover, in order to achieve confidentiality we also need the message sent by Alice right after c to be confidential.

2.6 The Almost-Optimal Scheme

Using the ideas sketched above, we can construct a scheme with almost-optimal security guarantees. We note that it is still highly non-trivial to properly combine these techniques, so that they work when the messages can be arbitrarily interleaved (so far we only considered certain idealized settings of perfectly interlocked and unidirectional communication).

The difference between our almost-optimal guarantees and the optimal ones [16, 13] is in the imperfection of our post-impersonation security. As explained in the previous subsections, for these additional guarantees we need two messages sent by the impersonated party (Alice above) to remain confidential: the one right before and the one right after the attack. Roughly, these messages are *not* confidential either if the encryption randomness is exposed for one of them, or if the state of the impersonated party is exposed right before receiving the last message before the attack. Note that the latter condition basically means that both parties are exposed at almost the same time. If they were exposed at exactly the same time, any security would anyway be impossible.

In summary, our almost-optimal security seems a very reasonable guarantee in practice.

3 Unidirectional Authentication

In this section we formalize the first solution for achieving authentication, sketched informally in Section 2.1. That is, we consider the goal of providing authentication for the communication from a sender (which we call the signer) to a receiver (which we call the verifier) in the presence of an adversary who has full control over the communication channel. Additionally, the adversary has the ability to expose secrets of the communicating parties. In particular, this means that for each party, its internal state and, independently, the randomness it chose during operations may leak.

We first intuitively describe the properties we would like to guarantee:

- As long as the state and sampled randomness of the *signer* are secret, the communication is authenticated (in particular, all sent messages, and only those, can only be received in the correct order). We require that leaking the state or randomness of the *verifier* has no influence on authentication.
- If the state right before signing the i -th message or the randomness used for this operation is exposed, then the adversary can trivially replace this message by one of her choice. However, we want that if she remains passive (that is, if she delivers sufficiently many messages in order), and if new secrets do not leak, then the security is eventually restored. Concretely, if only the state is exposed, then *only* the i -th message can be replaced, while if the signing randomness is exposed, then only two messages (i and $i + 1$) are compromised.

Observe that once the adversary decides to inject a message (while the signer is exposed), security cannot be restored. This is because from this point on, she can send any messages to the verifier by simply executing the protocol. We will say that in such case the adversary *hijacks* the channel, and is now communicating with the verifier.

The above requirements cannot be satisfied by symmetric primitives, because compromising the receiver should have no effect on security. Moreover, in order to protect against deleting and reordering messages, the algorithms need to be stateful. Hence, in the next subsection, we define a new primitive, which we call *key-updating signatures*. At a high level, a key-updating signature scheme is a stateful signature scheme, where the signing key changes with each signing operation, and the verification key changes with each verification.

3.1 Key-Updating Signatures

Syntax. A key-updating signature scheme KuSig consists of three polynomial-time algorithms $(\text{KuSig.Gen}, \text{KuSig.Sign}, \text{KuSig.Verify})$. The probabilistic algorithm KuSig.Gen generates an initial signing key sk and a corresponding verification key vk . Given a message m and sk , the signing algorithm outputs an updated signing key and a signature: $(sk', \sigma) \leftarrow \text{KuSig.Sign}(sk, m)$. Similarly, the verification algorithm outputs an updated verification key and the result v of verification: $(vk', v) \leftarrow \text{KuSig.Verify}(vk, m, \sigma)$.

Correctness. Let (sk_0, vk_0) be any output of KuSig.Gen , and let m_1, \dots, m_k be any sequence of messages. Further, let $(sk_i, \sigma_i) \leftarrow \text{KuSig.Sign}(sk_{i-1}, m_i)$ and $(vk_i, v_i) \leftarrow \text{KuSig.Verify}(vk_{i-1}, m_i, \sigma_i)$ for $i = 1 \dots (k - 1)$. For correctness, we require that $v_i = 1$ for all $i = 1 \dots (k - 1)$.

Security. The security of KuSig is formalized using the game KuSig-UF , described in [Figure 4](#). For simplicity, we define the security in the single-user setting (security in the multi-user setting can be obtained using the standard hybrid argument).




Fig. 4: The strong unforgeability game for key-updating signatures.

The game interface. The game without the parts of the code marked by boxes defines the interface exposed to the adversary.

At a high level, the adversary wins if he manages to set the internal flag `win` to `true` by providing a message with a forged signature. To this end, he interacts with three oracles: **Sign**, **Verify** and **Expose**. Using the oracle **Sign**, he can obtain signatures and update the secret signing key, using the oracle **Verify**, he can update the verification key (or submit a forgery), and the oracle **Expose** reveals the secret signing key.

A couple of details about the above oracles require further explanation. First, the verification key does not have to be kept secret. Hence, the updated key is always returned by the verification oracle. Second, we extend the signing oracle to additionally allow “insecure” queries. That is, the adversary learns not only the signature, but also the randomness used to generate it.

Disabling trivial attacks. Since the game described above can be trivially won for any scheme, we introduce additional checks (shown in boxes), which disable the trivial “wins”.

More precisely, the forgery of a message that will be verified using the key vk , for which the signing key sk was revealed is trivial. The key sk can be exposed either explicitly by calling the oracle **Expose**, or by leaking the signing randomness using the call **Sign**(m , `true`). To disable this attack, we keep the set `Exposed`, which, intuitively, keeps track of which messages were signed using an exposed state. Then, in the oracle **Verify**, we check whether the adversary decided to input a trivial forgery (this happens if the index $r - 1$ of currently

verified message is in `Exposed`). If so, the game can no longer be won (the variable `lost` is set to `true`).⁷

Advantage. For an adversary \mathcal{A} , let $\text{Adv}_{\text{KuSig}}^{\text{ku-suf}}(\mathcal{A})$ denote the probability that the game `KuSig-UF` returns `true` after interacting with \mathcal{A} . We say that a key-updating signature scheme `KuSig` is `KuSig-UF` secure if $\text{Adv}_{\text{KuSig}}^{\text{ku-suf}}(\mathcal{A})$ is negligible for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} .

3.2 Construction

We present a very simple construction of a `KuSig`, given any one-time signature scheme `Sig`, existentially-unforgable under chosen-message attack. The construction is depicted in [Figure 5](#). The high-level idea is to generate a new key pair for `Sig` with each signed message. The message, together with the new verification key and a counter, is then signed using the old signing key, and the new verification key is appended to the signature. The verification algorithm then replaces the old verification key by the one from the verified signature.




Fig. 5: The construction of key-updating signatures.

Theorem 1. *Let `Sig` be a signature scheme. The construction of [Figure 5](#) is `KuSig-UF` secure, if `Sig` is 1-SUF-CMA secure.*

A proof of [Theorem 1](#) is presented in [Appendix D](#).

3.3 Other Definitions of Key-Updating Signatures

Several notions of signatures with evolving keys are considered in the literature. For example, in forward-secure signatures [\[3\]](#) the signing key is periodically

⁷ The adversary knows which states are exposed, and hence can check himself before submitting a forgery attempt, whether this will make him lose the game.

updated. However, in such schemes the verification key is fixed. Moreover, the goal of forward secrecy is to protect the past (for signatures, this means that there exists some notion of time and exposing the secret key does not allow to forge signatures for the past time periods). On the other hand, we are interested in protecting the future, that is, the scheme should “heal” after exposure.

The notion closest to our setting is that of key-updateable digital signatures [13]. Here the difference is that their notion provides stronger guarantees (hence, the construction is also less efficient). In particular, in key-updateable digital signatures the signing key can be updated with *any (even adversarially chosen) public* information. In contrast, in our definition the secret key is updated secretly by the signer, and only part of the information used to update it is published as part of the signature.⁸

Relaxing the requirements of key-updateable digital signatures allows us to achieve a very efficient construction ([13] uses rather inefficient forward-secure signatures as a building block). On the other hand, the stronger guarantee seems to be necessary for the optimal security of [13].

4 Unidirectional Confidentiality

In this section we formalize the second solution for achieving confidentiality in the unidirectional setting, where the sender, which we now call the encryptor generates some secret update information and communicates it (encrypted) to the receiver, which we now call the decryptor. In the following, we assume that the secret update information is delivered through an idealized secure channel.

The setting is similar to the one we considered for authentication: the secret states and the randomness of the encryptor and of the decryptor can sometimes be exposed. However, now we also assume that the communication is authenticated. We assume authentication in the sense of Section 3, however, we do not consider hijacking the channel. In this section we give no guarantees if the channel is hijacked.

At a high level, the construction presented in this section should provide the following guarantees:

- Exposing the state of the encryptor should have no influence on confidentiality. Moreover, leaking the encryption randomness reveals only the single message being encrypted.
- Possibility of healing: if at some point in time the encryptor delivers to the decryptor an additional (update) message through some out-of-band secure channel, then any prior exposures of the decryption state should have no influence on the confidentiality of future messages. (Looking ahead, in our overall construction such updates will indeed be sometimes delivered securely.)

⁸ For example, in our construction the public part of the update is a fresh verification key, and the secret part is the corresponding signing key. This would not satisfy the requirements of [13], since there is no way to update the signing key using only the fresh verification key.

- Weak forward secrecy: exposing the decryptor’s state should not expose messages sent before the last securely delivered update.

For more intuition about the last two properties, consider [Figure 6](#). The states 1 to 7 correspond to the number of updates applied to encryption or decryption keys. The first two updates are not delivered securely (on the out-of-band channel), but the third one is. Exposing the decryption key at state 5 (after four updates) causes all messages encrypted under the public keys at states 4, 5 and 6 to be exposed. However, the messages encrypted under keys at states 1 to 3 are not affected.




Fig. 6: Intuition behind the confidentiality guarantees.

To formalize the above requirements, we define a new primitive, which we call *secretly key-updatable public-key encryption* (SkuPke).

4.1 Secretly Key-Updatable Public-Key Encryption

At a high level, a secretly key-updatable public-key encryption scheme is a public-key encryption scheme, where both the encryption and the decryption key can be (independently) updated. The information used to update the encryption key can be public (it will be a part of the encryptor’s state, whose exposure comes without consequences), while the corresponding update information for the decryption key should be kept secret (this update will be sent through the out-of-band secure channel).

In fact, for our overall scheme we need something a bit stronger: the update information should be generated independently of the encryption or decryption keys. Moreover, the properties of the scheme should be (in a certain sense) preserved even when the same update is applied to many independent key pairs. The reason for these requirements will become more clear in the next section, when we use the secretly key-updatable encryption to construct a scheme for the sesqui-directional setting.

The security definition presented in this section is slightly simplified and it does not consider the above additional guarantees. However, it is sufficient to understand our security goals. In the proof of the overall construction we use the full definition presented in [Appendix C](#), which is mostly a straightforward extension to the multi-instance setting.

Syntax. Formally, a secretly key-updatable public-key encryption scheme SkuPke consists of six polynomial-time algorithms (SkuPke.Gen, SkuPke.Enc, SkuPke.Dec,

`SkuPke.UpdateGen`, `SkuPke.UpdateEk`, `SkuPke.UpdateDk`). The probabilistic algorithm `SkuPke.Gen` generates an initial encryption key ek and a corresponding decryption key dk . Then, the probabilistic encryption algorithm can be used to encrypt a message m as $c \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.Enc}(ek, m)$, while the deterministic decryption algorithm decrypts the message: $m \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.Dec}(dk, c)$.

Furthermore, the probabilistic algorithm `SkuPke.UpdateGen` generates public update information u_e and the corresponding secret update information u_d , as $(u_e, u_d) \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.Gen}$. The former can then be used to update an encryption key $ek' \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateEk}(u_e, ek)$, while the latter can be used to update the corresponding decryption key $dk' \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateDk}(u_d, dk)$.

Correctness. Let (ek_0, dk_0) be the output of `SkuPke.Gen`, and let $(ue_1, ud_1), \dots, (ue_k, ud_k)$ be any sequence of outputs of `SkuPke.UpdateGen`. For $i = 1 \dots (k - 1)$, let $ek_i \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateEk}(ue_i, ek_{i-1})$ and $dk_i \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateDk}(ud_i, dk_{i-1})$. A `SkuPke` is called correct, if $\text{SkuPke.Dec}(dk_k, \text{SkuPke.Enc}(ek_k, m)) = m$ for any message m with probability 1.

Security. Figure 7 presents the single-instance security game for `SkuPke`.

The game interface. The interface exposed to the adversary is defined via the part of the code not marked by boxes.

We extend the standard notion of IND-CPA for public-key encryption, where the adversary gets to see the initial encryption key ek and has access to a left-or-right **Challenge** oracle.

Furthermore, the adversary can generate new update information by calling the oracle **UpdateGen**, and later apply the generated updates to the encryption and decryption key, by calling, respectively, the oracles **UpdateEk** and **UpdateDk**.

In our setting the adversary is allowed to expose the randomness and the state of parties. The encryption state is considered public information, hence, the key ek and the public update $\mathcal{U}_e[\text{ind}]$ are always returned by the corresponding oracles. The decryption key dk can be revealed by calling the **Expose** oracle⁹, and the secret decryption updates — by setting the randomness for the oracle **UpdateGen**.

Finally, the **Challenge** oracle encrypts the message together with the previously generated secret update information, chosen by the adversary (recall the idea sketched in Section 2.2).

Disabling trivial attacks. In essence, in the presence of exposures, it is not possible to protect the confidentiality of all messages. As already explained, we allow an exposure of the secret key to compromise secrecy of all messages sent between two consecutive secure updates. Hence, the game keeps track of the following events: generating a secure update (the set **NLeak**), exposing the secret key (the variable **exp**), and asking for a challenge ciphertext (the set **Chal**). Then, the

⁹ For technical reasons, we only allow one query to the **Expose** oracle.

adversary is not allowed to ask for a challenge generated using the encryption key, corresponding to a decryption key, which is in the “exposed” interval (that is, if all updates between the decryption key and the exposed state are insecure). An analogous condition is checked by the **Expose oracle**.

Advantage. Recall that in this section we present the single-instance security game, but in the proofs later we need the multi-instance version SkuPke-MI-CPA defined in Appendix C. Hence, we define security using the multi-instance game.

For an adversary \mathcal{A} , let $\text{Adv}_{\text{SkuPke}}^{\text{sku-cpa}}(\mathcal{A})$ denote the probability that the game SkuPke-MI-CPA returns **true** after interacting with \mathcal{A} . We say that a secretly key-updatable encryption scheme SkuPke is SkuPke-MI-CPA secure if $\text{Adv}_{\text{SkuPke}}^{\text{sku-cpa}}(\mathcal{A})$ is negligible for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} .




