

Finding Ordinary Cube Variables for Keccak-MAC with Greedy Algorithm

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Abstract. In this paper, we introduce an alternative method to find ordinary cube variables for Keccak-MAC by making full use of the key-independent bit conditions. First, we select some potential candidates for ordinary cube variables by properly adding key-independent bit conditions, which do not multiply with the chosen conditional cube variables in the first two rounds. Then, we carefully determine the ordinary cube variables from the candidates to establish the conditional cube tester with an approach inspired from the greedy algorithm. Finally, based on our new method to recover the 128-bit key, the conditional cube attack on 7-round Keccak-MAC-128/256/384 is improved to 2^{71} and 6-round Keccak-MAC-512 can be attacked with at most 2^{40} calls to 6-round Keccak internal permutation. It should be emphasized that our new approach does not require sophisticated modeling nor usage of a solver.

Keywords: Keccak, Keccak-MAC, ordinary cube variables, conditional cube attack, cube tester

1 Introduction

In 2007, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a public contest aiming at the selection of a new standard for a cryptographic hash function after Wang et al. made a break-through in MD-SHA hash family [14,15]. After five years of intensive scrutiny, Keccak was selected as the new SHA-3 standard [2].

Due to the low algebraic degree of a Keccak round, algebraic cryptanalysis has been deeply studied for Keccak, including cube attack [5], cube-attack-like cryptanalysis [3,5,11,16], conditional cube attack [8,9,12], linear structures for preimage attack [7], one/two/three-round connector for collision attack [4,10,13].

At Eurocrypt 2017, Huang et al. presented the conditional cube attack [8] on round-reduced Keccak keyed modes based on the pioneer work, i.e. cube attack [6,5] and cube tester [1]. Cube tester was first proposed by Aumasson et al. [1], aiming at detecting the non-random behaviour e.g. the cube sums are always equal to zero. Conditional cube tester detects a non-random behaviour (the cube sums are zero) only when some conditions hold. Therefore, once the key is involved in the conditions, conditional cube tester can be utilized to mount

key-recovery attack. Indeed, conditional cube tester can be viewed as a key-dependent distinguisher. To make the conditional cube tester work, Huang et al. developed a theorem and classified the cube variables into two types: conditional cube variable and ordinary cube variable. The classification is based on the multiplying relations of the cube variables in the first two rounds as follows.

- *Conditional cube variables can not multiply with each other after the **second** round.*
- *Ordinary cube variables can not multiply with each other after the **first** round.*
- *Ordinary cube variables can not multiply with conditional cube variables after the **second** round.*

The theorem to confirm the number of each type of the cube variables in order to establish a conditional cube tester is specified as follows, whose proof is based on the relations of the cube variables in the first two rounds as above.

Theorem 1. [8] *For $(n+2)$ -round Keccak sponge function ($n > 0$), if there are p conditional cube variables v_0, v_1, \dots, v_{p-1} and $q = 2^{n+1} - 2p + 1$ ordinary cube variables $v_p, v_{p+1}, \dots, v_{p+q-1}$, then the term $v_0 v_1 \dots v_{p+q-1}$ will not appear in the output polynomials of $(n+2)$ -round Keccak sponge function.*

Based on the new discovery, they successfully mounted key-recovery attack on 5/6/7-round Keccak-MAC-512/384/256 by establishing a conditional cube tester with $p = 1$. The reason why they could not reach more rounds for Keccak-MAC-512/384 was that they could not find enough ordinary cube variables. Later, an MILP-based method was proposed at Asiacrypt 2017 to find more ordinary cube variables for Keccak-MAC-512/384 [9] and extended the conditional cube attack on Keccak-MAC-512/384 by one more round. However, there are too many key-dependent conditions to slow down the propagation of the ordinary cube variables in [9], thus making the time complexity of the key-recovery attack not optimal. Very recently, Song et al. developed a new general MILP approach to find cube variables for Keccak-based primitives at Asiacrypt 2018 [12]. Compared with the modeling in [9], minimizing the number of key-dependent bit conditions was taken into account in the modeling as well. Moreover, the ordinary cube variable which multiplies with the chosen conditional cube variable only in the second round was leveraged in [12], which was abandoned in [8,9]. As a consequence, the conditional cube attack on 6-round Keccak-MAC-512 was significantly improved. Despite that Song et al. claimed that 64-dimensional cube variables with only 2 key-dependent bit conditions were found, the details of the 64-dimensional cube variables were not reported in [12]. For the new modeling in [12], it seems sophisticated at the first glance. However, since more factors are taken into account, it is more general and powerful to mount new or improved attack on many Keccak-based constructions.

Due to the limited number of bits of Keccak-MAC-512 that can be controlled for an attacker, it is very difficult to find 64-dimensional cube variables under the conditional cube attack framework. However, cube-attack-like cryptanalysis works quite well for Keccak-MAC-512 and attack on 7-round Keccak-MAC-512 was first achieved in [3], which was later slightly improved in [11].

Up till now, the improvement for [8] are all based on the MILP approach [9,12], which sometimes requires sophisticated modeling. This motivates us to consider whether there exist other simple approaches to find sufficient cube variables to establish the conditional cube tester.

The paper is organized as follows. The preliminaries of this paper will be presented in Section 2. In Section 3, our tracing algorithm will be introduced. Then, we will show our method to find enough ordinary cube variables for Keccak-MAC-384 and Keccak-MAC-512 in Section 4 and Section 5 respectively. Next, a slightly improved key-recovery method will be given in Section 6. The difference between our work and previous work is explained in Section 7. At last, we summarize the paper in Section 8.

1.1 Our Contributions

In this paper, we present an alternative method to find ordinary cube variables for Keccak-MAC-512/384. First, we observe that there are many potentially useful key-independent conditions to slow down the propagation of ordinary cube variables, which will help determine the candidates for ordinary cube variables. Then, we introduce a wise way to choose the ordinary cube variables from the candidates by considering their relations in the first round. With such a method, sufficient ordinary cube variables can be discovered to establish the conditional cube tester for 6-round Keccak-MAC-512 and 7-round Keccak-MAC-384. Meanwhile, the number of key-dependent bit conditions is minimum.

