Bidirectional Asynchronous Ratched Key Agreement
with Linear Complexity

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Abstract. Following up mass surveillance and privacy issues, modern secure communication protocols now seek more security such as forward secrecy and post-compromise security. They cannot rely on an assumption such as synchronization, predictable sender/receiver roles, or online availability. Ratcheting was introduced to address forward secrecy and post-compromise security in real-world messaging protocols. At CSF 2016 and CRYPTO 2017, ratcheting was studied either without zero round-trip time (0-RTT) or without bidirectional communication. At CRYPTO 2018, ratcheting with bidirectional communication was done using heavy key-update primitives. At EUROCRYPT 2019, another protocol was proposed. All those protocols use random oracles. Furthermore, exchanging $n$ messages has complexity $O(n^2)$.

In this work, we define the bidirectional asynchronous ratched key agreement ($BARK$) with formal security notions. We provide a simple security model and design a secure $BARK$ scheme using no key-update primitives, no random oracle, and with $O(n)$ complexity. It is based on a cryptosystem, a signature scheme, one-time symmetric encryption, and a collision-resistant hash function family. We further show that $BARK$ (even unidirectional) implies public-key cryptography, meaning that it cannot solely rely on symmetric cryptography.

1 Introduction

In standard communication systems, protocols are designed to provide messaging services with end-to-end encryption. Essentially, secure communication reduces to continuously exchanging keys, because each message requires a new key. In bidirectional two-party secure communication, participants alternate their role as a sender and a receiver. The modern instant messaging protocols are substantially asynchronous. In other words, for a two-party communication, the messages should be transmitted (or the key exchange should be done) even though the counterpart is not online. Moreover, to be able to send the payload data without requiring online exchanges is a major design goal called zero round trip time (0-RTT). Finally, the moment when a participant wants to send a message is undefined, meaning that participants use random roles (sender or receiver) without any synchronization. Namely, they could send messages at the same time.

Even though many systems were designed for the privacy of their users, they rapidly faced security vulnerabilities caused by the compromises of the participants’ states. In this work, compromising a participant means to obtain some information on its internal state. We will call it exposure. The desired security notion is that compromised information should not uncover more than possible by trivial attacks. For instance, the compromised state of participants should not allow decrypting past communication. This is called forward secrecy. Typically, forward secrecy is obtained by updating states with a one-way function $x \rightarrow H(x) \rightarrow H(H(x)) \rightarrow ...$ and deleting old entries. It is used, for instance, in RFID protocols [13, 14]. One mechanical technique to allow moving forward and preventing from moving backward is to use a ratchet. Ratcheting also includes the use of randomness in every state update so that a compromised state is not enough to decrypt future communication as well. This is called future secrecy or backward secrecy or post-compromise security or even self-healing. One thesis of the present work is that healing after an active attack involving a forgery is not a nice property. We show that it implies insecurity. After one participant
is compromised and impersonated, if communication self-heals, it means that some adversary can make a trivial attack which is not detected. We also show other insecurity cases. Hence, we rather mandate communication to be cut after active attacks.

**Previous work.** The security of key exchange was studied by many authors. The prominent models are the CK and eCK models [4, 12].

Techniques for ratcheting first appeared in real-world protocols. It appeared in the Off-the-Record (OTR) communication system by Borisov et al. [3]. The Signal protocol designed by Open Whisper Systems [16] later gained a lot of interest from message communication companies. Today, the WhatsApp messaging application reached billions of users worldwide [19]. It uses the Signal protocol. A broad survey about various techniques and terminologies was made at S&P 2015 by Unger et al. [17]. At CSF 2016, Cohn-Gordon et al. [6] studied bidirectional ratcheted communication and proposed a protocol. However, their protocol does not offer 0-RTT and requires synchronized roles. At EuroS&P 2017, Cohn-Gordon et al. [5] formally studied Signal.

0-RTT communication with forward secrecy was achieved using puncturable encryption by Günther et al. at EUROCRYPT 2017 [9]. Later on, at EUROCRYPT 2018, Derler et al. made it quite practical by using Bloom filters [7].

At CRYPTO 2017, Bellare et al. [2] gave a secure ratcheting key exchange protocol. Their protocol is unidirectional and does not allow receiver exposure.

At CRYPTO 2018, Poettering and Rössler [15] studied bidirectional asynchronous ratcheted key agreement and presented a protocol which is secure in the random oracle model. Their solution further relies on hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) but offers stronger security than what we aim at, leaving the room to better protocols. At the same conference, Jaeger and Stepanovs [10] had similar results but focused on secure communication rather than key agreement. They give another protocol relying on HIBE. In both results, HIBE is used to construct encryption/signature schemes with key-update security. This is a rather new notion allowing forward secrecy but is expensive to achieve. In both cases, it was claimed that the depth of HIBE is really small. However, when participants are disconnected and continue sending several messages, the depth grows up quite fast. Consequently, HIBE needs unbounded depth.

Two papers appeared after the first version of the current paper was released.

At EUROCRYPT 2019, Jost, Maurer, and Mularczyk [11] designed another ratcheting protocol which has “near-optimal” security and does not use HIBE. Nevertheless, it still has a huge complexity: When messages alternate well (i.e., no participant sends two messages without receiving one in between), processing $n$ messages requires $O(n^2)$ operations in total. However, when messages accumulate before alternating (for instance, because the participants are disconnected by the network), the complexity becomes $O(n^3)$. This is also the case for Poettering-Rössler [15] and Jaeger-Stepanovs [10].


At EUROCRYPT 2019, Alwen, Coretti, and Dodis [1] designed two other ratcheting protocols aiming at immediate decryption, i.e. the ability to decrypt even though some previous messages have not been received yet. This is closer to real-life protocols but this comes with a potential threat: keys to decrypt un-delivered messages are stored until the messages are delivered. Hence, the adversary could choose to hold messages and decrypt them with future state exposure. This prevents forward secrecy. Furthermore, unless the direction of communication changes (or more precisely, if the *epoch* increases), their protocols are not really ratcheting as no random coins are used to update the state. This weakens post-compromise security as well. In Table 1, we call this weaker security “id-optimal” (not to say “insecure” in the model we are interested in) because it is the best we can obtain with immediate decryption. The lighter of the two protocols is not competing in the same category because it mostly uses symmetric cryptography. It is more efficient but with lower security. Namely, corrupting the state of a participant $A$ implies impersonating $B$ to $A$, and also decrypting the messages that $A$ sends. Other protocols do not have this weakness. The second protocol by Alwen, Coretti, and Dodis [1] uses asymmetric cryptography.

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1 This is only visible in the corrected version of the paper on eprint [10].
Some authors address the corruption of random coins in different ways. Bellare et al. [2] and Jost et al. [11] allow leaking the random coins just after use. Jaeger and Stepanovs [10] allow leaking it just before usage only. Alwen et al. [1] allow adversarially chosen random coins. In most of the protocols, revealing (or choosing) the random coins imply revealing some part of the new state which allows decrypting incoming messages. It is comparable to state exposure. Jost et al. [11] offers better security as revealing the random coins reveals the new state (and allow to decrypt) only when the previous state was already known.

Table 1: Comparison of Protocols: complexity for exchanging $n$ messages in alternating or accumulating mode, with timing (in seconds) for $n = 900$ of comparable implementations; and types of coin-leakage security ($\Rightarrow$ state exposure means coins leakage implies a state exposure).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Complexity alternating</th>
<th>Coins leakage resilience</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poettering-Rösler [15]</td>
<td>optimal</td>
<td>47.92 $\mathcal{O}(n)$</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaeger-Stepanovs [10]</td>
<td>optimal</td>
<td>58.07 $\mathcal{O}(n)$</td>
<td>pre-send leakage, $\Rightarrow$ state exposure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARK [this paper]</td>
<td>sub-optimal</td>
<td>1.61 $\mathcal{O}(n)$</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alwen-Coretti-Dodis [1]</td>
<td>id-optimal</td>
<td>1.18 $\mathcal{O}(n)$</td>
<td>chosen coins, $\Rightarrow$ state exposure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our contributions. We give a definition for a bidirectional asynchronous key agreement (BARK) along with security properties. We start setting the stage with some definitions (such as matching status) then identify all cases leading to trivial attacks. We split them into direct and indirect leakages. Then, we define security with a KIND game (privacy). We also consider the resistance to forgery (impersonation) and the resistance to attacks which would heal after active attacks (RECOVER security). We use these two notions as a helper to prove KIND-security. We finally construct a secure protocol. Our design choices are detailed below and compared to other papers. More comprehensive and technical comparisons between BARK and Bellare et al. [2], Jaeger-Stepanovs [10], and Poettering-Rösler [15] are given in Appendix C.

1. Simplicity. Contrarily to previous work, we define KIND security in a very comprehensive way by moving all technicalities in a cleanliness predicate which identifies and captures all trivial ways of attacking.

2. Strong security. In the same line as previous works, the adversary in our model can see the entire communication between participants and control the delivery. Of course, he can replace messages with anything. Scheduling communications is under the control of the adversary. This means that the time when a participant sends or receives messages is decided by the adversary. Moreover, the adversary is capable of corrupting participants by making exposures of their internal data. We separate two types of exposures: the exposure of the state (that is kept in internal machinery of a participant) and the exposure of the key (which is produced by the key agreement and given to an external protocol). This is because states are (normally) kept secure in our protocol while the generated key leaves to other applications which may leak for different reasons. We do not consider exposure of the random coins. Essentially, when deciding if an attack is trivial or not, we just consider that each Send call made by the adversary with corrupted coins counts as exposure calls.

3. Slightly sub-optimal security. Using the result from exposure allows the adversary to be active, e.g. by impersonating the exposed participant. However, the adversary is not allowed to use exposures to make a trivial attack. Identifying such trivial attacks is not easy. As a design goal, we adopt not to forbid more than what the intuitive notion of ratheeting captures. We do forbid a bit more than Poettering-Rösler [15] and Jaeger-Stepanovs [10] which are considered of having

3.
optimal security and than Jost-Maurer-Mularczyk \cite{11} (which has near-optimal security)\(^2\), though, allowing lighter building blocks. Namely, we need no key-update primitives and have linear-time complexity in terms of the number of exchanged messages, even when the network is occasionally down. This translates to an important speedup factor, as shown on Table 1. We argue that this is a reasonable choice enabling ratchet security as we define it: unless trivial leakage, a message is private as long as it is acknowledged for reception in a subsequent message.

