Foundations of State Channel Networks

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Abstract. One of the main challenges that hinder further adaption of decentralized cryptocurrencies is scalability. Because current cryptocurrencies require that all transactions are processed and stored on a distributed ledger — the so-called blockchain — transaction throughput is inherently limited. An important proposal to significantly improve scalability are off-chain protocols, where the massive amount of transactions is executed without requiring the costly interaction with the blockchain. Examples of off-chain protocols include payment channels and networks, which are currently deployed by popular cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. A further extension of payment networks envisioned for cryptocurrencies are so-called state channel networks. In contrast to payment networks that only support carrying out off-chain payments between users, state channel networks allow execution of arbitrary complex smart contracts. The main contribution of this work is to give the first full specification for general state channel networks. Moreover, we provide formal security definitions and develop security proofs showing that our construction satisfies security against powerful adversaries. An additional benefit of our construction over most existing payment networks is the use of channel virtualization, which further reduces latency and costs in complex channel networks.

1 Introduction

In recent years we have witnessed a growing popularity of distributed cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [23] or Ethereum [33]. These systems enable pseudonymous online payments, cheap remittance and many novel applications such as smart contracts, which allow mutually distrusting parties to engage in complex agreements. The underlying main innovation of these currencies is a consensus mechanism that allows special parties — the miners — to maintain the so-called blockchain. The blockchain is an append-only ledger on which the transactions of the system are stored, and whose entire content is publicly available, and is checked for consistency by the miners. As the name suggests, blockchain is a chain of data blocks (containing transactions), that are created by the system at some rate. Unfortunately, blockchain-based systems currently face inherent scalability challenges that significantly hinder further adaption. Since each transaction that is processed via the network has to be stored on the blockchain, there is a fundamental limit on how many transactions can be processed per second. For instance, in Bitcoin with its 1MB block size, and a block creation rate of approx. 10 minutes, the network is currently limited to process up to 7 transactions per second [5].

A natural solution to this problem is to increase the block size, or the block creation rate, but even with these changes it is unlikely that blockchain-based cryptocurrencies can reach the efficiency of centralized payment systems, e.g., the VISA network processes during peak times more than 50,000 transactions per second [5]. Notice that already at the current transaction rate the blockchain in Bitcoin grows by approximately 5 GB every month — reaching over 150GB in February 2018. Because all miners need to replicate and verify the entire transaction history, it will be extremely costly to maintain such a system in the long run.

The scalability problem is further amplified by “microtransactions”, which is one of the expected “killer applications” when blockchain-based currencies go mainstream [32]. Microtransactions allow users to transfer very small amounts of money, typically less than 1 cent, and can enable many novel business models, e.g., fair sharing of WiFi connection, or devices paying to each other in the “Internet of Things”. Besides the scalability issues that are further amplified by microtransactions, there are also several other challenges

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that need to be addressed by blockchain-based cryptocurrencies before they can handle massive volumes of microtransactions. First, in many settings microtransactions have to be executed instantaneously (e.g., in the application of sharing the WiFi connection, or when a user wants to read an article on a news webpage). With state-of-the-art cryptocurrencies this is however not possible because current systems require significantly more time to confirm transactions, e.g., in Bitcoin confirmation takes at least around 10 minutes\(^4\). Secondly, and more importantly, when miners process transactions, they can ask for fees. While initially the fees in major cryptocurrencies were relatively low, they are expected to raise when millions of transactions compete for the scarce source of fast processing. Once these fees surpass the actual value assigned to a transaction, micropayments become much less attractive – something which we also witness for traditional online payment systems via credit cards or PayPal. Both systems do not offer real microtransactions due to their fee structure, e.g., PayPal asks for at least 30 cents for each transaction.

**Payment and state channels.** One prominent tool for addressing the above challenges is the so-called payment channel [4]. Payment channels allow two users to rapidly exchange money between each other without sending transactions to the blockchain. This is achieved by keeping the massive bulk of transactions off-chain, and using the blockchain only when parties involved in the payment channel disagree, or when they want to close the channel. Because off-chain transactions can always be fairly settled by the users via the blockchain, there is no incentive for them to disagree, and hence honest behavior is enforced. In the normal case, when the two parties involved in the payment channel play honestly and off-chain transactions never hit the blockchain before the channel is closed, payment channels significantly improve on the shortcomings mentioned above. They reduce transaction fees, allow for instantaneous payments and limit the load put on the blockchain.

The concept of payment channels has been extended in several directions. One of the most important extension is the so-called payment network, which enables users to route transactions via intermediary hubs. To illustrate the concept of a payment network, suppose that \(P_1\) has a payment channel with \(P_2\), and \(P_2\) has a payment channel with \(P_3\), while \(P_1\) and \(P_3\) are not directly connected via a channel on the ledger. A channel network allows \(P_1\) to route payments to \(P_3\) via the intermediate \(P_2\) without the need for \(P_1\) and \(P_3\) to open a channel between each other on the ledger. This reduces the on-chain transaction load even further. An example of such a network using the concept of hash-locked transactions has been designed and implemented by Poon and Dryja over Bitcoin [26]. In a hash-locked based channel network each transaction that is sent from \(P_1\) to \(P_3\) is routed explicitly via \(P_2\) – meaning that \(P_2\) confirms that the transaction can be carried out between \(P_1\) and \(P_3\). For further details on hash-locked transactions, we refer the reader to, e.g., to the description of the Lightning network [26] and to Appendix A.

A further generalization of payment channels are state channels [1], which radically enrich the functionality of payment channels. Concretely, the users of a state channel can, besides payments, execute entire complex smart contracts described in form of self-enforcing programs in an off-chain way. Examples of use cases for state channels are manifold and include contracts for digital content distribution, online gaming or fast decentralized token exchanges. Probably the most prominent project whose final goal is to implement state channels over Ethereum is called Raiden [30], but currently it only supports simple payments, and a specification of protocols for full state channel networks has not been provided yet. The main contribution of this work is to address this shortcoming and provide the first construction for building general state channel networks of arbitrary complexity. We next provide further background on state channels and virtual payment channels. A detailed discussion of relevant related work is given in Section 1.2.

**State channels.** At an informal level, a state channel between two parties Alice and Bob provides a method to implement a “simulated 2-party blockchain supporting contracts” in the following sense. Alice and Bob who established a state channel between each other can maintain a “simulated transaction ledger” between themselves and perform the blockchain transactions on it “without registering them on the real blockchain”. This happens as long as the parties do not enter into a conflict. The security of this solution comes from the fact that at any time parties can “register” the current off-chain state of the channel on the real blockchain, and let the blockchain fairly finish the execution of the contract. At a technical level, state channels (and

\(^4\) This is reduced in other cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum, or in Bitcoin via zero-confirmation transactions.
in fact also payment channels) are implemented using smart contracts. That is, during channel opening the
parties deploy a special “channel contract” on the blockchain, which handles fair settlement during channel
closing. Concretely, the users of the channel can at any point in time send their latest state to the channel
contract. In case when two (possibly malicious) parties send conflicting states to the channel contract, the
logic of the contract will select the latest state on which both users have agreed on.

Virtual payment channels. Recently, in [10] Dziembowski et al. show how a payment channel contract
can be extended to offer a more efficient alternative to hash-locked transactions to connect two payment
channels. To this end, the authors introduce a new concept called channel virtualization, where two parties
can open a virtual channel over two “extended payment channels” running on the ledger\(^5\). In contrast to
connecting payment channels via hash-locked transactions, virtual payment channels have the advantage
that the intermediate hub that connects the two extended payment channels on the ledger (in the above
depicted example party \(P_2\)) does not need to confirm each transaction routed via him. As argued in [10], virtual
channels can further reduce latency and fees, while at the same time improving availability.\(^6\) To distinguish
the standard channels from the virtual ones, the former ones are also called the ledger channels.

Let us explain the idea of [10] in more detail since our construction will also use the concept of channel
virtualization. Consider the example already mentioned above, where \(P_1\) and \(P_3\) are not connected by a
ledger payment channel, but each of them has an extended ledger payment channel with an intermediary
called \(P_2\). The technique of [10] allows \(P_1\) and \(P_3\) to establish a virtual payment channel with the help of \(P_2\)
but without touching the blockchain. More importantly, once the virtual channel is established, \(P_1\) and \(P_3\)
can carry out transactions using the virtual channel without interacting with the intermediate \(P_2\). In this
work, we will rely on the idea of channel virtualization from [10], but significantly extend this concept by
introducing full virtual state channel networks of arbitrary length.

1.1 Our contribution

Our main contribution is to design protocols for building state channel networks that (i) allow users to run
arbitrary smart contracts off-chain, and (ii) can be established between any number of intermediates. To the
best of our knowledge this is the first time that these two goals have been achieved simultaneously. Below we
provide further details on our contributions. We give a high-level overview of our construction in Section 2.

**Constructing state channel networks.** In this paper we construct a system of virtual state channels of arbitrary
length, i.e., channels that generalize the construction of [10] in the following sense. Suppose we have \(m\) parties,
\(P_1, \ldots, P_m\) and there is a ledger state channel between each pair \((P_j, P_{j+1})\) of them. Our construction allows
to create a virtual state channel between \(P_1\) and \(P_m\) with \(P_2, \ldots, P_{m-1}\) acting as intermediaries. This is
done in such a way that each party can be guaranteed that, no matter how the other parties behave, she will
not lose her coins locked in the channel. In particular whatever an intermediary \(P_j\) has to pay to \(P_{j+1}\) (as
a result of the execution of our protocol), she is always ensured to get back the same amount of coins from
\(P_{j-1}\).

A core contribution of our work is a modular way of constructing state channel networks. To this end,
we follow a recursive approach where virtual state channels are built recursively on top of ledger or other –
already constructed – virtual state channels. Concretely, if Alice has a ledger/virtual state channel \(\alpha\) with
the intermediate Ingrid, and Ingrid has a ledger/virtual state channel \(\beta\) with Bob, then our system enables
Alice and Bob to build a virtual state channel \(\gamma\) over the channels \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\). Later, \(\gamma\) may be used to construct
higher-level virtual state channels where either Alice or Bob may act as an intermediate. An example of our
recursive approach involving 6 parties is shown in Figure 1, and a high-level description is given in Section 2.

\(^5\) Concretely, the contract representing the extended payment channel offers additional functionality to support
connecting two ledger payment channels.

\(^6\) Availability is improved because payments via the virtual channel can be completed even if the intermediary is
temporarily off-line.
Modeling state channel networks and security proofs. In addition to designing protocols for state channel networks, we develop a UC-style “state channel theory” – inspired by the universal composability framework introduced in the seminal work of Canetti [6]. To this end, similarly to [10], we model money via a global ledger ideal functionality $L$ and describe novel ideal functionalities for state channel networks that provide an ideal specification of our protocols. Using our abstract model, we formally prove using the simulation paradigm that our protocols satisfy this ideal specification. Notice that this implies that our protocols satisfy the same security guarantees as offered by our ideal specification given by the ideal functionalities. Key challenges of our analysis are a careful study of timings that are imposed by the processing of the ledger, and the fact that we need to guarantee that honest parties will never lose money even if all other parties collude and are fully malicious.

We emphasize that in the context of cryptocurrencies, a sound security analysis is of particular importance because security flaws have a direct monetary value and hence, unlike in many other settings, are guaranteed to be exploited. The later is, e.g., illustrated by the infamous attacks on the DAO [29]. Thus, we believe that before complex off-chain protocols are massively deployed and used by potentially millions of users, their specification must be analyzed using formal methods as done in our work using UC-style proofs.

![Diagram of state channel networks](image)

**Fig. 1:** Example of a recursive construction of a virtual state channel $\gamma_4$ (of length 5) between $P_1$ and $P_6$. A virtual state channel between $P_1$ and $P_2$ will be denoted by $P_1 \leftrightarrow P_2$ and a ledger state channel between them will be denoted by $P_1 \leftrightarrow P_2$. To build $P_1 \leftrightarrow P_6$, we first create a virtual state channel $\gamma_1 := P_1 \leftrightarrow P_3$ using ledger state channels $P_1 \leftrightarrow P_2$ and $P_2 \leftrightarrow P_3$. Then a virtual state channel $\gamma_2 := P_4 \leftrightarrow P_6$ is created using ledger state channels $P_4 \leftrightarrow P_5$ and $P_5 \leftrightarrow P_6$. The other virtual state channels are created recursively, as follows: channel $\gamma_3 := P_1 \leftrightarrow P_4$ is created using the virtual state channel $\gamma_1$ and the ledger state channel $P_3 \leftrightarrow P_4$, and channel $\gamma_4 := P_1 \leftrightarrow P_6$ is created using virtual state channels $\gamma_3$ and $\gamma_2$.

**Key features of our construction.** We highlight some of the key features of our proposal. An important property of our construction and our model is that we support full concurrency. That is, we allow several virtual state channels to be created simultaneously over the same ledger state channels, and allow parties to be involved in several concurrent executions of (possibly complex) contracts. This is possible because our ledger state channels can store and execute several contracts “independently”. Our UC-style security model in which we analyze the security of our protocols also takes into account full concurrency.

Another important feature of our construction is the use of channel virtualization inspired by [10]. Besides the fact that channel virtualization reduces latency, fees and improves availability (as mentioned already above) it has the advantage that it naturally allows for building channels via multiple (possible incompatible) cryptocurrencies. For illustration, consider Alice having a ledger state channel with Ingrid in cryptocurrency A, and Bob having a ledger state channel with Ingrid in cryptocurrency B. Now, Alice and Bob can build a virtual state channel over Ingrid, where Alice (resp. Bob) is oblivious of the details of cryptocurrency B (resp. cryptocurrency A). This helps to improve interoperability between multiple blockchain-based systems.

Finally, we point out that our concept of higher-level channel virtualization has the key feature that it adds further “layers of defense” against malicious parties before honest users need to communicate with the
Consider for example the situation shown in Figure 1. Even if $P_6$ and the intermediary $P_4$ in the virtual state channel $\gamma_4$ are corrupt, then $P_1$ can resolve possible conflicts via the intermediary $P_3$ using the virtual state channel $\gamma_1$, i.e. $P_1$ does not need to communicate with the ledger.

Optimistic vs. pessimistic execution times. While constructing our protocols we will be providing the “optimistic” and “pessimistic” execution times. The “optimistic” ones refer to the standard case when all parties behave honestly. In the optimistic case all our protocols allow for instantaneous off-chain contract execution, and delay depends only on the latency of the network via which parties communicate. The “pessimistic” case corresponds to the situation when the corrupt parties try to delay the execution as much as they can by forcing contract execution on the blockchain. While we did not attempt to optimize the pessimistic timings in our protocols, we emphasize that even the pessimistic execution times grow only linear with the number of intermediates involved. We leave it as an important direction for future work to fine-tune our construction to further optimize the optimistic and pessimistic timings.

1.2 Further related work

Related work on payment channels. One of the first proposals for building payment channels is due to Decker [9], who in particular also introduced a construction for duplex payment channels (i.e., channels where payments can flow in both directions between Alice and Bob). Today, the most widely discussed proposals for extending payment channels towards channel networks are Lightning over Bitcoin and Raiden over Ethereum. Both of them are routing payments using the interactive mechanism based on the hash-locked transactions (we explain the main ideas of this mechanism in Appx. A). For Bitcoin there have been multiple implementations of the Lightning protocol including the Eclair implementation or an implementation from Lightning labs. For the Raiden network the developers currently focus on building a fully functional payment channel system under the name Raiden Minimum Viable Product [30].

An alternative proposal for payment channel networks has been proposed by Miller et al. [22]. In this work, the authors show how to reduce the pessimistic timings from linear time to constant time, i.e., the pessimistic time is independent of the length of the channel path. It is an interesting question for future work to combine the techniques from [22] with the channel virtualization of [10]. Other approaches focus on privacy in channel networks, path finding or money re-balancing in payment channels [20, 28, 15]. In particular, [22, 20, 10] also provide a UC-based security analysis of their constructions.

Channel constructions based on the sequence number maturity (that we also use in this paper) have been mentioned already in [26], and recently described in more detail (as “stateful duplex off-chain micropayment channels”) by Bentov et al. in [3]. We notice that version numbering only works in cryptocurrencies with contracts that can keep state such as offered by the Ethereum network.

Payment channels bare some resemblance with the credit networks prominently used by the cryptocurrency Ripple (see, e.g., [13]). In contrast to payment networks, credit networks have the advantage that parties involved in the network do not need to lock money. On the downside credit networks only rely on trust relationships between the parties, and hence honest parties may loose money in the worst case. Another idea to address some of the shortcomings of payment channel systems – in particular for implementations over Bitcoin – is the use of “trusted computing environments” [19].

Finally, other micropayment systems that have been proposed in the literature use, e.g., probabilistic payments (see [31, 27, 21, 25]).

State channel networks. In contrast to payment channel networks there has been only little work on state channels. To the best of our knowledge, currently the company Counterfactual [8] is independently also building generalized state channel networks. We are in contact with Counterfactual and planing future collaboration to further improve our construction and move state channel networks closer to practice.

2 Overview of our virtual state channel construction

Before we proceed to the technical part of this work, let us give an intuitive explanation of our virtual state channel construction. We would like to emphasize that the description of our approach as presented
in this section is very simplified and excludes many important technicalities. Formal definitions, detailed explanations of our protocols and their full description will be presented later in this work.

Let us start by briefly describing the functionality of ledger state channels and what guarantees they provide to their users. Two parties can create a ledger state channel by agreeing on a special smart contract on the blockchain in which each party locks some amount of coins. We call this smart contract state channel contract (SCC). Once the ledger state channel is successfully created and funded, parties can trade (create contracts in the channel and execute their functions) off-chain, i.e. without talking to the blockchain. The state channel contract on the blockchain guarantees that if something goes wrong during the off-chain trading (parties disagree on a state of some contract, one of the parties stops communicating, etc.), parties can always fairly resolve their disagreement and continue trading via the state channel contract on the blockchain.

From now on we will assume that ledger state channels exist and we will explain how we can use them to construct a virtual state channel. Due to the complexity of our construction, we will demonstrate the high level ideas of the construction by taking a look at a concrete example. To this end, let us assume that two parties, Alice and Bob, want to play some game with each other. Alice and Bob do not want to create a new ledger state channel to play the game since that would require a new smart contract on the blockchain which takes time and, in practice, costs a lot of money. Instead, they want to use the existing ledger state channels they have with a third party, which we call Ingrid, to create a virtual state channel γ. Let α be the ledger state channel between Alice and Ingrid and let β be the channel between Ingrid and Bob.

Alice and Bob need that the virtual state channel γ has the same functionality and provides the same guarantees as if it would be a ledger state channel. In particular, Alice and Bob should be allowed to create a contract in their channel γ and execute its functions just by communicating with each other (i.e. play their game without talking to any third party or the blockchain). However, if Alice and Bob run into dispute, there must be a judging mechanism which resolves their dispute such that honest parties never lose money. For ledger state channels, a state channel contract on the blockchain takes the role of such a judge. The question is, who provides this guarantee in case of a virtual state channel? Clearly, it cannot be Ingrid, since she might be corrupt and, for example, collude with Alice or Bob. The main idea is to create a special contract in each of the ledger state channels α and β. We will call this contract a virtual state channel contract (VSCC) since it is an analogy of the state channel contract on the blockchain which allows to create ledger state channels. The virtual state channel contract in α will provide guarantees for Alice and the virtual state channel contract in β will provide guarantees for Bob. In addition, these two contracts together guarantee Ingrid that she never loses money because of the channel γ.

Creating the virtual state channel. Let us explain the virtual state channel creation in more detail. The first thing Alice and Bob have to do is to inform Ingrid about their intention to use her as an intermediary for their virtual state channel γ. Alice will do so by proposing to open a VSCC instance in the channel α, let us denote it VSCC₁, which will contain all information about the virtual state channel γ (for example, how many coins each party wants to invest in the channel). In some sense VSCC₁ can be viewed as a “copy” of the virtual state channel γ in which Ingrid plays the role of Bob. So, for example, if the initial balance in γ is 1 coin for Alice and 5 coins for Bob, then Alice would lock 1 coin and Ingrid 5 coins in VSCC₁. Symmetrically, Bob will propose a new VSCC instance VSCC₂ in the ledger state channel β which can be viewed as a “copy” of the virtual state channel γ in which Ingrid plays the role of Alice. In the example from above, Ingrid would lock 1 coin and Bob 5 coins in VSCC₂. If Ingrid receives both proposals and she agrees to be the intermediary of the virtual state channel γ, she confirms both requests. See Figure 2 for pictorial explanation of the virtual state channel construction.

Off-chain contract execution in the virtual state channel. Alice and Bob now have created a virtual state channel γ which allows them to run contracts off-chain without the need for interacting with the intermediate Ingrid. Let us take a closer look how the off-chain contract execution is done via the virtual state channel. To this end, we take a look at an off-chain contract that allows Alice and Bob to play a game. Informally, one can think of the game contract as a set of rules of the game which should define how an instance of the game can be setup, what are the allowed moves in the game, how to determine the winner, what is the price for winning, but also for example what happens if one party stops playing. Alice and Bob first create
Alice and Ingrid created a ledger state channel $\alpha$ by agreeing on a state channel contract $SCC_A$ which they published on the blockchain. Bob and Ingrid created a ledger state channel $\beta$ by agreeing on a state channel contract $SCC_B$ which they published on the blockchain. Alice and Bob created a virtual state channel $\gamma$ by agreeing with Ingrid on the virtual state channel contracts $VSCC_A$ and $VSCC_B$ in the ledger state channels $\alpha$ and $\beta$, respectively.

Fig. 2: Construction of a virtual state channel of length 2. Alice and Ingrid created a ledger state channel $\alpha$ by agreeing on a state channel contract $SCC_A$ which they published on the blockchain. Bob and Ingrid created a ledger state channel $\beta$ by agreeing on a state channel contract $SCC_B$ which they published on the blockchain. Alice and Bob created a virtual state channel $\gamma$ by agreeing with Ingrid on the virtual state channel contracts $VSCC_A$ and $VSCC_B$ in the ledger state channels $\alpha$ and $\beta$, respectively.

a new instance of the game in their virtual state channel $\gamma$. We will call this initial setup of the game the version 0 of the game instance and denote it $G_0$. Assume that the first move in the game is made by Alice. She first locally makes the move to obtain the new version of the game instance $G_1$. Then she increases the version number to 1, signs the pair $(G_1, 1)$ and sends the information about her move together with the signature to Bob. If Bob is honest, he verifies Alice’s signature and checks if her move follows the rules of the game. Thereafter he signs Alice’s updated version of the game and sends his signature back to Alice. As long as both Alice and Bob are honest, they can continue playing the game by exchanging signatures on new versions of the game instance without talking to Ingrid at all. In other words, Alice and Bob are making changes in the channel $\gamma$ but they are not updating the “copies” $VSCC_A$ and $VSCC_B$ accordingly.

We will now explain what happens if Alice and Bob disagree. Let $G$ be the last version of the game instance both parties agreed on and let $v$ be its version number. Assume that Alice made a move $m$ which resulted in a new version $\tilde{G}$. Let us consider the situation when Bob is malicious and stops communicating with Alice, i.e. does not confirm Alice’s move. In this situation, Alice has to make her move “forcefully” via the virtual state channel contract $VSCC_A$. The first step is to update both “copies” $VSCC_A$ and $VSCC_B$ such that they contain the latest version of the game instance both Alice and Bob agreed on, i.e. $G$. We call this step, the registration of the game instance and it is realized via a function “Register” in $VSCC_A$ and $VSCC_B$. Let us next provide further details on how the registration works.

Alice executes $VSCC_A$ on the function “Register” with the input parameters $(G, v, s_A, s_B)$, where $s_A$ is her signature and $s_B$ is Bob’s signature on $(G, v)$. If both signatures are valid, Alice’s version is stored in $VSCC_A$ (not registered yet) which gives Ingrid a chance to ask Bob for his version of the game instance. She does so by executing the contract $VSCC_B$ on the function “Register” and the input parameters $(G, v, s_A, s_B)$. Bob can now submit his version of the game instance, let us denote it $(G', v', s'_A, s'_B)$, where again $s'_A$ is Alice’s signature and $s'_B$ is Bob’s signature on $(G', v')$. If both signatures $s'_A$ and $s'_B$ are valid, the version numbers $v$ and $v'$ are compared. Since in our example we assume Alice to be honest, it must be that $v > v'$ (Bob submitted an old version of the game) or $(G, v) = (G', v')$ (Bob submitted the same version as Alice). In any case, the contract instance $G$ is registered in $VSCC_B$; thus, Ingrid can now also finalize the registration on the channel with Alice accordingly.

After this step, both $VSCC_A$ and $VSCC_B$ are updated such that they both contain the game instance $G$. Alice can now finally make her move $m$ via $VSCC_A$. She does so by executing $VSCC_A$ on the function “Execute” and providing information about her move $m$ as input parameters.

Her request is stored in $VSCC_A$ (the move is not made yet) which again gives Ingrid time to first make the move in $VSCC_B$ and then finalize the execution in $VSCC_A$. Since Alice’s move $m$ was according to the
Fig. 3: Illustration of the force execution process from our example in which Alice and Bob have a virtual state channel \( \gamma \) in which they opened a game contract instance. We assume that \( G \) is the latest version Alice and Bob agreed on before Bob stopped communicating. In the picture, we assume that Ingrid is honest, \( v \geq v' \) and \( m \) represents a valid move of Alice which, when applied to \( G \), results in a new version of the game instance \( \tilde{G} \). The symbol “\%” denotes that nothing is stored, resp. registered.

rule of the game, both VSCC\(_A\) and VSCC\(_B\) now contain the updated version of the game instance, i.e. \( \tilde{G} \). See Figure 3 for pictorial explanation of the “forceful” execution.

Longer virtual state channels are constructed in a similar way. The difference is that one or both of the underlying channels are virtual state channels instead of ledger state channels.

3 The model

We follow the model of [10] which is closely related to the one used on works of Kumaresan and Bentov [2, 17, 16, 18] on modeling protocols that operate with coins\(^7\) using a synchronous version of the (simplified) UC framework [6, 7]. More precisely, an \( n \)-party protocol \( \pi \) is run between parties \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \), which are modeled as interactive poly-time Turing machines (ITMs). We assume that the \( P_i \)'s are connected by authentic communication channels. A protocol is executed in the presence of an adversary \( A \), formally modeled as an ITM, which can corrupt any party \( P_i \). By this we mean that \( A \) takes full control over \( P_i \). Parties and

\(^7\) Throughout this work, the word coin refers to a monetary unit.
the adversary $A$ receive their inputs from the environment $Z$, formally modeled as a ITM, which represents anything “external” to the current protocol execution. The environment also observes all outputs returned by the parties of the protocol. We consider static corruption, i.e., the environment $Z$ can decide at the beginning of the protocol execution which parties to corrupt via the adversary $A$. In addition to the above entities, a protocol can have access to ideal functionalities $G_1, \ldots, G_m$ (which are also ITMs), by which we mean that all parties can interact with them. In this case we say that the protocol works in the $(G_1, \ldots, G_m)$-hybrid model. One important difference to the standard UC model is that our ideal functionalities (and also parties) will have to deal with coins. We model this with a special functionality $L$ which we will describe in more detail below.

**Communication model.** Since we assume a synchronous communication network, the execution of the protocol happens in rounds (see, e.g, [11, 12, 24, 14] for a formalization of this model and its relation to the model with real time). We assume that if in round $i$ a party sends a message to another party, then it arrives to it at the beginning of round $i+1$. The adversary is rushing, i.e., he can decide about the order in which the messages arrive in a given round.

The parties, the ideal functionalities, the environment and the adversary are always aware of a given round (in practice one can think of it as equipping them with clocks that are synchronized). Let $\text{time} := \mathbb{N} \cup \{\infty\}$ denote the set of all possible round numbers. Whenever we say that some operation (e.g. delivering a message or simply staying in idle state) takes time at most $\tau \in \text{time}$ we mean that it is up to the adversary to decide how long this operation takes (as long as it takes at most $\tau$ rounds). For simplicity we assume that computation takes no time and is “atomic”. The communication between two $P_i$'s takes one round. All other communication – in particular, between the adversary $A$ and the environment $Z$ – takes no time.

**Handling coins.** Following [10], the money mechanics is modeled using a special functionality $L$ that keeps track on how much money the parties have. In some sense it is similar in spirit to the model of Bentov and Kumaresan [2] that model money as a special resource, and the money transfers using a special keyword “coins”. Unlike [2], we define the state of the user’s accounts as an explicit vector of non-negative (finite precision) real numbers $(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$, where each $x_i$ is the amount of coins that $P_i$ has.\(^8\) The vector is maintained by a special functionality $L$ (see Fig. 4) which can be realized by a cryptocurrency, for instance Ethereum or Bitcoin.

The state of this functionality is public, i.e., $P_1, \ldots, P_n, Z$, and $A$ can freely read all its contents. The functionality $L$ is initiated by the environment $Z$ that can also freely add and remove money in user’s accounts, via the operations add and remove. The parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ cannot directly perform any such operations on $L$. On the other hand, we will have special functionalities that can perform operations on $L$ (and hence, indirectly, $P_i$'s can also modify $L$, in a way that is “controlled” by the special functionalities). Every time a special functionality issues an add or remove command, this command is delivered to $L$ and can be delayed by at most $\Delta$ rounds (for some parameter $\Delta$), i.e., the message is given to the adversary who can decide when it arrives to $L$ (as long as the delay is at most $\Delta$ rounds). Special functionalities with access to $L$ (that can be delayed by $\Delta$ rounds) will be denoted with a superscript $L(\Delta)$ (e.g.: $F^{L(\Delta)}$).

By saying that a special functionality added $y$ coins to $P_i$’s account in ledger $L$ (with session id sid) we mean that the special functionality issued a query (add, sid, $P_i$, $y$) to $L$. Analogously, by saying that a special functionality removed $y_1, \ldots, y_i$ coins from the accounts of $P_{i_1}, \ldots, P_{i_\ell}$ (respectively) in ledger $L$ (with session id sid) we mean the special functionality issued a query (remove, sid, $\{(P_{i_t}, y_t)\}_{t=1}^\ell$) to $L$. For all the above instructions, if $L$ replies with a message (nofunds, sid) then we say that the operation has not been performed due to insufficient funds.

**Execution of ideal/real processes.** We now describe the process in the ideal/real world and in particular the order of activation. In each round of the protocol/real-world execution the environment $Z$ is activated first, where the environment $Z$ can add/remove coins from the ledger via add and remove instructions. Next, $Z$ provides inputs for the honest parties and for the adversary. Then, it activates the adversary.

