Plaintext Recovery Attack of OCB2*

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Abstract. Inoue and Minematsu [Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/1040] presented efficient forgery attacks against OCB2, and Poettering [Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/1087] presented a distinguishing attack. In this short note, based on these results, we show a plaintext recovery attack against OCB2 in the chosen plaintext and ciphertext setting. We also show that the decryption oracle of the underlying block cipher can be simulated. This complements the simulation of the encryption oracle of the block cipher by Poettering in [Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/1087].

Keywords: OCB2, plaintext recovery attack, chosen plaintext and ciphertext setting

1 Introduction

OCB2 is an efficient authenticated encryption scheme proposed in [6]. In [1], Inoue and Minematsu presented efficient forgery attacks against OCB2, and Poettering presented an implication of the attack in the context of confidentiality [3]. Specifically, Poettering presented a distinguishing attack under the chosen plaintext and ciphertext setting, and this breaks the privacy security notion in the sense of IND-CCA.

In this short note, based on the results of [1,3], we show a plaintext recovery attack against OCB2 in the chosen plaintext and ciphertext setting, i.e., Poettering showed that OCB2 allows a distinguishing attack and hence cannot achieve the privacy notion of IND-CCA, but we show that for a given ciphertext, the corresponding plaintext can be recovered if the adversary has access to the encryption and decryption oracles. This attack model is usually not covered in the provable security analysis, as the provable security notion only requires less ambitious goal of the adversary (and this is an important point in provable security results). A similar model was considered in the security analysis of

* See [Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/311] that appeared on March 20, 2019, which is a joint report that includes the findings of [Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/1040] (by Inoue and Minematsu), [Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/1087] (by Poettering), and this report.

1 We note that the updated version [5] of [3] includes the same plaintext recovery attack.
EAX-prime [2], while the attack against EAX-prime works without an encryption oracle.

In [4], Poettering showed that the encryption $E_K$ of the underlying block cipher can be simulated if the adversary has access to the encryption and decryption oracles of OCB2. That is, for any $X^*$ chosen by the adversary, it can compute $Y^* = E_K(X^*)$. We complement this by showing that the decryption $E^{-1}_K$ can also be simulated with an overwhelming probability if the adversary has access to the encryption and decryption oracles of OCB2, i.e., for any $Y^*$ chosen by the adversary, it can compute $X^* = E^{-1}_K(Y^*)$.

To make the paper succinct, we follow exactly the same notation used in [1], and we omit the description of OCB2.

## 2 Plaintext Recovery Attack Model

We consider an attack model that closely follows [2]. A challenger has a secret key $K$. Let $(C^*, T^*)$ be the encryption of $(N^*, A^*, M^*)$, where a nonce $N^*$, associated data $A^*$, and a plaintext $M^*$ are arbitrarily chosen by the challenger. However, we make assumptions that $M^*$ is long and $C^*$ has many blocks (for instance 3 or more blocks), and that when $C^*$ is broken into blocks as $(C^*[1], \ldots, C^*[m^*])$, there exist indices $j, k \in \{1, \ldots, m^* - 1\}$ such that $C^*[j] \neq C^*[k]$.

Then $(N^*, A^*, C^*, T^*)$ is given to the adversary as a challenge. The adversary has access to the encryption and decryption oracles, and the goal is to recover $M^*$. The encryption oracle takes $(N, A, M)$ as input and returns $(C, T)$. The decryption oracle takes $(N', A', C', T')$ as input and returns the corresponding plaintext $M'$ or the reject symbol $\bot$.

The adversary cannot use $N^*$ as a nonce in encryption queries (as $N^*$ was already used in encryption to generate the challenge). Also, the adversary is nonce-respecting and hence cannot repeat the same nonce in encryption queries. To avoid a trivial win, the adversary cannot use the challenge $(N^*, A^*, C^*, T^*)$ in decryption queries.

## 3 Plaintext Recovery Attack

Let $(C^*, T^*)$ be the encryption of $(N^*, A^*, M^*)$, and $(N^*, A^*, C^*, T^*)$ is given to the adversary as a challenge. The goal is to recover $M^*$.