Fig. 7: The single-instance confidentiality game for secretly key-updatable encryption.

4.2 Construction

We present an efficient construction of SkuPke, based on the ElGamal cryptosystem. At a high level, the key generation, encryption and decryption algorithms are the same as in the ElGamal encryption scheme. To generate the update information, we generate a new ElGamal key pair, and set the public and private update to, respectively, the new public and private ElGamal keys. To update the encryption key, we multiply the two ElGamal public keys, while to update the decryption key, we add the ElGamal secret keys. Finally, we need the hash function $\text{Hash}(\cdot)$, in order to deal with encrypting previously generated update information.

The construction is defined in Figure 8. We let G be a group of prime order q , generated by g . These parameters are implicitly passed to all algorithms.




Fig. 8: The construction of secretly key-updatable encryption.

In Appendix C we give a proof of the following theorem.

Theorem 2. *The construction of Figure 8 is SkuPke-MI-CPA secure in the random oracle model, if CDH is hard.*

5 Sesquidirectional Confidentiality

The goal of this section is to define additional confidentiality guarantees in the setting where also an authenticated back channel from the decryptor to the encryptor exists (but we still focus only the properties of the unidirectional from the encryptor to the decryptor). That is, we assume a perfectly-authenticated back channel and a forward channel, authenticated in the sense of Section 3 (in particular, we allow hijacking the decryptor).

It turns out that in this setting we can formalize all confidentiality properties needed for our overall construction of a secure channel. Intuitively, the properties

we consider include forward secrecy, post-hijack security, and healing through the back channel.

Forward secrecy. Exposing the decryptor’s state should not expose messages which he already received.

Post-hijack guarantees. Ideally, we would like to guarantee that if the communication to the decryptor is hijacked, then all messages sent by the encryptor *after* hijacking are secret, even if the decryptor’s state is exposed (note that these messages cannot be read by the decryptor, since the adversary caused his state to be “out-of-sync”). However, this guarantee turns out to be extremely strong, and seems to inherently require HIBE. Hence, we relax it by giving up on the secrecy of post-hijack messages in the following case: a message is sent insecurely (for example, because the encryption randomness is exposed), the adversary *immediately* hijacks the communication, and at some later time the decryptor’s state is exposed. We stress that the situation seems rather contrived, as explained in the introduction.

Healing through the back channel. Intuitively, the decryptor will update his state and send the corresponding update information on the back channel. Once the encryptor uses this information to update his state, the parties heal from past exposures. At a high level, this means that we require the following additional guarantees:

- Healing: messages sent after the update information is delivered are secret, irrespective of any exposures of the decryptor’s state, which happened before the update was generated.
- Correctness: in the situation where the messages on the back channel are delayed, it should still be possible to read the messages from the forward channel. That is, it should be possible to use a decryption key after i updates to decrypt messages encrypted using an “old” encryption key after $j < i$ updates.

Challenges. It turns out that the setting with both the back channel, and the possibility of hijacking, is extremely subtle. For example, one may be tempted to use an encryption scheme which itself updates keys and provides some form of forward secrecy, and then simply send on the back channel a fresh key pair for that scheme. With this solution, in order to provide correctness, every generated secret key would have to be stored until a ciphertext for a newer key arrives. Unfortunately, this simple solution does not work. Consider the following situation: the encryptor sends two messages, one before and one after receiving an update on the back channel, and these messages are delayed. Then, the adversary hijacks the decryptor by injecting an encryption under the *older* of the two keys. However, if now the decryptor’s state is exposed, then the adversary will learn the message encrypted with the *new* key (which breaks the post-hijack guarantees we wish to provide). Hence, it is necessary that receiving a message updates all decryption keys, also those for future messages. Intuitively, this is why we require that the same update for SkuPke can be applied to many keys.

5.1 Healable And Key-Updating Public-Key Encryption

To formalize the requirements sketched above, we define healable and key-updating public-key encryption (HkuPke). In a nutshell, a HkuPke scheme is a *stateful* public-key encryption scheme with additional algorithms used to generate and apply updates, sent on the back channel.

Syntax. A healable and key-updating public-key encryption scheme HkuPke consists of five polynomial-time algorithms (HkuPke.Gen, HkuPke.Enc, HkuPke.Dec, HkuPke.BcUpEk, HkuPke.BcUpDk).

The probabilistic algorithm HkuPke.Gen generates an initial encryption key ek and a corresponding decryption key dk . Encryption and decryption algorithms are stateful. Moreover, for reasons which will become clear in the overall construction of a secure channel, they take as input additional data, which need not be kept secret.¹⁰ Formally, we have $(ek', c) \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.Enc}(ek, m, ad)$ and $(dk', m) \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.Dec}(dk, c, m)$, where ek' and dk' are the updated keys and ad is the additional data.

The additional two algorithms are used to handle healing through the back channel: the operation $(dk', upd) \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.BcUpDk}(dk)$ outputs the updated decryption key dk' and the information upd , which will be sent on the back channel. Then, the encryption key can be updated by executing $ek' \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.BcUpEk}(ek, upd)$.

Correctness. We give the formal definition of correctness in [Appendix A](#). Intuitively, we require that if all ciphertexts are decrypted in the order of encryption, and if the additional data used for decryption matches that used for encryption, then they decrypt to the correct messages. Moreover, decryption must also work if the keys are updated in the meantime, that is, if an arbitrary sequence of HkuPke.BcUpDk calls is performed and the ciphertext is generated at a point where only a prefix of the resulting update information has been applied to the encryption key using HkuPke.BcUpEk.

Security. The security of HkuPke is formalized using the game HkuPke-CPA, described in [Figure 9](#). Similarly to the unidirectional case, we extend the IND-CPA game.

The interface. Consider the (insecure) variant of our game without the parts of the code marked in boxes. As in the IND-CPA game, the adversary gets to see the encryption key ek and has access to a left-or-right **Challenge** oracle. Since HkuPke schemes are stateful, we additionally allow the adversary to update the decryption key through the calls to the **Decrypt** oracle (which for now only

¹⁰ Roughly, the additional data is needed to provide post-hijack security of the final construction: changing the additional data means that the adversary decided to hijack the channel, hence, the decryption key should be updated.

returns \perp). The encryption key is updated using the calls to the **Encrypt** oracle (where the encrypted message is known) and to the **Challenge** oracle.

Furthermore, in our setting the adversary is allowed to expose the randomness and the state. To expose the state (that is, the decryption key), he can query the **Expose** oracle. To expose the randomness of any randomized oracle, he can set the input flag `leak` to `true`.

Finally, the adversary can access two oracles corresponding to the back channel: the oracle **BcUpdateDk** executes the algorithm `HkuPke.BcUpDk` and returns the update information to the adversary (this corresponds to sending on the back channel), and the oracle **BcUpdateEk** executes `HkuPke.BcUpEk` with the next generated update (since the channel is authenticated, the adversary has no influence on which update is applied).

Disabling trivial attacks. Observe that certain attacks are disabled by the construction itself. For example, the randomness used to encrypt a challenge ciphertext cannot be exposed.

Furthermore, the game can be trivially won if the adversary asks for a challenge ciphertext and, before calling `Decrypt` with this ciphertext, exposes the decryption key (by correctness, the exposed key can be used to decrypt the challenge). We disallow this by keeping track of when the adversary queried a challenge in the set `Challenges`, and adding corresponding checks in the **Expose** oracle.

Similarly, in the **Challenge** oracle we return \perp whenever the decryption key corresponding to the current encryption key is known to the adversary.

Finally, the decryptor can be hijacked, which the game marks by setting `hijacked` to `true`. Once this happens, the **Decrypt** oracle “opens up” and returns the decrypted message.

Moreover, ideally, exposing the secret key after hijacking would not reveal anything about the messages (the adversary gets to call `Expose` “for free”, without setting `exposed`). However, as already mentioned, we relax slightly the security. In particular, exposing is free only when hijacking did not occur immediately after leaking encryption randomness. This is checked using the conditions `vuln1` and `vuln2`.

Advantage. For an adversary \mathcal{A} , let $\text{Adv}_{\text{HkuPke}}^{\text{hku-cpa}}(\mathcal{A})$ denote the probability that the game `SkuPke-CPA` returns `true` after interacting with \mathcal{A} .

5.2 Construction

To construct a `HkuPke` scheme, we require two primitives: a secretly key-updatable encryption scheme `SkuPke` from [Section 4](#), and a public-key encryption scheme *with associated data* `PkeAd`. Intuitively, the latter primitive is an IND-CCA2 secure public-key encryption scheme, which additionally protects the integrity of non-secret associated data (similarly to authenticated encryption with associated data in the symmetric setting). We formalize this notion in [B](#).

Game HkuPke-CPA

Initialization

```

 $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ 
 $(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.Gen}$ 
 $s, r, i, j \leftarrow 0$ 

$\text{exposed} \leftarrow -1$   

 $\text{hijacked} \leftarrow \text{false}$   

 $\text{Challenges} \leftarrow \emptyset$

 $\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{U} \leftarrow$  array initialized to  $\perp$   

return  $ek$ 

```

Oracle Encrypt

```

Input:  $(m, ad) \in \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{AD}$ 
 $s \leftarrow s + 1$ 
 $z \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$ 
 $(ek, c) \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.Enc}(ek, m, ad; z)$ 
 $\mathcal{B}[s] \leftarrow (c, ad)$ 
return  $(ek, c, z)$ 

```

Oracle BcUpdateEk

```

if  $j = i$  then
   $\perp$  return  $\perp$ 
 $j \leftarrow j + 1$ 
 $ek \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.BcUpEk}(ek, \mathcal{U}[j])$ 

```

Oracle Challenge

```

Input:  $(m_1, m_2, ad) \in \mathcal{M}^2 \times \mathcal{AD}$ 

if  $|m_1| \neq |m_2|$  then
   $\perp$  return  $\perp$



if  $j \leq \text{exposed}$  then
   $\perp$  return  $\perp$

 $(ek, c, z) \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(m_b, ad)$ 

$\text{Challenges} \leftarrow \text{Challenges} \cup \{s\}$

return  $(ek, c)$ 

```

Oracle Decrypt

```

Input:  $(c, ad) \in \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{AD}$ 
 $(dk, m) \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.Dec}(dk, c, ad)$ 
if  $m = \perp$  then
   $\perp$  return  $\perp$ 

if  $\text{hijacked} \vee (c, ad) \neq \mathcal{B}[r + 1]$  then
   $\text{hijacked} \leftarrow \text{true}$   

  return  $m$

else
   $r \leftarrow r + 1$   

  return  $\perp$ 

```

Oracle BcUpdateDk

```

Input:  $\text{leak} \in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$ 

if  $\neg \text{hijacked}$  then
   $i \leftarrow i + 1$   

   $z \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$   

 $(dk, \mathcal{U}[i]) \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.BcUpDk}(dk; z)$

if  $\text{leak}$  then
   $\text{exposed} \leftarrow i$   

  return  $(\mathcal{U}[i], z)$ 
else
   $\perp$  return  $\mathcal{U}[i]$ 

```

Oracle Expose

```

 $\text{vuln}_1 \leftarrow r \notin \text{Challenges}$   

 $\text{vuln}_2 \leftarrow r + 1 \leq s \wedge r + 1 \notin \text{Challenges}$ 

if  $\text{hijacked} \wedge \neg \text{vuln}_1 \wedge \neg \text{vuln}_2$  then
  return  $dk$



else if  $\forall e \in (r, s] e \notin \text{Challenges}$  then
   $\text{exposed} \leftarrow i$   

  return  $dk$

else
   $\perp$  return  $\perp$ 

```

Finalization

```

Input:  $d \in \{0, 1\}$ 
return  $(d = b)$ 

```

Fig. 9: The confidentiality game for healable and key-updating encryption.

At the core of our construction, in order to encrypt a message m , we generate an update u_e, d_d for an SkuPke scheme and encrypt the secret update information u_d together with m . This update information is then used during decryption to update the secret key.

Unfortunately, this simple solution has a few problems. First, we need the guarantee that after the decryptor is hijacked, his state cannot be used to decrypt messages encrypted afterwards. We achieve this by adding a second layer of encryption, using a PkeAd. We generate a new key pair during every encryption, and send the new decryption key along with m and u_d , and store the corresponding encryption key for the next encryption operation. The decryptor will use his current such key to decrypt the message and then completely overwrite it with the new one he just received. Therefore, we call those keys “ephemeral”. The basic idea is of course that during the hijacking, the adversary has to provide a different ciphertext containing a new ephemeral key, which will then be useless for him when exposing the receiver afterwards. In order to make this idea sound, we have to ensure that this key is not only different from the previous one, but unrelated. To achieve this, we actually do not send the new encryption key directly, but send a random value z instead and then generate the key pairs using $\text{Hash}(tr \parallel z)$ as randomness. Here tr stands for a hash chain of ciphertexts and associated data sent/received so far, including the current one. Overall, an encryption of m is $\text{PkeAd.Enc}(ek^{\text{eph}}, \text{SkuPke.Enc}(ek^{\text{upd}}, (m, u_d, z_2)), ad)$, for some associated data ad .

Second, we need to provide healing guarantees through the back channel. This is achieved by generating fresh key pairs for both, the updating and the ephemeral, encryption schemes. For correctness, the encryptor however might have to ignore the new ephemeral key, if he detects that it will be overwritten by one of his updates in the meantime. He can detect this by the decryptor explicitly acknowledging the number of messages he received so far as part of the information transmitted on the backward-channel.

Third, observe that, for correctness, the decryptor needs to store all decryption keys generated during the back-channel healing, until he receives a ciphertext for a newer key (consider the back-channel messages being delayed). In order to still guarantee post-hijack security, we apply the SkuPke update u_d to *all* secret keys he still stores. This also implies that the encryptor has to store the corresponding public update information and apply them the the new key he obtains from the backward-channel, if necessary.

