Two round multiparty computation via Multi-key fully homomorphic encryption with faster homomorphic evaluations

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Abstract. Multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (MKFHE) allows computations on ciphertexts encrypted by different users (public keys), and the results can be jointly decrypted using the secret keys of all the users involved. The NTRU-based scheme is an important alternative to post-quantum cryptography, but the NTRU-based MKFHE has the following drawbacks, which cause it inefficient in scenarios such as secure multi-party computing (MPC). One is the relinearization technique used for key switching takes up most of the time of the scheme’s homomorphic evaluation, the other is that each user needs to decrypt in sequence, which makes the decryption process complicated. We propose an efficient leveled MKFHE scheme, which improves the efficiency of homomorphic evaluations, and constructs a two-round (MPC) protocol based on this. Firstly, we construct an efficient single key FHE with less relinearization operations. We greatly reduces the number of relinearization operations in homomorphic evaluations process by separating the homomorphic multiplication and relinearization techniques. Furthermore, the batching technique and a specialization of modulus can be applied to our scheme to improve the efficiency. Secondly, the efficient single-key homomorphic encryption scheme proposed in this paper is transformed into a multi-key vision according to the method in LT12v1 scheme. Finally, we construct a distributed decryption process which can be implemented independently for all participating users, and reduce the number of interactions between users in the decryption process. Based on this, a two-round MPC protocol is proposed. Experimental analysis shows that the homomorphic evaluation of the single-key FHE scheme constructed in this paper is 2.4 times faster than DHS16, and the MKFHE scheme constructed in this paper can be used to implement a two-round MPC protocol effectively, which can be applied to secure MPC between multiple users under the cloud computing environment.

Keywords: Multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (MKFHE), NTRU, two-round MPC, relinearization

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1 Introduction

People are increasingly inclined to store large amounts of data on powerful cloud servers and outsource the cumbersome and complicated data computing process to the cloud. Although the cloud facilitates the storage and computation of big data, it is also vulnerable to be attacked by illegal organizations and users [1], thus triggering a serious issue that cannot be ignored about how to protect users’ individual privacy and data security?

Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [2] allows arbitrary computation on encrypted data without access to user’s secret key, it has exchangeable properties for data encryption and computation, and can be used to protect the privacy and security processing of data in cloud computing environment.

Following the breakthrough blueprint [3] of FHE designed by Gentry in 2009, FHE has come a long way [4-9]. Traditional FHE is only suitable for scenarios where the computations of ciphertext involve a single user, since it requires all the input ciphertext to be encrypted under the same key. However, in many real-world scenarios, it is often necessary to perform computations on encrypted data corresponding to different users, while ensuring that the user’s individual privacy is not exposed.

Multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (MKFHE) [10] allows computations on ciphertexts encrypted by different parties without trust, and the results can be jointly decrypted using the secret keys of all the users involved. Meanwhile, the process of computations on ciphertexts can be outsourced to the cloud offline, which avoid the interaction between the users, and can be applied to implement the secure multi-party computing (MPC) [11-14] of multi-users in the cloud computing environment.

Similar to traditional single-key FHE, the type of current MKFHE mainly include NTRU type, GSW type and BGV type.

In 2012, L’opez-Alt et al. first proposed the concept of MKFHE, and construct a MKFHE scheme [LTV12] based on a variant NTRU public key cryptosystem [15], which is a variant of the original NTRU scheme in [16]. Its security relies on two assumptions: the ring-learning with errors (RLWE) assumption and the decisional small polynomial ratio (DSPR) assumption. [17] improved the efficiency of [LTV12] by optimizing parameters, introducing a specialization of the ring structure and modulus. In PKC2017, Chongchitmate et al. proposed an NTRU-type MKFHE scheme [18], which can protect the circuit privacy. This scheme proposes a basic framework for constructing MKFHE with circuit privacy characteristics, and constructs a basic framework based on this. 3 rounds of on-the-fly MPC protocol.

Clear and McGoldrick [19] proposed the first GSW-type MKFHE scheme CM15 based on the learning with error (LWE) problem whose security can be reduced to the worst-case hardness of problems on ideal lattices. Mukherjee and Wichs [20] simplified [CM15] and gave a construction of MKFHE scheme MW16 based on LWE. [MW16] can be used to construct a simple 1-round threshold decryption protocol and a two-round MPC protocol. Both [19] and [20] need to determine the parties involved in homomorphic computation in advance and
any new party cannot be allowed to join in during the homomorphic computation. This type of MKFHE is called single-hop in [21], comparing to multi-hop MKFHE whose result ciphertext can be employed to further evaluation with new parties, i.e. any new party can dynamically join the homomorphic evaluation at any time. Another similar concept named fully dynamic MKFHE was proposed in [22], which means that the bound of number of users does not need to be input during the setup procedure.

In TCC2017, Chen et al. proposed a BGV-type multi-hop MKFHE scheme [23], which supports the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)-based ciphertexts packing technique, and simplifies the ciphertext extension process in MKFHE. What’s more, [23] admits a threshold decryption protocol and two-round MPC protocol.

Comparing to BGV-type and GSW-type MKFHE, NTRU-based MKFHE scheme is simple and much faster. Furthermore, the ciphertext of NTRU-type scheme is a polynomial, thus the implementation of NTRU-type scheme is efficient, and the process of ciphertext extension is not required when extending a single-key NTRU-type FHE scheme to a multi-key vision.

**Contributions.** In this paper, we propose an efficient leveled MKFHE scheme which improves the efficiency of homomorphic evaluations, and constructs a two-round multiparty computation (MPC) protocol based on this.

- Optimized the single-key leveled FHE scheme in DHS16. We reduce the number of relinearization operations in homomorphic evaluations process by separating the homomorphic multiplication and relinearization techniques.
- Construct a multi-key leveled FHE scheme. Comparing to LTV12, the relinearization process are implemented after evaluating two levels circuit, which can reduce the computational complexity significantly. Besides that, only the evaluation keys whose corresponding users are existed in at least two ciphertexts are employed in relinearization process, which is efficient and important in real applications.
- Construct an efficient two-round MPC based on the multi-key FHE scheme in this paper. We construct a distributed decryption process which can be implemented independently for all participating users, thus reduce the interaction processes between users in the decryption process.

