Simple Verifiable Delay Functions

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Abstract
We construct a verifiable delay function (VDF) by showing how the Rivest-Shamir-Wagner time-lock puzzle can be made publicly verifiable.

Concretely, we give a statistically sound public-coin protocol to prove that a tuple \((N, x, T, y)\) satisfies \(y = x^{2^T} \pmod{N}\) where the prover doesn’t know the factorization of \(N\) and its running time is dominated by solving the puzzle, that is, compute \(x^{2^T}\), which is conjectured to require \(T\) sequential squarings. To get a VDF we make this protocol non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.

The motivation for this work comes from the Chia blockchain design, which uses a VDF as a key ingredient. For typical parameters \((T \leq 2^{40}, N = 2048)\), our proofs are of size around 10KB, verification cost around three RSA exponentiations and computing the proof is 8000 times faster than solving the puzzle even without any parallelism.

1 introduction

The RSW time-lock puzzle \([RSW96]\) is defined as follows

The puzzle is a tuple \((N, x, T)\) where \(N = p \cdot q\) is an RSA modulus, \(x \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*\) is random and \(T \in \mathbb{N}\) is a time parameter.

The solution of the puzzle is \(y = x^{2^T} \pmod{N}\). It can be computed making two exponentiations by the party who generates the puzzle (and thus knows the group order \(\phi(N) = (p - 1)(q - 1)\)) as

\[
e = 2^T \pmod{\phi(N)}, \quad y = x^e \pmod{N}
\]

but is conjectured to require \(T\) sequential squarings if the group order (or equivalently, the factorization of \(N\)) is not known

\[
x \rightarrow x^2 \rightarrow x^{2^2} \rightarrow x^{2^3} \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow x^{2^T} \pmod{N}
\]

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To be more precise, the conjecture here is that $T$ sequential steps are necessary to compute $x^{2T} \pmod{N}$ even if one can use large parallelism.

As an application, [RSW96] show how to "encrypt to the future": sample a puzzle $(N, x, T)$ together with its solution $y$, then derive a key $k_y$ from $y$ and encrypt a message $m$ into a ciphertext $c = \text{ENC}(k_y, m)$. Given $(N, x, T), c$ one can recover the message $m$ in time required to compute $T$ squarings sequentially, but (under the above conjecture) not faster.

Proofs of sequential work (PoSW) are closely related to time-lock puzzles. PoSW were introduced in [MMV13], and informally are proof systems where on input a random challenge $x$ and time parameter $T$ one can generate a publicly verifiable proof making $T$ sequential computations, but it’s hard to come up with an accepting proof in significantly less than $T$ sequential steps.

The PoSW constructed in [MMV13] is not very practical (at least for large $T$) as the prover needs not only $T$ time, but also linear in $T$ space to compute a proof. Recently [CP18] constructed a very simple and practical PoSW in the random oracle model. They were interested in PoSW as they serve as a key ingredient in the Chia blockchain design (chia.net).

The main open problem left open in [CP18] was to construct PoSW that is unique, in the sense that one cannot compute two accepting proofs on the same challenge. The existing PoSW all allow to generate many accepting proofs at basically the same cost as honestly computing the proof. Unfortunately such PoSW cannot be used for blockchains as they would allow for so called grinding attacks.

Verifiable delay functions (VDF) were recently introduced by Boneh, Bonneau, Bü nz and Fisch [BBBF18]. A VDF can be seen as a relaxation of unique PoSW which still suffice for blockchain applications (see [BBBF18] for other applications). In a VDF the proof on challenge $(x, T)$ has two parts $(y, \pi)$, where $y$ is a deterministic function of $x$ that needs $T$ sequential time to compute, and $\pi$ is a proof that $y$ was correctly computed. It must be possible to compute $\pi$ with low parallelism and such that $\pi$ can be output almost at the same time as $y$. In [BBBF18] this is achieved using incrementally verifiable computation [Val08].

The (very high level) idea is to compute a hash chain $y = h(h(\ldots h(x)\ldots))$ and at the same time use incrementally verifiable computation to compute the proof $\pi$, so the proof will be ready shortly after $y$ is computed. To make this generic approach actually practical the $h$ used in [BBBF18] is a particular algebraic function (a permutation polynomial) which has the property that one can invert it significantly faster than compute in forward direction, and also the proof system used to compute $\pi$ is tailored so it can exploit the algebraic structure of $h$.

A VDF from RSW. The RSW time-lock puzzle looks like a promising starting point for constructing a VDF. The main difficulty one needs to solve is achieving public verifiability: to efficiently verify $y \overset?= x^{2T} \pmod{N}$ one needs the group order of $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ (or equivalently, the factorization of $N$). But the factorization cannot be public as otherwise also computing $y$ becomes easy.

One idea to solve this issue is to somehow obfuscate the group order so it can only be used to efficiently verify if a given solution is correct, but not to speed up
its computation. There currently is no known instantiation to this approach.

