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Paper 2018/937

Improved Brute-Force Search Strategies for Single-Trace and Few-Traces Template Attacks on the DES Round Keys

Mathias Wagner and Stefan Heyse

Abstract

We present an improved search strategy for a template attack on the secret DES key of a widely-used smart card, which is based on a Common-Criteria certified chip. We use the logarithm of the probability function as returned by the template attack itself, averaged over all 28 template positions along the rings representing the C and D Registers of the DES key schedule, as the sorting criteria for the key candidates. For weak keys - which in this attack model have a minimal rest entropy of only two bits - we find that on average only 37.75 bits need to be recovered by brute force when using only a single trace in the Exploitation Phase. This effort goes down to just a few bits for a single DES key when using only a few traces in Exploitation Phase.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
DESTDESTemplate AttackSide-channel AttackSmart CardSCAblock cipherkey enumerationbrute-force attack
Contact author(s)
mathias wagner @ nxp com
History
2018-10-05: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/937
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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