We first recover $L^* = E_K(N^*)$. For this, we first perform the attack in [1] Sect. 4.1.

1. Fix any $N, M[2] \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $N \neq N^*$, and let $M = (M[1], M[2]) = (\text{len}(0^n), M[2])$.
2. Next, make an encryption query $(N, A, M)$, where $A$ is empty, and obtain $(C[1], C[2], T)$.
4. Make a decryption query $(N', A', C', T')$, where $N' = N$ and $A'$ is empty, and obtain $M' = 2L \oplus \text{len}(0^n)$.
As explained in [1] Sect. 4.3, the adversary can recover three input-output pairs \((X[1], Y[1]), (X[2], Y[2]), (X[3], Y[3])\) of the block cipher, where \(Y[i] = E_K(X[i])\). If \(X[i] = N^*\) for some \(i\), then \(L^*\) is \(Y[i]\). Otherwise, let \((N'', L'')\) be one of \((X[i], Y[i])\) that satisfies \(N'' \neq N\). We note that there is a negligible probability that this fails. However, this can be avoided by repeating the above Steps 1–4 with a different nonce \(N\). We could also follow [1] Sect. 4.2 to obtain more input-output pairs. We then proceed as follows:

1. Fix any \(A'' \in \{0, 1\}^*\) and \(M''[2] \in \{0, 1\}^n\), and let \(M'' = (M''[1], M''[2]) = (N^* \oplus 2L'', M''[2])\).
2. Make an encryption query \((N'', A'', M'')\) and obtain \((C''[1], C''[2], T'')\).
3. Let \(L^*\) be \(C''[1] \oplus 2L''\).

We see that Step 3 indeed gives \(L^*\). See Fig. 1 for the generation process of \(C''[1]\) for the encryption query \((N'', A'', M'')\) of Step 2.

![Diagram](image)

*Fig. 1. The generation process of \(C''[1]\) for the encryption query \((N'', A'', M'')\) of Step 2. \(L^* = E_K(N^*)\) is obtained as \(C''[1] \oplus 2L''\).*

With the knowledge of \(L^*\), following [1] Sect. 4.3, we modify \(C^*\) to make a decryption query. Specifically, let \(C^* = (C^*[1], \ldots, C^*[m^*])\) be the challenge ciphertext broken into blocks, and we first fix indices \(j, k \in \{1, \ldots, m^* - 1\}\) that satisfy \(C^*[j] \neq C^*[k]\). We then define \(C^8 = (C^8[1], \ldots, C^8[m^*])\) as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
C^8[i] &= C^*[i] \text{ for } i \in \{1, \ldots, m^*\} \setminus \{j, k\} \\
C^8[j] &= C^*[k] \oplus 2^k L^* \oplus 2^j L^* \\
C^8[k] &= C^*[j] \oplus 2^k L^* \oplus 2^j L^*
\end{align*}
\]

Next, the adversary makes a decryption query \((N^*, A^*, C^8, T^*)\), i.e., this is almost the same as the challenge, but the \(j\)-th and \(k\)-th blocks of \(C^*\) are modified. From the reasoning of [1] Sect. 4.3, the query will be accepted, and the adversary obtains \(M^8\). The goal of the attack, \(M^*\), is obtained by swapping the \(j\)-th and \(k\)-th blocks of \(M^8\) and making necessary modifications. More precisely, from \(M^8 = (M^8[1], \ldots, M^8[m^*])\), we obtain \(M^* = (M^*[1], \ldots, M^*[m^*])\) as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
M^*[i] &= M^8[i] \text{ for } i \in \{1, \ldots, m^*\} \setminus \{j, k\} \\
M^*[j] &= M^8[k] \oplus 2^k L^* \oplus 2^j L^* \\
M^*[k] &= M^8[j] \oplus 2^k L^* \oplus 2^j L^*
\end{align*}
\]
\[-M^*[k] = M^8[j] \oplus 2^kL^* \oplus 2^jL^*\]

See Fig. 2 for the encryption process of \((N^*, A^*, M^*)\) and the decryption process of \((N^*, A^*, C^3, T^*)\).