Theorem 3. *Let SkuPke be a secretly key-updatable encryption scheme, and let PkeAd be an encryption scheme. The scheme of Figure 10 is HkuPke-CPA secure, assuming that the SkuPke scheme is SkuPke-CPA secure, and the PkeAd is IND-CCA2-AD secure.*

6 Overall Security

So far, we have constructed two intermediate primitives that will help us build a secure messaging protocol. First, we showed a unidirectional authentication

Construction of HkuPke

Algorithm HkuPke.Gen

```

 $DK^{\text{upd}}, DK^{\text{eph}}, U_e \leftarrow$  array initialized to  $\perp$ 
 $(ek^{\text{upd}}, DK^{\text{upd}}[0]) \leftarrow$  SkuPke.Gen
 $(ek^{\text{eph}}, DK^{\text{eph}}[0]) \leftarrow$  PkeAd.Gen
 $s, r, i, j, tr_s, tr_r \leftarrow 0$ 
 $i_{\text{ack}} \leftarrow -1$ 
return  $((ek^{\text{upd}}, ek^{\text{eph}}, s, j, U_e, tr_s),$ 
 $(DK^{\text{upd}}, DK^{\text{eph}}, r, i, i_{\text{ack}}, tr_r))$ 

```

Algorithm HkuPke.Enc

```

Input:  $((ek^{\text{upd}}, ek^{\text{eph}}, s, j, U_e, tr_s), m, ad;$ 
 $(z_1, \dots, z_4)) \in \mathcal{EK} \times \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{AD} \times \mathcal{R}$ 
 $s \leftarrow s + 1$ 
 $(U_e[s], u_d) \leftarrow$  SkuPke.UpdateGen( $z_1$ )
 $\hat{c} \leftarrow$  SkuPke.Enc( $ek^{\text{upd}}, (m, u_d, z_2); z_3$ )
 $c \leftarrow$  PkeAd.Enc( $ek^{\text{eph}}, \hat{c}, ad; z_4$ )
 $tr_s \leftarrow$  Hash( $tr_s \parallel (c, j, ad)$ )
 $ek^{\text{upd}} \leftarrow$  SkuPke.UpdateEk( $U_e[s], ek^{\text{upd}}$ )
 $(ek^{\text{eph}}, \_ ) \leftarrow$  PkeAd.Gen(Hash( $tr_s \parallel z_2$ ))
return  $((ek^{\text{upd}}, ek^{\text{eph}}, s, j, U_e, tr_s), (c, j))$ 

```

Algorithm HkuPke.Dec

```

Input:  $((DK^{\text{upd}}, DK^{\text{eph}}, r, i, i_{\text{ack}}, tr_r), (c, i_{\text{msg}}, ad) \in \mathcal{DK} \times \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{AD}$ 
if  $i_{\text{msg}} \geq i_{\text{ack}} \wedge i_{\text{msg}} > i$  then
   $\hat{c} \leftarrow$  PkeAd.Dec( $DK^{\text{eph}}[i_{\text{msg}}], c, ad$ )
  if  $\hat{c} \neq \perp$  then
     $\hat{m} \leftarrow$  SkuPke.Dec( $DK^{\text{upd}}[i_{\text{msg}}], \hat{c}$ )
    if  $\hat{m} \in \mathcal{M} \times \text{SkuPke.U} \times \text{PkeAd.DK}$  then
       $(m, u_d, z) \leftarrow \hat{m}$ 
       $tr_r \leftarrow$  Hash( $tr_r \parallel (c, i_{\text{msg}}, ad)$ )
       $(\_, \hat{dk}^{\text{eph}}) \leftarrow$  PkeAd.Gen(Hash( $tr_r \parallel z_2$ ))
       $DK^{\text{upd}}[i_{\text{msg}}] \leftarrow$  SkuPke.UpdateDk( $u_d, DK^{\text{upd}}[i_{\text{msg}}]$ )
      for  $\ell \leftarrow 1 \dots i$  do
        if  $\ell < i_{\text{msg}}$  then  $DK^{\text{eph}}[\ell] \leftarrow \perp$ 
        else  $DK^{\text{eph}}[\ell] \leftarrow \hat{dk}^{\text{eph}}$ 
      return  $((DK^{\text{upd}}, DK^{\text{eph}}, r + 1, i, i_{\text{msg}}, m)$ 
return  $((DK^{\text{upd}}, DK^{\text{eph}}, r, i, i_{\text{ack}}, tr_r), \perp)$ 

```

Algorithm HkuPke.BcUpDk

```

Input:  $((DK^{\text{upd}}, DK^{\text{eph}}, r, i, i_{\text{ack}}, tr_r);$ 
 $(z_1, z_2)) \in \mathcal{DK} \times \mathcal{R}$ 
 $i \leftarrow i + 1$ 
 $(\hat{ek}^{\text{upd}}, \hat{dk}^{\text{upd}}) \leftarrow$  SkuPke.Gen( $z_1$ )
 $(\hat{ek}^{\text{eph}}, \hat{dk}^{\text{eph}}) \leftarrow$  PkeAd.Gen( $z_2$ )
 $DK^{\text{upd}}[i] \leftarrow \hat{dk}^{\text{upd}}$ 
 $DK^{\text{eph}}[i] \leftarrow \hat{dk}^{\text{eph}}$ 
return  $((DK^{\text{upd}}, DK^{\text{eph}}, r, i, i_{\text{ack}}, tr_r),$ 
 $(\hat{ek}^{\text{upd}}, \hat{ek}^{\text{eph}}, r))$ 

```

Algorithm HkuPke.BcUpEk

```

Input:  $((ek^{\text{upd}}, ek^{\text{eph}}, s, j, U_e, tr_s),$ 
 $(\hat{ek}^{\text{upd}}, \hat{dk}^{\text{eph}}, r^{\text{msg}})) \in \mathcal{EK} \times \mathcal{U}$ 
if  $r^{\text{msg}} \geq s$  then
   $ek^{\text{eph}} \leftarrow \hat{ek}^{\text{eph}}$ 
 $ek^{\text{upd}} \leftarrow \hat{ek}^{\text{upd}}$ 
for  $\ell \leftarrow (r^{\text{msg}} + 1), \dots, s$  do
   $ek^{\text{upd}} \leftarrow$  SkuPke.UpdateEk( $U_e[\ell], ek^{\text{upd}}$ )
return  $(ek^{\text{upd}}, ek^{\text{eph}}, s, j + 1, U_e, tr_s)$ 

```

Fig. 10: The construction of healable and key-updating encryption.

scheme that provides healing after exposure of the signer’s state. Second, we introduced a sesqui-directional confidentiality scheme that achieves forward secrecy, healing after the exposure of the receiver’s state, and it also provides post-hijack confidentiality.

The missing piece, except showing that the schemes can be securely plugged together, is post-hijack authentication: with the unidirectional authentication scheme we introduced, exposing a hijacked party’s secret state allows an attacker to forge signatures that are still accepted by the other party. This is not only undesirable in practice (the parties lose the chance of detecting the hijack), but it actually undermines post-hijack confidentiality as well. More specifically, an attacker might trick the so far uncompromised party into switching over to adversarially chosen “newer” encryption key, hence becoming a man-in-the-middle after the fact.

In contrast to confidentiality, one obtains healing of authentication in the unidirectional setting, but post-hijack security requires some form of bidirectional communication: receiving a message must irreversibly destroy the signing key. Generally, we could now follow the approach we took when dealing with the confidentiality and define a sesqui-directional authentication game. We refrain from doing so, as we believe that this does not simplify the exposition. As the reader will see later, our solution for achieving post-hijack authentication guarantees requires that the update information on the backward-channel is transmitted confidentially. This breaks the separation between authentication and confidentiality. More concretely, in order for a sesqui-directional authentication game to serve as a useful intermediate abstraction on which one could then build upon, it would now have to model the partial confidential channel of HkuPke in sufficient details. Therefore, we avoid such an intermediate step, and build our overall secure messaging scheme directly. First, however, we formalize the precise level of security we actually want to achieve.

6.1 Almost-Optimal Security of Secure Messaging

Syntax. A *secure messaging scheme* SecMsg consists of the following triple of polynomial-time algorithms $(\text{SecMsg.Init}, \text{SecMsg.Send}, \text{SecMsg.Receive})$. The probabilistic algorithm SecMsg.Init generates an initial pair of states st_A and st_B for Alice and Bob, respectively. Given a message m and a state st_u of a party, the probabilistic sending algorithm outputs an updated state and a ciphertext c : $(st_u, c) \leftarrow \text{SecMsg.Send}(st_u, m; z)$. Analogously, given a state and a ciphertext, the receiving algorithm outputs an updated state and a message m : $(st_u, m) \leftarrow \text{SecMsg.Receive}(st_u, c)$.

Correctness. Correctness of a secure messaging scheme SecMsg requires that if all sent ciphertext are received in order (per direction), then they decrypt to the correct message. More formally, we say the scheme is correct if no adversary can win the correctness game SecMsg-Corr , depicted in Figure 11, with non-negligible probability. For simplicity, we usually consider perfect correctness, i.e., even an unbounded adversary must have probability zero in winning the game.




Fig. 11: The correctness game for a secure messaging scheme.

Security. The security of SecMsg is formalized using the game SecMsg-Sec, described in Figure 12.

In general, the game composes the aspects of the security game for key-updating signature scheme KuSig-UF, depicted in Figure 4 on Figure 4, with the sesqui-directional confidentiality game HkuPke-CPA, depicted in Figure 9 on Figure 9. Nevertheless, there are a few noteworthy points:

- The game can be won in two ways: either by guessing the bit b , i.e., breaking confidentiality, or by setting the flag `win` to `true`, i.e., being able to inject messages when not permitted by an appropriate state exposure. Note that in contrast to the unidirectional authentication game, the game still has to continue after a permitted injection, hence no `lost` flag exists, as we want to guarantee post-hijack security.
- In contrast to the sesqui-directional confidentiality game, the **Send** oracle takes an additional flag as input modeling whether the randomness used during this operations leaks or not. This allows us to capture that a message might not remain confidential because the receivers decryption key has been exposed, yet it contributes to the healing of the reverse direction (which is not the case if the freshly sampled secret key already leaks again).
- Observe that r_u stops increasing the moment the user u is hijacked. Hence, whenever `hijackedu` is `true`, r_u corresponds to the number of messages he received before.
- The two flags `vuln1` and `vuln2` correspond to the two situations in which we cannot guarantee proper post-hijack security. First, `vuln1` corresponds to the situation that the last message from \bar{u} to u before u got hijacked was not transmitted confidentiality. This can have two reasons: either the randomness of the encryption of \bar{u} leaked, or u has been exposed just before receiving that message. Observe that in order to hijack u right after that message, the state

of \bar{u} needs to be exposed right after sending that message. So in a model where randomness does not leak, vuln_1 implies that both parties' state have been compromised almost at the same time. Secondly, vuln_2 implies that the next message by \bar{u} was not sent securely either.




Fig. 12: The game formalizing almost-optimal security of a secure messaging scheme. The solid boxes indicate the differences in comparison to the game with optimal security.

6.2 Construction

Our basic scheme. As the first step, consider a simplified version of our scheme depicted in Figure 13. This construction works by appropriately combining one

instance of our unidirectional key-updating signature scheme `SkuSig`, and one instance of our healable and key-updating confidentiality scheme `HkuPke`, per direction.




Fig. 13: The scheme obtained by plugging our `HkuPke` and our `SkuSig` schemes together. Note how the keys are only used for the corresponding direction, except the update information for the encryption key of our sesqui-directional confidentiality scheme, which is sent along the message.

Adding post-hijack authenticity. The scheme depicted in Figure 13 does not provide any post-hijack authenticity, which we now add.

Observe that in order to achieve such a guarantee, we have to resort to sesqui-directional techniques, i.e., we have to send some update information on the channel from u to \bar{u} that affects the signing key for the other direction. Given that this update information must “destroy” the signing key in case of a hijack, we will use the following simple trick: the update information is simply a fresh signing key under which the other party has to sign, whenever he acknowledges the receipt of this message. Note that the signer only has to keep the latest such signing key he received, and can securely delete all previous ones. Hence, whenever he gets hijacked, the signing key that he previously stored, and that he needs to sign his next message, gets irretrievably overwritten. This, of course, requires that those signing keys are transmitted securely, and hence will be included in the encryption in our overall scheme. However, the technique as described so far does not heal properly. In order to restore the healing property, we will simply ratchet this key as well in the usual manner: whenever we use it, we sample a fresh signing key and send the verification key along. In short, the additional signature will be produced with the following key:

- If we acknowledge a fresh message, i.e., we received a message since last sending one, we use the signing key included in that message (only the last one in case we received multiple messages).
- Otherwise, we use the one we generated during sending the last message.

To further strengthen post-hijack security, the parties also include a hash of the communication transcript in each signature. This ensures that even if the deciding message has not been transferred confidentially, at least the receiver will not accept any messages sent by the honest but hijacked sender. A summary of the additional signatures, the key handling, and the transcript involved in the communication from Alice to Bob is shown in Figure 14. Of course, the actual scheme is symmetric and these additional signatures will be applied by both parties. See Figure 15 for the full description of our overall scheme.

Theorem 4. *Let HkuPke be a healable and key-updating encryption scheme, let KuSig be a key-updating signature scheme, and let Sig be a signature scheme. The scheme SecChan of Figure 15 is SecMsg-Sec secure, if HkuPke scheme is HkuPke-CPA secure, KuSig is KuSig-UF secure, and Sig is 1-SUF-CMA secure.*

A proof sketch of Theorem 4 can be found in Appendix F.




Fig. 14: Handling of the additional signature keys for the communication from Alice to Bob. In addition to the new keys and signature, each message also sends an explicit index s_{msg} , indicating that so far the Alice has received that many messages from Bob. This allows Bob to look up the corresponding verification key. Moreover, they also maintain include a hash of the communication transcript in each signature.