## 2 Background

### 2.1 Preliminaries

In this paper, the bold upper case letters denote matrices, and the bold lower case letters denote vectors, and all the vectors are represented as columns. For a vector $\mathbf{a}$ we use $\mathbf{a}[i]$ to denote the $i$-th element in $\mathbf{a}$. For a positive integer $n \in \mathbb{N}$, let $[n] = \{1, ..., n\}$. For a distribution $A$, let $x \leftarrow A$ denote $x$ is chosen according to a distribution $A$.

For security parameter $\lambda$, let $d = d(\lambda)$ be a positive integer, and let $\varphi_d(x) = x^n + 1$ be the $d$-th cyclotomic polynomial, and the degree $n = \phi(d)$ is a power of 2, where $\phi(\cdot)$ is the Euler’s totient function.
The polynomial ring used in our scheme is defined as $R = \mathbb{Z}(x)/\varphi(x)$, and all operations over the ciphertext are performed in $R_q = R/qR$ where the modulus $q = q(\lambda)$ is a prime or a power of prime. Elements in $R_q$ are polynomials with coefficients in $[-q/2, q/2]$ (except for $q = 2$). We also define a $B=\lambda$-bound error distribution $\chi$ over the ring $R = \mathbb{Z}(x)/\varphi(x)$, which means that the coefficients of polynomial sampled from $\chi$ are at most $B$ in absolute value. For $a \in R$, we use $\|a\|_\infty = \max_{0 \leq i \leq n-1} |a_i|$ to denote the standard $\|\|_\infty$-norm.

The security of our scheme is based on the ring learning with error (RLWE) assumption and the decisional small polynomial ratio (DSPR) assumption. Here we give a brief introduction to them.

**Definition 1 (Ring Learning With Error (RLWE) Assumption).** The (decisional) RLWE assumption is a variant of learning with error (LWE) assumption. RLWE assumption states that it is infeasible to distinguish the following two distributions: First distribution is the uniform samples $(a_i, b_i) \in R_q^{n+1}$. In the second distribution, sampled $a_i \leftarrow R_q^n$ and $s \leftarrow R_q^n$ uniformly, $e_i$, and the second distribution is the specialization samples $(a_i, b_i) \in R_q^{n+1}$ where $b_i = <a_i; s> + e_i$.

**Definition 2 (Decisional Small Polynomial Ratio (DSPR) Assumption).** Given the ring $R$ and $R_q$, and a $B$-bound error distribution $\chi$ over $R$, the (decisional) DSPR assumption states that it is infeasible to distinguish the following two distributions:

- a polynomial $h = tg/f$, where $f = tf' + 1$ is invertible over $R_q$, and $f', g \leftarrow \chi$.
- a polynomial $h$ sampled uniformly at random over $R_q$.

Stehlé and Steinfeld states that the DSPR assumption is hard even for unbounded adversaries when the $n$-th cyclotomic polynomial’s degree $n$ is a power of 2, and the error distribution $\chi$ is a discrete Gaussian distribution $D_{\mathbb{Z}_n, \sigma}$ for $\sigma > \sqrt{q \cdot \text{poly}(n)}$.

### 2.2 Two subroutines

Here introduce two subroutines BitDecomp$(\cdot)$ and Powersof2$(\cdot)$ which are widely used in FHE schemes. Let $\beta = \lceil \log q \rceil + 1$, and describe these two subroutines as follows.

**BitDecomp$(x \in R_q^n, q)$**: Given a polynomial vector $x \in R_q^n$, write it as $x = \sum_{j=0}^{\beta-1} 2^j u_j$ with all $u_j \in R_q^2$, and output $U = [u_0, u_1, \ldots, u_{\beta-1}] \in \{0, 1\}^{n \cdot \beta}$.

**Powersof2$(y \in R_q^n, q)$**: Let $v_j = 2^j y \in R_q^n$, $j \in \{0, 1, \ldots, \beta - 1\}$, and output $V = [v_0, v_1, \ldots, v_{\beta-1}] \in R_q^{n \cdot \beta}$.

It’s obviously to verify that $(\text{BitDecomp}(x, q), \text{Powersof2}(y, q)) = (x, y) \mod q$. 

2.3 Basic NTRU homomorphic encryption scheme

Here we give an introduction of the basic NTRU homomorphic encryption scheme in [10], which is a variant of the original NTRU scheme in [15, 16] to support homomorphisms and improve its security.

Setup(1^λ) : For security parameter, given the following parameters which have been defined above: an integer \( n = n(\lambda) \), the prime modulus \( q = q(\lambda) \), the polynomial ring \( R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/x^n + 1 \) and \( R_q = R/qR \), and a \( B = B(\lambda) \)-bound error distribution \( \chi \) over the ring \( R \).

KeyGen(1^λ) : Sample polynomials \( f', g \leftarrow \chi \), and set \( f = 2f' + 1 \in R \) (If \( f \) is not invertible over \( R_q \), resample \( f' \)) so that \( f \equiv 1 \mod 2 \). Set the public key \( pk := h = 2gf^{-1} \in R_q \), and the secret key \( sk := f \in R \).

\[ \text{Enc}(pk, m) \text{Sample } s, e \leftarrow \chi \]
\[ c := hs + 2e + m \in R_q \]

\[ \text{Enc}(pk, m) \text{Sample } s, e \leftarrow \chi \], and output the ciphertext
\[ c := hs + 2e + m \in R_q \]

\[ \text{Dec}(sk, c) \text{Compute } \mu = fc \in R_q \text{ as} \]
\[ \mu = fc \mod q \]
\[ = f(hs + 2e + m \mod q) \]
\[ = 2(gs + fe) + fm \in R_q \]

Since \( f \equiv 1 \mod 2 \) and \( |2(gs + fe) + fm| < q/2 \), the message is recovered by \( m' = \mu \mod 2 \).

