

# From FE Combiners to Secure MPC and Back

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## Abstract

Cryptographic combiners allow one to combine many candidates for a cryptographic primitive, possibly based on different computational assumptions, into another candidate with the guarantee that the resulting candidate is secure as long as at least one of the original candidates is secure. While the original motivation of cryptographic combiners was to reduce trust on existing candidates, in this work, we study a rather surprising implication of combiners to constructing secure multiparty computation protocols. Specifically, we initiate the study of functional encryption combiners and show its connection to secure multiparty computation.

Functional encryption (FE) has incredible applications towards computing on encrypted data. However, constructing the most general form of this primitive has remained elusive. Although some candidate constructions exist, they rely on nonstandard assumptions, and thus, their security has been questioned. An FE combiner attempts to make use of these candidates while minimizing the trust placed on any individual FE candidate. Informally, an FE combiner takes in a set of FE candidates and outputs a secure FE scheme if at least one of the candidates is secure.

Another fundamental area in cryptography is secure multi-party computation (MPC), which has been extensively studied for several decades. In this work, we initiate a formal study of the relationship between functional encryption (FE) combiners and secure multi-party computation (MPC). In particular, we show implications in both directions between these primitives. As a consequence of these implications, we obtain the following main results.

- A two-round semi-honest MPC protocol in the plain model secure against up to  $n - 1$  corruptions with communication complexity proportional only to the depth of the circuit being computed assuming learning with errors (LWE). Prior two round protocols based on standard assumptions that achieved this communication complexity required trust assumptions, namely, a common reference string.
- A functional encryption combiner based on pseudorandom generators (PRGs) in  $\text{NC}^1$ . This is a weak assumption as such PRGs are implied by many concrete intractability problems commonly used in cryptography, such as ones related to factoring, discrete logarithm, and lattice problems [AIK05]. Previous constructions of FE combiners, implicit in [AJS17],

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were known only from LWE. Using this result, we build a universal construction of functional encryption: an explicit construction of functional encryption based only on the assumptions that functional encryption exists and PRGs in NC<sup>1</sup>.

## 1 Introduction

The foundations of several cryptographic primitives rely upon computational assumptions. The last few decades have seen the birth of many assumptions, such as factoring, quadratic residuosity, decisional Diffie-Hellman, learning with errors, and many more. Understanding the security of these assumptions is still very much an active research area. Despite years of research, very little is known in terms of how different cryptographic assumptions compare with each other. For instance, it's not known whether decisional Diffie-Hellman is a weaker or a stronger assumption than learning with errors. This leads us to the following unsatisfactory scenario: suppose a cryptographic primitive (say, public key encryption) has many candidate constructions based on different assumptions, and we want to pick the most secure candidate. In this scenario, it is unclear which one we should pick.

**Cryptographic Combiners.** The notion of cryptographic combiners was introduced to resolve this dilemma. Given many candidates of a cryptographic primitive, possibly based on different assumptions, a cryptographic combiner churns these candidates into another candidate construction for the same primitive with the guarantee that the resulting construction is secure as long as at least *one* of the original candidates are secure. For instance, a combiner for public key encryption can be used to transform two candidates based on decisional Diffie-Hellman and learning with errors into a different public-key encryption candidate that is secure as long as *either* decisional Diffie-Hellman *or* learning with errors is secure.

While combiners were originally introduced to reduce trust on existing cryptographic constructions, in this work, we study a rather surprising implication from combiners to secure multi-party computation. Secure multi-party computation [Yao86, GMW87, BOGW88], one of the fundamental notions in cryptography, allows many parties, who don't necessarily trust each other, to come together and compute a function on their private inputs. We consider the primitive of functional encryption and study the implications of functional encryption combiners to secure multi-party computation. But first, we recall the notion of functional encryption.

**Functional Encryption.** Functional encryption (FE), introduced by [SW05, BSW11, O'N10], is one of the core primitives in the area of computing on encrypted data. This notion allows an authority to generate and distribute constrained keys associated with functions  $f_1, \dots, f_q$ , called *functional keys*, which can be used to learn the values  $f_1(x), \dots, f_q(x)$  given an encryption of  $x$ . Intuitively, the security notion states that the functional keys associated with  $f_1, \dots, f_q$  and an encryption of  $x$  reveal nothing beyond the values  $f_1(x), \dots, f_q(x)$ . While this notion is interesting on its own, several works have studied its connections to other areas in cryptography and beyond, including reusable garbled circuits [GKP<sup>+</sup>13], indistinguishability obfuscation [AJ15, BV15, AJS15, LPST16b, LPST16a], adaptive garbling [HJO<sup>+</sup>16], verifiable random functions [GHKW17, Bit17, BGJS17], deniable encryption [GKW17], hardness of Nash equilibrium [GPS16, GPSZ17], and many more.

Currently, we know how to construct only restricted versions<sup>1</sup> of functional encryption from well studied cryptographic assumptions. However, constructing the most general form of functional encryption has been an active research area and has intensified over the past few

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<sup>1</sup>For instance, we can restrict the adversary to only ask for one functional key in the security experiment. A functional encryption scheme satisfying this property can be based on public key encryption schemes [SS10, GVV12] (or one-way functions if one can settle for the secret key version).

years given its implication to indistinguishability obfuscation [AJ15, BV15]. All the candidates [GGHZ14, Lin16, LV16, AS17, Lin17, LT17] we know so far are either based on assumptions pertaining to the tool of graded encodings [BS03, GGH13], or on other new and relatively unstudied assumptions [AJKS18, LM18, Agr18]. Recent cryptanalytic attacks [CHL<sup>+</sup>15, HJ15, CLLT15, CJL16, CGH<sup>+</sup>15] on assumptions related to graded encodings have prompted scrutiny of the security of schemes that use this tool as the building block. Given this, we should hope to minimize the trust we place on any individual FE candidate. The notion of a functional encryption combiner achieves this purpose. Roughly speaking, a functional encryption combiner allows for combining many functional encryption candidates in such a way that the resulting FE candidate is secure as long as any one of the initial FE candidates is secure. In other words, a functional encryption combiner says that it suffices to place trust collectively on multiple FE candidates, instead of placing trust on any specific FE candidate.

**Our Work.** We initiate a systematic study of functional encryption combiners. In particular, we study implications from FE combiners to secure multi-party computation (and vice versa), and by doing so, we achieve interesting consequences that were previously unknown. We detail our contributions next.

## 1.1 Our Contributions

Our results can be classified into two parts. The first part shows how to translate constructions of functional encryption combiners into secure MPC protocols. The second part studies the other direction.

**From combiners for single-key FE to secure MPC:** Our first result shows how to construct a passively secure multi-party computation protocol that is both round-optimal (two rounds) and communication efficient (depends only on circuit depth). Recall that in a passively secure MPC protocol, corrupted parties follow the instructions of the protocol, but try to learn about honest party inputs from their combined view of the protocol execution. Moreover, our resulting protocol is in the plain model and can tolerate all but one corruption<sup>2</sup>. Prior round-optimal passively-secure MPC protocols were either communication inefficient, that is communication complexity was proportional to circuit size [GS17, BGI<sup>+</sup>18, BL18, GS18], based on strong assumptions such as indistinguishability obfuscation [DHRW16] or were based on trust assumptions [CM15, MW16, PS16, BP16, BHP17] (for instance, a common reference string). Subsequent to our work<sup>3</sup>, [QWW18] (FOCS’18) matched our result under the same assumption; they use the new primitive of laconic function evaluation to achieve their result instead of FE combiners. We prove the following theorem.

**Theorem 1 (Informal).** *Consider an  $n$ -party functionality  $f$  computable by a poly-sized circuit of depth  $d$ , for any  $n \geq 2$ . Assuming  $LWE$ , there is a construction of a passively secure (semi-honest)  $n$ -party computation protocol for  $f$  in the plain model secure against  $n - 1$  corruptions. The number of rounds in this protocol is 2, and the communication complexity is  $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, d, L_{in}, L_{out})$ , where  $L_{in}$  is the input length of this circuit computing  $f$ ,  $L_{out}$  is its output length and  $\lambda$  is the security parameter.*

We summarize the state of art in the Table 1.1.

Central to proving the above theorem is a transformation from a functional encryption combiner to passively secure MPC. We only require a combiner for functional encryption schemes where the adversary only receives one functional key. We require the functional encryption

<sup>2</sup>Unless otherwise specified, we only consider MPC protocols tolerating all but one corruption.

<sup>3</sup>We note that [QWW18] explicitly write that our work “**previously** got such result using functional-encryption combiners” (emphasis added).

|   | Communication Complexity                      | Assumptions              | Model |
|---|---|--------------------------|-------|
| [CM15, MW16, PS16, BP16]                    | $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, d, L_{in}, L_{out})$ | LWE                      | CRS   |
| [DHRW16]                                    | $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, d, L_{in}, L_{out})$ | piO and lossy encryption | Plain |
| [GS17]                                      | $\text{poly}(\lambda, n,  f )$                | Bilinear maps            | Plain |
| [BL18, GS18]                                | $\text{poly}(\lambda, n,  f )$                | Two-round OT             | Plain |
| <b>Our Work</b> ,<br>(subsequently [QWW18]) | $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, d, L_{in}, L_{out})$ | LWE                      | Plain |

Figure 1: State of the art in terms of communication complexity of two-round passively secure  $n$ -party protocols in the all-but-one corruption model. We denote by  $|f|$  and  $d$  the size and depth of the circuit representing the MPC functionality  $f$ , respectively. Moreover,  $L_{in}$  and  $L_{out}$ , respectively, denote the input and output lengths of the circuit. CRS stands for common reference string and piO stands for probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscation [CLTV15].

combiner to have some structural properties. Namely, the functional key for  $f$  associated with the combined candidate needs to be of the form  $(f, sk_f^1, \dots, sk_f^n)$ , where (i) decomposability:  $sk_f^i$  is produced by the  $i^{\text{th}}$  FE candidate and, (ii) succinctness: the length of  $sk_f^i$  is  $\text{poly}(\lambda, d, L_{out})$ , where  $d$  is the depth of the circuit computing  $f$  and  $L_{out}$  is its output length. As part of the succinctness property, we also require that the encryption complexity is  $\text{poly}(\lambda, d, L_{in})$ , where  $L_{in}$  is the length of the message to be encrypted. We show how to construct such an FE combiner assuming LWE.

An intermediate tool we use in this implication is a communication **inefficient** passively secure MPC protocol. By communication inefficient, we mean that the communication complexity is proportional to the size of the circuit representing  $f$ . We note that such protocols [GS17, BL18, GS18] exist in the literature<sup>4</sup> based on just the assumption of round-optimal passively secure oblivious transfer.

**Lemma 1** (Informal). *Consider a  $n$ -party functionality  $f$ , for any  $n \geq 2$ . There is a passively secure  $n$ -party computation protocol for  $f$  in two rounds with communication complexity  $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, d, L_{in}, L_{out})$  secure against  $n - 1$  corruptions, where  $d$  is the depth of circuit computing  $f$ ,  $L_{in}$  is the input length of the circuit and  $L_{out}$  is its output length. Moreover, we assume (i) a decomposable and succinct functional encryption combiner and (ii) a communication inefficient (as defined above) two-round secure  $n$ -party computation protocol secure against  $n - 1$  corruptions.*

By plugging in the recent round-optimal secure MPC protocols [GS17, BL18, GS18] that can be based on two-round oblivious transfer, which in turn can be based on learning with errors [PVW08], and our new decomposable and succinct FE combiner from LWE, we get [Theorem 1](#). We note that MPC with malicious security requires at least 4 rounds [GMPP16, ACJ17, BHP17, BGJ<sup>+</sup>18, HHPV18], and thus, we do not consider MPC with malicious security in this work.

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<sup>4</sup>These protocols are inherently communication inefficient. The reason is that they present a compiler that turns any arbitrary interactive MPC protocol into a two-round MPC protocol. The communication complexity in the resulting two-round MPC protocol is at least the computational complexity of the original MPC protocol. However, the computational complexity of the resulting protocol has to be proportional to the size of the circuit representing the functionality  $f$ .

**From secure MPC to combiners for unbounded-key FE:** In the other direction, we show how to transform existing secure multi-party computation protocols into constructions of functional encryption combiners. However, we note that the FE combiners we construct from MPC here do not satisfy decomposability or succinctness. In particular, we show how to transform specific constant round passively secure MPC protocols based on low degree randomized encodings [BMR90] into functional encryption combiners. By instantiating low degree randomized encodings from pseudorandom generators in  $\text{NC}^1$ , we get the following result.

**Theorem 2** (Informal). *Assuming pseudorandom generators in  $\text{NC}^1$ , there is a construction of a combiner for unbounded-key functional encryption.*

By unbounded-key functional encryption, we mean that there is no a priori bound on the number of functional keys the adversary can request in the security experiment. We note that such pseudorandom generators in  $\text{NC}^1$  are implied by most concrete intractability assumptions commonly used in cryptography, such as ones related to factoring, discrete logarithm, and lattice problems [AIK05]. Furthermore, such PRGs are also implied by the existence of one-way permutations in  $\text{NC}^1$  or one-way functions in  $\text{NC}^1$  with efficiently computable entropy [AIK05].

Next, we present a generic reduction that can transform two-round passively secure MPC protocols into functional encryption combiners. For this transformation to hold, the MPC protocol must satisfy two properties: (i) delayed function-dependence: the first round of the MPC protocol should be independent of the functionality being securely computed and (ii) reusability: the first round can be reused by the parties to securely compute many functionalities (but on the same inputs fixed by the first round).

**Theorem 3** (Informal). *Assuming a delayed function-dependent and reusable round-optimal secure MPC protocol, there is a construction of an unbounded-key decomposable functional encryption combiner.*

We then observe that existing two-round secure MPC protocols [MW16, PS16, BP16], based on learning with errors, already satisfy delayed function-dependence and reusability. We note that it is not necessary for the round-optimal protocols to be in the plain model (indeed, the protocols [MW16, PS16, BP16] are in the common reference string (CRS) model).

Prior to this work, the only polynomial hardness assumption known to imply an FE combiner was the learning with errors assumption [AJS17]<sup>5</sup>. While [Theorem 2](#) already gives a construction of a functional encryption combiner from learning with errors (pseudorandom generators in  $\text{NC}^1$  can be based on learning with errors [BPR12]), the functional encryption combiner constructed in [Theorem 3](#) arguably provides a more efficient transformation. In particular, the efficiency of the functional keys in the combined scheme from [Theorem 3](#) is linear in the efficiency of the functional keys in the FE candidates. However, the efficiency in the combined scheme from [Theorem 2](#) degrades polynomially in the efficiency of the original FE candidates. Furthermore, the FE combiner from [Theorem 3](#) is *decomposable*, a property needed by an FE combiner as a building block in the proof of [Theorem 1](#). On the other hand, the FE combiner from [Theorem 2](#) is inherently not decomposable, since it is based on an “onion-layered” approach – this means that the keys generated with respect to one FE candidate make oracle calls to other FE candidates (see [HKN<sup>+</sup>05] for a related discussion on black-box combiners). Furthermore, the FE combiner from [Theorem 3](#) makes only black-box use of the underlying FE candidates, whereas the FE combiner from [Theorem 2](#) is inherently non-black-box.

In terms of techniques, we introduce mechanisms to emulate a MPC protocol using functional encryption candidates. This is reminiscent of “MPC-in-the-head” paradigm introduced by Ishai et al. [IKOS07] and more relevant to the context of FE is the work of Gorbunov et al. [GVW12] who

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<sup>5</sup>Note that [AJS17] required sub-exponential hardness only for constructing iO combiners, not for constructing FE combiners.

used information-theoretic MPC protocols to construct single-key FE. However, we encounter new challenges to implement the “MPC-in-the-head” paradigm in our context.

**Universal Functional Encryption:** We strengthen our constructions of FE combiners by showing how to transform them into combiners that also work when the insecure candidates don’t necessarily satisfy correctness (of course, we still require that the secure candidate is correct). Such combiners are called *robust combiners*. To do this, we present correctness amplification theorems based on previous works on indistinguishability obfuscation [BV16, AJS17] and, in particular, our correctness amplification assumes only one-way functions (unlike [BV16, BV17]). Robust combiners have been useful in universal constructions [AJN<sup>+</sup>16, AJS17]. Roughly speaking, a universal construction of FE is a concrete construction of FE that is secure as long as any secure and correct construction exists. We show how to build universal functional encryption from robust FE combiners.

**Theorem 4** (Universal Functional Encryption). *Assuming pseudorandom generators in  $\text{NC}^1$ , there is a universal unbounded-key functional encryption scheme.*

Our construction will be parameterized by  $T$ , where  $T$  is an upper bound on the running time of all the algorithms associated with the secure candidate. This was a feature even in the universal iO construction of [AJN<sup>+</sup>16].

**Related Work:** The notion of combiners has been studied in the context of many cryptographic primitives. Asmuth and Blakely [AB81] studied combiners for encryption schemes. Levin proposed a universal construction of one-way functions [Lev87]. Later, a systematic study of combiners and their relation to universal constructions was proposed by Harnik et al. [HKN<sup>+</sup>05] (also relevant are the constructions in [Her05, Her09]). Recently, Ananth et al. [AJN<sup>+</sup>16] designed universal constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO). Concurrently, Fishclin et al. also proposed combiners in the context of program obfuscation [FHNS16]. Ananth et al. [AJS17] then proposed the concept of transforming combiners that transforms many candidates of a primitive  $X$ , with at least one of them being secure and, into a secure candidate of primitive  $Y$ . In particular, they construct iO-to-functional encryption transforming combiners.

Subsequent to our work, [QWW18] (FOCS’18) matched our result by also achieving a two-round semi-honest MPC protocol in the plain model with depth-proportional communication complexity assuming LWE, using laconic function evaluation instead of FE combiners. [QWW18]’s protocol consists of pre-processing, online, and post-processing phases. Additionally, they note that the computation complexity of the online phase is also independent of the size of the function being computed. After seeing their work, we observe that our protocol also satisfies this property. In particular, in the construction in Section 5, steps 1 – 3 in round 1 can be made the preprocessing phase. The resulting protocol will now have online computation complexity independent of the size of the function being computed.

## 1.2 Technical Overview

We begin by tackling the problem of constructing secure multi-party computation with depth-proportional communication complexity, i.e, proportional only to the depth of the circuit being securely computed, starting from a functional encryption combiner.

**Round-Optimal MPC with Depth-Proportional Communication:** Let’s start by recalling prior known two-round secure MPC protocols [MW16, PS16, BP16] with depth-proportional communication in the CRS model. The basic template is as follows: in the first

round, the  $i^{\text{th}}$  party broadcasts an encryption of its input  $x_i$ . These ciphertexts are computed with respect to public keys that are derived from the CRS. All the  $n$  parties then homomorphically compute on the encryptions of  $(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  to obtain a ciphertext of  $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ , where  $f$  is the function they wish to securely compute. The resulting ciphertext is then partially decrypted, and every party broadcasts its partially decrypted value in the second round. These values can be combined to recover the output of the functionality.

One could imagine getting rid of the CRS in the above protocol using the recent round-optimal MPC protocols in the plain model [GS17, BL18]. If this were possible, then it would yield a round-optimal MPC in the plain model that has depth-proportional communication complexity. However, the issue is that the messages in the first round of [MW16, PS16, BP16] are computed as functions of the CRS and thus, such an approach would inherently require three rounds.

To overcome this, we introduce a mechanism to parallelize the evaluation and the encryption processes. The output of the evaluation in our approach is the output of the functionality and not a partially decrypted value, as was the case in [MW16, PS16, BP16], and thus, we save one round. To implement this high level idea, we use a functional encryption combiner. Before we describe the high level template, we require that the underlying functional encryption combiner satisfies the *decomposability property*: Suppose we have FE candidates  $\text{FE}_1, \dots, \text{FE}_n$ . Then, a functional key for a circuit  $C$  in the combined scheme is just a concatenation of the functional keys for  $C$ ,  $(sk_1^C, \dots, sk_n^C)$ , where  $sk_i^C$  is computed with respect to the  $i^{\text{th}}$  FE candidate.

The template of our depth-proportional communication secure MPC construction from an FE combiner satisfying this decomposability property is in Figure 1.2. As an intermediate tool, we use a size-proportional communication secure MPC protocol (henceforth, also referred to as a communication inefficient protocol). By this, we mean that the communication complexity of the secure MPC protocol grows polynomially with the size of the circuit being securely computed.

**Our Approach**

**Goal:**  $t$ -round depth-proportional communication secure MPC from  $t$ -round size-proportional communication secure MPC using decomposable FE combiners.

- Suppose the input of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  party is  $x_i$  and  $f$  is the function to be securely computed. All the parties execute the  $t$ -round (communication-inefficient) MPC protocol to obtain an encryption of  $(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  with respect to the combined FE scheme.
- Simultaneously, the  $i^{\text{th}}$  party computes the functional key of  $f$  with respect to the  $i^{\text{th}}$  candidate and sends it to everyone.

Figure 2: Our approach to construct round-optimal depth-proportional communication secure MPC from decomposable functional encryption combiners.

At the end of second round, every party has an encryption of  $(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  with respect to the combined candidate and functional keys for  $f$  with respect to every candidate. From the decomposability property, this is equivalent to generating a functional key for  $f$  with respect to the combined candidate. Each party can separately execute the FE combiner decryption algorithm to obtain  $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ , as desired. Here, we crucially rely on the fact that all the FE candidates are correct. This completes the high level description of the template.

In the first bullet in Figure 1.2, we instantiate the secure MPC protocol with size-proportional communication with [GS17, BL18, GS18]. The works of [GS17, BL18, GS18] are two-round

protocols in the plain model and by suitably instantiating the FE combiners (described later), our approach yields a two-round MPC protocol with depth-proportional communication.

To argue security of our MPC protocol, the idea is to start with the assumption of a secure FE scheme and instantiate all the candidates using the same FE scheme. If the adversary corrupts all but the  $j^{\text{th}}$  party, this means that he can obtain all the master secret keys of the FE scheme except the  $j^{\text{th}}$  one. This is effectively the same as all except the  $j^{\text{th}}$  candidate being broken. At this point, we can use the security of the  $j^{\text{th}}$  FE scheme to argue the security of the MPC protocol. This shows that the above template yields a secure two-round MPC protocol assuming a secure FE scheme.