Construction SecChan of SecMsg

Algorithm SecMsg.Init

```

for  $u \in \{A, B\}$  do
   $(ek_u, dk_u) \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.Gen}$ 
   $(sk_u^{\text{upd}}, vk_u^{\text{upd}}) \leftarrow \text{KuSig.Gen}$ 
   $(sk_u^{\text{eph}}, vk_u^{\text{eph}}) \leftarrow \text{Sig.Gen}$ 
for  $u \in \{A, B\}$  do
   $st_u \leftarrow (0, 0, 0, dk_u, ek_u, sk_u^{\text{upd}}, vk_u^{\text{upd}}, sk_u^{\text{eph}}, vk_u^{\text{eph}}, [], 0, []) \leftarrow st$ 
return  $(st_A, st_B)$ 

```

Algorithm SecMsg.Send

Input: $(st, m; z) \in \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{R}$

```

 $(r, s, s_{\text{ack}}, dk, ek, sk^{\text{upd}}, vk^{\text{upd}}, sk^{\text{eph}}, vk^{\text{eph}}, VK^{\text{eph}}, tr, TR) \leftarrow st$ 
 $(sk_1^{\text{eph}}, vk_1^{\text{eph}}) \leftarrow \text{Sig.Gen}(z_1)$  ▷ The key pair for the backwards channel.
 $(sk_2^{\text{eph}}, vk_2^{\text{eph}}) \leftarrow \text{Sig.Gen}(z_2)$  ▷ The key pair for the forwards channel.

▷ Encrypt.
 $(dk, upd) \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.BcUpDk}(dk; z_3)$ 
 $(ek, c) \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.Enc}(ek, (m, sk_1^{\text{eph}}), (upd, vk_2^{\text{eph}}, r); z_4)$ 

▷ Sign.
 $\hat{c} \leftarrow (c, upd, vk_2^{\text{eph}}, r)$ 
 $(sk^{\text{upd}}, \sigma_{\text{upd}}) \leftarrow \text{KuSig.Sign}(sk^{\text{upd}}, (\hat{c}, tr); z_5)$ 
 $\sigma_{\text{eph}} \leftarrow \text{Sig.Sign}(sk^{\text{eph}}, (\hat{c}, tr); z_6)$ 

▷ Update the state.
 $s \leftarrow s + 1$ 
 $VK[s] \leftarrow vk_1^{\text{eph}}$ 
 $TR[s] \leftarrow \text{Hash}(TR[s-1] \parallel \hat{c})$ 
 $st \leftarrow (r, s, s_{\text{ack}}, dk, ek, sk^{\text{upd}}, vk^{\text{upd}}, sk_2^{\text{eph}}, vk_2^{\text{eph}}, VK^{\text{eph}}, tr, TR)$ 
return  $(st, (\hat{c}, \sigma_{\text{upd}}, \sigma_{\text{eph}}))$ 

```

Algorithm SecMsg.Receive

Input: $(st_u, (\hat{c}, \sigma_{\text{upd}}, \sigma_{\text{eph}})) \in \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{C}$

```

 $(r, s, s_{\text{ack}}, dk, ek, sk^{\text{upd}}, vk^{\text{upd}}, sk^{\text{eph}}, vk^{\text{eph}}, VK^{\text{eph}}, tr, TR) \leftarrow st$ 
 $(c, upd, vk_{\text{msg}}^{\text{eph}}, s_{\text{msg}}) \leftarrow \hat{c}$ 
 $v \leftarrow \text{false}$ 
if  $s_{\text{ack}} \leq s_{\text{msg}} \leq s$  then
  if  $s_{\text{msg}} > s_{\text{ack}}$  then
     $vk \leftarrow VK^{\text{eph}}[s_{\text{msg}}]$ 
  else
     $vk \leftarrow vk^{\text{eph}}$ 
   $v_{\text{eph}} \leftarrow \text{Sig.Verify}(vk, (\hat{c}, TR[s_{\text{msg}}]), \sigma_{\text{eph}})$ 
   $(vk^{\text{upd}}, v_{\text{upd}}) \leftarrow \text{KuSig.Verify}(vk^{\text{upd}}, \hat{c}, \sigma_{\text{upd}})$ 
   $v \leftarrow v_{\text{eph}} \wedge v_{\text{upd}}$ 
if  $v$  then
   $ek \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.BcUpEk}(ek, upd)$ 
   $(dk, (m, sk_{\text{msg}}^{\text{eph}})) \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.Dec}(dk, c, (upd, vk_{\text{msg}}^{\text{eph}}, s_{\text{msg}}))$ 
   $r \leftarrow r + 1$ 
   $tr \leftarrow \text{Hash}(tr \parallel \hat{c})$ 
   $st \leftarrow (r, s, s_{\text{msg}}, dk, ek, sk^{\text{upd}}, vk^{\text{upd}}, sk_{\text{msg}}^{\text{eph}}, vk_{\text{msg}}^{\text{eph}}, VK^{\text{eph}}, tr, TR)$ 
  return  $(st, m)$ 
else
  return  $(st, \perp)$ 

```

Fig. 15: The construction of an almost-optimally secure messaging scheme.

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A Correctness of HkuPke

A healable and key-updating encryption scheme is correct if any (even unbounded) adversary has probability zero of winning the game HkuPke-Corr, depicted in Figure 16.




Fig. 16: The correctness game for healable and key-updating encryption.

B Public-Key Encryption with Associated Data

Public-key encryption with associated data is public-key encryption, where the encryption and decryption algorithms take an additional input $ad \in \mathcal{AD}$. Formally, it consists of three algorithms (PkeAd.Gen, PkeAd.Enc, PkeAd.Dec), which can be used to generate a new key pair $(dk, ek) \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Gen}$, encrypt a message m with associated data ad as $c \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Enc}(m, ad)$, and decrypt a ciphertext, providing the matching associated data $m' \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Dec}(c, ad)$.

For correctness, we require that for any $ad \in \mathcal{AD}$, for any $(dk, ek) \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Gen}$, and for any m , we have $\text{PkeAd.Dec}(\text{PkeAd.Enc}(m, ad), ad) = m$ with probability 1.

The security notion we require is IND-CCA2, formalized in Figure 17. Intuitively, the scheme should protect the integrity of the associated data, in addition to that of the message.

IND-CCA2 secure encryption with additional data can be easily constructed by extending standard IND-CCA2 public-key encryption schemes. For example, in the random oracle model, the following scheme of [4] is IND-CCA2 secure.

Let H and G be two independent random oracles, and let f be a trapdoor one-way permutation. To encrypt a message m , sample r at random and output $(f(r), H(r) \oplus m, G(m, r))$. This construction can be extended to incorporate additional data ad by changing the encryption to $(f(r), H(r) \oplus m, G(m, ad, r))$. The proof is straightforward. Alternatively, one can use the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem [9] and simply include the additional data in the hash.




Fig. 17: One time IND-CCA2 security of a public-key encryption scheme with associated data.

C Multi-Instance SkuPke

The multi-instance security of secretly key-updatable encryption is formalized using the game SkuPke-MI-CPA, depicted in Figure 18. To a large extent, the game is simply a multi-instance version of the game SkuPke-CPA from Section 5, however, a few points are worth mentioning:

- There is only one global list of updates. The oracle **UpdateDk** applies the secret update to *all* decryption keys created up to this point. The oracle **UpdateEk** can be used to update public keys independently.
- All decryption keys must be exposed at once.

Intuitively, this means that the decryption keys are, in some sense, synchronized.

C.1 Proof of Theorem 2

Theorem 2. *The construction of Figure 8 is SkuPke-MI-CPA secure in the random oracle model, if CDH is hard.*

Game SkuPke-MI-CPA

<p>Initialization</p> <pre> b ← {0, 1} N ← 0 $\mathcal{U}_e, \mathcal{U}_d$ ← array initialized to \perp ind, ind_d ← 1 NotLeaked ← {1} Chal ← \emptyset exp ← -1 EK, DK ← array initialized to \perp Ind_e ← array initialized to 1 </pre>	<p>Oracle UpdateGen</p> <pre> Input: $z \in \mathcal{R} \cup \{\perp\}$ ind ← ind + 1 if $z = \perp$ then $(\mathcal{U}_e[\text{ind}], \mathcal{U}_d[\text{ind}]) \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateGen}$ NotLeaked ← NotLeaked \cup {ind} return $\mathcal{U}_e[\text{ind}]$ else $(\mathcal{U}_e[\text{ind}], \mathcal{U}_d[\text{ind}]) \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateGen}(z)$ return $(\mathcal{U}_e[\text{ind}], \mathcal{U}_d[\text{ind}])$ </pre>
<p>Oracle NewKeys</p> <pre> N ← N + 1 (EK[N], DK[N]) ← SkuPke.Gen Ind_e[N] ← ind return EK[N] </pre>	<p>Oracle UpdateEk</p> <pre> Input: $n \in \mathbb{N}$ if Ind_e[n] \geq ind then return \perp Ind_e[n] ← Ind_e[n] + 1 EK[n] ← SkuPke.UpdateEk($\mathcal{U}_e[\text{Ind}_e[n]]$, EK[n]) return EK[n] </pre>
<p>Oracle Challenge</p> <pre> Input: $(n, m_1, m_2, i) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathcal{M}^2 \times \mathbb{N}$ if $n > N$ then return \perp nc₁ ← exp \geq Ind_e[n] \wedge (Ind_e[n], exp) \cap NotLeaked = \emptyset nc₂ ← exp $<$ Ind_e[n] \wedge (exp, Ind_e[n]) \cap NotLeaked = \emptyset if $m_1 \neq m_2 \vee \text{nc}_1 \vee \text{nc}_2 \vee i > \text{ind}$ then return \perp Chal ← Chal \cup {Ind_e[n]} c ← SkuPke.Enc(EK[n], $m_b \parallel \mathcal{U}_d[i]$) return c </pre>	
<p>Oracle Expose</p> <pre> if exp \geq 0 then return \perp ne₁ ← $\exists c \in \text{Chal} (c \geq \text{ind}_d \wedge (\text{ind}_d, c] \cap \text{NotLeaked} = \emptyset)$ ne₂ ← $\exists c \in \text{Chal} (c < \text{ind}_d \wedge (c, \text{ind}_d] \cap \text{NotLeaked} = \emptyset)$ if ne₁ \vee ne₂ then return \perp exp ← ind_d return DK </pre>	
<p>Finalization</p> <pre> Input: $d \in \{0, 1\}$ return $(d = b)$ </pre>	

Fig. 18: The multi-instance security game for secretly key-updatable encryption.

Recall that in our construction an encryption of a message m is a pair $(g^r, \text{Hash}(g^{xr} \oplus m))$, where r is random and $\text{Hash}(\cdot)$ is a random oracle.

Assume that \mathcal{A}_1 is an adversary who makes at most q_c queries to the Challenge oracle and q_e queries to the Expose oracle.

First, we employ the standard hybrid argument: we define a sequence of hybrids $\text{ind}^c = 1 \dots q_e + 1$, where in the hybrid ind^c , the Challenge oracle replies to the $\text{ind}^c - 1$ first queries using m_1 , and to the queries ind^c to q_e using m_2 . Now using \mathcal{A}_1 we can construct \mathcal{A}_2 who distinguishes between the ind^c and $\text{ind}^c + 1$.

We now use \mathcal{A}_2 to construct \mathcal{A}_3 , who, given a CDH instance, outputs a list, which contains a solution with high probability. Then we can use the Diffie-Hellman self-corrector by Shoup [17] to transform \mathcal{A}_3 into an algorithm outputting a single solution.

Let $A = g^a, B = g^b$ be the CDH instance. \mathcal{A}_3 guesses the index ind^s of the last secure update before the exposure. It simulates the random oracle by lazy sampling (in particular, it keeps a list L of all \mathcal{A}_2 's queries). Moreover, it simulates the game oracle queries for \mathcal{A}_2 as shown in Figure 19 (for simplicity, in the figure we assume that the guess is correct).

It is clear that if \mathcal{A}_2 can distinguish between the two hybrids, then it must query the random oracle on input $g^{(a+x)b}$, where x is the currently stored secret key $\text{DK}[n]$ and g^x is the encryption key $\text{EK}[n]$. Hence, \mathcal{A}_3 multiplies all elements of L by B^{-x} and applies the self-corrector to find the solution to CDH.

D Proof of Theorem 1

Theorem 1. *Let Sig be a signature scheme. The construction of Figure 5 is KuSig-UF secure, if Sig is 1-SUF-CMA secure.*

In the following section, we present a proof of Theorem 1.

First, consider the sequence of hybrids for $\text{idx} = 0, 1, 2, \dots$, as depicted in Figure 20. Observe that KuSig-UF_0 corresponds to the KuSig-UF game with our concrete scheme plugged in, while KuSig-UF_{q_s} corresponds to a game that cannot be won by an adversary doing at most q_s queries.

The proof is concluded by showing that the difference in the winning distance of two consecutive such hybrids is bounded by twice the winning probability of an appropriately modified adversary against the SUF-CMA game. To this end, consider the variant of SUF-CMA depicted in Figure 22 that allows exposing the signing key. Clearly, any adversary winning this game can be transformed into one winning the traditional SUF-CMA game at the cost of guessing whether the key will be exposed upfront. We conclude the proof by outline the reduction in distinguishing $\text{KuSig-UF}_{\text{idx}}$ from $\text{KuSig-UF}_{\text{idx}+1}$ in Figure 21.