\(^\text{8}\) This is similar to the concept of a safe of [2].
Let $\pi$ be a protocol working in the $G^{C(\Delta)}$-hybrid model (where $G^{C(\Delta)}$ is a special functionality that has access to the ledger $\mathcal{L}$). The output of an environment $Z$ interacting with a protocol $\pi$ and an adversary $A$ on input $1^\lambda$ and auxiliary input $z$ is denoted as $\text{EXEC}^{G^{C(\Delta)}}_{\pi,A,Z}(\lambda,z)$. If $\pi$ is a trivial protocol in which the parties simply forward their inputs to a special functionality $F^{C(\Delta)}$, then we will call the adversary a simulator $S$ and denote the above output as $\text{IDEAL}_{F^{C(\Delta)},S,Z}(\lambda,z)$. We will sometime refer to parties of such trivial protocol as to dummy parties. It will also be useful to restrict the power of the environment, so that, e.g., $Z$ will not be allowed to send some inputs to the honest parties in certain moments. For example $Z$ will be forbidden to initiate some protocol when the parties do not have enough coins for its execution, or to instruct one party to start a protocol without instructing the other party to start the protocol as well. In this case, we will say that $Z$ is from some class of environments $\mathcal{E}_{\text{res}}$. We will formally define the restrictions that we put on the environment in Appx. B.

**Definition 1.** Let $\mathcal{E}_{\text{res}}$ be some set of restricted environments $Z$. We say that a protocol $\pi$ working in a $G^{C(\Delta)}$-hybrid model emulates a special functionality $F^{C(\Delta)}$ against environments from class $\mathcal{E}_{\text{res}}$ if for every adversary $A$ there exists a simulator $S$ such that for every environment $Z \in \mathcal{E}_{\text{res}}$ we have

$$\{\text{EXEC}^{G^{C(\Delta)}}_{\pi,A,Z}(\lambda,z)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}, z \in \{0,1\}^*} \approx \{\text{IDEAL}_{F^{C(\Delta)},S,Z}(\lambda,z)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}, z \in \{0,1\}^*}.$$ 

**Session identifiers.** To simplify the exposition, we omit the session identifiers and the sub-session identifiers (in other works typically denoted with $\text{sid}$ and $\text{ssid}$, respectively). Instead, we will use expressions like “message $m$ is a reply to message $m'$” (technically, this would be handled by adding the identifiers to the message). We believe that this approach helps the readability, and does not lead to confusion.

**Setup assumptions.** To enable a simpler exposition we assume that before the protocol starts the following public-key infrastructure setup phase is executed by some trusted party: (1) For every $i = 1, \ldots, n$ let $(pk_P, sk_P) \leftarrow \text{KGen}(1^\lambda)$, (2) For every $i = 1, \ldots, n$ send $(sk_P, (pk_{P_1}, \ldots, pk_{P_n}))$ to $P_i$. The tuple $\Pi := (pk_{P_1}, \ldots, pk_{P_n})$ will also be called the public key tuple. We emphasize that the use of a PKI is only an abstraction, and can easily be realized using the blockchain.

**Functionality $\mathcal{L}$**

Functionality $\mathcal{L}$, running with parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ and the environment $Z$, gets as input $(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^n$ (where $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ are finite-precision non-negative reals). It stores the vector $(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ and accepts queries of following types:

**Adding money**

Upon receiving a message (add, $\text{sid}$, $P_i$, $y$) from $Z$ (for $y \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$):

Let $x_i := x_i + y$. We say that $y$ coins are added to $P_i$’s account in $\mathcal{L}$.

**Removing money**

Upon receiving a message (remove, $\text{sid}$, $\{(P_{i_j}, y_{i_j})\}_{j=1}^t$) (for some $t \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$) and $y_{i_j} \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$:

- Check if for every $j \in \{1, \ldots, t\}$ we have that $x_{i_j} \geq y_{i_j}$; if not then reply with a message (nofunds, $\text{sid}$) and stop.
- Otherwise for $j \in \{1, \ldots, t\}$ let $x_{i_j} := x_{i_j} - y_{i_j}$. We say that $y_{i_1}, \ldots, y_{i_t}$ coins were removed from the accounts of $P_{i_1}, \ldots, P_{i_t}$ (resp.) in $\mathcal{L}$.

![Fig. 4: The ledger functionality $\mathcal{L}$](image-url)
4 Definitions and notation

We assume that all values like real and natural numbers, poly-time computable functions, tuples of values, etc. are implicitly encoded as binary strings (e.g. when they are sent as messages). We will also use keywords which (formally) represent some fixed binary strings. We will frequently present tuples of values using the following convention. The individual values in a tuple \( T \) are identified using keywords called attributes: \( \texttt{attr1}, \texttt{attr2}, \ldots \). Strictly speaking an attribute tuple is a function from its set of attributes to \( \{0, 1\}^* \). The value of an attribute \( \texttt{attr} \) in a tuple \( T \) (i.e. \( T(\texttt{attr}) \)) will be referred to as \( T.\texttt{attr} \). This convention will allow us to easily handle tuples that have dynamically changing sets of attributes. For example when we say that “we add an attribute \( \texttt{attr} \) to \( T \) and set it to \( x \)” it means that \( T \) is replaced by \( T' \) with and additional attribute \( \texttt{attr} \) and \( T'.\texttt{attr} = x \).

4.1 Contract

In this section we introduce the formal terminology concerning contracts. We consider contracts between just two parties, as this is the only type of contract that we need in this paper.

A contract storage over a set of parties \( P \) is an attribute tuple \( \sigma \) that contains at least the following attributes: \( \sigma.\texttt{userL}, \sigma.\texttt{userR} \in P \) that denote the users that are involved in the contract storage, \( \sigma.\texttt{locked} \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \) that denote the amount of coins locked in the contract storage and \( \sigma.\texttt{cash}: \{\sigma.\texttt{userL}, \sigma.\texttt{userR}\} \to \mathbb{R} \) that contains information about the amounts of coins that the users have freely available in the contract storage.

A contract type over a set of parties \( P \) is a tuple \( \mathcal{C} = (A, g_1, \ldots, g_r, f_1, \ldots, f_s) \), where \( A \) is a (possibly infinite) set of contract storages over \( P \) called admissible contract storages, \( g_1, \ldots, g_r \) are contract constructors and \( f_1, \ldots, f_s \) are contract functions.

Each \( \sigma \in A \) must be such that \( \sigma.\texttt{locked} \geq \sigma.\texttt{cash}(\sigma.\texttt{userL}) + \sigma.\texttt{cash}(\sigma.\texttt{userR}) \). Informally speaking, the amount coins freely available to the users of the contract storage must be less or equal to the amount of locked coins in the contract storage. Each \( g_i \) is a poly-time computable function that takes as input a tuple \( (P, \tau, z) \), with \( P \in P, \tau \in \text{time} \), and \( z \in \{0, 1\}^* \), and produces as output an admissible contract storage \( \sigma \) or a special symbol \( \bot \) (in which case we say that the storage construction failed). Each \( f_j \) is poly-time computable function that takes as input a tuple \( (\sigma, P, \tau, z) \), with \( \sigma \) being an admissible contract storage, \( P \in \{\sigma.\texttt{userL}, \sigma.\texttt{userR}\}, \tau \in \text{time} \) and \( z \in \{0, 1\}^* \), and outputs a tuple \((\tilde{\sigma}, \texttt{addL}, \texttt{addR}, m)\), where \( \tilde{\sigma} \) is an admissible contract storage, values \( \texttt{addL}, \texttt{addR} \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \) correspond to the amount of coins that were unlocked from the contract storage to each user, and an output message \( m \in \{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\bot\} \). If the output message is \( \bot \), we say that the execution failed (we assume that the execution always fails if a function is executed on input that does not satisfy the constraints described above, e.g., it is applied to \( \sigma \) that is not admissible). If the output message \( m \neq \bot \), then we require that the attributes \( \texttt{userL} \) and \( \texttt{userR} \) in \( \tilde{\sigma} \) are identical to those in \( \sigma \). In addition, it must hold that \( \texttt{addL} + \texttt{addR} = \sigma.\texttt{locked} - \tilde{\sigma}.\texttt{locked} \). Intuitively, this condition guarantees that executions of a contract functions can never result in unlocking more coins than what was originally locked in the contract storage.

A contract instance is an attribute tuple \( \nu \) with attributes \texttt{storage} and \texttt{type}, where \( \nu.\texttt{type} = (A, g_1, \ldots, g_r, f_1, \ldots, f_s) \) is a contract type, and \( \nu.\texttt{storage} \in A \) is a contract storage.

4.2 State channels

We now present our notation for ledger state channels and virtual state channels. It is essentially an extension of the notation used in [10] for payment channels.

Ledger state channel. Formally, a ledger state channel \( \gamma \) over a set of parties \( P \) is defined as an attribute tuple \( \gamma := (\gamma.\texttt{id}, \gamma.\texttt{Alice}, \gamma.\texttt{Bob}, \gamma.\texttt{cash}, \gamma.\texttt{cspace}) \). We call the attribute \( \gamma.\texttt{id} \in \{0, 1\}^* \) the identifier of the ledger state channel. Attributes \( \gamma.\texttt{Alice} \in P \) and \( \gamma.\texttt{Bob} \in P \) are the identities of parties using the ledger state channel \( \gamma \). For convenience, we define the set \( \gamma.\texttt{end-users} := \{\gamma.\texttt{Alice}, \gamma.\texttt{Bob}\} \) and the function \( \gamma.\texttt{other-party} \) as \( \gamma.\texttt{other-party}(\gamma.\texttt{Alice}) := \gamma.\texttt{Bob} \) and \( \gamma.\texttt{other-party}(\gamma.\texttt{Bob}) := \gamma.\texttt{Alice} \). The attribute \( \gamma.\texttt{cash} \)
is a function mapping the set $\gamma$.end-users to $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ such that $\gamma$.cash($T$) is the amount of coins the party $T \in \gamma$.end-users has locked in the ledger state channel $\gamma$. Finally, the attribute $\gamma$.cspace is a partial function that takes as input a contract instance identifier $cid \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and outputs a contract instance $\nu$ such that $\{\nu.storage.user_L, \nu.storage.user_R\} = \gamma$.end-users. We will refer to $\gamma$.cspace($cid$) as the contract instance with identifier $cid$ in the ledger state channel $\gamma$.

We also define a function $\text{Value}$ which on input ledger state channel $\gamma$ outputs the sum of coins locked in the ledger state channel. More precisely, $\text{Value}(\gamma) := \gamma$.cash($\gamma$.Alice) + $\gamma$.cash($\gamma$.Bob) + $\sum_{cid \in \mathbb{N}} (c^\id_L + c^\id_R)$, where $c^\id_L := \sigma$.cash($\sigma.user_L$) and $c^\id_R := \sigma$.cash($\sigma.user_R$) for $\sigma := \gamma$.cspace($cid$).storage. In order to update the contract instances off-chain, the users of the ledger state channel will store some additional information in their local copies of $\gamma$. To this end, we introduce the following terminology. A contract instance version is an attribute tuple $\nu$ that in addition to the attributes of contract instance has an attribute $\nu.version \in \mathbb{N}$. As the name suggests, the purpose of $\nu.version$ is to indicate the version of the contract instance. When a contract instance is created, each user locally sets the version number of the contract instance to 0. Each time users want to update the contract instance off-chain, they increase the value of the version attribute by one. A contract instance version signed by $P \in \mathcal{P}$ additionally contains an attribute $\nu.sign$ which is a signature of $P$ on $(\nu.storage, \nu.type, \nu.version)$. In case $\nu.version = 0$, we allow $\nu.sign = \perp$.

An attribute tuple $\gamma$ is ledger state channel’s private version of a party $P$ if it is defined as the normal ledger state channel, except that every $\gamma$.cspace($cid$) is a contract instance version signed by $\gamma$.other-party($P$).

Before we introduce the notation for virtual state channels, let us establish one important convention. If it is not important for the context whether $\gamma$ is ledger state channel or a virtual state channel, we will refer to $\gamma$ as a state channel.

Virtual state channel. Formally, a virtual state channel $\gamma$ over a set of parties $\mathcal{P}$ is defined as a tuple $\gamma := (\gamma.id, \gamma.Alice, \gamma.Bob, \gamma.Ingrid, \gamma.subchan, \gamma.cash, \gamma.cspace, \gamma.length, \gamma.validity)$. The attributes $\gamma.id, \gamma.Alice, \gamma.Bob, \gamma.cash$ and $\gamma.cspace$, are defined as in the case of a ledger state channel. The same holds for the set $\gamma$.end-users and the functions $\gamma$.other-party and $\text{Value}$. The new attribute $\gamma.Ingrid \in \mathcal{P}$ denotes the identity of the intermediary of the virtual state channel. The attribute $\gamma.subchan$ is a function mapping the set $\gamma$.end-users to $\{0, 1\}^*$. The value $\gamma.subchan(\gamma.Alice)$ (resp. $\gamma.subchan(\gamma.Bob)$) equals the identifier of the state channel between $\gamma.Alice$ and $\gamma.Ingrid$ (resp. $\gamma.Ingrid$ and $\gamma.Bob$). We call the state channels $\gamma.subchan(\gamma.Alice)$ and $\gamma.subchan(\gamma.Bob)$ the subchannels of the virtual state channel $\gamma$. The attribute $\gamma.validity$ denotes the round in which the virtual state channel will be closed. And finally, the attribute $\gamma.length \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 1}$ refers to the length of the virtual state channel, i.e., the number of ledger state channels over which it is built. For example the state channels on Figure 1 (see Page 4) have the following lengths: $\gamma_1.length = 2, \gamma_2.length = 3, \gamma_3.length = 3, \gamma_4.length = 5$. Sometimes it will be convenient to refer to ledger state channels as to state channels of length one. Formally, this would require to define ledger state channels such they additionally contain the attribute length whose only possible value would be 1.

Each entity (ideal functionality or party in a protocol), stores and maintains a set of all state channels it is aware of. This set will be called channel space and denoted $\Gamma$.

4.3 Abbreviated notation
In order to simplify the notation in the description of ideal functionalities and protocols, we fix the following abbreviated notation. When it is clear from the context which state channel $\gamma$ we are talking about, we will denote the parties of the state channel $A := \gamma.Alice, B := \gamma.Bob$ and in case $\gamma$ is a virtual state channel $I := \gamma.Ingrid$. In addition, for a party $P \in \gamma$.end-users, we will always denote the other end-user of the state channel by $Q$, i.e. $Q := \gamma$.other-party($P$).

When we want to emphasize that we are referring to a local version of a state channel stored by some entity $T$, we add $T$ to the superscript. So for instance, $\gamma^T := \Gamma^T(id)$ denotes $T$’s local version of the state channel $\gamma$ as stored in $T$’s channel space $\Gamma^T$. We also introduce symbolic notation for sending and receiving messages. Instead of the instruction “Send the message $msg$ to party $P$ in round $\tau$”, we write $msg \mapsto P^\tau$. 

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Instead of the instruction “Send the message \( msg \) to all parties in the set \( \gamma \).end–users \) in round \( \tau \), we write \( msg \leftarrow \gamma \).end–users \). By \( msg \leftarrow P \) we mean that an entity (party in a protocol, ideal functionality, simulator etc.) receives a message \( msg \) from party \( P \) in round \( \tau \). And we use \( msg \overset{\tau \leq \tau_1}{\rightarrow} P \) when an entity receives a message \( msg \) from party \( P \) until round \( \tau_1 \).

In the protocols and ideal functionalities, entities will frequently update their local versions of a state channel stored in their channel space. Therefore, we define two local update procedure which will shorten the descriptions later in this work. The purpose of the first procedure, \( \text{LocalUpdate} \), is to update the contract instance and automatically adjust money distribution in the state channel. The other procedure, \( \text{LocalUpdateAdd} \), also updates the contract instance but in contrast to \( \text{LocalUpdate} \) it gets the amount of money that shall be added back to the state channel explicitly in its input.

\[
\text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma, id, cid, \tilde{\sigma}, \mathcal{C})
\]

Let \( \gamma := \Gamma(id) \) and \( \sigma := \gamma\.c\text{space}(cid)\.\text{storage} \). If \( \sigma = \bot \), the set \( (x_A, x_B) := (0, 0) \). Else set \( (x_A, x_B) := (\sigma\.\text{cash}(\gamma\.\text{Alice}), \sigma\.\text{cash}(\gamma\.\text{Bob})) \). Make the following updates:
1. Add \( x_A - \tilde{\sigma}.\text{cash}(\gamma\.\text{Alice}) \) coins to \( \gamma\.\text{cash}(\gamma\.\text{Alice}) \)
2. Add \( x_B - \tilde{\sigma}.\text{cash}(\gamma\.\text{Bob}) \) coins to \( \gamma\.\text{cash}(\gamma\.\text{Bob}) \)
3. Set \( \gamma\.\text{c\text{space}}(cid) \) equal to the tuple \( (\tilde{\sigma}, \mathcal{C}) \).

Output \( \Gamma \) with the updated contract instance \( cid \) in the state channel \( \gamma \).

\[
\text{LocalUpdateAdd}(\Gamma, id, cid, \tilde{\sigma}, \mathcal{C}, add_A, add_B)
\]

Let \( \gamma := \Gamma(id) \) and \( \sigma := \gamma\.c\text{space}(cid)\.\text{storage} \). Make the following updates:
1. Add \( add_A \) coins to \( \gamma\.\text{cash}(\gamma\.\text{Alice}) \)
2. Add \( add_B \) coins to \( \gamma\.\text{cash}(\gamma\.\text{Bob}) \)
3. Set \( \gamma\.\text{c\text{space}}(cid) \) equal to the tuple \( (\tilde{\sigma}, \mathcal{C}) \).

Output \( \Gamma \) with the updated contract instance \( cid \) in the state channel \( \gamma \).

Analogously, we define both \( \text{LocalUpdate} \) and \( \text{LocalUpdateAdd} \) in case a party wants to update the private extended version of the contract instance. Notice that in this case procedures will take additional two parameters: the new version number and the signatures created by the parties.

To further simplify the description of the ideal functionalities and the protocols, we will use two “timing functions” \( \text{TimeExecute}(i) \) and \( \text{TimeRegister}(i) \). Informally, these functions represent the maximal number of rounds it takes to execute/register a contract instance in a state channel of length \( i > 0 \). See Section 8.1 for formal definition of these functions.

5 Ideal functionalities for state channels

In this section, we describe the ideal functionality that defines how ledger state channels and virtual state channels are created, maintained and closed. We denote this ideal functionality \( \mathcal{F}_{ch}^{L}(\Delta)(i, \mathcal{C}) \), where \( i \in \mathbb{N} \) is the maximal length of a state channel that can be opened via the functionality, and \( \mathcal{C} \) denotes the set of contract types that can be open in the state channels. The ideal functionality \( \mathcal{F}_{ch}^{L}(\Delta)(i, \mathcal{C}) \) communicates with parties from the set \( \mathcal{P} \), it has access to the global ideal functionality \( \mathcal{L} \) (the ledger). The functionality maintains a channel space, that we denote \( \Gamma \), containing all the open state channels. The set \( \Gamma \) is initially empty.

Since inputs of parties and the messages they send to the ideal functionality do not contain any private information, we can implicitly assume that the ideal functionality forwards all messages it receives to the simulator \( \mathcal{S} \). More precisely, upon receiving the message \( m \) from party \( P \) the ideal functionality sends the message \( (P, m) \) to the simulator. The task of the simulator is to instruct the ideal functionality to make changes on the ledger and to output messages to the parties in the correct round (this depends on the choice
made by the adversary $A$ in the real world). We will not explicitly mention the instructions for making changes at the ledger. By saying “wait for at most \( \Delta \) rounds to remove/add \( x \) coins from \( P’ \)’s account on the ledger” we mean that the ideal functionality should wait until it is instructed by the simulator, which will happen within \( \Delta \) rounds, and then request changes of party \( P’ \)’s account on the ledger.

Below we first present the formal definition of the \( \mathcal{F}_{ch}^{(\Delta)}(i, \mathcal{L}) \) functionality and then explain it informally. During the high level explanation, we will also informally introduce the restrictions on the environment (see Section 3) whose full list is given in Appx. B. The constants that appear in the formal description of the ideal functionality will become clear later in work (see Section 6.2 and Section 8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functionality ( \mathcal{F}_{ch}^{(\Delta)}(i, \mathcal{L}) )</th>
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This functionality accepts messages from parties \( \mathcal{P} := \{P_1, \ldots, P_n\} \). We use the abbreviated notation defined in Section 4.3.

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<th>Create a ledger state channel</th>
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Upon \( (\text{create}, \gamma) \xrightarrow{\gamma_{\text{ledger}}} A \) where \( \gamma \) is a ledger state channel:
1. Within \( \Delta \) rounds remove \( \gamma.cash(A) \) coins from \( A’ \)’s account on \( \mathcal{L} \).
2. If \( (\text{create}, \gamma) \xrightarrow{\gamma_{\text{ledger}}} B \) remove within \( 2\Delta \) rounds \( \gamma.cash(B) \) coins from \( B’ \)’s account on \( \mathcal{L} \). Then set \( \Gamma(\gamma.id) := \gamma \), send \( (\text{created}, \gamma) \to \gamma.end-users \) and stop.
3. Otherwise upon \( (\text{refund}, \gamma) \xrightarrow{\gamma_{\text{ledger}}} A \), within \( \Delta \) rounds add \( \gamma.cash(A) \) coins to \( A’ \)’s account on \( \mathcal{L} \).

<table>
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<th>Create a virtual state channel</th>
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1. In this procedure the ideal functionality waits to receive \( (\text{create}, \gamma) \) message from all parties in \( \gamma.end-users \cup \{\gamma.Ingrid\} \) (the procedure starts when first such a message is received). These messages are recorded, and additionally the coins from \( \gamma’ \)’s subchannels are removed according to the following rules:
   - Upon \( (\text{create}, \gamma) \xrightarrow{\gamma} P \) where \( P \in \gamma.end-users \):
     If you have not yet received the message \( (\text{create}, \gamma) \) from \( \gamma.Ingrid \), then remove \( \gamma.cash(P) \) coins from \( P’ \)’s balance in \( \gamma.subchan(P) \) and \( \gamma.cash(\gamma.\text{other-party}(P)) \) coins from \( \gamma.Ingrid’ \)’s balance in \( \gamma.subchan(P) \). Otherwise do nothing.
   - Upon \( (\text{create}, \gamma) \xrightarrow{\gamma} \gamma.Ingrid \); then for both \( P \in \gamma.end-users \):
     If you have not yet received \( (\text{create}, \gamma) \) from \( P \) then remove \( \gamma.cash(P) \) coins from \( P’ \)’s balance in \( \gamma.subchan(P) \), and \( \gamma.cash(\gamma.\text{other-party}(P)) \) coins from \( \gamma.Ingrid’ \)’s balance in \( \gamma.subchan(P) \). Otherwise do nothing.
2. If within \( 3 \) rounds you record \( (\text{create}, \gamma) \) from all users in \( \gamma.end-users \cup \{\gamma.Ingrid\} \), then define \( \Gamma(\gamma.id) := \gamma, \text{send} (\text{created}, \gamma) \to \gamma.end-users \) and wait for channel closing in Step 4 (in the meanwhile accepting the update and execute messages that concern \( \gamma \)).
3. Otherwise wait till round \( \gamma.validity \). Then within time \( \text{TimeRegister}(j + 2 \cdot \text{TimeExecute}([j/2])) \) rounds, where \( j := \gamma.length \), refund the coins that you removed from the subchannels in Step 1.

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<th>Close virtual state channel</th>
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4. In the round \( \gamma.validity + \text{TimeRegister}(j + 2 \cdot \text{TimeExecute}([j/2])) \) proceed as follows. Let \( \gamma \) be the current version of the virtual state channel, i.e. \( \gamma := \Gamma(\gamma.id) \) and let \( \hat{\gamma}_A := \gamma.cash(A) \) and \( \hat{\gamma}_B := \gamma.cash(B) \).
5. Add \( \hat{\gamma}_A \) coins to \( \gamma.Alice’ \)s balance and \( \hat{\gamma}_B \) coins to \( \gamma.Ingrid’ \)’s balance in \( \gamma.subchan(\gamma.Alice) \). Add \( \hat{\gamma}_A \) coins to \( \gamma.Ingrid’ \)’s balance and \( \hat{\gamma}_B \) coins to \( \gamma.Bob’ \)’s balance in \( \gamma.subchan(\gamma.Bob) \).
6. Erase \( \gamma \) from \( \Gamma \) and send \( (\text{closed}, \gamma.id) \to \gamma.end-users \).

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<th>Update contract instance</th>
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Upon (update, id, cid, σ, C) \xrightarrow{\gamma_0} P:
1. Let γ := Γ(id) and j = γ.length. If P \notin γ.end-users then stop.
2. Send (update-requested, id, cid, σ, C) \xrightarrow{\gamma_{j+1}} γ.other-party(P).
3. Let T = \tau_0 + TimeRegister(j) + 1. If (update-reply, ok, id, cid) \xrightarrow{\gamma_{j+1}} γ.other-party(P), then set Γ := LocalUpdate(Γ, id, cid, σ, C) and send (updated, id, cid) \xrightarrow{\gamma_{j+1}} γ.end-users and stop. Otherwise stop.

Upon (execute, id, cid, f, z) \xrightarrow{\gamma_0} P:
1. Let γ := Γ(id) and j = γ.length. If P \notin γ.end-users then stop.
2. If j = 1, then set T = \tau_0 + 4\Delta + 5. Else set T = \tau_0 + 14 \cdot TimeExecute([j/2]) + 10.
3. In round τ_2 \leq T, let γ := Γ(id), ν := γ.cscape(cid), and σ := ν.storage.
4. Compute (σ, R, add_L, add_R, m) := f(σ, P, \tau_0, z). If m = ⊥, then stop. Else set Γ := LocalUpdate
   Add(Γ, id, cid, σ, ν.type, add_L, add_R, m) \xrightarrow{\tau_3} γ.end-users and stop.

Close ledger state channel

Upon (close, id) \xrightarrow{\gamma_0} P, let γ = Γ(id). If P \notin γ.end-users then stop. Otherwise wait at most 7\Delta rounds. Then distinguish the following two cases:
1. If there exists cid ∈ \{0, 1\}^* such that σ_{cid} := γ.cscape(cid) \neq ⊥ and σ_{cid}.cash(A) + σ_{cid}.cash(B) \neq 0, then stop.
2. Otherwise wait up to \Delta rounds to add γ.cash(A) coins to A’s account and γ.cash(B) coins to B’s account on the ledger L. Then set Γ(id) := ⊥, send (closed, id) \xrightarrow{\tau_2 \leq \tau_0 + 8\Delta} γ.end-users and stop.

Let us now provide some intuitions behind this definition. The F^{\mathcal{C}}(\Delta)(i, C) functionality consists of two “state channel opening” procedures: one for ledger state channels and one for virtual state channels. The ledger state channel opening procedure starts with a “create” message from A (without loss of generality we assume that A always initiates the opening process). As a result of this, the functionality removes the coins that A wants to deposit in the ledger state channel from A’s account on the ledger, and waits for B to also declare that he wants to open the ledger state channel. If this happens within time \Delta then also B’s coins are removed form the ledger and the ledger state channel is created (which is communicated to the parties with the “created” message), otherwise A can get her money back by sending a “refund” message.

The opening procedure for virtual state channel γ works slightly differently since its effects are visible on the subchannels of γ. It works as follows. The intention to open γ is expressed by P \in γ.end-users \cup \{γ.Ingrid\} by sending a “create” message to the functionality. Once such a message is received from P, the coins that are needed to create γ are locked immediately on both sides of the subchannel, i.e. if P \in γ.end-users sends the “create” message then also the money of γ.Ingrid is locked in her state channel with P (and symmetrically when γ.Ingrid sends the “create” message). If the functionality receives the “create” messages from all three parties, then the virtual state channel is created, which is communicated to γ.end-users by the “created” message. Note that γ.Ingrid does not receive this message, since she does not need to know whether γ has been created or not (as she is not going to perform any operations on this virtual state channel). After the virtual state channel is created γ.end-users can use it until time γ.validity. When this time comes, the parties initiate the closing procedure that has to end in time at most γ.validity + TimeRegister(j) + 2 \cdot TimeExecute([j/2]). The functionality then looks at the last version of γ and distributes the coins in the subchannels of γ according to it.

In both cases (“ledger” and “virtual”) we assume that all the honest parties involved in state channel opening initiate the procedure in the same round and that they have enough funds for the new state channel. In case of a virtual state channel, we additionally assume that the lengths of subchannels differ at most by one. All these assumptions are formally modeled by restricting the environment, see Appx. B.
The procedure for updating a contract instance is identical for ledger and virtual state channels (this procedure is also used for creating new contract instances). It is initiated by a party $P \in \gamma.end-users$ that sends an “update” message to the ideal functionality. This message has parameters $id$ and $cid$ that identify a state channel $\gamma$ and a contract instance in this state channel (respectively). The other parameters, $\tilde{\sigma}$ and $\mathcal{C}$, denote the new storage and type of the contract instance with identifier $cid$ in $\gamma$. Party $Q$ confirms the update with an “update-reply” message that has to reach the ideal functionality within time $T$ (which is a function of state channel length, see Step 3). If the update is confirm, then the contract instance with identifier $cid$ in $\gamma$ gets replaced with a contract instance determined by $\tilde{\sigma}, \mathcal{C}$ (if no such contract instance existed before then it gets created). We assume (see Appx. B) that the environment never asks the parties to do obviously illegal things, like updating a state channel that does not exits, creating a contract instance when there are not enough coins in the subchannels. Also, changing a type of a contract instance is not permitted. Moreover, we assume that the environment never asks to update a contract instance when it is already being updated or executed$^9$ and, for reasons that will be explained later in the work (see Section 8), we allow only one contract instance to be created in a virtual state channel.

The procedure for executing a contract instance is initiated by one of the parties $P \in \gamma.end-users$ that sends an “execute” message to the ideal functionality. This message has parameters $id$ and $cid$ whose meaning is as in the update procedure. Other parameters are: $f$ denoting the function to be executed, and $z$ which is an additional input parameter to the function $f$. The execution results in updating the contract instance with identifier $cid$ according to the result of computing $f(\sigma, P, \tau_0, z)$, where $\tau_0$ is the round when the “execute” message was received, and $\sigma$ is the current storage of the contract instance. Observe that this storage can be different than the storage in round $\tau_0$. This can sometimes result in a situation when two executions of a contract instance, happening one after another, will have “reversed” information about the rounds. More precisely: the first execution will assume that the current round is $\tau_0^1$, and the second one will assume that it is $\tau_0^2$ with $\tau_0^2 < \tau_0^1$. The users of our protocol should be aware of this asynchronicity when designing the contracts. The restrictions on the environment in case of the contract instance execution are straightforward. In particular, as before, we assume that a given contract instance has to exist.