Note that we also assume a two-round (communication-inefficient) MPC protocol. Without showing that our protocol has depth-proportional communication, the above protocol doesn't achieve anything new. Indeed, it is unclear why our protocol should have depth-proportional communication. There are two sources of concern: (i) we are still using a communication *inefficient* MPC protocol and, (ii) the functional key of  $f$  could be proportional to the size of the circuit computing  $f$ . Suppose we had a secure (magical) FE scheme satisfying the following two properties: (1) the encryption complexity of this FE scheme is proportional only to the depth of  $f$ , and (2) the functional key of  $f$  is of the form  $(f, \text{aux})$ , where  $|\text{aux}|$  only depends on the depth of the circuit computing  $f$ . We claim that this would immediately show that our protocol has communication complexity proportional only to the depth. Concern (i) is addressed by the fact the communication-inefficient MPC protocol is used only to evaluate the encryption circuit of the underlying FE scheme. Since the underlying FE scheme is succinct, the size of the encryption circuit only depends on the depth of the functionality  $f$ . Therefore, the communication complexity of the communication-inefficient MPC protocol does not affect our construction. Concern (ii) is handled by the fact that the parties only have to send the “aux” part of the function keys to the other parties, which is only proportional to the depth of  $f$ .

We next observe that the functional encryption scheme of Goldwasser et al. [GKP<sup>+</sup>13] can be used to satisfy both properties (1) and (2). We recall the functional encryption construction of Goldwasser et al.: the building blocks in this construction are attribute based encryption (ABE) for circuits, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), and garbling schemes.

- To encrypt a message  $x$ , first encrypt  $x$  using a (leveled) FHE scheme. Suppose the maximum output length of the functions for which we generate functional keys is  $L_{out}$ . Generate  $\text{poly}(L_{out})$  ABE encryptions of the FHE ciphertext, for some fixed polynomial  $\text{poly}$ , along with wire keys of a garbled circuit. The garbled circuit is associated with the FHE decryption circuit.
- A functional key of  $f$  consists of  $\text{poly}(L_{out})$  ABE keys associated with the circuit that computes the FHE evaluation of  $f$ .

If we instantiate the ABE scheme with the scheme of Boneh et al. [BGG<sup>+</sup>14] and the leveled FHE scheme with any of the schemes proposed in [GSW13, BGV14], we achieve both properties (1) and (2) described above. The schemes of [BGG<sup>+</sup>14] and [GSW13, BGV14] have encryption complexity proportional only to the depth of the circuit. In terms of the structure of the functional key, we note that the ABE scheme of [BGG<sup>+</sup>14] satisfies this nice property: you can express the ABE key of a function  $f$  as  $(f, \text{aux})$ , where  $|\text{aux}|$  is a polynomial in depth and  $L_{out}$ . This can be used to argue that the above FE scheme satisfies property (2).

Thus starting from an FE combiner, we have constructed a communication-efficient two-round MPC. We note that the FE combiner is required to satisfy simulation security in order to prove that the resulting MPC is simulation secure. The security proof of the resulting MPC directly follows from the simulation security of the FE combiner and the simulation security of the underlying communication inefficient MPC.

Next, we show how to construct such an FE combiner.

**Constructing the FE combiner:** As in the works of [AJN<sup>+</sup>16, AJS17], we view the FE candidates as analogous to parties in a secure MPC protocol. Suppose we want to construct an FE combiner for  $n$  candidates. We start with a two-round (semi-honest) secure  $n$ -party MPC protocol in the plain model. To encrypt a message  $x$ , first additively secret share  $x$  into shares  $(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ . Compute the first round messages of all the parties, where the  $i^{\text{th}}$  party’s input is  $x_i$ . Finally, for every  $i \in [n]$ , encrypt the first round messages of all the parties along with the local state of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  party using  $i^{\text{th}}$  FE candidate. All the  $n$  encryptions will form the ciphertext corresponding to the FE combiner scheme.

To generate a functional key for  $f$ , we generate  $n$  functional keys with each key associated with an FE candidate. The  $i^{\text{th}}$  functional key computes the next message function of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  party. In this context, we define the next message function to be a deterministic algorithm that takes as input the state of the party along with the messages received so far and produces the next message. Moreover, the MPC functionality associated with the next message function is as follows: it takes as input  $n$  shares of  $x$ , reconstructs  $x$ , and computes  $f(x)$ . The functional key of  $f$  corresponding to the FE combiner is the collection of all these  $n$  functional keys.

The decryption in the FE combiner scheme proceeds by recovering the first and second round messages of all the parties. The reconstruction algorithm of the secure MPC protocol is then executed to recover the output of the functionality. An issue here is that the reconstruction part need not be publicly computable. Meaning that it might not be possible to recover the output of the functionality from the transcript of the protocol alone. This can be resolved by revealing the local state of one of the parties to the FE evaluator who can then use this to recover the output. We implement this by considering an  $(n+1)$ -party MPC protocol with the FE evaluator corresponding to one of the parties in the MPC protocol.

Without restricting ourselves to a specific type of two-round secure MPC protocols, the above template could be ill defined for two reasons:

- *Function-Dependence:* The first round messages of the MPC protocol we start off with could depend on the functionality being securely computed. This means that the FE encryptor needs to be aware of the function  $f$  when it is encrypting the message  $x$ . Hence, we need to enforce a delayed function-dependence property on the underlying MPC protocol. Roughly, this property states that the first round messages of the MPC protocol are independent of the functionality being securely computed.
- *Reusability:* Suppose we wish to construct a *collusion-resistant* FE combiner, meaning that the FE combiner is secure even if the adversary obtains multiple functional keys during the security experiment. Even if one of the candidates is secure in the collusion-resistant setting, the above template doesn’t necessarily yield a collusion-resistant FE combiner. This is because the first round MPC messages are “reused” across different FE evaluations. The security of MPC, as is, doesn’t necessarily guarantee any security if the first round messages are reused for secure computation of multiple functionalities. Hence, we need to enforce a corresponding reusability property on the underlying MPC protocol to make it work in the collusion resistant setting.

Once we start with a delayed function-dependent and reusable secure MPC protocol, we can implement an FE combiner using the above template. We observe that the schemes of [MW16, PS16, BP16] are both delayed function-dependent and reusable. As a corollary, we obtain an FE combiner based on learning with errors.

We note that this would give an FE combiner that satisfies indistinguishability security. This is inherent since collusion-resistant FE that is also simulation secure was shown to be impossible [AGVW13]. Thus, for our application of communication efficient MPC, we construct a simulation secure FE combiner in the single-key setting (i.e., the adversary can only submit one function query) starting from a threshold fully homomorphic encryption scheme.

**FE Combiner from Weaker Assumptions:** The above constructions and previous constructions of FE combiners [AJS17] relied on the learning with errors assumption. However, it would be interesting to try to construct an FE combiner from weaker assumptions. Our first observation is that there is a simple construction of an FE combiner for two FE candidates. In this case, one can simply “nest” the two candidates. That is, if the candidates are denoted  $FE_1$  and  $FE_2$ , we encrypt a message  $x$  by first encrypting  $x$  under  $FE_1$  and then encrypting the resulting ciphertext under  $FE_2$ . To construct a function key for  $f$ , we first construct the function key  $SK_1$  for  $f$  using  $FE_1$  and then construct the function key  $SK_2$  for the decryption circuit of  $FE_1$ , with  $SK_1$  hardcoded as the function key, using  $FE_2$ .  $SK_2$  is then the function key for  $f$  in the nested scheme. In fact, this nested approach works to combine any constant  $d$  number of candidates. However, this approach does not scale polynomially in the number of candidates, and therefore, does not give us an FE combiner for a polynomial number of candidates.

Using the above observation, we note that we can evaluate circuits over a constant number of inputs. In particular, we can evaluate constant-sized products. If we could compute the sum of various constant-sized products, then we could compute constant-degree polynomials, which would allow us to apply known bootstrapping techniques to go from FE for constant degree polynomials to FE for arbitrary functions via randomized encodings. Such randomized encodings can be constructed assuming a PRG in  $NC^1$  [AIK05]. But how do we go about computing the sums of constant degree polynomials? To reason about this, we will view this as an MPC problem, where each FE candidate is associated with a party. Given an input  $x$ , we bitwise secret share  $x$  amongst all the parties. This effectively gives us an MPC problem where each party/candidate has a secret input (their share of  $x$ ). For simplicity, let’s consider the case where each candidate is given a single bit (the  $i$ th candidate is given the bit  $x_i$ ). As an example, suppose we wished to evaluate the polynomial

$$x_1^2 + x_1x_2 + x_1x_3 + x_2x_3.$$

Using the simple nested combiner for two candidates, we could evaluate each monomial and then sum the resulting monomial evaluations to compute the polynomial. However, this approach is flawed, since it will leak the values of each of the monomials, whereas functional encryption requires *only* the value of the polynomial to be computable and nothing else. We resolve this issue by masking each of the monomial evaluations by secret shares of 0 such that summing all these values gives the correct polynomial evaluation, but the individual computed monomial evaluations hide the true values of the monomials. To illustrate this, for the above polynomial, candidate 1 has its secret input in 3 monomials  $x_1^2, x_1x_2$ , and  $x_1x_3$ . We secret share 0 across 3 shares. Let  $Share_{1,1}, Share_{1,2}, Share_{1,3}$  denote these values, where

$$Share_{1,1} + Share_{1,2} + Share_{1,3} = 0.$$

Similarly, candidates 2 and 3 have their secret inputs in 2 monomials:  $x_1x_2, x_2x_3$  for candidate 2 and  $x_1x_3, x_2x_3$  for candidate 3. We secret share 0 across 2 shares for each of these candidates. These shares are denoted  $Share_{2,1}, Share_{2,2}$  for candidate 2 and  $Share_{3,1}, Share_{3,2}$  for candidate 3. We then place a total ordering on the monomials of the polynomial in order to assign the shares to the monomials. Suppose our ordering was

$$x_1^2 < x_1x_2 < x_1x_3 < x_2x_3.$$

Then, we would see that  $x_1^2$  was the first monomial containing  $x_1$  and assign  $Share_{1,1}$  to this monomial. For  $x_1x_2$ , we see that it is the second monomial containing  $x_1$  and the first monomial containing  $x_2$ . Therefore, we assign the shares  $Share_{1,2}$  and  $Share_{2,1}$  to the monomial  $x_1x_2$ . In a similar manner, we assign the shares  $Share_{1,3}, Share_{3,1}$  to  $x_1x_3$  and the shares  $Share_{2,2}, Share_{3,2}$  to  $x_2x_3$ . When generating the function key to evaluate the monomial  $x_1^2$ , we actually give out a function key that evaluates  $x_1^2 + Share_{1,1}$ . Similarly, when generating a function key to evaluate the monomial  $x_1x_2$ , we actually give out a function key that evaluates  $x_1x_2 + Share_{1,2} + Share_{2,1}$ .

By proceeding in this manner, we have made it so that each monomial evaluation hides the actual monomial value, but the sum of the monomial evaluations gives the polynomial value. However, this approach still raises several concerns: (i) how can we ensure that our secret sharing procedure hides intermediate sums of monomials, and (ii) how can we coordinate the randomness needed to generate the secret shares amongst the various monomials. To illustrate the first issue, suppose that the polynomial to evaluate was  $x_1 + x_2$ . In this instance, we would not add any secret shares, which would reveal  $x_1$  and  $x_2$ . Fortunately, the first issue is not an issue at all, since such problematic polynomials will not occur. This is because we begin by secret sharing the bits of the input  $x$  amongst the candidates. Therefore, every monomial will be broken into the sum of new monomials, such that each candidate contains a private bit in one of these new monomials. Since one of the candidates is secure, the secret sharing amongst the monomials with bits corresponding to the secure candidate ensures that nothing except the actual polynomial evaluation can be learned. To solve issue (ii), we utilize a PRF and generate a random PRF key for each candidate. This PRF key is then used to generate the secret shares of 0 associated with that candidate.

**Organization:** We begin by defining the notion of functional encryption and secure multi-party computation in [Section 2](#). In [Section 3](#), we define the notion of a functional encryption combiner. In [Section 4](#), we show how to build a decomposable FE combiner that will be used as a building block in the construction of our round-optimal and communication efficient MPC protocol and how to instantiate it from [\[GKP<sup>+</sup>13\]](#). In [Section 5](#), we give the construction of our round-optimal and communication efficient MPC protocol. In [Section 6](#), we show how to build an FE combiner assuming the existence of a PRG in  $\text{NC}^1$ . In [Section 7](#), we demonstrate how to convert a delayed function-dependent and reusable round-optimal secure MPC protocol into an FE combiner. Finally, in [Section 8](#), we show how to convert an FE combiner into a robust FE combiner and build a universal functional encryption scheme.

## 2 Preliminaries

We denote the security parameter by  $\lambda$ . For an integer  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , we use  $[n]$  to denote the set  $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ . We use  $\mathcal{D}_0 \cong_c \mathcal{D}_1$  to denote that two distributions  $\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1$  are computationally indistinguishable. We use  $\text{negl}(\lambda)$  to denote a function that is negligible in  $\lambda$ . We use  $x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}$  to denote that  $x$  is the output of a randomized algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ , where the randomness of  $\mathcal{A}$  is sampled from the uniform distribution.

### 2.1 Functional Encryption

We define the notion of a (secret key) functional encryption candidate and a (secret key) functional encryption scheme. A functional encryption candidate is associated with the correctness requirement, while a secure functional encryption scheme is associated with both correctness and security.

**Syntax of a Functional Encryption Candidate/Scheme.** A functional encryption (FE) candidate/scheme FE for a class of circuits  $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$  consists of four polynomial time algorithms (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec) defined as follows. Let  $\mathcal{X}_\lambda$  be the input space of the circuit class  $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$  and let  $\mathcal{Y}_\lambda$  be the output space of  $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$ . We refer to  $\mathcal{X}_\lambda$  and  $\mathcal{Y}_\lambda$  as the input and output space of the candidate/scheme, respectively.

- **Setup**,  $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ : It takes as input the security parameter  $\lambda$  and outputs the master secret key  $\text{MSK}$ .
- **Encryption**,  $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{FE.Enc}(\text{MSK}, m)$ : It takes as input the master secret key  $\text{MSK}$  and a message  $m \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$  and outputs  $\text{CT}$ , an encryption of  $m$ .
- **Key Generation**,  $\text{SK}_C \leftarrow \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, C)$ : It takes as input the master secret key  $\text{MSK}$  and a circuit  $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$  and outputs a function key  $\text{SK}_C$ .
- **Decryption**,  $y \leftarrow \text{FE.Dec}(\text{SK}_C, \text{CT})$ : It takes as input a function secret key  $\text{SK}_C$ , a ciphertext  $\text{CT}$  and outputs a value  $y \in \mathcal{Y}_\lambda$ .

Throughout this work, we will only be concerned with *uniform* algorithms. That is, (**Setup**, **Enc**, **KeyGen**, **Dec**) can be represented as Turing machines (or equivalently uniform circuits).

We describe the properties associated with the above candidate.

### Approximate Correctness.

**Definition 1** (Approximate Correctness). *A functional encryption candidate  $\text{FE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$  is said to be  $\alpha$ -correct if it satisfies the following property: for every  $C : \mathcal{X}_\lambda \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}_\lambda \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda, m \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$  it holds that:*

$$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} \text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda) \\ \text{CT} \leftarrow \text{FE.Enc}(\text{MSK}, m) \\ \text{SK}_C \leftarrow \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, C) \\ C(m) \leftarrow \text{FE.Dec}(\text{SK}_C, \text{CT}) \end{array} \right] \geq \alpha,$$

where the probability is taken over the coins of the algorithms.

We refer to FE candidates that satisfy the above definition of correctness with  $\alpha = 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$  for a negligible function  $\text{negl}(\cdot)$  as (almost) correct candidates.

Except for [Section 8](#), we will only deal with correct candidates. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, all FE candidates throughout this paper satisfy (almost) correctness.

We refer the reader to [Appendix A.1](#) for the indistinguishability and simulation based security definitions.

**Collusions.** We can parameterize the FE candidate by the number of function secret key queries that the adversary can make in the security experiment. If the adversary can only submit an a priori upper bounded  $q$  secret key queries, we say that the scheme is  $q$ -key or  $q$ -collusion secure. We say that the functional encryption scheme unbounded-key or unbounded-collusion secure if the adversary can make an unbounded (polynomial) number of function secret key queries. In this work, unless otherwise stated, we will allow the adversary to make an arbitrary polynomial number of function secret key queries.

### Succinctness.

**Definition 2** (Succinctness). *A functional encryption candidate  $\text{FE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Dec})$  for a circuit class  $\mathcal{C}$  containing circuits that take inputs of length  $\ell_{\text{in}}$ , outputs strings of length  $\ell_{\text{out}}$  bits and are of depth at most  $d$  is said to be succinct if the following holds: For any circuit  $C \in \mathcal{C}$ ,*

- Let  $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ . The size of the circuit  $\text{FE.Enc}(\text{MSK}, \cdot) < \text{poly}(\lambda, d, \ell_{\text{in}}, \ell_{\text{out}})$  for some polynomial  $\text{poly}$ .
- The function key  $\text{SK}_C \leftarrow \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, C)$  is of the form  $(C, \text{aux})$  where  $|\text{aux}| \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, d, \ell_{\text{out}})$  for some polynomial  $\text{poly}$ .

In general, an FE candidate/scheme need not satisfy succinctness. However, we will need to utilize succinct FE candidates when constructing depth-proportional communication MPC (Section 4 and Section 5). In such cases, we will explicitly state that the FE candidates are succinct.

**FE Candidates vs. FE Schemes.** As defined above, an FE scheme must satisfy *both* correctness and security, while an FE candidate is simply the set of algorithms. Unless otherwise specified, we will be dealing with FE candidates that satisfy correctness. We will only refer to FE constructions as FE schemes if it is known that the construction satisfies both correctness and security.

## 2.2 Secure Multi-Party Computation

The syntax and security definitions for secure multi-party computation can be found in Appendix A. Since we are dealing throughout this paper with the efficiency of MPC protocols, we give the definition of a succinct MPC protocol below.

**Definition 3** (Succinct MPC protocol). *Consider an  $n$ -party semi-honest secure MPC protocol  $\Pi$  for a functionality  $f$ , represented by a polynomial-sized circuit  $C$ . We define the communication complexity of  $\Pi$  to be the total length of all the messages exchanged in the protocol.*

*We define  $\Pi$  to be succinct if the communication complexity of  $\Pi$  is  $\text{poly}(\lambda, d, n)$ , where  $\lambda$  is the security parameter and  $d$  is the depth of the circuit  $C$ .*

## 2.3 Additional Preliminaries

In this work, we will also make occasional use of threshold leveled fully homomorphic encryption [AJLA<sup>+</sup>12, MW16, BGG<sup>+</sup>17] and garbling schemes [Yao86, BHR12]. Formal definitions of these primitives can be found in Appendix A.

## 3 FE Combiners: Definition

In this section, we give a formal definition of an FE combiner. Intuitively, an FE combiner  $\text{FEComb}$  takes  $n$  FE candidates,  $\text{FE}_1, \dots, \text{FE}_n$  and compiles them into a new FE candidate with the property that  $\text{FEComb}$  is a secure FE scheme provided that at least one of the  $n$  FE candidates is a secure FE scheme.

**Syntax of a Functional Encryption Combiner.** A functional encryption combiner  $\text{FEComb}$  for a class of circuits  $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$  consists of four polynomial time algorithms ( $\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Dec}$ ) defined as follows. Let  $\mathcal{X}_\lambda$  be the input space of the circuit class  $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$  and let  $\mathcal{Y}_\lambda$  be the output space of  $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$ . We refer to  $\mathcal{X}_\lambda$  and  $\mathcal{Y}_\lambda$  as the input and output space of the combiner, respectively. Furthermore, let  $\text{FE}_1, \dots, \text{FE}_n$  denote the descriptions of  $n$  FE candidates.

- **Setup**,  $\text{FEComb.Setup}(1^\lambda, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]})$ : It takes as input the security parameter  $\lambda$  and the descriptions of  $n$  FE candidates  $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$  and outputs the master secret key  $\text{MSK}$ .

- **Encryption**,  $\text{FEComb.Enc}(\text{MSK}, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, m)$ : It takes as input the master secret key MSK, the descriptions of  $n$  FE candidates  $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ , and a message  $m \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$  and outputs CT, an encryption of  $m$ .
- **Key Generation**,  $\text{FEComb.Keygen}(\text{MSK}, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, C)$ : It takes as input the master secret key MSK, the descriptions of  $n$  FE candidates  $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ , and a circuit  $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$  and outputs a function key  $\text{SK}_C$ .
- **Decryption**,  $\text{FEComb.Dec}(\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \text{SK}_C, \text{CT})$ : It is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input the descriptions of  $n$  FE candidates  $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ , a function secret key  $\text{SK}_C$ , and a ciphertext CT and outputs a value  $y \in \mathcal{Y}_\lambda$ .

**Remark 1.** *In the formal definition above, we have included  $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ , the descriptions of the FE candidates, as input to all the algorithms of FEComb. For notational simplicity, we will often forgo these inputs and assume that they are implicit.*

We now define the properties associated with an FE combiner. The three properties are correctness, polynomial slowdown, and security. Correctness is analogous to that of an FE candidate, provided that the  $n$  input FE candidates are all valid FE candidates. Polynomial slowdown says that the running times of all the algorithms of FEComb are polynomial in  $\lambda$  and  $n$ . Finally, security intuitively says that if at least one of the FE candidates is also secure, then FEComb is a secure FE scheme. We provide the formal definitions below.

### Correctness.

**Definition 4** (Correctness). *Suppose  $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$  are correct FE candidates. We say that an FE combiner is correct if for every circuit  $C : \mathcal{X}_\lambda \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}_\lambda \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ , and message  $m \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$  it holds that:*

$$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} \text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{FEComb.Setup}(1^\lambda, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}) \\ \text{CT} \leftarrow \text{FEComb.Enc}(\text{MSK}, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, m) \\ \text{SK}_C \leftarrow \text{FEComb.Keygen}(\text{MSK}, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, C) \\ C(m) \leftarrow \text{FEComb.Dec}(\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \text{SK}_C, \text{CT}) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where the probability is taken over the coins of the algorithms and  $\text{negl}(\lambda)$  is a negligible function in  $\lambda$ .