Moreover, we observe that there are many redundant iterations in z-axis of the conditional cube tester in [8]. Therefore, an optimal procedure to recover the key for 7-round Keccak-MAC-256/128 based on the conditional cube tester in [8] is proposed and the new key-recovery attack is twice faster. Such an optimal approach is applied to the newly discovered 64-dimensional cube variables for 7-round Keccak-MAC-384. Consequently, conditional cube attack on 7-round Keccak-MAC-384 is improved to 2^{71} from 2^{75} . By carefully choosing the order to recover the key, we can recover the 128-bit key for 6-round Keccak-MAC-512 with at most 2^{40} calls to 6-round Keccak internal permutation, while it costs $\lceil \frac{128}{3} \rceil \times 2^{2^5+3} = \lceil \frac{128}{3} \rceil \times 2^{35} \approx 2^{40.4}$ calls in [12]. The results are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Related results of Keccak-MAC

Attack Type	Capacity	Rounds	Time	Ref.
Conditional Cube Attack	256/512	7	2^{72}	[8]
	768	7	2^{75}	[9]
	1024	6	$2^{40.4}$	[12]
	256/512/768	7	2^{71}	Sect. 4
	1024	6	2^{40}	Sect. 5
Cube-attack-like Cryptanalysis	1024	7	$2^{112.6}$	[3]
	1024	7	2^{111}	[11]

2 Preliminaries

In this section, we will introduce the details of Keccak-MAC and some related techniques such as cube tester and conditional cube tester.

2.1 Description of Keccak-MAC

Keccak is a family of hash functions and Keccak-MAC is based on the Keccak internal permutations. The Keccak internal permutations denoted by Keccak-p $[b, n_r]$ are specified by two parameters, which are the width of permutation in bits b and the number of rounds n_r . There are many choices for b , i.e. $b = 25 \times 2^l$ with $l \in \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$. Keccak-p $[b, n_r]$ works on a b -bit state \mathbf{A} and iterates an identical round function \mathbf{R} n_r times. The state \mathbf{A} can be viewed as a three-dimensional array of bits, namely $A[5][5][w]$ with $w = 2^l$. The expression $A[x][y][z]$ represents the bit with (x, y, z) coordinate. At lane level, $A[x][y]$ represents the w -bit word located at the x^{th} column and the y^{th} row. In this paper, the coordinates are considered within modulo 5 for x and y and within modulo w for z . The round function \mathbf{R} consists of five operations $\mathbf{R} = \iota \circ \chi \circ \pi \circ \rho \circ \theta$ as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} \theta : A[x][y][z] &= A[x][y][z] \oplus \bigoplus_{y'=0}^4 A[x-1][y'][z] \oplus \bigoplus_{y'=0}^4 A[x+1][y'][z-1]. \\ \rho : A[x][y][z] &= A[x][y][z] \lll r[x, y]. \\ \pi : A[y][2x+3y] &= A[x][y]. \\ \chi : A[x][y] &= A[x][y] \oplus (\overline{A[x+1][y]} \wedge A[x+2][y]). \\ \iota : A[x][y] &= A[x][y] \oplus RC. \end{aligned}$$

The construction of Keccak-MAC- n is illustrated in Figure 1. For the sake of convenience, we denote the state \mathbf{A} after θ , ρ , and π in round i ($i \geq 0$) by A_θ^i , A_ρ^i and A_π^i respectively. The input state of round i is denoted by A^i . The 128-bit key is denoted by k , where k_i represents the i -th bit of k .




Fig. 1. Construction of Keccak-MAC- n

For Keccak-MAC-n, $n \in \{128, 256, 384, 512\}$, the 128-bit key is placed at $A^0[0][0]$ and $A^0[1][0]$. Specifically, k_i is placed at $A^0[0][0][i]$ and k_{i+64} is placed at $A^0[1][0][i]$, where $0 \leq i \leq 63$. Therefore, we can obtain **Observation 1**.

Observation 1. Based on the definition of θ operation, $A_\theta^0[3][i] = A^0[3][i] \oplus \bigoplus_{y=0}^4 A^0[2][y] \oplus \bigoplus_{y=0}^4 (A^0[4][y] \lll 1)$ for $0 \leq i \leq 4$. Therefore, the value of $A_\theta^0[3][i]$ is independent of the 128-bit key. In other words, if we add bit conditions on $A_\theta^0[3][i]$, all of them are key-independent.

Then, we consider the influence of $\pi \circ \rho$ operation as shown in Figure 2. Consequently, **Observation 2** can be obtained.

0,0	1,0	2,0	3,0	4,0		0,0	1,1	2,2	3,3	4,4
0,1	1,1	2,1	3,1	4,1		3,0	4,1	0,2	1,3	2,4
0,2	1,2	2,2	3,2	4,2	$\pi \circ \rho$	1,0	2,1	3,2	4,3	0,4
0,3	1,3	2,3	3,3	4,3		4,0	0,1	1,2	2,3	3,4
0,4	1,4	2,4	3,4	4,4		2,0	3,1	4,2	0,3	1,4

Fig. 2. $\pi \circ \rho$ operation

Observation 2. After $\pi \circ \rho$ operation, $A_\theta^0[2][i]$ and $A_\theta^0[4][k]$ are next to $A_\theta^0[3][j]$ in each row.

Our approach to determine the candidates for ordinary cube variables is much based on the two observations.

2.2 Cube Tester

Cube tester was first proposed by Aumasson et al. at FSE 2009 [1] after Dinur et al. introduced cube attack at Crypto 2008 [6]. Different from standard cube attack, which aims at key extraction, cube tester performs non-randomness detection. In our paper, we only concentrate on a specific non-random behaviour, i.e. the cube sums are zero. To describe cube tester, we first recall the concept of cube attack as follows.