4. Sequence integrity. We believe that duplex communication is reliably enforced by a lower level protocol. This is assumed to solve non-malicious packets loss e.g. by resend requests and also to reconstruct the correct sequence order. What we only have to care for is when an adversary prevents the delivery of a message consistently. We make the choice to make the transmission of the next messages impossible under such an attack. Contrarily, Alwen et al. \cite{1} advocate for immediate decryption, even though one message is missing. This lowers the security and we chose not to have it.

In the BARK protocol, the correctness implies that both participants generate the same keys. We define the stages matching status, direct leakage, indirect leakage. We aim to separate trivial attacks and trivial forgeries from non-trivial cases with our definitions. Direct and indirect leakages define when the adversary can trivially deduce the key generated due to the exposure of a participant who can either be the same participant (direct) or their counterpart (indirect).

We construct a secure BARK protocol. We build our constructions on top of a cryptosystem and a signature scheme and achieve strong security, without key-update primitives or random oracles. We further show that a secure unidirectional BARK implies public-key cryptography.

Notations. We have two characters: Alice (A) and Bob (B). When P designates a participant, \(\overline{P}\) refers to P’s counterpart. We use the roles send and rec for sender and receiver respectively. We define send = rec and rec = send. When participants A and B have exclusive roles (like in unidirectional cases), we call them sender S and receiver R.

Structure of the paper. In Section 2, we define our BARK protocol along with correctness definition and K\(\text{IND}\) security. Section 3 proves that a simple unidirectional scheme implies public-key encryption. In Section 4 we define the security notions unforgeability and unrecoverability. In Section 5, we give our BARK construction. Appendix A recalls definitions for underlying primitives. Using plaintext-aware security, Appendix B shows that “optimally secure” protocols may still eliminate attacks which are of no harm, hence eliminate more than necessary. In Appendix C, we make some comments and comparison with the results of Bellare et al. \cite{2}, Poettering-Rössler \cite{15}, and Jaeger-Stepanovs \cite{10}.

2  Bidirectional Asynchronous Ratcheted Communication

2.1 BARK Definition and Correctness

Definition 1 (BARK). A bidirectional asynchronous ratcheted key agreement (BARK) consists of the following algorithms:

- \(\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \xrightarrow{\delta} \text{pp}\): This defines the common public parameters pp.
- \(\text{Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{pp}) \xrightarrow{\triangleright} (\text{sk}, \text{pk})\): This generates the secret key sk and the public key pk of a participant.
- \(\text{Init}(1^\lambda, \text{pp}, \text{sk}_P, \text{pk}_P, P) \rightarrow \text{st}_P\): This sets up the initial state \(\text{st}_P\) of P given his secret key, his role role\(_P\), and the public key of his counterpart.
- \(\text{Send}(\text{st}_P) \xrightarrow{\delta} (\text{st}_P', \text{upd}, k)\): The algorithm inputs a current state \(\text{st}_P\) for \(P \in \{A, B\}\). It outputs a tuple \((\text{st}_P', \text{upd}, k)\) with an updated state \(\text{st}_P'\), a message \(\text{upd}\), and a key \(k\).
- \(\text{Receive}(\text{st}_P, \text{upd}) \rightarrow (\text{acc}, \text{st}_P', k)\): The algorithm inputs \((\text{st}_P, \text{upd})\) where \(P \in \{A, B\}\). It outputs a triple consisting of a flag \(\text{acc} \in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}\) to indicate an accept or reject of upd information, an updated state \(\text{st}_P'\), and a key \(k\) i.e. \((\text{acc}, \text{st}_P', k)\).

\(^2\) Those terms are more formally explained on p. 10.
For convenience, we define the following initialization procedure for all games. It returns the initial states of A and B as well as some publicly available information z.

\[
\text{Initall}(1^\lambda, \text{pp}) : \\
1: \text{Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{pp}) \rightarrow (\text{sk}_A, \text{pk}_A) \\
2: \text{Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{pp}) \rightarrow (\text{sk}_B, \text{pk}_B) \\
3: \text{st}_A \leftarrow \text{Init}(1^\lambda, \text{pp}, \text{sk}_A, \text{pk}_A, A) \\
4: \text{st}_B \leftarrow \text{Init}(1^\lambda, \text{pp}, \text{sk}_B, \text{pk}_A, B) \\
5: z \leftarrow (\text{pp}, \text{pk}_A, \text{pk}_B) \\
6: \text{return}\ (\text{st}_A, \text{st}_B, z)
\]

Our \text{Initall} procedure is defined so that it is \textit{splittable} in the sense that private keys can be generated by their holders and there is no need to rely on an authority (except maybe for authentication of \text{pk}_A and \text{pk}_B). Other protocols from the literature assume a trusted common initialization.

We consider bidirectional asynchronous communications. We can see, in Fig. 1, Alice and Bob running some sequences of Send and Receive operations without any prior agreement. Their time scale is different. This means that Alice and Bob run algorithms in an asynchronous way. We consider a notion of time relative to a participant P. Formally, the time t for P is the number of elementary steps that P executed since the beginning of the game. We assume no common clock.

We define the scheduling by a sequence of users (Alice and Bob). Reading the sequence tells who executes a new step of the protocol. In our model, scheduling is controlled by the adversary. As already explained, we assume that the order of transmitted messages is preserved in each direction. If two messages arrive in different order or one was lost or replayed, it must be due to the attacks.

The protocol also uses random roles. Alice and Bob can both send and receive messages. They take their role (sender or receiver) in a sequence, but the sequence of roles of Alice is not necessarily synchronized. Sending/receiving is refined by the \text{RATCH}(P, \text{role[upd]}) call in Fig. 2. In the correctness notion, sent messages by participants are buffered and delivered in the same order to the counterpart. Therefore, both participants can send messages at the same time.

\textbf{Correctness.} We say that a ratcheted communication protocol functions correctly if the receiver accepts the update information \text{upd} and generates the same key as its counterpart. Correctness implies that the received keys for participant P have been generated in the same order as sent keys of participant P. We formally define the correctness in Fig. 2. We define variables. received\textsubscript{key} \text{key} (respectively sent\textsubscript{key} \text{key}) keeps a list of secret keys that are generated by P when running Receive (respectively, Send). Similarly, received\textsubscript{msg} \text{msg} (respectively sent\textsubscript{msg} \text{msg}) keeps a list of \text{upd} information that are received (respectively sent) by P and accepted by Receive. We stress that the received sequences only keep values for which acc = true. (This will be important.)

Each variable v such that received\textsubscript{msg} \text{msg}, kp, or stp is relative to a participant P. We denote by v(t) the value of v at time t for P. For instance, received\textsubscript{msg} \text{msg}(t) is the sequence of \text{upd} which were received by A at time t.

For two communicating parties Alice and Bob, we run \text{Initall} to set up the states, and then run the correctness game in Fig. 2. The scheduling is defined by a sequence sched of tuples of form either (P, send) (saying that P must run Send and send) or (P, rec) (saying that P must run Receive with whatever is received). In this game, communication between the participants uses a waiting queue for messages in each direction. Each participant has a queue of incoming messages and is pulling them in the order they have been pushed in.

\textbf{Definition 2 (Correctness of BARK).} We say that BARK is \textit{correct} if for all sequence sched, the correctness game of Fig. 2 never returns 1. Namely, for each P, received\textsubscript{key} \text{key} is always prefix of sent\textsubscript{key} \text{key} and each \text{RATCH}(., \text{rec}, .) call accepts.

\footnote{By saying that received\textsubscript{key} \text{key} is prefix of sent\textsubscript{key} \text{key}, we mean that when n is the number of keys generated by P running Receive, then these keys are the first n keys generated by P running Send.}
Security. We model our security notion with an active adversary who can have access to some of the states of Alice or Bob along with access to their secret keys enabling them to act both as a sender and as a receiver. For simplicity, we have only Alice and Bob as participants. (Models with more participants would by asymptotically equivalent.) We focus on three main security
notions which are key indistinguishability (denoted as KIND) under the compromise of states or keys, unforgeability of upd information (FORGE) by the adversary which will be accepted, and recovery from impersonation (RECOVER) which will make the two participants restore secure communication without noticing a (trivial) impersonation resulting from a state exposure. A challenge in these notions is to eliminate the trivial attacks. FORGE and RECOVER security will be useful to prove KIND security.

2.2 KIND Security

The adversary can access four oracles called RATCH, EXP_st, EXP_key, and TEST.

RATCH. This is essentially the message exchange procedure. It is defined in Fig. 2. The adversary can call it with three inputs, a participant P, where P ∈ {A, B}; a role of P; and an upd information if the role is rec. The adversary gets upd (for role = send) or acc (for role = rec) in return.

EXP_st. The adversary can expose the state of Alice or Bob. It inputs P ∈ {A, B} to the EXP_st oracle and it receives the full state st_P of P.

EXP_key. The adversary can expose the generated key by calling this oracle. Upon inputting P, it gets the last key k_P generated by P. If no key was generated, ⊥ is returned.

TEST. This oracle can be called only once to receive a challenge key which is generated either uniformly at random (if the challenge bit is b = 0) or given as the last generated key of a participant P specified as input (if the challenge bit is b = 1). The oracle cannot be queried if no key was generated yet.

We specifically separate EXP_key from EXP_st as the key k generated by BARK will be used by the external process which may leak the key. Thus, EXP_key can be more frequent than EXP_st, however it harms security less.

To define security, we avoid trivial attacks. Capturing the trivial cases in a broad sense requires a new set of definitions. All of them are intuitive.

Intuitively, P is in a matching status at a given time if his state is not dependent on a “active” attack (i.e. on injected messages).

Definition 3 (Matching status). At a given time t, we say that a participant P is in a matching status if there exist times t and t' such that 1. t' ≤ t, 2. received_p^{msg}(t) = sent_p^{msg}(t), and 3. received_p^{msg}(t') = sent_p^{msg}(t'). If this is the case, we say that time t for P originates from time t' for P.

The second condition clearly states that all the received (and accepted) upd information match the upd information sent by the counterpart of P, at some point in the past (at time t), in the same order. The third condition similarly verifies that those messages from P only depend on information coming from P. In Fig. 1, Bob is in a matching status with Alice because he receives the upd information in the exact order as they have sent by Alice (i.e. Bob generates k_2 after k_1 and k_4 after k_2 same as it has sent by Alice). In general, as long as no adversary switches the order of messages or creates fake messages successfully for either party, the participants are always in a matching status. The third condition is useful to prove k_P(t) = k_T(t) in Lemma 7.