### Polynomial Slowdown.

**Definition 5** (Polynomial Slowdown). *An FE combiner FEComb satisfies polynomial slowdown if on all inputs, the running times of  $\text{FEComb.Setup}$ ,  $\text{FEComb.Enc}$ ,  $\text{FEComb.Keygen}$ , and  $\text{FEComb.Dec}$  are at most  $\text{poly}(\lambda, n)$ , where  $n$  is the number of FE candidates that are being combined.*

### IND-Security.

**Definition 6** (IND-Secure FE Combiner). *An FE combiner FEComb is selectively secure if for any set  $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$  of correct FE candidates, it satisfies [Definition 16](#), where the descriptions of  $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$  are public and implicit in all invocations of the algorithms of FEComb, if at least one of the FE candidates  $\text{FE}_1, \dots, \text{FE}_n$  also satisfies [Definition 16](#).*

Note that [Definition 16](#) is the IND-security definition for FE. Unless otherwise specified, when we say a *secure* FE combiner, we refer to one that satisfies IND-security.

**Simulation Security.** Similarly to FE candidates, we can also consider a different notion of security called (single-key) simulation security.

**Definition 7.** An FE combiner  $\text{FEComb}$  is single-key simulation secure if for any set  $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$  of correct FE candidates, it satisfies [Definition 17](#), where the descriptions of  $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$  are public and implicit in all invocations of the algorithms of  $\text{FEComb}$ , if at least one of the FE candidates  $\text{FE}_1, \dots, \text{FE}_n$  also satisfies [Definition 17](#).

Note that [Definition 17](#) is the simulation security definition for FE.

**Succinctness.** Similarly to FE candidates, we can also define the notion of a succinct FE combiner. An FE combiner is not required to satisfy succinctness, but we will utilize a succinct FE combiner when construction low communication MPC ([Section 4](#) and [Section 5](#)).

**Definition 8.** An FE combiner  $\text{FEComb} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Dec})$  for a circuit class  $\mathcal{C}$  containing circuits that take inputs of length  $\ell_{\text{in}}$ , outputs strings of length  $\ell_{\text{out}}$  bits and are of depth at most  $d$  is succinct if for every set of succinct FE candidates  $\text{FE}_1, \dots, \text{FE}_n$ , the following holds: For any circuit  $C \in \mathcal{C}$ ,

- Let  $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{FEComb.Setup}(1^\lambda, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]})$ . The size of the circuit  $\text{FEComb.Enc}(\text{MSK}, \cdot) \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, d, \ell_{\text{in}}, \ell_{\text{out}}, n)$  for some polynomial  $\text{poly}$ .
- The function key  $\text{SK}_C \leftarrow \text{FEComb.KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, C)$  is of the form  $(C, \text{aux})$  where  $|\text{aux}| \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, d, \ell_{\text{out}}, n)$  for some polynomial  $\text{poly}$ .

## Robust FE Combiners and Universal FE.

**Remark 2.** We also define the notion of a robust FE combiner. An FE combiner  $\text{FEComb}$  is robust if it is an FE combiner that satisfies the three properties (correctness, polynomial slowdown, and security) associated with an FE combiner when given any set of FE candidates  $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ , provided that one is a correct and secure FE candidate. No restriction is placed on the other FE candidates. In particular, they need not satisfy correctness at all.

Robust FE combiners can be used to build a universal functional encryption scheme defined below.

**Definition 9** (*T-Universal Functional Encryption*). We say that an explicit Turing machine  $\Pi_{\text{univ}} = (\Pi_{\text{univ}}.\text{Setup}, \Pi_{\text{univ}}.\text{Enc}, \Pi_{\text{univ}}.\text{KeyGen}, \Pi_{\text{univ}}.\text{Dec})$  is a universal functional encryption scheme parametrized by  $T$  if  $\Pi_{\text{univ}}$  is a correct and secure FE scheme assuming the existence a correct and secure FE scheme with runtime  $< T$ .

## 4 Succinct Single-Key Simulation Secure Decomposable FE Combiner

In this section, we define and construct a succinct single-key simulation secure decomposable FE combiner (DFEComb for short) that will be useful later for our communication-efficient MPC result. Such a combiner is an FE combiner that satisfies succinctness, a stronger single-key simulation notion of security (defined below), and the following decomposability property.

## Decomposability.

**Definition 10** (Decomposability). *An FE combiner  $\text{FEComb} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Dec})$  is said to be decomposable if  $\text{Setup}$  runs  $\text{MSK}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  for each FE candidate  $\text{FE}_i$  and outputs  $\text{MSK} = \{\text{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$  and  $\text{KeyGen}$  operates according to the following two steps.*

1. *It first runs a deterministic subroutine  $\text{Partition}$  that, on input a circuit  $C$  and the number of candidates  $1^n$ , outputs  $(C_1, \dots, C_n)$ , where each  $C_i$  is a circuit of depth polynomial in the depth of  $C$ .*
2. *It then runs  $\text{SK}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}_i, C_i)$  and outputs  $\text{SK}_C = \{\text{SK}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ . That is, it generates a functional key for  $C_i$  using the  $i$ th candidate and outputs the union of all these functional keys as the function key for  $C$ .*

When dealing with decomposable FE combiners, we will often make reference to the algorithm  $\text{Partition}$  used in the first step of  $\text{KeyGen}$ . We will include this algorithm as an additional algorithm for such combiners.

Such a notion of decomposability is natural when we consider the connection between FE combiners and MPC. In particular, in MPC, each party generates messages and broadcasts them to the other parties. When relating FE combiners to MPC, it will be useful to associate each FE candidate to a party in the MPC protocol. Decomposability of the FE combiner intuitively allows each party to generate a functional key corresponding to their FE candidate and broadcast it to the other parties. Once each party has acquired all the functional keys from the other parties, the decomposability property ensures that each party possesses the functional key for the FE combiner.

**Single-key Simulation Security for Decomposable FE combiners:** We require decomposable FE combiners to satisfy a stronger single-key simulation security definition than [Definition 7](#). Essentially, this notion allows the adversary to choose a set  $I$  containing all but one of the FE candidates and then receive the master secret keys associated with these candidates. This is in contrast to the weaker single-key simulation security definition ([Definition 7](#)), where the adversary received no master secret key information. Formally, single-key simulation security for decomposable FE combiners is defined by the computational indistinguishability of the real and ideal experiments defined below.

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| $\text{RealExpt}_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n, C)$   | $\text{IdealExpt}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Sim}}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n, C)$  |
|---|---|
| 1. Compute $\text{DFEComb.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n) \rightarrow \text{MSK} = \{\text{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$  | 1. Compute $\text{DFEComb.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n) \rightarrow \text{MSK} = \{\text{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$  |
| 2. Compute $\text{DFEComb.Keygen}(\text{MSK}, C) \rightarrow \text{SK}_C = (\text{SK}_1, \dots, \text{SK}_n)$ | 2. Compute $\text{DFEComb.Keygen}(\text{MSK}, C) \rightarrow \text{SK}_C = (\text{SK}_1, \dots, \text{SK}_n)$ |
| 3. $\mathcal{A}_0(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n, C) \rightarrow (I, z_0)$ . Here, $I \subset [n]$ of size $n - 1$ .     | 3. $\mathcal{A}_0(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n, C) \rightarrow (I, z_0)$ . Here, $I \subset [n]$ of size $n - 1$ .     |
| 4. $\mathcal{A}_1(\{\text{MSK}_i\}_{i \in I}, \text{SK}_C, z_0) \rightarrow (m, z_1)$                         | 4. $\mathcal{A}_1(\{\text{MSK}_i\}_{i \in I}, \text{SK}_C, z_0) \rightarrow (m, z_1)$                         |
| 5. $\text{DFEComb.Enc}(\text{MSK}, m) \rightarrow \text{CT}$  | 5. $\text{Sim}(\text{MSK}, \text{SK}_C, C, C(m)) \rightarrow \text{CT}$                                       |
| 6. $\mathcal{A}_2(\text{CT}, \text{SK}_C, z_1) \rightarrow \alpha$  | 6. $\mathcal{A}_2(\text{CT}, \text{SK}_C, z_1) \rightarrow \alpha$  |
| 7. Output $\alpha$  | 7. Output $\alpha$  |

---

**Definition 11.** *(Single-Key Simulation Security of Decomposable FE Combiner) A single-key simulation-secure decomposable FE combiner scheme  $\text{DFEComb}$  for a class of circuits  $\mathcal{C}$  is said*

to be secure if there exists an algorithm  $\text{DFEComb.Sim}$  such that the following holds: for a sufficiently large security parameter  $\lambda$ , for every circuit  $C \in \mathcal{C}$ , correct FE candidates  $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$  with at least one guaranteed to be secure, PPT non-uniform adversary  $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$ :

$$|\Pr[1 \leftarrow \text{RealExpt}_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n, C)] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \text{IdealExpt}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Sim}}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n, C)]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

#### 4.1 Construction of a DFE Combiner from LWE

In this section, we give our construction of a succinct single-key simulation secure decomposable FE combiner  $\text{DFEComb}$  from LWE. For the construction let,  $\text{TFHE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Eval}, \text{PartDec}, \text{FinDec})$  denote a threshold homomorphic encryption scheme. Let  $\text{FE}_1, \dots, \text{FE}_n$  be  $n$  FE candidates. For simplicity of the exposition, all the algorithms of  $\text{DFEComb}$  implicitly get the description of the candidates as input. We show the following result.

**Theorem 5.** *Assuming TFHE is a secure threshold (leveled) homomorphic encryption scheme, there exists a succinct single-key simulation secure decomposable FE combiner.*

**Corollary 1.** *Assuming LWE, there exists a succinct single-key simulation secure decomposable FE combiner.*

**Construction.** Since we are constructing a *succinct* FE combiner, the combiner and FE candidates will be instantiated for circuit classes with bounded depth. To make this clear, we input the depth of the circuit class to the setup algorithm in the construction. Additionally, we include  $\text{Partition}$  in the list of algorithms for  $\text{DFEComb}$  as we will reference it later.

- $\text{DFEComb.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n)$  : It runs  $\text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{d'}) \rightarrow \text{MSK}_i$  for all  $i \in [n]$  and outputs  $\text{MSK} = \{\text{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ .

Here,  $d'$  is the depth of the circuit  $\text{TFHE.PartDec}(\cdot, \text{TFHE.Eval}(\cdot, \cdot))$  that evaluates a TFHE ciphertext using a circuit of depth  $d$ , and then computes a partial decryption. Note that,  $d' = \text{poly}(\lambda, d)$  due to compactness of TFHE.

- $\text{DFEComb.Enc}(\text{MSK}, m)$  : It executes the setup of TFHE;  $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_n)$ .

Then, it proceeds as follows:

- Compute  $\text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, m) \rightarrow \text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}$
  - For all  $i \in [n]$ , sample  $r_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{fhe}}}$ . Here,  $\ell_{\text{fhe}}$  is the length of the randomness required by the  $\text{PartDec}$  algorithm.
  - Compute  $\text{CT}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}_i, (\text{fpk}, \text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}, \text{fsk}_i, r_i))$ .
  - Output  $\text{CT} = \{\text{CT}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ .
- $\text{DFEComb.Partition}(C)$  : Consider the circuit  $F_C$  that takes as input four strings from implicit domains of the form  $(\text{fpk}', \text{CT}'_{\text{fhe}}, \text{SK}', r')$  and computes

$$p \leftarrow \text{TFHE.PartDec}(\text{SK}', \text{TFHE.Eval}(\text{fpk}', \text{CT}'_{\text{fhe}}, C); r').$$

The partition function outputs  $(F_C, \dots, F_C)$ .

- $\text{DFEComb.Keygen}(\text{MSK}, C)$  : The key generation algorithm first computes  $(C_1, \dots, C_n) \leftarrow \text{DFEComb.Partition}(C)$ . Then, it computes  $(C_i, \text{SK}_i) \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}_i, C_i)$  for  $i \in [n]$ . It outputs  $\text{SK} = (C, \{\text{SK}_i\}_{i \in [n]})$ .

- $\text{DFEComb.Dec}(\text{SK}, \text{CT})$  : The decryption algorithm first parses  $\text{SK}$  as  $(C, \{\text{SK}_i\}_{i \in [n]})$  and  $\text{CT}$  as  $\{\text{CT}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ . Then, it computes  $p_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Dec}(\text{SK}_i, \text{CT}_i)$ . Finally, it outputs  $\text{TFHE.FinDec}(p_1, \dots, p_n)$ .

**Lemma 2.** *The FE combiner construction above satisfies correctness, polynomial slowdown, and decomposability.*

The correctness and efficiency of the combiner follow immediately from the construction and the correctness and efficiency of the FE candidates and TFHE. Decomposability follows immediately from the construction.

**Lemma 3.** *The FE combiner construction above satisfies succinctness.*

Let's denote  $|m|$  to be  $\ell_{\text{in}}$ . Let's first bound the size of the encryption circuit. The ciphertext contains encryptions of  $\text{fpk}, \text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}, \text{fsk}_i, r_i$  using the candidate  $i$ . If each candidate  $\text{FE}_i$  satisfies the efficiency requirement, then the size of the circuit computing each FE candidate ciphertext is just  $\text{poly}_i(\lambda, d, \ell_{\text{in}}, \ell_{\text{out}})$  for some polynomial  $\text{poly}_i$  as it only depends on the following.

- The depth and output length of  $\text{TFHE.PartDec}(\text{TFHE.Eval}(\cdot, C); \cdot)$ , which is  $\text{poly}(\lambda, d, \ell_{\text{in}}, \ell_{\text{out}})$  since the algorithms of TFHE are efficient.
- The length of  $\text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}, \text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_i, r_i$ , which is also  $\text{poly}(\lambda, d, \ell_{\text{in}}, \ell_{\text{out}})$  due to the compactness and efficiency of TFHE.
- The length of the output of  $C$ , which is  $\ell_{\text{out}}$ .

The size of the circuit that computes  $\text{TFHE.Enc}$  is bounded by some polynomial  $\text{poly}(\lambda, d, \ell_{\text{in}})$  due to the compactness property of the TFHE scheme. Thus, the total size of the FE combiner encryption circuit is bounded by some polynomial  $\text{poly}(n, \lambda, d, \ell_{\text{in}}, \ell_{\text{out}})$ . Furthermore,  $|\{\text{SK}_i\}_{i \in [n]}| < \text{poly}(n, \lambda, d, \ell_{\text{out}})$  since each of the underlying FE candidates are succinct.

**Theorem 6.** *The FE combiner construction above satisfies the single-key simulation security definition for a decomposable FE combiner (Definition 11).*

This is the last step towards proving Theorem 5. We give a description of the simulator in Figure 3.

We now prove security via a sequence of hybrid experiments by arguing that every pair of consecutive hybrids is computationally indistinguishable. The first hybrid,  $\text{Hyb}_0$ , corresponds to the real experiment, while the last hybrid,  $\text{Hyb}_3$ , corresponds to the simulated experiment. We will use red, underlined text to denote the differences between consecutive hybrids.

$\text{Hyb}_0$  : This hybrid is the real experiment. Namely,

1. For every  $i \in [n]$ , run  $\text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{d'}) \rightarrow \text{MSK}_i$ .
2. Compute  $\text{DFEComb.Keygen}(\text{MSK}, C) \rightarrow \text{SK}_C = (\text{SK}_1, \dots, \text{SK}_n)$ .
3.  $\mathcal{A}_0(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n, C) \rightarrow (I, z_0)$ .
4.  $\mathcal{A}_1(\{\text{MSK}_i\}_{i \in I}, \text{SK}_C, z_0) \rightarrow (m, z_1)$ .
5. Run  $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_n)$ .
6. Compute  $\text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, m) \rightarrow \text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}$ .
7. For all  $i \in [n]$ , sample  $r_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{fhe}}}$ . Here,  $\ell_{\text{fhe}}$  is the length of the randomness required by  $\text{PartDec}$  algorithm.

**Input:** Master secret key  $\text{MSK} = (\text{MSK}_1, \dots, \text{MSK}_n)$ , functional key  $\text{SK}_C = \{\text{SK}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ , circuit  $C$ , value  $C(m)$ , set of insecure candidates  $I = [n] \setminus i^*$ .

- Run  $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_n)$
- Compute  $\text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, 0) \rightarrow \text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}$
- For all  $i \in I$ , sample  $r_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{fhe}}}$ . Here,  $\ell_{\text{fhe}}$  is the length of the randomness required by PartDec algorithm.
- Let  $\text{TFHE.Sim}(\text{TFHE.Eval}(C, \text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}), \{\text{fsk}_i\}_{i \in I}, C(m)) \rightarrow p_{i^*}$
- Compute  $\text{CT}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}_i, (\text{fpk}, \text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}, \text{fsk}_i, r_i))$  for all  $i \in I$ .
- Compute  $\text{CT}_{i^*} \leftarrow \text{FE}_{i^*}.\text{Sim}(\text{MSK}_{i^*}, C, \text{SK}_{i^*}, p_{i^*})$
- Output  $\text{CT} = \{\text{CT}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ .

Figure 3: Simulator of DFECOMB

8. Compute  $\text{CT}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}_i, (\text{fpk}, \text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}, \text{fsk}_i, r_i))$ .
9. Output  $\text{CT} = \{\text{CT}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ .
10.  $\mathcal{A}_2(\text{CT}, \text{SK}_C, z_1) \rightarrow \alpha$ .
11. Output  $\alpha$ .

$\text{Hyb}_1$  : This hybrid is exactly the same as the previous one except that now, the output ciphertext of the secure candidate  $\text{FE}_1$  (without loss of generality, assume that  $\text{FE}_1$  is a secure candidate and  $I = [2, n]$  for the rest of the hybrids) is simulated using the correct TFHE partial decryption  $p_1$  (defined below).

1. For every  $i \in [n]$ , run  $\text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{d'}) \rightarrow \text{MSK}_i$ .
2. Compute  $\text{DFECOMB.Keygen}(\text{MSK}, C) \rightarrow \text{SK}_C = (\text{SK}_1, \dots, \text{SK}_n)$ .
3.  $\mathcal{A}_0(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n, C) \rightarrow (I, z_0)$ .
4.  $\mathcal{A}_1(\{\text{MSK}_i\}_{i \in I}, \text{SK}_C, z_0) \rightarrow (m, z_1)$ .
5. Run  $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_n)$ .
6. Compute  $\text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, m) \rightarrow \text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}$ .
7. For all  $i \in [n]$ , sample  $r_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{fhe}}}$ . Here,  $\ell_{\text{fhe}}$  is the length of the randomness required by PartDec algorithm.
8. Let  $\text{TFHE.PartDec}(\text{TFHE.Eval}(\text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}, C), \text{fsk}_1; r_1) \rightarrow p_1$ .
9. Compute  $\text{CT}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}_i, (\text{fpk}, \text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}, \text{fsk}_i, r_i))$  for all  $i \in [2, n]$ .
10. Compute  $\text{CT}_1 \leftarrow \text{FE}_1.\text{Sim}(\text{MSK}_1, C, \text{SK}_1, p_1)$ .
11. Output  $\text{CT} = \{\text{CT}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ .

12.  $\mathcal{A}_2(\text{CT}, \text{SK}_C, z_1) \rightarrow \alpha$ .
13. Output  $\alpha$ .

Hyb<sub>2</sub> : This hybrid is exactly the same as the previous one except that now, the TFHE partial decryption is simulated using secret keys  $\text{fsk}_2, \dots, \text{fsk}_n$ .

1. For every  $i \in [n]$ , run  $\text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{d'}) \rightarrow \text{MSK}_i$ .
2. Compute  $\text{DFEComb.Keygen}(\text{MSK}, C) \rightarrow \text{SK}_C = (\text{SK}_1, \dots, \text{SK}_n)$ .
3.  $\mathcal{A}_0(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n, C) \rightarrow (I, z_0)$ .
4.  $\mathcal{A}_1(\{\text{MSK}_i\}_{i \in I}, \text{SK}_C, z_0) \rightarrow (m, z_1)$ .
5. Run  $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_n)$ .
6. Compute  $\text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, m) \rightarrow \text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}$
7. For all  $i \in [n]$ , sample  $r_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{fhe}}}$ . Here,  $\ell_{\text{fhe}}$  is the length of the randomness required by PartDec algorithm.
8. Let  $\text{TFHE.Sim}(\text{TFHE.Eval}(C, \text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}), \{\text{fsk}_i\}_{i \in [2, n]}, C(m)) \rightarrow p_1$ .
9. Compute  $\text{CT}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}_i, (\text{fpk}, \text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}, \text{fsk}_i, r_i))$  for all  $i \in [2, n]$ .
10. Compute  $\text{CT}_1 \leftarrow \text{FE}_1.\text{Sim}(\text{MSK}_1, C, \text{SK}_1, p_1)$ .
11. Output  $\text{CT} = \{\text{CT}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ .
12.  $\mathcal{A}_2(\text{CT}, \text{SK}_C, z_1) \rightarrow \alpha$ .
13. Output  $\alpha$ .

Hyb<sub>3</sub> : This hybrid is exactly the same as the previous one except that now,  $\text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}$  is set as encryption of 0.

1. For every  $i \in [n]$ , run  $\text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{d'}) \rightarrow \text{MSK}_i$ .
2. Compute  $\text{DFEComb.Keygen}(\text{MSK}, C) \rightarrow \text{SK}_C = (\text{SK}_1, \dots, \text{SK}_n)$ .
3.  $\mathcal{A}_0(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n, C) \rightarrow (I, z_0)$ .
4.  $\mathcal{A}_1(\{\text{MSK}_i\}_{i \in I}, \text{SK}_C, z_0) \rightarrow (m, z_1)$ .
5. Run  $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_n)$ .
6. Compute  $\text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, 0) \rightarrow \text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}$ .
7. For all  $i \in [n]$ , sample  $r_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{fhe}}}$ . Here,  $\ell_{\text{fhe}}$  is the length of the randomness required by PartDec algorithm.
8. Let  $\text{TFHE.Sim}(\text{TFHE.Eval}(C, \text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}), \{\text{fsk}_i\}_{i \in [2, n]}, C(m)) \rightarrow p_1$ .
9. Compute  $\text{CT}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}_i, (\text{fpk}, \text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}, \text{fsk}_i, r_i))$  for all  $i \in [2, n]$ .
10. Compute  $\text{CT}_1 \leftarrow \text{FE}_1.\text{Sim}(\text{MSK}_1, C, \text{SK}_1, p_1)$ .
11. Output  $\text{CT} = \{\text{CT}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ .
12.  $\mathcal{A}_2(\text{CT}, \text{SK}_C, z_1) \rightarrow \alpha$ .