E Proof of Theorem 3

Theorem 3. *Let SkuPke be a secretly key-updatable encryption scheme, and let PkeAd be an encryption scheme. The scheme of Figure 10 is HkuPke-CPA*

Game SkuPke-MI-CPA

Initialization

```

 $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ 
 $N \leftarrow 0$ 
 $\mathcal{U}_e, \mathcal{U}_d \leftarrow$  array initialized to  $\perp$ 
 $\text{ind}, \text{ind}_d \leftarrow 1$ 
 $\text{NotLeaked} \leftarrow \{1\}$ 
 $\text{Chal} \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
 $\text{exp} \leftarrow -1$ 
 $\text{EK}, \text{DK} \leftarrow$  array initialized to  $\perp$ 
 $\text{Ind}_e \leftarrow$  array initialized to 1
 $\text{explInterval} \leftarrow (\text{ind}^s = -1)$ 

```

Oracle NewKeys

```

 $N \leftarrow N + 1$ 
 $x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ 
if  $\text{explInterval}$  then
   $(\text{EK}[N], \text{DK}[N]) \leftarrow (g^x, x)$ 
else
   $(\text{EK}[N], \text{DK}[N]) \leftarrow (Ag^x, x)$ 
 $\text{Ind}_e[N] \leftarrow \text{ind}$ 
return  $\text{EK}[N]$ 

```

Oracle UpdateGen

```

Input:  $z \in \mathcal{R} \cup \{\perp\}$ 
 $\text{ind} \leftarrow \text{ind} + 1$ 
if  $z = \perp$  then
   $z \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ 
  if  $\text{ind} = \text{ind}^s$  then
     $(\mathcal{U}_e[\text{ind}], \mathcal{U}_d[\text{ind}]) \leftarrow (A^{-1}g^z, z)$ 
  else if  $\text{explInterval} \wedge \text{ind} > \text{ind}^s$  then
     $(\mathcal{U}_e[\text{ind}], \mathcal{U}_d[\text{ind}]) \leftarrow (Ag^z, z)$ 
     $\text{explInterval} \leftarrow \text{false}$ 
  else
     $(\mathcal{U}_e[\text{ind}], \mathcal{U}_d[\text{ind}]) \leftarrow (g^z, z)$ 
   $\text{NotLeaked} \leftarrow \text{NotLeaked} \cup \{\text{ind}\}$ 
  return  $\mathcal{U}_e[\text{ind}]$ 
else
  if  $\text{ind} = \text{ind}^s$  then
     $\perp$  Abort.
   $(\mathcal{U}_e[\text{ind}], \mathcal{U}_d[\text{ind}]) \leftarrow (g^z, z)$ 
  return  $(\mathcal{U}_e[\text{ind}], \mathcal{U}_d[\text{ind}])$ 

```

Oracle UpdateEk

```

Input:  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ 
if  $\text{Ind}_e[n] \geq \text{ind}$  then
   $\perp$  return  $\perp$ 
 $\text{Ind}_e[n] \leftarrow \text{Ind}_e[n] + 1$ 
 $\text{EK}[n] \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_e[\text{Ind}_e[n]] \cdot \text{EK}[n]$ 
return  $\text{EK}[n]$ 

```

Oracle UpdateDk

```

if  $\text{ind}_d \geq \text{ind}$  then
   $\perp$  return  $\perp$ 
 $\text{ind}_d \leftarrow \text{ind}_d + 1$ 
for  $n \in \{1, \dots, N\}$  do
   $\text{DK}[n] \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_d[\text{ind}_d] + \text{DK}[n]$ 

```

Oracle Challenge

```

Input:  $(n, m_1, m_2, i) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathcal{M}^2 \times \mathbb{N}$ 
if  $n > N$  then
   $\perp$  return  $\perp$ 
 $\text{nc}_1 \leftarrow \text{exp} \geq \text{Ind}_e[n] \wedge (\text{Ind}_e[n], \text{exp}) \cap \text{NotLeaked} = \emptyset$ 
 $\text{nc}_2 \leftarrow \text{exp} < \text{Ind}_e[n] \wedge (\text{exp}, \text{Ind}_e[n]) \cap \text{NotLeaked} = \emptyset$ 
if  $|m_1| \neq |m_2| \vee \text{nc}_1 \vee \text{nc}_2 \vee i > \text{ind}$  then
   $\perp$  return  $\perp$ 
 $\text{Chal} \leftarrow \text{Chal} \cup \{\text{Ind}_e[n]\}$ 
if  $|\text{Chal}| < \text{ind}^c$  then
   $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ 
   $c \leftarrow (g^r, \text{Hash}(\text{EK}[n]^r) \oplus m_1 \parallel \mathcal{U}_d[i])$ 
   $\triangleright$   $\text{Hash}(\cdot)$  is computed by simulating the random oracle consistently with other queries
else if  $|\text{Chal}| > \text{ind}^c$  then
   $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ 
   $c \leftarrow (g^r, \text{Hash}(\text{EK}[n]^r) \oplus m_2 \parallel \mathcal{U}_d[i])$ 
   $\triangleright$   $\text{Hash}(\cdot)$  is computed by simulating the random oracle consistently with other queries
else
   $R \leftarrow G$ 
   $c \leftarrow (B, R)$ 
return  $c$ 

```

Finalization

```

Input:  $d \in \{0, 1\}$ 
return  $(d = b)$ 

```

Fig. 19: The proof of our construction of secretly key-updatable encryption.




Fig. 20: A sequence of hybrids for $\text{idx} = 0, 1, 2, \dots$. Observe that KuSig-UF_0 corresponds to the KuSig-UF game with our concrete scheme plugged in, while KuSig-UF_{q_s} corresponds to a game that cannot be won by an adversary doing at most q_s queries.

secure, assuming that the SkuPke scheme is SkuPke-CPA secure, and the PkeAd is IND-CCA2-AD secure.

In the following section, we provide a proof (sketch) of [Theorem 3](#). In order to prove the security of our scheme with respect to the HkuPke-CPA game, we first plug the concrete scheme into the security game, as shown in [Figure 23](#). Note that we avoided a number of redundant variable, kept track in both the scheme and the game, and applied a number of trivial simplifications already.

Next, we proceed by guessing if and what point the adversary hijacks. If we guess wrong, the adversary simply loses the game immediately. For an adversary that sends at most q messages, we guess correctly with probability $1/2q$ and, additionally, the guess does not affect the game at all up to the guessed point. Hence, we lose a factor of $2q$.

Moreover, we use the (perfect) correctness of our underlying schemes to make in the **Decrypt** oracle the state update independent of the cipher-texts up to the point of hijacking (the message is anyway never output before hijacking). The resulting game after both steps is shown in [Figure 24](#).

We now proceed with the first big step: arguing that confidentiality is ensured for all messages sent before hijacking. In the next hop, depicted in [Figure 25](#), we




Fig. 21: Depiction of the reduction showing that distinguishing $\text{KuSig-UF}_{\text{idx}}$ from $\text{KuSig-UF}_{\text{idx}+1}$ implies breaking SUF-CMA-WE security of the Sig scheme.

replace in the respective challenges the encrypted messages (m_b, u_d, z_2) by an encryption of zeros of appropriate length. Any adversary that can distinguish between the previous and this hop can break the security of our healable & key-updating PKE scheme. We only sketch the reduction here.

First of all, we will use multiple instances of the multi-key version of the SkuPke-CPA game. Namely, we create a new key pair in each BcUpdateDk oracle call according to the following rule:

- If the decryptor is currently exposed, i.e., has been exposed between the last call to BcUpdateDk and now, then we create a completely new instance of the game.
- Otherwise, we create a new key-pair in the current instance by calling the NewKeys oracle.

Game SUF-CMA-WE

<hr/> Initialization $(sk, vk) \leftarrow \text{Sig.Gen}$ $S \leftarrow \emptyset$ $\text{exposed} \leftarrow \text{false}$ return vk	<hr/> Oracle Sign Input: $m \in \mathcal{M}$ $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sig.Sign}(sk, m)$ $S \leftarrow S \cup \{(m, \sigma)\}$ return σ
<hr/> Oracle Expose Input: $\text{exposed} \leftarrow \text{true}$ return sk	<hr/> Finalization Input: $(m, \sigma) \in \mathcal{M} \times \Sigma$ return $\neg \text{exposed} \wedge m \notin S \wedge \text{Sig.Verify}(vk, m, \sigma)$

Fig. 22: Strong unforgeability game for a signature scheme, with potential exposure of the signing key. An adversary against this game can be easily reduced to one against the standard SUF-CMA game at a loss of a factor two by guessing upfront whether the signature will be exposed or not.

Moreover, if the randomness leaks, then we create the keys completely ourselves, as the decryption key is not secure in the first place.

In addition to that, the reduction will simulate all the HkuPke-CPA oracles, before the hijacking, as follows:

BcUpdateDk: First, we forget about all instances that are older than the one holding the decryption key we are concerned with. To all the remaining instances, we then apply the update.

If it is an insecure public update, we can simply create it for some instances if needed. If it is a private update, it is crucial to realize only the instance it was created for is alive, the way we create and use instances. For it to be a secret update in the first place, it must have been transmitted using a challenge, and hence that instance has not been exposed at this time. Having a challenge in transmission, however, implies that the instance cannot be exposed in the meantime either. Hence, all new key pairs in this time period will still be created in the same instance.

BcUpdateEk: The update information includes the index r^{msg} indicating the number of ciphertext that have been received at the point when it was generated. All updates we have transmitted on the main channel in between, we now also have to apply to the fresh encryption key ek^{upd} as well, to stay in sync with the receiver. Again, if any of this updates has been a secret one, we now that all concerning keys are in the same instance. Otherwise we “inject” them into the newer instances, carefully keeping track whether this has already been for BcUpdateDk.

Expose: We **Expose** all the SkuPke-CPA instances that are still in used, and have not been exposed before. Note that exposing is only allowed if there is no challenge in transmission, meaning that there is no secret update-information in transmission either. Furthermore, we will never challenge this instance again, thereby trivially satisfying the ne_1 and ne_2 checks, respectively.

Game HkuPke-CPA

Initialization

```

 $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ 
 $DK^{\text{upd}}, DK^{\text{eph}}, U_e \leftarrow \text{array init to } \perp$ 
 $(ek^{\text{upd}}, DK^{\text{upd}}[0]) \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.Gen}$ 
 $(ek^{\text{eph}}, DK^{\text{eph}}[0]) \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Gen}$ 
 $s, r, i, j, tr_s, tr_r \leftarrow 0$ 
 $i_{\text{ack}} \leftarrow -1$ 
 $r_{\text{hon}} \leftarrow 0 \quad \triangleright r \text{ from the game}$ 
 $\text{exposed} \leftarrow -1$ 
 $\text{hijacked} \leftarrow \text{false}$ 
 $\text{Challenges} \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
 $\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{U} \leftarrow \text{array initialized to } \perp$ 
return  $ek$ 

```

Oracle Encrypt

```

Input:  $(m, ad) \in \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{AD}$ 
 $s \leftarrow s + 1$ 
 $(z_1, \dots, z_4) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$ 
 $(U_e[s], u_d) \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateGen}(z_1)$ 
 $\hat{c} \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.Enc}(ek^{\text{upd}}, (m, u_d, z_2); z_3)$ 
 $c \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Enc}(ek^{\text{eph}}, \hat{c}, ad; z_4)$ 
 $tr_s \leftarrow \text{Hash}(tr_s \parallel (c, j, ad))$ 
 $ek^{\text{upd}} \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateEk}(U_e[s], ek^{\text{upd}})$ 
 $(ek^{\text{eph}}, \_ ) \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Gen}(\text{Hash}(tr_s \parallel z_2))$ 
 $\mathcal{B}[s] \leftarrow ((c, j), ad)$ 
return  $(ek, (c, j), (z_1, \dots, z_4))$ 

```

Oracle Expose & Challenge

as in the game

Oracle Decrypt

```

Input:  $((c, i_{\text{msg}}), ad) \in \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{AD}$ 
 $m \leftarrow \perp$ 
if  $i_{\text{msg}} \geq i_{\text{ack}} \wedge i_{\text{msg}} > i$  then
   $\hat{c} \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Dec}(DK^{\text{eph}}[i_{\text{msg}}], c, ad)$ 
  if  $\hat{c} \neq \perp$  then
     $\hat{m} \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.Dec}(DK^{\text{upd}}[i_{\text{msg}}], \hat{c})$ 
    if  $\hat{m} \in \mathcal{M} \times \text{SkuPke.U} \times \text{PkeAd.DK}$  then
       $(m, u_d, z) \leftarrow \hat{m}$ 
       $tr_r \leftarrow \text{Hash}(tr_r \parallel (c, i_{\text{msg}}, ad))$ 
       $(\_, \hat{dk}^{\text{eph}}) \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Gen}(\text{Hash}(tr_r \parallel z_2))$ 
       $DK^{\text{upd}}[i_{\text{msg}}] \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateDk}(u_d, DK^{\text{upd}}[i_{\text{msg}}])$ 
      for  $\ell \leftarrow 1 \dots i$  do
        if  $\ell < i_{\text{msg}}$  then  $DK^{\text{eph}}[\ell] \leftarrow \perp$ 
        else  $DK^{\text{eph}}[\ell] \leftarrow \hat{dk}^{\text{eph}}$ 
       $r \leftarrow r + 1$ 
       $i_{\text{ack}} \leftarrow i_{\text{msg}}$ 
  if  $m = \perp$  then
    return  $\perp$ 
  if hijacked  $\vee ((c, i_{\text{msg}}), ad) \neq \mathcal{B}[r_{\text{hon}} + 1]$  then
     $\text{hijacked} \leftarrow \text{true}$ 
    return  $m$ 
  else
     $r_{\text{hon}} \leftarrow r_{\text{hon}} + 1$ 
  return  $\perp$ 

```

where:

$ek := (ek^{\text{upd}}, ek^{\text{eph}}, s, j, U_e, tr_s), dk := (DK^{\text{upd}}, DK^{\text{eph}}, r, i, i_{\text{ack}}, tr_r)$

Oracle BcUpdateEk

```

if  $j = i$  then return  $\perp$ 
 $j \leftarrow j + 1$ 
 $(\hat{ek}^{\text{upd}}, \hat{dk}^{\text{eph}}, r^{\text{msg}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{U}[j]$ 
if  $r^{\text{msg}} \geq s$  then
   $ek^{\text{eph}} \leftarrow \hat{ek}^{\text{eph}}$ 
   $ek^{\text{upd}} \leftarrow \hat{ek}^{\text{upd}}$ 
  for  $\ell \leftarrow (r^{\text{msg}} + 1), \dots, s$  do
     $ek^{\text{upd}} \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateEk}(U_e[\ell], ek^{\text{upd}})$ 

```

Oracle BcUpdateDk

```

Input: leak  $\in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$ 
if  $\neg \text{hijacked}$  then
   $i \leftarrow i + 1$ 
   $(z_1, z_2) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$ 
   $(\hat{ek}^{\text{upd}}, \hat{dk}^{\text{upd}}) \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.Gen}(z_1)$ 
   $(\hat{ek}^{\text{eph}}, \hat{dk}^{\text{eph}}) \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Gen}(z_2)$ 
   $DK^{\text{upd}}[i] \leftarrow \hat{dk}^{\text{upd}}$ 
   $DK^{\text{eph}}[i] \leftarrow \hat{dk}^{\text{eph}}$ 
   $\mathcal{U}[i] \leftarrow (\hat{ek}^{\text{upd}}, \hat{ek}^{\text{eph}}, r)$ 
  if leak then
    return  $(\mathcal{U}[i], (z_1, z_2))$ 
  else
    return  $\mathcal{U}[i]$ 

```

Finalization

```

Input:  $d \in \{0, 1\}$ 
return  $(d = b)$ 

```

Fig. 23: The HkuPke-CPA game with our concrete scheme plugged in.