Theorem 2. [6] *Given a polynomial $f: \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ of degree d . Suppose $0 < k < d$ and t denotes the monomial $x_0 \dots x_{k-1}$. Then, f can be written as*

$$f = t \cdot P_t(x_k, \dots, x_{n-1}) + Q_t(X),$$

where none of $Q_t(X)$ is divisible by t . Then the sum of f over all values of the cube (cube sum) is

$$f = \sum_{x' \in C_t} f(x', x_k, \dots, x_{n-1}) = P_t(x_k, \dots, x_{n-1}).$$

If there exists such a cube C_t that the following equation always hold, then C_t can be viewed as one type of cube tester [1], i.e. the sum over it always equals zero.

$$f = \sum_{x' \in C_t} f(x', x_k, \dots, x_{n-1}) = P_t(x_k, \dots, x_{n-1}) = 0.$$

For example, consider the following polynomial f :

$$f(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3) = x_0x_1 + x_1x_2 + x_2x_4 + x_1x_3 + x_1x_2x_4.$$

Then, the following equation always hold:

$$\sum_{(x_0, x_3) \in \{0,1\}^2} f(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3) = 0.$$

The reason is that that none of the monomial in $f(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3)$ is divisible by x_0x_3 . However, if we sum f over all values of (x_1, x_2) , then we can obtain the following equation:

$$\sum_{(x_1, x_2) \in \{0,1\}^2} f(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3) = 1 + x_4.$$

That is, the sum is dependent on the value of x_4 .

The aim of one type of cube tester is to detect such cube that the sum of a black-box polynomial f over it always equals zero.

2.3 Conditional Cube Tester

Conditional cube tester was first proposed by Huang et al. [8], which was used to detect the non-randomness of Keccak-based constructions, i.e. the cube sum is zero. Different from the standard cube tester, conditional cube tester works only when certain conditions hold. For example, consider the following polynomial f , where c is an unknown variable over $\text{GF}(2)$.

$$f(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3) = c \cdot x_0x_1 + x_1x_2 + x_2x_4 + x_1x_3 + x_1x_2x_4.$$

If we have some conditions to ensure $c = 0$ always hold, then

$$\sum_{(x_0, x_1) \in \{0,1\}^2} f(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3) = 0.$$

However, when c can not be controlled and is randomly chosen, then the sum of f over all values of (x_0, x_1) can not be predicted and behaves randomly as well.

The aim of conditional cube tester is to discover such cube as well as its corresponding conditions that the sum of a black-box polynomial over it always equals zero only when these corresponding equations hold. When the conditions are not satisfied, the cube sum behaves randomly.

3 Tracing Algorithm

Although several algorithms to determine the relations of cube variables in the first two rounds have been presented in [8], it is difficult to directly apply them to our new approach to find sufficient ordinary cube variables. Therefore, before introducing how to determine the candidates for ordinary cube variables, we firstly describe how to trace the propagation of a variable in A_θ^0 to A_π^1 .

Since θ , ρ , π are all linear transformations, an equivalent linear transformation matrix M can be derived to express these three consecutive operations $\pi \circ \rho \circ \theta$. From the definitions of the three operations, it can be known that for each row of M , there are only 11 non-zero elements, whose values are all 1. To reduce the size of M , we can only record the positions of M where the corresponding value is 1 in a smaller matrix SM . Specifically, suppose $M[i][J] = 1$ ($J \in \{j_0, \dots, j_{10}\}$), then we construct a smaller matrix SM where $SM[i][t] = j_t$ for $0 \leq t \leq 10$. Moreover, since the two consecutive operations $\pi \circ \rho$ is equivalent to a permutation of bit positions, an equivalent permutation P can be derived to express the two consecutive operations.

To make the tracing algorithm more explicit, we should consider the internal state as a boolean vector denoted by V rather than a three-dimensional array. In addition, assume the internal state is an 1600-bit variable. For other sizes of the internal state, the procedure to trace the propagation is similar. For the sake of convenience, we denote the state V after θ , ρ , and π in round i ($i \geq 0$) by V_θ^i , V_ρ^i and V_π^i respectively. The input state of round i is denoted by V^i .

Now we describe how to trace the propagation of one-bit variable in A_θ^0 to A_π^1 .

- step 1. Suppose $A_\theta^0[x][y][z]$ contains a variable, we record $t_0 = (5x + y) \times 64 + z$.
- step 2. Calculate how the variable in $V_\theta^0[t_0]$ propagates through $\pi \circ \rho$ operation with P . Consequently, we record $t_1 = P[t_0]$.
- step 3. According to the definition of χ , after $\iota \circ \chi$ operation, three bits of V^1 will contain the variable from $V_\pi^0[t_1]$. We denote the corresponding three bit positions by t_2 , t_3 and t_4 . Among the three bits, one bit will always contain this variable. The other two bits contain this variable depending on bit conditions. Then, for each of the three bits, we trace how the variable in $V^1[pos]$ ($pos \in \{t_2, t_3, t_4\}$) propagates to V_π^1 with Algorithm 1. The bit positions of V_π^1 containing the variable from $V^1[pos]$ are stored in the the array *finalPosition*.

Up till now, the propagation of the one-bit variable in A_θ^0 to A_π^1 is known, i.e. the bit positions of A_π^1 containing the variable from A_θ^0 are known and are classified into three types. At last, we only need focus on how the cube variable in A^0 propagates to A_θ^0 , which can be easily finished by considering the influence of θ operation.

Once knowing and recording how a variable propagates in the first tow rounds with or without bit conditions to slow down this propagation, it is quite easy to determine their multiplying relations in the first two rounds. For example,

Algorithm 1 Tracing the influenced bit positions after $\pi \circ \rho \circ \theta$ operation

Input: SM, pos **Output:** $finalPosition$

```
1: for row in (0...1599) do
2:   for col in (0...10) do
3:     if  $SM[row][col] = pos$  then
4:        $finalPosition.push\_back(row)$ 
5:       break
```

suppose we know that $A_\pi^0[x][y][z]$ contains a variable v' and $A_\pi^0[x-1][y][z]$ contains a different variable v'' , then v'' will multiply with v' after the first round. In the same way, suppose we know that $A_\pi^1[x][y][z]$ contains a variable v' and $A_\pi^1[x-1][y][z]$ contains a different variable v'' , then v'' will multiply with v' after the second round.

4 Finding Ordinary Cube Variables for Keccak-MAC-384

In this section, we will expand on the procedure to find sufficient ordinary cube variables for Keccak-MAC-384. First, the potential candidates for ordinary cube variables will be determined by carefully adding key-independent bit conditions to slow down its propagation. Then, we consider the multiplying relations of these candidates after the first round and deduce some contradictions. Indeed, these contradictions can be converted into inequalities and solved with a solver with MILP method. However, this is not what we will do even though such a procedure is quite simple and straightforward after obtaining these contradictions. As will be shown, from these contradictions, we can efficiently determine how many ordinary cube variables can eventually survive. As a consequence, no modeling nor usage of the solver are needed in our work.