In this work we give a different solution. We construct a protocol where a prover $P$ can convince a verifier $V$ it computed the correct solution $y = x^{2T} \pmod{N}$ without either party knowing the factorization (or any other hard to compute function) of $N$. Our protocol is public-coin, and thus can be made non-interactive – and thus give a VDF – via the Fiat-Shamir transformation.

Our protocol is inspired by the $IP=PSPACE$ proof [LFKN90, Sha90]. The key idea of the proof is very simple. Assume $P$ wants to convince $V$ that a tuple $(x, y)$ satisfies $y = x^{2T} \pmod{N}$. For this, $P$ first sends $\mu = x^{2T}/2$ to $V$. Now $\mu = x^{2T}/2$ together with $y = \mu^{2T}$ imply $y = x^{2T}$. The only thing we have achieved at this point is to reduce the time parameter from $T$ to $T/2$ at the cost of having two instead just one statement to verify. We then show that the verifier can merge those two statements in a randomized way into a single statement $(x', y') = (x^r \cdot \mu, \mu^r \cdot y)$ that satisfies $y' = x'^{2T/2}$ if the original statement $y = x^{2T}$ was true, but is almost certainly wrong (over the choice of the random exponent $r$) if the original statement was wrong, no matter what $\mu$ the malicious prover did send. This subprotocol is repeated $\log(T)$ times – each time halving the time parameter – until $V$ can trivially verify correctness of the claim.

The VDF we get has short proofs and is efficiently verifiable. For typical parameters (2048 bit modulus and $\log(T) \leq 40$) a proof is about 10 KB large and the cost for verification is around three full exponentiations (for comparison, a standard RSA decryption or RSA signature computation requires one full exponentiation).

Wesolowski's VDF. The most closely related result to our VDF is a concurrent paper by Benjamin Wesolowski [Wes18]. Like in this work, he constructs a VDF by making the RSW time-lock puzzle publicly verifiable. His proof for showing that $y = x^{2T}$ is the value $\pi = x^{2T/B}$ where $B = \text{hash}(y)$ is a large prime. To verify this proof one checks $\pi^B \cdot x^{2T} \mod B \equiv y$. To prove soundness (i.e., that it's hard to come up with a $y \neq x^{2T}$ together with a $\pi$ that passes verification) one needs a computational hardness assumption which basically states that for any $y$ it's hard to compute the $B$th root $z, z^B = y$ in the underlying group when $B$ is a large random prime. In contrast, the proof for our construction is unconditional if the underlying group is $Z^*_N$ where $N$ is the product of two strong primes. But, as we'll shortly discuss in §5.1, the soundness proof for our construction will also require computational assumptions if instantiated in groups that do not need trusted setup as considered in by [Wes18].

The proof size and verification time of Wesolowski's VDF are roughly a log($T$) factor better than in our construction, but the overhead in computing the proof $\pi$ is significant, in particular, to compute $\pi$ he needs as much time as is required to compute $y$ (i.e., $T$ sequential multiplications), and this computation can only start after $y$ is computed. For the blockchain application we're interested in it is crucial that $\pi$ is available almost immediately after $y$ is computed. As we'll discuss in more detail in §5.2, in our construction the proof can be computed in $\approx \sqrt{T}$ time, or even much less if parallelism is available.

This construction appears in the 2nd version of the eprint paper [Wes18] from July 1st and improves over the construction in the first posting.
Outline. We present the protocol in §2 and the security proof in §3. In §4 we define VDFs, and in §5 we discuss how the protocol is turned into a VDF and discuss several efficiency and security issues.

Notation. For a set $X$, $x \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} X$ means $x$ is assigned a random value from $X$. For a randomized algorithm $\text{alg}$ we denote with $x \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{alg}$ that $x$ is assigned the output of $\text{alg}$ on fresh random coins, if $\text{alg}$ is deterministic we just write $x \leftarrow \text{alg}$.

## 2 the protocol

Our protocol, where $P$ convinces $V$ it solved an RSW puzzle, goes as follows:

- The verifier $V$ and prover $P$ have as common input an RSW puzzle $(N, x, T)$ and a statistical security parameter $\lambda$.
- $P$ solves the puzzle by computing $y = x^{2T} \mod N$ (making $T$ sequential squarings), and sends $y$ to $V$.
- Now $P$ and $V$ iterate the “halving protocol” below. In this subprotocol, on common input $(N, x, T, y)$ the output is either of the form $(N, x', [T/2], y')$, in which case it is used as input to the next iteration of the halving subprotocol, or the protocol has stopped with verifier output in $\{\text{reject}, \text{accept}\}$.