The key exchange literature often defines a notion of partnering which is simpler. Asynchronous random roles makes it more complicated.

An easy property of the notion of matching status is that if P is in a matching status at time t, then P is also in a matching status at any time t_0 ≤ t. Similarly, if P is in a matching status at
time \( t \) and \( t' \) for \( P \) originates from \( \overline{t} \) for \( \overline{P} \), then \( \overline{P} \) is in a matching status at time \( \overline{t} \) and also at any time before. Note that although \( t \) originates from \( \overline{t} \), which itself originates from \( t' \), we may have \( t' \neq t \).

**Definition 4 (Forgery).** Given a participant \( P \) in a game, we say that the list of forgeries for \( P \) is the list \( (\text{upd}_1, \ldots, \text{upd}_n) \) of \text{upd} messages such that there exist finite sequences of \text{upd} messages (possibly empty) \( \text{seq}_0, \ldots, \text{seq}_n \) such that

- \( \text{received}^P_{\text{msg}} = (\text{seq}_0, \text{upd}_1, \text{seq}_1, \text{upd}_2, \text{seq}_2, \ldots, \text{upd}_n, \text{seq}_n) \);
- for all \( i \), \( (\text{seq}_0, \ldots, \text{seq}_{i-1}) \) is a prefix of \( \text{sent}^P_{\text{msg}} \);
- for all \( i \), \( (\text{seq}_0, \text{seq}_1, \ldots, \text{seq}_{i-1}, \text{upd}_i) \) is not a prefix of \( \text{sent}^P_{\text{msg}} \).

Here, the comma operation “,” is the concatenation of sequences and single messages \( \text{upd}_1 \) are taken as sequences of length 1. We call \( \text{upd}_1 \) as \( P \)'s first forgery.

**Lemma 5.** If \( P \) is not in a matching status, either \( P \) or \( \overline{P} \) has received a forgery.

**Proof.** If \( P \) did not receive a forgery, then \( \text{received}^P_{\text{msg}} \) is a prefix of \( \text{sent}^P_{\text{msg}} \). Therefore, there exists a time \( \overline{t} \) such that \( \text{received}^P_{\text{msg}}(t) = \text{sent}^P_{\text{msg}}(\overline{t}) \). If \( P \) is not in matching status at time \( t \), then \( \text{received}^P_{\text{msg}}(\overline{t}) \) cannot be a prefix of \( \text{sent}^P_{\text{msg}}(t) \). This implies that \( P \) received a forgery due to Definition 4. \( \square \)

In a matching status, any \text{upd} received by \( P \) must correspond to an \text{upd} sent by \( \overline{P} \) and the sequences must match. This implies the following notion.

**Definition 6 (Corresponding RATCH calls).** Let \( P \) be a participant. We consider only the RATCH(\( P, \text{rec} \), \( P \)) calls by \( P \) returning true. We say that the \( i \)-th one corresponds to the \( j \)-th sending RATCH(\( \overline{P}, \text{send} \)) call by \( \overline{P} \) if \( i = j \) and \( P \) is in matching status at the time of this \( i \)-th accepting RATCH(\( P, \text{rec} \), \( P \)) call.

**Lemma 7.** In a correct BARK protocol, two corresponding RATCH(\( P, \text{rec}, \text{upd} \)) and RATCH(\( \overline{P}, \text{send} \)) calls generate the same key \( k_P = k_{\overline{P}} \).

**Proof.** If RATCH(\( P, \text{rec}, \text{upd} \)) and RATCH(\( \overline{P}, \text{send} \)) correspond to each other, then \( P \) is in matching status. We let \( t \) be the time of the RATCH(\( P, \text{rec}, \text{upd} \)) call and \( \overline{t} \) be the time of the RATCH(\( \overline{P}, \text{send} \)) call. We make the sequence of all RATCH calls from \( P \) until time \( t \) and all RATCH calls from \( \overline{P} \) until time \( \overline{t} \). By putting them in chronological order, thanks to the conditions of the matching status, we define a sequence \( \text{sched} \), and the experiment runs as the correctness game. Due to correctness, the last calls generate the same key \( k \). Hence, \( k_P(t) = k_{\overline{P}}(\overline{t}) \). \( \square \)

**Definition 8 (Ratcheting period of \( P \)).** A maximal time interval during which there is no RATCH(\( P, \text{send} \)) call is called a ratcheting period of \( P \).

Consequently, a RATCH(\( P, \text{send} \)) call ends a ratcheting period for \( P \) and starts a new one. In Fig. 1, the time between \( T_1 \) and \( T_3 \) or the interval \( T_5 - T_6 \) are called ratcheting period of Alice and Bob respectively.

We now define when the adversary can trivially obtain a key generated by \( P \) due to an exposure. We distinguish the case when the exposure was done on \( P \) (direct leakage) and on \( \overline{P} \) (indirect leakage).

**Definition 9 (Direct leakage).** Let \( t \) be a time and \( P \) be a participant. We say that \( k_P(t) \) has a direct leakage if one of the following conditions is satisfied:

- There is an EXP(\( P \)) at a time \( t_e \) such that the last RATCH call which is executed by \( P \) before time \( t \) and the last RATCH call which is executed by \( P \) before time \( t_e \) are the same.
- \( P \) is in a matching status and there exists \( t_0 \leq t_e \leq t \) such that \( t \) originates from time \( \overline{t} \); time \( \overline{t} \) originates from time \( t_0 \); there is one EXP(\( \overline{P} \)) at time \( t_e \); there is one RATCH(\( P, \text{rec}, \) ) at time \( t_{\text{RATCH}} \); and there is no RATCH(\( P, \) ) between time \( t_{\text{RATCH}} \) and time \( t \).
In the first case, it is clear that $\text{EXP}_{\text{key}}(P)$ gives $k_P(t_e) = k_P(t)$. In the second case (in Fig. 34), the state which leaks from $\text{EXP}_{\text{st}}(P)$ at time $t_e$ allows to simulate all deterministic Receive (skipping all Send) and to compute the key $k_P(t_{\text{RATCH}}) = k_P(t)$. The reason why we can allow the adversary skipping all Send is that they make messages which are supposed to be delivered to $\overline{P}$ after time $\overline{\tau}$, so they have no impact on $k_P(t)$.

Consider Fig. 1. Suppose $t$ is in between time $T_3$ and $T_4$. According to our definition $P = A$ and the last RATCH call is at time $T_3$. It is a $\text{Send}$, thus the second case cannot apply. The next RATCH call is at time $T_4$. In this case, $k_A(t)$ has a direct leakage if there is a key exposure of Alice between $T_3$ and $T_4$.

Suppose now that $T_8 < t < T_9$. We have $P = B$, the last RATCH call is a Receive, it is at time $t_{\text{RATCH}} = T_9$, and $t$ originates from time $\overline{\tau} = T_0$ which itself originates from the origin time $t_0 = T_{\text{init}}$ for B. We say that $t$ has a direct leakage if there is a key exposure between $T_8$ and $T_9$ or a state exposure of Bob before time $T_8$. Indeed, with this last state exposure, the adversary can ignore all Send and simulate all Receive to derive $k_0$.

**Definition 10 (Indirect leakage).** We consider a time $t$ and a participant $P$. Let $t_{\text{RATCH}}$ be the time of the last successful RATCH call and $\text{role}$ be its input role. (We have $k_P(t_{\text{RATCH}}) = k_P(t)$.) We say that $k_P(t)$ has an indirect leakage if $P$ is in matching status at time $t$ and one of the following conditions is satisfied:

- There exists a RATCH($\overline{P}$, $\text{role}$, ...) corresponding to that RATCH($P$, $\text{role}$, ...) and making a $k_P$ which has a direct leakage for $\overline{P}$.
- There exists $t' \leq t_{\text{RATCH}} \leq t$ and $\overline{\tau} \leq \overline{t_e}$ such that $P$ is in a matching status at time $\overline{t_e}$, $t$ originates from $\overline{\tau}$, $\overline{t_e}$ originates from $t'$, there is one $\text{EXP}_{\text{st}}(P)$ at time $\overline{t_e}$, and role = send.

In the first case, $k_P(t) = k_P(t_{\text{RATCH}})$ is also computed by $\overline{P}$ and leaks from there. The second case (in Fig. 3) is more complicated: it corresponds to an adversary who can get the internal state of $\overline{P}$ by $\text{EXP}_{\text{st}}(P)$ then simulate all Receive with messages from $P$ until the one sent at time $t_{\text{RATCH}}$, ignoring all Send by $\overline{P}$, to recover $k_P(t)$.

For example, let $t$ be a time between $T_1$ and $T_2$ in Fig. 1. We take $P = A$. The last RATCH call is at time $t_{\text{RATCH}} = T_1$, it is a Send and corresponds to a Receive at time $T_{10}$, but $t$ originates from time $\overline{\tau} = T_{\text{init}}$. We say that $t$ has an indirect leakage for $A$ if there exists a direct leakage for $\overline{P} = B$ at a time between $T_{10}$ and $T_{11}$ (first condition) or there exists a $\text{EXP}_{\text{st}}(B)$ call at a time $\overline{t_e}$ (after time $\overline{\tau} = T_{\text{init}}$), originating from a time $t'$ before time $T_1$, so $\overline{t_e} < T_{10}$ (second condition). In the

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4 Origin of dotted arrows indicate when a time originates from.
latter case, the adversary can simulate \texttt{Receive} with the updates sent at time $T_0$ and $T_1$ to derive the key $K_1$.

Exposing the state of a participant gives certain advantages to the attacker and make trivial attacks possible. In our security game, we avoid those attack scenarios. In the following lemma, we show that direct and indirect leakage capture the times when the adversary can trivially win. The proof is straightforward.

\textbf{Lemma 11 (Trivial attacks).} Assume that BARK is correct. For any $t$ and $P$, if $k_P(t)$ has a direct or indirect leakage, the adversary can compute $k_P(t)$.

\textit{Proof.} We use correctness, Lemma 7, and the explanations given after Def. 9 and Def. 10. \hfill \Box

So far, we mostly focused on matching status cases but there could be situations with forgeries as well. We define trivial forgeries as follows.