Given two ciphertexts \( c_1 = h_1s_1 + 2e_1 + m_1 \in R_q \) and \( c_2 = h_2s_2 + 2e_2 + m_2 \in R_q \) that encrypt messages \( m_1 \) and \( m_2 \) under the same secret key \( f \), it’s not difficult to verify its homomorphism properties of addition and multiplication.

\[ f(c_1 + c_2) = f(h_1s_1 + 2e_1 + m_1 + h_2s_2 + 2e_2 + m_2) \]
\[ = 2(g_1s_1 + g_2s_2 + f(e_1 + e_2)) + f(m_1 + m_2) \]
\[ f^2 \cdot c_1c_2 = f^2[(h_1s_1 + 2e_1 + m_1)(h_2s_2 + 2e_2 + m_2)] \]
\[ = 2E_{\text{error}} + f^2 \cdot m_1m_2 \]

Here we mainly introduce the multikey homomorphic properties which the basic NTRU scheme naturally has.

Given two ciphertexts \( c_1 = h_1s_1 + 2e_1 + m_1 \in R_q \) and \( c_2 = h_2s_2 + 2e_2 + m_2 \in R_q \) that encrypt messages \( m_1 \) and \( m_2 \) under the public key \( h_1 \) and \( h_2 \) respectively, and the corresponding secret key are \( f_1 \) and \( f_2 \). Some simple algebraic expressions (see the expressions [1] and [2]) show that the sum or multiplication of \( c_1 \) and \( c_2 \) can be decrypted by their “jointly secret key” \( f_1f_2 \).
\[ f_1f_2(c_1 + c_2) = f_1f_2(h_1s_1 + 2e_1 + m_1 + h_2s_2 + 2e_2 + m_2) \]
\[ = 2(f_1f_2(e_1 + e_2) + f_2g_1s_1 + f_1g_2s_2) + f_1f_2(m_1 + m_2) \]
\[ = 2e_{add} + f_1f_2(m_1 + m_2) \]
\[ f_1f_2(c_1c_2) = f_1f_2(h_1s_1 + 2e_1 + m_1)(h_2s_2 + 2e_2 + m_2) \]
\[ = 2(2g_1s_1g_2s_2 + 2f_2g_1s_1e_2 + f_2g_1s_1m_2 + 2f_1g_2s_2e_1) \]
\[ + f_1g_2s_2m_1) + f_1f_2(4e_1e_2 + 2e_1m_2 + 2e_2m_1) + f_1f_2m_1m_2 \]
\[ = 2e_{mul} + f_1f_2(m_1m_2) \]

This shows that decrypting \( c_1 + c_2 \) and \( c_1c_2 \) using the joint secret key \( f_1f_2 \) results in the sum and product of the two messages, assuming that the error \( e_{add} \) and \( e_{mul} \) do not grow to be too large. Furthermore, as for some complicated circuit, we can observe that the ciphertext \( c \) resulting from evaluating a multivariate polynomial function on the input ciphertext of \( N \) users can be decrypted by the jointly secret key \( \prod_{i=1}^{N} f_i^{d_i} \), where \( d_i \) denotes the degree of the \( i \)-th variable in the polynomial function. In other words, the secret key required to decrypt the result ciphertext is not only dependent on the involved users, but also the evaluating circuit. For example, the secret key to jointly decrypt the evaluated ciphertext \( c_1^2 + c_2 \) is \( f_1^2f_2 \), which is related to the involved users and the evaluating function \( f(x_1, x_2) = x_1^2 + x_2 \).

With the assumption of DSPR, the security of the basic NTRU homomorphic encryption scheme can be proved under the RLWE assumption following two steps: 1. Based on the hardness of DSPR assumption, the public key \( h = 2qf^{-1} \) can be replaced by \( 2h' \) for a uniformly sampled \( h' \). 2. Once the step 1 is done, we can change the ciphertext \( c = hs + 2e + m \) to \( c' = u + m \) with the RLWE assumption, where \( u \) is uniformly sampled from \( R_q \). As for arbitrary adversary, the advantage of distinguish \( c' \) and \( c \) is both 1/2 since \( u \) is uniformly distributed in \( R_q \), which is independent of the message \( m \).

### 2.4 Cryptographic Definitions of Multi-key FHE

**Definition 3 (Multi-key FHE scheme).** A leveled multi-key FHE scheme consists of a set of algorithms described as follows:

- **Setup(1^\lambda, 1^K, 1^L)**: Given the security parameter \( \lambda \), a bound \( K \) on the number of keys, a bound \( L \) on the circuit depth; output the public parameter \( pp \).
- **Gen(pp)**: Given the public parameter \( pp \), output the public key and secret key of party \( i(i = 1, ..., K) \) and output the materials which are required for the generation of evaluation keys \( evk \).
- **Enc(pp, pk_i, m)**: Given the public key \( pk_i \) of party \( i \) and a message \( m \), output the ciphertext \( ct_i \) which contains the index of the corresponding secret key and the level tag.
- **Dec(pp, (sk_{i_1}, sk_{i_2}, ..., sk_{i_k}), ct_S)**: Given a ciphertext \( ct_S \) corresponding to a set of parties \( S = \{i_1, i_2, ..., i_k\} \subseteq [K] \) and their secret keys \( sk_S = \{sk_{i_1}, sk_{i_2}, ..., sk_{i_k}\} \), output the message \( \mu_i \).
- $Eval(pp, evk, C, (ct_{S_1}, pk_{S_1}), ..., (ct_{S_t}, pk_{S_t}))$ Given $t$ tuples $\{(ct_{S_i}, pk_{S_i})\}_{i=1,...,t}$ and a boolean circuit $C$ which is needed to be evaluated. Each tuple contains a ciphertext $ct_{S_i}$ corresponding to a set of secret keys indexed by $S_i = i_1, ..., i_k, \subseteq [K]$ and a set of public keys $pk_{S_i} = \{pk_j, \forall j \in S_i\}$. Output a ciphertext $ct$ corresponding to a set of secret keys indexed by $S = \cup_{i=1}^{t} S_i \subseteq [K]$.

If the input ciphertext of $Eval(\cdot)$ can be fresh ciphertext or intermediate results after any homomorphic operation, the MKFHE scheme satisfies the multi-hop property.