### 2.1 the halving subprotocol

On common input $(N, x, T, y)$

1. If $T = 2$ then $V$ outputs accept if $y = x^{2T} = x^4 \pmod N$ and reject otherwise. If $T > 2$ go to the next step.
2. The prover $P$ sends $\mu' = x^{2^{T-1}} \pmod N$ to $V$.
3. If $\mu' \notin \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ $V$ outputs reject and stops, otherwise $V$ computes $\mu := \mu'^2 \pmod N$ (note that $\mu \in \mathbb{QR}_N$).
4. $V$ samples a random $r \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_{2^\lambda}$ and sends it to $P$ (in the non-interactive version of the protocol $r$ is the hash of the prover’s message $\mu'$).
5. If $T/2$ is even, $P$ and $V$ output

$$(N, x', T/2, y')$$

where

$$x' := x^r \cdot \mu \mod N \quad (= x^{r+2^{T/2}})$$

$$y' := \mu' \cdot y \mod N \quad (= x^{r-2^{T/2}+2^T})$$

(note that if $y = x^{2T}$ then $y' = x^{2T/2} = (\pmod N)$. If $T/2$ is odd, output

$$(N, x', T/2 + 1, y')$$.
2.2 security statement

Theorem 1. If the input \((N, x, T)\) to the protocol satisfies

1. \(N = pq\) is the product of safe primes, i.e., \(p = 2p' + 1, q = 2q' + 1\) for primes \(p', q'\).
2. \(\langle x \rangle = QR_N\),
3. \(2^4 \leq \min(p', q')\)

Then for any malicious prover \(\widehat{P}\) who sends as first message \(y\) anything else than the solution to the RSW time-lock puzzle, i.e.,

\[ y \neq x^{2T} \mod N. \]

\(V\) will finally output accept with probability at most

\[ \frac{3\log(T)}{2^4}. \]

3 security proof

It will be convenient to define the language

\[ \mathcal{L} = \{(N, x, T, y) : y \neq x^{2T} \mod N \text{ and } \langle x \rangle = QR_N\} \]

We’ll establish the following lemma.

Lemma 1. For \(N, \lambda\) as in Thm. 1, and any malicious prover \(\widehat{P}\) the following holds. If the input to the halving protocol in §2.1 satisfies

\[(N, x, T, y) \in \mathcal{L}\]

then with probability \(\geq 1 - 3/2^4\) (over the choice of \(r\)) \(V\)’s output is either reject or satisfies

\[(N, x', [T/2], y') \in \mathcal{L}\]

Before we prove the lemma, let’s see how it implies Theorem 1.

Proof of Theorem 1. In every iteration of the halving protocol the time parameter decreases from \(T\) to \([T/2]\) and it stops once \(T = 2\), this means we iterate for at most \([\log(T)] - 2\) rounds. By assumption, the input \((N, x, T, y)\) to the first iteration is in \(\mathcal{L}\), and by construction, the only case where \(V\) outputs accept is on an input \((N, x, 2, y)\) where \(y = x^{2T} = x^4 \mod N\), in particular, this input is not in \(\mathcal{L}\).

So, if \(V\) outputs accept, there must be one iteration of the halving protocol where the input is in \(\mathcal{L}\) but the output is not. By Lemma 1, for any particular iteration this happens with probability \(\leq 3/2^4\). By the union bound, the probability of this happening in any of the \([\log(T)] - 2\) rounds can be upper bounded by \(3\log(T)/2^4\) as claimed. \(\square\)

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\[\text{That is, } x \text{ generates } QR_N, \text{ the quadratic residues modulo } N. \text{ For our choice of } N \text{ we have } |QR_N| = p'q', \text{ so} \]

\[ \langle x \rangle \overset{\text{def}}{=} \{x, x^2, \ldots, x^{p'q'} \mod N\} = QR_N \overset{\text{def}}{=} \{z^2 \mod N : z \in Z_N^*\}. \]
Proof of Lemma 1. We just consider the case where \( T \) is even, the odd \( T \) case is almost identical.

Assuming the input to the halving protocol satisfies \((N,x,T,y)\in\mathcal{L}\), we must bound the probability that \( \mathcal{V} \) outputs reject or the output \((N,x',T/2,y')\not\in\mathcal{L}\).

If \( T = 2 \) then \( \mathcal{V} \) outputs reject and we’re done. Otherwise, if \( \mathcal{P} \) sends a \( \mu' \not\in Z_N^* \) in step 3. then \( \mathcal{V} \) outputs reject and we’re done. So from now we assume \( \mu' \in Z_N^* \), and thus \( \mu = \mu'^2 \in QR_N \). We must bound

\[
Pr[(y' = x'^{2T/2} \mod N) \lor ((x') \neq QR_N)] \leq 3/2^3
\]

using \( Pr[a \lor b] = Pr[a \land \overline{a}] + Pr[b] \) we rewrite this as

\[
Pr[y' = x'^{2T/2} \mod N \land (x') = QR_N] + Pr[r(x') \neq QR_N] \leq 3/2^3
\]

Eq. (3) follows by the two claims below.

Claim 1. \( Pr_r[(x') \neq QR_N] \leq 2/2^3 \).