\textbf{Definition 12 (Trivial forgery). Let $\text{upd}$ be the first forgery received by $P$. Let $t$ be the time just before the $\text{RATCH}(P, \text{rec}, $\text{upd}$)$ call. Let $T$ be a time such that $\text{received}^r_{\text{mag}}(t) = \text{sent}^P_{\text{mag}}(T)$. If there is any $\text{EXP}_{st}(P)$ call during the ratcheting period of $P$ which includes time $T$, we say that $\text{upd}$ is a trivial forgery.

We define the KIND security game in Fig. 4. Essentially, the adversary plays with all oracles. At some point, he does one \texttt{TEST}(P) call which returns either the same result as $\text{EXP}_{\text{key}}(P)$ (case $b = 1$) or some random value (case $b = 0$). The goal of the adversary is to guess $b$. The \texttt{TEST} call can be done only once and it defines the participant $P_{\text{test}} = P$ and the time $t_{\text{test}}$ at which this call is made. It also defines $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$, the last $\text{upd}$ which was used (either sent or received) to carry $k_{\text{req}}(t_{\text{test}})$ from the sender to the receiver. It is not allowed to make this call at the beginning, when $P$ did not generate a key yet. It is not allowed to make a trivial attack as defined by a cleanness predicate $C_{\text{clean}}$ appearing on Step 6 in the KIND game in Fig. 4. Identifying the appropriate cleanness predicate $C_{\text{clean}}$ is not easy. It must clearly forbid trivial attacks but also allow efficient protocols. In what follows we use the following predicates:

- $C_{\text{leak}}$: $k_{\text{req}}(t_{\text{test}})$ has no direct or indirect leakage.
- $C_{\text{trivial forge}}^P$: $P$ received no trivial forgery until $P$ has seen $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$.
  (This implies that $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$ is not a trivial forgery. It also implies that if $P$ never sees $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$, then $P$ received no trivial forgery at all.)
- $C_{\text{forge}}^P$: $P$ received no forgery until $P$ has seen $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$.
- $C_{\text{ratchet}}$: $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$ was sent by a participant $P$, then received and accepted by $P$, then, some $\text{upd}'$, was sent by $P$, then $\text{upd}'$ was received and accepted by $P$.
  (Here, $P$ could be $P_{\text{test}}$ or his counterpart. This accounts for the receipt of $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$ being acknowledged by $P$ through $\text{upd}'$.)
- $C_{\text{noEXP}(R)}$: there is no $\text{EXP}_{st}(R)$ and no $\text{EXP}_{\text{key}}(R)$ query. ($R$ is the receiver.)

Lemma 11 says that the adopted cleanness predicate $C_{\text{clean}}$ must imply $C_{\text{leak}}$ in all considered games. Otherwise, no security is possible. It is however not sufficient as it only covers trivial attacks with no forgeries.

$C_{\text{ratchet}}$ targets that any acknowledged sent message is secure. Another way to say is that a key generated by one \texttt{Send} starting a round trip must be safe. This is the notion of healing by ratcheting. Intuitively, the security notion from $C_{\text{clean}} = C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{ratchet}}$ is fair enough.

Bellare et al. [2] consider unidirectional BARK with $C_{\text{clean}} = C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{ratch}}^P \land C_{\text{noEXP}(R)}$. Other papers like Poettering-Rössler [15] and Jaeger-Stepanovs [10] implicitly use $C_{\text{clean}} = C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{trivial forge}}^P$ as cleanness predicate. They show that this is sufficient to build secure protocols but it is probably not the minimal cleanness predicate (it is nevertheless called “optimal”). Jost-Maurer-Mularczyk [11] excludes cases where $P_{\text{test}}$ received a (trivial) forgery then had an $\text{EXP}_{st}(P_{\text{test}})$ before receiving $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$. Actually, they use a cleanness predicate (“near-optimal” security) which is somewhere between $C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{trivial forge}}^P$ and $C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{ratchet}}^P \land C_{\text{trivial forge}}^P$. Hence, our cleanness implies the JMM cleanness and this cleanness implies the PR/JS cleanness.
In our construction ("sub-optimal"), we use the predicate $C_{\text{clean}} = C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{forgo}}^A \land C_{\text{forgo}}^B$. However, in Section 4.1, we define the FORGE security (unforgeability) which implies that $(C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{forgo}}^A \land C_{\text{forgo}}^B)$-KIND security and $(C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{trivial forge}} \land C_{\text{trivial forge}}^B)$-KIND security are equivalent. (See Th. 18.) One drawback is that it forbids more than $(C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{trivial forge}}^B)$-KIND security. The advantage is that we can achieve security without key-update primitives. We will prove in Th. 20 that this security is enough to achieve security with the predicate $C_{\text{clean}} = C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{ratchet}}$, thanks to RECOVER-security which we define in Section 4.2. Thus, our cleanness notion is fair enough.

![Game KIND$_A^A$$_{\text{clean}}$](image)

Oracle TEST($P$)
1: if $t_{\text{test}} \neq \bot$ then return $\bot$
2: if $k_{p} = \bot$ then return $\bot$
3: $t_{\text{test}} \leftarrow$ time, $P_{\text{test}} \leftarrow P$, $\text{upd}_{\text{test}} \leftarrow \text{upd}_{P}$
4: if $b = 1$ then
5: return $k_{p}$
6: else
7: return random $\{0,1\}^{\lambda}$
8: end if

![Oracle EXP$_{\text{exp}}$($P$)](image)
1: return $k_{p}$

**Definition 13 (C$_{\text{clean}}$-KIND security).** Let $C_{\text{clean}}$ be a cleanness predicate. We consider the KIND$_b^A$$_{\text{clean}}$ game of Fig. 4. We say that the ratcheted key agreement BARK is $(q, T, \varepsilon)$-C$_{\text{clean}}$-KIND-secure if for any adversary limited to $q$ queries and time complexity $T$, the advantage

$$\text{Adv}(A) = |\text{Pr}[\text{KIND}^A_{b.C_{\text{clean}} \rightarrow 1}] - \text{Pr}[^{A}_{b.C_{\text{clean}} \rightarrow 1}]|$$

of $A$ in KIND$_b^A$$_{\text{clean}}$ security game is bounded by $\varepsilon$.

### 3 uniARK Implies KEM

We now prove that a weakly secure uniARK (a unidirectional asynchronous ratcheted key exchange — a variant of BARK in which messages can only go from a participant whom we call S to a participant whom we call R) implies public key encryption. Namely, we can construct a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) out of it. We recall the KEM definition.

**Definition 14 (KEM scheme).** A KEM scheme consists of three algorithms: a key pair generation $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \xrightarrow{\$} (sk, pk)$, an encapsulation algorithm $\text{Enc}(pk) \xrightarrow{\$} (k, ct)$, and a decapsulation algorithm $\text{Dec}(sk, ct) \rightarrow k$. It is correct if $\text{Pr}[\text{Dec}(sk, ct) = k] = 1$ when the keys are generated with $\text{Gen}$ and $\text{Enc}(pk) \rightarrow (k, ct)$.

We consider a uniARK which is KIND-secure for the following cleanness predicate:

$C_{\text{weak}}$: the adversary makes only three oracle calls which are, in order, EXP$_{\text{exp}}(S)$, RATCH$(S, \text{send})$, and TEST$(S)$.

(Note that R is never used.) $C_{\text{weak}}$ implies cleanness for all other considered predicates. Hence, it is more restrictive. Our result implies that it is unlikely to construct even such weakly secure uniARK from symmetric cryptography.
Theorem 15. Given a uniARK protocol, we can construct a KEM with the following properties. The correctness of uniARK implies the correctness of KEM. The $C_{\text{weak}}$-KIND-security of uniARK implies the IND-CPA security of KEM.

Proof. Assuming a uniARK protocol, we construct a KEM as follows:

$\text{KEM.Gen}(\lambda) \xrightarrow{\$} (\text{sk}, \text{pk})$: run uniARK.Setup($\lambda$) $\xrightarrow{\$} \text{pp}$, uniARK.Initall($\lambda$, pp) $\xrightarrow{\$} (\text{st}_S, \text{st}_R, z)$ and set $\text{pk} = \text{st}_S$, $\text{sk} = \text{st}_R$.

$\text{KEM.Enc}(\text{pk}) \xrightarrow{\$} (k, ct)$: run uniARK.Send($\text{pk}$) $\xrightarrow{\$} (., \text{upd}, k)$ and set $ct = \text{upd}$.

$\text{KEM.Dec}(\text{sk}, ct) \rightarrow k$: run uniARK.Receive($\text{sk}, \text{upd}$) $\rightarrow (., ., k)$.

The IND-CPA security game with adversary $A$ works as in the left-hand side below. We transform $A$ into a KIND adversary $B$ in the right-hand side below.

Game IND-CPA:

1. $\text{KEM.Gen}(\lambda) \xrightarrow{\$} (\text{sk}, \text{pk})$
2. $\text{KEM.Enc}(\text{pk}) \xrightarrow{\$} (k, ct)$
3. if $b = 0$ then set $k$ to random
4. $A(\text{pk}, ct, k) \xrightarrow{\$} b'$
5. return $b'$

Adversary $B(z)$:

1. call EXP$_A(S) \rightarrow \text{pk}$
2. call RATCH($S$, send) $\rightarrow ct$
3. call TEST($S$) $\rightarrow k$
4. run $A(\text{pk}, ct, k) \rightarrow b'$
5. return $b'$

We can check that $C_{\text{weak}}$ is satisfied. The KIND game with $B$ simulates perfectly the IND-CPA game with $A$. So, the KIND-security of uniARK implies the IND-CPA security of KEM. $\square$

4 FORGE and RECOVER Security

4.1 Unforgeability

Another security aspect of the key agreement BARK is to have that no upd information is forgeable by any bounded adversary except trivially by state exposure. This security notion is independent from KIND security but is certainly nice to have for explicit authentication in key agreement. Besides, it is easy to achieve. We will also use it as a helper to prove KIND security: to reduce

$C_{\text{trivial forge}}$-cleanness to $C_{\text{forge}}$-cleanness.

A first forgery is a upd received by a participant $P$ making him lose his matching status. Let the adversary interact with the oracles RATCH, EXP$_A$, EXP$_B$, in any order. For BARK to have unforgeability, we eliminate the trivial forgeries (as defined in Def. 12). The FORGE game is defined in Fig. 5.

