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Paper 2018/528
Recovering short secret keys of RLCE in polynomial time
Alain Couvreur and Matthieu Lequesne and Jean-Pierre Tillich
Abstract
We present a key recovery attack against Y. Wang's Random Linear Code Encryption (RLCE) scheme recently submitted to the NIST call for post-quantum cryptography. This attack recovers the secret key for all the short key parameters proposed by the author.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Code-based CryptographyMcEliece encryption schemekey recovery attackgeneralised Reed Solomon codesSchur product of codes
- Contact author(s)
- matthieu lequesne @ inria fr
- History
- 2018-06-04: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/528
- License
-
CC BY