The procedure for closing a ledger state channel $\gamma$ starts when a party $P \in \gamma.end-users$ sends to the ideal functionality a message (close, $id$) (where $id$ is the identifier of $\gamma$). The functionality checks (in Step 1) if there are no contract instances that are open over $\gamma$. If not, then in Step 2 the functionality distributes the coins from $\gamma$ to parties’ ledger accounts according to $\gamma$’s latest balance, removes the ledger state channel from $\mathcal{L}$, and communicates to the parties that the ledger state channel has been closed. We assume that $Z$ only asks to close the ledger state channels (as the virtual ones are closed “automatically”) and that $\gamma$ exists.$^{10}$

5.1 Modular approach

Before we define a protocol realizing the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{ch}^{C(\Delta)}(i, \mathcal{C})$, let us give a short overview of our approach.

We will first define an ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{scc}^{C(\Delta)}(\mathcal{C})$ which models the behavior of a concrete smart contract, which we call state channel contract, on a blockchain that allows two parties to open, maintain and close a ledger state channel. The ideal functionality is parametrized by the set of contract types whose instances can be opened in the ledger state channels created via this ideal functionality. The ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{scc}^{C(\Delta)}(\mathcal{C})$ together with the ledger functionality $\mathcal{L}$ can be implemented by a cryptocurrency which supports such a state channel contract on its blockchain (a candidate cryptocurrency would be, e.g., Ethereum).

As already mentioned in Section 1.1, our technique allows to create virtual state channels of arbitrary length, via applying the state channel functionality recursively. This will be modeled by constructing our protocols in the “hybrid model”, i.e., a protocol for constructing state channels of length up to $i$ (in other

$^9$ Although we forbid parallel updates of the same contract instance, we do not make any restrictions about parallel updates of two different contract instances even if they are in the same ledger state channel. This in particular means that we allow concurrent creation of virtual state channels.

$^{10}$ We say that a state channel $\gamma$ exists if the environment received the message (created, $\gamma$) but not yet (closed, $\gamma.id$).
words: a protocol realizing functionality $F_{ch}^{L(\Delta)}(i, C)$ will work in a model with access to an ideal functionality $F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C)$ which represents the smart contract allowing two parties to open, maintain and close a ledger state channel. We call such a smart contract a state channel contract. Then we will describe the protocol $\Pi(1, C)$ that realizes the state channels ideal functionality $F_{ch}^{L(\Delta)}(1, C)$ (see Sect. 5) in the hybrid world $F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C)$ for any set of contract types $C$.

6 Ledger State Channels

In this section, we will first define an ideal functionality $F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C)$ which represents the smart contract allowing two parties to open, maintain and close a ledger state channel. We call such a smart contract a state channel contract. Then we will describe the protocol $\Pi(1, C)$ that realizes the state channels ideal functionality $F_{ch}^{L(\Delta)}(1, C)$ (see Sect. 5) in the hybrid world $F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C)$ for any set of contract types $C$.

6.1 Ideal functionality for the State Channel Contract

The ideal functionality $F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C)$ is parametrized by a set $C$ defining the contract types whose instance can be constructed in a ledger state channel. The ideal functionality $F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C)$ has access to the global ideal functionality $L$ (the ledger). The ideal functionality $F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C)$ accepts messages from parties $P := \{P_1, \ldots, P_n\}$. Let us emphasize that since the ideal functionality models a concrete smart contracts on the ledger, each communication session (party sends a message to the ideal functionality which potentially makes some modifications on the ledger and replies) comes with a delay up to $\Delta$ rounds. The exact timing (and if applicable, the exact round when transaction on the ledger takes place), is determined by the adversary. In order to shorten the description of the ideal functionality, we do not mention the transact instructions explicitly.

The functionality $F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C)$ maintains a space $\Gamma$ containing all open ledger state channels. The set $\Gamma$ is initially empty. The functionality consists of four parts: “Create a ledger state channel”, “Contract instance registration”, “Contract instance execution” and “Close a ledger state channel”. These parts will be described and formally defined together with the protocol for ledger state channels in Section 6.2.
6.2 Protocol for Ledger State Channels

Create a ledger state channel. In order to create a new ledger state channel \(\gamma\), the environment sends the message (create, \(\gamma\)) to both parties in \(\gamma\).end-users. A new ledger state channel can be built only if both users of the ledger state channel agree on a state channel contract that is published on the ledger. In this work, such smart contract modeled via an ideal functionality \(F_{scc}\) which is parametrized by \(C\) – a set of contract types that can be opened in the ledger state channel. The protocol for creating a ledger state channel works at a high level as follows.

The initiating party \(\gamma.Alice\) requests construction of the state channel contract by sending the message (construct, \(\gamma\)) to the ideal functionality \(F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C)\). The ideal functionality locks the required amount of coins in her account on the ledger and sends the message (initializing, \(\gamma\)) to both parties. If party \(\gamma.Bob\) confirms the initialization by sending the message (confirm, \(\gamma\)), the ideal functionality \(F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C)\) outputs (created, \(\gamma\)). In case \(\gamma.Bob\) does not confirm, the ledger state channel cannot be created and the initiating party \(\gamma.Alice\) has the option to refund the coins that were locked in her account on the ledger during the first step.

To conclude, creation of a ledger state channels takes up to \(2\Delta\) rounds since it requires two interactions with the hybrid ideal functionality modeling a smart contract on the ledger. In case the ledger state channel is not created but \(\gamma.Alice\)'s coins were locked in the first phase of the ledger state channel creation, she can receive them back latest after \(3\Delta\) rounds.

Formal description of the protocol for ledger state channel creation and the corresponding part of the \(F_{scc}\) functionality can be found below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocol (\Pi(1, C)): Create a ledger state channel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

We use the abbreviated notation from Section 4.3 and let \(F_{scc} := F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C)\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party A upon (create, (\gamma))</th>
<th>(\xrightarrow{T_0} Z)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Send (construct, (\gamma))</td>
<td>(\xrightarrow{T_0} F_{scc}) and wait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. If (initializing, (\gamma))</td>
<td>(\xrightarrow{T_1 \leq T_0 + \Delta} F_{scc}), then (confirm, (\gamma)) (\xrightarrow{T_1} F_{scc}) and wait. Else stop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. If (initialized, (\gamma))</td>
<td>(\xrightarrow{T_2 \leq T_0 + 2\Delta} F_{scc}), then set (\Gamma^B(\gamma.id) := \gamma), output (created, (\gamma)) (\xrightarrow{T_2} Z) and stop. Else stop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back to party A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. If (initialized, (\gamma))</td>
<td>(\xleftarrow{T_2 \leq T_0 + 2\Delta} F_{scc}), then set (\Gamma^A(\gamma.id) := \gamma), output (created, (\gamma)) (\xrightarrow{T_2} Z) and stop. Else go to next step.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. If (refund, (\gamma))</td>
<td>(\xleftarrow{T_3 &gt; T_0 + 2\Delta} Z), then (refund, (\gamma)) (\xrightarrow{T_3} F_{scc}) and stop.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Functionality \(F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C)\): Create a ledger state channel |

We use the abbreviated notation from Section 4.3.

**Upon** (create, \(\gamma\)) \(\xrightarrow{T_0} P\):

1. If \(P \neq A\), there already exists a state channel \(\gamma'\) such that \(\gamma.id = \gamma'.id\), \(\text{cspace}(cid) \neq \perp\) for some \(cid \in \{0, 1\}^*\) or \(\text{Value}(\gamma) < 0\), then stop.

2. Within \(\Delta\) rounds remove \(\gamma.cash(A)\) coins from \(A\)'s account on the ledger \(L\). If it is impossible due to insufficient funds, then stop. Else (initializing, \(\gamma\)) \(\rightarrow B\) and store the pair \(tamp := (T_0, \gamma)\) in memory.

**Upon** (confirm, \(\gamma\)) \(\xrightarrow{T_1} P\):
3. If there is no pair \( t_\text{amp} = (\tau_0, \gamma) \) in the storage, \((\tau_1 - \tau_0) > \Delta \) or \( P \neq B \), then stop.
4. Within \( \Delta \) rounds remove \( \gamma.\text{cash}(B) \) coins from \( B \)'s account on the ledger \( L \). If it is impossible due to insufficient funds, then stop. Else set \( \Gamma(\gamma, \text{id}) := \gamma \) and delete \( t_\text{amp} \) from the memory. Thereafter send (initialized, \( \gamma \)) \( \rightarrow \gamma.\text{end-users} \).

Upon (refund, \( \gamma \)) \( \xrightarrow{2} P \):
5. If there is no pair \( t_\text{amp} = (\tau_0, \gamma) \) in the storage, \((\tau_2 - \tau_0) \leq 2\Delta \) or \( P \neq A \), then stop.
6. Else within \( \Delta \) rounds add \( \gamma.\text{cash}(A) \) coins to \( A \)'s account on the ledger \( L \) and delete \( t_\text{amp} \) from the storage.

Register a contract instance in a ledger state channel. As long as both end-users of a ledger state channel behave honestly, they can update, execute and close contract instances running in the ledger state channel off-chain; i.e. without communicating with the ideal functionality \( F^{L(\Delta)}(C) \). However, once the parties run into dispute (e.g., one party does not communicate, sends an invalid message, etc.), parties have to resolve their disagreement on the ledger. We call this process “registration of a contract instance”, and will describe its basic functionality below.

The registration of a contract instance might be necessary either when the contract instance is being updated, executed or when a ledger state channel is being closed. To prevent repeating the same part of the protocol multiple times in each of the protocols, we state the registration process as a separate procedure \( \text{Register}(P, \text{id}, \text{cid}) \) which can be called by parties running one of the sub-protocols mentioned above. The procedure takes as input party \( P \) which initiates the registration and the identifiers defining the contract instance to be registered, i.e. identifier of the ledger state channel \( \text{id} \) and the contract instance identifier \( \text{cid} \).

At a high level, the initiating party (assume for now that it is \( \gamma.\text{Alice} \)) sends her contract instance version to the ideal functionality \( F^{L(\Delta)}(C) \) which first checks the validity of the received version (for example, if it is correctly signed by \( \gamma.\text{Bob} \), if the contract type of the instance is in the set \( C \), etc.). If the contract instance version is valid, within \( \Delta \) rounds the hybrid ideal functionality \( F^{L(\Delta)}(C) \) informs both users that the contract instance is being registered. Party \( \gamma.\text{Bob} \) then immediately reacts by sending his own version of the contract instance to \( F^{L(\Delta)}(C) \). The ideal functionality compares the two received versions, registers the one with higher version number and within \( \Delta \) rounds informs both users which version was registered. In case \( \gamma.\text{Bob} \) did not send in his version, \( \gamma.\text{Alice} \) can finalize the registration by sending the message “finalize-register” to the hybrid ideal functionality.

In the optimistic case when \( \gamma.\text{Bob} \) submits a valid version of the contract instance, the registration procedure takes up to \( 2\Delta \) rounds since it requires two interactions with the ideal functionality \( F^{L(\Delta)}(C) \). In the pessimistic case when \( \gamma.\text{Bob} \) does not react or submits an invalid version, the procedure takes up to \( 3\Delta \). Formal description of this procedure and the corresponding part of the \( F^{L(\Delta)}(C) \) functionality can be found below.

We use the abbreviated notation from Section 4.3. In addition, we denote \( F^{\Delta} := F^{L(\Delta)}(C) \).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>Register((P, \text{id}, \text{cid}))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party P</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1. Let \( \gamma^P := \Gamma^P(\text{id}), \nu^P := \gamma^P.\text{cspace}(\text{cid}) \), and let \( \tau_0 \) be the current round. Send (instance-register, \( \text{id}, \text{cid}, \nu^P \)) \( \xleftarrow{\tau_0} F^{\Delta}\).
| 2. If not (instance-registering, \( \text{id}, \text{cid} \)) \( \xleftarrow{\tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + \Delta} F^{\Delta}\), then stop. Else goto step 4. |
| **Party Q** upon (instance-registering, \( \text{id}, \text{cid} \)) \( \xleftarrow{\tau_1} F^{\Delta}\) |
| 3. Let \( \gamma^Q := \Gamma^Q(\text{id}) \) and \( \nu^Q := \gamma^Q.\text{cspace}(\text{cid}) \). Then send (instance-register, \( \text{id}, \text{cid}, \nu^Q \)) \( \xrightarrow{\tau_1} F^{\Delta}\) and goto step 5. |
4. If not \((\text{instance–registered}, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \tilde{\nu}) \xleftarrow{T\leq \tau_{1}+\Delta} \mathcal{F}_{\text{acc}})\), then send (\text{finalize–register}, \text{id}, \text{cid}) \xrightarrow{T=\tau_{1}+\Delta} \mathcal{F}_{\text{acc}}

End for both \(T = A\) and \(T = B\)

5. Upon (\text{instance–registered}, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \tilde{\nu}) \xleftarrow{\mathcal{F}_{\text{acc}}}, mark \((\text{id}, \text{cid})\) as registered in \(\Gamma^{T}\) and set \(\Gamma^{T} := \text{Local Update}(\Gamma^{T}, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \tilde{\nu})\).

### Functionality \(\mathcal{F}_{\text{acc}}(\Delta)(C)\): Contract instance registration

We use the abbreviated notation from Section 4.3.

**Upon** (\text{instance–register}, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \nu) \xleftarrow{T_{0}} P, let \(\gamma := \Gamma(\text{id})\) and do:

1. If party \(P \notin \gamma.\text{end–users}\), one of the signatures \(\nu.\text{sign}(A), \nu.\text{sign}(B)\) is invalid, \(\nu.\text{type} \notin C\), \(\gamma.\text{cspace}(\text{cid}) \neq \bot\), \(\nu.\text{storage} \notin \nu.\text{type}.\Lambda\), then stop.

2. Else let \(Q := \gamma.\text{other–party}(P)\) and consider the following three cases:
   - If your memory contains a tuple \((P, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \tilde{\nu}, \tilde{\tau}_{0})\), then ignore this call.
   - If your memory contains a tuple \((Q, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \tilde{\nu}, \tilde{\tau}_{0})\), then first compare the version number, i.e. if \(\nu.\text{storage}.\text{version} > \tilde{\nu}.\text{storage}.\text{version}\), then set \(\tilde{\nu} := (\nu.\text{storage}, \nu.\text{type})\) and otherwise set \(\tilde{\nu} := (\tilde{\nu}.\text{storage}, \tilde{\nu}.\text{type})\). Thereafter wait for at most \(\Delta\) rounds to send (\text{instance–registered}, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \tilde{\nu}, \tilde{\tau}_{0}) \xrightarrow{T_{0} \leq \tau_{0} + \Delta} \gamma.\text{end–users}, \text{update} \Gamma := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \tilde{\nu})\) and erase \((Q, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \tilde{\nu}, \tilde{\tau}_{0})\) from your memory.
   - Else save \((P, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \nu, \tau_{0})\) to your memory and send (\text{instance–registering}, \text{id}, \text{cid}) \xrightarrow{T_{1} \leq \tau_{0} + \Delta} \gamma.\text{end–users}.

**Upon** (\text{finalize–register}, \text{id}, \text{cid}) \xleftarrow{T_{2}} P, let \(\gamma := \Gamma(\text{id})\) and do:

- If \(P \in \gamma.\text{end–users}\) and your memory contains a value \((P, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \tilde{\nu}, \tilde{\tau}_{0})\) such that \(T_{2} - \tilde{\tau}_{0} \geq 2\Delta\), then set \(\tilde{\nu} := (\tilde{\nu}.\text{storage}, \tilde{\nu}.\text{type})\), send (\text{instance–registered}, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \tilde{\nu}) \xrightarrow{T_{0} \leq \tau_{0} + \Delta} \gamma.\text{end–users}, \text{set} \Gamma := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \tilde{\nu})\) and erase \((P, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \tilde{\nu}, \tilde{\tau}_{0})\) from your memory.
- Else ignore this call.

### Update a contract instance in a ledger state channel

In order to update the storage of a contract instance in a ledger state channel, we assume that the environment sends the message (update, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \tilde{\sigma}, C) to the initiating party \(P \in \gamma.\text{end–users}\). The input parameters \(\tilde{\sigma}\) and \(C\) define the new contract instance that should be stored in \(\gamma.\text{cspace}\) under the identifier \(\text{cid}\).

The update protocol works on high level as follows. The initiating party \(P\) signs the new contract instance version with increased version number (i.e. if \(\nu^{P}\) is the contract instance version stored by \(P\) until now, then the new contract instance version \(\nu\) will be such that \(\nu.\text{version} = \nu^{P}.\text{version} + 1\)). Party \(P\) then sends her signature on this value to the party \(Q := \gamma.\text{other–party}(P)\). The other party verifies the signature and informs the environment that the update was requested. If the environment confirms the update, the party \(Q\) signs the updated contract version and sends the signature to \(P\). In this optimistic case, the update takes 2 rounds.

Let us discuss how parties behave in case the environment does not confirm the update. If \(Q\) simply aborts in this situation, \(P\) does not know if update failed because \(Q\) is malicious or because the environment did not confirm the update. Therefore, \(Q\) has to inform \(P\) about the failure. This is, however, still not sufficient. Note that \(Q\) holds \(P\)'s signature of the new contract instance. If \(Q\) is corrupt, it can register the updated contract instance on the ledger at any later point. Thus, in case the environment does not confirm the update, party \(Q\) must sign the original contract instance but with version number increased by 2 (i.e. will be equal to \(\nu^{P}.\text{version} + 2\)) and send the signature to party \(P\). Now, if \(P\) does not receive a valid signature on either the updated contract instance version or the original contract instance with increased version number
from $Q$, it is clear that $Q$ is malicious and therefore $P$ initiates the registration of the contract instance on the ledger by calling the procedure $\text{Register}(P, \text{id}, \text{cid})$. Note that $Q$ can still register the updated contract instance (the one that was signed by $P$). But importantly, after at most $2 + 3\Delta$ rounds it will be clear to both parties what the current contract instance version is. Formal description of the protocol for updating a contract instance in a ledger state channel can be found below.

**Protocol $II(1, \mathcal{C})$: Contract instance update**

We use the abbreviated notation from Section 4.3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party $P$ upon (update, id, cid, $\hat{\sigma}$, $\mathcal{C}$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_1} \mathcal{Z}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Let $\gamma^P := \Gamma^P(\text{id})$ and $\nu^P := \gamma^P.\text{cspace}(\text{cid})$. If $\nu^P = \bot$, then set $\nu^P := 0$, else set $\nu^P := \nu^P.\text{version}$.
| 2. Compute $s_P := \text{Sign}_{sk_P}(\text{id}, \text{cid}, \hat{\sigma}, \mathcal{C}, \nu^P + 1)$.
| 3. Send (update, $s_P$, id, cid, $\hat{\sigma}$, $\mathcal{C}$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_3} Q$ and wait. |

| Party $Q$ upon (update, $s_P$, id, cid, $\hat{\sigma}$, $\mathcal{C}$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_3} P$ |

| 4. Let $\gamma^Q := \Gamma^Q(\text{id})$ and $\nu^Q := \gamma^Q.\text{cspace}(\text{cid})$. If $\nu^Q = \bot$, then set $\nu^Q := 0$, else set $\nu^Q := \nu^Q.\text{version}$.
| 5. If $\text{Vfy}_{pk_P}(\text{id}, \text{cid}, \hat{\sigma}, \mathcal{C}, \nu^Q + 1; s_P) \neq 1$, then mark (id, cid) as corrupt and stop. Else output (update–requested, id, cid) $\xrightarrow{\tau_3} \mathcal{Z}$ and consider the following two cases
| | - If (update–reply, ok, id, cid) $\xrightarrow{\tau_3} \mathcal{Z}$, then compute the signature $s_Q := \text{Sign}_{sk_Q}(\text{id}, \text{cid}, \hat{\sigma}, \mathcal{C}, \nu^Q + 1)$, send (update–ok, $s_Q$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_3} P$, set $\Gamma^Q := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma^Q, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \hat{\sigma}, \mathcal{C}, \nu^Q + 1, \{s_P, s_Q\})$ and output (updated, id, cid) $\xrightarrow{\tau_3+1} \mathcal{Z}$. |
| | - Else compute $s_Q := \text{Sign}_{sk_Q}(\text{id}, \text{cid}, \nu^Q.\text{storage}, \nu^Q.\text{type}, \nu^Q + 2)$, send (update–not-ok, $s_Q$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_3} P$ and stop. |

| Back to party $P$ |

| 6. Distinguish the following three cases: |
| | - If (update–ok, $s_Q$) $\xleftarrow{\tau_3=\tau_0+2} Q$, where $\text{Vfy}_{pk_Q}(\text{id}, \text{cid}, \hat{\sigma}, \mathcal{C}, \nu^P + 1; s_Q) = 1$, then set $\Gamma^P := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma^P, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \hat{\sigma}, \mathcal{C}, \nu^P + 1, \{s_P, s_Q\})$, output (updated, id, cid) $\xrightarrow{\tau_3} \mathcal{Z}$ and stop. |
| | - If (update–not–ok, $s_Q$) $\xleftarrow{\tau_3=\tau_0+2} Q$, where $\text{Vfy}_{pk_Q}(\text{id}, \text{cid}, \nu^P.\text{storage}, \nu^P.\text{type}, \nu^P + 2; s_Q) = 1$, then compute $s_P := \text{Sign}_{sk_P}(\text{id}, \text{cid}, \nu^P.\text{storage}, \nu^P.\text{type}, \nu^P + 2)$, set $\Gamma^P := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma^P, \text{id}, \text{cid}, \nu^P.\text{storage}, \nu^P.\text{type}, \nu^P + 2, \{s_P, s_Q\})$ and stop. |
| | - Else mark (id, cid) as corrupt and in round $\tau_0 + 2$ call the subprocedure $\text{Register}(P, \text{id}, \text{cid})$. After the subprocedure execution (in round $\tau_0 \leq \tau_0 + 3\Delta + 2$), if $\gamma^P.\text{cspace}(\text{cid}) = (\hat{\sigma}, \mathcal{C})$, then output (updated, id, cid) $\xrightarrow{\tau_3} \mathcal{Z}$. |

**Execute a contract instance in a ledger state channel.** In order to execute a contract instance stored in a ledger state channel $\gamma$, the environment sends the message (execute, $\gamma.\text{id}, \text{cid}, f, z$) to the initiating party $P \in \gamma.\text{end–users}$. The parameter $\text{cid}$ points to the contract instance, $f$ is the contract function to be applied to the contract instance and $z$ are additional input values of the function $f$.

The protocol works on a high level as follows (let us for now assume that $P = \gamma.\text{Alice}$). If the parties never registered the contract instance with identifier $\text{cid}$, then $\gamma.\text{Alice}$ first tries to execute the contract instance “peacefully”. This means that she locally executes $f$ on the contract version she stores in $\Gamma^{\gamma.\text{Alice}}$, signs the new contract instance and sends the signature to $\gamma.\text{Bob}$. Party $\gamma.\text{Bob}$ also executes $f$ locally on his own version of the contract instance stored in $\Gamma^{\gamma.\text{Bob}}$ and thereafter verifies $\gamma.\text{Alice}$’s signature. If the signature is valid, $\gamma.\text{Bob}$ immediately confirms the execution by sending his signature on the new contract instance to party $\gamma.\text{Alice}$. 

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A technical challenge occurs when both parties want to peacefully execute the same contract instance in the same round $\tau$ since it becomes unclear what is the new contract instance. To overcome this technical difficulty, $\gamma$.Alice peacefully executes only if $\tau = 1 \mod 4$ and $\gamma$.Bob only when $\tau = 3 \mod 4$. So, for example, if $\gamma$.Alice receives the message “execute” in round $\tau = 2 \mod 4$, then she waits for three rounds and only then starts the peaceful execution. Hence, in the optimistic case when both users are honest, the execution protocol takes up to 5 rounds.

In case the contract instance with identifier $cid$ has already been registered on the ledger or the peaceful execution fails, the initiating party executes the contract instance “forcefully”. By this we mean that $\gamma$.Alice first initiates registration of the contract instance by calling the procedure $\text{Register}(P, id, cid)$, and then instructs the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{sec}}^\mathcal{L}(\Delta)(C)$ to execute the contract instance. The $\text{Register}$ procedure can take up to $3\Delta$ rounds and the contract instance execution on the ledger can take up to $\Delta$ rounds. Thus, pessimistic time complexity of the execution protocol is equal to $4\Delta + 5$ rounds. Formal description of the protocol for executing a contract instance in a ledger state channel and the corresponding part of the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{sec}}^\mathcal{L}(\Delta)(C)$ can be found below.

**Protocol II(1; C): Contract instance execution**

We use the abbreviated notation from Section 4.3 and denote $\mathcal{F}_{\text{sec}} := \mathcal{F}_{\text{sec}}^\mathcal{L}(\Delta)(C)$.

**Party P upon (execute, id, cid, f, z) $\xrightarrow{\tau_0} Z$**

1. Let $\gamma^P := \Gamma^P(id), \nu^P := \gamma^P.\text{space}(cid), \sigma^P := \nu^P.\text{storage}, \mathcal{C}^P := \nu^P.\text{type}$ and $v^P := \nu^P.\text{version}$.
2. Set $\tau_1 := \tau_0 + x$, where $x$ is the smallest offset such that $\tau_1 = 1 \mod 4$ if $P = \gamma^P$.Alice and $\tau_1 = 3 \mod 4$ if $P = \gamma^P$.Bob. Wait till round $\tau_1$.
3. If $(id, cid)$ is not marked as corrupt in $\Gamma^P$, then compute $(\tilde{\sigma}, \text{addr}_L, \text{addr}_R, m) := f(\sigma^P, P, \tau_0, z)$. If $m = \bot$, then stop. Otherwise compute $s_p := \text{Sign}_{sk_p}(id, cid, \tilde{\sigma}, \mathcal{C}^P, v^P + 1)$, send (peaceful–request, id, cid, f, z, $s_p, \tau_0$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_1} Q$ and goto step 10.
4. If $(id, cid)$ is marked as corrupt, proceed as follows. If $(id, cid)$ not marked as registered, then run $\text{Register}(P, id, cid)$. Let $\tau_3$ be the current round. Then send $(\text{instance–execute, id, cid, f, z})$ $\xrightarrow{\tau_3} \mathcal{F}_{\text{sec}}$ and goto step 11.

**Party Q upon (peaceful–request, id, cid, f, z, $s_p, \tau_0$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_0} P$**

5. Let $\gamma^Q := \Gamma^Q(id), \nu^Q := \gamma^Q.\text{space}(cid), \sigma^Q := \nu^Q.\text{storage}, \mathcal{C}^Q := \nu^Q.\text{type}$, $v^Q := \nu^Q.\text{version}$. If $\gamma^Q = \bot$ or $P, Q \notin \gamma^Q.\text{end–users}$ or $v^Q = \bot$, then goto step 9.
6. If $P = \gamma^Q$.Alice and $\tau_Q \mod 4 \neq 2$ or if $P = \gamma^Q$.Bob and $\tau_Q \mod 4 \neq 0$, then goto step 9.
7. If $\tau_0 \notin [\tau_Q - 4, \tau_Q - 1]$, then goto step 9.
8. If $(id, cid)$ is not marked as corrupt in $\Gamma^Q$, do:
   (a) Compute $(\tilde{\sigma}, \text{addr}_L, \text{addr}_R, m) := f(\sigma^Q, P, \tau_0, z)$.
   (b) If $m = \bot$ or $\forall y_{pk_p}(id, cid, \tilde{\sigma}, \mathcal{C}^Q, v^Q + 1; s_p) \neq 1$, then goto step 9.
   (c) Else sign $s_Q := \text{Sign}_{sk_q}(id, cid, \tilde{\sigma}, \mathcal{C}^Q, v^Q + 1)$, send (peaceful–confirm, id, cid, f, z, $s_Q$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_3} P$, set $\Gamma^Q := \text{LocalUpdateAdd}(\Gamma^Q, id, cid, \tilde{\sigma}, \mathcal{C}^Q, \text{addr}_A, \text{addr}_R, v^Q + 1, \{s_p, s_Q\})$, output (executed, id, cid, $\tilde{\sigma}$, $\text{addr}_A, \text{addr}_R, m$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_{Q+1}} Z$ and stop.
9. Mark $(id, cid)$ as corrupt in $\Gamma^Q$. Then goto step 11.

**Back to party P**

10. Distinguish the following two cases
instance, the ledger state channel can not be closed in which case the ledger state channel was successfully closed. If there exists at least one unterminated contract instance that they have constructed off-chain. Thus, the initiating party P upon (close, id) ends the contract functionality for the ledger state channel closing are presented formally below.

1. If (instance–executed, id, cid, f, z) \( \gamma \) then stop. Else compute \((\hat{\sigma}, add_L, add_R, m) := f(\sigma, P, \tau_0, z)\). If \( m = \bot \), then stop. Else update the \( \hat{\sigma} \) and stop.

11. If (instance–executed, id, cid, \( \hat{\sigma}, add_L, add_R, m \)) \( \tau_4 \leq \tau_0 + 4\Delta + 5 \) \( F_{scc} \), set \( \Gamma^T := \text{LocalUpdateAdd}(\Gamma^T, id, cid, \hat{\sigma}, c^T, add_L, add_R) \), output (executed, id, cid, \( \hat{\sigma}, add_L, add_R, m \)) \( \tau_4 \) \( Z \) and stop. Else stop.

**Functionality** \( F_{scc}^{\Delta}(C) \): Contract instance execution

We use the abbreviated notation from Section 4.3.

Upon (instance–execute, id, cid, f, z) \( \tau_0 \) \( P \), within \( \Delta \) rounds proceed as follows. Let \( \gamma := \Gamma(id) \). If \( \gamma = \bot \), then stop. Else set \( \nu := \gamma\text{.space}(cid) \) and \( \sigma := \nu\text{.storage} \). If \( P \neq \gamma\text{.end-users} \) or \( \nu = \bot \), then stop. Else compute \((\hat{\sigma}, add_L, add_R, m) := f(\sigma, P, \tau_0, z)\). If \( m = \bot \), then stop. Else update the channel space \( \Gamma := \text{LocalUpdateAdd}(\Gamma, id, cid, \hat{\sigma}, c^T, add_L, add_R) \), send (instance–executed, id, cid, \( \hat{\sigma}, add_L, add_R, m \)) \( \tau_4 \) \( Z \) and stop.