Game HkuPke-CPA

Initialization

```

b  $\leftarrow$  {0, 1}
DKupd, DKeph, Ue  $\leftarrow$  array init to  $\perp$ 
(ekupd, DKupd[0])  $\leftarrow$  SkuPke.Gen
(ekeph, DKeph[0])  $\leftarrow$  PkeAd.Gen
s, r, i, j, trs, trr  $\leftarrow$  0
iack  $\leftarrow$  -1
rhon  $\leftarrow$  0  $\triangleright$  r from the game
exposed  $\leftarrow$  -1
hijacked  $\leftarrow$  false
Challenges  $\leftarrow$   $\emptyset$ 
B, U  $\leftarrow$  array initialized to  $\perp$ 
C  $\leftarrow$  array initialized to  $\perp$ 
lost  $\leftarrow$  false
hidx  $\leftarrow$  {0, ..., q - 1}
hidx  $\leftarrow$  {hidx,  $\infty$ }
return ek

```

Oracle Encrypt

```

Input: (m, ad)  $\in$   $\mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{AD}$ 
s  $\leftarrow$  s + 1
(z1, ..., z4)  $\leftarrow$   $\mathcal{R}$ 
(Ue[s], ud)  $\leftarrow$  SkuPke.UpdateGen(z1)
c  $\leftarrow$  SkuPke.Enc(ekupd, (m, ud, z2); z3)
c  $\leftarrow$  PkeAd.Enc(ekeph, c, ad; z4)
trs  $\leftarrow$  Hash(trs || (c, j, ad))
ekupd  $\leftarrow$  SkuPke.UpdateEk(Ue[s], ekupd)
(ekeph, _)  $\leftarrow$  PkeAd.Gen(Hash(trs || z2))
B[s]  $\leftarrow$  ((c, j), ad)
C[s]  $\leftarrow$  (ud, z2)
return (ek, (c, j), (z1, ..., z4))

```

Finalization

```

Input: d  $\in$  {0, 1}
return (d = b)  $\wedge$   $\neg$  lost

```

Oracle Decrypt

```

Input: ((c, imsg), ad)  $\in$   $\mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{AD}$ 
m  $\leftarrow$   $\perp$ 
if imsg  $\geq$  iack  $\wedge$  imsg > i then
  c  $\leftarrow$  PkeAd.Dec(DKeph[imsg], c, ad)
  if c  $\neq$   $\perp$  then
    m  $\leftarrow$  SkuPke.Dec(DKupd[imsg], c)
    if m  $\in$   $\mathcal{M} \times$  SkuPke. $\mathcal{U} \times$  PkeAd. $\mathcal{DK}$  then
      (m, ud, z)  $\leftarrow$  m
      if rhon < hidx then
        C[rhon + 1]  $\leftarrow$  (ud, z)  $\triangleright$  same, by correctness
        trr  $\leftarrow$  Hash(trr || (c, imsg, ad))
        (dkeph, _)  $\leftarrow$  PkeAd.Gen(Hash(trr || z2))
        DKupd[imsg]  $\leftarrow$  SkuPke.UpdateDk(ud, DKupd[imsg])
        for  $\ell \leftarrow 1 \dots i$  do
          if  $\ell < i$ msg then DKeph[ $\ell$ ]  $\leftarrow$   $\perp$ 
          else DKeph[ $\ell$ ]  $\leftarrow$  dkeph
        r  $\leftarrow$  r + 1
        iack  $\leftarrow$  imsg
      if m =  $\perp \vee$  hijacked then
        return m
      else if rhon < hidx then
        if ((c, imsg), ad) = B[rhon + 1] then
          rhon  $\leftarrow$  rhon + 1
          return  $\perp$ 
        else
          lost  $\leftarrow$  true  $\triangleright$  guessed wrongly
      else if rhon = hidx then
        if ((c, imsg), ad)  $\neq$  B[rhon + 1] then
          hijacked  $\leftarrow$  true
          return m
        else
          lost  $\leftarrow$  true  $\triangleright$  guessed wrongly
      else
        lost  $\leftarrow$  true  $\triangleright$  lost must be true here already

```

Fig. 24: First hop. We guess the point of hijacking and let the adversary lose the game if guessed wrongly, thereby losing a linear factor in the number in the upper bound q on the adversary's queries. Moreover, we use correctness of the scheme.

Game HkuPke-CPA

Oracle Encrypt

Input: $(m, ad) \in \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{AD}$
 $s \leftarrow s + 1$
 $(z_1, \dots, z_4) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$
 $(U_e[s], u_d) \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateGen}(z_1)$
 $\hat{c} \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.Enc}(ek^{\text{upd}}, (m, u_d, z_2); z_3)$
 $c \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Enc}(ek^{\text{eph}}, \hat{c}, ad; z_4)$
 $tr_s \leftarrow \text{Hash}(tr_s \parallel (c, j, ad))$
 $ek^{\text{upd}} \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateEk}(U_e[s], ek^{\text{upd}})$
 $(ek^{\text{eph}}, _) \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Gen}(\text{Hash}(tr_s \parallel z_2))$
 $\mathcal{B}[s] \leftarrow ((c, j), ad)$
 $\mathcal{C}[s] \leftarrow (u_d, z_2)$
return $(ek, (c, j), (z_1, \dots, z_4))$

Finalization

Input: $d \in \{0, 1\}$
return $(d = b) \wedge \text{-lost}$

Oracle Challenge

Input: $(m_1, m_2, ad) \in \mathcal{M}^2 \times \mathcal{AD}$
if $|m_1| \neq |m_2|$ **then**
 return \perp
if $j \leq \text{exposed}$ **then**
 return \perp
 $s \leftarrow s + 1$
 $(z_1, \dots, z_4) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$
 $(U_e[s], u_d) \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateGen}(z_1)$
if $s \leq \text{hidx}$ **then**
 $\hat{c} \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.Enc}(ek^{\text{upd}}, 0^{(|m_b \cdot u_d \cdot z_2|)}; z_3)$
else
 $\hat{c} \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.Enc}(ek^{\text{upd}}, (m_b, u_d, z_2); z_3)$
 $c \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Enc}(ek^{\text{eph}}, \hat{c}, ad; z_4)$
 $tr_s \leftarrow \text{Hash}(tr_s \parallel (c, j, ad))$
 $ek^{\text{upd}} \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateEk}(U_e[s], ek^{\text{upd}})$
 $(ek^{\text{eph}}, _) \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Gen}(\text{Hash}(tr_s \parallel z_2))$
 $\mathcal{B}[s] \leftarrow ((c, j), ad)$
 $\mathcal{C}[s] \leftarrow (u_d, z_2)$
Challenges $\leftarrow \text{Challenges} \cup \{s\}$
return $(ek, (c, j))$

Fig. 25: Second hop. We replace all challenges before the hijacking by encryptions of zeros of the appropriate length.

Encrypt: We have to create new update information and an encryption including this update information. We do so by choosing the randomness for the update information ourselves, i.e., calling **UpdateGen**(z_1), and then simply encrypt ourselves using the public key.

Challenge: In contrast to the previous oracle, here we create the update information secretly, i.e., calling **UpdateGen**(\perp). To encrypt m_b , we then use the **Challenge** oracle, specifying the index of the secret update information we just created to be included. The checks with respect to exposure of the HkuPke-CPA game, moreover imply that the ones for the SkuPke-CPA will be satisfied as well.

Decrypt: First of all, before hijacking we do not to actually decrypt the ciphertext, and we only use the SkuPke-CPA instances for everything happening before the hijacking. Moreover, we simply call the corresponding **UpdateDk** oracle as appropriate.

Using this sketched reduction, one can verify that indeed distinguish the previous hop from that hop implies breaking one of the instances.

As a next step, in Figure 26, we also replace the challenge at position hidx with an encryption of zeros, if the previous message was a challenge. This is the first ciphertext, which will not delivered properly. As the previous message was a challenge, it did not contain the randomness z_2 to sample the next ephemeral decryption key, corresponding to the encryption key under which we now encrypt. Moreover, if the adversary gets this decryption key via the Expose oracle, then

Game HkuPke-CPA

Oracle Encrypt

Input: $(m, ad) \in \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{AD}$
 $s \leftarrow s + 1$
 $(z_1, \dots, z_4) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$
 $(U_e[s], u_d) \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateGen}(z_1)$
 $\hat{c} \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.Enc}(ek^{\text{upd}}, (m, u_d, z_2); z_3)$
 $c \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Enc}(ek^{\text{eph}}, \hat{c}, ad; z_4)$
 $tr_s \leftarrow \text{Hash}(tr_s \parallel (c, j, ad))$
 $ek^{\text{upd}} \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateEk}(U_e[s], ek^{\text{upd}})$
 $(ek^{\text{eph}}, _) \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Gen}(\text{Hash}(tr_s \parallel z_2))$
 $\mathcal{B}[s] \leftarrow ((c, j), ad)$
 $\mathcal{C}[s] \leftarrow (u_d, z_2)$
return $(ek, (c, j), (z_1, \dots, z_4))$

Oracle Expose

$vuln_1 \leftarrow r \notin \text{Challenges}$
 $vuln_2 \leftarrow r + 1 \leq s \wedge r + 1 \notin \text{Challenges}$
if hijacked $\wedge \neg vuln_1 \wedge \neg vuln_2$ **then**
 return dk
else if $\forall e \in (r, s] e \notin \text{Challenges}$ **then**
 exposed $\leftarrow i$
 return dk
else
 return \perp

Finalization

Input: $d \in \{0, 1\}$
return $(d = b) \wedge \neg \text{lost}$

Oracle Challenge

Input: $(m_1, m_2, ad) \in \mathcal{M}^2 \times \mathcal{AD}$
if $|m_1| \neq |m_2|$ **then**
 return \perp
if $j \leq \text{exposed}$ **then**
 return \perp
 $s \leftarrow s + 1$
 $(z_1, \dots, z_4) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$
 $(U_e[s], u_d) \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateGen}(z_1)$
if $s \leq \text{hidX}$ **then**
 $\hat{c} \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.Enc}(ek^{\text{upd}}, 0^{|(m_b, u_d, z_2)|}; z_3)$
 $c \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Enc}(ek^{\text{eph}}, \hat{c}, ad; z_4)$
else if $s = \text{hidX} + 1 \wedge \text{hidX} \in \text{Challenges}$ **then**
 $\hat{c} \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.Enc}(ek^{\text{upd}}, (m_b, u_d, z_2); z_3)$
 $c \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Enc}(ek^{\text{eph}}, 0^{|\hat{c}|}, ad; z_4)$
else
 $\hat{c} \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.Enc}(ek^{\text{upd}}, (m_b, u_d, z_2); z_3)$
 $\hat{c} \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.Enc}(ek^{\text{upd}}, 0^{|(m_b, u_d, z_2)|}; z_3)$
 $c \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Enc}(ek^{\text{eph}}, \hat{c}, ad; z_4)$
 $c \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Enc}(ek^{\text{eph}}, \hat{c}, ad; z_4)$
 $tr_s \leftarrow \text{Hash}(tr_s \parallel (c, j, ad))$
 $ek^{\text{upd}} \leftarrow \text{SkuPke.UpdateEk}(U_e[s], ek^{\text{upd}})$
 $(ek^{\text{eph}}, _) \leftarrow \text{PkeAd.Gen}(\text{Hash}(tr_s \parallel z_2))$
 $\mathcal{B}[s] \leftarrow ((c, j), ad)$
 $\mathcal{C}[s] \leftarrow (u_d, z_2)$
 $\text{Challenges} \leftarrow \text{Challenges} \cup \{s\}$
return $(ek, (c, j))$

Fig. 26: The third and the fourth, the final, hops. The else-if branch in the dashed box is present in both hops, whereas the solid box gets replaced by the dotted box in the fourth hop. Note that after the last hop, the game does the bit b anymore.

this prevents the current message from being a challenge. Hence, there must have been an BcUpdateDk-operation in the meantime, which replaces the ephemeral key by a fresh one again.

Therefore, if the current message, i.e., the first one that will not be delivered properly, is a challenge, then nothing about the corresponding ephemeral key leaked up to the point of the hijacking.

This leaves the adversary with two options to figure out which message is contained in that challenge: first, he can hijack the receiver by inputting a mauled version of this challenge ciphertext to the receiver, who provides him the decryption. As he is required to either change the ciphertext itself or the associated data, however, learning b that way breaks the IND-CCA2-AD security of the ephemeral PKE scheme. Second, he can expose the receiver right after providing him the hijacked information. The new ephemeral key that he learns that way has been computed as $\text{PkeAd.Gen}(\text{Hash}(tr_r \parallel z_2))$, where tr_r already contains

the hijacked message. Hence, assuming the ROM, the randomness $\text{Hash}(tr_r \parallel z_2)$ used to generate the ephemeral key that was exposed is independent of the one used to generate the critical one before.

As a final step, we have to deal with challenges with $s > \text{hid}x + 1$. For this phase, we again rely on the security of our updating PKE as before the hijacking, and not the ephemeral one anymore. The corresponding final game hop is depicted in [Figure 26](#). There are two cases to consider. The easy one is the case where $\text{vul}n_1 \vee \text{vul}n_2$, implying that we did not substitute the encryption with the ephemeral key in the previous hop, then, however, exposure is not “free” neither, and security is simply implied by the SkuPke-CPA security in the same way as before the hijack. In the other case, $\neg \text{vul}n_1 \wedge \neg \text{vul}n_2$, we did replace the encryption of \hat{c} by an encryption of zeros. Hence, the updating information u_d contained in this message does not leak at all; also not through the buffer \mathcal{C} as this is not used with index $\text{hid}x + 1$ anymore. With respect to the SkuPke-CPA game, however, this means that it is a secret update that is lost forever. So in terms of a reduction, we can expose the secret key before applying this update. Anything encrypted with a key that applied this update is then still secure. Observe that this is sent with the $(\text{hid}x + 1)$ -th message, whereas all updates on the backward-channel have index smaller equal $\text{hid}x$ (the **BcUpdateDk** oracle is after hijacking). Hence, none of the fresh public keys will acknowledge this secret update, implying that the sender will apply it to all of them as well. Thus, confidentiality can also not be broken by tricking the sender to use a public-key that is “too new” again.

F Proof of [Theorem 4](#)

Theorem 4. *Let HkuPke be a healable and key-updating encryption scheme, let KuSig be a key-updating signature scheme, and let Sig be a signature scheme. The scheme SecChan of [Figure 15](#) is SecMsg-Sec secure, if HkuPke scheme is HkuPke-CPA secure, KuSig is KuSig-UF secure, and Sig is 1-SUF-CMA secure.*

In the following section, we present a proof sketch of [Theorem 4](#).