**Definition 4 (Correctness).** A leveled multi-hop MKFHE scheme is correct if for any circuit $C$ of depth at most $L$ with $t$ input wires and a set of tuples $\{(ct_{S_i}, pk_{S_i})\}_{i=1,...,t}$, letting $\mu_i = Dec(sk_{S_i}, ct_{S_i})$, where $sk_{S_i} = \{sk_j, \forall j \in S_i\}, i = 1, ..., t$, it holds that

$$\Pr[Dec(sk_{S_i}, Eval(C, (ct_{S_i}, pk_{S_i}), ..., (ct_{S_t}, pk_{S_t}))) \neq C(\mu_1, ..., \mu_t)] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Where $S = \cup_{i=1}^{t} S_i \subseteq [K]$, $pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^{\lambda}, 1^K, 1^L)(pk_j, sk_j) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(pp)$ for $j \in [S]$.

**Definition 5 (Compactness).** A leveled multi-hop MKFHE scheme is compact if there exists a polynomial $\text{poly}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$ such that $|ct| \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, K, L)$, which means that the length of $ct$ is independent of the circuit $C$, but can depend of $\lambda$, $K$ and $L$.

### 3 Efficient leveled NTRU-based FHE scheme

#### 3.1 Motivation

Recall the basic NTRU-type homomorphic encryption scheme in section 2.3. What we already know is that the secret key required to decrypt the result NTRU ciphertext is not only dependent on the involved users, but also the evaluating circuit.

In order to eliminate the influence of the circuit evaluated on the decryption and maintain the consistency of the decrypting form, we can use the relinearization technology introduced in [5] to transform the ciphertext into one that can be jointly decrypted by the unified secret key $\prod_{i=1}^{N} f_i$ of all the involved users after homomorphic operation.

In RLWE-based leveled FHE scheme BV11a, the ciphertext form is a polynomial vector, thus the ciphertext dimension after homomorphic multiplication will expand quadratically, which may cause trouble for the storage and operation of the ciphertext. To handle it, relinearization technique was proposed in [5] to reduce the dimension of the result ciphertext to the original extent.

However, relinearization is by far the most expensive operation in a leveled FHE scheme. We noticed that in the NTRU-type FHE scheme, the ciphertext form is a simple polynomial in $R_4$, so the homomorphic operations on the ciphertexts does not cause dimension expansion. In other words, we do not have to do
relinearization after every homomorphic operation. However, in order to maintain the consistency of decryption, it is still necessary to perform relinearization operation to transform the result ciphertext to one under the secret key.

In this paper, we consider to perform relinearization operation on the ciphertext after \( k4 \) homomorphic evaluations to reduce the number of complicated relinearization operations, thus reducing the computational complexity of homomorphic evaluations and improving the scheme’s efficiency. It should be noted that the modulus-switching operation is still necessary after each homomorphic evaluation to control the noise in the ciphertext, i.e. we separate the relinearization technique from the modulus-switching technique to make them no longer bundle.

3.2 Parameters selection in DHS16

In [17], Doröz et al. optimize the parameters selection in the light of recent theoretical and experimental results in the field of lattice reduction so as to reduce the size of public key significantly. Beyond that, the secret key remain the same for all levels so that the evaluation keys can be computed by the initial evaluation keys at level 0. In this paper, we follow the method of parameters selection in DHS16 to improve scheme’s efficiency comparing to LTV12, and give a simple introduction to it in this section.

Assume that the modulus of each level of the circuit is a decreasing sequence \( q_0 > q_1 > \cdots > q_L \), and set \( q_i = p^{t-i} \) for \( i = 0, \ldots, t - 1 \), where \( p \in \mathbb{Z} \) is a prime integer. The secret key \( f \in R_{q_0} \) remains the same for all levels and is invertible in all rings \( \mathbb{Z}_{q_i} \).

**Lemma 1 (Lemma 3 in [17])**. Let \( p \) be a prime, and let \( f \) be a polynomial. If \( f \) is a unit in \( R_p \), then \( f \) is a unit in \( R_{p^k} \) for \( k \geq 1 \). According to lemma 1, the evaluation keys for level \( i \) can be simply computed by \( \zeta^{(i)} = \zeta^{(0)} \mod q_i \).

DHS16 introduces batching technology [24] to package multiple input plaintext into the same ciphertext and realize simultaneous input of multiple plaintext, thus improving the encryption efficiency and reducing the number of ciphertext required for homomorphic operation. Batching technology can also be applied to our scheme to improve its efficiency. The details of batching process are presented in section 4.1 in [17].

3.3 Optimized leveled single-key FHE scheme

In this paper, we construct an leveled single-key FHE scheme, which can homomorphically evaluate the circuit more efficiently than DHS16.

– **Setup(1^λ)**: Given the security parameter \( \lambda \), an integer \( n = n(\lambda) \), a prime integer \( p = p(\lambda) \), the prime modulus \( q = q(\lambda) \), the polynomial ring \( R = \mathbb{Z}(x)/x^n + 1 \) and \( R_q = R/qR \), and a \( B = B(\lambda) \)-bound error distribution \( \chi \) over the ring \( R \). Define a series of decreasing modulus \( q_0 = p^t > q_1 > \cdots > q_{t-1} \), one modulus per circuit level, and require that \( q_i = p^{t-i} \) for \( i \in \{0, \ldots, t - 1\} \).
- **KeyGen** \( (1^k) \): Choose polynomials \( f', g \leftarrow \chi \), and set \( f = 2^f + 1 \) so that \( f \equiv 1 \mod 2 \). Set \( h = 2^g / f \in R_q \). (If \( f \) is not invertible over \( R_q \), resample \( f' \).)

Sample \( s, e \leftarrow \chi_{\log q_0} \), let \( \zeta(0) := h + 2e_{\chi} \) and \( \zeta(i) := 2((f)^3) \in R_q^{[\log q_0]} \), and \( \zeta_{(i \to i + 2)} \equiv \zeta(0) \mod q_i+1 \). Let \( f^{(i)}(x) = f(x)^{-1} \mod q_i \), thus \( f(x) f^{(i)}(x) = 1 \mod q_i \).

Output: \( sk := f \in R_q \) (the secret key \( f \) remains the same for all levels), and \( pk := \{ h, \zeta(0) \} \), where \( \zeta(0) \) denotes the evaluation key in level 0, and evaluation keys of other levels can be computed by \( \zeta(0) \) and the modulus.

- **Enc** \( (h, m) \): Input the message \( m \), sample \( s^{(0)}, e^{(0)} \leftarrow \chi \), and output the ciphertext \( c^{(0)} := hs^{(0)} + 2e^{(0)} + m \in R_q \).