13. Output  $\alpha$ .

**Lemma 4.** *Assuming  $\text{FE}_1$  is single-key simulation-secure,  $\text{Hyb}_0$  is indistinguishable to  $\text{Hyb}_1$ .*

*Proof.* The only difference between the two hybrids is the way  $\text{CT}_1$  is generated. In  $\text{Hyb}_0$ , it is generated honestly while in  $\text{Hyb}_1$ , it is simulated using the correct output  $p_1$ . We sketch the reduction here. The reduction generates TFHE parameters and the functional encryption keys for all candidates in  $[2, n]$ . Then, it generates the value  $p_1$  correctly and gives  $p_1$  to the challenger. The challenger either sends a simulated  $\text{FE}_1$  ciphertext or the actual ciphertext. This ciphertext is forwarded to the adversary. The reduction outputs whatever the adversary outputs.  $\square$

**Lemma 5.** *Assuming TFHE is a secure threshold (leveled) homomorphic encryption scheme,  $\text{Hyb}_1$  is indistinguishable to  $\text{Hyb}_2$ .*

*Proof.* The only difference between the two hybrids is the way  $p_1$  is generated. In  $\text{Hyb}_1$ , it is generated honestly while in  $\text{Hyb}_2$ , it is simulated using the secret keys  $\text{fsk}_2, \dots, \text{fsk}_n$  and the output  $C(m)$ . We sketch the reduction here. The adversary sends  $[2, n]$  to the reduction. The reduction sends it to the challenger and gets  $(\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_2, \dots, \text{fsk}_n)$  from the challenger. Then, the reduction generates  $\text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}$  using the message  $m$  sent by the adversary. The reduction also generates  $\text{FE}_i$  keys and interacts with the adversary using this information. It sends  $C(m)$  to the challenger. It either receives the actual  $p_1$  or a simulated  $p_1$  from the challenger. This response is then used to interact with the adversary. It outputs whatever the adversary outputs.  $\square$

**Lemma 6.** *Assuming TFHE is a secure threshold (leveled) homomorphic encryption scheme,  $\text{Hyb}_2$  is indistinguishable to  $\text{Hyb}_3$ .*

*Proof.* The only difference between the two hybrids is the way  $\text{CT}_{\text{fhe}}$  is generated. In  $\text{Hyb}_2$ , it is generated honestly while in  $\text{Hyb}_3$ , it is generated as an encryption of 0. Note that both hybrids are independent of  $\text{fsk}_1$ . Indistinguishability follows from the semantic security of TFHE.  $\square$

**Instantiation:** We have given a construction of a succinct single-key simulation secure decomposable FE combiner. We note that we can potentially instantiate all the candidates using the same scheme.

In particular, the FE construction in [GKP<sup>+</sup>13] can be made to satisfy these requirements. The candidate in [GKP<sup>+</sup>13] is based on any leveled FHE scheme, garbling scheme, and attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme for circuits. In order for the FE candidate to satisfy succinctness, the underlying ABE scheme must also be succinct. This can be done by instantiating the ABE scheme with [BGG<sup>+</sup>14, GVW15] and the leveled FHE scheme with [GSW13, BGV14] as described in the technical overview. All these results are based on LWE. Therefore, we arrive at the following lemma.

**Lemma 7.** *The FE construction in [GKP<sup>+</sup>13] is succinct according to Definition 2.*

Combining the above lemma and Theorem 5, we get the following corollary:

**Corollary 2.** *Assuming LWE, there exists a single-key simulation secure succinct FE scheme.*

**Remark:** At first glance, it might seem weird that we want to instantiate all the candidates using the same scheme, seemingly defeating the purpose of an FE combiner. However, looking ahead to the application to MPC, we associate each FE candidate with a party in the MPC protocol. There, the adversary might corrupt an arbitrary set of parties, which would translate to insecure FE candidates. Therefore, by instantiating all the candidates with the same (secure) scheme, we guarantee that the honest parties' inputs remain secure. More details on this are provided in the next section.

## 5 Round Optimal MPC with Depth-Proportional Communication from an FE Combiner

In this section, using any succinct single-key simulation secure decomposable FE combiner (see [Section 4](#)), we show how to compile any two round semi-honest secure MPC protocol into one where the communication complexity is proportional only to the depth of the circuit being evaluated.

Let  $\text{Comm.Compl}(\pi)$  denote the communication complexity of any protocol  $\pi$ . Let  $\lambda$  denote the security parameter,  $n$  denote the number of parties, and  $\ell$  denote the size of the input to each party. Formally, we show the following theorem:

**Theorem 7.** *Assuming the existence of*

- *A succinct single-key single-ciphertext simulation secure decomposable FE combiner (AND)*
- *Succinct FE candidates (AND)*
- *A two round semi-honest MPC in the plain model (that may not be communication efficient) that is secure against up to all but one corruption,*

*there exists a two round semi-honest MPC protocol  $\pi$  in the plain model that is secure against up to all but one corruption for any boolean circuit  $C$ , where the communication complexity of the protocol  $\pi$  is independent of the size of the circuit. That is,  $\text{Comm.Compl}(\pi) = \text{poly}(\text{Depth}(C), n, \ell, \lambda)$ .*

We know how to construct a succinct single-key simulation secure decomposable FE combiner based on the learning with errors (LWE) assumption (see [Section 4](#)). Further, from [Lemma 7](#), we know that the construction in [\[GKP<sup>+</sup>13\]](#) is a succinct FE candidate. Also, two round semi-honest MPC protocols secure against up to all but one corruption can be based on the LWE assumption [\[GS18, BL18, PVW08\]](#)<sup>6</sup>. Instantiating the primitives in the above theorem, we get the following corollary:

**Corollary 3.** *Assuming LWE, there exists a two round semi-honest MPC protocol  $\pi$  in the plain model that is secure against up to all but one corruption for any boolean circuit  $C$  with  $\text{Comm.Compl}(\pi) = \text{poly}(\text{Depth}(C), n, \ell, \lambda)$ .*

Furthermore, if we allow our protocol to have a preprocessing phase, we can obtain a two round semi-honest MPC protocol with depth-proportional communication complexity and with the computational complexity of each party in the online phase independent of the size of the circuit, matching the result of [\[QWW18\]](#). By simply making steps 1 – 3 in round 1 of our construction the preprocessing phase, we arrive at the following corollary:

**Corollary 4.** *Assuming LWE, there exists a two round semi-honest MPC protocol  $\pi$  in the plain model that is secure against up to all but one corruption for any boolean circuit  $C$  with  $\text{Comm.Compl}(\pi) = \text{poly}(\text{Depth}(C), n, \ell, \lambda)$  and with the computational complexity of the online phase  $\text{poly}(\text{Depth}(C), n, \ell, \lambda)$ .*

### 5.1 Construction

**Notation:**

- Consider  $n$  parties  $P_1, \dots, P_n$  with inputs  $x_1, \dots, x_n$ , respectively, who wish to evaluate a boolean circuit  $C$  on their joint inputs. Let  $\lambda$  denote the security parameter and without loss of generality, let's assume  $|x_i| = \lambda$  for all  $i \in [n]$ . Also, let's denote the randomness of each party  $P_i$  as  $r_i = (r_i^{\text{Setup}}, r_i^{\text{Enc}}, r_i^{\text{SH}}, r_i^{\text{KeyGen}})$ .

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<sup>6</sup>[\[GS18, BL18\]](#) showed how to construct two round semi-honest MPC in the plain model from any two round semi-honest OT in the plain model and [\[PVW08\]](#) show that the latter can be constructed from LWE.

- Let  $\text{DFEComb} = (\text{DFEComb.Setup}, \text{DFEComb.Enc}, \text{DFEComb.Keygen}, \text{DFEComb.Dec}, \text{DFEComb.Partition})$  be a succinct single-key simulation secure decomposable FE combiner (see Section 4) for  $n$  FE candidates  $\text{FE}_1, \dots, \text{FE}_n$ .
- Let  $\pi^{\text{SH}}$  be a two round semi-honest secure MPC protocol (not necessarily communication efficient). Let  $(\pi^{\text{SH}}.\text{Round}_1, \pi^{\text{SH}}.\text{Round}_2)$  denote the algorithms used by any party to compute the messages in each of the two rounds and  $\pi^{\text{SH}}.\text{Out}$  denote the algorithm to compute the final output. Further, let  $\pi^{\text{SH}}.\text{Sim} = (\pi^{\text{SH}}.\text{Sim}_1, \pi^{\text{SH}}.\text{Sim}_2)$  denote the simulator for this protocol - that is,  $\pi^{\text{SH}}.\text{Sim}_i$  is the simulator's algorithm to compute the  $i^{\text{th}}$  round's messages.

**Protocol.** We now describe the construction of our protocol  $\pi$  with depth-proportional communication complexity.

- **Round 1:** Each party  $P_i$  does the following:
  1. Generate  $\text{MSK}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  using randomness  $r_i^{\text{Setup}}$ .
  2. Compute  $(C_1, \dots, C_n) \leftarrow \text{DFEComb.Partition}(1^\lambda, C)$ .
  3. Compute  $\text{SK}_i = \text{FE}_i.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}_i, C_i)$  using randomness  $r_i^{\text{KeyGen}}$ .
  4. Participate in an execution of protocol  $\pi^{\text{SH}}$  with the remaining  $(n - 1)$  parties using input  $y_i = (x_i, \text{MSK}_i, r_i^{\text{Enc}})$  and randomness  $r_i^{\text{SH}}$  to compute the deterministic circuit  $C_{\text{CT}}$  defined in Figure 4. That is, compute the first round message  $\text{msg}_{1,i} \leftarrow \pi^{\text{SH}}.\text{Round}_1(y_i; r_i^{\text{SH}})$ .
  5. Output  $(\text{msg}_{1,i}, \text{SK}_i)$ .
- **Round 2:** Each party  $P_i$  does the following:
  1. Let  $\tau_1$  denote the transcript of protocol  $\pi^{\text{SH}}$  after round 1.
  2. Compute the second round message  $\text{msg}_{2,i} \leftarrow \pi^{\text{SH}}.\text{Round}_2(y_i, \tau_1; r_i^{\text{SH}})$  where  $y_i = (x_i, \text{MSK}_i, r_i^{\text{Enc}})$ .
  3. Output  $(\text{msg}_{2,i})$ .
- **Output Computation:** Each party  $P_i$  does the following:
  1. Let  $\tau_2$  denote the transcript of protocol  $\pi^{\text{SH}}$  after round 2.
  2. Compute the output of  $\pi^{\text{SH}}$  as  $\text{CT} \leftarrow \pi^{\text{SH}}.\text{Out}(y_i, \tau_2; r_i^{\text{SH}})$ .
  3. Let  $\text{SK}_C = (\text{SK}_1, \dots, \text{SK}_n)$ .
  4. Output  $\text{DFEComb.Dec}(\text{SK}_C, \text{CT})$ .

**Input:**  $\{(x_i, \text{MSK}_i, r_i^{\text{Enc}})\}_{i=1}^n$

- Let  $\text{MSK} = (\text{MSK}_1, \dots, \text{MSK}_n)$ ,  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  and  $r = (r_1^{\text{Enc}}, \dots, r_n^{\text{Enc}})$ .
- Output  $\text{DFEComb.Enc}(\text{MSK}, x)$  using randomness  $r$ .

Figure 4: Circuit  $C_{\text{CT}}$

**Correctness and Efficiency:** Correctness follows immediately from the construction. In particular, at the end of the protocol, each party possesses CT, an encryption of  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  under the FE combiner, and  $\text{SK}_C$ , the function key for  $C$ . This ciphertext can then be decrypted using  $\text{SK}_C$  to yield  $C(x)$ , as desired.

Now, let's analyze the communication complexity of the protocol. First, observe that each circuit  $C$  that is of depth  $d$  and outputs a single bit is partitioned into  $n$  circuits  $C_1, \dots, C_n$  by running the  $\text{DFECOMB.PARTITION}$  algorithm. The circuit  $C_i$  just computes a partial decryption of  $\text{TFHE.EVAL}(C, \cdot)$ . Now, even though  $C$  is a boolean circuit, the output length of  $C_i$  might not be 1. However, this is not an issue for us. Indeed, observe that from the compactness of the TFHE scheme, the length of the partial decryption is just  $\text{poly}(\lambda, d)$  for some fixed polynomial  $\text{poly}$  for all circuits  $C$  with depth  $d$  and output length 1. Thus, the size of the output length of  $C_i$  for all  $i \in [n]$  is at most  $\text{poly}(\lambda, d)$  bits. Thus, from Section 4, we know that  $|\text{SK}_i| = \text{poly}(d, n, \lambda)$  and  $|\text{CT}| = \text{poly}(d, n, \lambda)$ . Recall that CT is the ciphertext that is the output of the protocol  $\pi^{\text{SH}}$  (computed during decryption). In fact, from Section 4, we also know that the size of the circuit computing the ciphertext CT is also bounded by  $\text{poly}(d, n, \lambda)$ . Then, for the protocol  $\pi^{\text{SH}}$  recall that the input is  $y_i = (x_i, \text{MSK}_i, r_i^{\text{Enc}})$  and so  $|y_i| = \text{poly}(\lambda, d)$  for some polynomial. Therefore, for each party  $P_i$ ,  $|\text{msg}_{1,i}| = \text{poly}(d, n, \lambda)$  and  $|\text{msg}_{2,i}| = \text{poly}(d, n, \lambda)$ .

Therefore, in our two round protocol  $\pi$ , in each round the size of the message sent by any party is  $\text{poly}(n, d, \lambda)$ . Thus,  $\text{Comm.Compl}(\pi) = \text{poly}(n, d, \lambda)$ .

The above analysis was for circuits with boolean output. For circuits that output multi-bit strings, the communication complexity of our MPC protocol  $\pi$  is bounded by  $\text{poly}(n, d, \lambda) \cdot \ell_{\text{out}}$ , where  $\ell_{\text{out}}$  is the output length of the circuit. This follows immediately by viewing the multi-bit output circuit as  $\ell_{\text{out}}$  different boolean circuits and running in parallel.

## 5.2 Security Proof

We will first describe the simulator and then show that the real and ideal worlds are indistinguishable. Suppose the adversary corrupts a set of  $k$  parties (denoted by  $\text{Corr}$ ) with  $k < n$ . At a very high level, the simulator does the following: simulate the underlying semi-honest MPC protocol whose output - the FE combiner ciphertext - is computed using the simulator of the FE combiner. Below, we formally describe the simulator.

**Description of the Simulator:** The simulator  $\text{Sim}$  gets as input  $(\{m_i, r_i\}_{P_i \in \text{Corr}}, C(\{m_i\}_{i \in [n]}), C)$  and does the following:

- **Round 1:**

1. Compute  $(C_1, \dots, C_n) \leftarrow \text{DFECOMB.PARTITION}(1^\lambda, C)$ .
2. For each corrupt party  $P_i$ , parse  $r_i = (r_i^{\text{Setup}}, r_i^{\text{Enc}}, r_i^{\text{SH}}, r_i^{\text{KeyGen}})$ . Generate  $\text{MSK}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  and  $\text{SK}_i = \text{FE}_i.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}_i, C_i)$  using randomness  $r_i^{\text{Setup}}, r_i^{\text{KeyGen}}$  respectively.
3. For each honest party  $P_j$ , compute  $\text{MSK}_j \leftarrow \text{FE}_j.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  and  $\text{SK}_j = \text{FE}_j.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}_j, C_j)$  using uniformly generated randomness.
4. Pick one honest party  $P_{j^*} \notin \text{Corr}$  at random amongst the set of honest parties and let  $I$  denote the set of indices of all parties except  $P_{j^*}$ .
5. Compute  $\text{CT}^* = \text{DFECOMB.SIM}(\{\text{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{\text{SK}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, C, C(\{m_i\}_{i \in [n]}), I)$ .
6. Compute  $\text{msg}_1 \leftarrow \pi^{\text{SH}}.\text{SIM}_1(\text{CT}^*, \{m_i, \text{MSK}_i, r_i^{\text{Enc}}\}_{P_i \in \text{Corr}}, \{r_i^{\text{SH}}\}_{P_i \in \text{Corr}})$ . where  $\{r_i^{\text{SH}}\}_{P_i \in \text{Corr}}$  is the randomness of all the parties. Here,  $\text{msg}_1$  denotes the set of the first round messages of all the honest parties.
7. Output  $(\text{msg}_1, \{\text{SK}_j\}_{P_j \in [n]/\text{Corr}})$ .

- **Round 2:**

1. Compute  $\text{msg}_2 \leftarrow \pi^{\text{SH}}.\text{Sim}_2(\text{CT}^*, \{m_i, \text{MSK}_i, r_i^{\text{Enc}}\}_{P_i \in \text{Corr}}, \{r_i^{\text{SH}}\}_{P_i \in \text{Corr}})$  as the second round message of  $\pi^{\text{SH}}$ . Here,  $\text{msg}_2$  denotes the set of the first round messages of all the honest parties.
2. Output  $(\text{msg}_2)$ .

**Hybrids.** We will now complete the proof of [Theorem 7](#) via a sequence of computationally indistinguishable hybrids  $\text{Hyb}_0, \text{Hyb}_1, \text{Hyb}_2$  where  $\text{Hyb}_0$  corresponds to the real world and  $\text{Hyb}_2$  corresponds to the ideal world.

**Hyb<sub>0</sub> - Real World:** In this hybrid, consider a simulator  $\text{SimHyb}$  that plays the role of the honest parties. This corresponds to the real world experiment.

**Hyb<sub>1</sub> - Simulate MPC:** In this hybrid,  $\text{SimHyb}$  computes the messages of  $\pi^{\text{SH}}$  using the simulator. That is,  $\text{SimHyb}$  does the following:

- **Round 1:**

1. Compute  $(C_1, \dots, C_n) \leftarrow \text{DFECmb.Partition}(1^\lambda, C)$ .
2. For each corrupt party  $P_i$ , parse  $r_i = (r_i^{\text{Setup}}, r_i^{\text{Enc}}, r_i^{\text{SH}}, r_i^{\text{KeyGen}})$ . Generate  $\text{MSK}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  and  $\text{SK}_i = \text{FE}_i.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}_i, C_i)$  using randomness  $r_i^{\text{Setup}}, r_i^{\text{KeyGen}}$  respectively.
3. For each honest party  $P_j$ , compute  $\text{MSK}_j \leftarrow \text{FE}_j.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  and  $\text{SK}_j = \text{FE}_j.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}_j, C_j)$  using uniformly generated randomness.
4. Compute  $\text{CT}^* = \text{DFECmb.Enc}(\{\text{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{m_i\}_{i \in [n]})$  using randomness  $\{r_i^{\text{Enc}}\}_{i \in [n]}$ , which are picked uniformly at random for the honest parties.
5. Compute  $\text{msg}_1 \leftarrow \pi^{\text{SH}}.\text{Sim}_1(\text{CT}^*, \{m_i, \text{MSK}_i, r_i^{\text{Enc}}\}_{P_i \in \text{Corr}}, \{r_i^{\text{SH}}\}_{P_i \in \text{Corr}})$ . where  $\{r_i^{\text{SH}}\}_{P_i \in \text{Corr}}$  is the randomness of all the parties.
6. Output  $(\text{msg}_1, \{\text{SK}_j\}_{P_j \in [n]/\text{Corr}})$ .

- **Round 2:**

1. Compute  $\text{msg}_2 \leftarrow \pi^{\text{SH}}.\text{Sim}_2(\text{CT}^*, \{m_i, \text{MSK}_i, r_i^{\text{Enc}}\}_{P_i \in \text{Corr}}, \{r_i^{\text{SH}}\}_{P_i \in \text{Corr}})$  as the second round message of  $\pi^{\text{SH}}$ .
2. Output  $(\text{msg}_2)$

**Hyb<sub>2</sub> - Simulate FE:** In this hybrid,  $\text{SimHyb}$  does the following differently:

- Pick one honest party  $P_{j^*}$  at random and let  $I$  denote the set of indices of all parties except  $P_{j^*}$ .
- Compute  $\text{CT}^* = \text{DFECmb.Sim}(\{\text{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{\text{SK}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, C, C(\{m_i\}_{i \in [n]}), I)$ .

This corresponds to the ideal world.

We will now show the indistinguishability of consecutive hybrids.

**Lemma 8.** *Assuming  $\pi^{\text{SH}}$  is a semi-honest MPC protocol secure against up to all but one corruption,  $\text{Hyb}_0$  is computationally indistinguishable from  $\text{Hyb}_1$ .*

*Proof.* Suppose there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability. We will use  $\mathcal{A}$  to construct an adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{SH}}$  that breaks the security of the MPC protocol  $\pi^{\text{SH}}$ , which is a contradiction.

The adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{SH}}$  interacts with the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  as in  $\text{Hyb}_0$ .  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{SH}}$  corrupts a set of parties  $\text{Corr}$  and for each  $P_i \in \text{Corr}$ ,  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{SH}}$  receives  $(m_i)$  from  $\mathcal{A}$ .  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{SH}}$  interacts with the challenger  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{SH}}$  in an MPC protocol  $\pi^{\text{SH}}$  with  $(n)$  parties to compute circuit  $C_{\text{CT}}$  defined in Figure 4 and corrupts the same set of parties. In this protocol, for each corrupt party  $P_i$ ,  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{SH}}$  picks random  $r_i^{\text{Setup}}, r_i^{\text{Enc}}, r_i^{\text{KeyGen}}$  and computes  $\text{MSK}_i = \text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  using randomness  $r_i^{\text{Setup}}$ . Each corrupt party uses input  $(m_i, \text{MSK}_i, r_i^{\text{Enc}})$ .  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{SH}}$  sends the input of each corrupt party to  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{SH}}$  and receives its randomness  $r_i^{\text{SH}}$ . Then, in the interaction with  $\mathcal{A}$ , for each corrupt party  $P_i$ ,  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{SH}}$  sends randomness  $r_i^{\text{Setup}}, r_i^{\text{Enc}}, r_i^{\text{SH}}, r_i^{\text{KeyGen}}$ .

In the interaction with the challenger,  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{SH}}$  receives messages  $(\text{msg}_1, \text{msg}_2)$  for rounds 1 and 2 of protocol  $\pi^{\text{SH}}$  for each honest party  $P_j$  from the challenger  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{SH}}$ .  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{SH}}$  sets these as the messages  $(\text{msg}_{1,j}, \text{msg}_{2,j})$  in its interaction with  $\mathcal{A}$ . The rest of the experiment with  $\mathcal{A}$  (i.e generating  $\text{SK}_j$  for each honest  $P_j$ ) is performed exactly as in  $\text{Hyb}_0$ .