F.1 A Simplified Analysis

For simplicity, we only prove the guarantees with respect to Alice’s secret state. The other direction then follows by symmetry of both the scheme, and the security game. Namely, we prove that messages sent from Alice to Bob are authentic, and that messages sent from Bob to Alice are confidential. Moreover, we show the appropriate post-hijack security properties with respect to hijacking Alice, namely that hijacking Alice renders both her decryption and signing keys useless.

This allows us to consider a simplified security game as defined in [Figure 27](#). Moreover, we can strip down the scheme to only apply the parts that we use for those guarantees. Especially, for the authentic direction we do not need to consider encryption, instead, we can simply consider the ciphertext as the message. Analogously, for the communication from Bob to Alice, we do not need

to include signatures, or the update information for the encryption from Alice to Bob. Instead, we can simply see $(upd, vk_2^{\text{eph}}, r)$ as associated data, ensuring that Alice is considered hijacked whenever either the ciphertext or this associated data changes. Moreover, because of our use of strongly unforgeable signatures, we do not need to take the signatures themselves into account when deciding the point at which Alice is hijacked. In order to account for this associated data, which is not an input to our actual scheme, we have already plugged in the stripped down scheme for the communication from Bob to Alice in [Figure 27](#), marked by solid boxes. The algorithms marked with the dashed boxes will be replaced by the simplified algorithms, that only consider the guarantees we need, in a further step.

F.2 Confidentiality up to Hijacking

Observe that the confidentiality guarantees we require almost match the confidentiality guarantees our HkuPke provides. However, there is one caveat: in the HkuPke-CPA game it is assumed that once the receiver (Alice) is hijacked, she will not send any further update information on the backward-channel, which is a guarantee we will get from post-hijack authenticity.

In a first step, therefore, we will show that confidentiality is guaranteed up to hijacking of Alice. More concretely, we will replace all the challenges that will be received by Alice before being hijacked with encryptions of zeros. Clearly, all those challenges have not been affected yet by the “illegal” update information, and hence security of this step can be easily reduced to HkuPke-CPA security of the HkuPke scheme.

In more detail, in a first game hop, depicted in [Figure 28](#), we performed the following three steps:

1. We guessed the point at which Alice will be hijacked (and whether she will be hijacked at all), thereby losing a factor of $2q_s$, if q_s is an upper bound on the number of queries of the adversary.
2. We used correctness of the scheme, to replace the new signing key $sk_{\text{msg}}^{\text{eph}}$ obtained from decryption with the one actually encrypted.
3. For all challenges that Alice will receive before hijacking, we replace the encryption of (m_b, sk_1^{eph}) by a string of zeros of the appropriate length.
4. We modified to game such that hijacked_A is no longer a boolean, but keeps track of the number of messages Alice sent before getting hijacked.

Game SecMsg-ASesqui

Initialization

```

 $(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.Gen}$ 
 $(sk^{\text{upd}}, vk^{\text{upd}}) \leftarrow \text{KuSig.Gen}$ 
 $(sk^{\text{eph}}, vk^{\text{eph}}) \leftarrow \text{Sig.Gen}$ 
 $r, s_{\text{ack}}, tr \leftarrow 0$ 
 $VK, TR \leftarrow []$ 

 $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}, \text{win} \leftarrow \text{false}$ 
 $\text{Exposed} \leftarrow \{-1\}, \text{Challenges} \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
for  $u \in \{A, B\}$  do
   $\mathcal{B}_{u \rightarrow \bar{u}} \leftarrow$  array initialized to  $\perp$ 
   $s_u, r_u \leftarrow 0, \text{hijacked}_u \leftarrow \text{false}$ 

```

Oracle SendB

```

Input:  $(m, ad) \in \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{AD}$ 
 $z \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$ 
 $(sk_1^{\text{eph}}, vk_1^{\text{eph}}) \leftarrow \text{Sig.Gen}(z_1)$ 
 $(ek, c) \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.Enc}(ek, (m, sk_1^{\text{eph}}), ad; z_4)$ 
 $s_B \leftarrow s_B + 1$ 
 $VK[s_B] \leftarrow vk_1^{\text{eph}}$ 
 $TR[s_B] \leftarrow \text{Hash}(TR[s_B - 1] \parallel (c, ad))$ 

if  $\neg \text{hijacked}_B$  then
   $\mathcal{B}_{B \rightarrow A}[s_B] \leftarrow (c, ad)$ 
  return  $(c, z, st_B)$ 

```

Oracle ChallengeB

```

Input:  $(m_1, m_2, ad) \in \mathcal{M}^2 \times \mathcal{AD}$ 
if  $|m_1| \neq |m_2| \vee \text{hijacked}_B \vee r_B \leq \max(\text{Exposed})$  then
  return  $\perp$ 
 $z \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$ 
 $(sk_1^{\text{eph}}, vk_1^{\text{eph}}) \leftarrow \text{Sig.Gen}(z_1)$ 
 $(ek, c) \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.Enc}(ek, (m_b, sk_1^{\text{eph}}), ad; z_4)$ 
 $s_B \leftarrow s_B + 1$ 
 $VK[s_B] \leftarrow vk_1^{\text{eph}}$ 
 $TR[s_B] \leftarrow \text{Hash}(TR[s_B - 1] \parallel (c, ad))$ 

 $\mathcal{B}_{B \rightarrow A}[s_B] \leftarrow (c, ad)$ 
 $\text{Challenges} \leftarrow \text{Challenges} \cup \{s_B\}$ 
return  $(c, st_B)$ 

```

Oracle ReceiveB

```

Input:  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ 
 $(st_B, m) \leftarrow \text{SecMsg.Receive}(st_B, c)$ 
if  $m = \perp \vee \text{hijacked}_B$  then
  return  $(m, st_B)$ 
if  $c \neq \mathcal{B}_{A \rightarrow B}[r_B + 1]$  then
  if  $r_B \in \text{Exposed}$  then  $\text{hijacked}_B \leftarrow \text{true}$ 
  else  $\text{win} \leftarrow \text{true}$ 
 $r_B \leftarrow r_B + 1$ 
return  $(m, st_B)$ 

```

Oracle SendA

```

Input:  $(m, \text{leak}) \in \mathcal{M} \times \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$ 
 $s_A \leftarrow s_A + 1$ 
 $z \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$ 
 $(st_A, c) \leftarrow \text{SecMsg.Send}(st_A, m; z)$ 
if  $\neg \text{hijacked}_A$  then
  if  $\text{leak}$  then
     $\text{Exposed} \leftarrow \text{Exposed} \cup \{s_A\}$ 
     $\mathcal{B}_{A \rightarrow B}[s_A] \leftarrow c$ 
  if  $\text{leak}$  then
    return  $(c, z)$ 
  else
    return  $c$ 

```

Oracle ReceiveA

```

Input:  $(c, ad) \in \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{AD}$ 
 $ek \leftarrow \text{HkuPke.BcUpEk}(ek, \text{upd})$ 
 $r_A \leftarrow r_A + 1$ 
 $tr \leftarrow \text{Hash}(tr \parallel (c, ad))$ 
 $sk^{\text{eph}} \leftarrow sk_{\text{msg}}^{\text{eph}}$ 

if  $\text{hijacked}_A \vee (c, ad) \neq \mathcal{B}_{B \rightarrow A}[r + 1]$  then
   $\text{hijacked}_A \leftarrow \text{true}$ 
  return  $m$ 
else
   $r \leftarrow r + 1$ 
  return  $\perp$ 

```

Oracle ExposeA

```

 $\text{vuln}_1 \leftarrow r \notin \text{Challenges}$ 
 $\text{vuln}_2 \leftarrow (r + 1 \leq s_B) \wedge r + 1 \notin \text{Challenges}$ 
if  $\text{hijacked}_A \wedge \neg \text{vuln}_1 \wedge \neg \text{vuln}_2$  then
  return  $st_A$ 
else if  $\forall i \in (r, s_B) i \notin \text{Challenges}$  then
  if  $\text{hijacked}_A$  then
     $\text{Exposed} \leftarrow \text{Exposed} \cup \{s_A, \dots, \infty\}$ 
  else
     $\text{Exposed}_A \leftarrow \text{Exposed}_A \cup \{s_A\}$ 
  return  $st_A$ 
else
  return  $\perp$ 

```

Finalization

```

Input:  $d \in \{0, 1\}$ 
return  $(d = b) \vee \text{win}$ 

```

where:

```

 $st_A := (r_A, s_A, dk, sk^{\text{upd}}, sk^{\text{eph}}, tr)$ 
 $st_B := (r_B, s_B, s_{\text{ack}}, ek, vk^{\text{upd}}, vk^{\text{eph}}, VK^{\text{eph}}, TR)$ 

```

Fig. 27: A simplification of SecMsg-Sec that only focuses on the security guarantees for Alice, namely that the channel from Alice to Bob is authentic and the reverse one confidential. Part of our concrete scheme is already compiled, indicated by the solid boxes in a simplified version omitting everything not corresponding to the aforementioned guarantees. Some other simplified parts of our scheme are not yet specified, as indicated by the dashed boxes!

Game SecMsg-ASesqui

Initialization

```

hidx  $\leftarrow$   $\{1, \dots, q_s\}$ 
hidx  $\leftarrow$   $\{hidx, \infty\}$ 
lost  $\leftarrow$  false
 $(ek, dk) \leftarrow$  HkuPke.Gen
 $(sk^{upd}, vk^{upd}) \leftarrow$  KuSig.Gen
 $(sk^{eph}, vk^{eph}) \leftarrow$  Sig.Gen
 $r, s_{ack}, tr \leftarrow 0$ 
 $VK, TR \leftarrow []$ 
 $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ 
win  $\leftarrow$  false
Exposed  $\leftarrow$   $\{-1\}$ 
Challenges  $\leftarrow$   $\emptyset$ 
hijackedA  $\leftarrow$   $\infty$ 
hijackedB  $\leftarrow$  false
for  $u \in \{A, B\}$  do
   $\mathcal{B}_{u \rightarrow \bar{u}} \leftarrow$  array initialized to  $\perp$ 
   $s_u, r_u \leftarrow 0$ 

```

Oracle ReceiveA

```

Input:  $(c, ad) \in \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{AD}$ 
 $(dk, (m, sk_{msg}^{eph})) \leftarrow$  HkuPke.Dec( $dk, c, ad$ )
 $r_A \leftarrow r_A + 1$ 
 $tr \leftarrow$  Hash( $tr \parallel (c, ad)$ )
if hijackedA  $\leq$   $s_A$  then
   $sk^{eph} \leftarrow sk_{msg}^{eph}$ 
  return  $m$ 
else if  $(c, ad) \neq \mathcal{B}_{B \rightarrow A}[r_A + 1]$  then
   $sk^{eph} \leftarrow sk_{msg}^{eph}$ 
  if  $r + 1 = hidx$  then
    hijackedA  $\leftarrow$   $s_A$ 
    return  $m$ 
  else
    lost  $\leftarrow$  true
    return  $m$ 
else
   $r \leftarrow r + 1$ 
   $sk^{eph} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}[r]$   $\triangleright$  by correctness
  return  $\perp$ 

```

Oracle SendB

```

Input:  $(m, ad) \in \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{AD}$ 
 $z \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$ 
 $(sk_1^{eph}, vk_1^{eph}) \leftarrow$  Sig.Gen( $z_1$ )
 $(ek, c) \leftarrow$  HkuPke.Enc( $ek, (m, sk_1^{eph}), ad; z_4$ )
 $s_B \leftarrow s_B + 1$ 
 $VK[s_B] \leftarrow vk_1^{eph}$ 
 $TR[s_B] \leftarrow$  Hash( $TR[s_B - 1] \parallel (c, ad)$ )
if  $\neg$ hijackedB then
   $\mathcal{B}_{B \rightarrow A}[s_B] \leftarrow (c, ad)$ 
   $\mathcal{S}[s_B] \leftarrow sk_1^{eph}$ 
return  $(c, z, st_B)$ 

```

Oracle ChallengeB

```

Input:  $(m_1, m_2, ad) \in \mathcal{M}^2 \times \mathcal{AD}$ 
if  $|m_1| \neq |m_2| \vee$  hijackedB  $\vee$   $r_B \leq$  max(Exposed)
then
  return  $\perp$ 
 $s_B \leftarrow s_B + 1$ 
 $z \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$ 
 $(sk_1^{eph}, vk_1^{eph}) \leftarrow$  Sig.Gen( $z_1$ )
if  $s_B < hidx$  then
   $(ek, c) \leftarrow$  HkuPke.Enc( $ek, 0^{(|m_b, sk_1^{eph}|)}, ad; z_4$ )
else
   $(ek, c) \leftarrow$  HkuPke.Enc( $ek, (m_b, sk_1^{eph}), ad; z_4$ )
 $VK[s_B] \leftarrow vk_1^{eph}$ 
 $TR[s_B] \leftarrow$  Hash( $TR[s_B - 1] \parallel (c, ad)$ )
 $\mathcal{B}_{B \rightarrow A}[s_B] \leftarrow (c, ad)$ 
 $\mathcal{S}[s_B] \leftarrow sk_1^{eph}$ 
Challenges  $\leftarrow$  Challenges  $\cup \{s_B\}$ 
return  $(c, st_B)$ 

```

Finalization

```

Input:  $d \in \{0, 1\}$ 
return  $((d = b) \vee win) \wedge \neg$ lost

```

Fig. 28: First hop concerning confidentiality before Alice is hijacked. Unchanged oracles with respect to Figure 27 are omitted.

F.3 Authentication

Next, we consider authenticity of the communication from Alice to Bob, including the post-hijack guarantees. In order to do so, we plug in our concrete scheme, ignoring encryption for this direction, as depicted in [Figure 29](#).