4.1 Determining Candidates for Keccak-MAC-384

The initial state of Keccak-MAC-384 is shown in Figure 3 with 12 lanes set to 0. In the same way as [8,9,12], $A[2][0][0] = A[2][1][0] = v_0$ is chosen as the conditional cube variable with four bit conditions ($A_\theta^0[1][4][60] = 1$, $A_\theta^0[1][0][5] = 1$, $A_\theta^0[3][1][7] = 0$, $A_\theta^0[3][2][45] = 0$) to slow down its propagation. Then, the ordinary cube variables are set in the CP kernel. The complete procedure is as follows.

- For the first column, we exhaust all 64 possible variables $A[0][1][i] = A[0][2][i]$ ($0 \leq i \leq 63$). Based on **Observation 1** and **2**, if we add bit conditions to slow down the propagation of the variables in this case, all of them are key-dependent bit conditions. Therefore, we do not impose bit conditions. For these 64 possible variables, only those are selected as candidates that they do not multiply with v_0 in the first two rounds.
- For the second column, we exhaust all 64 possible variables $A[1][1][i] = A[1][2][i]$ ($0 \leq i \leq 63$) and process in the same way as the first column.

			0	0	
0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0

Fig. 3. Keccak-MAC-384

- For the third column, we exhaust 63×3 possible variables $A[2][0][i] = A[2][1][i]$, $A[2][0][i] = A[2][2][i]$ and $A[2][1][i] = A[2][2][i]$ ($1 \leq i \leq 63$). Based on **Observation 1** and **2**, we can add key-independent bit conditions on $A_\theta^0[3][k]$ ($0 \leq k \leq 4$) to slow down the propagation of the variables. To remove the redundant conditions, we impose a condition only when it is necessary. In other words, if such a condition is not added and the variable satisfies the required relation with v_0 in the first two rounds, this condition is not necessary and redundant. Moreover, if such a condition is added, the variable still does not satisfy the requirement, we filter this variable.
- For the fourth column, we exhaust all 64 possible variables $A[3][0][i] = A[3][1][i]$ ($0 \leq i \leq 63$) and process in the same way as the first column since there are no key-independent bit conditions to slow the propagation of variables.
- For the fifth column, we exhaust 64 possible variables $A[4][0][i] = A[4][1][i]$ ($0 \leq i \leq 63$). Based on **Observation 1** and **2**, we can add key-independent bit conditions to slow down the propagation of variables as the third column.

The candidates found with our method are presented in Table 2.

4.2 Discussion

Imposing some bit conditions on $A_\theta^0[3][k]$ ($0 \leq k \leq 4$) as described above will cause the following bad cases.

- Case 1: Contradiction of conditions will occur. Specifically, for the third column, the bit condition on a certain bit i of $A_\theta^0[3][k_0]$ is $A_\theta^0[3][k_0][i] = 0$. However, for the fifth column, the bit condition on a certain bit j of $A_\theta^0[3][k_1]$ is $A_\theta^0[3][k_1][j] = 1$. If $i = j$ and $k_0 = k_1$, the contradiction of conditions is detected. In other words, we can not choose both of their corresponding variables as the final ordinary cube variables. Moreover, if $A_\theta^0[3][y_0][z_0]$ and $A_\theta^0[3][y_1][z_0]$ are imposed different bit conditions for $y_0 > 1, y_1 > 1$, this is also a contradiction since $A[3][y][z_0]$ is set to a constant 0 for Keccak-MAC-384 for $y > 1$.
- Case 2: Contradiction between conditions and ordinary cube variables will occur. Specifically, for the fourth column, some of $A[3][0][i] = A[3][1][i]$ ($0 \leq i \leq 63$) will be chosen as candidates. The bad case is that $A[3][0][t] = A[3][1][t]$ is chosen as a candidate and $A_\theta^0[3][0][t]$ or $A_\theta^0[3][1][t]$ is imposed a condition.

Table 2. Candidates for Keccak-MAC-384, where c is an adjustable constant over $\text{GF}(2)$ for each variable.