**Close a ledger state channel.** In order to close a ledger state channel with identifier id by party \( P \in \gamma\text{.end-users} \), the environment sends the message (close, id) to the initiating party \( P \). Before a ledger state channel can be closed, the end-users of the ledger state channel have the chance to register all the contract instances that they have constructed off-chain. Thus, the initiating party \( P \) first (in parallel) registers all the contract instances which have been updated/peacefully executed but not registered at the ledger yet. This takes up to \( 3\Delta \) rounds. Next, \( P \) asks the ideal functionality \( F_{scc}^{\Delta}(C) \) representing the state channel contract on the ledger to close the ledger state channel. Within \( \Delta \) rounds, the ideal functionality informs both parties that the ledger state channel is being closed and gives the other end-user of the ledger state channel time \( 3\Delta \) to register contract instances that were not registered by \( P \). If after \( 3\Delta \) rounds all registered contract instances are terminated (the locked amount of coins is equal to zero), the ideal functionality adds \( \gamma\text{.cash}(\gamma, Alice) \) coins to \( gamma.Alice\)’s account on the ledger, and \( \gamma\text{.cash}(\gamma, Bob) \) coins to \( gamma.Bob\)’s account on the ledger, deletes the ledger state channel from its channel space and within \( \Delta \) rounds informs both parties that the ledger state channel was successfully closed. If there exists at least one unterminated contract instance, the ledger state channel can not be closed in which case the \( F_{scc}^{\Delta}(C) \) simply aborts. To conclude our description, it can take up to \( 8\Delta \) rounds to successfully close a ledger state channel. The protocol and the contract functionality for the ledger state channel closing are presented formally below.

**Protocol II(1, C): Close a ledger state channel**

We use the abbreviated notation from Section 4.3 and denote \( F_{scc} := F_{scc}^{\Delta}(C) \)

Party \( P \) upon (close, id) \( \tau_0 \) \( Z \).
1. Let $\gamma^P := \Gamma^P(id)$. For each $cid \in \{0,1\}^*$ such that $\gamma^P.cspace(cid) \neq \bot$ and $(id,cid)$ is not marked as registered, execute $\text{Register}(P,id,cid)$ in round $\tau_0$. Then send (contract–close, $id$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + 3\Delta} F_{\text{ssc}}$ and wait.

\[
\text{Party } Q \text{ upon (contract–closing, } id) \xleftarrow{\tau_2 \leq \tau_0 + 4\Delta} F_{\text{ssc}}
\]

2. Let $\gamma^Q := \Gamma^Q(id)$. For each $cid \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $(id,cid)$ is not marked as registered in $\Gamma^Q$ and $\gamma^Q.cspace(cid) \neq \bot$, call $\text{Register}(Q,id,cid)$ in round $\tau_2$

Rest of the protocol for $T = P,Q$ (respectively):

3. If (contract–closed, $id$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_3 \leq \tau_0 + 8\Delta} F_{\text{ssc}}$, then set $\Gamma^T(id) := \bot$ and output (closed, $id$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_4} \gamma.Z$.

---

**Functionality $F_{\text{ssc}}^{\mathcal{L}(\Delta)}(\mathcal{C})$: Close a ledger state channel**

We use the abbreviated notation from Section 4.3.

**Upon** (contract–close, $id$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_0} P$ let $\gamma := \Gamma(id)$ and proceed as follows:

1. Within $\Delta$ rounds send (contract–closing, $id$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + \Delta} \gamma.end\_users$.
2. Wait for at most $3\Delta$ rounds. If in round $\tau_2 \leq \tau_0 + 4\Delta$ there exists $cid \in \{0,1\}^*$ such that $\gamma.cspace(cid) \neq \bot$ but the contract instance is not terminated, i.e. $\sigma_{cid}.\text{cash}(A) + \sigma_{cid}.\text{cash}(B) \neq 0$, where $\sigma_{cid} := \gamma.cspace(cid).\text{storage}$, then stop.
3. Else wait for at most $\Delta$ rounds to add $\gamma.\text{cash}(A)$ coins to $A$’s account and $\gamma.\text{cash}(B)$ coins to $B$’s account on the ledger and set $\Gamma(id) = \bot$. Then send (contract–closed, $id$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_3 \leq \tau_0 + 5\Delta} \gamma.end\_users$.

We can now state the theorem showing that our construction for ledger state channels emulates the ideal functionality $F_{\text{ch}}^{\mathcal{L}(\Delta)}(1,C)$ from Section 5. The proof is given in the Appx. C.

**Theorem 1.** Let $\mathcal{E}_{\text{res}}$ be the class of restricted environments defined in Appx. B. The protocol $\Pi(1,C)$ working in $F_{\text{ssc}}^{\mathcal{L}(\Delta)}(\mathcal{C})$-hybrid model emulates the ideal functionality $F_{\text{ch}}^{\mathcal{L}(\Delta)}(1,C)$ against environments from class $\mathcal{E}_{\text{res}}$ for every set of contract types $C$ and every $\Delta \in \mathbb{N}$.

### 7 Virtual State Channel Contract

We now define a concrete contract type whose instances can be used to create virtual state channels $\gamma$. We call this contract type a virtual state channel contract and denote it $\text{VSCC}_i(C)$, where the parameter $i > 1$ is the length of $\gamma$ and the parameter $C$ is a set of contract types that can be constructed in $\gamma$. Consider three parties: Alice, Bob, and Ingrid, and suppose that Alice and Ingrid have opened a state channel $\alpha$, and Bob and Ingrid have created a state channel $\beta$. During the creation of the virtual state channel $\gamma$ between Alice and Bob, the parties Alice and Ingrid agree on updating $\alpha$ such that it contains the contract instance $(\sigma_{A},\text{VSCC}_i(C))$. Here, $\sigma_{A}$ denotes the initial contract storage created by calling $\text{Init}_{i}^\gamma$, the constructor of $\text{VSCC}_i(C)$, on input tuple $(\text{Alice},\tau,\gamma)$. On a very informal level, one may think of the contract storage $\sigma_{A} := \text{Init}_{i}^\gamma(\text{Alice},\tau,\gamma)$ as being a “copy” of the virtual state channel description $\gamma$, where Ingrid plays the role of Bob. This “copy” of the virtual state channel $\gamma$ will be stored in $\alpha.cspace$ under the identifier $cid_{A} := \text{Alice}|\tau.id$. Symmetrically, Ingrid and Bob agree on updating their state channel $\beta$ such that it contains the contract instance $(\sigma_{B},\text{VSCC}_i(C))$, where $\sigma_{B} := \text{Init}_{i}^\gamma(\text{Bob},\tau,\gamma)$ is the initial state representing $\gamma$. This “copy” of the virtual state channel $\gamma$ will be stored in $\beta.cspace$ under the identifier $cid_{B} := \text{Bob}|\gamma.id$.

The contract functions of $\text{VSCC}_i(C)$ are defined in such a way that they provide Ingrid with enough time to react on possible changes in $cid_{A}$ or $cid_{B}$ and to always keep both virtual state channel “copies” in the same state. Since Ingrid plays the role of Bob in contract $cid_{A}$, and the role of Alice in contract $cid_{B}$, in
order to prevent her from losing money, she has to react to events happening in one of the contracts and mimic them in the corresponding other contract. In some sense, for the users in \( \gamma \text{-end-users} \), the contracts referred to by \( cid_A \) and \( cid_B \) are now representing the contracts running on the ledger. They guarantee that as long as the parties \( \gamma \text{-end-users} \) behave honestly, they will never lose money.

Before we move to the formal description of our construction, we will now take a look at a simple example for the case when \( i = 3 \) (see Fig. 6). Suppose that each two consecutive parties \( P_1, \ldots, P_4 \) have ledger state channel with each other. If \( P_1 \) and \( P_3 \) want to create a virtual state channel using the underlying ledger state channels, they can proceed recursively as follows. First, \( P_1 \) and \( P_3 \) create a virtual state channel \( \gamma' \) of length 2 between each other, where \( P_2 \) takes the role of Ingrid. This is done by creating a contract instance from type \( \text{VSCC}_2(C \cup \text{VSCC}_3(C)) \) in the ledger state channel between \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \), resp. between \( P_2 \) and \( P_3 \). Let us take a closer look at the meaning of the contract type \( \text{VSCC}_2(C \cup \text{VSCC}_3(C)) \). Very informally, this contract type says that the virtual state channel is of length 2 (this is the reason for \( \text{VSCC}_2 \)), and that \( \gamma' \) can be used by its end-users to create contracts of type \( C \) and \( \text{VSCC}_3(C) \). The later are contracts that represent virtual state channels of length 3, which allows its end-users (of the length 3 virtual state channel) to open contracts from type \( C \). Next, parties \( P_1 \) and \( P_4 \) can open the virtual state channel of length 3, where party \( P_3 \) will take the role of Ingrid. To this end, \( P_1 \) and \( P_3 \) will use their previously created virtual state channel \( \gamma' \), and \( P_3 \) and \( P_4 \) will update their ledger state channel. The contract instance in these two state channels is from type \( \text{VSCC}_3(C) \).

Fig. 6: The contracts opened in state channels in order to create a virtual state channel of length 3 in which a contract \( C \in C \) was opened.

8 Virtual State Channels

We will now describe the protocol \( \Pi(i, C) \) that \( \mathcal{E}_{\text{res}} \)-realizes the ideal functionality \( F^{\mathcal{C}(\Delta)}_{\text{ch}}(i, C) \) for \( i > 1 \). The protocol is in the hybrid world with the hybrid ideal functionality which allows to create, update, execute and close state channels of lengths up to \( i - 1 \) in which contract instances of type from the set \( \text{VSCC}_i(C) \cup C \) can be constructed, i.e. the functionality \( F^{\mathcal{C}(\Delta)}_{\text{ch}}(i - 1, \text{VSCC}_i(C) \cup C) \).

The protocol consists of four subprotocols: Create a virtual state channel, Contract instance update, Contract instance execute and Close a virtual state channel. Similarly as for ledger state channels, we will additionally define a procedure \( \text{Register}_i(P, id, cid) \) that registers a contract instance in a virtual state channel of length \( i \) and can be called by parties of the protocol \( \Pi(i, C) \).

The protocol \( \Pi(i, C) \) has to handle messages about state channels of any length \( j \), where \( 1 \leq j \leq i \). If a party \( P \) of the protocol \( \Pi(i, C) \) is instructed by the environment to create, update, execute or close a state channel of length \( 1 \leq j < i \), the party forwards this message to the hybrid ideal functionality \( F^{\mathcal{C}(\Delta)}_{\text{ch}}(i - 1, \text{VSCC}_i(C) \cup C) \).\(^\text{11}\) Concretely, in case of create and close \( P \) acts as a dummy party and directly forwards the message without any modifications. In case of update and execute, for technical reasons the party adds a prefix “external” to the contract instance identifier. So for example, if the party \( P \) receives the message (execute, \( id, cid, f, z \)), where \( id \) refers to a state channel of length \( j < i \), the forwarded message is

\(^{11}\) Recall that we assume with our restrictions on the environment that the environment never lies to an honest party about the length of a virtual state channel, so this forwarding can be implemented in a trivial way.
(execute, id, external || cid, f, z). The purpose of the prefix is to ensure that the contract instance identifiers which are of the form Alice||id or Bob||id for id ∈ {0, 1}∗ are reserved for contract instances corresponding to the virtual state channel of length i with the identifier id. These contract instances can be updated or executed only by parties of the protocol II(i, C) creating, maintaining or closing the corresponding virtual state channel of length i.

From now on we will focus on the protocol II(i, C) in case of virtual state channels of length exactly i.

Create a virtual state channel. To create the virtual state channel γ of length i in which contract instances of type from set C can be constructed, the environment sends a message (create, γ) to all three parties γ.Alice, γ.Bob and γ.Ingrid in the same round τ0. The creation of γ then works at a high level as follows.

As already explained in Section 7, end-users of the virtual state channel, γ.Alice and γ.Bob, both need to construct a new contract instance of type VSCCγ(C) in the subchannels they each have with γ.Ingrid. Let us denote these state channels by α, β in the outline that follows below. To create these contract instances, party γ.Alice first locally computes the constructor Initγ(γ.Alice, τ, γ) to obtain the initial admissible contract storage of type VSCCγ(C). Recall that informally this contract storage can be viewed as a “copy” of the virtual state channel γ. Thereafter, she sends an update request of the state channel α to the hybrid ideal functionality Fch(i − 1, VSCCγ(C) ∪ C). At the same time, γ.Bob analogously requests the update of the state channel β. If γ.Ingrid receives update requests of both state channels α and β from the hybrid ideal functionality, she immediately confirms both of them. As already mentioned before, it is crucial for γ.Ingrid that either both contract instances are created (meaning both her state channels α and β are updated) or none of them. Only then she has a guarantee that if she loses coins in the subchannel α because of the virtual state channel γ, she can claim these coins back from the subchannel β.

To ensure that at the end of the protocol two honest users γ.Alice and γ.Bob can conclude whether the virtual state channel γ was successfully created, there is one additional technicality in our protocol. Notice that if γ.Alice would know whether γ.Ingrid is honest, once she receives a confirmation that her update request of α was successfully competed, she could conclude that the virtual state channel is created. However, γ.Alice does not have any information about the state channel between γ.Ingrid and γ.Bob, and, in particular, whether it was updated for creating γ. It might be the case that malicious γ.Ingrid did not confirm the update request of the state channel β which led γ.Bob to conclude that the virtual state channel γ was not created. To guarantee that when both γ.Alice and γ.Bob are honest they will agree on whether γ was opened, they exchange confirmation messages at the end of the protocol. Thus, if creation of a virtual state channel is successful, both end-users output (created, γ) to the environment after 3 rounds. Notice that internally when something during virtual state channel creation went wrong (e.g., Ingrid misbehaved) the parties may still run registration of contract instances in the subchannels. This is internally handled by the hybrid functionality and does not require the end-users of the virtual state channel to wait for in order to reach an agreement whether γ was created or not.

We emphasize that creating a virtual state channel runs in constant time – independent of the ledger processing time Δ and length of the virtual state channel. This is in contrast to the ledger state channels with require always 2Δ time for creation. Formal description of the protocol for ledger state channel creation and the corresponding part of the contract type VSCCγ(C) can be found below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocol II(i, C): Create a virtual state channel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We use the notation established in Section 4.3 and denote the hybrid functionality as Fch := Fch(i − 1, VSCCγ(C) ∪ C). In addition, let C := VSCCγ(C).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party T ∈ γ.end−users upon (create, γ) ↦ τ0 [\mathcal{Z} ]:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Compute $\hat{\sigma}_T := \text{Init}^c_T(T, \tau_0; \gamma)$ and send $(\text{update}, id_T, cid_T, \hat{\sigma}_T, \mathcal{C}) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} F_{ch}$, where $cid_T := T||\gamma.id$ and $id_T := \gamma.\text{subchan}(T)$.

   Party I upon $(\text{create}, \gamma) \leftarrow T Z.$

2. Compute $\hat{\sigma}_A := \text{Init}^c_T(\gamma, \text{Alice}, \tau_0, \gamma)$ and $\hat{\sigma}_B := \text{Init}^c_T(\gamma, \text{Bob}, \tau_0, \gamma)$. Let $id_A := \gamma.\text{subchan}(\gamma, \text{Alice})$, $id_B := \gamma.\text{subchan}(\gamma, \text{Bob})$ and $cid_A := \gamma.\text{Alice}\|\gamma.id$ and $cid_B := \gamma.\text{Bob}\|\gamma.id$.

3. If both messages $(\text{update}–\text{requested}, id_A, cid_A, \hat{\sigma}_A, \mathcal{C}) \xrightarrow{\tau_0+1} F_{ch}$ and $(\text{update}–\text{requested}, id_B, cid_B, \hat{\sigma}_B, \mathcal{C}) \xrightarrow{\tau_0+1} F_{ch}$ are received, then set $I^A(\gamma.id) := \gamma$ and send $(\text{update}–\text{reply}, ok, id_A, cid_A) \xrightarrow{\tau_0+1} F_{ch}$ and $(\text{update}–\text{reply}, ok, id_B, cid_B) \xrightarrow{\tau_0+1} F_{ch}$ and wait till time $\gamma.\text{validity}$. Else stop.

   Back to $T \in \gamma.\text{end-users}$

4. If $(\text{updated}, id_T, cid_T) \xrightarrow{\tau_0+2} F_{ch}$, then send $(\text{create}–\text{ok}, \gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0+2} \gamma.\text{other-party}(T)$. If $(\text{create}–\text{ok}, \gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0+3} \gamma.\text{other-party}(T)$, then set $I^T(\gamma.id) := \gamma$ and output $(\text{created}, \gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0+3} Z$.

5. Wait till time $\gamma.\text{validity}$.

### Contract VSCC$_c$(C): constructor $\text{Init}^c_T(P, \tau, \gamma)$

If $P \notin \gamma.\text{end-users}$ or $\gamma.\text{cash}(\gamma, \text{Alice}) < 0$ or $\gamma.\text{cash}(\gamma, \text{Bob}) < 0$ or $\gamma.\text{cspace}(cid) \neq \bot$ for some $cid \in \{0, 1\}^*$ or $\gamma.\text{validity} < \tau + 3$, then output $\bot$. Else output the attribute tuple $\sigma$ defined as follows:

\[
(\sigma.\text{user}_L, \sigma.\text{user}_R) := \begin{cases} 
(\gamma, \text{Alice}, \gamma, \text{Ingrid}), & \text{if } P = \gamma, \text{Alice}, \\
(\gamma, \text{Ingrid}, \gamma, \text{Bob}), & \text{if } P = \gamma, \text{Bob}, \\
& \sigma.\text{locked} := \gamma.\text{cash}(\gamma, \text{Alice}) + \gamma.\text{cash}(\gamma, \text{Bob}), \\
& (\sigma.\text{cash}(\sigma.\text{user}_L), \sigma.\text{cash}(\sigma.\text{user}_R)) := (\gamma.\text{cash}(\gamma, \text{Alice}), \gamma.\text{cash}(\gamma, \text{Bob})), \\
& \sigma.\text{virtual-channel} := \gamma, \\
& \sigma.\text{cspace}(cid) := \bot, \text{ for all } cid \in \{0, 1\}^*, \\
& (\sigma.\text{aux}_R, \sigma.\text{aux}_E) := (\emptyset, \emptyset).
\]

**Resister a contract instance in a virtual state channel.** Similarly to the procedure Register defined for ledger state channels, the subprotocol Register is called with parameters $(P, id, cid)$ the first time end-users of a virtual state channel $\gamma$ with identifier $id$ disagree on a contract instance $\nu := \gamma.\text{cspace}(cid)$. Intuitively, we need the intermediate party $\gamma.\text{Ingrid}$ to play the role of the ledger and resolve the dispute between $\gamma.\text{Alice}$ and $\gamma.\text{Bob}$. If the intermediary would be trusted, then both end-users could simply send their latest contract instance version to $\gamma.\text{Ingrid}$, who would then decide whose contract instance version is the latest valid one. Unfortunately, the situation is more complicated since $\gamma.\text{Ingrid}$ is not a trusted party. She might, for example, stop communicating or collude with one of the end-users. This is the point where the contract instances of type $VSCC_c(C)$ created in the underlying subchannels during the virtual state channel creation play an important role. Parties instead of sending versions of $\nu$ directly to each other send them indirectly by executing the contract instances in their subchannels with $\gamma.\text{Ingrid}$ on the contract function $\text{RegisterInstance}^c_T$. Since this execution of the contract instance in the subchannel cannot be stopped (i.e., in the worst case it may involve the ledger which will resolve the conflict), this guarantees that the end-users eventually can settle the latest state on which they both have agreed on.

Let us now take a closer look at how this is achieved by $VSCC_c(C)$. Let $cid_A := \gamma.\text{Alice}\|\gamma.id$ be the contract instance of type $VSCC_c^c$ stored in the state channel $\alpha := \gamma.\text{subchan}(\gamma, \text{Alice})$ and $cid_B := \gamma.\text{Bob}\|\gamma.id$ the contract instance of type $VSCC_c^c$ stored in the state channel $\beta := \gamma.\text{subchan}(\gamma, \text{Bob})$. The initiating party (assume for now that it is $\gamma.\text{Alice}$) first executes $cid_A$ on the function $\text{RegisterInstance}^c_T$ with input parameters
(cid, νA), where νA is γ.Alice's current off-chain contract instance version. Notice that this execution is in a state channel of length strictly less than i and hence will be handled by the trusted hybrid ideal functionality \( F_{ch} := F_{ch}^{L(\Delta)}(i - 1, VSCC_i(C) \cup C) \).

The contract function \( \text{RegisterInstance}_i^C \) is defined in such a way that it first verifies the validity of γ.Alice's contract instance version (it, for example, verifies the signatures, admissibility of the storage with respect to the type of the contract instance, if the amount of coins locked in the contract instance is not negative etc.). If all these checks pass, it stores νA together with a time-stamp in the auxiliary attribute auxB. Then, it outputs γ.Alice's contract instance version νA and the identifier cid in the output message. The intermediary γ.Ingrid upon receiving information about the execution of cidA can now symmetrically execute cidB with inputs (cid, νA) via the ideal functionality \( F_{ch} \). Once γ.Bob is notified about the execution of cidB, he immediately reacts by executing cidB again on the contract function \( \text{RegisterInstance}_i^C \) but with input parameters (cid, νB), where νB is Bob's contract instance version. If γ.Bob's version of the contract instance with identifier cid is valid as well, the contract function \( \text{RegisterInstance}_i^C \) compares γ.Bob's and γ.Alice's versions and stores the one with higher version number in the attribute cspace(cid). It outputs the registered version and the identifier cid in the output message. In case γ.Bob's version was registered, γ.Ingrid can complete the registration procedure by symmetrically executing cidA on input (cid, νB). In case γ.Alice's version was registered, then γ.Ingrid only needs to confirm that γ.Alice's version of cid should be registered. She does so by executing cidA on function \( \text{EndRegisterInstance}_i^C \) on the input parameter cid.

In case γ.Bob is corrupt and does not submit a valid contract instance version in time, γ.Ingrid can finalize the registration procedure by executing both cidA and cidB on function \( \text{EndRegisterInstance}_i^C \) on the input parameter cid. Similarly, if γ.Ingrid is corrupt and stops communicating, γ.Alice can after certain time finalize the registration by executing cidA on function \( \text{EndRegisterInstance}_i^C \) with the input parameter cid. The registration procedure of a virtual state channel of length i can take up to

\[
\text{TimeRegister}(i) := 5 \cdot \text{TimeExecute}([i/2])
\]  

rounds (this corresponds to the pessimistic case when γ.Alice has to finalize the registration).

Before we give the full description of the registration protocol and the corresponding contract parts of VSCC_i(C), let us explain here the reason why we restrict the number of contract instances in a virtual state channel (although the syntax as defined in Section 4.2 supports infinitely many contract instances as in the ledger state channel).

Assume the following scenario. Alice and Bob open a virtual state channel on top of two ledger state channels which they each have with Ingrid and thereafter they create (off-line) a large amount of contract instances in this virtual state channel. At some point Alice starts registering all the contract instances by executing the subchannel she has with Ingrid. According to the protocol, Ingrid has to symmetrically execute the subchannel she has with Bob otherwise she might lose money. If Bob is corrupt and does not react on peaceful execution requests, Ingrid has to execute all the requests forcefully on the blockchain. While in our theoretical model this is not an issue, in practice, this step would be very expensive for Ingrid due to the large amount of fees Ingrid would have to pay to the miners in common cryptocurrencies such as the Ethereum network.

Thus, if Ingrid has no control on the amount of contract instances that Alice and Bob can create, the two parties can force Ingrid to pay arbitrary amount of money in fees. Therefore, we restrict the number of contract instance that Alice and Bob can open in a virtual state channel and hence give Ingrid the ability to estimate the costs in fees that might result from the virtual state channel (recall that Ingrid had to agree with the virtual state channel creation; in particular, with the channel length and the contract types that can be open in the virtual state channel).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedure ( \text{Register}_i(P, id, cid) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We use the notation from Section 4.3 and denote ( F_{ch} := F_{ch}^{L(\Delta)}(i - 1, VSCC_i(C) \cup C) ) and ( \text{TE}_{sub} := \text{TimeExecute}([i/2]) ).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Let \( \nu^P := \Gamma^P(id), \nu^P := \gamma^P.cspace(cid), id_P := \gamma^P.subchan(P), cid_P := P||id \) and let \( \tau_0^P \) be the current round. Then send \((execute, id_P, cid_P, \text{RegisterInstance}_P, (cid, \nu^P)) \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_ch \) and goto step 7.

**Party I:**

2. Upon \((execute, id_P, cid_P, \sigma_P, L_P, R_P, m_P) \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_ch\), where \( m_P \) = \((instance-registering, cid, \nu^P)\) proceed as follows. Set \( \gamma^I := \sigma_P.virtual-channel, \ P := \gamma^I.end-users \cap \{\sigma_P.users_L, \sigma_P.users_R\}, Q := \gamma^I.\text{other-party}(P), id_Q := \gamma^I.subchan(Q) \) and \( cid_Q := Q||id^I.id \). Then send \((execute, id_Q, cid_Q, \text{RegisterInstance}_Q, (cid, \nu^P)) \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_ch \) and goto step 5.

3. Upon \((execute, id_Q, cid_Q, \sigma_Q, L_Q, R_Q, m_Q) \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_ch\), where \( m_Q \) = \((instance-registering, cid, \nu^P)\), proceed as follows. Parse \( Q||id := cid_Q \), set \( \eta^Q := \Gamma^Q(id), \nu^Q := \gamma^Q.cspace(cid) \) and then send \((execute, id_Q, cid_Q, \text{RegisterInstance}_Q, (cid, \nu^Q)) \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_ch\).

4. Upon \((execute, id_Q, cid_Q, \sigma_Q, L_Q, R_Q, m_Q) \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_ch\), where \( m := (instance-registered, cid, \nu) \), set \( \Gamma^Q := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma^Q, id, cid, \nu) \).

5. If you receive \((execute, id_Q, cid_Q, \sigma_Q, L_Q, R_Q, m_Q) \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_ch\), where \( m_Q \) = \((instance-registered, cid, \nu)\), then send \((execute, id_P, cid_P, \text{EndRegisterInstance}_P, (cid, \nu)) \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_ch\).

6. Else send messages \((execute, id_P, cid_P, \text{EndRegisterInstance}_P, (cid)) \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_ch \) and \((execute, id_Q, cid_Q, \text{EndRegisterInstance}_Q, (cid)) \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_ch\).

7. If not \((execute, id_P, cid_P, \sigma_P, L_P, R_P, m_P) \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_ch\), where \( m_P := (instance-registered, cid, \nu) \), then send \((execute, id_P, cid_P, \text{EndRegisterInstance}_P, (cid)) \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_ch\).

8. Upon \((execute, id_P, cid_P, \sigma_P, L_P, R_P, m_P) \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_ch\), where \( m_P := (instance-registered, cid, \nu) \), then set \( \Gamma^P := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma^F, id, cid, \nu) \).

**Contract VSCE(C)**

Let \( \gamma := \sigma.virtual-channel, id := \gamma.id, A := \gamma.Alice, B := \gamma.Bob, I := \gamma.Ingrid \). Let \( C := \nu.type, \sigma_n := \nu_n.storage, v := \nu_n.version, s_A := \nu_n.sign(A), s_B := \nu_n.sign(B) \) and \( \text{TE}_{\text{sub}} := \text{TimeExecute}([i/2]) \). Let \( P \notin \{\sigma._users_L, \sigma._users_R\} \), then output \((\sigma, 0, 0, \perp)\).

1. If \( Vfy_{pk_A}(id, cid, \sigma_n, C, v; s_A) \neq 1 \) or \( Vfy_{pk_B}(id, cid, \sigma_n, C, v; s_B) \neq 1 \) or \( \{\sigma_n._users_L, \sigma_n._users_R\} \neq \{A, B\} \) or \( C \notin \{A, B\} \) or \( \sigma_n \notin C.A \) or there exists \( cid' \in \{0, 1\}^* \) such that \( \sigma.cspace(cid') \neq \perp \), then output \((\sigma, 0, 0, \perp)\).

2. Else define \( \sigma := \sigma \) and consider the following cases:
- If there is no tuple \((Q, \tau^Q; cid, \nu^Q_n)\) in \(\sigma.aux_R\), i.e. none of the parties has registered the contract instance with identifier \(cid\), and

\[
\tau \leq \begin{cases} 
\gamma.\text{validity} & \text{if } P \in \{A, B\}, \\
\gamma.\text{validity} + \text{TE}_{sub} & \text{if } P = I,
\end{cases}
\]

then add \((P, \tau; cid, \nu_n)\) to \(\delta.aux_R\) and output \((\delta, 0, 0, m)\), where \(m := (\text{instance}-\text{registering}, cid, \nu_n)\).

- If there is \((Q, \tau^Q; cid, \nu^Q_n)\) in \(\sigma.aux_R\), where \(Q \neq P\), and

\[
0 < \tau - \tau^Q \leq \begin{cases} 
\text{TE}_{sub}, & \text{if } P \in \{A, B\}, \\
3 \cdot \text{TE}_{sub}, & \text{if } P = I,
\end{cases}
\]

then set \(\tilde{\nu}_n := \nu_n\) if \(v \geq \nu^Q_n.\text{version}\) and otherwise let \(\tilde{\nu}_n := \nu^Q_n\). Then make the following changes: set \(\tilde{\sigma}.\text{cspace}(cid) := (\tilde{\nu}_n.\text{storage}, \tilde{\nu}_n.\text{type})\) and modify the cash attributes accordingly (for example, assuming that \(\sigma.\text{user}_L = \sigma_n.\text{user}_L\) and denoting the registered instance \(\tilde{\sigma}_n := \tilde{\sigma}.\text{cspace}(cid).\text{storage}\), the value \(\tilde{\sigma}.\text{cash}(\tilde{\sigma}_n.\text{user}_L)\) will be set to the value of \(\sigma.\text{cash}(\sigma_n.\text{user}_L) - \tilde{\sigma}_n.\text{cash}(\sigma_n.\text{user}_L)\)). Finally, delete \((Q, \tau^Q; cid, \nu^Q_n)\) from \(\tilde{\sigma}.aux_R\) and output \((\delta, 0, 0, m)\), where \(m := (\text{instance}-\text{registered}, cid, \tilde{\nu}_n)\).

---

**Function** \(\text{EndRegisterInstance}^C(\sigma, P, \tau; cid)\)

Let \(\gamma := \sigma.\text{virtual-channel}\), \(I := \gamma.\text{Ingrid}\), \(\text{TR}_i := \text{TimeRegister}(i)\) and \(\text{TE}_{sub} := \text{TimeExecute}([i/2])\)

1. If \(P \notin \{\sigma.\text{user}_L, \sigma.\text{user}_R\}\) or \(\tau > \gamma.\text{validity} + \text{TR}_i\), then output \((\sigma, 0, 0, \bot)\).
2. If for every \(cid' \in \{0, 1\}^*\) it holds that \(\sigma.\text{cspace}(cid') = \bot\) and there is \((Q, \tau^Q; cid, \nu^Q_n)\) in \(\sigma.aux_R\), such that either \(P \neq Q\) or \(P = Q\) and

\[
\tau - \tau^Q > \begin{cases} 
4 \cdot \text{TE}_{sub}, & \text{if } P \in \{A, B\}, \\
2 \cdot \text{TE}_{sub}, & \text{if } P = I,
\end{cases}
\]

then let \(\tilde{\sigma} := \sigma\) and make the following changes. Delete \((Q, \tau^Q; cid, \nu^Q_n)\) from \(\tilde{\sigma}.aux_R\) and set \(\tilde{\sigma}.\text{cspace}(cid) := (\nu^Q_n.\text{storage}, \nu^Q_n.\text{type})\). Thereafter modify the attribute \(\tilde{\sigma}.\text{cash}\) accordingly and output \((\sigma, 0, 0, m)\), where \(m := (\text{instance}-\text{registered}, cid, \nu^Q_n)\).
3. Else output \((\sigma, 0, 0, \bot)\).