Definition 16 (FORGE security). Consider FORGE$^A$ game in Fig. 5 associated to the adversary $A$. Let the advantage of $A$ in succeeding the attack in FORGE$^A$ game be the probability that the game outputs 1. We say that BARK is $(q, t, \varepsilon)$-FORGE-secure if, for any adversary limited to $q$ queries and time complexity $T$, the advantage is bounded by $\varepsilon$.

We can now justify why forgeries in the KIND game must be trivial for a BARK with unforgeability.

Lemma 17. Assume that BARK is FORGE-secure. Let $A$ be an adversary playing KIND$^A_{\text{R,C},\text{max}}$ game. For any $P$ and $t$, if there exists no trivial forgery, the probability that $P$ is not in matching status at a time $t$ is negligible.

Proof. It follows from Lemma 5 and the definition of the FORGE$^A$ game. $\square$

Theorem 18. If a BARK is FORGE-secure, then $(C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{forge}})$-KIND-security implies $(C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{trivial forge}})$-KIND-security and $(C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{forge}} \land C_{\text{forge}})$-KIND-security implies $(C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{trivial forge}})$-KIND-security.

Proof. This is obvious, as FORGE-security implies no non-trivial forgery. $\square$
A priori, it seems nice to be able to restore a secure state when a state exposure of a participant takes place. We show here that it is not a good idea.

4.2 Recovery from Impersonation

A priori, it seems nice to be able to restore a secure state when a state exposure of a participant takes place. We show here that it is not a good idea.

Let $A$ be an adversary playing the two games in Fig. 6. On the left strategy, $A$ exposes $A$ with an $\text{EXP}_{st}$ query (Step 2). Then, the adversary $A$ impersonates $A$ by running the $\text{Send}$ algorithm on its own (Step 3). Next, the adversary $A$ “sends” a message to $B$ which is accepted due to correctness because it is generated with $A$’s state. In Step 5, $A$ lets the legitimate sender generate $\text{upd}'$ by calling $\text{RATCH}$ oracle. In this step, if security self-restores, $B$ accepts $\text{upd}'$ which is sent by $A$. Hence, $\text{acc}' = 1$ in the final step. It is clear that the strategy shown on the left side in Fig. 6 is equivalent to the strategy shown on the right side of the same figure (which only switches Alice and the adversary who run the same algorithm). Hence, both lead to $\text{acc}' = 1$ with the same probability $p$.

The crucial point is that the forgery in the right-hand strategy becomes non-trivial, which implies that the protocol is not $\text{FORGE}$-secure. In addition to this, if such phenomenon occurs, we can make a $\text{KIND}$ adversary passing the $\text{C}_{\text{adv}} \wedge \text{trivial forge}$ condition. Thus, we lose $\text{KIND}$-security.

In general, we believe it is not reasonable to allow recoveries from impersonation as it could serve as a discrete and temporary active attack and facilitate mass surveillance. For this purpose,
we define the RECOVER security notion with another game in Fig. 5. Essentially, in the game, we require the receiver $P$ to accept some messages $upd'$ sent by the sender after the adversary makes successful forgeries $upd$. We further use it as a second helper to prove KIND security with $C_{\text{ratchet}}$-cleanness.

**Definition 19 (RECOVER security).** Consider $\text{RECOVER}_{\text{BARK}}^A$ game in Fig. 5 associated to the adversary $A$. Let the advantage of $A$ in succeeding playing the game be $\Pr[\text{win} = 1]$. We say that the ratcheted communication protocol is $(q, T, \epsilon)$ RECOVER-secure, if for any adversary limited to $q$ queries and time complexity $T$, the advantage is bounded by $\epsilon$.

RECOVER-secure is easy to achieve using a collision-resistant hash function.

**Theorem 20.** If a BARK is RECOVER-secure and $(C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{forge}}^A \land C_{\text{forge}}^B)$-KIND secure, then it is $(C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{ratchet}})$-KIND secure.

**Proof.** Let us consider a $(C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{ratchet}})$-KIND game in which $C_{\text{ratchet}}$ holds. Let $P$ be the participant who sent $upd_{\text{test}}$. Since $upd_{\text{test}}$ is a genuine message from $P$ which is received by $P$, the RECOVER security implies that $P$ did not receive a forgery until it received $upd_{\text{test}}$ (except in negligible cases). So, $C_{\text{forge}}^P$ holds. Similarly, since $P$ received a genuine $upd'$ after seeing $upd_{\text{test}}$, $P$ did not receive a forgery until then (except in negligible cases). So, $C_{\text{forge}}^P$ holds, except in negligible cases. \hfill $\square$

## 5 Our BARK Protocol

We construct a BARK from a signcryption $SC$ and a hash function $H$ as in Fig. 7. The signcryption we use is a naive combination of a public-key cryptosystem and a digital signature scheme, as defined in Appendix A. The collision-resistant hash function is defined in Appendix A as well.

The state of a participant is a tuple $st = (\lambda, hk, \text{List}_S, \text{List}_R, H_{\text{sent}}, H_{\text{received}})$ where $hk$ is the hashing key, $H_{\text{sent}}$ is the iterated hash of all sent messages, and $H_{\text{received}}$ is the iterated hash of all received messages. We also have two lists $\text{List}_S$ and $\text{List}_R$. They are lists of states to be used for unidirectional communication: sending and receiving. Both lists are growing but entries are eventually erased. Thus, they can be compressed. (Typically, only the last entry is not erased.)

The idea is that the $i$th entry of $\text{List}_S$ for a participant $P$ is associated to the $i$th entry of $\text{List}_R$ for its counterpart $P$. Every time a participant $P$ sends a message, it creates a new pair of states for sending and receiving and sends the sending state to his counterpart $P'$, to be used in the case $P'$ wants to respond. If the same participant $P$ keeps sending without receiving anything, he accumulates some receiving states this way. Whenever a participant $P$ who received many messages starts sending, he also accumulated many sending states. His message is sent using all those states in the onion Send procedure. After sending, all but the last send state are erased, and the message shall indicate the erasures to the counterpart $P$, who shall erase corresponding receiving states accordingly. Our onion encryption needs to ensure $O(n)$ complexity (we cannot compose $SC$ encryptions as ciphertext overheads would produce a $O(n^2)$ complexity). For that, we use a one-time symmetric encryption $\text{Sym}$ using a key $k$ in $\{0, 1\}^{\text{Sym} \cdot k}$ which is split into shares $k_1, \ldots, k_n$. Each share is $SC$-encrypted in one state. Only the last state is updated (as others are meant to be erased).

The protocol is quite efficient when participants alternate their roles well, because the lists are often flushed to contain only one unerased state. It also becomes more secure due to ratcheting: any exposure has very limited impact. If there are unidirectional sequences, the protocol becomes less and less efficient due to the growth of the lists.

We note that our protocol does not offer $(C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{forge}}^P)$-KIND security due to the following attack:

1. $\text{EXP}_A(\lambda) \rightarrow st_\lambda$
2. $\text{EXP}_B(B) \rightarrow st_B$
3. $\text{RATCH}(B, \text{send}) \rightarrow upd_B$
4. $\text{RATCH}(\lambda, \text{rec, } upd_B) \rightarrow \text{true}$
Fig. 7: Our BARK Protocol.

5: RATCH(A, send) → upd
6: TEST(A) → k
7: Send(st_A) → upd_A
8: RATCH(B, rec, upd_A) → true
9: EXP_A(B) → st_B
10: use sk_B^{rec,1} (original) and sk_B^{rec,2} to decrypt upd
11: compare the result with k

Note that the trivial forgery is here to make the following EXP_A(B) a non-trivial leakage for sk_B^{rec,2} (sk_B^{rec,1} is already known).

The attack is ruled out in the (C_{leak} \land C_{A-forge} \land C_{B-forge}^B)-KIND security which does not allow forgeries until upd is received.

We state the security of our protocol below.
Theorem 21 (Unrecoverability). If $H$ is a $(T, \varepsilon)$-collision-resistant hash function, then BARK in Fig. 7 is $(T, \varepsilon)$-RECOVER-secure.

Proof. Each upd sent must include the hash of the previous upd sent. We call them chained for this reason. If $(\text{seq}_1, \text{upd}, \text{seq}_2)$ and $(\text{seq}_3, \text{upd}, \text{seq}_1)$ are two validly chained list of messages with $\text{seq}_1 \neq \text{seq}_2$, we can easily see that upd = $(h, \text{onion})$ must include a collision on $h$. This cannot happen, thanks to collision resistance. \hfill \Box

Theorem 22 (Unforgeability). For any $q, T, \varepsilon$, assuming that $SC$ is $(T', \varepsilon)$-EF-OTCPA-secure and $H$ is a $(T, \varepsilon)$-collision-resistant hash function, then BARK in Fig. 7 is $(q, T, q\epsilon)$-FORGE-secure. We let $T' = T + T_{\text{init}} + q T_{\text{Send.Receive}}$ where $T_{\text{init}}$ denotes a complexity upper bound of Setup and Initialize and $T_{\text{Send.Receive}}$ denotes a complexity upper bound of both Send and Receive.

Proof. We consider an adversary $A$ making a forgery upd = $(h, \text{ct})$ which is accepted by $P$. We let $n + 1$ be the number of components in $\text{ct}$. We denote by $\Gamma$ the FORGE game that $A$ plays against BARK. We assume without loss of generality that both participants are always in a matching status during $\Gamma$ (otherwise, we make $\Gamma$ abort as it will be the case in the FORGE game, eventually).

We first assume that $P$ successfully received a message upd' from $\overline{P}$ before upd. (See Fig. 8.) The receiving RATCH($P$, rec, upd') $\to$ true call at some time $t$ corresponds to a RATCH($\overline{P}$, send) $\to$ upd' call at some time $\overline{t}$. Since the forgery upd is non-trivial, this call starts a ratcheting session for $\overline{P}$ with no state exposure. This ratcheting session may never end, or end with some RATCH($\overline{P}$, send) $\to$ upd'' call.

