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Paper 2018/1211

Countering Block Withholding Attack Effciently

Suhyeon Lee and Seungjoo Kim

Abstract

Bitcoin, well-known cryptocurrency, selected Poof-of-Work (PoW) for its security. PoW mechanism incentivizes participants and deters attacks on the network. Bitcoin seems to have operated the stable distributed network with PoW until now. Researchers found, however, some vulnerabilities in PoW such as selfish mining, block withholding attack, and so on. Especially, after Rosenfeld suggested block withholding attack and Eyal made this attack practical, many variants and countermeasures have been proposed. Most countermeasures, however, were accompanied by changes in the mining algorithm to make the attack impossible, which lowered the practical adaptability. In this paper, we propose a countermeasure to prevent block withholding attack effectively. Mining pools can adapt our method without changing their mining environment.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
blockchain
Contact author(s)
orion-alpha @ korea ac kr
History
2022-03-04: last of 3 revisions
2018-12-19: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/1211
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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