$A[0][1][i] = A[0][2][i] + c$																					
i	15	22	28	34	37	46	47	58	59												
Variable	v_1	v_2	v_3	v_4	v_5	v_6	v_7	v_8	v_9												
$A[1][1][i] = A[1][2][i] + c$																					
i	7	15	20	26	30	38	39	40	52	54	57										
Variable	v_{10}	v_{11}	v_{12}	v_{13}	v_{14}	v_{15}	v_{16}	v_{17}	v_{18}	v_{19}	v_{20}										
$A[2][0][i] = A[2][1][i] + c$																					
i	1	8	12	14	15	20	23	25	28	41	42	43	45	50	52	53	61	62	63		
Variable	v_{21}	v_{22}	v_{23}	v_{24}	v_{25}	v_{26}	v_{27}	v_{28}	v_{29}	v_{30}	v_{31}	v_{32}	v_{33}	v_{34}	v_{35}	v_{36}	v_{37}	v_{38}	v_{39}		
Condition	i=1: $A_\theta^0[3][2][46] = 0$ i=15: $A_\theta^0[3][1][22] = 0$ i=25: $A_\theta^0[3][1][32] = 0$ i=50: $A_\theta^0[3][2][31] = 0$ i=63: $A_\theta^0[3][1][6] = 0, A_\theta^0[3][2][44] = 0$						i=14: $A_\theta^0[3][1][21] = 0$ i=23: $A_\theta^0[3][2][4] = 0$ i=42: $A_\theta^0[3][1][49] = 0$ i=52: $A_\theta^0[3][1][59] = 0$														
$A[3][0][i] = A[3][1][i] + c$																					
i	3	4	9	13	15	23	30	35	39	40	46	56	57								
Variable	v_{40}	v_{41}	v_{42}	v_{43}	v_{44}	v_{45}	v_{46}	v_{47}	v_{48}	v_{49}	v_{50}	v_{51}	v_{52}								
$A[4][0][i] = A[4][1][i] + c$																					
i	3	5	8	10	12	14	20	22	25	30	31	35	38	41	47	57	58	62	63		
Variable	v_{53}	v_{54}	v_{55}	v_{56}	v_{57}	v_{58}	v_{59}	v_{60}	v_{61}	v_{62}	v_{63}	v_{64}	v_{65}	v_{66}	v_{67}	v_{68}	v_{69}	v_{70}	v_{71}		
Condition	i=3: $A_\theta^0[3][0][59] = 1$ i=20: $A_\theta^0[3][0][12] = 1$ i=25: $A_\theta^0[3][0][17] = 1$ i=35: $A_\theta^0[3][4][6] = 1, A_\theta^0[3][0][27] = 1$ i=41: $A_\theta^0[3][0][33] = 1$						i=8: $A_\theta^0[3][0][0] = 1$ i=22: $A_\theta^0[3][0][14] = 1$ i=30: $A_\theta^0[3][4][1] = 1, A_\theta^0[3][0][22] = 1$ i=38: $A_\theta^0[3][4][9] = 1$ i=57: $A_\theta^0[3][0][49] = 1$														
$A[2][0][i] = A[2][2][i] + c$																					
i	1	5	6	14	15	16	20	21	27	30	33	38	39	40	41	46	51	52	57	61	62
Variable	v_{72}	v_{73}	v_{74}	v_{75}	v_{76}	v_{77}	v_{78}	v_{79}	v_{80}	v_{81}	v_{82}	v_{83}	v_{84}	v_{85}	v_{86}	v_{87}	v_{88}	v_{89}	v_{90}	v_{91}	v_{92}
Condition	i=1: $A_\theta^0[3][3][23] = 0$ i=15: $A_\theta^0[3][1][22] = 0$ i=30: $A_\theta^0[3][1][37] = 0$ i=38: $A_\theta^0[3][1][45] = 0$ i=46: $A_\theta^0[3][1][53] = 0$ i=57: $A_\theta^0[3][1][0] = 0$						i=14: $A_\theta^0[3][1][21] = 0, A_\theta^0[3][3][36] = 0$ i=20: $A_\theta^0[3][3][42] = 0$ i=33: $A_\theta^0[3][3][55] = 0$ i=40: $A_\theta^0[3][1][47] = 0$ i=52: $A_\theta^0[3][1][59] = 0$ i=62: $A_\theta^0[3][3][20] = 0$														
$A[2][1][i] = A[2][2][i] + c$																					
i	1	11	14	15	18	19	20	24	41	52	56	58	61	62							
Variable	v_{93}	v_{94}	v_{95}	v_{96}	v_{97}	v_{98}	v_{99}	v_{100}	v_{101}	v_{102}	v_{103}	v_{104}	v_{105}	v_{106}							
Condition	i=1: $A_\theta^0[3][2][46] = 0, A_\theta^0[3][3][23] = 0$ i=18: $A_\theta^0[3][2][63] = 0$ i=56: $A_\theta^0[3][3][14] = 0$					i=14: $A_\theta^0[3][3][36] = 0$ i=20: $A_\theta^0[3][3][42] = 0$ i=62: $A_\theta^0[3][3][20] = 0$															

Indeed, the second case can be processed in a simple way. After the candidates are determined, if a contradiction in the second case is detected, it implies that two ordinary variables multiplies with each other in the first round. For example, supposing $A_\theta^0[3][0][t]$ is imposed a condition and $A[3][0][t] = A[3][1][t]$ is chosen as a candidate, it implies a variables set in $A[2][4]$ or $A[4][1]$ is chosen as a candidate, which will multiply with the variable set to $A[3][0][t]$ after the first round. This can be seen from the $\pi \circ \rho$ operation in Figure 2. Thus, the second case is equivalent to the case that two ordinary cube variables multiply with each other in the first round. Benefiting from this new property, we do not have to process the second bad case and only need concentrate on the relation of the candidates in the first round as well as the contradiction caused by conditions.

4.3 Deducing Contradictions

The contradictions of candidates are deduced from two cases. The first case is that variables multiply with each other in the first round. The second case is that there is contradiction of conditions. The contradictions deduced are displayed in Table 3. In this table, $v_i\{v_{j_0}, \dots, v_{j_n}\}$ means v_i can not be chosen with any of $\{v_{j_0}, \dots, v_{j_n}\}$ as the final candidates at the same time. We count the times that each variable appears in these contradictions and do not choose the one which appears more than one time as marked in red and blue. However, although some variables appear two times as marked in green in this table, we can still choose them. Therefore, for the obtained contradictions, at most 28 variables can be derived. Moreover, there are 56 fully free variables, i.e. there are no contradictions on them. Actually, these contradictions can be trivially converted into inequalities with MILP method and solved with a solver as well.

Table 3. Contradictions of candidates

$v_1\{v_{70}\}$	$v_2\{v_{54}, v_{63}\}$	$v_3\{v_{19}\}$	$v_5\{v_{59}\}$	$v_7\{v_{62}\}$
$v_8\{v_{12}, v_{53}, v_{66}\}$	$v_{11}\{v_{77}\}$	$v_{12}\{v_{79}\}$	$v_{13}\{v_{80}\}$	$v_{15}\{v_{84}\}$
$v_{16}\{v_{85}\}$	$v_{17}\{v_{86}, v_{101}\}$	$v_{20}\{v_{104}\}$	$v_{22}\{v_{44}\}$	$v_{27}\{v_{46}\}$
$v_{29}\{v_{47}\}$	$v_{34}\{v_{52}\}$	$v_{37}\{v_{41}\}$	$v_{41}\{v_{57}, v_{91}\}$	$v_{43}\{v_{74}\}$
$v_{45}\{v_{63}, v_{77}\}$	$v_{46}\{v_{65}\}$	$v_{48}\{v_{67}\}$	$v_{49}\{v_{82}\}$	$v_{50}\{v_{84}\}$

Observe that we consider the third column under three cases, which will cause two problems. Specifically, if $A[2][0][t] = A[2][1][t] + c$, $A[2][0][t] = A[2][2][t] + c$ and $A[2][1][t] = A[2][2][t] + c$ are chosen simultaneously, only two variables rather than three variables can be obtained. In this case, we should change the variables as $A[2][0][t] = v_{x_0}$, $A[2][1][t] = v_{x_1}$, $A[2][2][t] = v_{x_0} + v_{x_1} + c$. This is due to that the ordinary cube variables are set in the CP kernel. According to Table 2, there are 8 possible values for t and they are $\{1, 14, 15, 20, 41, 52, 61, 62\}$. Therefore, for the worst case, we can finally obtain $28+56-8=76$ ordinary cube variables, which is much larger than the required number (63) to mount key-recovery attack on 7-round Keccak-MAC-384.