- **Dec** \( (f, c^{(i)}) \): Input the ciphertext \( c^{(i)} \in R_q \), compute \( \mu := f \cdot c^{(i)} \in R_q \) and output the message \( m' := \mu \mod 2 \).

- (1) **Add** \( (c^{(i-1)}, c^{(i-1)}) \): Input two ciphertexts \( c^{(i-1)}_1 \) and \( c^{(i-1)}_2 \) at level \( i - 1 \).
  (a) Addition: \( \hat{c}^{(i-1)}_{\text{add}} = c^{(i-1)}_1 + c^{(i-1)}_2 \).
  (b) Modulus switching: \( \hat{c}^{(i)}_{\text{add}} = \left[ (q_i/q_{i-1}) \cdot \hat{c}^{(i-1)}_{\text{add}} \right]_2 \), where \( \cdot \mod 2 \) denotes \( \hat{c}^{(i)}_{\text{add}} = \hat{c}^{(i-1)}_{\text{add}} \mod 2 \) (Relinearization is not required as addition doesn’t change the secret key).

- (2) **Mult** \( (c^{(i-2)}, c^{(i-2)}, c^{(i-2)}, c^{(i-2)}) \): Input \( i - 2 \) level ciphertext \( c^{(i-2)}_1, c^{(i-2)}_2, c^{(i-2)}_3, c^{(i-2)}_4 \) at level \( i - 2 \).
  (a) Multiplication: \( \hat{c}^{(i-2)}_1 = c^{(i-2)}_1 \times c^{(i-2)}_2 \mod q_{i-2} \).
  (b) Modulus switching: \( \hat{c}^{(i-1)}_{\text{add}} = \left[ (q_{i-1}/q_{i-2}) \cdot \hat{c}^{(i-2)}_1 \right]_2 \).
  (c) Multiplication: \( \hat{c}^{(i-1)}_2 = \left[ (q_{i-1}/q_{i-2}) \cdot \hat{c}^{(i-2)}_2 \right]_2 \), where \( \cdot \mod 2 \) denotes \( \hat{c}^{(i-1)}_2 = \hat{c}^{(i-2)}_2 \mod 2 \) and \( \hat{c}^{(i-1)}_2 = \hat{c}^{(i-2)}_2 \mod 2 \).
  (d) Relinearization: \( \hat{c}^{(i)} = \left[ \text{BitDecomp}(\hat{c}^{(i-1)}_1), \hat{c}^{(i-2)} \right]_2 \).
  (e) Modulus switching: \( \hat{c}^{(i)} = \left[ (q_{i-1}/q_{i-2}) \cdot \hat{c}^{(i)} \right]_2 \).

**Analysis.**

(1) **Correctness analysis**

Here we mainly analyze the correctness of ciphertext multiplication. **Lemma 2**: The noise growth of evaluating two levels as a block under average case is:

\[
B_{i, \text{average}} \approx v^4 n^1 B_{i-2}^4 + 2v^2 n^2 (2B + 1)^2 B_{i-2}^2 \log q_i (2B^2 + 6B^3) \kappa + \sqrt{n} (2B+1)
\]

where \( n \) is the degree, \( B \) is the bound of error distribution \( \chi \) over the ring \( R \), \( B_i \) denotes the error bound of the ciphertext at level \( i \), \( \kappa \) is the reduction scale of modulus switching.

(a) Multiplication: \( \hat{c}^{(i-2)}_1 = c^{(i-2)}_1 \times c^{(i-2)}_2 \), \( \hat{c}^{(i-2)}_2 = c^{(i-2)}_3 \times c^{(i-2)}_4 \mod q_{i-2} \).
Suppose that \( c_k^{(i-2)} = 2E_k^{(i-2)} + fm_k \pmod{q_{i-2}} \) for \( k \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\} \). As the corresponding secret key of \( \hat{c}_1^{(i-1)} \) and \( \hat{c}_1^{(i-2)} \) is \( f^2 \), we have

\[
\hat{c}_1^{(i-2)}(x)f^2 = 2E_1^{(i-2)} + f^2m_1m_2 \pmod{q_{i-2}}
\]

\[
\hat{c}_2^{(i-2)}(x)f^2 = 2E_2^{(i-2)} + f^2m_3m_4 \pmod{q_{i-2}}
\]

(b) Modulus switching

**Lemma 3:** Let \( q \) and \( p \) be two odd integer, \( c \in R_q \), denote \( c' = [(p/q) \cdot c]_2 \), where \([(\_)]_2 \) denotes \( c' = c \pmod{2} \). For arbitrary \( f \) that satisfies \( ||f^2c_p||_\infty < q/2 \) \( - (q/p) \cdot ||f^2||_1 \), we have \( ||f^2c'_p||_2 = ||f^2c|| \) \( \pmod{2} \) and \( ||f^2c'_p||_\infty < (p/q)||f^2c||_\infty + ||f^2||_1 \).

According to lemma 3, we have

\[
\hat{c}_1^{(i-1)}(x) = [(q_{i-1}/q_{i-2}) \cdot \hat{c}_1^{(i-2)}(x)]_2 \pmod{q_{i-1}} \Rightarrow
\]

\[
[f^2\hat{c}_1^{(i-1)}(x)]_{q_{i-1}} = [f^2\hat{c}_1^{(i-2)}(x)]_{q_{i-2}} \pmod{2} = m_1m_2;
\]

\[
\hat{c}_2^{(i-1)}(x) = [(q_{i-1}/q_{i-2}) \cdot \hat{c}_2^{(i-2)}(x)]_2 \pmod{q_{i-1}} \Rightarrow
\]

\[
[f^2\hat{c}_2^{(i-1)}(x)]_{q_{i-1}} = [f^2\hat{c}_2^{(i-2)}(x)]_{q_{i-2}} \pmod{2} = m_3m_4
\]

(c) Multiplication: \( \hat{c}^{(i-1)} f^4 \triangleq \hat{c}_1^{(i-1)} \times \hat{c}_2^{(i-1)} \pmod{q_{i-1}} \)