**Update a contract instance in a virtual state channel.** As long as both end-users of a virtual state channel are honest, they can update a contract instance exactly the same way as if it would be a ledger state channel. That means that parties exchange signatures on the new contract instance version (see Section 6.2 for more details). The differences between update of a ledger state channel and a virtual state channel appears only when end-users of the state channel run into dispute, i.e., when the parties run the contract instance registration procedure, which was defined above. The pessimistic time complexity of updating a virtual state channel of length \(i\) is equal to \(\text{TimeRegister}(i) + 2\).

**Execute a contract instance in a virtual state channel.** In order to execute a contract instance in a virtual state channel, the environment sends a message \((\text{execute}, id, cid, f, z)\) to one of the end-users of the virtual state channel. Let us assume for now that this party is \(\gamma.\text{Alice}\). The party \(\gamma.\text{Alice}\) first tries to execute the contract instance “peacefully”, exactly as if \(\gamma\) would be a ledger state channel (see Section 6.2 in the “Execute a contract instance” protocol). In case the peaceful execution fails, \(\gamma.\text{Alice}\) registers the contract instance by calling the subprocedure \(\text{Register}_i(\gamma.\text{Alice}, id, cid)\). Next, \(\gamma.\text{Alice}\) has to execute the contract
instance “forcefully” via the intermediary of the virtual state channel; $\gamma.$Ingrid. Since the intermediary is not trusted, execution must be performed by executing the contract instances of type $\text{VSCC}_i(C)$ stored in the underlying subchannels via the hybrid ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{ch}$ (recall that the contract instance in the subchannel $\alpha$ between $\gamma.$Alice and $\gamma.$Ingrid is stored under the identifier $cid_A := \gamma.$Alice$|$y$|id$ and the contract instance in the state channel $\beta$ between $\gamma.$Bob and $\gamma.$Ingrid is stored under the identifier $cid_B := \gamma.$Bob$|$y$|id$).

The first attempt would be to let $\gamma.$Alice execute $cid_A$ on the function $\text{ExecuteInstance} \gamma.$ with parameters $\text{param} = (cid, \gamma.$Alice, $\tau, f, z, s_A)$, where $\tau$ is the round in which $\gamma.$Alice received the message from the environment and $s_A$ is $\gamma.$Alice’s signature on the tuple $(cid, \gamma.$Alice, $\tau, f, z)$. The contract function $\text{ExecuteInstance} \gamma.$ would be defined such that it verifies $\gamma.$Alice’s signature and then internally executes the contract instance with identifier $cid$. After successful execution of $cid_A$, $\gamma.$Ingrid would symmetrically execute $cid_B$ on the same contract function $\text{ExecuteInstance} \gamma.$ and the same input parameters $\text{param} = (cid, \gamma.$Alice, $\tau, f, z, s_A)$. The entire process of force execution would then take $5 + \text{TimeRegister}(i) + 2 \cdot \text{TimeExecute}([i/2])$.

Let us explain with the following example why this straightforward solution does not work, which is due to losing money. $\gamma.$Ingrid wants to forcefully execute the contract instance with identifier $cid$ in round $\tau' = \tau + 1$ on different inputs. This means that before $\gamma.$Ingrid has time to execute $cid_B$ on $\gamma.$Alice’s request, $\gamma.$Bob executes $cid_B$ on the function $\text{ExecuteInstance} \gamma.$ with his own parameters $\text{param}' = (cid, B, \tau', f', z', s_B)$. Consequently, the order of internal execution of the contract instance $cid$ is different in $cid_A$ and $cid_B$. Depending on the contract type of $cid$, this asymmetry may lead to $\gamma.$Ingrid losing money.

To overcome this difficulty, we define the contract function $\text{ExecuteInstance} \gamma.$ in such a way that when it is executed by $\gamma.$Bob on some parameters $\text{param}'$, the request is stored in the attribute $\text{aux}_F$ but the internal execution of the contract instance $cid$ is not performed yet. The function outputs details of the request in its output message. In other words, execution of the contract instance $cid_B$ on the function $\text{ExecuteInstance} \gamma.$ with $\text{param}' = (cid, \gamma.$Bob, $\tau', f, z, s_A)$ only informs $\gamma.$Ingrid about $\gamma.$Bob’s intention to internally execute the contract instance $cid$ and gives her time to execute potential $\text{ExecuteInstance}$ requests with the same $cid$ which were made earlier by $\gamma.$Alice. Once $\gamma.$Ingrid successfully executes $\gamma.$Bob’s request in $cid_A$, she can finalize the execution of $cid_B$ via the function $\text{EndExecuteInstance}$. It works analogously for the contract instance $cid_A$ in the state channel between $\gamma.$Alice and $\gamma.$Ingrid. If $\gamma.$Bob’s execution request was not finalized by $\gamma.$Ingrid, the contract instance execution protocol of a virtual state channel of length $i$ can take up to $\text{TimeExecute}(i) := 2 \cdot (5 + \text{TimeRegister}(i) + 2 \cdot \text{TimeExecute}([i/2]))$ rounds. Using the Equation (1) we obtain

$$\text{TimeExecute}(i) := 10 + 14 \cdot \text{TimeExecute}([i/2]).$$ (2)

The previous description omits many technicalities and we refer the reader for further details to the full specification below.

**Protocol II($i, C$): Contract instance execution**

We use the notation established in Section 4.3 and denote $\mathcal{F}_{ch} := \mathcal{F}_{ch}^{L(\Delta)}(i-1, \text{VSCC}_i(C) \cup C)$. In addition, let $\text{TE}_{sub} := \text{TimeExecute}([i/2])$ and $\text{TR}_i := \text{TimeRegister}(i)$.

| Party $P$ upon (execute, id, cid, f, z) $\xleftarrow{z_0} Z$ |
| 1. Let $\gamma^P := \Gamma^P(id), \nu^P := \gamma^P$.csp$cid$, $\sigma^P := \nu^P$.storage, $C^P := \nu^P$.type, $\nu^P := \nu^P$.version. |
| 2. Set $\tau_1 := \tau_0 + 1$, where $x$ is the smallest offset such that $\tau_1 = 1 \mod 4$ if $P = \gamma^P$.Alice and $\tau_1 = 3 \mod 4$ if $P = \gamma^P$.Bob. Wait till round $\tau_1$. |
| 3. If $(id, cid)$ is not marked as corrupt in $\Gamma^P$, then compute $(\bar{\sigma}, \text{add}_L, \text{add}_R, m) := f(\sigma^P, P, \tau_0, z)$. If $m = \perp$, then stop. Otherwise compute $s_P := \text{Sign}_{sk_P}(id, cid, \bar{\sigma}, C^P, \nu^P + 1)$, send (peaceful- request, id, cid, f, z, $s_P, \tau_0$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_1} Q$ and goto step 10. |
4. If \((id, cid)\) is marked as corrupt, proceed as follows. If \((id, cid)\) not marked as registered, then run \texttt{Register}(P, id, cid). Goto step 11.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Party }Q \text{ upon (peaceful- } \text{request, } id, cid, f, z, sp, \tau_0) \xleftarrow{\tau_0} P
\end{center}

5. Let \(\gamma^Q := \Gamma^Q(id), \nu^Q := \gamma^Q.cspace(cid), \sigma^Q := \nu^Q.storage, C^Q := \nu^Q.type, \nu^Q := \nu^Q.version\). If \(\gamma^Q = \bot\) or \(P, Q \notin \gamma^Q.end-users\) or \(\nu^Q = \bot\), then goto step 9.

6. If \(P = \gamma^Q.Alice\) and \(\tau_Q \equiv 4 \neq 2\) or if \(P = \gamma^Q.Bob\) and \(\tau_Q \equiv 4 \neq 0\), then goto step 9.

7. If \(\tau_0 \notin [\tau_Q - 4, \tau_Q - 1]\), then goto step 9.

8. If \((id, cid)\) is not marked as corrupt in \(\Gamma^Q\), do:
   (a) Compute \((\tilde{\sigma}, addL, addR, m) := f(\sigma^Q, P, \tau_0, z)\).
   (b) If \(m = 1\) or \(\forall y_{pk_p}(id, \tilde{\sigma}, C^Q, \nu^Q + 1; sp) \neq 1\), then goto step 9.
   (c) Else sign \(s_Q := \texttt{Sign}_{sk_Q}(id, \tilde{\sigma}, C^Q, \nu^Q + 1)\), send \((\text{peaceful- } \text{confirm, } id, cid, f, z, s_Q) \xleftarrow{\tau_0} P\), set \(\Gamma^Q := \texttt{LocalUpdateAdd}(\Gamma^Q, id, cid, \tilde{\sigma}, C^Q, addL, addR, \nu^Q + 1, \{s, s_Q\})\), output \((\text{executed, } id, cid, \tilde{\sigma}, addL, addR, m) \xleftarrow{\tau_0+1} \tau\) and stop.

9. Mark \((id, cid)\) as corrupt in \(\Gamma^Q\). Then goto step 14.

\textbf{Back to party }P\]

10. Distinguish the following two cases:
   - If \((\text{peaceful- } \text{confirm, } id, cid, f, z, s_Q) \xrightarrow{\tau = \tau_1 + \tau_2} Q\) such that \(\forall y_{pk_p}(id, cid, \tilde{\sigma}, C^Q, \nu^Q + 1; sp) = 1\), then set \(F^P := \texttt{LocalUpdateAdd}(F^P, id, cid, \tilde{\sigma}, C^Q, addL, addR, \nu^Q + 1, \{s, s_Q\})\), output \((\text{executed, id, cid, } \tilde{\sigma}, addL, addR, m) \xrightarrow{\tau} \tau\) and stop.
   - Else mark \((id, cid)\) as corrupt in \(F^P\) and execute the \texttt{Register}(P, id, cid). Once the procedure is executed (in round \(\tau_3 \leq \tau_1 + TR_3 + 2\)), distinguish the following two cases:
     • If \(\sigma^P = \tilde{\sigma}\), then output \((\text{executed, id, cid, } \tilde{\sigma}, addL, addR, m) \xrightarrow{\tau} \tau\) and stop.
     • Else goto step 11.

11. Let \(\tau_4\) be the current round, \(id_P := \gamma^P.\text{subchan}(P), cid_P := P || id, s_n := \texttt{Sign}_{sk_P}(cid, P, \tau_0, f, z)\) and \(p_n := (P, \tau_0, f, z, s_n)\). Then send \((\text{execute, id}_P, cid_P, \texttt{ExecuteInstance}_c, (cid, p_n)) \xrightarrow{\tau} F_{ch}\).

\textbf{Party }I:

12. Upon receiving \((\text{execute, id}_P, cid_P, \sigma_P, L_P, R_P, m_P) \xrightarrow{\tau} F_{ch}\), where \(m_P = (\text{instance-executing, } cid, p_n, m)\), proceed as follows. Define \(\gamma^I := \sigma_P.\text{virtual-channel, } P := \gamma^I.\text{end-users } \cap \{\sigma_P.\text{user}_L, \sigma_P.\text{user}_R\}, Q := \gamma^I.\text{other-party}(P), id_Q := \gamma^I.\text{subchan}(Q)\) and \(cid_Q := Q || \gamma^I.id\).

13. Send \((\text{execute, id}_Q, cid_Q, \texttt{ExecuteInstance}_c, (cid, p_n)) \xrightarrow{\tau} F_{ch}\).

\textbf{Party }Q:\]

14. Upon receiving \((\text{execute, id}_Q, cid_Q, \sigma_Q, L_Q, R_Q, M_Q) \xrightarrow{\tau} F_{ch}\), where the message \(M_Q\) contains \((\text{instance-executed, } cid, \tilde{\sigma}_n, p_n, addL, addR, m_n)\), then parse \(Q || id := cid_Q\), output \((\text{executed, id, } cid, \tilde{\sigma}_n, addL, addR, m_n) \xrightarrow{\tau} \tau\) and stop.

\textbf{Back to party }I:
15. Upon receiving (executed, id_Q, cid_Q, σ_Q, L_Q, R_Q, M_Q) \( \leftarrow F_{ch} \), where the message \( M_Q \) contains (instance-executed, \( cid, \tilde{σ}, p_n, add_L, add_R, m_n \)), send the message (execute, id_p, cid_p, End ExecuteInstance\( ^C \), (cid, p_n)) \( \leftarrow F_{ch} \).

16. Let \( τ_6 := τ_1 + 4 + TR_i + 2 \cdot TE_{sub} \). If you receive (executed, id_p, cid_p, \( \tilde{σ}, \tilde{L}, \tilde{R}, M_p \)) \( \leftarrow F_{ch} \), where \( M_p \) contains (instance-executed, \( cid, \tilde{σ}, p_n, add_L, add_R, m_n \)), output (executed, id, cid, \( \tilde{σ}, add_L, add_R, m_n \)) \( \rightarrow Z \), set \( Γ^P := LocalUpdateAdd(Γ^P, id, cid, \tilde{σ}, M_p, add_L, add_R) \) and stop.

17. Else send (execute, id_p, cid_p, EndExecuteInstance\( ^C \), (cid, p_n)) \( \rightarrow F_{ch} \) and when you receive the message (executed, id_p, cid_p, \( \tilde{σ}, \tilde{L}, \tilde{R}, M_p \)) \( \leftarrow F_{ch} \), where \( M_p \) contains (instance-executed, \( cid, \tilde{σ}, p_n, add_L, add_R, m_n \)), then output (executed, id, cid, \( \tilde{σ}, add_L, add_R, m_n \)) \( \rightarrow Z \), set \( Γ^P := LocalUpdateAdd(Γ^P, id, cid, \tilde{σ}, M_p, add_L, add_R) \) and stop.

We will now define the contract functions ExecuteInstance\( ^C \) and EndExecuteInstance\( ^C \) of the contract type VSCC\( ^C \). Both of these functions have to internally execute contract functions. Not to repeat the same code several times, we separately define an auxiliary procedure Evaluate.

### Contract VSCC\( ^C \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>Evaluate(σ, cid, P_n, τ_n, f_n, z_n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Let ( γ := σ.virtual-channel ), ( I := γ.Ingrid ), ( ν := σ.cspace(cid) ), ( σ_n := ν.storage ) and ( P := γ.end-users \cap {σ.user_L, σ.user_R} )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Compute ( (\tilde{σ}, add_L, add_R, m_n) = f_n(σ_n, P_n, τ_n, z_n) )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. If ( m_n = ⊥ ), then output ((σ, 0, 0, ⊥)).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Otherwise let ( \hat{σ} := σ ) and make the following changes:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Set ( \hat{σ}.cspace(cid) := (\tilde{σ}, ν.type) )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) If ( P = σ_n.user_L ), then ( \hat{σ}.cash(P) := σ.cash(P) + add_L ) and ( \hat{σ}.cash(I) := σ.cash(I) + add_R ).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) If ( P = σ_n.user_R ), then ( \hat{σ}.cash(P) := σ.cash(P) + add_R ) and ( \hat{σ}.cash(I) := σ.cash(I) + add_L ).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Output ((\hat{σ}, add_L, add_R, m_n)).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>ExecuteInstance( ^C )(σ, P, τ, (cid, P_n, τ_n, f_n, z_n, s_n))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Let ( γ := σ.virtual-channel ), ( A := γ.Alice, B := γ.Bob ), ( I := γ.Ingrid ), ( ν := σ.cspace(cid) ) and ( σ_n := ν.storage ). In addition, let ( TE_{sub} := TimeExecute([i/2]) ) and ( TR_i := TimeRegister(i) ).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. If ( P \notin {σ.user_L, σ.user_R} ), then output ((σ, 0, 0, ⊥)).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. If ( ν = ⊥, P_n \notin {A, B} ), ( ∀f \in pk_p ) ((cid, P_n, τ_n, f_n, z_n; s_n) \neq 1 ) or ( f_n ) is not a contract function with respect to ( ν, C ), then output ((σ, 0, 0, ⊥)).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Distinguish the following two situations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (a) \( P \in \{A, B\} \)
| (i) If \( τ - τ_n > 5 + TR_i \) and \( P = P_n \), then output \((σ, 0, 0, ⊥)\). Else let \( \hat{σ} := σ \), add \((τ; cid, P_n, τ_n, f_n, z_n)\) to \( \hat{σ}.aux_E \) and output \((\hat{σ}, 0, 0, m)\) for \( m := \) (instance-executing, \( cid, P_n, τ_n, f_n, z_n, s_n \)). |
| (b) \( P = I \)
| (i) If \( τ - τ_n > 5 + TR_i + TE_{sub} \), then output \((σ, 0, 0, ⊥)\). |
| Else proceed as follows |
| (a) Let \( Q := \{A, B\} \cap \{σ.user_L, σ.user_R\} \) and \( \hat{σ}^{(0)} := σ \). |
| (b) Let \( E \subseteq σ.aux_E \) consisting of all tuples \((τ'; cid, Q_n, τ_n', f_n', z_n')\) \( \forall \tau_n' \leq τ_n \). |
(c) Let $|E| = \ell$ and $(e^{(1)}, \ldots, e^{(\ell)})$ be such that $e^{(k)} = (\tau^{(k)}, cid, Q_n, \tau^{(k)}_n, f^{(k)}_n, z^{(k)}_n) \in E$ for every $k \in [1, \ell]$ and $\tau^{(1)}_n \leq \cdots \leq \tau^{(\ell)}_n$.  
(d) For $k = 1$ to $\ell$

i. Compute $(\hat{\sigma}^{(k)}, add^{(k)}_L, add^{(k)}_R, m^{(k)}) := \text{Evaluate}(\hat{\sigma}^{(k-1)}, cid, Q_n, \tau^{(k)}_n, f^{(k)}_n, z^{(k)}_n)$.  
ii. Delete $e^{(k)}$ from $\hat{\sigma}^{(k)}$.aux$_E$.  
(c) Compute $(\hat{\sigma}, add_R, add_R, m) := \text{Evaluate}(\hat{\sigma}^{(\ell)}, cid, P_n, \tau_n, f_n, z_n)$.  
(f) Output $(\hat{\sigma}, 0, 0, M(|M^{(1)}|), \ldots, |M^{(\ell)}|)$, for $M := \text{instance-executed, } \hat{\sigma}$.cspace$(cid), p, add_1, add_R, m)$ for $p = (cid, P_n, \tau_n, f_n, z_n)$, and $M^{(k)} := \text{instance-executed, } \hat{\sigma}$.cspace$(cid), p^{(k)}, add_L^{(k)}$, add$_R^{(k)}$, m$_{(k)}$) for $p^{(k)} = (cid, Q_n, \tau_n^{(k)}, f_n^{(k)}, z_n^{(k)})$ for every $k \in [\ell]$.  

\begin{boxed_text}
\textbf{Function EndExecuteInstance}$_\ell^\gamma(\sigma, P, \tau, (cid, P_n, \tau_n, f_n, z_n))$

Let $\gamma := \sigma$.virtual-channel, $A := \gamma$.Alice, $B := \gamma$.Bob, $\nu := \text{cspace}(cid), \sigma := \nu$.storage, TE$_{\text{sub}} := \text{TimeExecute}(i/2)$ and TR$_i := \text{TimeRegister}(i)$.  
1. If $P \notin \{\sigma$.user$_L, \sigma$.user$_R\}$, then output $(\sigma, 0, 0, \bot)$.  
2. If there is no entry $(\tau^{(k)}, cid, P_n, \tau_n, f_n, z_n)$ in $\sigma$.aux$_E$, then output $(\sigma, 0, 0, \bot)$.  
3. If $P = P_n$ and $\tau - \tau^{(k)} < 5 + TR_i + 2 : \text{TE}_{\text{sub}}$, then output $(\sigma, 0, 0, \bot)$.  
4. Else compute $(\hat{\sigma}, add_1, add_R, m) := \text{Evaluate}(\sigma, cid, P_n, \tau_n, f_n, z_n)$, and output $(\hat{\sigma}, 0, 0, \text{instance-executed, } \hat{\sigma}$.cspace$(cid), p, add_L, add_R, m))$ for $p = (cid, P_n, \tau_n, f_n, z_n)$.  
\end{boxed_text}

Close a virtual state channel. Recall that in case of ledger state channels, the environment instructs one party to close the ledger state channel. The parties of the ledger state channel have some time to register all contract instances that were opened in the ledger state channel offline. If thereafter there is a contract instance in the ledger state channel which is not terminated (the amount of coins locked in the instance is greater than zero), then the ledger state channel is not closed.

The situation is different for virtual state channels. We require that the closing procedure of a virtual state channel $\gamma$ always starts in round $\gamma$.validity and always results in $\gamma$ being closed. In other words, both contract instances with type VSCC$_\ell^\gamma$ that were opened in the subchannels of $\gamma$ must be terminated (also in the case when the virtual state channel was not created). Let us now explain how the protocol “Close a virtual state channel” works.

In round $\gamma$.validity both end-users of the virtual state channel start registering the contract instance (if it has been created in the virtual state channel $\gamma$ but have never been registered before). This takes up to $\text{TimeRegister}(i)$ rounds. Afterwards, $\gamma$.Alice requests execution of the contract instance $cid_A := \gamma$.Alice$|\gamma$.id stored in the subchannel $id_A := \gamma$.subchan$(\gamma$.Alice), on the contact function $\text{Close}_\ell^\gamma$. Party $\gamma$.Bob behaves analogously. In case one of the end-users of the virtual state channels does not request the closure of the underlying contract instance, $\gamma$.Ingrid can request it herself after certain time has passed.

The contract function $\text{Close}_\ell^\gamma$ first checks if there is a registered but unterminated contract instance in the virtual state channel $\gamma$. The first idea would be to let $\text{Close}_\ell^\gamma$ ignore such contract instance. However, this would lead to the problem that the intermediary of the virtual state channel, $\gamma$.Ingrid, loses money (because some money may still be locked in the contract) without ever having the chance to react to virtual state channel closing. Instead, the contract function $\text{Close}_\ell^\gamma$ fairly distributes the locked coins to accounts of the users. For example, if user$_L$’s cash balance in the contract instance with identifier $cid$ is 3 and user$_R$’s balance is $-2$, then 1 coin is added to user$_L$’s account.

Next, the contract function verifies that the current value of the attribute cash is non-negative for both users and that the amount of coins that were originally invested into the virtual state channel is equal to the current amount of coins in the virtual state channel. If this is the case, $\text{Close}_\ell^\gamma$ unlocks for each user the amount of coins it holds in the channel contract. If one of the users have negative balance in the virtual state channel or the amount of invested coins is not equal to the current amount of coins, then any trading that happened between the end-users is reverted by $\text{Close}_\ell^\gamma$. This again guarantees that $\gamma$.Ingrid
cannot lose money when $\gamma.$Alice and $\gamma.$Bob are malicious. The time complexity of closing a virtual state channel of length $i$ can be computed as $T_V := \gamma.$validity, $TR_{sub} := \text{TimeRegister}(\lceil i/2 \rceil), TR_i := \text{TimeRegister}(i)$ and $TE_{sub} := \text{TimeExecute}(\lceil i/2 \rceil)$.

Before we provide the full specification of the protocol and the corresponding part of $\text{VSCC}_i(C)$, let us briefly explain one additional technicality. Recall that in case $\gamma.$Ingrid is corrupt, it can happen that the contract instances of type $\text{VSCC}_i(C)$ are opened in the subchannels of $\gamma$ although the virtual state channel $\gamma$ was not successfully created. This in particular means that the coins needed to create $\gamma$ are locked in the subchannels and can be unlocked only after round $\gamma.$validity by executing the contract function $\text{Close}_i^C$.

**Protocol $\Pi(i, C)$: Close a virtual state channel**

We use the notation established in Section 4.3 and denote $\mathcal{F}_{ch} := \mathcal{F}_{ch}^{\mathcal{C}(\Delta)}(i - 1, \text{VSCC}_i(C) \cup C)$. In addition, let $TV := \gamma.$validity, $TR_{sub} := \text{TimeRegister}(\lceil i/2 \rceil), TR_i := \text{TimeRegister}(i)$ and $TE_{sub} := \text{TimeExecute}(\lceil i/2 \rceil)$.

1. If $I_T(\gamma.id) = \bot$ and you received (updated, $id_T, cid_T$) $\xleftarrow{\leq \gamma_0 + 2 + TR_{sub}} \mathcal{F}_{ch}$, then goto step 3.
2. If $\gamma^T := I_T^T(\gamma.id) \neq \bot$, then for $cid \in \{0, 1\}^*$ such that $\gamma^T.cspace(cid) \neq \bot$ and $(id, cid)$ is not marked as registered in $I_T^T$, call $\text{Register}(T, id, cid)$. Thereafter, goto step 3.
3. Send (execute, $id_T, cid_T, \text{Close}_i^C, \emptyset$) $\xrightarrow{TV + TR我没有}$ $\mathcal{F}_{ch}.$

For both $T \in \{A, B\}$ behave as follows:

4. If you did not receive (executed, $id_T, cid_T, \sigma_T, L_T, R_T, m_T$) $\xleftarrow{TV + TR_i + TE_{sub}} \mathcal{F}_{ch}$ where $m_T =$ (contract–closed, $final_A, final_B$), then send (execute, $id_T, cid_T, \text{Close}_i^C, \emptyset$) $\xrightarrow{TV + TR_i + TE_{sub}} \mathcal{F}_{ch}.$

5. Upon (executed, $id_T, cid_T, \sigma_T, L_T, R_T, m_T$) $\xleftarrow{TV + TR_i + 2TE_{sub}} \mathcal{F}_{ch}$ where $m_T =$ (contract–closed, $final_A, final_B$), delete $\gamma^T$ from $I_T^T$ and output (closed, $id, final_A, final_B$) $\xrightarrow{TV + TR_i + 2TE_{sub}} \mathcal{Z}.$

**Contract $\text{VSCC}_i(C)$: function $\text{Close}_i^C(\sigma, F, \tau)$**

Let $L := \sigma.$user$_L, R := \sigma.$user$_R, \gamma := \sigma.$virtual–channel, $A := \gamma.$Alice, $B := \gamma.$Bob.

1. If $P \notin \{L, R\}$, $\tau < \gamma.$validity + $\text{TimeRegister}(i)$ or $\gamma = \bot$, then output $(\sigma, 0, 0, \bot)$.
2. Let $\sigma := \sigma.$ If there exists $cid \in \{0, 1\}^*$ such that $\sigma.cspace(cid) \neq \bot$ and we have that $\sigma.$locked $> 0$, where $\sigma.$space$(cid).storage$ (i.e. the contract instance with identifier $cid$ still has some locked coins), then distribute the coins fairly between the users as follows:
   - If $\sigma.$cash$(L) > 0$ and $\sigma.$cash$(R) > 0$, then set $\sigma.$cash$(L) := \sigma.$cash$(L) + \sigma.$cash$(L)$ and $\sigma.$cash$(R) := \sigma.$cash$(R) + \sigma.$cash$(R)$.
   - If $\sigma.$cash$(L) > 0$ and $\sigma.$cash$(R) \leq 0$, then set $\sigma.$cash$(L) := \sigma.$cash$(L) + (\sigma.$cash$(L) + \sigma.$cash$(R))$.
   - If $\sigma.$cash$(L) \leq 0$ and $\sigma.$cash$(R) > 0$, then set $\sigma.$cash$(R) := \sigma.$cash$(R) + (\sigma.$cash$(L) + \sigma.$cash$(R)).$
3. Let $\text{invest}_L := \gamma.$cash$(A), \text{invest}_R := \gamma.$cash$(B)$ denote the balance when the contract was opened and let $\text{final}_L := \sigma.$cash$(L)$ and $\text{final}_R := \sigma.$cash$(R)$ denote the current balance. Distinguish the following two situations:
   - If $(\text{invest}_L - \text{final}_L) + (\text{invest}_R - \text{final}_R) = 0$, then set $\sigma.$cash$(L) := (\text{invest}_L - \text{final}_L)$ and $\text{add}_L := \text{final}_L$. Analogously for $\sigma.$cash$(R)$ and $\text{add}_R$. 

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– Otherwise set both \( \tilde{\sigma}.\text{cash}(L) := 0 \) and \( \tilde{\sigma}.\text{cash}(R) := 0 \) and \((add_L, add_R) := (\text{invest}_L, \text{invest}_R)\).

4. Set \( \tilde{\sigma}.\text{locked} := 0 \), \( \tilde{\sigma}.\text{virtual-channel} := \perp \) and output \((\tilde{\sigma}, add_L, add_R, m)\), where \( m = (\text{contract-closed}, add_L, add_R) \).

We can now state the final theorem showing that our constructions emulates the ideal functionality from Section 5. The proof is given in the Appx. D.

**Theorem 2.** Let \( \mathcal{E}_{\text{res}} \) be the class of restricted environments defined in Appx. B and let \( \text{VSCC} \) be the contract type defined in Section 7. The protocol \( \Pi(i, C) \) working in \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{ch}}^{\mathcal{C}}(\Delta - 1, \text{VSCC}(i) \cup C) \)-hybrid model emulates the ideal functionality \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{ch}}^{\mathcal{C}}(\Delta - 1, i) \) against environments from class \( \mathcal{E}_{\text{res}} \) for every set of contract types \( C \), every \( i > 1 \) and every \( \Delta \in \mathbb{N} \).

8.1 Time complexity

Let us summaries the complexities of the protocol \( \Pi(i, C) \) and define the timing functions \( \text{TimeCreate}(i, \Delta) \), \( \text{TimeUpdate}(i, \Delta) \), \( \text{TimeRegister}(i, \Delta) \), \( \text{TimeExecute}(i, \Delta) \) and \( \text{TimeClose}(i, \Delta) \). These functions, informally speaking, on input the channel length \( i \in \mathbb{N} \) and the delay parameter \( \Delta \in \mathbb{N} \), output the maximal number of rounds the corresponding part of the protocol \( \Pi(i, C) \) takes.

Recall that for protocol parts that do not require interaction with the ledger (in case all parties behave honestly), we define optimistic time complexity in addition to the pessimistic time complexity. The optimistic time complexity of updating a contract instance in a state channel is equal to 2 rounds. Executing a contract instance in a state channel takes in the optimistic case at most 5 rounds. Let us emphasize that the optimistic time complexity of these protocol parts is independent of the channel length. This is also the case for virtual channel creation which takes at most 3 rounds for any \( i > 1 \).

