Paper 2018/357
Statistical Ineffective Fault Attacks on Masked AES with Fault Countermeasures
Christoph Dobraunig and Maria Eichlseder and Hannes Gross and Stefan Mangard and Florian Mendel and Robert Primas
Abstract
Implementation attacks like side-channel and fault attacks are a threat for deployed devices especially if an attacker has physical access to a device. As a consequence, devices like smart cards usually provide countermeasures against implementation attacks, such as masking against side-channel attacks and detection-based countermeasures like temporal redundancy against fault attacks. In this paper, we show how to attack implementations protected with both masking and detection-based fault countermeasures by using statistical ineffective fault attacks using a single fault induction per execution. Our attacks are largely unaffected by the deployed protection order of masking and the level of redundancy of the detection-based countermeasure. Our observations refute the intuition that masking is a viable countermeasure against biased faults, statistical fault attacks, or statistical ineffective fault attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Implementation attackFault attackSFASIFA
- Contact author(s)
- robert primas @ iaik tugraz at
- History
- 2018-09-08: revised
- 2018-04-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/357
- License
-
CC BY