The RATCH($\overline{P}$, send) call at time $\overline{t}$ also defines some value $u$ and some states $st_{P}^{\text{send}, u}$ and $st_{\overline{P}}^{\text{recv}, u}$. During this call, $st_{P}^{\text{send}. u}$ is updated with some $st'_{P}$ generated by onion.Send. Inside $st'_{P}$, there is a sk'_{\overline{P}} generated by SC.Gen_{\overline{P}}. We transform $\Gamma$ into an EF-OTCPA game $\Gamma'$ where the initialization SC.Gen_{\overline{P}} is this one. The initialization SC.Gen is the one following SC.Gen_{\overline{P}}. We construct an adversary $A'$ to play in $\Gamma'$ and who will simulate $A$ and some part of $\Gamma$. The EF-OTCPA game gives all generated keys except $sk'_{\overline{P}}$ to the adversary $A'$, so he can simulate $\Gamma$, except when $sk'_{\overline{P}}$ is needed. We recall that in $\Gamma$, there is no exposure which needs to give $sk'_{\overline{P}}$ to $A$. This $sk'_{\overline{P}}$ is actually not used in $\Gamma$, but for one SC.Enc instruction to compute $\text{upd''} = (\text{ad''}, \text{ct''})$ (if $\text{upd''}$ exists), with $\text{ct''}$ of $n'' + 1$ components. More precisely, it computes $ct''_0 = \text{SC.Enc}(sk'_{\overline{P}}, pk_{\overline{P}}, ad''_1, k''_1)$, the first element of $ct''$ with some associated data $ad''_1$ resulting from hashing $ad''_1, ct''_{n''+1}, \ldots, ct''_2$. The only SC.Enc which needs $sk'_{\overline{P}}$ can be simulated in the EF-OTCPA game, as the adversary is allowed to make one chosen message query. Finally, the adversary $A'$ in $\Gamma'$ computes $ad_1$, the iterated hash of $ad, ct_{n+1}, \ldots, ct_2$ in $\text{upd}$, and returns $(ad_1, ct_1)$ as a final output. We reduce $\Gamma'$ to a game $\Gamma''$ where either the adversary made no chosen message query, or $ad_1 \neq ad_1'$, or $ad_1 = ad_1''$ are
computed from exactly the same input list \(\{ad''', ct''''_{n+1}, \ldots, ct''''_2\} = \{ad, ct_{n+1}, \ldots, ct_2\}\). Due to collision-resistance, \(\Gamma'\) and \(\Gamma''\) succeeds with negligibly close probability of success. In \(\Gamma''\), having a forgery against \(\text{SC}\) is then equivalent to having a forgery in \(\Gamma\). Since \(\text{SC}\) is EF-OTCPA-secure, this happens with negligible probability.

In the second case, we assume that \(\text{P}\) never received anything from \(\overline{\text{P}}\). We proceed as before with \(u = 1\). The proof is the same.

\[\square\]

**Theorem 23 (KIND Security).** For any \(q, T, \varepsilon\), assuming that \(\text{SC}\) is \((T', \varepsilon')\)-IND-CCA-secure and \(\text{Sym}\) is \((T, \varepsilon)\)-IND-OTCCA-secure, then BARK in Fig. 7 is \((q, T, 2q\varepsilon)\)-(\(C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{trivial forge}}^A \land C_{\text{trivial forge}}^B\))\-KIND-secure. Here, \(T' = T + T_{\text{Init}} + qT_{\text{Send,Receive}}\) where \(T_{\text{Init}}\) denotes a complexity upper bound of Setup and \(T_{\text{Send,Receive}}\) denotes a complexity upper bound of both \(\text{Send}\) and \(\text{Receive}\).

Due to Th. 18, Th. 22, and Th. 23, we deduce \((C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{trivial forge}}^A \land C_{\text{trivial forge}}^B)\)-KIND-security. The advantage of treating \((C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{trivial forge}}^A \land C_{\text{trivial forge}}^B)\)-KIND-security specifically is that we clearly separate the required security assumptions for \(\text{SC}\).

Due to Th. 20, Th. 21, and Th. 23, we deduce \((C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{ratchet}})\)-KIND-security.

**Proof.** We take a KIND game which we denote by \(\Gamma\). The idea is that we will identify which keys generated by \(\text{SC,Gen}_R\) are safe and apply the IND-OTCCA reduction to whatever they encrypt. This way, we hope that the key \(k\) which is tested by TEST will be replaced by a random one and never used in a distinguishable way. The difficulties are

- to identify which keys are safe;
- to get rid of a safe \(sk_R\) (except for decryption) to apply the IND-OTCCA game;
- to see the connection between \(C_{\text{clean}}\) and the notion of safe key.

We number each use of \(\text{SC,Gen}_R\) with an index \(j\). All indices are set in chronological order. For each \(j\), we define a list \(i_{j,1}, \ldots, i_{j,\ell_j}\) of length \(\ell_j\). The \(j^{th}\) run of \(\text{SC,Gen}_R\) is done either on Step 2 in onion.Init (called by \(\text{BARK,Send}\)), or on Step 2 in \(\text{BARK,Gen}\) (called by \(\text{BARK,Initial}\)), or on Step 2 in onion.Send (called by \(\text{BARK,Send}\)). If it is done in onion.Init or \(\text{BARK,Gen}\), \(j\) is generated by \(\text{SC,Gen}_R\), we set \(\ell_j = 0\). Actually, the receive decryption key \(sk_R\) which is generated by \(\text{SC,Gen}_R\) stays local on the participant which generated it in \(\text{BARK,Send}\) (or \(\text{BARK,Initial}\)), so is not encrypted. Otherwise, \(sk_R\) is generated during a onion.Send called by \(\text{BARK,Send}\) and it is encrypted in an onion to be sent to the other participant. Actually, it is encrypted with \(\text{Sym,Enc}\) with a key splitted into several shares which are encrypted in Step 12. We let \(i_{j,1}, \ldots, i_{j,\ell_j}\) be the indices of the \(\text{SC,Gen}_R\) runs which generated the keys which are needed to decrypt those shares. (If some keys were not generated by a \(\text{SC,Gen}_R\) run of the game, they are not listed.) We note that those indices are all lower than \(j\), due to the chronological order.

In a game, for each \(j\) we define a flag \(\text{NoEXP}_j\). The \(j^{th}\) decryption key \(sk_R\) generated by the \(j^{th}\) run of \(\text{SC,Gen}_R\) appears in some \(st^{\text{rec}}\) in \(st_p\) for \(P = A\) or \(P = B\). If there is no oracle call \(\text{EXP}_{st}(P)\) at a time when \(st_p\) includes \(sk_R\), we set \(\text{NoEXP}_j\) to true. Otherwise, we set it to false. Hence, \(\text{NoEXP}_j\) indicates if the \(j^{th}\) key \(sk_R\) is revealed by some \(\text{EXP}_{st}\). One problem is that \(\text{NoEXP}_j\) can only be determined for sure after the key is updated or erased by a successful \(\text{BARK,Receive}\).

For each \(j\), if \(\ell_j = 0\), we define \(\text{SafeKey}_j = \text{NoEXP}_j\). Otherwise, we define recursively safe keys as those which are not exposed and which are encrypted by at least one safe key:

\[\text{SafeKey}_j = (\text{SafeKey}_{i_{j,1}} \lor \cdots \lor \text{SafeKey}_{i_{j,\ell_j}}) \land \text{NoEXP}_j\]

This is well defined because the indices \(i_{j,1}, \ldots, i_{j,\ell_j}\) are all lower than \(j\).

To understand which keys are safe, let us consider some RATCH calls:

- \(\text{RATCH}(P, \text{send})\) \(\rightarrow\) \(\text{upd}_1\) at time \(t_1\) (some \(sk_R\) is generated by onion.Init),
- \(\text{RATCH}(P, \text{rec}, \text{upd}_1)\) \(\rightarrow\) true at time \(t_1\),
- \(\text{RATCH}(P, \text{send})\) \(\rightarrow\) \(\text{upd}_2\) at time \(t_2 > t_1\),
- \(\text{RATCH}(P, \text{rec}, \text{upd}_2)\) \(\rightarrow\) true at time \(t_2 > t_1\).
(See Fig. 9.)

This is a round-trip $P \rightarrow P \rightarrow P$. We assume that there is no $\text{EXP}_{st}(P)$ between $t_1$ and $t_2$. Hence, the new receive key $sk_R$ generated by $P$ in onion.init at time $t_1$ stays in $P$. It is used to decrypt $\text{upd}_2$ at time $t_2$ and then destroyed (actually, $sk_R$ is updated into another key generated by $\overline{P}$). As there is no $\text{EXP}_{st}(P)$ to reveal $sk_R$ between time $t_1$ and $t_2$, this key $sk_R$ is safe. As long as no $\text{EXP}_{st}(P)$ reveals it, the key generated by $\overline{P}$ in onion.Send at time $t_2$ to update $sk_R$ at time $t_2$ (and the same for the keys generated in subsequent $\text{RATCH}(\overline{P}, \text{send})$) as long as there is no $\text{RATCH}(\overline{P}, \text{rec.})$ is also safe as it is safely encrypted for the decryption key $sk_R$.

We define hybrid games $\Gamma_j$ starting from $\Gamma_0 = \Gamma$. In those games, there is a flag $\text{bad}$ which is set to $\text{false}$ at the beginning. Some $\text{st}^P$ states in $\text{st}_A$ or $\text{st}_B$ will include some decryption keys $sk_R$ which will be replaced in hybrid games by random values and clearly marked as such. If any $\text{EXP}_{st}$ call reveals a state which includes such marked key, the flag $\text{bad}$ is set to $\text{true}$ and the game aborts.

Given $\Gamma_{j-1}$, we look at the $j^{th}$ run of $S.C.\text{Gen}_R$. We let $pk_R$ be the encryption key and $sk_R$ be the decryption key. We compute the flag $\text{NoEXP}_j$ and $\text{SafeKey}_j$ in $\Gamma_{j-1}$. If $\text{SafeKey}_j = \text{false}$, we set $\Gamma_j = \Gamma_{j-1}$. Otherwise, once generated, we replace $sk_R$ by a well-marked random value, but we use the right $sk_R$ when it is needed in a $S.C.\text{Dec}$ execution. If the key $sk_R$ is not onion-encrypted, the two games exactly the same result as $\text{NoEXP}_j = \text{true}$ and $sk_R$ is only used for decryption. If the key $sk_R$ is onion-encrypted, since $\text{SafeKey}_j = \text{true}$, there must be one index $j_{1,m}$ such that $\text{SafeKey}_{j_{1,m}} = \text{true}$. We can use the IND-OTCCA game with the key of index $j_{1,m}$ to show that the encryption of the real $sk_R$ or some random value are indistinguishable, up to an advantage of $\epsilon$. The probability that $\text{bad}$ becomes true in $\Gamma_{j-1}$ and $\Gamma_j$ cannot differ by more than $\epsilon$ as well.

