You are looking at a specific version 20180226:195626 of this paper. See the latest version.

Paper 2018/218

Fault Resilient Encoding Schemes in Software: How Far Can We Go?

Jakub Breier and Xiaolu Hou and Yang Liu

Abstract

Cryptographic implementations are often vulnerable against physical attacks, fault injection analysis being among the most popular techniques. On par with development of attacks, the area of countermeasures is advancing rapidly, utilizing both hardware- and software-based approaches. When it comes to software encoding countermeasures for fault protection and their evaluation, there are very few proposals so far, mostly focusing on single operations rather than on cipher as a whole. In this paper we propose an evaluation framework that can be used for analyzing the effectivity of software encoding countermeasures against fault attacks. We first formalize the encoding schemes in software, helping us to define what properties are required when designing a fault protection. These findings show that using anticodes in such countermeasure can increase its detection capabilities. We provide a way to generate a code according to user criteria and also a method to evaluate the level of protection of assembly implementations using encoding schemes. This evaluation is based on static code analysis and provides a practical information on how good will the protection be on a real device. Finally, we verify our findings by implementing a block cipher PRESENT, protected by encoding scheme based on anticodes, and provide a detailed evaluation of such implementation.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
software encoding schemesfault attackscountermeasuresevaluation
Contact author(s)
jbreier @ ntu edu sg
History
2019-02-03: last of 2 revisions
2018-02-26: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/218
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.