On the other hand, if two of $A[2][0][t] = A[2][1][t] + c$, $A[2][0][t] = A[2][2][t] + c$, $A[2][1][t] = A[2][2][t] + c$ are chosen simultaneously, we should change the variables as $A[2][0][t] = v_{x_0}$, $A[2][1][t] = v_{x_1}$, $A[2][2][t] = v_{x_0} + v_{x_1} + c$.

One choice of the 64-dimensional cube variables to establish the conditional cube tester is displayed in Table 4.

Table 4. One choice of ordinary cube variables for Keccak-MAC-384

Free ordinary cube variables (56-6=50 in total)	$v_4, v_6, v_9, v_{10}, v_{14}, v_{18}, v_{21}, v_{23}, v_{24}, v_{25},$ $v_{26}, v_{28}, v_{30}, v_{31}, v_{32}, v_{33}, v_{35}, v_{36}, v_{38}, v_{39},$ $v_{40}, v_{42}, v_{51}, v_{55}, v_{56}, v_{58}, v_{60}, v_{61}, v_{64}, v_{68},$ $v_{69}, v_{71}, v_{72}, v_{73}, v_{75}, v_{76}, v_{78}, v_{81}, v_{83}, v_{87},$ $v_{88}, v_{89}, v_{90}, v_{92}, v_{93}, v_{94}, v_{95}, v_{96}, v_{97}, v_{98},$ $v_{99}, v_{100}, v_{102}, v_{103}, v_{105}, v_{106}.$ $\{v_{21}, v_{72}, v_{93}\}, \{v_{24}, v_{75}, v_{95}\}, \{v_{25}, v_{76}, v_{96}\}$ $\{v_{26}, v_{78}, v_{99}\}, \{v_{35}, v_{89}, v_{102}\}$ and $\{v_{38}, v_{92}, v_{106}\}$ provide two variables respectively.
Ordinary cube variables derived from contradictions (13 in total)	$v_1, v_{54}, v_{63}, v_3, v_5, v_7, v_{53}, v_{66}, v_{11}, v_{79},$ v_{13}, v_{15}, v_{16}
Conditional cube variable	v_0
Key-dependent conditions	$A_\theta^0[1][4][60] = 1, A_\theta^0[1][0][5] = 1.$
Key-independent conditions for v_0	$A_\theta^0[3][1][7] = 0, A_\theta^0[3][2][45] = 0.$
Other key-independent conditions for ordinary cube variables	Refer to Table 3 according to the chosen variables.

5 Finding Ordinary Cube Variables for Keccak-MAC-512

Similarly, we discovered 32 candidates for ordinary cube variables as displayed in Table 5. The corresponding contradictions are as follows.

$$v_2\{v_{24}\}, v_7\{v_{26}\}, v_9\{v_{27}\}, v_{14}\{v_{32}\}, v_{17}\{v_{21}\}.$$

Therefore, there will be $32-5=27$ possible ordinary cube variables in total if the ordinary cube variables are set only in the CP kernel. As a result, we can not mount key-recovery attack on 6-round Keccak-MAC-512, which requires 31 ordinary cube variables if only v_0 is chosen to be the conditional cube variable.

Based on [12], the variables which multiply with v_0 only in the second round can be leveraged as well. For an intuitive example, suppose one variable v_{x_0} multiplies with v_0 only in the second round and the multiplying bit position is p_0 . If another variable v_{x_1} multiplies with v_0 only in the second round and the multiplying bit position is p_0 as well, then setting $v_{x_0} = v_{x_1}$ will cause the already filtered two variables become one possible variable. Then, the goal becomes how to find these possible variables.

Table 5. Candidates for Keccak-MAC-512, where c is an adjustable constant over GF(2) for each variable.

$A[2][0][i] = A[2][1][i] + c$																			
i	1	8	12	14	15	20	23	25	28	41	42	43	45	50	52	53	61	62	63
Variable	v_1	v_2	v_3	v_4	v_5	v_6	v_7	v_8	v_9	v_{10}	v_{11}	v_{12}	v_{13}	v_{14}	v_{15}	v_{16}	v_{17}	v_{18}	v_{19}
Condition	$i=1: A_\theta^0[3][2][46] = 0$ $i=15: A_\theta^0[3][1][22] = 0$ $i=25: A_\theta^0[3][1][32] = 0$ $i=50: A_\theta^0[3][2][31] = 0$ $i=63: A_\theta^0[3][1][6] = 0, A_\theta^0[3][2][44] = 0$														$i=14: A_\theta^0[3][1][21] = 0$ $i=23: A_\theta^0[3][2][4] = 0$ $i=42: A_\theta^0[3][1][49] = 0$ $i=52: A_\theta^0[3][1][59] = 0$				
$A[3][0][i] = A[3][1][i] + c$																			
i	3	4	9	13	15	23	30	35	39	40	46	56	57						
Variable	v_{20}	v_{21}	v_{22}	v_{23}	v_{24}	v_{25}	v_{26}	v_{27}	v_{28}	v_{29}	v_{30}	v_{31}	v_{32}						

Suppose $A_\theta^0[i][j][k]$ contains a variable, then after χ operation, three bits will contain this variable. Based on the definition of χ operation, among the three bits, one bit will always contain this variable and the other two bits contains this variable depending on the conditions. We classify the three bits into three types.

Type-1: It always contains this variable.

Type-2: It contains this variable depending on a key-independent bit condition.

Type-3: It contains this variable depending on a key-dependent bit condition.

Then, we trace how the three bits propagates to the second round with the tracing algorithm. Specifically, we trace the **Type-1** bit and record the influenced bits of A_π^1 multiplying with v_0 in the second round. For the **Type-2** and **Type-3** bits, we process in the same way. The recorded bits for **Type-1**, **Type-2** and **Type-3** are defined as core bits, independent-key bits and key-dependent bits. Since our focus is the minimal independent-key conditions, once the key-dependent bits are detected, the corresponding variable should not be chosen as a candidate.

With the above method, we reconsider the filtered ordinary cube variables set in the CP kernel. Besides, the variables set to a single bit are also considered. The final result obtained is displayed in Table 6.

