Paper 2018/357

Statistical Ineffective Fault Attacks on Masked AES with Fault Countermeasures

Christoph Dobraunig and Maria Eichlseder and Hannes Gross and Stefan Mangard and Florian Mendel and Robert Primas

Abstract

Implementation attacks like side-channel and fault attacks are a threat to deployed devices especially if an attacker has physical access. As a consequence, devices like smart cards and IoT devices usually provide countermeasures against implementation attacks, such as masking against side-channel attacks and detection-based countermeasures like temporal or spacial redundancy against fault attacks. In this paper, we show how to attack implementations protected with both masking and detection-based fault countermeasures by using statistical ineffective fault attacks using a single fault induction per execution. Our attacks are largely unaffected by the deployed protection order of masking and the level of redundancy of the detection-based countermeasure. These observations show that the combination of masking plus error detection alone may not provide sufficient protection against implementation attacks.

Note: Camera ready version for asiacrypt