As the secret key of \( \hat{c}^{(i-1)} \) is \( f^4 \), we have

\[
\hat{c}^{(i-1)} f^4 \triangleq \hat{c}_1^{(i-1)} f^2 \hat{c}_2^{(i-1)} f^2 \triangleq 2E^{(i-1)} + f^4m_1m_2m_3m_4 \pmod{q_{i-1}}
\]

(d) Relinearization: \( \hat{c}^{(i)} = \langle \text{BitDecomp}(\hat{c}^{(i-1)}), \hat{c}^{(i-2\rightarrow i)} \rangle \pmod{q_{i-1}} \) \( \in R_{q_{i-1}} \)

As the evaluation key \( \zeta^{(i-2\rightarrow i)} \) is a ciphertext at level \( (i-1) \), i.e.

\[
\zeta^{(i-2\rightarrow i)} f = 2E^{(i-2\rightarrow i)} + 2^7 f^4 \pmod{q_{i-1}}
\]

then we can get

\[
\hat{c}^{(i)}(x) f = f(\sum_{\tau=0}^{[\log q_{i-1}]} \hat{c}_\tau^{(i-1)}(x)\zeta^{(i-2\rightarrow i)})(\pmod{q_{i-1}})
\]

\[
= \sum_{\tau=0}^{[\log q_{i-1}]} \hat{c}_\tau^{(i-1)}(x)(2E^{(i-2\rightarrow i)} + 2^7 f^4) \pmod{q_{i-1}}
\]

\[
= 2 \sum_{\tau=0}^{[\log q_{i-1}]} \hat{c}_\tau^{(i-1)}(x)E^{(i-2\rightarrow i)} + \sum_{\tau=0}^{[\log q_{i-1}]} \hat{c}_\tau^{(i-1)}(x) \cdot 2^7 f^4 \pmod{q_{i-1}}
\]

\[
= 2 \sum_{\tau=0}^{[\log q_{i-1}]} \hat{c}_\tau^{(i-1)}(x)E^{(i-2\rightarrow i)} + f^4 \hat{c}^{(i-1)}(x) \pmod{q_{i-1}}
\]

\[
= 2 \sum_{\tau=0}^{[\log q_{i-1}]} \hat{c}_\tau^{(i-1)}(x)E^{(i-2\rightarrow i)} + 2E^{(i-1)} + f^4m_1m_2m_3m_4 \pmod{q_{i-1}}
\]

\[
= 2E^{(i-1)} + f^4m_1m_2m_3m_4 \pmod{q_{i-1}}
\]
(e) Modulus switching: \( c^{(i)}(x) = [(q_i/q_{i-1}) \cdot \tilde{c}^{(i)}(x)]_2 \)

\[
c^{(i)} f = \tilde{c}^{(i)}(x)f \pmod{q_{i-1}}(\pmod{2})
= \tilde{2E}^{(i-1)} + f^4 m_1 m_2 m_3 m_4 \pmod{2}
= m_1 m_2 m_3 m_4
\]

(2) Noise growth
In this paper, we set \( B_i = 2^{12}, B = 2, \delta = 1.0066 \), and compute the noise growth of evaluating one block (one level per block in DHS16). The results are presented in table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Log(n)</th>
<th>Log(q)</th>
<th>Noise growth in DHS(bit)</th>
<th>Noise growth in our scheme(bit)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>8.322</td>
<td>8.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>8.822</td>
<td>8.821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>9.322</td>
<td>9.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>1244</td>
<td>9.822</td>
<td>9.821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>2488</td>
<td>10.322</td>
<td>10.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>4976</td>
<td>10.823</td>
<td>10.822</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis shows that in the case of two levels per block, the noise growth in our scheme is almost same as DHS16. Therefore we choose the same number of levels and modulus as in DHS16.

### 3.4 Leveled multi-key FHE scheme

In this section, we extend the leveled single-key FHE scheme in section 3.1 to a leveled multi-key FHE scheme based on the framework of LTV12.

- Setup(\( 1^\lambda \)):
  For security parameter \( \lambda \), given the following parameters which have been defined above: an integer \( n = n(\lambda) \), the prime modulus \( q = q(\lambda) \), the polynomial ring \( R = \mathbb{Z}(x)/x^n + 1 \) and \( R_q = R/qR \), and a \( B = B(\lambda) \)-bound error distribution \( \chi \) over the ring \( R \). Define a series of decreasing modulus \( q_0 = p^t > q_1 > \cdots > q_{t-1} \), one modulus per circuit level, and require that \( q_i = p^{t-i} \) for \( i \in \{0, ..., t-1\} \).

- KeyGen(\( 1^\lambda \)):
  Choose polynomials \( f', g \leftarrow \chi \), and set \( f = 2f' + 1 \) (If \( f \) is not invertible over \( R_q \), resample \( f' \)) so that \( f \equiv 1 \pmod{2} \).
  Sample \( s_\tau, e_\tau \leftarrow \chi \), and for \( j \in \{1, 2, 3\} \), \( \tau \in \{0, ..., \lfloor \log q_0 \rfloor \} \), compute

\[
\zeta_{j, \tau}^{(0)} := hs_\tau + 2e_\tau + 2^\tau f^j \in R_{q_0}
\]

and \( \zeta_{j, \tau}^{(i-2 \rightarrow i)} \) can be computed by \( \zeta_{j, \tau}^{(i-2 \rightarrow i)} \equiv \zeta_{j, \tau}^{(0)} \pmod{q_{i-1}} \).
Output $sk := f \in R_{q_0}$ (the secret key $f$ remains the same for all levels), and $pk := \{ h, c^{(0)}_j \}_{j \in \{1, 2, 3\}, \tau \in \{0, \ldots, [\log q_0]\}}$.

- **Enc($pk, m$)**: Input the message $m$, sample $s^{(0)}$, $e^{(0)} \leftarrow \chi$, and output the ciphertext $c^{(0)} := hs^{(0)} + 2e^{(0)} + m \in R_{q_0}$.

- **Dec($f_1, \ldots, f_N, c$)**: Input the ciphertext $c \in R_p$, suppose the corresponding secret keys of the involved users are $f_1, \ldots, f_N$, compute $\mu := (f_1 \cdots f_N) \cdot c (\text{mod} 2)$, and output the message $\mu$.