Proof of Claim. We’ll denote with \( e_\mu \) the unique values in \( Z_p/q' \) satisfying \( x^\mu = \mu \) (it’s unique as \( \mu \in (x') = QR_N \) and \( |QR_N| = p'q' \)). As \( x,\mu \in QR_N \), also \( x' = x' \cdot \mu = x'^{e_\mu} \) is in \( QR_N \), and \( (x') = QR_N \) holds if \( ord(x') = p'q' \), which is the case except if \( (r + e_\mu) = 0 \mod p' \) or \( (r + e_\mu) = 0 \mod q' \) or equivalently (using that \( 2^3 < \min(p',q') \)) if \( r \in \mathbb{Z}_N^* \).

\[
\mathbb{Z}_N^* \cap \{e_\mu \mod p', e_\mu \mod q'\}.
\]

Clearly \(|\mathcal{B}| \leq 2\) and the claim follows.

Claim 2. \( Pr_r[y' = x'^{2T/2} \mod N \land (x') = QR_N] \leq 1/2^3 \).

Proof of Claim. If \( y \not\in QR_N \), then also \( y' = \mu \cdot y \not\in QR_N \) (as \( a \in QR_N, b \not\in QR_N \) implies \( a \cdot b \not\in QR_N \)). As \( (x') = QR_N \) and \( y' \neq x'^{2T/2} \) can’t hold simultaneously in this case the probability in the claim is 0. From now on we consider the case \( y \in QR_N \). We have

\[
Pr[y' = x'^{2T/2} \mod N \land (x') = QR_N] =
Pr[y' = x'^{2T/2} \mod N \land (x') = QR_N] \cdot Pr[(x') = QR_N]
\]

For the second factor in (5) we have with \( \mathcal{B} \) as in (4)

\[
Pr[(x') = QR_N] = \frac{2^3 - |\mathcal{B}|}{2^3}.
\]

Conditioned on \( (x') = QR_N \) the \( r \) is uniform in \( \mathbb{Z}_{p'q'} \), so the first factor in (5) is

\[
Pr[y' = x'^{2T/2} \mod N \land (x') = QR_N] = \mathbb{Pr}_r[y' = x'^{2T/2} \mod N].
\]

Let \( e_y \in Z_p/q' \) be the unique value such that \( x^{e_y} = y \mod N \). Using \( (x) = QR_N \) in the last step below we can rewrite

\[
y' = x'^{2T/2} \mod N \iff
\mu \cdot y = (x' \cdot \mu^2)^{2T/2} \mod N \iff
x^{e_y + e_\mu} = x^{(r + e_\mu) \cdot 2T/2} \mod N \iff
r \cdot e_\mu + e_y = (r + e_\mu) \cdot 2T/2 \mod p'q'.
\]
rearranging terms
\[ r(e_{\mu} - 2^{T/2}) + e_y - e_{\mu}2^{T/2} = 0 \mod p'q'. \] (8)

If \( e_{\mu} = 2^{T/2} \) this becomes
\[ e_y - 2^T = 0 \mod p'q' \]
which does not hold as by assumption we have \( y \neq x^{2^T} \mod N \). So from now on we assume \( e_{\mu} \neq 2^{T/2} \mod p'q' \). Then for \( a = e_{\mu} - 2^{T/2} \) \( \not\equiv \) \( 0 \mod p'q' \) (and \( b = e_y - e_{\mu}2^{T/2} \)) eq.(8) becomes
\[ r \cdot a = b \mod p'q' \]
which holds for at most one choice of \( r \) from its domain \( \mathbb{Z}_{2^\lambda} \). Thus
\[ \Pr_{r \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\lambda}}[y' = x^{2^{T/2}} \mod N] \leq \frac{1}{2^\lambda - |\mathcal{B}|} \]
and the claim follows from the above equation and (5)-(7) as
\[ \Pr_{r \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\lambda}}[y' = x^{2^{T/2}} \mod N] \cdot \Pr_{r}[\langle x' \rangle = QR_N] \leq \frac{1}{2^\lambda - |\mathcal{B}|} \cdot \frac{2^\lambda - |\mathcal{B}|}{2^\lambda} \leq \frac{1}{2^\lambda}. \]

4 verifiable delay functions

In this section we define verifiable delay functions (VDF), we mostly follow the definition from [BBBF18]. A VDF is defined by a four-tuple of algorithms:

VDF.Setup\((1^\lambda) \rightarrow pp\) on input a statistical security parameter \(1^\lambda\) outputs public parameters \(pp\).

VDF.Gen\((pp, T) \rightarrow (x, T)\) on input a time parameter \(T \in \mathbb{N}\), samples an input \(x\).

VDF.Sol\((pp, (x, T)) \rightarrow (y, \pi)\) on input \((x, T)\) outputs \((y, \pi)\), where \(\pi\) is a proof that the output \(y\) has been correctly computed.