Eventually, we obtain a game $\Gamma_q$ in which $\text{bad}$ is $\text{true}$ with negligible probability and giving an outcome which is indistinguishable from $\Gamma$. In $\Gamma_q$, all keys $sk_R$ which are safe are marked and replaced by a random value, so only used for decryption. Hence, we can apply the IND-OTCCA game for any of the safe keys.

Now, we can analyze what happens if the key $k$ tested with $\text{TEST}(P_{\text{test}})$ at time $t_{\text{test}}$ is replaced by a random one, when the cleanness property of the KIND game is satisfied.

First of all, we note that the key $k_{\text{test}} = k_{P_{\text{test}}} (t_{\text{test}})$ is made on $P_{\text{test}}$ either by $\text{BARK.Send}$ together with $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$ (so generated by this algorithm), or by $\text{BARK.Receive}$ hence transmitted before through $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$. (See Fig. 10.) Due to the $C^A_\text{forge} \land C^B_\text{forge}$ cleanness condition, $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$ is not a forgery. So, $k_{\text{test}}$ is always originally made by $\text{BARK.Send}$ which generated $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$. In what follows we denote by $P$ the participant who runs this $\text{BARK.Send}$ and by $t$ the time when this execution terminates. Let $t$ be the time when $\overline{P}$ ends the reception of $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$ (let $t = \infty$ if it never receives it). Hence, $k_{\text{test}}$ is generated by $P$ and somehow sent to $\overline{P}$. Note that $P_{\text{test}}$ may be $P$ (so $k_{\text{test}} = k_P (t)$) or $\overline{P}$ (so $k_{\text{test}} = k_{P} (\overline{t})$). We stress that thanks to the $C^A_\text{forge} \land C^B_\text{forge}$ assumption and Lemma 5, $P$ is in a matching status at time $t$ and $\overline{P}$ is in a matching status at time $\overline{t}$.
Clearly, $k_{\text{test}}$ is not revealed by any $\text{EXP}_{\text{key}}$ due to the assumption that there is no direct or indirect leakage. Hence, $\text{EXP}_{\text{key}}$ never uses $k_{\text{test}}$. So, $k_{\text{test}}$ is only used during onion encryption in $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$ and by $\text{TEST}$.

Now, we can look at which flow of onion encryption followed the $k_{\text{test}}$ generation to reach the receiver $\overline{P}$, with the cleanliness assumption. The onion encryption is done with some keys defined in $s_{\text{send},i}, s_{\text{send},i+1}, \ldots, s_{\text{send},u}$. We show below that $k_{\text{test}}$ is transmitted with at least one safe encryption (in the sense of the SafeKey flag). Hence, we can use the IND-OTCCA game for this safe encryption. The encrypted share becomes indistinguishable from random. Thus, the ephemeral key used in $\text{Sym.Enc}$ is safe and we can use the IND-OTCCA property for $\text{Sym}$. We deduce that $k_{\text{test}}$ is only used by $\text{TEST}$, and indistinguishable from random. We obtain KIND security. Therefore, what remains to be proven is that $k$ is encrypted by at least one safe encryption.

We start with the $t < \infty$ case: $\overline{P}$ receives $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$ at some point (like in Fig. 10). We recall that $\overline{P}$ must be in a matching status, due to the above discussion. Hence, both $P$ and $\overline{P}$ have $k_{\text{test}}$ and $P_{\text{test}}$ is one or the other. Due to the $C_{\text{leak}}$ hypothesis, $\overline{P}$ has no direct leakage at time $t$. (This is straightforward if $P_{\text{test}} = P$, and this comes from the first condition of indirect leakage if $P_{\text{test}} = \overline{P}$.) Since $\overline{P}$ receives $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$, the condition of no direct leakage implies that either there is no prior $\text{EXP}_{\text{st}}$ or there is a round-trip communication $\overline{P} \rightarrow P \rightarrow \overline{P}$ in between the last $\text{EXP}_{\text{st}}$ and time $t$, hence, a message sent by $\overline{P}$ after the last $\text{EXP}_{\text{st}}$ and received by $P$ before time $t$. (See Fig. 11.)
Due to our previous analysis on this round trip, it means that $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$ was encrypted with a safe encryption.

![Diagram](image)

Fig. 12: Tested $\text{upd}$ not seen by one participant

If now $\bar{t} = \infty$ ($\overline{P}$ never receives $\text{upd}$; so $P_{\text{test}} = P$) and there are some $\text{EXP}_{\text{st}}(\overline{P})$ queries, due to the no forgery assumption, $\overline{P}$ stays in a matching status originating from a time prior to $t$. (See Fig. 12.) The second condition of no indirect leakage on $P$ at time $t$ implies that if $T_e$ denotes the time of the latest $\text{EXP}_{\text{st}}(P)$ and $t'$ denotes the time when it originates from, then there is a $\text{RATCH}(\overline{P}, \text{send}) \rightarrow \text{upd}$ at a time $t_0$ after time $T_e$ and a corresponding $\text{RATCH}(P, \text{rec}, \text{upd})$ at a time $t_0$ between time $t'$ and time $t$. The onion.\text{Send} at time $t_0$ generates a safe key which is used to encrypt the next sent $\text{upd}$ from $P$, and $\text{upd}_{\text{test}}$ as well.

We now consider the case $\bar{t} = \infty$ with no $\text{EXP}_{\text{st}}(\overline{P})$ query. With a similar analysis as before, the last reception key generated for $\overline{P}$ is safe. So, $\text{udp}_{\text{test}}$ is safely encrypted. \hfill \Box

6 Conclusion

We studied the BARK protocol and its security. For security, we marked three important security objectives: the BARK protocol should be KIND-secure; the BARK protocol should be resistant to forgery attacks (FORGE-security), and the BARK protocol should not self-heal after impersonation (RECOVER-security). By relaxing the cleanness notion in KIND-security, we designed a protocol based on an IND-CCA-secure cryptosystem and a one-time signature scheme. We used neither random oracle nor key-update primitives.

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References


A Used Definitions

**Function families and collision-resistant hash functions.** A function family $H$ defines an algorithm $H.Gen(1^λ)$ which generates a key $hk$ (we may denote its length as $H.kl$) and a deterministic algorithm $H.Eval(hk, m)$ which takes a key $hk$ and a message $m$ to produce a digest of fixed length (we may denote it by $H ln$). We will need a collision-resistant hash function $H$. It should be intractable, given a honestly generated hashing key $hk$, to find two different messages $m$ and $m'$ such that $H.Eval(hk, m) = H.Eval(hk, m')$.

**Definition 24 (Collision-resistant hash function).** We say that a function family $H$ is $(T, \varepsilon)$-collision resistant if for any adversary $A$ limited to time complexity $T$, the probability to win is bounded by $\varepsilon$.

1. $H.Gen(1^λ) \xrightarrow{s} hk$
2. $A(hk) \xrightarrow{s} (m_1, m_2)$
3. If $H.Eval(hk, m_1) = H.Eval(hk, m_2)$ and $m_1 \neq m_2$ then win
Signcryption. Our construction is based on signcryption. Actually, we do not use a strong signcryption scheme as defined by Dodis et al. [8] but rather a naive combination of signature and encryption. We only want that it encrypts and authenticates at the same time. We take the following definition for our naive signcryption scheme.

Definition 25 (Signcryption scheme). A signcryption scheme SC consists of four algorithms:

- two key generation algorithms GenS(1^λ) \xrightarrow{\$} (skS, pkS); and GenR(1^λ) \xrightarrow{\$} (skR, pkR);
- an encryption algorithm Enc (skS, pkR, ad, pt) \xrightarrow{\$} ct; a decryption algorithm Dec (skR, pkS, ad, ct) \xrightarrow{} pt returning a plaintext or \perp. The correctness property is that for all pt and ad,

\[
\Pr [\text{Dec} (skR, pkS, ad, Enc (skS, pkR, ad, pt)) = pt] = 1
\]

when the keys are generated with Gen.

This notion comes with two security notions.

Definition 26 (EF-OTCPA). A signcryption scheme (T, ε)-resists to existential forgeries under one-time chosen plaintext attacks (EF-OTCPA) if for any adversary A limited to time complexity T playing the following game, the probability to win is bounded by ε.

1. GenS(1^λ) \xrightarrow{\$} (skS, pkS)
2. GenR(1^λ) \xrightarrow{\$} (skR, pkR)
3. A (skR, skS, pkR) \xrightarrow{\$} (st, ad, pt)
4. Enc (skS, pkR, ad, pt) \xrightarrow{\$} ct
5. A (st, ct) \xrightarrow{\$} (ad', ct')
6. if (ad, ct) = (ad', ct') then abort
7. Dec (skR, pkS, ad, ct') \xrightarrow{} pt'
8. if pt' = ∥ then abort
9. the adversary wins

Definition 27 (IND-CCA). A signcryption scheme is (q, T, ε)-IND-CCA-secure if for any adversary A limited to q queries and time complexity T, playing the following game, the advantage

\[
\Pr [\text{IND-CCA}^a_0 \xrightarrow{\$} 1] - \Pr [\text{IND-CCA}^a_1 \xrightarrow{\$} 1] \text{ is bounded by } \varepsilon.
\]

Game IND-CCA^a_0
1. challenge = ∥
2. GenS(1^λ) \xrightarrow{\$} (skS, pkS)
3. GenR(1^λ) \xrightarrow{\$} (skR, pkR)
4. A (skS, pkR, pkS) \xrightarrow{\$} b'
5. return b'
6. if (ad, ct) = challenge then abort
7. Dec (skR, pkS, ad, ct) \xrightarrow{} pt
8. return pt

Oracle Ch(ad, pt)
1. if challenge ≠ ∥ then abort
2. if b = 0 then replace pt by a random message of same length
3. Enc (skS, pkR, ad, pt) \xrightarrow{\$} ct
4. challenge ← (ad, ct)
5. return ct

Clearly, we can work with the naive signcryption scheme defined by

\[
\text{SC.Enc} (skS, pkR, ad, pt) = \text{PKC.Enc} (pkR, pt, DSS.Sign (skS, (ad, pt)))
\]

using an IND-CCA-secure public-key cryptosystem PKC and a EF-OTCMA-secure digital signature scheme DSS.