- **Eval($C_x, c_1^{(i-2)}, c_2^{(i-2)}, c_3^{(i-2)}, c_4^{(i-2)}$)**: Here we show how to homomorphically multiply four ciphertexts $c_1^{(i-2)}, c_2^{(i-2)}, c_3^{(i-2)}, c_4^{(i-2)}$ at level $(i - 2)$. We assume that the users associated with each ciphertext is denoted by $K_1, K_2, K_3,$ and $K_4$ respectively. The public-key set of a fresh encryption is simply the set $\{pk\}$ containing the public key under which it was encrypted, and we set $K_1 \cup K_2 \cup K_3 \cup K_4 = \{pk_1, \ldots, pk_r\}$.

1. **Multiplication**: $\hat{c}_1^{(i-2)} = c_1^{(i-2)} \times c_2^{(i-2)} \pmod{q_{i-2}}$; \ $\hat{c}_2^{(i-2)} = c_3^{(i-2)} \times c_4^{(i-2)} \pmod{q_{i-2}}$.

2. **Modulus switching**: $\check{c}_1^{(i-1)} = [(q_{i-1}/q_i) \cdot c_1^{(i-2)}]_2$; \ $\check{c}_2^{(i-1)} = [(q_{i-1}/q_{i-2}) \cdot c_2^{(i-2)}]_2$.

3. **Multiplication**: $\check{c}_1^{(i-1)} = \check{c}_1^{(i-1)} \cdot \check{c}_2^{(i-1)} \pmod{q_{i-1}}$.

4. **Relinearization** For $v = 1, \ldots, r$ and $\tau \in \{0, \ldots, [\log q_{i-1}]\}$, define $\check{c}_v^{(i-1)}$ so that

$$
\check{c}_v^{(i-1)} = \sum_{\tau = 0}^{[\log q_{i-1}]} \check{c}_v^{(i-1)} \cdot 2^\tau
$$

is the binary representation of $\check{c}_v^{(i-1)}$, and $\check{c}_0^{(i-1)} = \check{c}^{(i-1)}$.

(a) If $pk_v \in \{K_1 \cap K_2 \cap K_3 \cap K_4\}$, let

$$
\hat{c}_v^{(i-1)} = \sum_{\tau = 0}^{[\log q_{i-1}]} \hat{c}_v^{(i-1)} \cdot 2^\tau
$$

(b) If $pk_v \notin \{K_1 \cap K_2 \cap K_3 \cap K_4\}$, and $pk_v$ is exist in any three sets of $K_1, K_2, K_3, K_4$, let

$$
\hat{c}_v^{(i-1)} = \sum_{\tau = 0}^{[\log q_{i-1}]} \hat{c}_v^{(i-1)} \cdot 2^\tau
$$

(c) If $pk_v \notin \{K_1 \cap K_2 \cap K_3 \cap K_4\}$, and $pk_v$ is exist in any two sets of $K_1, K_2, K_3, K_4$, let

$$
\hat{c}_v^{(i-1)} = \sum_{\tau = 0}^{[\log q_{i-1}]} \hat{c}_v^{(i-1)} \cdot 2^\tau
$$
Finally, we can get $\tilde{c}_v^{(i-1)}$ iteratively.

(5) Modulus switching: \( \tilde{c}^{(i)} = ([q_i/q_{i-1}] \cdot \tilde{c}_v^{(i-1)})_2 \), and output the result ciphertext \( \tilde{c}^{(i)} \), whose corresponding secret key is \( f_1 \cdot f_2 \cdots f_r \).

To see why relinearization works, see the proof below.

**Proof**: Suppose that the evaluation key of \( v \)-th user is \( c_{j_v,\tau}^{(i-2 \rightarrow i)} = h_{s_\tau} + 2e_\tau + 2^\tau (f_v)^{j_v} \), thus the corresponding secret key of \( \tilde{c}_{v-1}^{(i-1)} \) can be represented by \( f' \cdot (f_v)^{j_v+1} \), where \( f' \) generally denotes the combination of other users’ secret keys, and we show that the new secret key after 1-round relinearization by the evaluation key \( c_{j_v,\tau}^{(i-2 \rightarrow i)} \) is changed to \( f' \cdot f_v \).

The new ciphertext \( \tilde{c}_v^{(i-1)} = \sum_{\tau=0}^{\lfloor \log q_{i-1} \rfloor} c_{v-1,\tau}^{(i-1)} c_{j_v,\tau}^{(i-2 \rightarrow i)} \), and the decrypting process can be represented by:

\[
(f' \cdot f_v) \cdot \tilde{c}_v^{(i-1)} = (f' \cdot f_v) \sum_{\tau=0}^{\lfloor \log q_{i-1} \rfloor} c_{v-1,\tau}^{(i-1)} c_{j_v,\tau}^{(i-2 \rightarrow i)} \pmod{q_{i-1}}
\]

\[
= f' \cdot \sum_{\tau=0}^{\lfloor \log q_{i-1} \rfloor} c_{v-1,\tau}^{(i-1)} (2E_\zeta + 2^\tau (f_v)^{j_v+1})
\]

\[
= 2f' \sum_{\tau=0}^{\lfloor \log q_{i-1} \rfloor} c_{v-1,\tau}^{(i-1)} E_\zeta + f' \cdot (f_v)^{j_v+1} \sum_{\tau=0}^{\lfloor \log q_{i-1} \rfloor} c_{v-1,\tau}^{(i-1)} 2^\tau
\]

\[
= 2f' \sum_{\tau=0}^{\lfloor \log q_{i-1} \rfloor} c_{v-1,\tau}^{(i-1)} E_\zeta + \tilde{c}_{v-1}^{(i-1)} (f' \cdot (f_v)^{j_v+1} \pmod{q_{i-1}})
\]

\[
= 2f' \sum_{\tau=0}^{\lfloor \log q_{i-1} \rfloor} c_{v-1,\tau}^{(i-1)} E_\zeta + \left( \tilde{E}_{v-1}^{(i-1)} + f' \cdot (f_v)^{j_v+1} \cdot C(m_1, \ldots, m_r) \right) \pmod{q_{i-1}}
\]

Finally we can get \( \tilde{c}_v^{(i-1)} \) iteratively whose secret key is \( \prod_{v=1}^r f_v \).

The optimized multi-key FHE scheme in this section has the following advantages comparing to LTV12:

1. Relinearization process are implemented after evaluating two levels circuit, which can reduce the computational complexity significantly.