Notice that when the challenger  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{SH}}$  sends honestly generated messages for the honest parties (real world), the experiment between  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{SH}}$  and  $\mathcal{A}$  corresponds exactly to  $\text{Hyb}_0$  and when the challenger  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{SH}}$  sends simulated messages for the honest parties (ideal world), the experiment corresponds exactly to  $\text{Hyb}_1$ . Thus, if  $\mathcal{A}$  can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability,  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{SH}}$  can use the same guess to break the security of the MPC protocol  $\pi^{\text{SH}}$  with non-negligible probability which is a contradiction.  $\square$

**Lemma 9.** *Assuming DFECComb is a succinct single-key simulation secure decomposable FE combiner scheme,  $\text{Hyb}_1$  is computationally indistinguishable from  $\text{Hyb}_2$ .*

*Proof.* Suppose there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability. We will use  $\mathcal{A}$  to construct an adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DFECComb}}$  that breaks the security of the succinct simulation secure decomposable FE combiner DFECComb which is a contradiction.

The adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DFECComb}}$  interacts with the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  as in  $\text{Hyb}_1$ . For each  $i \in \text{Corr}$ ,  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DFECComb}}$  receives  $(m_i, r_i^{\text{Setup}}, r_i^{\text{Enc}}, r_i^{\text{SH}}, r_i^{\text{KeyGen}})$  from  $\mathcal{A}$ . Then,  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DFECComb}}$  computes  $(C_1, \dots, C_n) \leftarrow \text{DFECComb.Partition}(1^\lambda, C)$ .

For each honest party  $P_j$ ,  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DFECComb}}$  picks  $(m_j, r_j^{\text{Setup}}, r_j^{\text{Enc}}, r_j^{\text{KeyGen}})$  randomly and computes  $\text{MSK}_j \leftarrow \text{FE}_j.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ ,  $\text{SK}_j \leftarrow \text{FE}_j.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}_j, C_j)$  using randomness  $r_j^{\text{Setup}}$  and  $r_j^{\text{KeyGen}}$  respectively. Then,  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DFECComb}}$  picks an honest party  $P_j$  at random. Let  $I$  denote the set of indices of all parties except  $P_j$ .  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DFECComb}}$  interacts with the challenger  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{DFECComb}}$  and sends the following tuple:  $(\{m_i, \text{MSK}_i, \text{SK}_i, r_i^{\text{Enc}}, C, C(m_1, \dots, m_n)\}_{i \in [n]}, I)$ .  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DFECComb}}$  receives back a ciphertext CT from  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{DFECComb}}$  that is either honestly generated or simulated. It sets this as the ciphertext  $\text{CT}^*$  in its interaction with  $\mathcal{A}$ . The rest of the experiment with  $\mathcal{A}$  is performed exactly as in  $\text{Hyb}_1$ .

Notice that when the challenger  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{DFECComb}}$  sends an honestly generated ciphertext, the experiment between  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DFECComb}}$  and  $\mathcal{A}$  corresponds exactly to  $\text{Hyb}_1$  and when the challenger  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{SH}}$  sends a simulated ciphertext, the experiment corresponds exactly to  $\text{Hyb}_2$ . Thus, if  $\mathcal{A}$  can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability,  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DFECComb}}$  can use the same guess to break the security of the scheme DFECComb with non-negligible probability which is a contradiction.  $\square$

## 6 Construction of an FE Combiner from Weaker Assumptions

In this section, we employ a tool extensively used in the secure multi-party computation literature, namely, randomized encodings to construct an FE combiner. Roughly speaking, a randomized encoding is a mechanism to “efficiently” encode a function  $f$  and an input  $x$  such

that the encoding reveals  $f(x)$  and nothing more. A randomized encoding scheme is said to be low degree if the encoding algorithm can be represented as a low degree polynomial. Low degree randomized encodings have been used to achieve constant-round secure multi-party computation [BMR90]. We show how to use this tool to obtain functional encryption combiners. The underlying assumption used to instantiate the low degree randomized encoding is the existence of a PRG in  $\text{NC}^1$ . Formally, we show the following theorem.

**Theorem 8.** *Assuming the existence of a PRG in  $\text{NC}^1$ , there exists an unbounded-key FE combiner for polynomial-sized circuits.*

## 6.1 Degree-d Randomizing Polynomials

At the heart of our FE combiner construction are constant degree randomizing polynomials schemes. Such randomizing polynomials schemes can be defined as follows.

**Definition 12.** *A degree- $d$  randomizing polynomials scheme,  $\text{RP} = (\text{Encode}, \text{Decode})$ , for a class of circuits  $\mathcal{C}$  over some field  $\mathbb{F}$  consists of the following polynomial time algorithms:*

- *Encoding,  $\text{Encode}(1^\lambda, C, x; r)$ : On input the security parameter  $\lambda$ , a circuit  $C$ , an input  $x$  and some randomness  $r$ ,  $\text{Encode}$  outputs an encoding of  $C \in \mathcal{C}$  and  $x$ , denoted  $\widehat{C}, x$ . We require that  $\widehat{C}, x = (p_1(x, r), \dots, p_\ell(x, r))$ , where each  $p_i$  is a degree  $d$  homogenous polynomial over  $\mathbb{F}$  dependent only on  $C$ .*
- *Decoding,  $\text{Decode}(\widehat{C}, x)$ : On input an encoding of  $C$  and  $x$ ,  $\widehat{C}, x$ ,  $\text{Decode}$  outputs the decoded value  $\alpha$ .*

*A randomizing polynomials scheme,  $\text{RP}$ , is required to satisfy the following properties:*

- **Correctness:** *For every  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , circuit  $C \in \mathcal{C}$  and input  $x$ ,  $C(x) = \text{Decode}(\text{Encode}(1^\lambda, C, x))$ .*
- **Security:** *For every PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , large enough  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , circuit  $C \in \mathcal{C}$  and input  $x$ , there exists a simulator  $\text{SimRP}$  such that:*

$$\{\text{Encode}(1^\lambda, C, x)\} \approx \{\text{SimRP}(1^\lambda, |C|, C(x))\}$$

**Theorem 9** ([AIK05]). *Assuming the existence of a PRG in  $\text{NC}^1$ , there exist constant degree randomizing polynomials schemes for polynomial-sized circuits.*

## 6.2 d-Nested FE

Another tool used in our construction is  $d$ -nested FE.  $d$ -nested FE is a new FE candidate that can be created easily from  $d$  FE candidates by simply encrypting in sequence using the  $d$  FE candidates. Intuitively, this new FE candidate will be secure as long as one of the  $d$  candidates is secure since an adversary should be unable to break the encryption of the secure candidate.  $d$ -nested FE can be viewed as an FE combiner that can only handle a constant number of FE candidates since the runtime of its algorithms may depend exponentially on  $d$ . We present the definition of  $d$ -nested FE below.

**Definition 13** ( $d$ -nested FE). *Let  $\text{FE}_1, \dots, \text{FE}_d$  be  $d$  correct FE candidates. We define another FE candidate  $\text{FE}_S$ , where  $S = [1, \dots, d]$ , as follows:*

- **Setup( $1^\lambda$ ):** *It computes  $\text{MSK}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  for all  $i \in [n]$  and outputs  $\text{MSK} = \{\text{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$  as the master secret key for  $\text{FE}_S$ .*
- **Enc( $\text{MSK} = \{\text{MSK}_1, \dots, \text{MSK}_d\}, m$ ):** *It first computes  $\text{CT}_1 = \text{FE}_1.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}_1, m)$  and then recursively computes  $\text{CT}_{i+1} = \text{FE}_{i+1}.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}_{i+1}, \text{CT}_i)$  for  $i \in [d-1]$ . It outputs  $\text{CT}_d$  as the ciphertext.*

- $\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK} = \{\text{MSK}_1, \dots, \text{MSK}_d\}, C)$  : On input the master secret key  $\text{MSK}$  and a circuit  $C \in \mathcal{C}$ , it first computes  $\text{SK}_1 = \text{FE}_1.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}_1, C)$  and sets  $G_1 = \text{FE}_1.\text{Dec}(\text{SK}_1, \cdot)$  as a circuit. Then it recursively computes  $\text{SK}_{i+1} = \text{FE}_{i+1}.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}_{i+1}, G_i)$  for  $i \in [d-1]$  where circuit  $G_i = \text{FE}_i.\text{Dec}(\text{SK}_i, \cdot)$ . It outputs  $\text{SK}_d$  as the function secret key for the circuit  $C$ .
- $\text{Dec}(\text{SK}_d, \text{CT}_d)$  : It outputs  $\text{FE}_d.\text{Dec}(\text{SK}_d, \text{CT}_d)$ .

**Theorem 10.** For constant  $d$ ,  $\text{FE}_S$ , defined by [Definition 13](#), is an FE candidate. Moreover, if at least one of the  $d$  FE candidates is secure, then  $\text{FE}_S$  is also secure (it is an FE scheme).

*Proof.* We observe that if  $d$  is a constant, the scheme described above is efficient if the underlying candidates are efficient. Correctness of  $\text{FE}_S$  follows immediately from the construction and the correctness of the underlying FE candidates.

Suppose that one of the FE candidates, say  $\text{FE}_j$ , is secure. Suppose that  $\text{FE}_S$  is not secure; that is, there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that can break the security of  $\text{FE}_S$ . Then, consider the following adversary  $\mathcal{A}'$  that breaks the security of  $\text{FE}_j$ .  $\mathcal{A}'$  runs  $\mathcal{A}$  and simulates the challenger.  $\mathcal{A}'$  first runs  $\text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  for all  $i \in [n] \setminus \{j\}$  to obtain  $\text{MSK}_i$ 's. When  $\mathcal{A}$  submits a challenge message pair  $(m_0, m_1)$ ,  $\mathcal{A}'$  computes  $\text{CT}_{j-1,0}$  and  $\text{CT}_{j-1,1}$  by encrypting  $m_0$  and  $m_1$ , respectively by repeated encryption under  $\text{FE}_1, \dots, \text{FE}_{j-1}$ . It then submits these two ciphertexts as its messages to its challenger and receives a ciphertext,  $\text{CT}_j$ . It then encrypts this ciphertext using  $\text{FE}_{j+1}, \dots, \text{FE}_d$  to obtain  $\text{CT}_d$ , which it gives to  $\mathcal{A}$  as the ciphertext. When  $\mathcal{A}$  asks for a function key for a circuit  $C$ ,  $\mathcal{A}'$  runs  $\text{FE}_S.\text{KeyGen}$  on  $C$  until it needs to run the keygen algorithm for  $\text{FE}_j$ . Here, it queries its challenger for the appropriate function key and then uses this response to continue generating  $\text{SK}_C$ . It then gives the resulting function key  $\text{SK}_C$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . When  $\mathcal{A}$  terminates,  $\mathcal{A}'$  outputs the same response. Note that  $\mathcal{A}'$  simulates the security game for  $\mathcal{A}$  perfectly and therefore wins whenever  $\mathcal{A}$  wins, contradicting the security of  $\text{FE}_j$ . Therefore, it follows that  $\text{FE}_S$  is a secure FE scheme.  $\square$

### 6.3 Construction

We are now ready to prove [Theorem 8](#). At a high level, the construction works as follows. For a circuit  $C$ , we use a constant degree randomizing polynomials scheme to obtain polynomials  $p_\alpha$  corresponding to  $C$ . Since  $C(x)$  can be obtained from the evaluations of these polynomials on  $(x, r)$  for randomness  $r$ , it suffices to be able to generate function keys for degree- $d$  homogeneous polynomials. Additionally, since only one of the FE candidates is guaranteed to be secure, we need a means of ensuring that no information is leaked even if all but one FE candidate is broken. This is accomplished by bitwise secret sharing the input  $x$ , with one share per FE candidate. We then make the observation that degree- $d$  homogeneous polynomials in the bits of  $x$  remain degree  $d$  homogeneous polynomials when expressed as polynomials in the *shares* of the bits of  $x$ . Furthermore, we observe that the number of subsets  $S \subseteq [n]$  of size at most  $d$  is polynomial in  $n$ . We make the ciphertext for  $x$  consist of a set of ciphertexts, one for each subset  $S$ , and generate them using the  $d$ -nested FE candidates,  $\text{FE}_S$ . Each of these ciphertexts contains the shares of  $x$  corresponding to the FE candidates used by  $\text{FE}_S$ . Since every monomial in the polynomials has degree  $d$ , we can map each monomial to a corresponding set  $S$  such that it is possible to evaluate the monomial using the contents of the ciphertext corresponding to  $S$ . By masking the monomial evaluations with secret shares of 0, as described in the technical overview, we are able to ensure that only the value of the polynomial is learned.

We now formally describe the construction. First, we provide some notation that will be used throughout the construction.

**Notation:**

- Let PRF be a pseudorandom function that outputs in the range  $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$ .
- Let E be any  $\lambda$ -bit CPA-secure secret-key encryption scheme with message space  $\{0, 1\}$ .
- Let  $\ell_x = \ell_x(\lambda)$  denote the length of the messages and let  $\ell_E = \ell_E(\lambda)$  denote the length of the encryption key for the scheme E.
- Let RP denote a degree  $d$  randomizing polynomials scheme over  $\mathbb{F}_2$  for the circuit class  $\mathcal{C}$ , the class of all polynomial-sized boolean circuits with input space  $\{0, 1\}^{\ell_x}$ .
- Let  $\text{FE}_1, \dots, \text{FE}_n$  denote  $n$  FE candidates. In the following construction, we assume that the descriptions  $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$  are implicit in all the algorithms of FEComb.

**Construction:**

- $\text{FEComb.Setup}(1^\lambda)$  : On input the security parameter, it runs  $\text{MSK}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  for  $i \in [n]$  and  $\text{E.SK} \leftarrow \text{E.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ . It outputs  $\text{MSK} = (\text{MSK}_1, \dots, \text{MSK}_n, \text{E.SK})$ .

- $\text{FEComb.Enc}(\text{MSK}, x \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_x})$  : It executes the following steps.
  - First, randomly secret share  $x$  amongst  $n$  shares using bitwise additive secret sharing. That is, for each  $x_i$  for  $i \in [\ell_x]$ ,  $x_i = \sum_{j \in [n]} x_{i,j}$  where  $x_{i,j}$  is  $j^{\text{th}}$  share of  $x_i$ .
  - Then, sample  $n$  distinct PRF keys  $K_i$  for  $i \in [n]$  uniformly at random.
  - For each subset  $S \subseteq [n]$  of size at most  $d$ , compute

$$\text{CT}_S = \text{FE}_S.\text{Enc}(\{\text{MSK}_j\}_{j \in S}, (\{x_{i,j}, K_j\}_{i \in [\ell_x], j \in S}, 0^{\ell_E}, 0)).$$

- Output  $\text{CT} = \{\text{CT}_S\}_{S \subseteq [n], 1 \leq |S| \leq d}$ .
- $\text{FEComb.KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, C)$  : Generate  $\text{tag}_C \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$  uniformly at random. Let  $p_1, \dots, p_N$  denote the randomizing polynomials corresponding to the circuit  $C$  determined by the encoding function of RP. For each polynomial  $p_\alpha$ , do the following:
  - Let  $p_\alpha = p_\alpha(x_1, \dots, x_{\ell_x}, r_1, \dots, r_{\ell_r})$  where  $\ell_r$  is the length of the randomness taken by RP.Encode. Define new variables  $x_i = \sum_{j \in [n]} x_{i,j}$  for  $i \in [\ell_x]$  and  $r_i = \sum_{j \in [n]} r_{i,j}$  for  $i \in [\ell_r]$ . Let  $p'_\alpha$  be the degree  $d$  polynomial obtained by computing  $p_\alpha$  as a polynomial over the variables  $x_{i,j}$  and  $r_{i,j}$ .
  - For each polynomial  $p'_\alpha$  do the following.
    - \* Generate  $\text{tag}_{p'_\alpha} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$  uniformly at random (and distinct for each polynomial).
    - \* Let  $M_\alpha$  be the number of monomials occurring in  $p'_\alpha$ . For every  $j \in [n]$ , denote by  $M_{\alpha,j}$  the number of monomials depending on variables of the form  $x_{i',j}$  or  $r_{i',j}$  for some  $i'$ . Viewing the  $x_{i',j}$ 's and  $r_{i',j}$ 's as the  $j^{\text{th}}$  party's shares of the  $x_i$ 's and  $r_i$ 's,  $M_{\alpha,j}$  is the number of monomials in  $p'_\alpha$  that contain a share corresponding to the  $j^{\text{th}}$  party.
    - \* Let there be a total ordering on the monomials of  $p'_\alpha$ . For all monomials  $m_{\alpha,k}$  for  $k \in [M_\alpha]$  of  $p'_\alpha$ , let  $S_{m_{\alpha,k}}$  denote the set of size less than or equal to  $d$  consisting of the parties whose shares of variables lie in  $m_{\alpha,k}$ . That is, if  $m_{\alpha,k} = x_{i_1,j_1} x_{i_2,j_2} \dots r_{i_d,j_d}$ , then  $S_{m_{\alpha,k}} = \{j_1, j_2, \dots, j_d\}$ .
    - \* For this ordering, let  $V(p'_\alpha, j, m_{\alpha,k})$  denote the number of monomials (less than or equal to  $m_{\alpha,k}$ ) that have a variable of the form  $x_{i',j}$  or  $r_{i',j}$  (a share corresponding to the  $j^{\text{th}}$  party).

- \* For every monomial  $m_{\alpha,k}$  occuring inside  $p'_\alpha$ , first generate a ciphertext  $c_{m_{\alpha,k}}$  by running

$$\text{E.Enc}(\text{E.SK}, \beta_{m_{\alpha,k}}),$$

where  $\beta_{m_{\alpha,k}}$  is a bit chosen uniformly at random. Then, compute

$$\text{SK}_{p'_\alpha, m_{\alpha,k}} \leftarrow \text{FE}_{S_{m_{\alpha,k}}}. \text{KeyGen}(\{\text{MSK}_j\}_{j \in S_{m_{\alpha,k}}}, H_{p'_\alpha, m_{\alpha,k}}),$$

where circuit  $H_{p'_\alpha, m_{\alpha,k}}$  is described in Figure 5. Here  $\text{FE}_S$  for any subset  $S \subseteq [d]$ , is the  $|S|$ -nested FE scheme.




Figure 5: Description of the Monomial Evaluation Circuit.

- Output  $\text{SK}_C = (C, \{\text{SK}_{p'_\alpha, m_{\alpha,k}}\})$ , where the set is the set of function keys for each monomial  $m_{\alpha,k}$  of each polynomial  $p'_\alpha$ .
- $\text{FEComb.Dec}(\text{SK}_C, \text{CT})$  : Using  $C$ , derive  $p'_\alpha$  for all  $\alpha \in [N]$  and each of its monomials  $m_{\alpha,k}$  for  $k \in [M_\alpha]$ . For all function keys  $\text{SK}_{p'_\alpha, m_{\alpha,k}} \in \text{SK}_C$ , compute

$$v_{p'_\alpha, m_{\alpha,k}} = \text{FE}_{S_{m_{\alpha,k}}}. \text{Dec}(\text{SK}_{p'_\alpha, m_{\alpha,k}}, \text{CT}).$$

Compute

$$v_{p'_\alpha} = \sum_{k \in [M_\alpha]} v_{p'_\alpha, m_{\alpha,k}}$$

for all  $\alpha \in [N]$ . Run  $\text{RP.Decode}((v_{p'_1}, \dots, v_{p'_N}))$  and output the result.

**Correctness:** To see that the above construction satisfies correctness, let  $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$  be  $n$  FE candidates, let  $C : \{0, 1\}^{\ell_x(\lambda)} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}_\lambda \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$  be any circuit and let  $x \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_x(\lambda)}$  be any message.

Suppose we run  $\text{FEComb.Setup}(1^\lambda)$  to obtain the master secret key  $\text{MSK}$ , then encrypt  $x$  by running  $\text{FEComb.Enc}(\text{MSK}, x)$  to obtain  $\text{CT}$ , and then generate a function key  $\text{SK}_C$  by running  $\text{FEComb.Keygen}(\text{MSK}, C)$ . Then, if we run  $\text{FEComb.Dec}(\text{SK}_C, \text{CT})$ , we note the following. By the correctness of the underlying FE candidates, the values  $v_{p'_\alpha, m_{\alpha,k}}$  will be

$$u_{\alpha,k} + \sum_{j \in S_{m_{\alpha,k}}} \text{Share}_{\alpha,j, V(p'_\alpha, j, m_{\alpha,k})}.$$

Then,

$$v_{p'_\alpha} = \sum_{k \in [M_\alpha]} v_{p'_\alpha, m_{\alpha, k}} = \sum_{k \in [M_\alpha]} u_{\alpha, k}$$

is the value of the polynomial  $p_\alpha$  on input  $x$  with randomness

$$r_i = \sum_{j \in [n]} \text{PRF}_1(K_j, i || \text{tag}_C)$$

for  $i \in [\ell_r]$ . Since the  $p_\alpha$ 's are the polynomials corresponding to  $C$ , by the correctness of RP, it follows that  $\text{RP.Decode}((p_1(x; r), \dots, p_N(x; r))) = C(x)$  as desired.

**Polynomial Slowdown:** All the algorithms of `FEComb` run in time  $\text{poly}(\lambda, n)$ . This follows immediately from the efficiency of the FE candidates, RP, and E and the fact that all subsets  $S \subseteq [n]$  of size at most  $d$  is  $\text{poly}(n)$  since  $d$  is a constant.

## 6.4 Security Proof

For simplicity, we will consider the case where the adversary submits a single message pair and only queries a single function key. This proof naturally extends to multiple message pairs and multiple function keys via standard hybrid techniques (repeat the series of hybrids for each function key sequentially to argue indistinguishability for a polynomial number of function keys and then flip each message pair one at a time to argue indistinguishability for a polynomial number of message pairs). We show that any PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  will only succeed in the FE selective security game ([Definition 16](#)) with negligible probability. We will show this via a sequence of hybrids. Assume that the  $\gamma$ th FE candidate,  $\text{FE}_\gamma$  is secure.