For a better understanding of this table, we take the variable $A[3][1][8]$ as instance. For the first column, it means $A[3][1][8]$ is set to be a variable. For the second column, it means 5 bits of A_π^1 will multiply with v_0 only in the second round. For the third column, $\{656,1003\}$ means the two bits of A_π^1 , i.e. $A_\pi^1[0][2][16]$ and $A_\pi^1[0][3][43]$, will multiply with v_0 only in the second round depending on the same key-independent bit condition. The last column means $A[3][1][8]$ can not be chosen as a variable with any of v_1 and v_{31} in Table 5 simultaneously.

According to Table 6, at most three more possible ordinary cube variables can be obtained. One choice is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
A[3][0][58] &= A[3][1][58] = A[2][0][24] = A[2][1][24] = v_{e_0}, \\
A[3][0][61] &= v_{e_1}, A[3][1][61] = v_{e_2}, \\
A[2][0][26] &= A[2][1][26] = v_{e_3}, v_{e_3} = v_{e_2} + v_{e_1} \\
A[2][0][46] &= A[2][1][46] = v_{e_2}. \\
\text{Condition : } &A_\theta^0[3][3][20] = 0, A_\theta^0[3][4][21] = 0, A_\theta^0[3][1][53] = 0.
\end{aligned}$$

According to Table 6, adding $A[2][0][37] = A[2][1][37] = v_{e_2}$ to the above variables and converting the bit condition $A_\theta^0[3][1][53] = 0$ into $A_\theta^0[3][1][53] = 1$ is also possible. However, it can not help improve the number of possible variables. In fact, there are many interesting cases. For example, if $A[3][0][60] = A[3][1][60]$ does not multiply with v_{16} in the first round, we can obtain one more candidate. For the third row, if $\{652, 1109\}$ does not depend on the same condition, then we can add one key-independent bit condition to prevent the propagation to the 652-th bit and another key-independent bit condition to allow the propagation to the 1109-th bit of A_π^1 .

Then we test whether v_{e_i} ($0 \leq i \leq 3$) multiplies with each other in the first round and check whether the three bit conditions to slow down the propagation of v_{e_1} and v_{e_2} are contradict with the conditions in Table 5. It is shown that the three variables are all valid. Therefore, we can obtain at most $32-5+3=30$ ordinary cube variables without key-dependent bit conditions. It reveals in a way why [12] can only discovered the same number of such ordinary variables with a solver. However, to mount key-recovery attack on 6-round Keccak-MAC-512, 31 ordinary cube variables are necessary. Thus, we try to search ordinary cube variables set in the CP kernel with only one key-dependent bit condition, which satisfy the required relation with v_0 and the chosen $32+4=36$ candidates for ordinary cube variables. Our searching result is displayed in Table 7. Thus, there are many possible choices for 31 ordinary cube variables, i.e. at least $2^5 \times 12$. The verification can be found at https://github.com/Crypt-CNS/Keccak_ConditionalCubeAttack.git.

6 Recovering the Key

In this section, a new slightly improved way to recover 128-bit key for Keccak-MAC is presented by removing redundant iterations of conditional cube tester. In [8], 64 iterations in z-axis of the conditional cube tester were used to recover the 128-bit key for Keccak-MAC-256. For each iteration, it costs $2^{64+2} = 2^{66}$ to recover 2-bit key. Observe that once there are only a few key bits to be recovered, there is no need to iterate the conditional cube tester since each iteration is costly and only 2 bits are recovered.

Taking Keccak-MAC-128/256 for instance, for the 64-dimensional cube variable [8], after 31 iterations in z-axis of the conditional cube tester, 62 bits of key can be recovered. Then, the remaining 66 bits can be recovered by brute force.

Table 6. Possible candidates for Keccak-MAC-512

Possible Variables	Core Bits	Key-independent Bits	Contradictions
$A[2][0][4] = A[2][1][4]$	1540		
$A[2][0][5] = A[2][1][5]$	1109	{652,1109}	
$A[2][0][9] = A[2][1][9]$	848,467	{656,1003}	
$A[2][0][13] = A[2][1][13]$	652,1109		
$A[2][0][16] = A[2][1][16]$	1472	515	v_{25}
$A[2][0][24] = A[2][1][24]$	515		
$A[2][0][26] = A[2][1][26]$	665		
$A[2][0][29] = A[2][1][29]$	71,1032	241	
$A[2][0][33] = A[2][1][33]$	491		v_{29}
$A[2][0][35] = A[2][1][35]$	1131,42	1242	
$A[2][0][37] = A[2][1][37]$	1040		
$A[2][0][46] = A[2][1][46]$	903	1040	
$A[2][0][51] = A[2][1][51]$	767,1160		
$A[2][0][54] = A[2][1][54]$	1510		
$A[2][0][57] = A[2][1][57]$	170	205	
$A[2][0][60] = A[2][1][60]$	1280	1540	v_{20}
$A[3][0][41] = A[3][1][41]$	113		
$A[3][0][43] = A[3][1][43]$	848		
$A[3][0][50] = A[3][1][50]$	42		v_{12}
$A[3][0][58] = A[3][1][58]$	515		
$A[3][0][60] = A[3][1][60]$	665		v_{16}
$A[3][0][61] = A[3][1][61]$	903		
$A[3][1][8]$	170,848,467,1382,1003	{656,1003}, {903}, {1237}	v_1, v_{31}
$A[3][0][32]$	491,903,1382	{13}, {848}, {775}	v_{29}
$A[3][0][61]$	665	{42}, {1348}	
$A[3][1][61]$	903,665	{42}, {1348}	