The pessimistic time complexities of the protocol \( \Pi(1, C) \), i.e. for ledger state channels, are the following. It takes at most \( 2\Delta \) rounds to create a ledger state channel, i.e. \( \text{TimeCreate}(1, \Delta) = 2\Delta \). The pessimistic time complexity for registering a contract instance in a ledger state channel is \( \text{TimeRegister}(1, \Delta) := 3\Delta \) rounds. The pessimistic time complexity for updating a contract instance is \( \text{TimeUpdate}(1, \Delta) := 2 + 3\Delta \) rounds. Execution of a contract instance in a ledger state channel takes in the pessimistic case up to \( \text{TimeExecute}(1, \Delta) := 5 + 4\Delta \) rounds and closing a ledger state channel takes \( \text{TimeClose}(1, \Delta) := 8\Delta \) rounds.

The pessimistic time complexities of the protocol \( \Pi(i, C) \) for a virtual state channel of length \( i \) can be expressed in terms of the time complexities to execute its subchannels (which are state channels of length \([i/2]\)) using recursively Equation (2). After solving the recurrence we obtain

\[
\text{TimeExecute}(i, \Delta) := \frac{14 \left[ \log_2 i \right]}{13} \cdot (75 + 52\Delta) - 10.
\]

Registering a contact instance in a virtual state channel of length \( i \) takes at most \( \text{TimeRegister}(i, \Delta) := 5 \cdot \text{TimeExecute}([i/2], \Delta) \) rounds. Updating a contract instance in a virtual state channel of length \( i \) is upper bounded by \( \text{TimeUpdate}(i, \Delta) := 2 + 5 \cdot \text{TimeExecute}([i/2], \Delta) \) and closing a virtual state channel of length \( i \) takes in the pessimistic case \( \text{TimeClose}(i, \Delta) := 7 \cdot \text{TimeExecute}([i/2], \Delta) \).

Acknowledgment

We thank Jeff Coleman for several useful comments and in particular for pointing out a weakness of an earlier version of our protocol when taking fees into account.

References

Consider the situation when Alice has a payment channel with Ingrid and Ingrid has a payment channel with Bob. Assume that Alice wants to send one coin to Bob and route the payment via Ingrid. The first idea would be to let Alice update the channel with Ingrid such that Alice pays one coin to Ingrid and then let Ingrid symmetrically update the channel with Bob such that Ingrid pays one coin to Bob. However, this naive solution allows a malicious Ingrid to abort after receiving the coin from Alice and never pay anything to Bob.

Let us briefly explain how to solve the above problem using hash-locked transactions. Let $H$ be some fixed hash function. Bob first picks a random value $x \in \{0,1\}^*$ and sends the hash value $h = H(x)$ to Alice who creates a hash-locked transaction $HLT_A$. Informally, this transaction promises to update the channel between Alice and Ingrid such that Ingrid earns one coin if she publishes a preimage of $h$ before a timeout $t_A$. Ingrid, upon receiving the hash-locked transaction $HLT_A$ from Alice, creates a hash-locked transaction $HLT_B$ which promises to update the channel between Ingrid and Bob such that Bob earns one coin if he publishes a preimage of $h$ before the timeout $t_B < t_A$. Hence, if Bob reveals $x$ before time $t_B$, he gets one coin from Ingrid. Since $t_B < t_A$, Ingrid has time to use the value $x$ to get one coin from Alice and thus finalize the payment. In case Bob does not reveal $x$ to Ingrid before the timeout $t_B$, Ingrid can refund her coin locked in $HLT_B$. Analogously, in case Ingrid does not reveal $x$, Alice can refund her coin locked in $HLT_A$ after round $t_A$. 

A Routing payments using hash-locked transactions

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B Restrictions on the Environment

In order to simplify the description of the ideal functionality $F_{ch}^{\Pi(\Delta)}(i, C)$ and the protocol $\Pi(i, C)$ realizing it, we define a set of restricted environments $E_{res}$. Every $Z \in E_{res}$ has to satisfy the following

- $Z$ never sends the message to the same party twice.
- $Z$ sends a message (create, $\gamma$), where $\gamma$ is a ledger state channel, to all honest parties in the set $\gamma$.end–users in the same round $\tau_0$ (and it never send this message to any other honest party). In addition, we assume the following: there does not exist a state channel $\gamma'$ with $\gamma$.id = $\gamma'$.(\id) (and no such state channel is currently being created); parties of the ledger state channel are from the set $P$, $\text{Value}(\gamma$.id) $\geq 0$; both parties of the ledger state channel have enough funds on the ledger for the channel creation;\footnote{In case the environment requests opening more ledger state channels at the same time, we require that all parties have enough funds for all ledger state channels that are being created.} the set of contract instances is empty; and $\gamma$.length $= 1$. In addition, we assume that if $\gamma$.Alice is honest and the environment does not receive the message (created, $\gamma$) from $\gamma$.Alice within $2\Delta$ rounds, it sends the message (refund, $\gamma$) to party $\gamma$.Alice.
- $Z$ sends the message (create, $\gamma$), where $\gamma$ is a virtual state channel, to all honest parties in the set $\gamma$.end–users $\cup \{\gamma$.Ingrid\} in the same round $\tau_0$ (and it never send this message to any other honest party). In addition, we assume the following: there does not exist a state channel $\gamma'$ with $\gamma$.id = $\gamma'$.(\id) (and no such state channel is currently being created); parties of the virtual state channel are from the set $P$; $\text{Value}(\gamma$.id) $\geq 0$; the set of contract instances is empty; $\gamma$.validity $< \tau_0 + 3$. Additionally, we assume the following about the subchannels of $\gamma$:
  - if honest $P \in \gamma$.end–users receives the message (create, $\gamma$), then the following must be satisfied: the subchannel $\alpha := \gamma$.subchan($P$) must exist; $\alpha$.end–users = $\{P, \gamma$.Ingrid\}; $\alpha$.length $\leq \gamma$.length/2; $\gamma$.validity $> \alpha$.validity + $\text{TimeClose}(\gamma$.length); $\alpha$.cspace($cid$) $= \bot$ for every $cid \in \{0, 1\}^*$ if $\alpha$ is a virtual state channel; both $P$ and $\gamma$.Ingrid have enough funds in $\alpha$.
  - if honest $\gamma$.Ingrid receives the message (create, $\gamma$), then both subchannels $\alpha := \gamma$.subchan($\gamma$.Alice), $\beta := \gamma$.subchan($\gamma$.Bob) exist; $\alpha$.end–users = $\{\gamma$.Alice, $\gamma$.Ingrid\} and $\beta$.end–users = $\{\gamma$.Bob, $\gamma$.Ingrid\}; $\alpha$.length $\leq \gamma$.length/2, $\beta$.length $\leq \gamma$.length/2 and $\gamma$.length $= \alpha$.length + $\beta$.length; $\gamma$.validity $> \max\{\alpha$.validity, $\beta$.validity\} + $\text{TimeClose}(\gamma$.length); $\alpha$.cspace($cid$) $= \bot$ for every $cid \in \{0, 1\}^*$ if $\beta$ is a virtual state channel; $\beta$.cspace($cid$) $= \bot$ for every $cid \in \{0, 1\}^*$ if $\beta$ is a virtual state channel; $\gamma$.Alice and $\gamma$.Ingrid have enough funds in $\alpha$ and $\gamma$.Bob and $\gamma$.Ingrid have enough funds in $\beta$.
- If $Z$ sends the message (execute, $id$, $cid$, $\delta$, $C$) or (update–reply, $ok$, $id$, $cid$) to an honest party $P$, then a state channel $\gamma$ with identifier $id$ exists in $\Gamma$; $P \in \gamma$.end–users, the state channel supports the contract type; if the contract instance has already been updated before, then the contract type remains the same, i.e. if $\nu := \gamma$.cspace($cid$) $\neq \bot$, then $\nu$.type $= C$; the new contract instance $\delta$ is admissible with respect to $C$, i.e. $\delta \in C.A$; and both parties have enough cash in the state channel for the contract instance update.\footnote{In case the environment requests constructing more contract instances at the same time, we require that both parties have enough funds in the state channel for all of them.} $Z$ never asks to update a contract instance that is currently being updated or executed. In addition, if $\Gamma(id)$ is a virtual state channel, then we assume that there is no other contract channel in the virtual state channel (and no other instance is being created).
- If $Z$ sends the message (execute, $id$, $cid$, $f$, $z$) to an honest party $P$, then a state channel $\gamma$ with identifier $id$ exists in $\Gamma$, $P \in \gamma$.end–users, the contract instance $cid$ has already been defined in $\gamma$, i.e. $\gamma$.cspace($cid$) $\neq \bot$, and $f$ is a contract function with respect to $\gamma$.cspace($cid$).type.
- If $Z$ sends the message (close, $id$) to honest party $P$, then state channel $\gamma$ with identifier $id$ exists in $\Gamma$, $\gamma$ is a ledger state channel and $P \in \gamma$.end–users.

C Security analysis of the ledger state channel protocol

In this section, we will show that for any set of contract types $C$, the $\Pi(1, C)$ protocol $E_{res}$-emulates the ideal functionality $F_{ch}^{\Pi(\Delta)}(1, C)$ in $F_{res}^{\Pi(\Delta)}(C)$-hybrid world. In other words, for any PPT adversary $A$ we construct...
a simulator \( S_1 \) that operates in the \( F_{ch}^{L(\Delta)}(1, C) \) world and simulates the \( F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C) \)-hybrid world to any environment \( Z \in \mathcal{E}_{res} \).

The two main challenges of our analysis are the following: (i) ensure the consistency of timings (if an honest party \( P \) outputs a message \( m \) in round \( \tau \) in the hybrid world, then \( P \) must output the same message \( m \) in the same round \( \tau \) in the ideal world as well) and (ii) ensure the consistency of balances of parties on the ledger (i.e. if the state of accounts on the ledger in round \( \tau \) is equal \((x_1, \ldots, x_n)\) in the hybrid world, then the state of user’s accounts in round \( \tau \) must be \((x_1, \ldots, x_n)\) in the ideal world as well). Recall that the ledger \( \mathcal{L} \) is a global ideal functionality thus the environment can read its state at any point in time. Inconsistencies on the ledger could therefore reveal to the environment whether it is communicating with the real or ideal world.

The simulator \( S_1 \) constructed in this section will internally run a copy the hybrid world. It will maintain a channel space \( \Gamma^T \) for every honest party \( T \) and the channel space \( \Gamma \) for the hybrid ideal functionality \( F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C) \). In addition, the simulator will generate a key pair \( (pk_T, sk_T) \leftarrow KGen(1^\lambda) \) for every honest party \( T \) during the setup phase. Recall that since there are no private inputs or messages being sent, we implicitly assume that the ideal functionality \( F_{ch}^{L(\Delta)}(1, C) \) on receiving a message \( m \) from party \( P \) immediately sends a message \((P, m)\) to the simulator \( S_1 \) (this convention was introduced in Section 5). The simulator \( S_1 \) thus receives all the input messages of the honest parties from the ideal functionality \( F_{ch}^{L(\Delta)}(1, C) \). Since \( S_1 \) receives messages addressed to the adversary \( A \) (which it internally runs) from the environment \( Z \), it knows the behavior of corrupt parties in the protocol as well as the instruction given by the adversary to the hybrid ideal functionality \( F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C) \). This, in particular, means that our simulator \( S_1 \) can instruct the ideal functionality \( F_{ch}^{L(\Delta)}(1, C) \) to make changes on the ledger \( \mathcal{L} \) in the same round as the adversary \( A \) would instruct the hybrid ideal functionality \( F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C) \) to make the changes on the ledger. To simplify the pseudocode description of the simulator \( S_1 \), we do not write these instructions explicitly.

We will discuss each part of the protocol separately and for each of them distinguish all possible corruption combinations: both parties are honest, only one party is honest and both parties are corrupt. We present a full description of the simulator \( S_1 \) for all of these cases and provide a detailed proof sketch of the ideal and hybrid world indistinguishability for the ledger state channel creation when \( A \) is honest and \( B \) is corrupt.

The argumentation in the remaining cases is very similar and thus omitted from this version of the paper.

**Create a ledger state channel.** Let us begin with the description of the simulator \( S_1 \) for the ledger state channel creation. We will first discuss in detail the case when \( A \) is honest and \( B \) is corrupt (the corresponding pseudocode description of the simulator can be found below).

According to the protocol \( \Pi(1, C) \), honest party \( A \) upon receiving the message (create, \( \gamma \)) from the environment \( Z \) sends the message (construct, \( \gamma \)) to the hybrid ideal functionality \( F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C) \). Since we assume that \( Z \in \mathcal{E}_{res} \), all checks made by the hybrid ideal functionality \( F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C) \) will pass. This can be verified by careful inspection of \( \mathcal{E}_{res} \) definition (see page 39) and the description of the ideal functionality \( F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C) \) for ledger state channel creation (see page 18). The hybrid ideal functionality \( F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C) \) within \( \Delta \) rounds removes coins from \( A \)'s account on the ledger \( \mathcal{L} \). The exact round is determined by the adversary \( A \). The simulator \( S_1 \) is receiving messages from \( Z \) addressed to the adversary \( A \); thus, it can instruct the ideal functionality \( F_{ch}^{L(\Delta)}(1, C) \) to remove coins from \( A \)'s account in the same round (recall our convention that these messages from the simulator to the ideal functionality are implicit in our descriptions to for better readability). After removing the coins from \( A \)'s account, the hybrid ideal functionality \( F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C) \) sends the message (initializing, \( \gamma \)) to party \( B \) which is exactly what the simulator \( S_1 \) does as well.

If \( B \) is instructed by the environment \( Z \) to immediately reply to the hybrid ideal functionality \( F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C) \) with the message (confirm, \( \gamma \)), the ledger state channel \( \gamma \) will be created in the hybrid world. Therefore, the simulator \( S_1 \) sends the message (create, \( \gamma \)) to the ideal functionality \( F_{ch}^{L(\Delta)}(1, C) \) on behalf of \( B \) which ensures the channel creation in the ideal world as well. The simulator again instructs the ideal functionality \( F_{ch}^{L(\Delta)}(1, C) \) to remove coins from \( B \)'s account in the same round the adversary \( A \) would instruct the hybrid ideal functionality \( F_{scc}^{L(\Delta)}(C) \). After removing coins from \( B \)'s account, the hybrid ideal functionality
immediately sends the message (initialized, γ) to both end-users which makes honest A output the message (created, γ) to the environment. Therefore, the simulator S1 sends the message (initialized, γ) to B right after the coins are removed. In addition, the ideal functionality \( F_{ch}^{\Delta}(i, C) \) after removing coins from B’s account sends the message (created, γ) to both end-users which results in the honest party A forwarding it to the environment. Thus, the content and timing of the honest party’s output message to the environment is the same in both worlds. Finally, the simulator S1 stores the new ledger state channel γ in the channel space of the hybrid ideal functionality \( \Gamma \) and the channel space of the honest party \( \Gamma^A \) and stops.

If B is not instructed by the environment Z to confirm the channel creation by sending the message (confirm, γ) to the hybrid ideal functionality \( F_{ch}^{\Delta}(C) \), the ledger state channel γ will not be created in the hybrid world. Thus, simulator S1 does not send any message to \( F_{ch}^{\Delta}(1, C) \) on B’s behalf in this case. By our assumption that \( Z \in \mathcal{E}_{res} \), the honest party A receives the message (refund, γ). In the hybrid world, A forwards this message to the hybrid ideal functionality \( F_{sc}^{\Delta}(C) \) who adds coins back to A’s account on the ledger within \( \Delta \) rounds. In the ideal world, A is a dummy party and thus forwards the message to the ideal functionality \( F_{ch}^{\Delta}(1, C) \). Hence, the only thing that the simulator S1 has to do is to instruct the ideal functionality \( F_{ch}^{\Delta}(1, C) \) to add the coins back to A’s account in the correct round and then stop.

We will now present the pseudocode description of the simulator S1 that we just defined as well as the description of S1 for the remaining corruption combinations.

**Simulator \( \mathcal{S}_1 \): Create a ledger state channel**

We use the abbreviated notation from Section 4.3. Let \( F_{ch} := F_{ch}^{\Delta}(1, C) \).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case A is honest and B is corrupt:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upon ((A, \text{create, } \gamma) \overset{\tau_0}{\rightarrow} F_{ch}), proceed as follows:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Wait till round ( \tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + \Delta ) to send ((\text{initializing, } \gamma) \overset{\tau_1}{\rightarrow} B).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. If ((\text{confirm, } \gamma) \overset{\tau_1}{\rightarrow} B), then send ((\text{create, } \gamma) \overset{\tau_1}{\rightarrow} F_{ch}) on behalf of B. Send ((\text{initialized, } \gamma) \overset{\tau_2 \leq \tau_1 + \Delta}{\rightarrow} B) and set ( \Gamma^A(\gamma, \text{id}) := \gamma, \Gamma(\gamma, \text{id}) := \gamma ) and stop.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case A is corrupt and B is honest:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upon ((\text{create, } \gamma) \overset{\tau_1}{\rightarrow} A), proceed as follows:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. If A does not have enough funds on the ledger, there already exists a state channel ( \gamma' ) such that ( \gamma'.\text{id} = \gamma'.\text{id} ) in ( \Gamma ), ( \gamma'.\text{cspace} \neq \emptyset ), or ( \text{Value}(\gamma) &lt; 0 ), then stop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Else send ((\text{create, } \gamma) \overset{\tau_0}{\rightarrow} F_{ch}) on behalf of A and in round ( \tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + \Delta ) send ((\text{initializing, } \gamma) \overset{\tau_1}{\rightarrow} A).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Distinguish the following two situations:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- If ((B, \text{create, } \gamma) \overset{\tau_0}{\rightarrow} F_{ch}), then send ((\text{initialized, } \gamma) \overset{\tau_0 + 2\Delta}{\rightarrow} A) and set ( \Gamma^B(\gamma, \text{id}) := \gamma, \Gamma(\gamma, \text{id}) := \gamma ) and stop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Else wait. If ((\text{refund, } \gamma) \overset{\tau_1 &gt; \tau_0 + 2\Delta}{\rightarrow} A), then send ((\text{refund, } \gamma) \overset{\tau_1}{\rightarrow} F_{ch}).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case A and B are corrupt:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upon ((\text{construct, } \gamma) \overset{\tau_0}{\rightarrow} A), proceed as follows:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. If A does not have enough funds on the ledger, there already exists a state channel ( \gamma' ) such that ( \gamma'.\text{id} = \gamma'.\text{id} ), ( \gamma'.\text{cspace} \neq \emptyset ) or ( \text{Value}(\gamma) &lt; 0 ), then stop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Else send ((\text{create, } \gamma) \overset{\tau_0}{\rightarrow} F_{ch}) on behalf of A and in round ( \tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + \Delta ) send ((\text{initializing, } \gamma) \overset{\tau_1}{\rightarrow} \gamma.\text{end-users.}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 3. Distinguish the following two situations:
If (confirm, \( \gamma \)) \( \xrightarrow{\tau_1} B \) and \( B \) has sufficient funds on the ledger, then (create, \( \gamma \)) \( \xrightarrow{\tau_1} F_{ch} \) and on behalf of \( B \) and wait till round \( \tau_2 \leq \tau_0 + 2\Delta \) to send (initialized, \( \gamma \)) \( \xrightarrow{\tau_2} \gamma.\text{end-users} \). Then set \( \Gamma(\gamma.id) := \gamma \) and stop.

- Else wait if (refund, \( \gamma \)) \( \xrightarrow{\tau_3 \geq \tau_0 + 2\Delta} A \). In such a case send (refund, \( \gamma \)) \( \xrightarrow{\tau_3} F_{ch} \) and stop.

It remains to discuss the case when both parties of the ledger state channel are honest. The only thing the simulator has to do is to instruct the ideal functionality to remove coins from ledger accounts in the correct round which can be done since it received the message addressed to the adversary \( A \). After removing the coins from both user’s accounts, the simulator updates the channel space sets, i.e. defines \( \Gamma(\gamma.id) = \Gamma^B(\gamma.id) = \Gamma(\gamma.id) = \gamma \).

Registration of a contract instance in a ledger state channel. Since registration of a contract instance is defined as a separate procedure that can be called by parties of the protocol \( \Pi(1, C) \), we define a "subsimulator" \( \text{SimRegister}(P, id, cid) \) which can be called as a procedure by the simulator \( S_1 \). Before we define the subsimulator formally, let us discuss one technicality.

As already mentioned, one of the main challenges of the simulation is to ensure the consistency of the ledger accounts in the ideal and hybrid world. In particular, if two parties created a ledger state channel between them (i.e. their coins were subtracted from their ledger accounts), the simulator has to ensure that once this ledger state channel is closed, the amount of coins returned to each party’s account on the ledger is the same in the real and hybrid world. In case at least one of the ledger state channels is honest, every time the channel is updated or executed, the ideal functionality \( F_{ch}^{L(D)}(1, C) \) receives the corresponding message from the honest party and thus has the same view on the channel’s state as the honest party in the hybrid world. The situation is more tricky in case both parties are corrupt.

If two corrupt parties have a ledger state channel between them, they can update its state arbitrarily (even to an invalid state). As long as these updates are done off-chain (parties exchange messages with each other and do not send any message to the hybrid ideal functionality \( F_{ch}^{L(D)}(C) \)), no changes in the channel space \( \Gamma \) of ideal functionality \( F_{ch}^{L(D)}(1, C) \) are needed. Only when parties successfully register a contract instance with the hybrid ideal functionality \( F_{ch}^{L(D)}(C) \), the update of the ledger state channel resulting from the new contract instance becomes “official”. Thus, the simulator has to ensure that these changes to the ledger state channel are also made in the ideal functionality \( F_{ch}^{L(D)}(1, C) \). This is the reason, why the simulator has to send update message to the ideal functionality on behalf of the corrupt parties, in case they successfully register a contract instance in the hybrid world.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-simulator : ( \text{SimRegister}(P, id, cid) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

We use the abbreviated notation from Section 4.3. Let \( F_{ch} := F_{ch}^{L(D)}(1, C) \).

**Case \( P \) and \( Q \) are honest:**

1. Let \( \gamma^P := \Gamma^P(id), \nu^P := \gamma^P.\text{space}(cid) \) and \( \gamma^Q := \Gamma^Q(id), \nu^Q := \gamma^Q.\text{space}(cid) \).
2. Wait up to \( 2\Delta \) rounds and then proceed as follows. If \( \nu^P.\text{version} \geq \nu^Q.\text{version} \), then set \( \tilde{\nu} := (\nu^P.\text{storage}, \nu^P.\text{type}) \). Else set \( \tilde{\nu} := (\nu^Q.\text{storage}, \nu^Q.\text{type}) \).
3. Mark \((id, cid)\) as registered in \( \Gamma, \Gamma^P, \Gamma^Q \) and update all three sets, i.e. set \( \Gamma := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma, id, cid, \tilde{\nu}), \Gamma^P := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma^P, id, cid, \tilde{\nu}), \Gamma^Q := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma^Q, id, cid, \tilde{\nu}) \).

**Case \( P \) is honest and \( Q \) is corrupt:**

1. Let \( \gamma^P := \Gamma^P(id), \nu^P := \gamma^P.\text{space}(cid), \sigma^P := \nu^P.\text{storage} \).
2. Set \( \tau_0 \) be the current round. Send (instance–registering, \( id, cid, \nu^P \)) \( \xrightarrow{\tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + \Delta} Q \).
3. If \((\text{instance}-\text{register}, id, cid, \nu^Q) \xrightarrow{\tau_1} Q\) where \(\nu^Q\) is a valid contract instance (both signatures \(\nu^Q.\text{sign}(A)\) and \(\nu^Q.\text{sign}(B)\) are valid, the amount of locked coins in \(\nu^Q\) is non-negative, users of the contract instance are \(A\) and \(B\), the contract instance storage is admissible and the contract type is from the set \(C\)), then proceed as follows. If \(\nu^P.\text{version} \geq \nu^Q.\text{version}\), then \(\bar{\nu} := (\nu^P.\text{storage}, \nu^P.\text{type})\) and otherwise set \(\bar{\nu} := (\nu^Q.\text{storage}, \nu^Q.\text{type})\). Thereafter (instance–registered, \(id, cid, \bar{\nu}\)) \xrightarrow{\tau_2 \leq \tau_1 + \Delta} Q\) and goto step 5.
4. Else define \(\bar{\nu} := (\nu^P.\text{storage}, \nu^P.\text{type})\), send (instance–registered, \(id, cid, \bar{\nu}\)) \xrightarrow{\tau_2 \leq \tau_1 + \Delta} Q\) and goto step 5.
5. Mark \((id, cid)\) as registered in \(\Gamma^P\), \(\Gamma\) and set \(\Gamma := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma, id, cid, \bar{\nu})\) and \(\Gamma^P := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma^P, id, cid, \bar{\nu})\).

Case \(P\) is corrupt and \(Q\) is honest:

Upon (instance–register, \(id, cid, \nu^P\)) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} P\), s.t. \(\Gamma(id) \neq \bot\), \(\Gamma(id).\text{cspace}(cid) = \bot\), \(\nu^P\) is a valid contract instance (both signatures \(\nu^P.\text{sign}(A)\) and \(\nu^P.\text{sign}(B)\) are valid, the amount of locked coins in \(\nu^P\) is non-negative, users of the contract instance are \(A\) and \(B\), the contract instance storage is admissible and the contract type is from the set \(C\)), then do:

1. Within \(\Delta\) rounds, send (instance–registering, \(id, cid, \nu^P\)) \xrightarrow{\tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + \Delta} P\).
2. Let \(\gamma^Q := \Gamma^Q(id)\), \(\nu^Q := \Gamma^Q.\text{cspace}(cid)\). If \(\nu^P.\text{version} \geq \nu^Q.\text{version}\), then \(\bar{\nu} := (\nu^P.\text{storage}, \nu^P.\text{type})\) and otherwise set \(\bar{\nu} := (\nu^Q.\text{storage}, \nu^Q.\text{type})\).
3. Send (instance–registered, \(id, cid, \bar{\nu}\)) \xrightarrow{\tau_2 \leq \tau_1 + \Delta} P\), mark \((id, cid)\) as registered in \(\Gamma^Q\) and \(\Gamma\) and then set \(\Gamma := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma, id, cid, \bar{\nu})\) and \(\Gamma^Q := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma^Q, id, cid, \bar{\nu})\).

Case \(P\) and \(Q\) are corrupt:

Upon (instance–register, \(id, cid, \nu^P\)) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} P\), s.t. \(\Gamma(id) \neq \bot\), \(\Gamma(id).\text{cspace}(cid) = \bot\), \(\nu^P\) is a valid contract instance (both signatures \(\nu^P.\text{sign}(A)\), \(\nu^P.\text{sign}(B)\) are valid, the amount of locked coins in \(\nu^P\) is non-negative, users of the contract instance are \(A\) and \(B\), the contract instance storage is admissible and the contract type is from the set \(C\)), then do:

1. Within \(\Delta\) rounds, send (instance–registering, \(id, cid, \nu^P\)) \xrightarrow{\tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + \Delta} \Gamma(id).\text{end–users}.
2. If (instance–register, \(id, cid, \nu^Q\)) \xrightarrow{\tau_1} Q\) s.t. \(\nu^Q\) is a valid contract instance (both \(\nu^Q.\text{sign}(A)\) and \(\nu^Q.\text{sign}(B)\) are valid signatures, the amount of locked money in \(\nu^Q\) is non-negative, users of the contract instance are \(A\) and \(B\), the contract instance storage is admissible and the contract type is from the set \(C\)), then proceed as follows. If \(\nu^P.\text{version} \geq \nu^Q.\text{version}\), then \(\bar{\nu} := (\nu^P.\text{storage}, \nu^P.\text{type})\) and otherwise set \(\bar{\nu} := (\nu^Q.\text{storage}, \nu^Q.\text{type})\). Thereafter send (instance–registered, \(id, cid, \bar{\nu}\)) \xrightarrow{\tau_2 \leq \tau_1 + \Delta} \Gamma(id).\text{end–users} and goto step 4.
3. Else proceed as follows. If (finalise–register, \(id, cid\)) \xrightarrow{\tau_0 + \Delta} P\), then define \(\bar{\nu} := (\nu^P.\text{storage}, \nu^P.\text{type})\), send (instance–registered, \(id, cid, \bar{\nu}\)) \xrightarrow{\tau_2 \leq \tau_0 + \Delta} \Gamma(id).\text{end–users} and goto step 4.
4. Mark \((id, cid)\) as registered \(\Gamma\) and update the channel space \(\Gamma := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma, id, cid, \bar{\nu})\). Then send (update, \(id, cid, \bar{\nu}.\text{storage}, \bar{\nu}.\text{type}) \mapsto \mathcal{F}_{ch}\) on behalf of \(P\) and (update–reply, ok, \(id, cid\)) \mapsto \mathcal{F}_{ch}\) on behalf of \(Q\).

**Update a contract instance in a ledger state channel** If both parties are honest, the simulator does not need to give any instructions to the ideal functionality and only updates the sets \(\Gamma^P, \Gamma^Q\), when the messages \((P, \text{update}, id, cid, \sigma, C)\) and \((Q, \text{update–reply}, ok, id, cid)\) are received from the ideal functionality.

In case both parties are corrupt, the simulator can internally simulate the communication of the two corrupt parties and in case the registration procedure is started by one of them, it executes the subsimulator \(\text{SimRegister}\) for the case when both parties are corrupt. Note that if the registration procedure is successful
below we define the simulator $S_1$ for the remaining two case; i.e. when only the initiating party is corrupt and if only the reacting party is corrupt.

**Simulator $S_1$: Contract instance update**

We use the abbreviated notation from Section 4.3. Let $F_{ch} := F^{(\Delta)}_{ch}(1,C)$.

**Case $P$ is honest and $Q$ is corrupt:**

Upon $(P,update,id,cid,\hat{\sigma},C) \overset{\tau_0}{\Rightarrow} F_{ch}$ do:
1. Let $\gamma^P := \Gamma^P(id), \nu^P := \gamma^P.cspace(cid), \sigma^P := \nu^P.storage$. If $\nu^P = \perp$, then set $\nu^P := 0$, else set $\nu^P := \nu^P.version$.
2. Sign $s_P := \text{Sign}_{sk_P}(id,cid,\hat{\sigma},C,v^P+1)$ and send $(update,s_P,id,cid,\hat{\sigma},C) \overset{\tau_0+1}{\Rightarrow} Q$ of behalf of $P$.
3. Distinguish the following cases:
   - If $(update-ok,s_Q) \overset{\tau_1}{\Rightarrow} Q$ such that $\text{Vfy}_{pk_Q}(id,cid,\hat{\sigma},C,v^P+1;s_B) = 1$, then send $(update-reply,ok,id,cid) \overset{\tau_1}{\Rightarrow} F_{ch}$ on behalf of $Q$ and set $\Gamma^P := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma^P,id,cid,\hat{\sigma},C,v^P+1,\{s_P,s_Q\})$.
   - If $(update-not-ok,s_Q) \overset{\tau_1}{\Rightarrow} Q$ such that $\text{Vfy}_{pk_Q}(id,cid,\sigma^P,C,v^P+2;s_B) = 1$, then compute $s_P := \text{Sign}_{sk_P}(id,cid,\sigma^P,C,v^P+2)$ and set $\Gamma^P := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma^P,id,cid,\sigma^P,C,v^P+2,\{s_P,s_Q\})$.
   - Else execute $\text{SimRegister}(P,id,cid)$. If after the sub-simulator is executed (in round $\tau_2 \leq \tau_0 + 3\Delta + 1$) it holds that $\Gamma^P(id).cspace(cid) = (\hat{\sigma},C)$, then $(update-reply,ok,id,cid) \overset{\tau_2}{\Rightarrow} F_{ch}$ on behalf of $Q$.