**Hyb<sub>0</sub>:** This hybrid corresponds to the real security game where the challenger sets the bit  $b$  to 0.

**Hyb<sub>1</sub>:** This hybrid is the same as **Hyb<sub>0</sub>** except that when generating  $c_{m_{\alpha, k}}$ , the challenger sets  $\beta_{m_{\alpha, k}}$  to be

$$u_{\alpha, k} + \sum_{j \in S_{m_{\alpha, k}}} \text{Share}_{\alpha, j, V(p'_\alpha, j, m_{\alpha, k})},$$

the value obtained by running  $H_{p'_\alpha, m_{\alpha, k}}$  on  $\{x_{i, j}\}_{i \in [\ell_x], j \in S_{m_{\alpha, k}}}, \{K_j\}_{j \in S_{m_{\alpha, k}}}, \text{E.SK}$ , and 0. Note that the challenger knows these values because  $\mathcal{A}$  must submit  $x$  and the challenger generates the encryption of  $x$  prior to generating the function key  $\text{SK}_C$ .

**Hyb<sub>2</sub>:** This hybrid is the same as **Hyb<sub>1</sub>** except that when encrypting  $x$ , whenever the challenger generates  $\text{CT}_S$  for a subset  $S$  that contains  $\gamma$ , the challenger does so by setting

$$\text{CT}_S = \text{FE}_S.\text{Enc}(\{\text{MSK}_j\}_{j \in S}, (\{x_{i, j}, K_j\}_{i \in [\ell_x], j \in S}, \text{E.SK}, 1)).$$

That is, the  $0^{\ell_E}$  term is replaced with  $\text{E.SK}$ , the secret key for E, and the last bit is switched to 1 when generating ciphertexts for subsets  $S$  that contain  $\gamma$ .

**Hyb<sub>3</sub>:** This hybrid is the same as **Hyb<sub>2</sub>** except that when encrypting  $x$ , whenever the challenger generates  $\text{CT}_S$  for a subset  $S$  that contains  $\gamma$ , the challenger replaces  $K_\gamma$ , the PRF key for the  $\gamma$ th party, with the all 0 string.

**Hyb<sub>4</sub>:** This hybrid is the same as **Hyb<sub>3</sub>** except that when setting  $\beta_{m_{\alpha, k}}$ 's, the additive secret sharing of 0 consisting of  $M_{\alpha, \gamma}$  shares is computed using uniformly sampled randomness

rather than  $\text{PRF}(K_\gamma, \text{tag}_{p'_\alpha})$  and the randomness shares  $r_{i',\gamma}$  corresponding to the  $\gamma$ th party are generated uniformly at random, as opposed to using  $\text{PRF}_1(K_\gamma, i' || \text{tag}_C)$ . That is, every evaluation output of the PRF that used  $K_\gamma$  as the PRF key is replaced by a uniformly random value.

**Hyb<sub>5</sub>**: This hybrid is the same as **Hyb<sub>4</sub>** except that when encrypting the  $x_{i,\gamma}$ 's, (the shares of  $x$  corresponding to the  $\gamma$ th party), the challenger instead encrypts new values  $x'_{i,\gamma}$ , sampled uniformly at random.

**Hyb<sub>6</sub>**: This hybrid is the same as **Hyb<sub>5</sub>** except the challenger now uses the randomizing polynomials simulator, **SimRP**, to generate the values of the polynomials. That is, when generating a function key for a circuit  $C$ , the challenger first runs

$$\text{SimRP}(1^\lambda, |C|, C(x))$$

to obtain  $v_{p'_\alpha}$ , the values for all the randomizing polynomials. The challenger then proceeds with the key generation as before, except when computing the  $\beta_{m_{\alpha,k}}$  value for a monomial  $m_{\alpha,k}$  where  $\gamma \in S_{m_{\alpha,k}}$ . Let  $\mathcal{M}_\alpha$  denote the set containing all monomials of  $p'_\alpha$ . Let  $\mathcal{M}_{\alpha,\gamma}$  denote the set of all monomials of  $p'_\alpha$  that contain a variable of the form  $x_{i',\gamma}$  or  $r_{i',\gamma}$  for some  $i'$ . In this hybrid, the challenger first sets  $\beta_{m_{\alpha,k}}$  for all  $m_{\alpha,k} \notin \mathcal{M}_{\alpha,\gamma}$  as before. Then, the challenger computes

$$v'_{p'_\alpha} = v_{p'_\alpha} - \sum_{m_{\alpha,k} \in \mathcal{M}_\alpha \setminus \mathcal{M}_{\alpha,\gamma}} \beta_{m_{\alpha,k}}.$$

The challenger then secret shares the value  $v'_{p'_\alpha}$  uniformly at random amongst  $|\mathcal{M}_{\alpha,\gamma}|$  shares and sets each of the  $\beta_{m_{\alpha,k}}$  values for the monomials  $m_{\alpha,k} \in \mathcal{M}_{\alpha,\gamma}$  to be such that

$$\sum_{m_{\alpha,k} \in \mathcal{M}_{\alpha,\gamma}} \beta_{m_{\alpha,k}} = v'_{p'_\alpha}.$$

**Lemma 10.** *If  $E$  is a  $\lambda$ -bit CPA-secure secret-key encryption scheme, then **Hyb<sub>0</sub>** and **Hyb<sub>1</sub>** are computationally indistinguishable.*

*Proof.* Suppose there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that can distinguish between these two hybrids. Then, we construct an adversary  $\mathcal{A}'$  that can break the security game of  $E$ . Since  $\mathcal{A}$  can distinguish between **Hyb<sub>0</sub>** and **Hyb<sub>1</sub>** and since there are at most a polynomial number of monomials  $m_{\alpha,k}$ , we can construct a sequence of hybrids that correspond to switching the values  $\beta_{m_{\alpha,k}}$  one at a time. It follows that  $\mathcal{A}$  must be able to distinguish between two of these neighboring hybrids. WLOG, say  $\mathcal{A}$  distinguishes between the sequential hybrids where the  $\beta_{m_{\alpha',k'}}$  value is changed. Then,  $\mathcal{A}'$  runs as follows. It runs  $\mathcal{A}$  and plays the role of the challenger. Whenever, it would have to generate a ciphertext by running  $E.\text{Enc}$ , it instead queries its challenger on the message to receive the ciphertext. When it wants to encrypt the value corresponding to  $m_{\alpha',k'}$ , it submits the message pair  $(\beta_{m_{\alpha',k'}}^0, \beta_{m_{\alpha',k'}}^1)$  to its challenger where the first component is the unchanged (randomly sampled) value and the second component is the changed (monomial evaluation) value corresponding to **Hyb<sub>0</sub>** and **Hyb<sub>1</sub>**, respectively. It then uses the ciphertext it receives from its challenger. When  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs,  $\mathcal{A}'$  outputs the same response. Note that  $\mathcal{A}'$  simulates  $\mathcal{A}$  on these two neighboring hybrids perfectly and so  $\mathcal{A}'$  will distinguish with nonnegligible advantage, contradicting the security of  $E$ . Therefore, **Hyb<sub>0</sub>** and **Hyb<sub>1</sub>** must be indistinguishable.  $\square$

**Lemma 11.** *If  $FE_\gamma$  is a selectively-secure FE scheme, then **Hyb<sub>1</sub>** and **Hyb<sub>2</sub>** are computationally indistinguishable.*

*Proof.* Suppose there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that can distinguish between these two hybrids. Then, we construct an adversary  $\mathcal{A}'$  that can break the security game of  $FE_\gamma$ .  $\mathcal{A}'$  runs  $\mathcal{A}$

and simulates the role of the challenger. Whenever, it needs to encrypt using  $\text{FE}_\gamma.\text{Enc}$ , it computes the messages  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  that it would want to encrypt were it simulating  $\text{Hyb}_1$  or  $\text{Hyb}_2$ , respectively. It then submits  $(m_1, m_2)$  as a message pair to its challenger and receives a ciphertext, CT, which it uses to continue its simulation. Note that  $\mathcal{A}'$  can submit all its message queries prior to submitting any function queries. Whenever it would need to run  $\text{FE}_\gamma.\text{KeyGen}$  on a circuit  $C$ , it submits  $C$  as a function query and uses the response of its challenger to continue the simulation. When  $\mathcal{A}$  terminates,  $\mathcal{A}'$  outputs the same value as  $\mathcal{A}$ . Note that  $\mathcal{A}'$  simulates both  $\text{Hyb}_1$  and  $\text{Hyb}_2$  exactly and is an admissible adversary since all computable function evaluations are identical across hybrids, so  $\mathcal{A}'$  wins if  $\mathcal{A}$  wins, contradicting the security of  $\text{FE}_\gamma$ .  $\square$

**Lemma 12.** *If  $\text{FE}_\gamma$  is a selectively-secure FE scheme, then  $\text{Hyb}_2$  and  $\text{Hyb}_3$  are computationally indistinguishable.*

*Proof.* This follows from an analogous proof as that of [Lemma 11](#).  $\square$

**Lemma 13.** *If PRF is a pseudorandom function, then  $\text{Hyb}_3$  and  $\text{Hyb}_4$  are computationally indistinguishable.*

*Proof.* Suppose there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that can distinguish between these two hybrids. Then, we construct an adversary  $\mathcal{A}'$  that can break the pseudorandomness property of PRF.  $\mathcal{A}'$  simply runs  $\mathcal{A}$  and simulates the challenger. Whenever  $\mathcal{A}'$  would run  $\text{PRF}(K_\gamma, \cdot)$  on some input  $t$  in  $\text{Hyb}_3$  or generate a uniformly random value in  $\text{Hyb}_4$ ,  $\mathcal{A}'$  instead queries its oracle on  $t$  and uses this value as its output. If  $\mathcal{A}$  thinks it is seeing  $\text{Hyb}_3$ ,  $\mathcal{A}'$  outputs that its oracle is the PRF and if  $\mathcal{A}$  thinks it is seeing  $\text{Hyb}_4$ ,  $\mathcal{A}'$  outputs that its oracle is a truly random function. Note that  $\mathcal{A}'$  simulates these hybrids exactly, so  $\mathcal{A}'$  will win with nonnegligible advantage, contradicting the pseudorandomness of PRF.  $\square$

**Lemma 14.** *If  $\text{FE}_\gamma$  is a selectively-secure FE scheme, then  $\text{Hyb}_4$  and  $\text{Hyb}_5$  are computationally indistinguishable.*

*Proof.* This follows from an analogous proof as that of [Lemma 11](#).  $\square$

**Lemma 15.** *If RP is a secure randomizing polynomials scheme, then  $\text{Hyb}_5$  and  $\text{Hyb}_6$  are computationally indistinguishable.*

*Proof.* Suppose there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that can distinguish between these two hybrids. Then, we construct an adversary  $\mathcal{A}'$  that can break the security of RP.  $\mathcal{A}'$  runs  $\mathcal{A}$  and simulates the role of the challenger. When it needs to generate a function key for a circuit  $C$ , it queries its challenger of circuit  $C$  and input  $x$  (specified by  $\mathcal{A}$ ). It then receives values  $v_{p'_\alpha}$  for all polynomials.  $\mathcal{A}'$  sets the  $\beta_{m_{\alpha,k}}$  values as follows. Let  $\mathcal{M}_\alpha$  denote the set containing all monomials of  $p'_\alpha$ . Let  $\mathcal{M}_{\alpha,\gamma}$  denote the set of all monomials of  $p'_\alpha$  that contain a variable of the form  $x_{i',\gamma}$  or  $r_{i',\gamma}$  for some  $i'$ .  $\mathcal{A}'$  first sets  $\beta_{m_{\alpha,k}}$  for all  $m_{\alpha,k} \notin \mathcal{M}_{\alpha,\gamma}$  as specified by both  $\text{Hyb}_5$  and  $\text{Hyb}_6$ . Then,  $\mathcal{A}'$  computes

$$v'_{p'_\alpha} = v_{p'_\alpha} - \sum_{m_{\alpha,k} \in \mathcal{M}_\alpha \setminus \mathcal{M}_{\alpha,\gamma}} \beta_{m_{\alpha,k}}.$$

$\mathcal{A}'$  then secret shares the value  $v'_{p'_\alpha}$  uniformly at random amongst  $|\mathcal{M}_{\alpha,\gamma}|$  shares and sets each of the  $\beta_{m_{\alpha,k}}$  values for the monomials  $m_{\alpha,k} \in \mathcal{M}_{\alpha,\gamma}$  to be such that

$$\sum_{m_{\alpha,k} \in \mathcal{M}_{\alpha,\gamma}} \beta_{m_{\alpha,k}} = v'_{p'_\alpha}.$$

When  $\mathcal{A}$  terminates, if  $\mathcal{A}$  guesses that the game is  $\text{Hyb}_5$ , then  $\mathcal{A}'$  outputs that it is using the real encoding function. If  $\mathcal{A}$  guesses that the game is  $\text{Hyb}_6$ , then  $\mathcal{A}'$  outputs that its challenger is the

simulator. Note that  $\mathcal{A}'$  simulates these hybrids exactly. This follows from the fact that all the  $\beta_{m_{\alpha,k}}$  values for  $m_{\alpha,k} \in \mathcal{M}_{\alpha,\gamma}$  are masked by uniformly random secret shares of 0. Therefore, the values of these  $\beta_{m_{\alpha,k}}$ 's look like a uniformly random secret share of  $v'_{p'_\alpha}$ , their intended sum and  $\text{Hyb}_5$  is simulated exactly. If  $\mathcal{A}'$ 's challenger is using the simulated encoding, then  $\mathcal{A}'$  simulates  $\text{Hyb}_6$  exactly. So, it follows that  $\mathcal{A}'$  could break the security of RP, a contradiction.  $\square$

So, it follows that  $\text{Hyb}_0$  and  $\text{Hyb}_6$  are computationally indistinguishable. Moreover,  $\text{Hyb}_6$  is independent of  $x$  and depends only on  $C(x)$ . Therefore, by an analogous sequence of hybrids, this time with the challenge bit  $b = 1$ , it follows that the real game with  $b = 1$  is also indistinguishable from  $\text{Hyb}_6$ . So, it follows that the two real games are computationally indistinguishable, completing the proof.  $\square$

## 7 From MPC to FE Combiners

In this section, we show how to build an FE combiner from any semi-honest MPC protocol  $\pi$  that satisfies a property called delayed function-dependence. Informally, we say that an MPC protocol is *delayed function-dependent* if the messages of all the rounds except the last one can be generated independently of the function being evaluated. Formally, let  $\pi$  denote a  $k$  round semi-honest MPC protocol for computing a function  $f$  between  $n$  parties  $P_1, \dots, P_n$  using inputs  $x_1, \dots, x_n$ , respectively. For each  $i \in [k]$ , let  $\pi^{\text{SH}}.\text{Round}_i$  denote the algorithm used by each party to compute its message for round  $i$ . Let  $\text{Sim} = (\text{Sim}_1, \text{Sim}_2)$  denote the simulator for  $\pi$  where  $\text{Sim}_1$  is used to generate the first  $(k - 1)$  rounds of the adversary's view and  $\text{Sim}_2$  generates the last round's view.

**Definition 14** (Delayed Function-Dependent). *Protocol  $\pi$  is said to be delayed function-dependent if, for every function  $f$  and all inputs  $(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ :*

- **Correctness:** *For each party  $P_j$ , for each  $i \in [k - 1]$ , algorithm  $\pi^{\text{SH}}.\text{Round}_i$  only takes as input  $(x_j, \tau, |f|)$  where  $\tau$  is the transcript of  $\pi$  up to round  $(i - 1)$ . In particular, it does not take as input the function  $f$  being computed.*
- **Security:** *Let  $\mathcal{A}$  denote the set of corrupted parties. Algorithm  $\text{Sim}_1$  only takes as input  $(|f|, \{x_i\}_{P_i \in \mathcal{A}})$ . In particular, it does not take as input the function  $f$  or the output  $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ .*

We observe that several MPC protocols in literature [MW16, PS16, BP16] are, in fact, delayed function-dependent.

Using any delayed function-dependent MPC protocol, we are able to construct an FE combiner. Formally, we show the following theorem:

**Theorem 11.** *Given any delayed function-dependent semi-honest MPC protocol  $\pi$  secure against all but one corruption, there exists a bounded-collusion secure decomposable FE combiner.*

Furthermore, we can construct an unbounded-collusion secure (unbounded-key) FE combiner if the delayed function-dependent MPC protocol  $\pi$  additionally satisfies the following *reusability* property. Consider  $n$  parties with inputs  $x_1, \dots, x_n$ . Run the first  $(k - 1)$  rounds of the protocol  $\pi$  to generate a transcript  $\tau$ . Informally, reusability requires that the parties should be able to reuse this same transcript  $\tau$  to securely evaluate an unbounded number of functions  $f_1, \dots, f_\ell$ . That is, for each function  $f_i$ , they can just run the last round of  $\pi$  using transcript  $\tau$  to compute the output and the transcript  $\tau$  along with the set of outputs should not reveal any party's input. (beyond what can be learned from the given information). Formally, consider a  $k$  round delayed function-dependent semi-honest MPC protocol  $\pi$  between  $n$  parties  $P_1, \dots, P_n$  using inputs  $x_1, \dots, x_n$  respectively. We first list some notation.

- Let  $\text{View}_{\mathcal{A}}^{k-1}(\{x_i\}_{i \in [n]})$  denote the view of a set of parties  $\{P_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{A}}$  after the first  $(k-1)$  rounds of an execution of  $\pi$ .
- Let  $\text{View}_{\mathcal{A}}^k(\{x_i, \text{state}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \tau)$  denote the view of a set of parties  $\{P_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{A}}$  in the last round of an execution of  $\pi$  where  $\tau$  is the transcript after  $(k-1)$  rounds and for each party  $P_i$ , its input is  $x_i$  and its state is  $\text{state}_i$ .
- Also, let's assume that the size of any function is bounded by  $p(\lambda)$  for some polynomial  $p$ .

**Definition 15** (Delayed Function-Dependent and Reusable). *Protocol  $\pi$  is said to be reusable if, for all  $\mathcal{A} \subset [n]$  with  $|\mathcal{A}| \leq (n-1)$ , there exists a PPT simulator  $\text{Sim} = (\text{Sim}_1, \text{Sim}_2)$  such that for every PPT distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}$ , there exists a negligible function  $\mu(\cdot)$  such that for all sufficiently large  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , the advantage of  $\mathcal{D}$  is*

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{Reus}} = & \\ & \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{Reus}}(1^\lambda, \{x_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \mathcal{A}, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{Reus}}(1^\lambda, \{x_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \mathcal{A}, 1) = 1] \right| \\ & \leq \mu(\lambda), \end{aligned}$$

where for each  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  and  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , the experiment  $\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{Reus}}(1^\lambda, \{x_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \mathcal{A}, b)$  is defined below:

$\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{Reus}}(1^\lambda, \{x_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \mathcal{A}, b)$ :

1. If  $b = 0$ , Challenger runs the first  $(k-1)$  rounds of  $\pi$  amongst  $n$  parties  $P_1, \dots, P_n$  with inputs  $x_1, \dots, x_n$ . Let  $\text{state}_i$  denote the state of party  $P_i$  after  $(k-1)$  rounds. Challenger outputs  $\text{View}_{\mathcal{A}}^{k-1}(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ .
2. If  $b = 1$ , Challenger outputs  $\text{Sim}_1(p(\lambda), \{x_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{A}})$ .
3. Challenger presents  $\mathcal{D}$  with an oracle  $\mathcal{O}_b$  that takes as input a function  $f$  and does the following:
  - (a) If  $b = 0$ , execute the last round of protocol  $\pi$  for function  $f$  and output  $\text{View}_{\mathcal{A}}^k(\{x_i, \text{state}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \tau)$ .<sup>7</sup>
  - (b) If  $b = 1$ , output  $(\text{Sim}_2(f(x_1, \dots, x_n), \{x_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{A}}))$ .

We show how to construct an unbounded-collusion secure FE combiner from such an MPC protocol. Formally, we show the following theorem:

**Theorem 12.** *Given any delayed function-dependent and reusable semi-honest MPC protocol  $\pi$  secure against all but one corruption, there exists an unbounded-collusion secure decomposable FE combiner.*

The two round semi-honest MPC protocol of Mukherjee and Wichs [MW16] based on the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption is both *delayed function-dependent* and *reusable*. As a corollary of [Theorem 12](#), we get:

**Corollary 5.** *Assuming LWE holds, there exists an unbounded-collusion secure decomposable FE combiner.*

The above corollary gives us a construction of an FE combiner from LWE that differs from the one in [AJS17].

## 7.1 Construction

We first list some notation for the construction.

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<sup>7</sup>For simplicity, we assume that the function produces the same output for all parties and hence don't include the output along with the view.

### Primitives and Notation Used:

- Let the  $n$  candidates be  $FE_1, \dots, FE_n$ . Let the message space of the FE combiner be the set of all  $\lambda$ -bit strings.
- Let  $\pi$  denote any  $k = \text{poly}(\lambda)$  round semi-honest *delayed function-dependent* MPC protocol amongst  $(n+1)$  parties where each party uses inputs of length  $\lambda$ . Let  $p(\lambda)$  denote the sum of the length of the transcript of the protocol and the internal state of any party after the first  $(k-1)$  rounds and let  $q(\lambda)$  denote the length of the message sent by any party in the last round.
- In the above protocol  $\pi$ , let  $\text{Final.Round}_\pi(\cdot)$  denote the algorithm used by any party to compute its message in the last round and  $\text{Final.Output}_\pi(\cdot)$  denote the algorithm to compute the final output after the end of the  $k$  rounds.  $\text{Final.Round}_\pi$  takes as input the transcript up to  $(k-1)$  rounds and the internal state of the party. Similarly,  $\text{Final.Output}_\pi$  takes as input the entire transcript of the protocol and the internal state of the party.
- Finally, let  $\text{Sym} = (\text{Sym.Setup}, \text{Sym.Enc}, \text{Sym.Dec})$  denote any symmetric key encryption scheme with pseudorandom ciphertexts that encrypts messages of length  $q(\lambda)$  using keys of length  $p(\lambda)$  to generate ciphertexts of length  $\ell(\lambda)$ . Here,  $p(\cdot), q(\cdot), \ell(\cdot)$  are all polynomials. We know that such a scheme can be built assuming one way functions e.g. using weak pseudorandom functions by defining  $\text{Sym.Enc}(K, m; r) = (r, \text{PRF}_K(r) \oplus m)$  (see [Gol04] for more details).

### Scheme:

We now describe the construction of our FE Combiner scheme FEComb.

FEComb.Setup( $1^\lambda$ ): The setup algorithm does the following:

1. For each  $i \in [n]$ , generate  $\text{MSK}_i \leftarrow FE_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ .
2. Output  $\text{MSK} = (\text{MSK}_1, \dots, \text{MSK}_n)$ .