VDF.Ver\((pp, (x, T), (y, \pi)) \rightarrow \{\text{accept/reject}\}\) given an input/output tuple \((x, T), (y, \pi)\) outputs either accept or reject.

The statistical security parameter \(\lambda\) measures the bit-security we expect from our protocol, i.e., an adversary of complexity \(\tau\) should have advantage no more than \(\approx \tau/2^\lambda\) in breaking the scheme. It only makes sense to consider time parameters \(T\) that are much smaller than \(2^\lambda\) (say we require \(T \leq 2^{3/2}\)) so the sequential running time of the honest prover is much smaller than what is required to break the underlying hardness assumptions.

Efficiency of setup, sampling and verification. The VDF.Setup and VDF.Gen algorithms are probabilistic, VDF.Ver is deterministic. They all run in time \(\text{poly}(\log(T), \lambda)\).
Efficiency of solving. The VDF.Sol algorithm can compute the output \(y\) in \(T\) sequential steps (in this work a “sequential step” is a squaring or multiplication in \(Z_N^*\)). Moreover we require that \(\pi\) can be computed in much fewer than \(T\) steps. As we’ll discuss in §5.2, we’ll require \(\approx p T\) sequential steps, and less if parallelism is available. In [BBBF18] the requirement is more relaxed, they compute \(\pi\) in parallel with \(y\) using bounded \(\text{poly} \left( \log(T), \lambda \right)\) parallelism, so the \(\pi\) is available shortly after \(y\) is computed, but overall the computation is much larger than \(T\). As discussed in the introduction, Wesolowski’s VDF [Wes18] doesn’t meet our requirement as it requires \(T\) sequential steps after \(y\) has been computed.

Completeness. The completeness property simply requires that correctly generated proofs will always accept, that is, for any \(\lambda, T\)

\[
\Pr \left[ \text{VDF Ver}(\mathbf{pp}, (x, T), (y, \pi)) = \text{accept} \right]
\]

\[
= \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{pp } \xleftarrow{\text{\$}} \text{VDF Setup}(1^\lambda) \\
(x, T) \xleftarrow{\text{\$}} \text{VDF Gen}(\mathbf{pp}, T) \\
(y, \pi) \xleftarrow{\text{\$}} \text{VDF Sol}(\mathbf{pp}, (x, T)) 
\end{cases}
\]

Security (sequentiality). The first security property is sequentiality. For this we consider a two part adversary \(\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)\), where \(\mathcal{A}_1\) can run a pre-computation and choose \(T\). Then \(\mathcal{A}_2\) gets a random challenge for time \(T\) together with the output state of the precomputation, we require that whenever

\[
\Pr \left[ \text{VDF Ver}(\mathbf{pp}, (x, T), (\tilde{y}, \tilde{\pi})) = \text{accept} \right] \neq \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]

\[
= \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{pp } \xleftarrow{\text{\$}} \text{VDF Setup}(1^\lambda) \\
(T, \text{state}) \xleftarrow{\text{\$}} \mathcal{A}_1(\mathbf{pp}) \\
(x, T) \xleftarrow{\text{\$}} \text{VDF Gen}(\mathbf{pp}, T) \\
(\tilde{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \xleftarrow{\text{\$}} \mathcal{A}_2(\mathbf{pp}, (x, T), \text{state}) 
\end{cases}
\]

the \(\mathcal{A}_2\) adversary must use almost the same sequential time \(T\) as required by an honest execution of VDF.Sol(\(\mathbf{pp}, (\pi, T)\)), and this even holds if \(\mathcal{A}\) is allowed massive parallel computation (say we just bound the total computation to \(2^{\Omega(\lambda)}\)). This means there’s no possible speedup to compute the VDF output by using parallelism. Let us stress that by this we mean any parallelism that goes beyond what can be used to speed up a single sequential step, which here is a multiplication in \(Z_N^*\), and we assume the honest prover can use such bounded parallelism.

Security (soundness). The second security property is soundness, which means that one cannot come up with an accepting proof \(\hat{\pi}\) for a \(\hat{y} \neq x^2 T \mod N\). Formally, for an adversary \(\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)\) we have (unlike in the previous definition, here we don’t make any assumption about \(\mathcal{A}_2\)’s sequential running time, just the total

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running time of $\mathcal{A}$ must be bounded to, say $2^{4/2}$)

$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l}
VDF.\text{Ver}(pp,(x,T),\langle \bar{y},\bar{\pi} \rangle) = \text{accept} \\
\text{and } \bar{y} \neq y
\end{array} \right. = \negl(\lambda)$

where $.pp \leftarrow VDF.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$

$(T,\text{state}) \leftarrow A_1(pp)$

$(x,T) \leftarrow VDF.\text{Gen}(pp,T)$

$(y,\pi) \leftarrow VDF.\text{Sol}(pp,(x,T))$

$\langle \bar{y},\bar{\pi} \rangle \leftarrow A_2(pp,(x,T),\text{state})$

5 a VDF from RSW

In this section we explain the simple transformation of the protocol from §2 into a VDF and then discuss the efficiency, security and some other issues of this construction.