Table 7. Candidates for Keccak-MAC-512 with one key-dependent bit condition

Variable	Conditions
$A[2][0][11] = A[2][1][11]$	$A_\theta^0[1][4][7] = 1$
$A[2][0][19] = A[2][1][19]$	$A_\theta^0[1][4][15] = 1$
$A[2][0][21] = A[2][1][21]$	$A_\theta^0[1][0][26] = 1, A_\theta^0[3][2][2] = 0$
$A[2][0][22] = A[2][1][22]$	$A_\theta^0[1][0][27] = 1$
$A[2][0][30] = A[2][1][30]$	$A_\theta^0[3][1][37] = 0, A_\theta^0[1][0][35] = 1$
$A[2][0][34] = A[2][1][34]$	$A_\theta^0[1][0][39] = 1, A_\theta^0[3][2][15] = 0$
$A[2][0][44] = A[2][1][44]$	$A_\theta^0[3][1][51] = 0, A_\theta^0[1][0][49] = 1$
$A[2][0][56] = A[2][1][56]$	$A_\theta^0[1][4][52] = 1, A_\theta^0[3][1][63] = 0$
$A[3][0][12] = A[3][1][12]$	$A_\theta^0[4][1][20] = 0$
$A[3][0][20] = A[3][1][20]$	$A_\theta^0[4][2][36] = 0$
$A[3][0][29] = A[3][1][29]$	$A_\theta^0[2][4][60] = 1$
$A[3][0][34] = A[3][1][34]$	$A_\theta^0[2][4][1] = 1$

Therefore, the time complexity is improved to $2^{66} \times 31 + 2^{66} = 2^{71}$ from 2^{72} . Similarly, for the 64-dimensional cube variables in Table 4, we can recover the 128-bit key for 7-round Keccak-MAC-384 with time complexity is 2^{71} .

For the conditional cube attack on 6-round Keccak-MAC-512, we choose $A[2][0][11] = A[2][1][11]$ in Table 7 as the ordinary cube variable with one key-dependent bit condition $A_0^0[1][4][7] = 1$, while $A[2][0][19] = A[2][1][19]$ is chosen in [12]. For our choice, only 31 iterations in z-axis is enough. Then, $3 \times 31 = 93$ bits can be recovered with time complexity $2^{32+3} \times 31 = 2^{35} \times 31$. The remaining $128 - 93 = 35$ bits can be recovered by brute force. The order to recover 93 bits of key with conditional cube tester is shown in Table 8. Therefore, the total time complexity becomes $2^{35} \times 31 + 2^{35} = 2^{40}$. However, the time complexity is estimated as $\lceil \frac{128}{3} \rceil \times 2^{2^5+3} = \lceil \frac{128}{3} \rceil \times 2^{35} = 2^{40.4}$ in [12], which implies 64 iterations of the conditional cube tester are used to recover the 128-bit key.

Table 8. The order to recover 93 bits of key with conditional cube tester

$(k_0, k_{53}, k_{62} + k_{126}), (k_1, k_{54}, k_{63} + k_{127}), (k_2, k_{55}, k_0 + k_{64}), (k_3, k_{56}, k_1 + k_{65}),$ $(k_4, k_{57}, k_2 + k_{66}), (k_5, k_{58}, k_3 + k_{67}), (k_6, k_{59}, k_4 + k_{68}), (k_7, k_{60}, k_5 + k_{69}),$ $(k_8, k_{61}, k_6 + k_{70}), (k_9, k_{62}, k_7 + k_{71}), (k_{10}, k_{63}, k_8 + k_{72}), (k_{22}, k_{11}, k_{20} + k_{84}),$ $(k_{23}, k_{12}, k_{21} + k_{85}), (k_{24}, k_{13}, k_{22} + k_{86}), (k_{25}, k_{14}, k_{23} + k_{87}), (k_{26}, k_{15}, k_{24} + k_{88}),$ $(k_{27}, k_{16}, k_{25} + k_{89}), (k_{28}, k_{17}, k_{26} + k_{90}), (k_{29}, k_{18}, k_{27} + k_{91}), (k_{30}, k_{19}, k_{28} + k_{92}),$ $(k_{31}, k_{20}, k_{29} + k_{93}), (k_{32}, k_{21}, k_{30} + k_{94}), (k_{44}, k_{33}, k_{42} + k_{106}), (k_{45}, k_{34}, k_{43} + k_{107}),$ $(k_{46}, k_{35}, k_{44} + k_{108}), (k_{47}, k_{36}, k_{45} + k_{109}), (k_{48}, k_{37}, k_{46} + k_{110}), (k_{49}, k_{38}, k_{47} + k_{111}),$ $(k_{50}, k_{39}, k_{48} + k_{112}), (k_{51}, k_{40}, k_{49} + k_{113}), (k_{52}, k_{41}, k_{50} + k_{114}).$

7 Comparison with Previous Work

Our work is much based on [8]. However, Huang et al. did not consider the potentially useful key-independent bit conditions to slow down the propagation of ordinary cube variables [8].

As for [9], it seems that the key-independent bit conditions have been considered. However, it is strange that Li et al. found 63 ordinary cube variables with 6 key-dependent bit conditions for Keccak-MAC-384, while we can find much more ordinary cube variables without key-dependent bit conditions, i.e. at least 76 variables. Besides, Li et al. only found 25 ordinary cube variables set in the CP kernel for Keccak-MAC-512, while we can find $32-5=27$ ordinary cube variables set in the CP kernel. Therefore, we guess that the key-independent bit conditions were not fully leveraged in [9].

As for [12], minimum key-dependent bit conditions is considered in the model. In that paper, one instance of 31 ordinary cube variables for Keccak-MAC-512 was presented, which is almost the same with what we found. However, it is strange that there are 18 key-independent bit conditions to slow down the propagation of the ordinary cube variables. With our approach, there are at

most $10+3+1=14$ key-independent bit conditions for ordinary cube variables. If we choose the same cube variables as [12], only $9+3=12$ key-independent bit conditions are sufficient. Indeed, we can reach the minimum key-independent bit conditions, which is $8+3=11$. Thus, we guess the redundancy in key-independent bit conditions are not well processed in the modeling in [12].

In addition, a new slightly improved approach to recover the 128-bit key are introduced. This is based on the observation that many iterations of the conditional cube tester are costly once a few bits of key are left. Consequently, we improve the conditional cube attack on 7-round Keccak-MAC-128/256/384 and 6-round Keccak-MAC-512.

8 Conclusion

Inspired from greedy algorithm, we firstly determine some potential ordinary cube variable by making full use of the key-independent bit conditions. Then, we further filter these candidates by considering their relations after the first round with an efficient approach. In this way, no modeling nor usage of a solver are needed, while sufficient ordinary cube variables can be discovered to establish the conditional cube tester. Combined with the new slightly improved way to recover the key, the time complexity of the conditional cube attack on 7-round Keccak-MAC-128/256/384 and 6-round Keccak-MAC-512 are improved to 2^{71} and 2^{40} respectively.

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