FEComb.Enc( $\text{MSK}, x$ ): Given input the master secret key  $\text{MSK}$  and a message  $x$ , the encryption algorithm does the following:

1. Choose  $\lambda$ -bit random strings  $s_1, \dots, s_{n-1}$  and set  $s_n = (x \oplus s_1 \oplus \dots \oplus s_{n-1})$ .
2. Consider  $(n+1)$  parties  $P_1, \dots, P_{n+1}$  where for all  $i \in [n]$ ,  $P_i$  has input  $s_i$  and  $P_{n+1}$  has no input. Run the first  $(k-1)$  rounds of protocol  $\pi$  amongst these parties. (Recall that this can be done independently of the function being computed)
3. After round  $(k-1)$ , let  $\tau_x$  denote the transcript of the protocol and for each  $i \in [n+1]$ , let  $\text{state}_i$  denote the state of party  $P_i$ .
4. For each  $i \in [n]$ , compute  $\text{CT}_i = FE_i.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}_i, (\tau_x, \text{state}_i, 0))$ . Set  $\text{CT}_{n+1} = (\tau_x, \text{state}_{n+1})$ .
5. Output  $\text{CT} = (\text{CT}_1, \dots, \text{CT}_{n+1})$ .

FEComb.Keygen( $\text{MSK}, C$ ): The setup algorithm does the following:

1. For each  $i \in [n]$ , choose a random string  $\text{Sym.CT}_i$  of length  $\ell(\lambda)$  and generate  $\text{SK}_i \leftarrow FE_i.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}_i, C_i)$  where the circuit  $C_i$  is defined in Figure 6.
2. Output  $\text{SK}_C = (\text{SK}_1, \dots, \text{SK}_n)$ .

FEComb.Dec( $\text{SK}_C, \text{CT}$ ): Given input a function secret key  $\text{SK}_C$  and a ciphertext  $\text{CT}$ , the decryption algorithm does the following:

**Input:**  $(\tau_x, \text{state}_i, \beta)$

**Hardwired:**  $\text{Sym.CT}_i$

- If  $\beta = 1$ , set  $k = (\tau_x, \text{state}_i)$  and output  $\text{Sym.Dec}(k, \text{Sym.CT}_i)$ .
- Else, consider the party  $P_i$  that takes part in the MPC protocol  $\pi$  with  $n$  other parties to compute the circuit  $C$ . After  $(k-1)$  rounds, let  $\tau_x$  be the transcript of the protocol and  $\text{state}_i$  be  $P_i$ 's internal state. Output  $\text{Final.Round}_\pi(\tau_x, \text{state}_i)$ .

Figure 6: Circuit  $C_i$

1. Parse  $\text{SK}_C = (\text{SK}_1, \dots, \text{SK}_n)$  and  $\text{CT} = (\text{CT}_1, \dots, \text{CT}_n, \text{CT}_{n+1})$ .
2. For each  $i \in [n]$ , compute  $\text{out}_i = \text{FE}_i.\text{Dec}(\text{SK}_i, \text{CT}_i)$ .
3. Parse  $\text{CT}_{n+1} = (\tau_x, \text{state}_{n+1})$ .
4. Now, consider  $\tau_x$  to be the transcript after  $(k-1)$  rounds of executing protocol  $\pi$  amongst  $n$  parties,  $(\text{out}_1, \dots, \text{out}_n)$  to be the messages of  $n$  parties in the last round and  $\text{state}_{n+1}$  to be the state of the other remaining party and compute its output.
5. That is, set  $\text{trans} = (\tau_x, \text{out}_1, \dots, \text{out}_n)$  and output  $\text{Final.Output}_\pi(\text{trans}, \text{state}_{n+1})$ .

**Correctness and Decomposability:** We observe that the correctness, polynomial slowdown, and decomposability properties follow by inspection.

## 7.2 Security Proof

In this section, we formally prove [Theorem 11](#). The proof of [Theorem 12](#) directly follows.

For the proof, let  $(\text{Sim}_\pi^1(\cdot), \text{Sim}_\pi^2(\cdot))$  denote the simulator of the protocol  $\pi$ .  $\text{Sim}_\pi^1$  generates the messages of the first  $(k-1)$  rounds, while  $\text{Sim}_\pi^2$  generates the last round message of the honest parties. Note that  $\text{Sim}_\pi^1$  only takes as input the adversary's input, while  $\text{Sim}_\pi^2$  also takes as input the output of the function.

To ease the exposition, let's consider the case where the adversary makes only one function key query. For an a priori bounded number of function key queries, we do the standard trick of repeating the scheme in parallel the bound number of times. We show that any PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  succeeds in the selective security game ([Definition 16](#)) with only negligible probability. We will show this via a sequence of hybrids  $\text{Hyb}_0, \dots, \text{Hyb}_4$ . Let's say that candidate  $j$  is secure.

**Hyb<sub>0</sub>** : This hybrid corresponds to the real security game where the challenger picks a bit  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  uniformly at random and computes  $\text{FECOMB.Enc}(\text{MSK}, x_b)$ . Let's denote the challenge ciphertext by  $\text{CT}^* = (\text{CT}_1^*, \dots, \text{CT}_{n+1}^*)$ .

**Hyb<sub>1</sub>** : In this hybrid, in the ciphertext generation step, the challenger picks  $s_1, \dots, s_{j-1}, s_{j+1}, \dots, s_n$  uniformly at random and computes  $s_j = (x_b \oplus s_1 \oplus \dots \oplus s_{j-1} \oplus s_{j+1} \oplus \dots \oplus s_n)$ .

**Hyb<sub>2</sub>** : In this hybrid, the challenger first picks a key  $\text{Sym.SK} \leftarrow \text{Sym.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ . Then, for the function secret key query  $C$  made by the adversary, in order to generate the component  $\text{SK}_j$ , the challenger does the following:

- Recall the values  $(\tau_{x_b}, \text{state}_j)$  that were used to compute one of the components of the challenge ciphertext as follows:  $\text{CT}_j^* = \text{FE}_j.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}_j, (\tau_{x_b}, \text{state}_j, 0))$ .

- Now, consider a party  $P_j$  that takes part in the MPC protocol  $\pi$  with  $n$  other parties and let  $\tau_{x_b}$  be the transcript of the protocol,  $\text{state}_j$  be  $P_j$ 's internal state after  $(k-1)$  rounds.
- Compute the value  $\text{Sym.CT}_j \leftarrow \text{Sym.Enc}(\text{Sym.SK}, \text{Final.Round}_\pi(\tau_{x_b}, \text{state}_j))$ .
- The rest of the procedure is exactly as in  $\text{Hyb}_0$ . That is, generate  $\text{SK}_j \leftarrow \text{FE}_j.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}_j, C_j)$  where the circuit  $C_j$  is defined in Figure 6 (with the hardwired value  $\text{Sym.CT}_j$  described above and replacing the index in the figure from  $i$  to  $j$ ).

$\text{Hyb}_3$  : In this hybrid, the challenger generates the  $j^{\text{th}}$  component of the challenge ciphertext  $\text{CT}_j^*$  as follows:  $\text{CT}_j^* = \text{FE}_j.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}_j, (\text{Sym.SK}, 1))$ .

$\text{Hyb}_4$  : In this hybrid, the challenger computes the messages of party  $P_j$  (corresponding to the  $j^{\text{th}}$  candidate) in the challenge ciphertext and all the function secret keys using the simulator  $\text{Sim}_\pi$  of the MPC protocol  $\pi$ . More precisely, the challenger does the following:

- In the challenge ciphertext generation phase,  $s_j$  is picked randomly and no longer set to be  $(x_b \oplus s_1 \oplus \dots \oplus s_{j-1} \oplus s_{j+1} \oplus \dots \oplus s_n)$ .
- In the challenge ciphertext generation phase, to generate the transcript  $\text{msg}_{x_b}$ , compute the messages of party  $P_j$  by running the algorithm  $\text{Sim}_\pi^1$ . That is, treat the other  $n$  parties as corrupt parties with inputs  $s_1, \dots, s_n, \perp$  (except party  $P_j$ ) and compute  $P_j$ 's message as  $\text{Sim}_\pi^1(|C|, s_1, \dots, s_{j-1}, s_{j+1}, \dots, s_n, \perp)$ .
- Then, for the function secret key query  $C$ , compute  $\text{Sym.CT}_j \leftarrow \text{Sym.Enc}(\text{Sym.SK}, \text{Sim}_\pi^2(s_1, \dots, s_{j-1}, s_{j+1}, \dots, s_n, \perp, C(x_b)))$  where  $C(x_b)$  is the output of the protocol  $\pi$  executed by the  $n+1$  parties.

We will now argue that every pair of consecutive hybrids are computationally indistinguishable and finally, show that any PPT adversary has negligible advantage in  $\text{Hyb}_4$ .

**Lemma 16.**  *$\text{Hyb}_0$  is identical to  $\text{Hyb}_1$ .*

*Proof.* Since the only difference between the two hybrids is that in  $\text{Hyb}_0$ ,  $s_n$  is computed as  $(x_b \oplus s_1 \oplus \dots \oplus s_{n-1})$  while in  $\text{Hyb}_1$ ,  $s_j$  is computed as  $(x_b \oplus s_1 \oplus \dots \oplus s_{j-1} \oplus s_{j+1} \oplus \dots \oplus s_n)$ , it is easy to observe that they are identical.  $\square$

**Lemma 17.** *Assuming the pseudorandom ciphertexts property of  $\text{Sym}$ ,  $\text{Hyb}_1$  is computationally indistinguishable from  $\text{Hyb}_2$ .*

*Proof.* Suppose there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability. We will use  $\mathcal{A}$  to construct an adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{Sym}}$  that breaks the pseudorandom ciphertexts property of  $\text{Sym}$  which is a contradiction.

The adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{Sym}}$  interacts with the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  as in  $\text{Hyb}_1$ . Then, on receiving the challenge message pair  $(x_0, x_1)$  and function secret key query  $C$ , to compute the function secret key,  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{Sym}}$  first sends the tuple  $(\tau_{x_b}, \text{state}_j)$  to the challenger  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{Sym}}$  of the scheme  $\text{Sym}$ . It receives a string which is either an encryption of this tuple using the scheme  $\text{Sym}$  or a uniformly random string. Then,  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{Sym}}$  sets this string to be the value  $\text{Sym.CT}_j$  hardwired in the circuit  $C_j$  and continues interacting with the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  exactly as in  $\text{Hyb}_1$ . Notice that when the challenger  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{Sym}}$  sends an actual ciphertext, the experiment between  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{Sym}}$  and  $\mathcal{A}$  corresponds exactly to  $\text{Hyb}_2$  and when the challenger  $\mathcal{C}_{\text{Sym}}$  sends a uniformly random string, the experiment corresponds exactly to  $\text{Hyb}_1$ . Thus, if  $\mathcal{A}$  can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability,  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{Sym}}$  can use the same guess to break the pseudorandom ciphertexts property of the scheme  $\text{Sym}$  with non-negligible probability which is a contradiction.  $\square$

**Lemma 18.** *Assuming the security of the FE candidate  $FE_j$ ,  $Hyb_2$  is computationally indistinguishable from  $Hyb_3$ .*

*Proof.* Suppose there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability. We will use  $\mathcal{A}$  to construct an adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{FE}$  that breaks the security of the candidate  $FE_j$  which is a contradiction.

The adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{FE}$  interacts with the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  as in  $Hyb_2$ . Then, on receiving the challenge message pair  $(x_0, x_1)$  and function secret key query  $C$ ,  $\mathcal{A}_{FE}$  first sends the pair of tuples  $((\tau_{x_b}, \text{state}_j, 0), (\text{Sym.SK}, 1))$  as the challenge message pair along with function key query  $C_j$  (see Figure 6) to the challenger  $\mathcal{C}_{FE}$  of the FE candidate  $FE_j$ . Note that the function evaluates to the same value on both messages. From  $\mathcal{C}_{FE}$ ,  $\mathcal{A}_{FE}$  receives a ciphertext which is set as the value  $CT_j^*$  and a function secret key which is set as the value  $SK_j$  in its interaction with  $\mathcal{A}$ . Then,  $\mathcal{A}_{FE}$  continues interacting with the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  exactly as in  $Hyb_2$ .

Notice that when the challenger  $\mathcal{C}_{FE}$  encrypts the message  $(\tau_{x_b}, \text{state}_j, 0)$ , the experiment between  $\mathcal{A}_{FE}$  and  $\mathcal{A}$  corresponds exactly to  $Hyb_2$  and when the challenger  $\mathcal{C}_{FE}$  encrypts the message  $(\text{Sym.SK}, 1)$ , the experiment corresponds exactly to  $Hyb_3$ . Thus, if  $\mathcal{A}$  can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability,  $\mathcal{A}_{FE}$  can use the same guess to break the security of the candidate  $FE_j$  with non-negligible probability which is a contradiction.  $\square$

**Lemma 19.** *Assuming the security of the semi-honest delayed function-dependent MPC protocol  $\pi$ ,  $Hyb_3$  is computationally indistinguishable from  $Hyb_4$ .*

*Proof.* Suppose there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability. We will use  $\mathcal{A}$  to construct an adversary  $\mathcal{A}_\pi$  that breaks the security of the MPC protocol  $\pi$  which is a contradiction.

The adversary  $\mathcal{A}_\pi$  interacts with the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  as in  $Hyb_3$  and receives the challenge message pair  $(x_0, x_1)$  and function secret key query  $C$ . Then,  $\mathcal{A}_{FE}$  interacts with the challenger in an MPC protocol  $\pi$  with  $(n+1)$  parties where it corrupts parties  $P_1, \dots, P_{j-1}, \dots, P_{j+1}, \dots, P_{n+1}$ . It receives a random input  $s_i$  for each party from  $\mathcal{A}$  and interacts in the protocol receiving messages for party  $P_j$  from the challenger  $\mathcal{C}_\pi$ .  $\mathcal{A}_\pi$  continues interacting with  $\mathcal{A}$  exactly as in  $Hyb_3$ .

Notice that when the challenger  $\mathcal{C}_\pi$  sends honestly generated messages for party  $P_j$  (real world), the experiment between  $\mathcal{A}_\pi$  and  $\mathcal{A}$  corresponds exactly to  $Hyb_3$  and when the challenger  $\mathcal{C}_\pi$  sends simulated messages for party  $P_j$  (ideal world), the experiment corresponds exactly to  $Hyb_4$ . Thus, if  $\mathcal{A}$  can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability,  $\mathcal{A}_\pi$  can use the same guess to break the security of the MPC protocol  $\pi$  with non-negligible probability which is a contradiction.  $\square$

**Lemma 20.** *The adversary's advantage in  $Hyb_4$  is negligible.*

*Proof.* Observe that the bit  $b$  is not used at all by the challenger in this hybrid and hence, any PPT adversary's advantage is negligible.  $\square$

**Remark:** Note that the proof of Theorem 12 directly follows. That is, to achieve unbounded collusion security, we will now rely on the reusability security property of the underlying MPC protocol.

## 8 From an FE Combiner to a Robust FE Combiner

The FE combiners constructed previously are not *robust*. By this, we mean that the constructions provide no guarantee of correctness or security if any of the underlying FE candidates do not satisfy correctness. However, determining the correctness of FE candidates may be difficult since a candidate FE may be correct with overwhelming probability on certain message, circuit

pairs  $(m, C)$  and not others. With no worst-case guarantees, it can be challenging to reason about the correctness of an FE candidate especially if the function space  $\mathcal{C}$  is say all poly-sized circuits, where sampling uniformly over the space is difficult.

We can mitigate this issue by making our FE combiners robust. A *robust FE combiner* is an FE combiner that satisfies correctness and security provided that at least one FE candidate,  $\text{FE}_i$ , satisfies both correctness and security. No restrictions are placed on the other FE candidates. In particular, they may satisfy neither correctness nor security. In this section, we show how to transform any FE combiner into a robust FE combiner. Formally, we show the following.

**Theorem 13.** *If there exists an FE combiner, then there exists a robust FE combiner.*

Combining [Theorem 13](#) with [Theorem 8](#), we obtain the following corollary.

**Corollary 6.** *Assuming the existence of a PRG in  $\text{NC}^1$ , there exists an unbounded-key robust FE combiner.*

This is done, at a high level, via the following steps.

1. Transform each FE candidate  $\text{FE}_i$  into a new FE candidate  $\text{FE}'_i$  such that
  - (a) If  $\text{FE}_i$  is correct and secure, then  $\text{FE}'_i$  is also correct and secure.
  - (b) If  $\text{FE}'_i$  is correct for any fixed message, circuit pair  $(m, C)$  with probability  $\alpha$ , then it is at least  $\alpha'$ -correct for all other message, circuit pairs  $(m', C')$  where  $\alpha' = \alpha - \text{negl}(\lambda)$ .
2. Fix a message  $m$  and a circuit  $C$  and test each candidate repeatedly on  $(m, C)$  to determine if each candidate is  $\alpha$ -correct for  $\alpha \geq 1 - \frac{1}{\lambda}$ . Discard those that are not.
3. Using standard techniques of BPP correctness amplification, transform the  $\alpha$ -correct candidates into (almost) correct candidates.
4. Instantiate constructions of FE combiners from previous sections with these (almost) correct candidates.

## 8.1 FE Candidate Transformation

In this section, we describe the transformation described in step 1 in the construction overview in [Section 8](#). The idea is to use a universal circuit  $U_m$  for a message  $m$  that takes as input the description of a circuit  $C$  and evaluates to  $C(m)$ . By encrypting a garbled circuit corresponding to  $U_m$ , we are able to transform correctness for a message, circuit pair  $(m, C)$  to correctness for a message, circuit pair where the message is a garbled circuit and the function is the evaluation circuit with the appropriate labels. We can then leverage the security of garbling scheme to argue that correctness of the new FE candidate cannot differ greatly between different message, circuit pairs. Note that in our transformation, security of the transformed FE scheme follows from the security of the original FE scheme and correctness of the garbling scheme. In particular, security of the garbling scheme is not necessary to argue security of the transformed FE scheme. We now formally describe the transformation.

Let FE be an arbitrary FE candidate. Let GC = (Gen, GrbC, Grbl, EvalGC) be a garbling scheme. Then, consider the following FE candidate  $\text{FE}'$ .

- $\text{Setup}'(1^\lambda)$ : Run  $\text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$  to obtain MSK and  $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$  to obtain gcsk. Set  $\text{MSK}' = (\text{MSK}, \text{gcsk})$ .
- $\text{Enc}'(\text{MSK}', m)$ : Parse  $\text{MSK}'$  as  $(\text{MSK}, \text{gcsk})$ . Let  $U_m$  denote the universal circuit that takes as input a description  $\langle C \rangle$  of a circuit  $C \in \mathcal{C}$  and outputs  $C(m)$ . Let  $b$  be a uniformly random bit. Output

$$(\text{FE.Enc}(\text{MSK}, \text{GrbC}(\text{gcsk}, U_m(\cdot) \oplus b)), b)$$

as the ciphertext.

- $\text{KeyGen}'(\text{MSK}', C)$ : Parse  $\text{MSK}'$  as  $(\text{MSK}, \text{gcsk})$ . Run  $\text{Grbl}(\text{gcsk})$  to obtain  $\vec{\mathbf{k}}$ , the garbled circuit labels. Let  $\vec{\mathbf{k}}(C)$  denote the labels corresponding to  $\langle C \rangle$ . Output

$$\text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, \text{EvalGC}(\cdot, \vec{\mathbf{k}}(C)))$$

as  $\text{SK}_C$ .

- $\text{Dec}'(\text{SK}_C, \text{CT}')$ : Parse  $\text{CT}'$  as  $(\text{CT}, b)$ . Output

$$\text{FE.Dec}(\text{SK}_C, \text{CT}) \oplus b.$$

**Theorem 14.** *If FE is a correct and secure FE candidate and GC is a garbling scheme, then  $\text{FE}'$  is also correct and secure.*

*Proof.* Correctness follows immediately from the correctness of FE and GC. In particular, fix any message  $m$  and circuit  $C$ . Let CT denote the encryption of  $m$  and  $\text{SK}_C$  denote the function key for  $C$ . Then,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{FE}'.\text{Dec}(\text{SK}_C, \text{CT}) &= \text{EvalGC}(\text{GrbC}(\text{gcsk}, U_m(\cdot) \oplus b), \vec{\mathbf{k}}(C)) \oplus b \\ &= U_m(\langle C \rangle) \oplus b \oplus b = C(m). \end{aligned}$$

For security, suppose there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that can win at the indistinguishability security game for  $\text{FE}'$ . Then, consider the adversary  $\mathcal{A}'$  that breaks the security of FE.  $\mathcal{A}'$  runs  $\mathcal{A}$  and plays the role of the challenger. When  $\mathcal{A}$  submits a message pair  $(m_0, m_1)$ ,  $\mathcal{A}'$  runs  $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$  to obtain  $\text{gcsk}$ . Then, it obtains  $m'_0 = \text{GrbC}(\text{gcsk}, U_{m_0} \oplus b)$  and similarly for  $m'_1$  for a uniformly sampled bit  $b$ . It then submits  $(m'_0, m'_1)$  to its challenger to receive CT and gives  $(\text{CT}, b)$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . Whenever,  $\mathcal{A}$  requests a function key for a circuit  $C$ ,  $\mathcal{A}'$  runs  $\text{Grbl}(\text{gcsk})$  to obtain  $\vec{\mathbf{k}}$  and then requests a function key to its challenger for the circuit  $\text{EvalGC}(\cdot, \vec{\mathbf{k}}(C))$ . It gives the resulting function key to  $\mathcal{A}$ . When  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a response,  $\mathcal{A}'$  outputs the same response. Note that  $\mathcal{A}'$  simulates the security game for  $\mathcal{A}$  perfectly and wins whenever  $\mathcal{A}$  wins. Therefore,  $\mathcal{A}'$  is a distinguisher for FE, contradicting the security of FE.  $\square$

**Theorem 15.** *Let  $\text{FE}'$  be the result of applying the above transformation to an FE candidate FE and let GC be a garbling scheme. For a message, circuit pair  $(m, C)$ , let*

$$\Pr[\text{Corr}(m, C)] = \Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} \text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{FE}'.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\ \text{CT} \leftarrow \text{FE}'.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, m) \\ \text{SK}_C \leftarrow \text{FE}'.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, C) \\ C(m) \leftarrow \text{FE}'.\text{Dec}(\text{SK}_C, \text{CT}) \end{array} \right]$$

*denote the probability of correctness when  $\text{FE}'$  is run on  $(m, C)$ . Then, for any two message, circuit pairs  $(m_0, C_0)$  and  $(m_1, C_1)$ ,*

$$|\Pr[\text{Corr}(m_0, C_0)] - \Pr[\text{Corr}(m_1, C_1)]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

*Proof.* We will show this via a series of experiments. Fix any message, circuit pair  $(m, C)$ .