To keep things simple we'll assume that the time parameter $T = 2^t$ is a power of two. The four algorithms from §4 are instantiated as

VDF.Setup(1$^\lambda$) The statistical security parameter $\lambda$ defines another security parameter $\lambda_{RSA}$ specifying the bitlength of an RSA modulus, where $\lambda_{RSA}$ should be at least as large so that an $\lambda_{RSA}$ bit RSA modulus offers $\lambda$ bits of security (e.g. $\lambda = 100$ and $\lambda_{RSA} = 2048$). As hardness of factoring is subexponential, we can without loss of generality assume that $\lambda \leq \lambda_{RSA}/2$, so point 3. in the statement of Theorem 1 is satisfied.

The setup algorithm samples two random $\lambda_{RSA}/2$ bit safe primes $p,q$ and output as public parameters the single $\lambda_{RSA}$ bit RSA modulus $N := pq$.

VDF.Gen($N,T$) samples a random $x \in QR_N$ and outputs $(x,T)$.

VDF.Sol($N,(x,T)$) outputs $(y,\pi)$ where $y = x^{2^r} \mod N$ is the solution of the RSW time-lock puzzle and $\pi = \langle \mu_1^* \rangle_{i \in [1..2]}$ is a proof that $y$ has been correctly computed. It is derived by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to the protocol in §2. Recall that in this heuristic the public-coin challenges $r_i \in Z_q^*$ of the verifier are replaced with a hash of the last prover message. Concretely, we fix a hash function $hash : Z_N^2 \rightarrow Z_2^*$, let $(x_1,y_1) = (x,T,y)$ and for $i = 1 \ldots t - 3 \text{ let} \mu_i$.

$^3$ Let us stress that for the Fiat-Shamir heuristic we not only hash the previous prover message $\mu_i$, but also the instance $x$ and the claimed solution $y$. Hashing $x$ is not crucial for the security proof (showing that the Fiat-Shamir heuristic is sound in the random oracle model), but it’s a cheap way of deterring precomputation attacks (basically, if $x$ has high min-entropy, then any oracle queries made before $x$ was received will be useless), which in practice means we can use a smaller $\lambda$ and thus get better efficiency. Hashing $y$ is actually important because in our setting where the statement $y$ can be chosen by the prover (BPW12). There exists an attack (communicated to us by Benjamin Wesolowski) on soundness of the VDF if $y$ is not hashed: on challenge $(x,T)$, pick $\mu_1^*$ at random, this then defines $\mu_1 = \mu_1^*, r_1 = hash(x,\mu_1^*)$, and only now compute $y$ as the wrong value $y := (x^{2^{T_2}/\mu_1^*} \cdot \mu_1^* \cdot x^{2^{T_2}})$. The inputs $x_2 = x_2^1, y_2 = \mu_1^* \cdot y$ to the next round satisfy $y_2 = x_2^{2^{T_2}}$, so we can just honestly continue to get an accepting proof.
\begin{align*}
T_{i+1} & := T_i/2 \quad (= T/2^i) \\
\mu'_i & := x_i^{2T_i/2-1} \mod N \\
\mu_i & := \mu'_i^2 = x_i^{2T_i/2} \mod N \\
r_i & := \text{hash}((x,y),\mu'_i) \\
x_{i+1} & := x_{r_i} \cdot \mu_i \mod N \\
y_{i+1} & := \mu_{r_i} \cdot y_i \mod N \\
\end{align*}

VDF.Ver\((N, (x,T),(y,\pi))\) parse \(\pi = \{\mu'_i\}_{i \in \mathbb{Z}}\) and check if any \(\mu'_i \not\in \mathbb{Z}_N\), if this is the case output reject. Otherwise set \((x_1, T_1, y_1) = (x, T, y)\) and then for \(i = 1 \ldots 3\) compute

\begin{align*}
T_{i+1} & := T_i/2 \quad (= T/2^i) \\
\mu_i & := \mu'_i^2 \mod N \\
r_i & := \text{hash}((x,y),\mu'_i) \\
x_{i+1} & := x_{r_i} \cdot \mu_i \mod N \\
y_{i+1} & := \mu_{r_i} \cdot y_i \mod N \\
\end{align*}

Finally check whether

\(y_{t-2} \equiv x_4^{t-2} \mod N\) \hspace{1cm} (11)

and output accept if this holds, otherwise output reject.