**Case $P$ is corrupt and $Q$ is honest:**

Upon $(update,s_P,id,cid,\hat{\sigma},C) \overset{\tau_0}{\Rightarrow} F_{ch}$ do:
1. Let $\gamma^Q := \Gamma^Q(id)$. If $\gamma^Q = \perp$ or there exists $cid' \neq cid$ such that $\gamma^Q.cspace(cid') \neq \perp$, then stop; else let $\nu^Q := \gamma^Q.cspace(cid)$. If $\nu^Q = \perp$, then set $\nu^Q := 0$, else set $\nu^Q := \nu^Q.version$.
2. If $\text{Vfy}_{pk_P}(id,cid,\hat{\sigma},C,v^Q+1;s_P) \neq 1$, then mark $(id,cid)$ as corrupt in $\Gamma^Q$ and stop. Else send $(update,ok,id,cid,\hat{\sigma},C) \overset{\tau_0}{\Rightarrow} F_{ch}$ on behalf of $P$.
3. Distinguish the following cases:
   - If $(Q,update-reply,ok,\nu^Q,\{s_P\}) \overset{\tau_1}{\Rightarrow} F_{ch}$, then compute $s_Q := \text{Sign}_{sk_Q}(id,cid,\hat{\sigma},C,v^Q+1)$, set $\Gamma^Q := \text{LocalUpdate}(\Gamma^Q,id,cid,\hat{\sigma},C,v^Q+1,\{s_Q\})$ and send $(update-ok,s_Q) \overset{\tau_0+2}{\Rightarrow} P$ on behalf of $Q$ and stop.
   - Else compute $s_Q := \text{Sign}_{sk_Q}(id,cid,\nu^Qstorage,\nu^Qtype,v^Q+2)$ and on behalf of $Q$ send $(update-not-ok,s_Q) \overset{\tau_0+2}{\Rightarrow} P$.

**Execute a contract instance in a ledger state channel** In case both parties are honest, the simulator only has to instruct the ideal functionality to output the result in the correct round. Let $\tau_0$ be the round in which the environment instructed the initiating party $P$ to execute. Then the simulator sets $\tau_1 := \tau_0 + x$, where $x$ is the smallest offset such that $\tau_1 = 1 \mod 4$ if $P = \gamma.Alice$ and $\tau_1 = 3 \mod 4$ if $P = \gamma.Bob$ and waits till round $\tau_1$ to instruct the ideal functionality to output the result. The it updates both channel space $\Gamma^P$ and $\Gamma^Q$ accordingly.

Below we describe in detail the situation when one or two parties are corrupt.
Simulator $S_1$: Contract instance execution.

We use the abbreviated notation from Section 4.3. Let $F_{ch} := F_{ch}^{\ell(\Delta)}(1, C)$.

**Case $P$ is honest and $Q$ is corrupt:**

Upon $(P, \text{execute}, id, cid, f, z) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} F_{ch}$, let $\gamma^P := \Gamma^P(id)$, $\nu^P := \nu^P.cspace(cid)$, $\sigma^P := \nu^P.storage$ and $\nu^P := \nu^P.version$. In addition, set $\tau_1 := \tau_0 + x$, where $x$ is the smallest offset such that $\tau_1 = 1 \mod 4$ if $P = \gamma^P.Alice$ and $\tau_1 = 3 \mod 4$ if $P = \gamma^P.Bob$. Wait till round $\tau_1$ and then proceed as follows:

1. If $(id, cid)$ is not marked as corrupt in $\Gamma^P$, do:
   - (a) Set $(\tilde{\sigma}, \text{add}_L, \text{add}_R, m) := f(\sigma^P, P, \tau_0, z)$. If $m = \bot$, then stop.
   - (b) Else compute $s_P := \text{Sign}_{sk_P}(id, cid, \tilde{\sigma}, \nu^P.type, \nu^P + 1)$ and send (peaceful–request, id, cid, f, z, $s_P, \tau_0$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_1 + 1} Q$.
   - (c) If (peaceful–confirm, id, cid, f, z, $s_Q$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_1 + 1} Q$ such that $\text{Vfy}_{pk_Q}(id, cid, \tilde{\sigma}, \nu^P.type, \nu^P + 1; s_Q) = 1$, then set $\Gamma^P := \text{LocalUpdateAdd}(\Gamma^P, id, cid, \tilde{\sigma}, \nu^P.type, \text{add}_L, \text{add}_R, \nu^P + 1, \{s_P, s_Q\})$ and instruct the ideal functionality to output the result. Else execute $\text{SimRegister}(P, id, cid)$ in round $\tau_1 + 2$. If after the execution of the sub-simulator (in round $\tau_1 < \tau_0 + 3\Delta + 5$) it holds that $\sigma^P = \tilde{\sigma}$, then set $\Gamma^P := \text{LocalUpdateAdd}(\Gamma^P, id, cid, \tilde{\sigma}, \nu^P.type, \text{add}_L, \text{add}_R)$, instruct the ideal functionality to output the result and stop. Else goto step 2e.

2. If $(id, cid)$ is marked as corrupt
   - (d) If $(id, cid)$ is not marked as registered in $\Gamma^P$, then execute the sub-simulator $\text{SimRegister}(P, id, cid)$.
   - (e) Let $\tau_3$ be the current round. If (executed, id, cid, $\sigma, \text{add}_L, \text{add}_R, m) \xrightarrow{\tau_3 \leq \tau_1 + \Delta} F_{ch}$, then update the channel space $\Gamma^P$ and $\Gamma$ and send (instance–execute, id, cid, $\sigma, \text{add}_L, \text{add}_R, m) \xrightarrow{\tau_3} Q$ and stop. Else stop.

**Case $P$ is corrupt and $Q$ is honest:**

Upon (peaceful–request, id, cid, f, z, $s_P, \tau_0$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_1} P$

1. Let $\gamma^Q := \Gamma^Q(id)$, $\nu^Q := \gamma^Q.cspace(cid)$, $\sigma^Q := \nu^Q.storage$, $\nu^Q := \nu^Q.version$. If $\gamma^Q = \bot$, $P \not\in \gamma^Q.end-users$, $\nu^Q = \bot$ or $f \not\in \nu^Q.type$, then goto step 4.

2. If $P = \gamma^Q.Alice$ and $\tau_1 \mod 4 \neq 1$ or if $P = \gamma^Q.Bob$ and $\tau_1 \mod 4 \neq 3$, then goto step 4.

3. If $(id, cid)$ is not marked as corrupt in $\Gamma^Q$, do:
   - (a) Compute $(\tilde{\sigma}, \text{add}_L, \text{add}_R, m) := f(\sigma^Q, P, \tau_0, z)$.
   - (b) If $m = \bot$ or $\text{Vfy}_{pk_P}(id, cid, \tilde{\sigma}, \nu^Q.type, \nu^Q + 1; s_P) = 1$, then goto step 4.
   - (c) Send (execute, id, cid, f, z) $\xrightarrow{\tau_0} F_{ch}$ on behalf of $P$ and instruct the functionality to deliver the result.
   - (d) Compute the signature $s_Q := \text{Sign}_{sk_Q}(id, cid, \tilde{\sigma}, \nu^Q.type, \nu^Q + 1)$, send (peaceful–confirm, id, cid, f, z, $s_Q$) $\xrightarrow{\tau_1 + 1} P$, set $\Gamma^Q := \text{LocalUpdateAdd}(\Gamma^Q, id, cid, \tilde{\sigma}, \nu^Q.type, \text{add}_L, \text{add}_R)$ and stop.

4. Mark $(id, cid)$ as corrupt in $\Gamma^Q$ and stop.

Upon $P$ starting the registration procedure for id, cid, then execute the sub-simulator $\text{SimRegister}(P, id, cid)$.

Upon (instance–execute, id, cid, f, z) $\xrightarrow{\tau_2} P$, then

1. Let $\gamma := \Gamma(id)$. If $\gamma = \bot$ or $P \not\in \gamma.end-users$, then stop. Else let $\nu := \gamma.cspace(cid)$, $\sigma := \nu.storage$. If $\nu = \bot$ or $f \not\in \nu.type$, then stop.

2. Else send (execute, id, cid, f, z) $\xrightarrow{\tau_3} F_{ch}$ on behalf of $P$ and within $\Delta$ round instruct the functionality to output the result.
We discuss all four possible situations.

Close a ledger state channel. Below we describe the simulator in case of ledger state channel closure. We use the abbreviated notation from Section 4.3. Let \( F \) and \( \Gamma \) be the ideal functionality for the contract instance.

1. Execute the sub-simulator \( \text{SimRegister}(P, id, cid) \) for the case when both parties are honest. In round \( \tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + 8\Delta \) instruct the functionality to output the result. If (closed, \( id \)) \( \stackrel{\tau_3}{\rightarrow} F_{ch} \), set \( \Gamma(id) := \bot \) and stop.

2. Send (execute, \( id, cid, f, z \)) \( \stackrel{\tau_2}{\rightarrow} F_{ch} \) on behalf of \( P \) and within \( \Delta \) round instruct the functionality to output the result.

3. If (executed, \( id, cid, \sigma, addL, addR, m \)) \( \stackrel{\tau_3}{\rightarrow} P \) and stop.

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{Case } P & \text{ and } Q \text{ are corrupt:} \\
\end{align*} \]

Internally simulate the communication of the corrupt parties. If \( P \) starting the registration procedure for \( id, cid \), then execute the sub-simulator \( \text{SimRegister}(P, id, cid) \) for the case when both parties are corrupt. Note that if the registration procedure is successful (a contract instance gets registered), the sub-simulator \( \text{SimRegister} \) instructs the ideal functionality to update the contract instance accordingly.

1. Let \( \gamma := \Gamma(id) \). If \( \gamma = \bot \) or \( P \notin \gamma \text{-end-users} \), then stop.
2. Else send (execute, \( id, cid, f, z \)) \( \stackrel{\tau_2}{\rightarrow} F_{ch} \) on behalf of \( P \) and within \( \Delta \) round instruct the functionality to output the result.
3. If (executed, \( id, cid, \sigma, addL, addR, m \)) \( \stackrel{\tau_3}{\rightarrow} P \) and stop.

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{Case } P & \text{ is honest and } Q \text{ is corrupt:} \\
\end{align*} \]

Upon \( (P, \text{close}, id) \) \( \stackrel{\tau_0}{\rightarrow} F_{ch} \), proceed as follows. Let \( \gamma^P := \Gamma^P(id) \). For every \( cid \in \{0, 1\}^* \) such that \( \gamma^P \text{-cspace}(cid) \neq \bot \), execute \( \text{SimRegister}(P, id, cid) \) for the case when both parties are honest. In round \( \tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + 8\Delta \) instruct the ideal functionality to output the result. If (closed, \( id \)) \( \stackrel{\tau_3}{\rightarrow} F_{ch} \), set \( \Gamma(id) := \bot \), \( \Gamma^P(id) := \bot \), \( \Gamma^Q(id) := \bot \), and stop.

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{Case } P & \text{ is corrupt and } Q \text{ is honest:} \\
\end{align*} \]

Upon \((P, \text{close}, id)\) \( \stackrel{\tau_0}{\rightarrow} F_{ch} \), do:

1. Let \( \gamma^P := \Gamma^P(id) \). For every \( cid \) such that \( \gamma^P \text{-cspace}(cid) \neq \bot \) but the contract instance has never been registered, execute \( \text{SimRegister}(P, id, cid) \).
2. After the execution of the sub-simulator, wait for at most \( \Delta \) rounds to send the message (contract-closing, \( id \)) \( \stackrel{\tau_3}{\rightarrow} Q \).
3. Execute the sub-simulator \( \text{SimRegister}(Q, id, cid) \) if registration started by \( Q \) for some \( cid \).
4. In round \( \tau_3 \leq \tau_0 + 8\Delta \) instruct the ideal functionality to output the result. If (closed, \( id \)) \( \stackrel{\tau_3}{\rightarrow} F_{ch} \), set \( \Gamma(id) := \bot \), \( \Gamma^P(id) := \bot \), and send (contract-closed, \( id \)) \( \rightarrow Q \). Then stop.

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{Case } P & \text{ is honest and } Q \text{ is corrupt:} \\
\end{align*} \]

We use the abbreviated notation from Section 4.3. Let \( F_{ch} := F_{ch}^{C(\Delta)}(1, C) \).

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{Simulator } S_1: \text{Close a ledger state channel} \\
\end{align*} \]

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{Case } P & \text{ and } Q \text{ are honest} \\
\end{align*} \]

Upon \((P, \text{close}, id)\) \( \stackrel{\tau_0}{\rightarrow} F_{ch} \), proceed as follows. Let \( \gamma^P := \Gamma^P(id) \). For every \( cid \in \{0, 1\}^* \) such that \( \gamma^P \text{-cspace}(cid) \neq \bot \), instruct the ideal functionality to output the result. If (closed, \( id \)) \( \stackrel{\tau_3}{\rightarrow} F_{ch} \), set \( \Gamma(id) := \bot \), \( \Gamma^P(id) := \bot \), and stop.

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{Case } P & \text{ is honest and } Q \text{ is corrupt:} \\
\end{align*} \]

Upon \((P, \text{close}, id)\) \( \stackrel{\tau_0}{\rightarrow} F_{ch} \), do:

1. Let \( \gamma^P := \Gamma^P(id) \). For every \( cid \) such that \( \gamma^P \text{-cspace}(cid) \neq \bot \) but the contract instance has never been registered, execute \( \text{SimRegister}(P, id, cid) \).
2. After the execution of the sub-simulator, wait for at most \( \Delta \) rounds to send the message (contract-closing, \( id \)) \( \stackrel{\tau_3}{\rightarrow} Q \).
3. Execute the sub-simulator \( \text{SimRegister}(Q, id, cid) \) if registration started by \( Q \) for some \( cid \).
4. In round \( \tau_3 \leq \tau_0 + 8\Delta \) instruct the ideal functionality to output the result. If (closed, \( id \)) \( \stackrel{\tau_3}{\rightarrow} F_{ch} \), set \( \Gamma(id) := \bot \), \( \Gamma^P(id) := \bot \), and send (contract-closed, \( id \)) \( \rightarrow Q \). Then stop.

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{Case } P & \text{ is corrupt and } Q \text{ is honest:} \\
\end{align*} \]

Upon \((P, \text{close}, id)\) \( \stackrel{\tau_0}{\rightarrow} F_{ch} \), do:

1. Execute the sub-simulator \( \text{SimRegister}(P, id, cid) \) if registration started by \( P \) for some \( cid \) in round \( \tau_0 \).
2. After the execution (in round \( \tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + 2\Delta \)), if (contract-close, \( id \)) \( \stackrel{\tau_3}{\rightarrow} P \), where \( \Gamma(id) \neq \bot \), then send (close, \( id \)) \( \stackrel{\tau_3}{\rightarrow} F_{ch} \) on behalf of \( P \).
3. Wait at most \( \Delta \) rounds to (contract-closing, \( id \)) \( \stackrel{\tau_3}{\rightarrow} P \).

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4. Let $\gamma^Q := I^Q(id)$. If there exists $cid$ such that $\gamma^Q \text{cspace}(cid) \neq \bot$ but the contract instance has never been registered, execute the sub-simulator $\text{SimRegister}(Q, id, cid)$.

5. Upon (closed, id) $\xrightarrow{\tau_5 \leq \tau_0 + 8\Delta} F_{ch}, I^Q(id) := \bot$ and (contract–closed, id) $\xrightarrow{\tau_5} P$ and stop.

Case $P$ and $Q$ are corrupt:

1. Execute the sub-simulator $\text{SimRegister}(P, id, cid)$ if registration started by $P$ for some $cid$. Note that if the registration procedure is successful (a contract instance gets registered), the subsimulator $\text{SimRegister}$ instructs the ideal functionality to update the contract instance accordingly.

2. After the execution (in round $\tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + 2\Delta$), if (contract–close, id) $\xrightarrow{\tau_1} P$, where $I(id) \neq \bot$, then send (close, id) $\xrightarrow{\tau_1} F_{ch}$ on behalf of $P$.

3. Wait at most $\Delta$ rounds to (contract–closing, id) $\xrightarrow{\tau_2 \leq \tau_0 + 4\Delta} I(id).\text{end-users}.

4. Execute the sub-simulator $\text{SimRegister}(Q, id, cid)$ if registration started by $Q$ for some $cid$. Again, if the registration procedure is successful, the subsimulator $\text{SimRegister}$ instructs the ideal functionality to update the contract instance accordingly.

5. In round $\tau_3 \leq \tau_0 + 8\Delta$ instruct the ideal functionality to output the result. If (closed, id) $\xrightarrow{\tau_3 \leq \tau_0 + 8\Delta} F_{ch}$, set $I(id) := \bot$ and stop.

**D Security analysis of the virtual state channel protocol**

The purpose of this section is to show that for any $i > 1$ and any set $C$ of contract types, the protocol $\Pi(i, C)$ emulates the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{ch}^{\mathcal{E}(\Delta)}(i, C)$ in $\mathcal{F}_{ch}^{\mathcal{E}(\Delta)}(i - 1, \text{VSCC}_i(C) \cup C)$-hybrid world against environments from the set $\mathcal{E}_{res}$.

The proof consists of two parts. First, we need to prove an auxiliary lemma stating that an instance of the protocol $\Pi(i, C)$ called by an environment $Z \in \mathcal{E}_{res}$ is $\mathcal{E}_{res}$-respecting. This is because the hybrid ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{ch}^{\mathcal{E}(\Delta)}(i - 1, \text{VSCC}_i(C) \cup C)$ is emulated by the protocol $\Pi(i - 1, \text{VSCC}_i(C) \cup C)$ only against environments from the set $\mathcal{E}_{res}$. This proves that the hybrid world is well defined and the composition of state channel protocols is possible. Thereafter we can construct the simulator $S_i$ in order to prove that the protocol $\Pi(i, C)$ in the hybrid world of $\mathcal{F}_{ch}^{\mathcal{E}(\Delta)}(i - 1, \text{VSCC}_i(C) \cup C)$ emulates the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{ch}^{\mathcal{E}(\Delta)}(i, C)$ against environments from the set $\mathcal{E}_{res}$.

**Lemma 1.** For any $i > 1$, set of contract types $C$, PPT adversary $A$ and environment $Z \in \mathcal{E}_{res}$, the protocol $\Pi(i, C)$ is $\mathcal{E}_{res}$-respecting.

**Proof.** We need to prove that for any PPT adversary $A$ and any environment $Z \in \mathcal{E}_{res}$, honest parties of the protocol $\Pi(i, C)$ make calls to the hybrid ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{ch}^{\mathcal{E}(\Delta)}(i - 1, \text{VSCC}_i(C) \cup C)$ according to the restrictions defining the set $\mathcal{E}_{res}$. In other words, honest parties of the protocol jointly represent an environment from the set $\mathcal{E}_{res}$.

If the environment $Z$ sends a message to an honest party in the protocol regarding a state channel of length $j < i$, then the party simply forwards the message to the hybrid ideal functionality. Since $Z \in \mathcal{E}_{res}$, no invalid calls can be made to the hybrid functionality in this way. It remains to show that the protocol is $\mathcal{E}_{res}$-respecting even if the environments send a message regarding a virtual state channel of length $i$.

First note that honest parties in the protocol $\Pi(i, C)$ upon receiving a message about a virtual state channel of length $i$ only ask the hybrid ideal functionality to update or execute a contract instance in a state channel but never to create or close a state channel. Thus, none of the restrictions regarding creating or closing a state channel can be violated.

Parties of the protocol send messages regarding update of a contract instance to the hybrid ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{ch}^{\mathcal{E}(\Delta)}(i - 1, \text{VSCC}_i(C) \cup C)$ only during the protocol “Create a virtual state channel”. Since we assume that parties of the protocol receive messages from an environment $Z \in \mathcal{E}_{res}$, we have the guarantee that they all receive the message (create, $\gamma$) in the same round $\tau_0$. According to the protocol, party
γ. Alice sends in round τ₀ the message (update, id_A, cid_A, δ_A, VSCC_i(C)), where δ_A := Init^c(γ.Alice, τ₀, γ), id_A := γ.subchan(γ.Alice) and cid_A := γ.Alice||γ.id. Hence clearly δ_A is admissible with respect to VSCC_i(C).

We can argue similarly with the update of the subchannel between γ.Ingrid and γ.Bob. Since Z ∈ E_{res}, we know that both subchannels of the virtual state channel γ exist, that there contain no contract instances and that they have enough funds. In addition, the subchannels do support contracts of type VSCC_i(C) since they were created via the hybrid ideal functionality F^{ch}_{ch}(i − 1, VSCC_i(C) ∪ C).

Parties of the protocol send messages regarding execution of a contract instance to the hybrid ideal functionality F^{ch}_{ch}(i − 1, VSCC_i(C) ∪ C) during (i) the protocol “Update a contract instance in a virtual state channel” (more specifically in the procedure Register), during (ii) the protocol “Execute a contract instance in a virtual state channel” and (iii) during the protocol “Close virtual state channel”. Since Z ∈ E_{res}, we know that none these protocols is ever called for a state channel that does not exists. This in particular implies that the contract instance that is being executed by parties of the protocol in the underlying subchannels must have been constructed and could not have been closed yet. In other words, we know that a. cspace(cid_A) = ⊥ and β. cspace(cid_B) = ⊥, where cid_A := γ.Alice||γ.id, α := Γ^A(γ.subchan(γ.Alice)) and cid_B := γ.Bob||γ.id, β := Γ^B(γ.subchan(γ.Bob)), where Γ^A and Γ^B are the channel spaces of Alice and Bob, respectively. □

In order to complete the proof that Π(i, C) protocol E_{res}-emulates the ideal functionality F^{ch}_{ch}(i, C) in F^{ch}_{ch}(i − 1, VSCC_i(C) ∪ C)-hybrid world for any set of contract types C, we need for every adversary A to construct a simulator S_i that simulates the hybrid world for any environment Z ∈ E_{res}.

The simulator S_i constructed in this section will maintain a channel space Γ^T for every honest party T ∈ P and Γ for the hybrid ideal functionality F^{ch}_{ch}(i − 1, VSCC_i(C) ∪ C). In addition, the simulator will generate a key pair (pk_T, sk_T) ← KGen(1^λ) for every honest party T during the setup phase which allows S_i to internally run a copy of the hybrid world. Recall that there are no private inputs or messages being sent, thus we assume that the ideal functionality F^{ch}_{ch}(i, C) upon receiving a message m from party P immediately sends the message (P, m) to the simulator S_i.

We will discuss in detail the most interesting case, when the ideal functionality F^{ch}_{ch}(i, C) sends message about a virtual state channel of length exactly i or when a corrupt party P is instructed by the environment to update or execute a subchannel of a virtual state channel of length exactly i, where the other user of the subchannel is not corrupt. The simulation in the remaining cases is straightforward. Let us describe it here only briefly.

If the ideal functionality F^{ch}_{ch}(i, C) sends a message about a state channel of length j, where 1 ≤ j < i, the simulator internally executes the hybrid ideal functionality F^{ch}_{ch}(i − 1, VSCC_i(C) ∪ C) on the received message and sends the result to the adversary A (recall that honest parties in the protocol Π(i, C) act like dummy parties and only forward messages to the hybrid ideal functionality F^{ch}_{ch}(i − 1, VSCC_i(C)∪C)). If the corrupt parties are instructed to send valid replies to the hybrid ideal functionality F^{ch}_{ch}(i − 1, VSCC_i(C)∪C), the simulator S_i sends the messages to the ideal functionality F^{ch}_{ch}(i, C) on their behalf and further instructs the ideal functionality F^{ch}_{ch}(i, C) as the simulator S_j would do. Thus specially, if all parties of a state channel are honest, then the simulator S_i is defined exactly as the simulator S_j. Let us give one example on how the simulator is defined in case there are corrupt parties.

Let us consider the situation when γ.Alice and γ.Ingrid are honest, γ.Bob is corrupt and the ideal functionality F^{ch}_{ch}(i, C) sends the messages (γ.Alice, create, γ) and (γ.Ingrid, create, γ), where 1 < γ.length < i, in round τ₀. Then the simulator waits till round τ₀ + 3 if the corrupt party γ.Bob is instructed to send (create, γ) to the hybrid ideal functionality F^{ch}_{ch}(i − 1, VSCC_i(C)∪C). In that case, S_i forwards the message to the ideal functionality F^{ch}_{ch}(i, C) on behalf of γ.Bob, adds the new virtual state channel γ to the channel spaces Γ^A and Γ. The simulator then waits till round γ.validity.

The simulator S_i is defined similarly in the remaining case when it does not receive any message from the ideal functionality F^{ch}_{ch}(i, C) but a corrupt party is instructed to send a message to the hybrid ideal functionality F^{ch}_{ch}(i − 1, VSCC_i(C)∪C) about a state channel of length 1 ≤ j < i. This happens if a corrupt party is the initiator of execute or update procedure or when all parties of the state channel are corrupt. In
this situation, the simulator $S_i$ internally executes the hybrid ideal functionality $F_{ch}^{L}((i-1),\text{VSCC}_i(C) \cup C)$. In case the message satisfies the restrictions on the environment, $S_i$ forwards it to the ideal functionality $F_{ch}^{L}((i),C)$ on behalf of the corrupt party and further instructs the ideal functionality $F_{ch}^{L}((i),C)$ as the simulator $S_j$ would do.

From now on, we will focus on the simulator $S_i$ for the most challenging case when at least one party of a virtual state channel of length exactly $i$ is honest.

Create a virtual state channel. We begin with the definition of the simulator for virtual state channel creation.

### Simulator $S_i$: Create a virtual state channel

We use the notation established in Section 4.3 and denote the ideal functionality $F_{ch}(i):=F_{ch}^{L}(i,C)$ and $F_{ch}(i-1):=F_{ch}^{L}(i-1,C)$.

#### Case $A,I,B$ are honest

Upon receiving $(A,\text{create},\gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} F_{ch}(i)$, $(B,\text{create},\gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} F_{ch}(i)$ and $(I,\text{create},\gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} F_{ch}(i)$ proceed as follows:

1. Set $id_A := \gamma,\text{subchan}(|\gamma,\text{id})), cId_A := A|\gamma,\text{id}$ and $id_B := \gamma,\text{subchan}(B), cId_B := B|\gamma,\text{id}$. Compute $\tilde{\sigma}_A := \text{Init}_A^i(A,\tau_0,\gamma)$ and $\tilde{\sigma}_B := \text{Init}_A^i(B,\tau_0,\gamma)$.
2. For both $T \in \{A,B\}$, internally simulate $F_{ch}(i-1)$ upon receiving the message (update, $id_T,cId_T$, $\tilde{\sigma}_T,$ $\text{VSCC}_i(C)) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} T$.
3. For both $T \in \{A,B\}$ internally simulate $F_{ch}(i-1)$ upon receiving the message (update--reply, $ok$, $id_T,cId_T$) upon receiving the message (update--reply, $ok$, $id_T,cId_T$) proceed as follows:
   4. Set $\tilde{\Gamma}_A(\gamma,\text{id}) := \gamma, \tilde{\Gamma}_B(\gamma,\text{id}) := \gamma$ and wait till round $\gamma$ validity.

#### Case $A,B$ are honest and $I$ is corrupt

Upon receiving $(A,\text{create},\gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} F_{ch}(i)$ and $(B,\text{create},\gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} F_{ch}(i)$ proceed as follows:

1. Set $id_A := \gamma,\text{subchan}(|\gamma,\text{id})), cId_A := A|\gamma,\text{id}$ and $id_B := \gamma,\text{subchan}(B), cId_B := B|\gamma,\text{id}$. Compute $\tilde{\sigma}_A := \text{Init}_A^i(A,\tau_0,\gamma)$ and $\tilde{\sigma}_B := \text{Init}_A^i(B,\tau_0,\gamma)$.
2. For both $T \in \{A,B\}$, internally simulate $F_{ch}(i-1)$ upon receiving the message (update, $id_T,cId_T$, $\tilde{\sigma}_T,$ $\text{VSCC}_i(C)) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} T$ and forward the result to $I$.
3. If (update--reply, $ok$, $id_T,cId_T$) upon receiving this message and forward the result to $I$.
4. If in round $\tau_0+1$, party $I$ confirms both updates, then send (create, $\gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0+1} F_{ch}(i)$ on behalf of $I$, set $\Gamma^A(\gamma,\text{id}) := \gamma, \Gamma^B(\gamma,\text{id}) := \gamma$.
5. Wait till round $\gamma$ validity.

#### Case $A,I$ are honest and $B$ is corrupt

Upon $(A,\text{create},\gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} F_{ch}(i)$ and $(I,\text{create},\gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} F_{ch}(i)$, proceed as follows:

1. Set $id_A := \gamma,\text{subchan}(|\gamma,\text{id})), cId_A := A|\gamma,\text{id}$ and $id_B := \gamma,\text{subchan}(B), cId_B := B|\gamma,\text{id}$. Compute $\tilde{\sigma}_A := \text{Init}_A^i(A,\tau_0,\gamma)$ and $\tilde{\sigma}_B := \text{Init}_A^i(B,\tau_0,\gamma)$.
2. In round $\tau_0$, internally simulate $F_{ch}(i-1)$ upon receiving (update, $id_A,cId_B,\tilde{\sigma}_B,$ $\text{VSCC}_i(C))$ upon receiving this message and proceed. Else stop.
3. If (update, $id_B,cId_B,\tilde{\sigma}_B,$ $\text{VSCC}_i(C))$ proceed.
4. For both $T \in \{A,B\}$ internally simulate $F_{ch}(i-1)$ upon receiving the message (update--reply, $ok$, $id_T,cId_T$) proceed.
5. Send \((\text{create–ok}, \gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0 + 3} B\) on behalf of \(A\).
6. If \((\text{create–ok}, \gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0 + 2} B\), then send \((\text{create}, \gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0 + 3} F_{ch}(i)\) on behalf of \(B\), add \(\gamma\) to \(\Gamma^A\).
7. Wait till round \(\gamma, \text{validity}\).

**Case I, B are honest and A is corrupt:**

Analogous to the case when only \(B\) is corrupt.