One-time symmetric encryption. We use Sym.Enc and Sym.Dec satisfying

\[
\text{Sym.Dec} (k, \text{Sym.Enc} (k, pt)) = pt
\]

for any key k in \{0, 1\}^{Sym.kl} and any bitstring pt in Sym.D \subseteq (0, 1)^*}. It must satisfy one-time security.

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Definition 28 (One-time IND-OTCCA). A symmetric encryption scheme is \((T, \varepsilon)\)-IND-OTCCA-secure if for any adversary \(A\) limited to time complexity \(T\), playing the following game, the advantage \(\Pr[\text{IND-OTCCA}^T_{\text{a}} \xrightarrow{\$} 1] - \Pr[\text{IND-OTCCA}^T_{\text{a}} \xrightarrow{\$} 1]\) is bounded by \(\varepsilon\).

\[
\text{Game IND-OTCCA}^T_{\text{a}}:
\begin{align*}
1: & \text{ challenge } = \perp \\
2: & \text{ pick } k \text{ in } \{0, 1\}^{\text{Sym.kl}} \\
3: & A^{\text{Ch}, \text{Dec}(k)} = b' \\
4: & \text{return } b' \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[\text{Oracle Ch}(pt)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
1: & \text{ if challenge } \neq \perp \text{ then abort} \\
2: & \text{ if } b = 0 \text{ then replace pt by a random message of same length} \\
3: & \text{Sym.Enc}(k, pt) \rightarrow ct \\
4: & \text{challenge } \leftarrow ct \\
5: & \text{return } ct \\
\end{align*}
\]

B C^{\text{test}}_{\text{forge}} Forbids More Than Necessary

Let us consider SC.Enc(sk, pk, pt) = PKC.Enc(pk, pt) (which does not use sk, pk), where PKC is an IND-CCA-secure cryptosystem without the plaintext aware (PA) security. Hence, there exists an algorithm \(C(pk, k, pt) = ct\) such that \((pk, k, \text{PKC.Dec}(sk, ct))\) and \((pk, k, \text{random})\) are indistinguishable.\(^5\)

We can show that the uniARK obtained from the onion of Fig. 7 has \((\text{C}_{\text{leak}} \land C^{\text{test}}_{\text{forge}})\)-KIND security. We can consider the following adversary:

\[
\begin{align*}
1: & \text{ EXP}_\alpha(S) \rightarrow pk \\
2: & \text{ pick } r; C(pk, k, r) \rightarrow ct \\
3: & \text{RATCH}(R, \text{rec, ct}) \rightarrow true \\
4: & \text{TEST}(R) \rightarrow K^* \\
\end{align*}
\]

Due to the non-PA security, we do have privacy for the tested key. However, this adversary is ruled out by \(C^{\text{test}}_{\text{forge}}\). Hence, this cleanness predicate does forbid more than necessary: we have KIND security for more attacks than allowed.

C Comparison with Other Protocols

C.1 Comparison with Bellare et al. [2]

Bellare et al. [2] consider uniARK (unidirectional BARK). They consider the KIND security defined by the game in Fig. 13 (with slightly adapted notations). This game has a single exposure oracle revealing the state st, the key k, and also the last used coins, but for the sender only. It also allows multiple TEST queries.

In the KIND game, the restricted flag is set when there is a trivial forgery. (It could be unset by receiving a genuine upd but we can ignore it for schemes with RECOVER security.) We can easily see that the cleanness notion required by the TEST queries corresponds to \(C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{trivial forge}} \land C_{\text{noEXP}}(R)\).

C.2 Comparison with Poettering-Rößler [15]

Poettering and Rößler [15] have a different way to define correctness. Unfortunately, their definition is not complete as it takes schemes doing nothing as correct [18]. Indeed, the trivial scheme letting all states equal to \(\perp\) and doing nothing is correct (and obviously secure).

The Poettering-Rößler construction allows to generate keys while treating “associated data” ad at the same time. However, their security notion does not seem to imply authentication of ad although their proposed protocol does. Like ours, this construction method starts from unidirectional, but their unidirectional scheme is not FORGE-secure as the state of the receiver allows to

\(^5\) As an example, we can start from an IND-CCA-secure PKC and add a ciphertext in the public key to define PKC. PKC.Gen: PKC.Gen \(\rightarrow \{sk, pk\}\); pick \(x\); PKC.Enc(pk, x) \(\rightarrow y\); pk \(\leftarrow \{sk, y\}\). Set Enc and Dec the same in PKC and PKC. Then \(C(pk, r) = y\). PKC is also IND-CCA-secure and \(C\) has the required property.
Fig. 13: The security game in Bellare et al. [2].

Forge messages. Another important difference is that their scheme erases the state of the receiver as soon as the reception of an upd fails, instead of just rejecting it and waiting for a correct one. This makes their scheme vulnerable to denial-of-services attack.

The scheme construction uses no encryption. It also accumulates many keys in states, but instead of using an onion encryption, it does many parallel KEMs and combines all generated keys as input to a random oracle. They feed the random oracle with the local history of communication as well (instead of using a collision-resistant hash function). It uses a KEM with a special additional property which could be realized with a hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE). Instead, we use a signcryption scheme. Finally, it uses the output of the random oracle to generate a new sk/pk pair. One of the participants erases sk and keeps pk while the other keeps sk. In our construction, one participant generates the pair, sends sk to the other, and erases it.

![Game KIND](image)

```
Game KIND
1: for P ∈ {A, B} do
2: xP, yP ← 0
3: eP ← 0
4: EP[x] ← P
5: EP[y] ← P
6: TRP[x] ← 0
7: TRP[y] ← 0
8: if TRP[x] ∩ CHA[x] ≠ ∅ or TRP[y] ∩ CHA[y] ≠ ∅ then abort
9: if TRP[x] ∩ CHA[y] ≠ ∅ or TRP[y] ∩ CHA[x] ≠ ∅ then abort
10: Oracle RATSEND
11: if SK[x] ∩ CHA[x] ∩ {xP, yP} then abort
12: if SK[y] ∩ CHA[y] ∩ {xP, yP} then abort
13: if eP[x] = eP[y] then abort
14: Oracle CHREC
15: if eP[x] ≠ eP[y] then abort
16: Oracle RATREC(upd)
17: return
```

![Game KIND](image)

```
Game KIND
1: l0 ← 0, l1 ← 0
2: lett[1] = {st, xu, xu, z}
3: pick k
4: k0 ← k, k1 ← k
5: l = l0 ∪ l1
6: Oracle RATSEND
1: pick r, (st, xu, k1) = Send(st, r)
2: auth[1] = upd, l1 := l1 + 1
3: return upd
```

![Oracle RATSEND](image)

```
Oracle RATSEND
1: pick r, (st, xu, k1) = Send(st, r)
2: auth[1] = upd, l1 := l1 + 1
3: return upd
```

![Oracle RATREC(upd)](image)

```
Oracle RATREC(upd)
1: (st, xu, k1) = Receive(st, upd)
2: if not act then return false
3: if upd[1] = "exp" then restricted ← true
4: if upd[1] = "auth" then restricted ← false
5: l1 := l1 + 1: return true
```

![Oracle CHSEND](image)

```
Oracle CHSEND
1: if upd[1] = "exp" then return ⊥
2: if upd[1] = "auth" then return ⊥
3: if key[1] = ⊥ then return key[1] ⊲ (0, 1)m
4: if b = 1 then return l1, else return key[1] ⊲
```

![Oracle CHREC](image)

```
Oracle CHREC
1: if restricted then return k
2: if upd[1] = "exp" then return ⊥
3: if key[1] = ⊥ then return key[1] ⊲ (0, 1)m
4: if b = 1 then return k, else return key[1]
```

![Oracle CHREC](image)

```
Oracle CHREC
1: if restricted then return k
2: if upd[1] = "exp" then return ⊥
3: if key[1] = ⊥ then return key[1] ⊲ (0, 1)m
4: if b = 1 then return k, else return key[1]
```

Fig. 14: The KIND game of Poettering-Rössler [15].
We recall the KIND game of Poettering-Rössler \[15\] in Fig. 14 (with slightly adapted notations). The adversary can make several TEST queries. Furthermore, TEST(P) queries are not necessarily on the last active kp but can be on any previously generated kp value. For this reason, TEST takes as input the index (a triplet (role, e, s)) of the tested key. This does not change the security notion.

The KIND game keeps a flag isP stating if P is “in-sync”. It means that P did not receive any forgery. This is a bit weaker than our matching status. However, assuming that a protocol is such that participants who received a forgery are no longer able to send valid messages to their counterparts, in-sync is equivalent to the matching status. As we can see, a key kp produced during a reception is erased if P is in-sync, because it is available on the P side from where it could be tested. This is one way to rule out some trivial attacks.

The other way is to mark a TEST as forbidden in a TR list. We can see in the KIND game (Step 2–8 in RATREC) that if P receives a trivial forgery (this is deduced by rP ∈ XP), then no further TEST(P) is allowed. This means that CP_{trivial forge} is included in the cleanness predicate of this KIND game.

We can easily check that Cleak is included in the cleanness predicate. Hence, this KIND game looks equivalent to ours with cleanness predicate Cleak ∧ CP_{trivial forge}.

This security notion does not seem to imply FORGE security.

C.3 Comparison with Jaeger-Stepanovs \[10\]

We recall the AEAC game of Jaeger-Stepanovs \[10\] in Fig. 15 (with slightly adapted notations). The RATSEND oracle implements the left-or-right challenge at the same time. Hence, the adversary can make several challenges. Additionally, the RATREC oracle implements a decrypt-or-silent oracle which leaks b in the case of a non-trivial forgery. (The oracle always decrypts after a trivial forgery and never decrypts if no forgery. Its behavior changes only in the presence of a non-trivial forgery and with no previous trivial forgery.) Hence, FORGE security is implied by AEAC security. A novelty here is that the adversary can get the next random coins to be used: zP for sending or ηP for receiving. (Bellare et al. \[2\] allowed to expose the last coins.) This is managed by all instructions in gray in Fig. 15. Extracting these coins must be followed by the appropriate oracle query (enforced by the nextop state).

We cannot challenge P after P received a trivial forgery (due to the restrictedP flag). Hence, we have some kind of CP_{trivial forge} condition for cleanness. Since Cleak is necessary, we can say that this model includes the Cleak ∧ CP_{trivial forge} predicate.
Fig. 15: The AEAC game of Jaeger-Stepanovs [10].