### 5.1 public parameters for the VDF

For the security of the VDF it's crucial that a prover does not know the factorization of the public parameter \(N\), as otherwise he could compute \(x^{2^i} \mod N\) in just two exponentiations as in eq.(1). Thus one either has to rely on a trusted party, or use multiparty-computation to sample \(N\). In particular, it's possible to sample \(N\) securely as long as not all the participants in the multiparty computation are malicious. Such an "MPC ceremony" has been done before, e.g. to set up the common random string for Zcash.\footnote{https://z.cash/technology/paramgen.html} This is in contrast to the random-oracle based PoSW [MMV13, CP18] which don't require a setup procedure at all.

Dan Boneh and Benjamin Wesolowski suggested to use class groups of an imaginary quadratic field [BBHM02] instead an RSA group for our VDF in order to avoid a trusted setup. Weselowski already discusses how to instantiate his VDF [Wes18] in such groups. Using class groups will require to use computational assumptions for the soundness property. It's also possible to instantiate our VDF in a "standard" RSA group, where \(N\) is the product of two large primes \((\text{instead of strong primes})\), but then the soundness proof is no longer unconditional, but relies on the assumption that it's hard to find a group element (other than \(\pm1 \mod N\)) of small order.

\footnote{https://z.cash/technology/paramgen.html}
5.2 efficiency of the VDF

Cost of verification. The cost of running the verification VDF.Ver(N,(x,T = 2^t),(y,π)) is dominated by the 2(t−3) exponentiations (with λ bit long exponents) in eq.(9-10). As exponentiation with a random λ bit exponent cost about 1.5λ multiplications, the cost of verification is around 3·λ·(t−3) multiplications in \( \mathbb{Z}_N^* \). For concreteness, consider an implementation where \( \lambda = 100, \lambda_{RSA} = 2048 \) and assume \( t = 40 \), this gives a cost of about 3·λ·(t−3) = 11100 multiplications, which corresponds to 11100/(2048·1.5) ≈ 3.6 full exponentiations in \( \mathbb{Z}_N^* \).

A minor improvement. There’s a simple way to save on verification time and proof size. Currently, for \( \Delta = 2 \) we run the halving protocol for \( t - \Delta - 1 = t - 3 \) rounds and then in eq.(11) check if \( y_{t-\Delta} = x^{2^\Delta} \). We can run the protocol for fewer rounds, say set \( \Delta = 8 \), which saves 6 rounds and thus reduces proof size from 37 to 31 elements (or about 16%), and we save on computation as we save 2·6 exponentiations in eq.(9-10). But the final check eq.(11) must be adapted, and for general \( \Delta \) becomes \( y_{t-\Delta} = x^{2^\Delta} \mod N \) (or if \( T \) is not a power of 2 then \( y_{t-\Delta} = x^{2^\Delta T_{t-2,\Delta-1}} \mod N \), so its computational cost grows exponentially fast in \( \Delta \). It’s still worth to moderately increase \( \Delta \), for \( \Delta = 8 \) the overall computation still drops by about 14% for a total cost of slightly above 3 full exponentiations.

Cost of computing the proof. Computing the proof \( (y,\pi) \leftarrow VDF.Sol(N,(x,T)) \) requires one to solve the underlying RSW puzzle \( y = x^{2^T} \mod N \), which is done by squaring \( x \) sequentially \( T \) times (the security of the RSW puzzle and thus also our VDF relies on the assumption that there’s no shortcut to this computation).

On top of that, for the VDF we also must compute the proof \( \pi = \{ \mu_i \}_{i \in \{t−2\}} \).
Recall that \( \mu' = x_i^{2^T_i/2−1} \) and \( \mu_i = \mu'_i \cdot 2 = x_i^{2^T_i/2} \). Below we discuss how to compute the \( \mu_i \) instead of the \( \mu'_i \), this doesn’t really affect the argument but the “−1” in the exponent of the \( \mu'_i \)’s makes the statements a bit more messy; we also still assume \( T = 2^s \) is a power of 2.

If naively implemented, computing the \( \mu_i \) will require \( T/2 \) squarings for \( \mu_1 \), \( T/4 \) for \( \mu_2 \) etc., adding up to a total of \( T = T/2 + T/4 + T/8 + ... + 8 \) sequential steps. Fortunately we don’t have to compute \( \mu_1 = x^{2^T/2} \) as we already did so while computing \( y = x^{2^T} \) by repeated squaring (cf. eq.(2)). This observation already saves us half the overhead. We can also compute the remaining \( \mu_2, \mu_3, \ldots \) using stored values, but it becomes increasingly costly, as we discuss below.

In general, for some \( s \in \{t−3\} \) the proof can compute \( \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_s \) using stored values, and then fully recompute the remaining \( \mu_{s+1} = x_1^{2^T_{s+1}}, \mu_{s+2}, \ldots, \mu_{t−3} \) which will only require \( T/2^{s+1} + T/2^{s+2} + ... < T/2^s \) squarings.