**Case I, B are corrupt and A is honest:**

Upon receiving \((A, \text{create}, \gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} F_{ch}(i)\) proceed as follows:
1. Set \(id_A := \gamma.\text{subchan}(\gamma, \text{id}), cid_A := A||\gamma, \text{id}\) and \(id_B := \gamma.\text{subchan}(B), cid_B \neq B||\gamma, \text{id}\). Compute \(\tilde{\sigma}_A := \text{Init}_{\text{C}}^\gamma(A, \tau_0, \gamma)\).
2. In round \(\tau_0\), internally simulate \(F_{ch}(i - 1)\) upon receiving \((\text{update}, id_A, cid_A, \tilde{\sigma}_A, \text{VSCC}_i(C)) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} A\) and forward the result to \(I\).
3. If \((\text{update–reply}, ok, id_A, cid_A) \xrightarrow{\tau_0 + 1} I\), then internally simulate \(F_{ch}(i - 1)\) upon receiving this message, send \((\text{create}, \gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0 + 1} F_{ch}(i)\) on behalf of \(I\) and send \((\text{create–ok}, \gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0 + 3} B\) on behalf of \(A\).
4. If \((\text{create–ok}, \gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0 + 2} B\), then send \((\text{create}, \gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0 + 3} F_{ch}(i)\) on behalf of \(B\) and add \(\gamma\) to \(\Gamma^A\).
5. Wait till round \(\gamma, \text{validity}\).

**Case A, I are corrupt and B is honest:**

Analogous to the case when only \(A\) is honest.

**Case A, B are corrupt and I is honest:**

Upon receiving \((I, \text{create}, \gamma) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} F_{ch}(i)\) proceed as follows:
1. Set \(id_A := \gamma.\text{subchan}(\gamma, \text{id}), cid_A := A||\gamma, \text{id}\) and \(id_B := \gamma.\text{subchan}(B), cid_B \neq B||\gamma, \text{id}\). Compute \(\tilde{\sigma}_A := \text{Init}_{\text{C}}^\gamma(A, \tau_0, \gamma)\) and \(\tilde{\sigma}_B := \text{Init}_{\text{C}}^\gamma(B, \tau_0, \gamma)\).
2. If \((\text{update}, id_A, cid_A, \tilde{\sigma}_A, \text{VSCC}_i(C)) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} A\) and in the same round \((\text{update}, id_B, cid_B, \tilde{\sigma}_B, \text{VSCC}_i(C)) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} B\), then proceed. Else stop.
3. For both \(T \in \{A, B\}\), internally simulate \(F_{ch}(i - 1)\) upon receiving the message \((\text{update}, id_T, cid_T, \tilde{\sigma}_T, \text{VSCC}_i(C)) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} T\).
4. For both \(T \in \{A, B\}\) internally simulate \(F_{ch}(i - 1)\) upon receiving the message \((\text{update–reply}, ok, id_T, cid_T) \xrightarrow{\tau_0 + 1} I\) and forward the result to \(T\).
5. Wait till round \(\gamma, \text{validity}\).

Register a contact instance in a virtual state channel. Similarly as for the ledger state channels, we will separately define a sub-simulator \(\text{SimRegister}\), which can be called as a procedure by the simulator \(S_i\). The subsimulator is defined below.

**Subsimulator: \(\text{SimRegister}_i(P, id, cid)\)**

We use the notation established in Section 4.3. In addition, let \(\text{TE}_{\text{sub}} := \text{TimeExecute}([i/2])\), \(F_{ch}(i) := F_{ch}^{\xi_i}(i, C)\) and \(F_{ch}(i - 1) := F_{ch}^{\xi_i}(i - 1, C)\).

**All parties are honest:**

1. Let \(\gamma := \Gamma^P(id), id_P := \gamma.\text{subchan}(P), cid_P := P||\gamma, \text{id}, id_Q := \gamma.\text{subchan}(Q), cid_Q := Q||\gamma^P, \text{id}, v^P := \gamma.\text{cspace}(cid), v^Q := \Gamma^Q(id).\text{cspace}(cid)\) and let \(\tau_0\) be the current round.

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2. In round $\tau_0$, internally simulate $F_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving (execute, $id_P, cid_P, RegisterInstance^C_i$, $(cid, \nu^P)) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} P$.

3. In round $\tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + 5$, internally simulate $F_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving (execute, $id_Q, cid_Q, RegisterInstance^C_i$, $(cid, \nu^Q)) \xrightarrow{\tau_1} I$.

4. In round $\tau_2 \leq \tau_1 + 5$, internally simulate $F_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving (execute, $id_Q, cid_Q, RegisterInstance^C_i$, $(cid, \nu^Q)) \xrightarrow{\tau_2} Q$.

5. In round $\tau_3 \leq \tau_2 + 5$, internally simulate $F_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving (execute, $id_Q, cid_Q, RegisterInstance^C_i$, $(cid, \nu^Q)) \xrightarrow{\tau_3} I$.

**Case $P, I$ are honest and $Q$ is corrupt:**

1. Let $\gamma := \Gamma^P(id), id_P := \gamma.subchan(P), cid_P := P||\gamma.id, id_Q := \gamma.subchan(Q), cid_Q := Q||\gamma.id,$ $\nu^P := \gamma.cspace(cid)$ and let $\tau_0$ be the current round.

2. In round $\tau_0$, internally simulate $F_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving (execute, $id_P, cid_P, RegisterInstance^C_i$, $(cid, \nu^P)) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} P$.

3. In round $\tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + 5$, internally simulate $F_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving (execute, $id_Q, cid_Q, RegisterInstance^C_i$, $(cid, \nu^Q)) \xrightarrow{\tau_1} I$ and forward the result of the execution to $Q$.

4. Let $\tau_2 \leq \tau_1 + \text{TE}_{sub}$ be the current round. Distinguish the following two cases
   - If (execute, $id_Q, cid_Q, RegisterInstance^C_i$, $(cid, \nu^Q)) \xrightarrow{\tau_2} Q$, where $\nu^Q$ is a valid contract instance, then
     (a) Internally simulate $F_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving (execute, $id_Q, cid_Q, RegisterInstance^C_i$, $(cid, \nu^Q)) \xrightarrow{\tau_2} I$ and forward the result of execution to $Q$.
     (b) Let $\tilde{\nu}$ be the internally registered version of the contract instance $cid$ in the state channel $id_Q$. In round $\tau_3 \leq \tau_2 + \text{TE}_{sub}$, internally simulate $F_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving (execute, $id_P, cid_P, RegisterInstance^C_i$, $(cid, \tilde{\nu})) \xrightarrow{\tau_3} I$.
   - Otherwise in round $\tau_3 := \tau_1 + 3 \cdot \text{TE}_{sub}$ proceed as follows
     (a) Internally simulate $F_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving (execute, $id_Q, cid_Q, EndRegisterInstance$, $cid) \xrightarrow{\tau_3} I$ and forward the result of execution to $Q$.
     (b) Internally simulate $F_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving (execute, $id_P, cid_P, EndRegisterInstance$, $cid) \xrightarrow{\tau_3} I$.

**Case $P, Q$ are honest and $I$ is corrupt:**

1. Let $\gamma := \Gamma^P(id), id_P := \gamma.subchan(P), cid_P := P||\gamma.id, id_Q := \gamma.subchan(Q), cid_Q := Q||\gamma.id.$

2. Let $\nu^P := \gamma.cspace(cid)$ and $\nu^Q := \Gamma^Q(id).cspace(cid)$.

3. Internally simulate $F_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving the message (execute, $id_P, cid_P, RegisterInstance^C_i$, $(cid, \nu^P)) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} P$ and forward the result of the execution to $I$.

4. Let $\tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + \text{TE}_{sub}$ be the current round. The distinguish the following two situations
   - If (execute, $id_Q, cid_Q, RegisterInstance^C_i$, $(cid, \nu^Q)) \xrightarrow{\tau_1} I$, then
     (a) Internally simulate $F_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving (execute, $id_Q, cid_Q, RegisterInstance^C_i$, $(cid, \nu^Q)) \xrightarrow{\tau_1} I$ and forward the result of execution to $I$.
     (b) Let $\tau_2 \leq \tau_1 + \text{TE}_{sub}$ be the current round. Internally simulate $F_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving (execute, $id_Q, cid_Q, RegisterInstance^C_i$, $(cid, \nu^Q)) \xrightarrow{\tau_2} Q$ and forward the result of execution to $I$ and goto step 5.
   - Else go to step 5.

5. Distinguish the following two cases
Upon (execute, $id_P, cid_P, \textit{RegisterInstance}_c$, $(cid, \nu^P)) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} P$, such that $\alpha \neq \bot$ for $\alpha := \Gamma(id_P)$, $\nu \neq \bot$ for $\nu := \alpha.\textit{cspace}(cid_P)$, $\nu.\text{type} = \textit{VSCC}_c(C)$, $\nu.\text{storage}.\text{cspace}(cid') = \bot$ for every $cid' \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $\nu^P$ is a valid contract instance, proceed as follows:

1. Set $\gamma := \nu.\text{storage}.\text{virtual-channel}, Q := \gamma.\text{other-party}(P), id_Q := \gamma.\text{subchan}(Q), cid_Q := Q||\gamma.id$ and $\nu^Q := \Gamma_Q(\gamma.id).\text{cspace}(cid)$.
2. In round $\tau_0$, internally simulate $\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving $(execute, id_P, cid_P, \textit{RegisterInstance}_c, (cid, \nu^P)) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} P$ and forward the result of the execution to $P$.
3. Let $\tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + \text{TE}_{sub}$ be the current round. Internally simulate $\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving $(execute, id_Q, cid_Q, \textit{RegisterInstance}_c, (cid, \nu^Q)) \xrightarrow{\tau_1} I$.
4. In round $\tau_2 \leq \tau_1 + 5$, internally simulate $\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving $(execute, id_P, cid_P, \textit{RegisterInstance}_c, (cid, \nu^P)) \xrightarrow{\tau_2} Q$.
5. In round $\tau_3 \leq \tau_2 + 5$, internally simulate $\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving $(execute, id_p, cid_p, \textit{RegisterInstance}_c, (cid, \nu^Q)) \xrightarrow{\tau_3} I$ and forward the result of the execution to $P$.

Case $I, Q$ are honest and $P$ is corrupt:

Upon (execute, $id_P, cid_P, \textit{RegisterInstance}_c, (cid, \nu^P)) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} P$, such that $\alpha \neq \bot$ for $\alpha := \Gamma(id_P)$, $\nu \neq \bot$ for $\nu := \alpha.\text{cspace}(cid_P)$, $\nu.\text{type} = \textit{VSCC}_c(C)$, $\nu.\text{storage}.\text{cspace}(cid') = \bot$ for every $cid' \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $\nu^P$ is a valid contract instance, proceed as follows:

1. Set $\gamma := \nu.\text{storage}.\text{virtual-channel}, Q := \gamma.\text{other-party}(P), id_Q := \gamma.\text{subchan}(Q), cid_Q := Q||\gamma.id$ and $\nu^Q := \Gamma_Q(\gamma.id).\text{cspace}(cid)$.
2. Internally simulate $\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving $(execute, id_P, cid_P, \textit{RegisterInstance}_c, (cid, \nu^P)) \xrightarrow{\tau_0} P$ and forward the result of the execution to $P$.
3. Let $\tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + \text{TE}_{sub}$ be the current round. Internally simulate $\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving $(execute, id_Q, cid_Q, \textit{RegisterInstance}_c, (cid, \nu^Q)) \xrightarrow{\tau_1} I$ and forward the result of the execution to $Q$.
4. Let $\tau_2 \leq \tau_1 + \text{TE}_{sub}$ be the current round. Then distinguish two cases
   - If (execute, $id_Q, cid_Q, \textit{RegisterInstance}_c, (cid, \nu^Q)) \xrightarrow{\tau_2} Q$, then proceed as follows
     a. Internally simulate $\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving $(execute, id_Q, cid_Q, \textit{RegisterInstance}_c, (cid, \nu^Q)) \xrightarrow{\tau_2} Q$ and forward the result of the execution to $Q$. Let $\tilde{v}$ be the registered contract instance.
     b. In round $\tau_3 := \tau_2 + \text{TE}_{sub}$, internally simulate $\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving $(execute, id_P, cid_P, \textit{RegisterInstance}_c, (cid, \tilde{v})) \xrightarrow{\tau_3} I$ and forward the result of the execution to $P$.
   - Otherwise set $\tilde{v} := \nu^P$ and in round $\tau_3 := \tau_1 + 2 \cdot \text{TE}_{sub}$ do the following
     a. Internally simulate $\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving $(execute, id_Q, cid_Q, \textit{EndRegisterInstance}_c, cid) \xrightarrow{\tau_3} I$ and forward the result of the execution to $Q$.
     b. Internally simulate $\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving $(execute, id_P, cid_P, \textit{EndRegisterInstance}_c, cid) \xrightarrow{\tau_3} I$ and forward the result of the execution to $P$.
5. Let $\tau_4$ be the current round. Then (update, $id, cid, \tilde{v}.\text{storage}, \tilde{v}.\text{type}) \xrightarrow{\tau_4} \mathcal{F}_{ch}(i)$ on behalf of $P$ and (update–reply, $ok, id, cid) \xrightarrow{\tau_4 + 1} \mathcal{F}_{ch}(i)$ on behalf of $Q$.

Case $Q$ is honest and $P, I$ are corrupt:
1. If \((\text{execute, } id_Q, cid_Q, \text{RegisterInstance}^i_c, (cid, \nu^P)) \xRightarrow{\tau_0} I\), such that \(\beta \neq \perp\) for \(\beta := \Gamma(id_Q)\), \(\nu \neq \perp\) for \(\nu := \beta \cdot \text{cspace}(cid_Q)\), \(\nu \cdot \text{type} = \text{VSCC}(C)\), \(\nu \cdot \text{storage.cspace}(cid') = \perp\) for every \(cid' \in \{0, 1\}^*\) and \(\nu^P\) is a valid contract instance, then proceed. Otherwise stop.
2. Set \(\gamma := \nu \cdot \text{storage.virtual-channel}\), \(Q := \gamma \cdot \text{other-party}(P)\) and \(\nu^Q := \Gamma_Q(\gamma \cdot \text{id}).\text{cspace}(cid)\).
3. Internally simulate \(\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i - 1)\) upon receiving the message \((\text{execute, } id_Q, cid_Q, \text{RegisterInstance}^i_c, (cid, \nu^P)) \xRightarrow{\tau_0} I\) and forward the result of execution to \(I\).
4. Let \(\tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + \text{TE}_{\text{sub}}\) be the current round. Internally simulate \(\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i - 1)\) upon receiving \((\text{execute, } id_Q, cid_Q, \text{RegisterInstance}^i_c, (cid, \nu^P)) \xRightarrow{\tau_0} I\) and forward the result of execution to \(I\).

**Case \(P\) is honest and \(Q, I\) are corrupt:**

1. Let \(\gamma := \Gamma^P(id), \ id_P := \gamma \cdot \text{subchan}(P), \ cid_P := P||\gamma \cdot \text{id}, \ id_Q := \gamma \cdot \text{subchan}(Q), \ cid_Q := Q||\gamma \cdot \text{id}\) and \(\nu^P := \gamma \cdot \text{cspace}(cid)\).
2. Internally simulate \(\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i - 1)\) upon receiving \((\text{execute, } id_P, cid_P, \text{RegisterInstance}^i_c, (cid, \nu^P)) \xRightarrow{\tau_0} P\) and forward the result of execution to \(I\).
3. Then distinguish the following two situations
   - If \((\text{execute, } id_P, cid_P, \text{RegisterInstance}^i_c, (cid, \nu^P)) \xRightarrow{\tau_1 \leq \tau_0 + 3 \cdot \text{TE}_{\text{sub}}} I, \) then internally simulate \(\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i - 1)\) upon receiving \((\text{execute, } id_P, cid_P, \text{RegisterInstance}^i_c, (cid, \nu^P)) \xRightarrow{\tau_1} I\) and forward the result of execution to \(I\).
   - Else, in round \(\tau_2 := \tau_0 + 4 \cdot \text{TE}_{\text{sub}}\), internally simulate \(\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i - 1)\) upon receiving \((\text{execute, } id_P, cid_P, \text{EndRegisterInstance}^i_c, cid) \xRightarrow{\tau_2} I\) and forward the result of execution to \(I\).

**Update a contract instance in a virtual state channel.** The description of the simulator \(S_i\) for the contract instance update in a virtual state channel of length \(i\) will be very similar to the simulator \(S_1\). Therefore, we refer the reader to the described in Appx. C and discuss here only the main differences. Firstly, the simulator \(S_i\) internally calls the subsimulator \(\text{SimRegister}_i\) instead of the subsimulator \(\text{SimRegister}\) and secondly, in case the initiating party \(P\) is corrupt the simulator \(S_i\) also checks if there is no other contract instance \(cid'\) already created in the virtual state channel (recall that we allow only one contract instance to be opened in each virtual state channel).

**Execute a contract instance in a virtual state channel.** In case both end-users of the virtual state channel are honest, the simulator \(S_i\) is defined exactly as the simulator \(S_1\), see Appx. C. Let us below define the simulator for the cases when at least one of the end-users is corrupt.

**Simulator \(S_i\): Contract instance execution**

We use the abbreviated notation from Section 4.3. Let \(\text{TE}_{\text{sub}} := \text{TimeExecute}([i/2])\), \(\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i) := \mathcal{F}_{ch}^c(i, C)\) and \(\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i - 1) := \mathcal{F}_{ch}^c(i - 1, \text{VSCC}(C) \cup C)\).

**Case \(P\) and \(I\) are honest and \(Q\) is corrupt:**

Upon \((P, \text{execute, } id, cid, f, z) \xRightarrow{\tau_0} \mathcal{F}_{ch}\), let \(\gamma^P := \Gamma^P(id), \ nu^P := \gamma^P \cdot \text{cspace}(cid), \ a^P := nu^P \cdot \text{storage.version}\) and \(nu^P := nu^P \cdot \text{version}\). In addition, set \(\tau_1 := \tau_0 + x\), where \(x\) is the smallest offset such that \(\tau_1 = 1 \mod 4\) if \(P = \gamma^P\). Alice and \(\tau_1 = 3 \mod 4\) if \(P = \gamma^P\). Bob. Wait till round \(\tau_1\) and then proceed as follows:

1. If \((id, cid)\) is not marked as corrupt in \(\gamma^P\), do:
   (a) Set \((\hat{s}, \text{add}, L, \text{add}, R, m) := f(a^P, P, \tau_0, z)\). If \(m = \perp\), then stop.
   (b) Else compute \(s_P := \text{Sign}_{sk_P}(id, cid, \hat{s}, nu^P \cdot \text{type}, nu^P + 1)\) and send (peaceful–request, \(id, cid, f, z, s_P, \tau_0\)) \xrightarrow{\tau_1 + 1} Q.\)
Upon receiving $(id, cid, f, z, s_Q)$, do: 

(a) Compute $\sigma_Q := \nu_Q.\text{storage}, \nu_Q := \nu_Q.\text{version}$. If $\sigma_Q = 1$ or $P \notin \gamma_Q.\text{end-users}$ or $\nu_Q = \bot$ or $f \notin \nu_Q.\text{type}$, then goto step 4.

2. If $P = \gamma_Q.Alice$ and $\tau_1 \mod 4 \neq 1$ or if $P = \gamma_Q.Bob$ and $\tau_1 \mod 4 \neq 3$, then goto step 4.

3. If $(id, cid)$ is not marked as corrupt in $I_P$, do:

(a) Compute $\sigma = \nu.\text{version}$.

(b) If $m = 1$ or $\nu_P.\text{type} = \bot$, then goto step 4.

(c) Send $(id, cid, f, z, s_Q) \stackrel{\tau_2+1}{\rightarrow} F_{ch}$ on behalf of $P$ and instruct the functionality to deliver the result.

(d) Compute the signature $s_Q := \text{Sign}_{sk_P}(id, cid, \sigma_Q, \nu_Q.\text{type}, \nu_Q + 1)$, send (peaceful–confirm, id, cid, f, z, s_Q) \stackrel{\tau_1+1}{\rightarrow} P$, set $\Gamma_Q := \text{LocalUpdateAdd}(\Gamma_Q, id, cid, \sigma, \nu_Q.\text{type}, add_L, add_R)$ and stop.

4. Mark $(id, cid)$ as corrupt in $I_P$ and stop.

Upon $P$, the registration procedure for id, cid, then execute the sub-simulator $\text{SimRegister}(P, id, cid)$ and proceed as follows:

1. Let $\alpha := \Gamma(id_P), \nu_P := \alpha.\text{channel}(id_P), \gamma := \nu_P.\text{virtual–channel}, Q := \gamma.\text{other–party}(P), id_Q := \gamma.\text{subchan}(Q)$. In addition, parse $p_n := (P, \tau_0, f, z, s_n)$.

2. Send $(id, cid, f, z, s_Q) \stackrel{\tau_2}{\rightarrow} F_{ch}(i)$ and internally simulate $F_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving (execute, $id_P, cid_P, \text{ExecuteInstance}(cid, p_n)) \stackrel{\tau_2}{\rightarrow} P$ and forward the result to $P$. If the result of execution is $(\text{executed}, id_P, cid_P, \sigma, \nu_Q.\text{type}, add_L, add_R, m_P)$, where $m_P = (\text{instance–executing}, cid, p_n, m)$, proceed. Else stop.

3. In round $\tau_3 \leq \tau_2 + \text{TE}_{\text{sub}}$, internally simulate $F_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving (execute, $id_Q, cid_Q$, $\text{ExecuteInstance}(cid, p_n)) \stackrel{\tau_1}{\rightarrow} I$ and update the set $\Gamma_Q$.

4. In round $\tau_4 \leq \tau_3 + 5$, internally simulate $F_{ch}(i - 1)$ upon receiving (execute, $id_P, cid_P, \text{EndExecuteInstance}(cid, p_n)) \stackrel{\tau_2}{\rightarrow} I$.
5. Let $\tau_5 \leq \tau_4 + T\text{E}_{\text{sub}}$ be the current round. Instruct the ideal functionality to output the result.

**Case $P$ and $Q$ are corrupt and $I$ is honest:**

Internally simulate the communication of the corrupt parties. If $P$ starting the registration procedure for $id,cid$, then execute the sub-simulator $\text{SimRegister}(P, id, cid)$ for the case when both parties are corrupt. Note that if the registration procedure is successful (a contract instance gets registered), the subsimulator $\text{SimRegister}$, instructs the ideal functionality to update the contract instance accordingly.

Upon $(\text{execute}, id_P, cid_P, \text{ExecuteInstance}, (cid, p_n)) \xrightarrow{i} P$ proceed as follows:

1. Let $\alpha := \Gamma(id_P)$, $\nu_P := \alpha.\text{cspace}(cid_P)$, $\gamma := \nu_P.\text{storage.virtual--channel}, Q := \gamma.\text{other--party}(P)$, $id_Q := \gamma.\text{subchan}(Q)$ and $cid_Q := Q||id$. In addition, parse $p_n := (P, \tau_0, f, z, s_n)$.
2. Send $(\text{execute}, \gamma, id, cid, f, z) \xrightarrow{\gamma} \text{F}_{\text{ch}}(i)$ and internally simulate $\text{F}_{\text{ch}}(i - 1)$ upon receiving $(\text{execute}, id_P, cid_P, \text{ExecuteInstance}, (cid, p_n)) \xrightarrow{i} P$ and forward the result to $P$. If the result of execution is $(\text{executed}, id_P, cid_P, \text{End}, \text{Simulator})$, where $m_P = (\text{instance--executing}, cid, p_n, m)$, proceed. Else stop.
3. In round $\tau_3 \leq \tau_2 + T\text{E}_{\text{sub}}$, internally simulate $\text{F}_{\text{ch}}(i - 1)$ upon receiving $(\text{execute}, id_Q, cid_Q, \text{ExecuteInstance}, (cid, p_n)) \xrightarrow{i} I$ and forward the result to $Q$.
4. In round $\tau_4 \leq \tau_3 + T\text{E}_{\text{sub}}$, internally simulate $\text{F}_{\text{ch}}(i - 1)$ upon receiving $(\text{execute}, id_P, cid_P, \text{ExecuteInstance}, (cid, p_n)) \xrightarrow{i} I$ and forward the result to $P$.
5. Let $\tau_5 \leq \tau_4 + T\text{E}_{\text{sub}}$ be the current round. Instruct the ideal functionality to output the result.

**Closing a virtual state channel.** Finally, we finalize the definition of the simulator $S_4$ by defining its behavior in time $\gamma.\text{validity}$, where $\gamma$ is a virtual state channel of length $i$ whose creation environment requested earlier.

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**Simulator $S_4$: Closing a virtual state channel**

We use the abbreviated notation from Section 4.3. Let $T\text{E}_{\text{sub}} := \text{TimeExecute}([i/2])$, $\text{F}_{\text{ch}}(i) := \mathcal{F}_{\text{ch}}^{L(\Delta)}(i, C)$ and $\text{F}_{\text{ch}}(i - 1) := \mathcal{F}_{\text{ch}}^{L(\Delta)}(i - 1, \text{VSCC}_i(C) \cup C)$.

**Case $A,B,I$ are honest**

Let $\gamma$ the virtual state channel to be closed. In round $\gamma.\text{validity}$ proceed as follows for both $T \in \{A, B\}$.

1. Set $id_T := \gamma.\text{subchan}(\gamma, id)$, $cid_T := T||id$.
2. In parallel, run the subsimulator $\text{SimRegister}$, with parameters $T, \gamma, id, cid$ for every $cid \in \{0, 1\}^*$ such that $\Gamma^T(\gamma, id).\text{cspace}(cid) \neq \bot$.
3. After the subsimulator is executed, then internally simulate $\text{F}_{\text{ch}}(i - 1)$ upon receiving $(\text{execute}, id_T, cid_T, \text{Close}_T, \emptyset) \rightarrow T$.
4. After the execution, set $\Gamma^T(\gamma, id) := \bot$.

**Case $A,B$ are honest and $I$ is corrupt**

In round $\gamma.\text{validity}$ for both $T \in \{A, B\}$ proceed as follows.

1. Set $id := \gamma, id, id_T := \gamma.\text{subchan}(T), cid_T := T||id$.
2. If $\Gamma^T(id) = \bot$ and $\Gamma(id_T).\text{cspace}(cid_T) = \bot$, then stop.
3. If $\Gamma^T(id) = \bot$ but $\Gamma(id_T).\text{cspace}(cid_T) \neq \bot$, then go to step 5.
4. If $\Gamma^T(id) \neq \bot$, then in parallel, run the subsimulator $\text{SimRegister}$, with parameters $T, \gamma, id, cid$ for every $cid \in \{0, 1\}^*$ such that $\Gamma^T(\gamma, id).\text{cspace}(cid) \neq \bot$ and after the execution go to step 5.
5. In round $\tau_1 := \gamma.\text{validity} + \text{TimeRegister}(i) + T\text{E}_{\text{sub}}$, internally simulate $\text{F}_{\text{ch}}(i - 1)$ upon receiving $(\text{execute}, id_T, cid_T, \text{Close}_T, \emptyset) \xrightarrow{i} T$. 

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6. After the execution, set $\Gamma_A(\gamma, \text{id}) := \bot$.

**Case A, I are honest and B is corrupt**

In round $\gamma$, proceed as follows.

1. Set $id := \gamma, \text{id}$, $id_A := \gamma, \text{subchan}(A)$, $cid_A := A||id$, $id_B := \gamma, \text{subchan}(B)$, $cid_B := B||id$.
2. If $\Gamma_A(id) = \bot$, then stop.
3. If $\Gamma_A(id) \neq \bot$, then in parallel, run the subsimulator $\text{SimRegister}_i$ with parameters $A, \gamma, \text{id}, cid$ for every $cid \in \{0,1\}^*$ such that $\Gamma_A(\gamma, \text{id}).\text{cspace}(cid) \neq \bot$ and $(id, cid)$ is not marked as registered in $\Gamma_A$. After the execution goto step 5.
4. If $B$ starts the registration procedure with parameters $B, id, cid$ for some $cid \in \{0,1\}^*$, then execute the subsimulator $\text{SimRegister}_i$, with the same parameters.
5. In round $\tau_1 := \gamma, \text{validity} + \text{TimeRegister}(i) + \text{TE}_{\text{sub}}$, internally simulate $\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i-1)$ upon receiving $(\text{execute}, id_A, cid_A, \text{Close}_i^C, \emptyset) \xleftarrow{\tau_1} A$. After the execution, set $\Gamma_A(\gamma, \text{id}) := \bot$.
6. Upon receiving $(\text{execute}, id_B, cid_B, \text{Close}_i^C, \emptyset) \xleftarrow{\tau_1} B$, internally simulate the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i-1)$ upon receiving this message and forward the result to $B$.
7. If $B$ does not initiate the execution, then in round $\tau_2 := \tau_1 + \text{TE}_{\text{sub}}$ internally simulate the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i-1)$ upon receiving $(\text{execute}, id_B, cid_B, \text{Close}_i^C, \emptyset) \xleftarrow{\tau_2} I$ and forward the result to $I$.

**Case B, I are honest and A is corrupt**

Analogous to the previous case.

**Case A is honest and I, B are corrupt**

In round $\gamma$, proceed as follows.

1. Set $id := \gamma, \text{id}$, $id_A := \gamma, \text{subchan}(A)$, $cid_A := A||id$
2. If $\Gamma_A(id) = \bot$ and $\Gamma(id_A).\text{cspace}(cid_A) = \bot$, then stop.
3. If $\Gamma_A(id) = \bot$ but $\Gamma(id_A).\text{cspace}(cid_A) \neq \bot$, then goto step 6.
4. If $\Gamma_A(id) \neq \bot$, then in parallel, run the subsimulator $\text{SimRegister}_i$ with parameters $A, \gamma, \text{id}, cid$ for every $cid \in \{0,1\}^*$ such that $\Gamma_A(\gamma, \text{id}).\text{cspace}(cid) \neq \bot$ and $(id, cid)$ is not marked as registered in $\Gamma_A$. After the execution goto step 6.
5. If $B$ starts the registration procedure with parameters $B, id, cid$ for some $cid \in \{0,1\}^*$, then execute the subsimulator $\text{SimRegister}_i$, with the same parameters.
6. In round $\tau_1 := \gamma, \text{validity} + \text{TimeRegister}(i) + \text{TE}_{\text{sub}}$, internally simulate $\mathcal{F}_{ch}(i-1)$ upon receiving $(\text{execute}, id_A, cid_A, \text{Close}_i^C, \emptyset) \xleftarrow{\tau_1} A$. After the execution, set $\Gamma_A(\gamma, \text{id}) := \bot$.

**Case B is honest and I, A are corrupt**

Analogous to the previous case.