2. Only the evaluation keys whose corresponding users are existed in at least two ciphertexts are employed in relinearization process, which is efficient and important in real applications.

3. An efficient two-round MPC can be constructed based on the multi-key FHE scheme in this section.

### 4 Two-round multiparty computation

MKFHE schemes can be used to construct secure MPC protocols. When executing a MPC protocol, each user involved in homomorphic evaluations is
usually required to decrypt in sequence, which may cause complicated decryption process and inevitable interaction between users. However, in many actual scenarios, we do not want too much interaction, and prefer the final decryption process is completed by each user independently. That is to say, distributed decryption, in most cases, is the preferred decryption method in real life.

4.1 Construction

In this paper, according to the particularity of ciphertext form in NTRU-based leveled FHE scheme, we construct a distributed decryption process which can be implemented by the involved users independently. In our construction, each user will firstly receive the result evaluated ciphertext from the cloud server, and compute the ciphertext with his (her) own secret key to obtain an “intermediate ciphertext”. Secondly, all the “intermediate ciphertext” will be sent to the user or organization who requires the evaluated results for decryption.

The whole process is relatively simple and intuitive, and we give a formalized explanation below to demonstrate the feasibility of constructing the distributed decryption by the NTRU-type FHE scheme.

Suppose that the result ciphertext after homomorphically evaluating the circuit $C$ is denoted by $c \in R_{qL}$, the user set involved in $c$ is $S = \{i_1, ..., i_N\}$, their corresponding secret keys $sk_{i_j} = f_{i_j}$, and the corresponding message is $m_{i_j}$, $j \in [N]$. Then it holds that

\[
\prod_{j=1}^{N} f_{i_j} \cdot c = 2E_{\text{error}} + C(m_{i_1}, ..., m_{i_N})(\text{mod} q_L)
\]

Step 1. After the cloud return the result ciphertext $c \in R_{q_{l-1}}$ to involved users, each user firstly semi-decrypt the ciphertext using his own secret key and get a semi-ciphertext $c'_{i_j} = f_{i_j} \cdot c$. As the corresponding secret key of $c$ is $\prod_{j=1}^{N} f_{i_j}$, $c'_{i_j}$ doesn’t reveal any information of users’ messages.

Step 2. After all the users return the semi-ciphertexts $c'_{i_j}$ to the user or organization who are going to decrypt, the user or organization firstly compute $c^{-(N-1)} \in R_{q_{l-1}}$, and then compute

\[
c^{-(N-1)} \prod_{j=1}^{N} c'_{i_j} = c^{-(N-1)} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{N} (f_{i_j} \cdot c) = c^{-(N-1)} \cdot c^{N-1} \cdot (\prod_{j=1}^{N} f_{i_j}) \cdot c = (\prod_{j=1}^{N} f_{i_j}) \cdot c(\text{mod} q_L)(\text{mod} 2) = 2E_{\text{error}} + C(m_{i_1}, ..., m_{i_N}) \prod_{j=1}^{N} c'_{i_j} \text{ (mod} 2) = C(m_{i_1}, ..., m_{i_N})
\]

Note that the modulus switching process is needed to reduce the noise at the final process of step 2 to ensure correct decryption.

4.2 Applications in secure genomic diagnoses

Here we present an application of MKFHE for secure genomic diagnoses without revealing patient genomes, which is an optimized vision of [25].
Genes are codes that direct human activity, thousands of monogenic diseases have been diagnosed to be caused by "malignant" mutations in certain genes. In the diagnosis of such diseases, it is necessary to find the exact location where these genetic variants occur, and this often requires comparison between the genes of patients and healthy people. However, genetic data is individual's privacy, genome sharing enables discrimination [25], and even causes crime once genome information is leaked or stolen by malicious and illegal person or organization. How to analyze the patient's genetic data while protecting the privacy of genetic data is a problem worth considering in the current cloud environment.

In [25], Jagadeesh K A et al. apply a cryptographic method called Yao's protocol to perform the desired computation without revealing any participant’s input, and introduce a “two-cloud” model to extend the protocol to N parties. However, they need to assume there are two non-colluding cloud servers that facilitate the protocol execution, which is weak in real cloud and is vulnerable to collusion attacks.

MKFHE can effectively solve the problem of colluding cloud, because the cloud can only access and compute the ciphertext of the patient's genetic data. The process is as follows:

Step1. The medical institution performs gene sequencing on the patients, after that, each individual will get a variant vector of all possible rare missense and nonsense variants in the human genome, and privately denote “1” or “0” to indicate whether they have the specific mutation or not respectively, so that each individual will get a bit string.

Step2. All patients encrypt their genome bits by MKFHE scheme and upload them to the cloud.

Step3. The research institution upload the homomorphic evaluating function of genome data to the cloud.

Step4. The cloud perform the homomorphic evaluating function on the encrypted genome data and return the result ciphertext to the patients.

Step5. The result ciphertext is jointly decrypted by all patients and return the result to the research institution.

5 Experimental results

In this section, we compare the efficiency of our single key holomorphic encryption scheme and DHS16. The results are presented in table 2.

Experimental results show that when we use two layers as a block, the speed of the 36-level homomorphic multiplication is 1.9 times that of the DHS scheme. When we use three layers as a block, the speed of the 36-level homomorphic multiplication is 2.4 times that of the DHS scheme. Therefore, our scheme can run the homomorphic circuit more efficiently.
Table 2. The comparison of homomorphic multiplication between DHS16 and our scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Level(s) for one relinearization</th>
<th>Number of levels</th>
<th>Total Time for evaluating multiplication gate</th>
<th>Average time for evaluating multiplication gate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DHS16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>168084</td>
<td>4669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our scheme</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>86832</td>
<td>2412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>68400</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6 Conclusions

In this paper, we propose an efficient leveled MKFHE scheme, which improves the efficiency of homomorphic evaluations, and constructs a two-round multiparty computation (MPC) protocol based on this. We reduce the number of relinearization operations in homomorphic evaluations process by separating the homomorphic multiplication and relinearization techniques. We construct a distributed decryption process which can be implemented independently for all participating users, and avoid the interaction between users in the decryption process. Based on this, a two-round MPC protocol is proposed.

References