To see how the \( \mu_i \)’s can be efficiently computed for small \( i \), for \( z \in QR_N \) let \( z \)
\[ i \quad \bar{x}_i' \quad \bar{y}_i \]

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
1 & 1 & 2^{T/4} & 2^{T/4} + 2^{3T/4} \\
2 & r_1 + 2^{T/2} & r_1 \cdot 2^{T/4} + 2^{3T/4} & r_1 \cdot 2^{T/4} + 2^T \\
3 & r_1 \cdot r_2 + r_2 \cdot 2^{T/2} + 2^{T/4} \cdot r_1 + 2^{3T/4} & r_1 \cdot r_2 \cdot 2^{T/8} + r_2 \cdot 2^{T/5} + r_1 \cdot 2^{T/3} + 2^{T/6} + 2^{T/8} & r_1 \cdot r_2 \cdot 2^{T/4} + r_2 \cdot 2^{3T/4} + r_1 \cdot 2^{T/2} + 2^T \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
\end{array}
\]

Figure 1: Exponents of the values in the protocol, here \( z = x^\gamma \).

denote \( z \)'s log to basis \( x \), i.e., \( x^\gamma \equiv z \mod N \). We have \( \bar{x}_1 = 1, \bar{y}_1 = 2^T \) and

\[
\begin{align*}
\bar{\mu}_i & := \bar{x}_i \cdot 2^{T/2} \\
\bar{x}_{i+1} & := r_1 \cdot \bar{x}_i + \bar{\mu}_i \\
\bar{y}_{i+1} & := r_1 \cdot \bar{\mu}_i + \bar{y}_i
\end{align*}
\]

How these exponents concretely develop for \( i = 1 \) to 3 is illustrated in Figure 1. For example, we can compute \( \mu_3 \) assuming we stored the \( x^{2^{T/8}}, x^{2^{T/38}}, x^{2^{T/58}}, x^{2^{T/78}} \) values as

\[
\mu_3 = (x^{2^{T/8}})^{r_1} \cdot (x^{2^{T/38}})^{r_2} \cdot (x^{2^{T/58}})^{r_3} \cdot (x^{2^{T/78}})^{\bar{x}_3}
\]

In general, computing \( \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_s \) will require to store \( 2^s \) values \( \{x^{2^{T_i}}\}_{i \in [2^s]} \), and then compute \( 2^s \) exponentiations with exponents of bitlength at most \( \lambda \cdot (s-1) \) (and half that on average). We can’t speed this up by first taking the exponents modulo the group order \( p’q’ \) as it is not know, but if we have bounded parallelism \( 2^p, p \leq (s-2) \) this can be done in \( 2^{s-p} \cdot \lambda \cdot (s-1) \cdot \frac{3}{4} \) sequential steps. Summing up, with sufficient space to store \( 2^s \) elements in \( \mathbb{Z}_N \) and \( 2^p \leq 2^{s-2} \) parallelism the proof \( \pi \) can be computed in roughly

\[
2^{s-p} \cdot \lambda \cdot (s-1) \cdot \frac{3}{4} + 2^{\frac{1}{4}} \text{ sequential steps and } 2^s \cdot \log(N) \text{ bits of storage}
\]

after \( y \) has been computed. For example with a single core \( p = 0 \) and \( s = t/2 - \log(t \cdot \lambda)/2 \) space we get

\[
2^{t/2 - \log(t \cdot \lambda)/2} \cdot (s-1) \cdot \frac{3}{4} + 2^{s-1} \log(t \cdot \lambda) = 2^{t/2} \left( \frac{\lambda(s-1)}{\sqrt{t \lambda}} \cdot \frac{3}{4} + \sqrt{t \lambda} \right) < \sqrt{T} \frac{11}{8} \sqrt{\log(T) \cdot \lambda}
\]

For our typical values \( t = 40, \lambda = 100 \) this is \( \leq 2^{27} \), and thus over \( 2^{40-27} = 2^{13} \) times faster than computing \( y \), e.g. if computing \( y \) takes \( 1h \), computing \( \pi \) just takes half a second on top and require around \( 1MB \) of storage.

5.3 security of the VDF

Soundness. If we model \( hash \) as a random oracle, then by Theorem 1 and the Fiat-Shamir heuristic we are guaranteed that a prover will not find an accepting proof \( (\bar{y}, \bar{x}) \) where \( \bar{y} \neq x^{2^T} \).

Concretely, the probability that a prover that makes up to \( q \) queries to \( hash \) finds such an accepting proof where \( y \neq x^{2^T} \) is at most \( 3 \cdot q/2^3 \).
As outlined in Footnote 3, by using the challenge instance $x$ as an additional input to the random oracle, we get soundness almost $3 \cdot q/2^\lambda$ even against an adversary who makes $q$ queries after receiving the challenge $x$, but can make a huge number of oracle queries before that.

**Sequentiality.** To break sequentiality means computing $y$ faster than in $T$ sequential computations. We rely on the same assumption as [RSW96], which simply states that such a shortcut does not exist (the only difference to [RSW96] is that our $N$ is the product of safe primes, not a general RSA modulus).

**References**