$\text{Expt}_0(1^\lambda, m, C)$ :

1. Run  $\text{MSK}' \leftarrow \text{FE}'.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ .
2. Run  $\text{CT}' \leftarrow \text{FE}'.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}', m)$ .
3. Run  $\text{SK}_C \leftarrow \text{FE}'.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}', C)$ .
4. If  $\text{FE}'.\text{Dec}(\text{SK}_C, \text{CT}') = C(m)$ , output 1. Else, output 0.

$\text{Expt}_1(1^\lambda, m, C)$ :

1. Run  $(\text{MSK}, \text{gcsk}) \leftarrow \text{FE}'.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ .
2. Sample a uniformly random bit  $b$ . Let  $C'$  denote the circuit  $U_m(\cdot) \oplus b$ .
3. Run  $\text{SimGC}(1^\lambda, \phi(C'), C(m) \oplus b)$  to obtain  $(\widehat{C}', k_1, \dots, k_\ell)$ .
4. Set  $\text{CT} = \text{FE}.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, \widehat{C}')$ .
5. Set  $\text{SK}_C = \text{FE}.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, \text{EvalGC}(\cdot, (k_1, \dots, k_\ell)))$ .
6. If  $\text{FE}.\text{Dec}(\text{SK}_C, \text{CT}) \oplus b = C(m)$ , output 1. Else, output 0.

$\text{Expt}_2(1^\lambda, m, C)$ :

1. Run  $(\text{MSK}, \text{gcsk}) \leftarrow \text{FE}'.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ .
2. Sample a uniformly random bit  $b'$ . Let  $\phi(C')$  denote the topology of the circuit  $U_m(\cdot) \oplus b$ . This is independent of  $m$  and  $b$ .
3. Run  $\text{SimGC}(1^\lambda, \phi(C'), b')$  to obtain  $(\widehat{C}', k_1, \dots, k_\ell)$ .
4. Set  $\text{CT} = \text{FE}.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, \widehat{C}')$ .
5. Set  $\text{SK}_C = \text{FE}.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, \text{EvalGC}(\cdot, (k_1, \dots, k_\ell)))$ .
6. If  $\text{FE}.\text{Dec}(\text{SK}_C, \text{CT}) = b'$ , output 1. Else, output 0.

**Lemma 21.**

$$|\Pr[\text{Expt}_0(1^\lambda, m, C) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_1(1^\lambda, m, C) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

*Proof.* Suppose the above did not hold. Then, consider the following adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that breaks the security of GC.  $\mathcal{A}$  samples a random bit  $b$  and submits its challenge circuit to be  $U_m(\cdot) \oplus b$  and its challenge input to be  $\langle C \rangle$ . It receives a garbled circuit  $\widehat{C}'$  and wire keys  $k_1, \dots, k_\ell$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  runs  $\text{FE}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  to obtain MSK. It then sets  $\text{CT} = \text{FE}.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, \widehat{C}')$ . It additionally sets  $\text{SK}_C = \text{FE}.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, \text{EvalGC}(\cdot, (k_1, \dots, k_\ell)))$ . It then checks if  $\text{FE}.\text{Dec}(\text{SK}_C, \text{CT}) \oplus b = C(m)$ . If it does, it outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0. Note that if  $\mathcal{A}$ 's challenger is using the garbling scheme, then  $\mathcal{A}$  runs  $\text{Expt}_0(1^\lambda, m, C)$ . On the other hand, if  $\mathcal{A}$ 's challenger is using the garbled circuit simulator, then  $\mathcal{A}$  runs  $\text{Expt}_1(1^\lambda, m, C)$ . So, if the lemma did not hold,  $\mathcal{A}$  would break the security of GC.  $\square$

**Lemma 22.**

$$|\Pr[\text{Expt}_1(1^\lambda, m, C) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_2(1^\lambda, m, C) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

*Proof.* This follows immediately from the definitions of the experiments. Note that these two experiments are functionally equivalent, since the distributions of a random bit  $b'$  and  $C(m) \oplus b$  for a random bit  $b$  are identical. Additionally,  $\text{FE}.\text{Dec}(\text{SK}_C, \text{CT}) \oplus b = C(m)$  if and only if  $\text{FE}.\text{Dec}(\text{SK}_C, \text{CT}) = C(m) \oplus b$ , which is distributed the same as a random bit  $b'$ . Therefore, the lemma holds.

Now, note that  $\text{Expt}_2(1^\lambda, m, C)$  is independent of the message, circuit pair  $(m, C)$  since it depends only on the topology of the circuit  $U_m(\cdot) \oplus b$ , which is the same regardless of  $m$ . Since  $\text{Expt}_0(1^\lambda, m, C)$  is 1 with the same probability as the probability statement in the theorem, it follows from the above lemmas that for any message, circuit pairs  $(m_0, C_0)$  and  $(m_1, C_1)$ , that

$$|\Pr[\text{Expt}_0(1^\lambda, m_0, C_0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_2(1^\lambda, m_0, C_0) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

and

$$|\Pr[\text{Expt}_0(1^\lambda, m_1, C_1) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_2(1^\lambda, m_1, C_1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

and

$$|\Pr [\text{Expt}_2(1^\lambda, m_0, C_0) = 1] - \Pr [\text{Expt}_2(1^\lambda, m_1, C_1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

and so the theorem holds.  $\square$

## 8.2 Proof of Theorem 13

Using the FE candidate transformation described in Section 8.1, we can now show Theorem 13. Given FE candidates  $\{\text{FE}_i\}_i$  with the guarantee that at least one is correct and secure, run the FE transformation from Section 8.1 to obtain new FE candidates  $\{\text{FE}'_i\}_i$ . Next, fix an arbitrary message  $m$  and circuit  $C$  and test for correctness on  $(m, C)$  a total of  $\lambda^2$  times. If the FE candidate is not correct on any of the tests, discard it. By a Chernoff bound, all remaining candidates will be  $\alpha$ -correct for  $\alpha \geq 1 - 1/\lambda$  with overwhelming probability. Note that since the secure FE candidate must be (almost) correct, it will not be discarded with overwhelming probability. Next, use standard techniques of BPP amplification (repeat in parallel a  $\text{poly}(\lambda)$  number of times and take a majority vote) to transform all the remaining FE candidates into (almost) correct candidates. This follows from [AJN<sup>+</sup>16]. Finally, instantiate the FE combiner construction from Section 6 to obtain a robust FE combiner.

**Universal Functional Encryption:** Robust FE combiners are closely related to the notion of universal functional encryption. Universal functional encryption is a construction of functional encryption satisfying the following simple guarantee. If there exists a Turing Machine with running time bounded by some  $T(n) = \text{poly}(n)$  that implements a correct and secure FE scheme, then the universal functional encryption construction is itself a correct and secure FE scheme. Using the existence of a robust FE combiner (Theorem 13) and the results of [AJN<sup>+</sup>16], we observe the following.

**Theorem 16.** *Assuming the existence of a robust FE combiner, there exists a universal functional encryption scheme.*

Using the above theorem and Corollary 6, we arrive at the following corollary.

**Corollary 7.** *Assuming the existence of a PRG in  $\text{NC}^1$ , there exists a universal unbounded-key functional encryption scheme.*

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## A Additional Preliminaries

### A.1 Functional Encryption: Security Definitions

**IND-Security.** We recall indistinguishability-based selective security for FE. This security notion is modeled as a game between a challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  and an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  where the adversary

can request functional keys and ciphertexts from  $\mathcal{C}$ . Specifically,  $\mathcal{A}$  can submit function queries  $C$  and  $\mathcal{C}$  responds with the corresponding functional keys.  $\mathcal{A}$  can also submit message queries of the form  $(x_0, x_1)$  and receives an encryption of messages  $x_b$  for some bit  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ . The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  wins the game if she can guess  $b$  with probability significantly more than  $1/2$  and if for all function queries  $C$  and message queries  $(x_0, x_1)$ ,  $C(x_0) = C(x_1)$ . That is to say, any function evaluation that is computable by  $\mathcal{A}$  gives the same value regardless of  $b$ . It is required that the adversary must declare the challenge messages at the beginning of the game.

**Definition 16** (IND-secure FE). *A secret-key FE scheme FE for a class of circuits  $\mathcal{C} = \{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in [\mathbb{N}]}$  and message space  $\mathcal{X} = \{\mathcal{X}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in [\mathbb{N}]}$  is selectively secure if for any PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists a negligible function  $\mu(\cdot)$  such that for all sufficiently large  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  is*

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{FE}} = \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{FE}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{FE}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1] \right| \leq \mu(\lambda),$$

where for each  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  and  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , the experiment  $\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{FE}}(1^\lambda, b)$  is defined below:

1. **Challenge message queries:**  $\mathcal{A}$  submits message queries,

$$\{(x_0^i, x_1^i)\}$$

with  $x_0^i, x_1^i \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$  to the challenger  $\mathcal{C}$ .

2.  $\mathcal{C}$  computes  $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$  and then computes  $\text{CT}_i \leftarrow \text{FE.Enc}(\text{MSK}, x_b^i)$  for all  $i$ . The challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  then sends  $\{\text{CT}_i\}$  to the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ .
3. **Function queries:** The following is repeated an at most polynomial number of times:  $\mathcal{A}$  submits a function query  $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$  to  $\mathcal{C}$ . The challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  computes  $\text{SK}_C \leftarrow \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, C)$  and sends it to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
4. If there exists a function query  $C$  and challenge message queries  $(x_0^i, x_1^i)$  such that  $C(x_0^i) \neq C(x_1^i)$ , then the output of the experiment is set to  $\perp$ . Otherwise, the output of the experiment is set to  $b'$ , where  $b'$  is the output of  $\mathcal{A}$ .

**Adaptive Security.** The above security notion is referred to as selective security in the literature. One can consider a stronger notion of security, called *adaptive security*, where the adversary can interleave the challenge messages and the function queries in any arbitrary order. Analogous to Definition 16, we can define an adaptively secure FE scheme. In this paper, we only deal with selectively secure FE schemes. However, the security of these schemes can be upgraded to adaptive with no additional cost [ABS15].

**Simulation Security.** We can also consider a different notion of security, called (single-key) simulation security.

**Definition 17.** (*SIM-Security*) Let FE denote a functional encryption scheme for a circuit class  $\mathcal{C}$ . For every PPT adversary  $\mathbf{A} = (\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{A}_2)$  and a PPT simulator Sim, consider the following two experiments:

---

| $\text{Exp}_{\text{FE}, \mathbf{A}}^{\text{real}}(1^\lambda)$   | $\text{Exp}_{\text{FE}, \mathbf{A}, \text{Sim}}^{\text{ideal}}(1^\lambda)$                            |
|---|---|
| $\{\text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow \text{MSK}\}$   | $\{\text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow \text{MSK}\}$   |
| $\mathbf{A}_1 \rightarrow (C, \text{state}_{\mathbf{A}_1})$   | $\mathbf{A}_1 \rightarrow (C, \text{state}_{\mathbf{A}_1})$   |
| $\{\text{SK}_C \leftarrow \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, C)\}$  | $\{\text{SK}_C \leftarrow \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, C)\}$  |
| $\mathbf{A}_2(\text{state}_{\mathbf{A}_1}, \text{SK}_C) \rightarrow (m, \text{state}_{\mathbf{A}_2})$ | $\mathbf{A}_2(\text{state}_{\mathbf{A}_1}, \text{SK}_C) \rightarrow (m, \text{state}_{\mathbf{A}_2})$ |
| $\text{FE.Enc}(\text{MSK}, m) \rightarrow \text{CT}$  | $\text{Sim}(\text{MSK}, C, \text{SK}_C, C(m)) \rightarrow \text{CT}$                                  |

The scheme is said to be (single-key) SIM-secure if there exists a PPT simulator Sim such that for all PPT adversaries (A<sub>1</sub>, A<sub>2</sub>), the outcomes of the two experiments are computationally indistinguishable:

$$\{\text{Exp}_{\text{PFE},A}^{\text{real}}(1^\lambda)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \approx_c \{\text{Exp}_{\text{PFE},A,\text{Sim}}^{\text{ideal}}(1^\lambda)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$$

## A.2 Secure Multi-Party Computation

We now provide the necessary background on secure multi-party computation. We first present the syntax and then the security definition.

**Syntax.** We define a secure multi-party computation protocol  $\Pi$  for  $n$  parties  $P_1, \dots, P_n$  associated with an  $n$ -party functionality  $f : \{0, 1\}^{\ell_1} \times \dots \times \{0, 1\}^{\ell_n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{y_1}} \times \dots \times \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{y_n}}$ . We let  $\ell_i$  denote the length of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  party's input and  $\ell_{y_i}$  denote the length of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  party's output. In any given execution of the protocol, the  $i^{\text{th}}$  party receives as input  $x_i \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_i}$  and maintains a state  $\text{state}_i$ . All the parties jointly compute the functionality  $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  by following the protocol. The protocol proceeds in rounds and in each round, every party broadcasts a message to the other parties. In the end, party  $P_i$  outputs  $\text{out}_i$ . The protocol is said to be correct if the joint distribution  $(\text{out}_1, \dots, \text{out}_n)$  is statistically close to  $(y_1, \dots, y_n) = f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ .

**Semi-Honest Adversaries.** We consider weaker adversarial models where the adversaries follow the instructions of the protocol. That is, they receive their inputs from the environment, behave as prescribed by the protocol, and, finally, output their view of the protocol. Such types of adversaries are referred to as semi-honest adversaries.

We define semi-honest security below. Denote  $\text{Real}_{f,S}^\Pi(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  to be the joint distribution over the outputs of all the parties along with the views of the parties indexed by the set  $S$ .

**Definition 18** (Semi-Honest Security). *Consider an  $n$ -party functionality  $f$  as defined above. Fix a set of inputs  $(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ , where  $x_i \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_i}$  and let  $r_i$  be the randomness of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  party. Let  $\Pi$  be a  $n$ -party protocol implementing  $f$ . We say that  $\Pi$  satisfies **security against semi-honest adversaries** if for every subset of parties  $S$ , there exists a PPT simulator Sim such that:*

$$\{ (\{y_i\}_{i \notin S}, \text{Sim}(\{y_i\}_{i \in S}, \{x_i\}_{i \in S})) \} \approx_c \{ \text{Real}_{f,S}^\Pi(x_1, \dots, x_n) \},$$

where  $y_i$  is the  $i^{\text{th}}$  output of  $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ . In particular, we say that  $\Pi$  is semi-honest secure.

## A.3 Threshold Leveled Fully Homomorphic Encryption

The following definition of threshold homomorphic encryption is adapted from [AJLA<sup>+</sup>12, MW16, BGG<sup>+</sup>17]. A threshold homomorphic encryption scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms  $\text{TFHE} = (\text{TFHE.Setup}, \text{TFHE.Enc}, \text{TFHE.Eval}, \text{TFHE.PartDec}, \text{TFHE.FinDec})$  satisfying the following specifications:

- **Setup**,  $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n)$ : It takes as input the security parameter  $\lambda$ , a circuit depth  $d$ , and the number of parties  $n$ . It outputs a public key  $\text{fpk}$  and secret key shares  $\text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_n$ .
- **Encryption**,  $\text{Enc}(\text{fpk}, \mu)$ : It takes as input a public key  $\text{fpk}$  and a single bit plaintext  $\mu \in \{0, 1\}$  and outputs a ciphertext CT.

- **Evaluation**,  $\text{Eval}(C, \text{CT}_1, \dots, \text{CT}_k)$ : It takes as input a boolean circuit  $C: \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$  of depth  $\leq d$  and ciphertexts  $\text{CT}_1, \dots, \text{CT}_k$  encrypted under the same public key. It outputs an evaluation ciphertext  $\text{CT}$ . We shall assume that the ciphertext also contains  $\text{fpk}$ .
- **Partial Decryption**,  $p_i \leftarrow \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{CT})$ : It takes as input a secret key share  $\text{fsk}_i$  and a ciphertext  $\text{CT}$ . It outputs a partial decryption  $p_i$  related to the party  $i$ .
- **Final Decryption**,  $\text{FinDec}(B)$ : It is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a set  $B = \{p_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ . It outputs a plaintext  $\hat{\mu} \in \{0, 1, \perp\}$ .

**Definition 19 (TFHE).** A TFHE scheme is required to satisfy the following properties for all parameters  $(\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_N) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n)$ , any plaintexts  $\mu_1, \dots, \mu_k \in \{0, 1\}$ , and any boolean circuit  $C: \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$  of depth  $\leq d$ .

**Correctness of Encryption.** Let  $\text{CT} = \text{Enc}(\text{fpk}, \mu_1)$  and  $B = \{\text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{CT})\}_{i \in [n]}$ . With all but negligible probability in  $\lambda$  over the coins of  $\text{Setup}$ ,  $\text{Enc}$ , and  $\text{PartDec}$ ,  $\text{FinDec}(B) = \mu_1$ .

**Correctness of Evaluation.** Let  $\text{CT}_i = \text{Enc}(\text{fpk}, \mu_i)$  for  $1 \leq i \leq k$ ,  $\hat{\text{CT}} = \text{Eval}(C, \text{CT}_1, \dots, \text{CT}_k)$ , and  $B = \{\text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \hat{\text{CT}})\}_{i \in [n]}$ . With all but negligible probability in  $\lambda$  over the coins of  $\text{Setup}$ ,  $\text{Enc}$ , and  $\text{PartDec}$ ,  $\text{FinDec}(B) = C(\mu_1, \dots, \mu_k)$ .

**Compactness of Ciphertexts.** There exists a polynomial,  $\text{poly}$ , such that  $|\text{CT}| \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, d)$  for any ciphertext  $\text{CT}$  generated from the algorithms of TFHE.

**Semantic Security of Encryption.** Any PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  has only negligible advantage as a function of  $\lambda$  over the coins of all the algorithms in the following game:

1. Run  $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_n)$ . The adversary is given  $\text{fpk}$ .
2. The adversary outputs a set  $S \subset [n]$  of size  $n - 1$ .
3. The adversary receives  $\{\text{fsk}_i\}_{i \in S}$  along with  $\text{Enc}(\text{fpk}, b) \rightarrow \text{CT}$  for a random  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ .
4. The adversary outputs  $b'$  and wins if  $b = b'$ .

**Simulation Security.** Let  $\text{CT}_i = \text{Enc}(\text{fpk}, \mu_i)$  for  $1 \leq i \leq k$ ,  $\hat{\text{CT}} = \text{Eval}(C, \text{CT}_1, \dots, \text{CT}_k)$ , and  $p_i = \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \hat{\text{CT}})$  for all  $i \in [n]$ . There exists a PPT algorithm  $\text{Sim}$  such that for any subset  $S$  of the form  $[n] \setminus i^*$ ,  $\text{Sim}(\hat{\text{CT}}, \{\text{fsk}_i\}_S, C(\mu_1, \dots, \mu_k)) \rightarrow p'_{i^*}$  the following distributions are statistically close (in the security parameter):

$$(p_i, \text{fpk}, \text{CT}_1, \dots, \text{CT}_k, \{\text{fsk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}) \approx (p'_{i^*}, \text{fpk}, \text{CT}_1, \dots, \text{CT}_k, \{\text{fsk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}).$$

## A.4 Garbling Schemes

We recall the definition of garbling schemes [Yao86, BHR12].

**Definition 20 (Garbling Schemes [Yao86, BHR12]).** A garbling scheme  $\text{GC} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Grbl}, \text{GrbC}, \text{EvalGC})$  defined for a class of circuits  $\mathcal{C}$  consists of the following polynomial time algorithms:

- **Setup**,  $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$ : On input security parameter  $\lambda$ , it generates the secret parameters  $\text{gcsk}$ .
- **Generation of Garbling Keys**,  $\text{Grbl}(\text{gcsk})$ : On input secret parameters  $\text{gcsk}$ , it generates the wire keys  $\vec{\mathbf{k}} = (\mathbf{k}_1, \dots, \mathbf{k}_\ell)$ , where  $\mathbf{k}_i = (k_i^0, k_i^1)$ .
- **Garbled Circuit Generation**,  $\text{GrbC}(\text{gcsk}, C)$ : On input secret parameters  $\text{gcsk}$  and circuit  $C \in \mathcal{C}$ , it generates the garbled circuit  $\hat{C}$ .

- **Evaluation**,  $\text{EvalGC}(\widehat{C}, (k_1^{x_1}, \dots, k_\ell^{x_\ell}))$ : On input garbled circuit  $\widehat{C}$ , wire keys  $(k_1^{x_1}, \dots, k_\ell^{x_\ell})$ , it generates the output  $\text{out}$ .

It satisfies the following properties:

- **Correctness**: For every circuit  $C \in \mathcal{C}$  with input length  $\ell$ ,  $x \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ , for every security parameter  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , it should hold that:

$$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} \text{gcsk} \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda), \\ ((k_1^0, k_1^1), \dots, (k_\ell^0, k_\ell^1)) \leftarrow \text{Grbl}(\text{gcsk}), \\ \widehat{C} \leftarrow \text{GrbC}(\text{gcsk}, C) \\ C(x) \leftarrow \text{EvalGC}(\widehat{C}, (k_1^{x_1}, \dots, k_\ell^{x_\ell})) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

- **Security**: There exists a PPT simulator  $\text{SimGC}$  such that the following holds for every circuit  $C \in \mathcal{C}$  of input length  $\ell$ ,  $x \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ ,

$$(\widehat{C}, k_1^{x_1}, \dots, k_\ell^{x_\ell}) \cong_c \text{SimGC}(1^\lambda, \phi(C), C(x)),$$

where:

- $\text{gcsk} \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$
- $((k_1^0, k_1^1), \dots, (k_\ell^0, k_\ell^1)) \leftarrow \text{Grbl}(\text{gcsk})$
- $\widehat{C} \leftarrow \text{GrbC}(\text{gcsk}, C)$
- $\phi(C)$  is the topology of  $C$ .

**Theorem 17** ([Yao86, LP09, BHR12]). Assuming the existence of one-way functions, there exists a secure garbling scheme GC.