Basically, our key-updating signature scheme already provides us with the necessary guarantees up to hijacking, after which in the new security game exposing can become “free”, i.e., is not recorded anymore. More specifically, it is not recorded if:

$$\text{hijacked}_A \leq s_A \wedge \neg \text{vuln}_1 \wedge \neg \text{vuln}_2$$

Assume that up to the point of hijacking, all messages were either rejected by the verifier, or delivered in order (as otherwise Bob would either be hijacked, or the game won already). Now observe that $\neg \text{vuln}_1$ means that for the ephemeral signature scheme, the last signing key Bob sent to Alice before Alice was hijacked did not leak in transmission. Hence

- If Alice did not send any further messages to Bob between receiving that key and being hijacked, then this is the key that Bob expects a signature with next. Unless the adversary exposed Alice in between, in which case she is allowed to inject something to Bob and thereby hijack him, this is a signature key about which the adversary has absolutely no information. This is because that signature key got overwritten during the hijacking of Alice, and because we already replaced the ciphertext transporting it with a ciphertext encrypting zeros. Hence, a reduction can appropriately embed a 1-SUF-CMA instance that is won whenever Bob would accept a forged message with the corresponding verification key.
- Alternatively, Alice could have sent on or many messages to Bob between receiving the last key and being hijacked. Along with each such message, and especially the last one, Alice sends a fresh verification key under which Bob then verifies the next message. Note that if Alice’s randomness during producing that fresh keys got exposed, then Alice is considered to be exposed and the adversary is allowed to hijack Bob. Therefore, winning the game by injecting a message to Bob at this point in time again requires the adversary to break 1-SUF-CMA security of the ephemeral signature scheme.

In terms of game-hopping, we will use this to alter the behavior in [Figure 30](#) in this situation (after the `bad` flag) with respect to [Figure 29](#). As a next hop, we can then argue that we can actually record such an exposure without altering the behavior, as done in [Figure 31](#).

Besides the remaining “free” exposures after Alice sent another message after being hijacked, the main difference between [Figure 31](#) and the `KuSig-UF` game is that we stop recording the messages in the buffer $\mathcal{B}_{A \rightarrow B}$, as soon as Alice is hijacked. We deal with both issues in a sequence of three final hops, all depicted in [Figure 32](#). Recall that in the previous hop of [Figure 31](#), `win` is set to `true` after each of the three `bad` flags, whereas after the final hop they will all set the `hijackedB` flag to `true`, implying that no adversary can win the game by setting the `win` flag anymore.

Game SecMsg-ASesqui

Initialization

```

hidx  $\leftarrow$   $\{1, \dots, q_s\}$ 
hidx  $\leftarrow$   $\{\text{hidx}, \infty\}$ 
lost  $\leftarrow$  false
 $(ek, dk) \leftarrow$  HkuPke.Gen
 $(sk^{\text{upd}}, vk^{\text{upd}}) \leftarrow$  KuSig.Gen
 $(sk^{\text{eph}}, vk^{\text{eph}}) \leftarrow$  Sig.Gen
 $s_{\text{ack}}, tr \leftarrow 0$ 
 $VK, TR \leftarrow []$ 
 $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ 
win  $\leftarrow$  false
Exposed  $\leftarrow \{-1\}$ 
Challenges  $\leftarrow \emptyset$ 
for  $u \in \{A, B\}$  do
   $\mathcal{B}_{u \rightarrow \bar{u}} \leftarrow$  array initialized to  $\perp$ 
   $s_u, r_u \leftarrow 0$ 
  hijacked $_u \leftarrow$  false
  
```

Oracle SendA

Input: $(m, \text{leak}) \in \mathcal{M} \times \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$

```

 $s_A \leftarrow s_A + 1$ 
 $(z_1, \dots, z_4) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$ 
  
```

```

 $(sk_2^{\text{eph}}, vk_2^{\text{eph}}) \leftarrow$  Sig.Gen( $z_1$ )
 $(dk, upd) \leftarrow$  HkuPke.BcUpDk( $dk; z_2$ )
 $\hat{m} \leftarrow (m, upd, vk_2^{\text{eph}}, r_A)$ 
 $(sk^{\text{upd}}, \sigma_{\text{upd}}) \leftarrow$ 
  KuSig.Sign( $sk^{\text{upd}}, (\hat{m}, tr); z_3$ )
 $\sigma_{\text{eph}} \leftarrow$  Sig.Sign( $sk^{\text{eph}}, (\hat{m}, tr); z_4$ )
  
```

```

if hijacked $_A \neq \infty$  then
  if leak then
    Exposed  $\leftarrow$  Exposed  $\cup \{s_A\}$ 
     $\mathcal{B}_{A \rightarrow B}[s_A] \leftarrow (\hat{m}, \sigma_{\text{upd}}, \sigma_{\text{eph}})$ 
  if leak then
    return  $((\hat{m}, \sigma_{\text{upd}}, \sigma_{\text{eph}}), z)$ 
  else
    return  $(\hat{m}, \sigma_{\text{upd}}, \sigma_{\text{eph}})$ 
  
```

Finalization

Input: $d \in \{0, 1\}$

```

return  $((d = b) \vee \text{win}) \wedge \neg \text{lost}$ 
  
```

where:

```

 $st_A := (r_A, s_A, dk, sk^{\text{upd}}, sk^{\text{eph}}, tr)$ 
 $st_B := (r_B, s_B, s_{\text{ack}}, ek, vk^{\text{upd}}, vk^{\text{eph}}, VK^{\text{eph}}, TR)$ 
  
```

Oracle ReceiveB

Input: $c \in \mathcal{C}$

```

 $(\hat{m}, \sigma_{\text{upd}}, \sigma_{\text{eph}}) \leftarrow c$ 
 $(m, upd, vk_{\text{msg}}^{\text{eph}}, s_{\text{msg}}) \leftarrow \hat{m}$ 
 $v \leftarrow$  false
if  $s_{\text{ack}} \leq s_{\text{msg}} \leq s_B$  then
  if  $s_{\text{msg}} > s_{\text{ack}}$  then
     $vk \leftarrow VK^{\text{eph}}[s_{\text{msg}}]$ 
  else
     $vk \leftarrow vk^{\text{eph}}$ 
     $v_{\text{eph}} \leftarrow$  Sig.Verify( $vk, (\hat{m}, TR[s_{\text{msg}}]), \sigma_{\text{eph}}$ )
     $(vk^{\text{upd}}, v_{\text{upd}}) \leftarrow$  KuSig.Verify( $vk^{\text{upd}}, \hat{m}, \sigma_{\text{upd}}$ )
     $v \leftarrow v_{\text{eph}} \wedge v_{\text{upd}}$ 
  if  $v$  then
     $ek \leftarrow$  HkuPke.BcUpEk( $ek, upd$ )
  else
     $m = \perp$ 
  
```

```

if  $m = \perp \vee$  hijacked $_B$  then
  return  $(m, st_B)$ 
  
```

```

if  $c \neq \mathcal{B}_{A \rightarrow B}[r_B + 1]$  then
  if  $r_B \in$  Exposed then
    hijacked $_B \leftarrow$  true
  else
    win  $\leftarrow$  true
  
```

```

 $r_B \leftarrow r_B + 1$ 
return  $(m, st_B)$ 
  
```

Oracle ExposeA

```

 $\text{vuln}_1 \leftarrow r \notin$  Challenges
 $\text{vuln}_2 \leftarrow (r + 1 \leq s_B) \wedge r + 1 \notin$  Challenges
if hijacked $_A \leq s_A \wedge \neg \text{vuln}_1 \wedge \neg \text{vuln}_2$  then
  return  $st_A$ 
else if  $\forall i \in (r, s_B]$   $i \notin$  Challenges then
  if hijacked $_A \leq s_A$  then
    Exposed  $\leftarrow$  Exposed  $\cup \{s_A, \dots, \infty\}$ 
  else
    Exposed $_A \leftarrow$  Exposed $_A \cup \{s_A\}$ 
  return  $st_A$ 
else
  return  $\perp$ 
  
```

Fig. 29: The game from Figure 28 with the parts of the scheme relevant for authentication plugged in as well. The oracles modeling the channel from Bob to Alice are unchanged and omitted.

Game SecMsg-Sec




Fig. 30: The first hop for authentication. Triggering the bad flag requires the adversary to break the ephemeral Sig scheme.

1. First, consider bad_1 . Observe that by construction the hash transcript stored in $\mathcal{C}[\text{hijacked}_A + 1]$ includes the injected update information leading to the hijack. On the other hand, $TR[s_{\text{msg}}]$ does not. Hence, whenever $\text{bad}_1 = \text{true}$, we have found a hash collision.
2. Next, consider the flag bad_2 . If $r - 1 < \text{hijacked}_A$, then the message stored in $\mathcal{B}_{A \rightarrow B}[r_B]$ and $\mathcal{C}[r_B]$ is the same, and hence $\mathcal{B}_{A \rightarrow B}[r_B] \neq m$ implies $\mathcal{C}[r_A] \neq (\hat{m}, TR[s_{\text{msg}}])$. Due to the previous else-if branch, this also holds for $r - 1 = \text{hijacked}_A$ at this point. However, this implies that we have broken the KuSig scheme. We omit a more detailed sketch of the reduction, as it would be very straightforward: the buffer \mathcal{C} corresponds to the buffer \mathcal{B} from the KuSig-UF, and everything with respect to the additional signature (keys indexed by two) would go into the reduction. Observe that for $r - 1 \leq \text{hijacked}_A$ it does not make a difference, whether $s \in \text{AExp}$ for any $s_A > \text{hijack}$.
3. Finally, consider the flag bad_3 . At this point, $r_B > \text{hijacked} + 1$, implying that we already must have accepted the $(\text{hijacked}_A + 1)$ -th message. Since $\mathcal{B}_{A \rightarrow B}[\text{hijacked}_A] = \perp \neq m'$ for any message m' , however, it caused the adversary to set $\text{hijacked}_B \leftarrow \text{true}$ back at this point already, implying that we never actually make it to that flag in the first place. Hence, we can change the behavior after bad_3 without altering the winning probability.

This concludes the second part of our proof, showing that authenticity is guaranteed including the post-hijack authenticity.

Game SecMsg-Sec

Oracle ExposeA

```

vuln1 ← r ∉ Challenges
vuln2 ← (r + 1 ≤ sB) ∧ r + 1 ∉ Challenges
if hijackedA < sA ∧ ¬vuln1 ∧ ¬vuln2 then
  return stA
else if hijackedA = sA ∧ ¬vuln1 ∧ ¬vuln2 then
  AExp ← AExp ∪ {sA}
  return stA
else if ∀i ∈ (r, sB}] i ∉ Challenges then
  if hijackedA ≤ sA then
    Exposed ← Exposed ∪ {sA, ..., ∞}
    AExp ← Exposed ∪ {sA, ..., ∞}
  else
    ExposedA ← ExposedA ∪ {sA}
    AExpA ← ExposedA ∪ {sA}
  return stA
else
  return ⊥

```

Oracle ReceiveB

```

Input: c ∈ C
:
:
if m = ⊥ ∨ hijackedB then
  return (m, stB)
if c ≠ BA→B[rB + 1] then
  if rB ∈ AExp then
    hijackedB ← true
  else
    win ← true
rB ← rB + 1
return (m, stB)

```

Fig. 31: Second hop for authenticity. This is a functionally equivalent simplification of the previous game. Observe that whenever in the previous version $r_B = \text{hijacked}_r a \wedge \neg \text{vuln}_1 \wedge r_r b \in \text{AExp}$ was true, now $r_B \in \text{AExp}$ is still true, and hence Bob is still considered to be hijacked. Moreover, if it was the case that $r_B \notin \text{Exposed} \wedge r = \text{hijacked}_A \wedge \text{vuln}_1$, then in the new version we still have $r_B \notin \text{AExp}$, and thus the adversary will still win the game.

F.4 Post-Hijack Confidentiality

Finally, let us focus on confidentiality again, where so far we have only proven confidentiality of messages sent from Bob to Alice before Alice is hijacked. Note that a HkuPke-CPA secure HkuPke scheme in principle already provides the same post-hijack security we require here with the same conditions on when Alice allowed to be exposed after hijacking an when not. The only caveat that prevented us from directly reducing to HkuPke-CPA security, was that the HkuPke-CPA game does not consider Alice to send any update information after she is hijacked. In our last game hop, however, we have shown that if Bob accepts any message after Alice is hijacked, in particular any update information, then Bob is now considered to be hijacked as well and we do not need to provide confidentiality guarantees for Bob anymore. Hence, confidentiality in the latest hop, partially depicted in [Figure 32](#), can be easily reduced to HkuPke-CPA security now, concluding our proof.

Game SecMsg-Sec

Oracle ExposeA

```

vuln1 ← r ∉ Challenges
vuln2 ← (r + 1 ≤ sB) ∧ r + 1 ∉ Challenges
if hijackedA < sA ∧ ¬vuln1 ∧ ¬vuln2 then
  return stA
else if hijackedA = sA ∧ ¬vuln1 ∧ ¬vuln2 then
  AExp ← AExp ∪ {sA}
  return stA
else if ∀i ∈ (r, sB] i ∉ Challenges then
  if hijackedA ≤ sA then
    Exposed ← Exposed ∪ {sA, ..., ∞}
    AExp ← Exposed ∪ {sA, ..., ∞}
  else
    ExposedA ← ExposedA ∪ {sA}
    AExpA ← ExposedA ∪ {sA}
  return stA
else
  return ⊥

```

Oracle SendA

```

Input: (m, leak) ∈ M × {true, false}
sA ← sA + 1
(z1, ..., z4) ← R
(sk2eph, vk2eph) ← Sig.Gen(z1)
(dk, upd) ← HkuPke.BcUpDk(dk; z2)
m̂ ← (m, upd, vk2eph, rA)
(skupd, σupd) ← KuSig.Sign(skupd, (m̂, tr); z3)
C[sA] ← (m̂, tr)
σeph ← Sig.Sign(skeph, (m̂, tr); z4)
if hijackedA ≠ ∞ then
  if leak then
    Exposed ← Exposed ∪ {sA}
  BA→B[sA] ← (m̂, σupd, σeph)
if leak then
  return ((m̂, σupd, σeph), z)
else
  return (m̂, σupd, σeph)

```

Oracle ReceiveB

```

Input: c ∈ C
(m̂, σupd, σeph) ← c
(m, upd, vkmsgeph, smsg) ← m̂
:
:
if m = ⊥ ∨ hijackedB then
  return (m, stB)
if c ≠ BA→B[rB + 1] then
  if rB ∈ AExp then
    hijackedB ← true
  else if rB - 1 = hijackedA ∧ C[rB] =
  (m, upd, vkmsgeph, smsg, TR[smsg]) then
    bad1 ← true
    hijackedB ← true
  else if rB - 1 ≤ hijack then
    bad2 ← true
    hijackedB ← true
  else
    bad3 ← true
    hijackedB ← true
rB ← rB + 1
return (m, stB)

```

Fig. 32: A sketch of the remain three game hops for authenticity, in which we will change from win ← true to hijacked_B ← true after the respective bad flags in ascending order.