![Diagram](image.png)

**Fig. 2.** The encryption process of \((N^*, A^*, M^*)\) (left) and the decryption process of \((N^*, A^*, C^3, T^*)\) (right). In the right figure, we have \(C^8[j] = C^*[k] \oplus 2^L^* \oplus 2^jL^*\) and \(C^8[k] = C^*[j] \oplus 2^L^* \oplus 2^jL^*\), and it follows that \(M^*[j] = M^8[k] \oplus 2^L^* \oplus 2^jL^*\) and \(M^*[k] = M^8[j] \oplus 2^L^* \oplus 2^jL^*\).

### 4 Block Cipher Decryption

We show that, for any \(Y^*\), the adversary can compute \(X^* = E_{K^{-1}}^-(Y^*)\).

We first perform the attack in [1, Sect. 4.1] by using any nonce \(N \in \{0,1\}^n\). The adversary can recover \(L = E_K(N)\), and from this, the adversary obtains three input-output pairs \((X[1], Y[1]), (X[2], Y[2]), (X[3], Y[3])\) of the block cipher, where \(Y[i] = E_K(X[i])\).

Let \((N', L') = (X[1], Y[1])\), where we assume that \(N' \neq N\), and define

\[M^* = (X^* \oplus 2L^*, X^* \oplus 2^2L', 0^n) \in \{0,1\}^{3n}\]

The approach we take is to compute \(C^*\) and \(T^*\) under the nonce \(N'\) and empty \(A^*\), and make a decryption query \((N', A^*, C^*, T^*)\). The adversary obtains \(M^*\), and \(X^*\) can be obtained in an obvious way.

The observation here is that the check sum of \(M^*\) is \(\Sigma^* = 2L^* \oplus 2^2L',\) which is independent of \(X^*\), and we know all the block cipher input values to compute \(C^*\) and \(T^*\). See Fig. 2 for the encryption process of \((N', A^*, M^*)\). We need to derive the values of \(C^*[3]\) and \(T^*\) in Fig. 2. This can be done as in the computation of \(L^*\) from \(N^*\) in the previous section.

1. Let \((N'', L'') = (X[2], Y[2]),\) where we assume that \(N'' \neq N'\) and \(N'' \neq N\).
2. Fix any \(A'' \in \{0,1\}^*,\) and let \(M'' = (M''[1], M''[2], M''[3]) = (1\text{en}(0^n) \oplus 2^3L' \oplus 2L', 2L' \oplus 2^2L' \oplus 2^33L' \oplus 2^2L'' \oplus M''[3]),\) where \(M''[3] \in \{0,1\}^n\) can be arbitrarily fixed.
3. Make an encryption query \((N", A", M")\) and obtain \((C"[1], C"[2], C"[3], T")\).
4. Let \(C^*[3]\) be \(C"[1] \oplus 2L"\) and \(T^*\) be \(C"[2] \oplus 2^2L"\).

See Fig. 3 for this step.

The final step is to make a decryption query \((N', A^*, C^*, T^*)\), where \(A^*\) is empty, \(C^* = (Y^* \oplus 2L', Y^* \oplus 2^2L', C^*[3])\), and \(C^*[3]\) and \(T^*\) are obtained as above. The query will be accepted, and the oracle returns \(M^* = (X^* \oplus 2L', X^* \oplus 2^2L', 0^n)\). The adversary can compute \(X^*\) from the knowledge of \(L'\), and we see that the entire process succeeds with an overwhelming probability.

**Fig. 3.** The encryption process of \((N', A^*, M^*)\). \(C^*[3]\) and \(T^*\) are unknown.

**Fig. 4.** The encryption process of \((N", A", M")\). We see that \(C^*[3] = C"[1] \oplus 2L"\) and \(T^* = C"[2] \oplus 2^2L"\).

### 5 Conclusions

In this short note, based on the results of [1, 3], we presented a plaintext recovery attack against OCB2 in the chosen plaintext and ciphertext setting. The distinguishing attack by Poettering [3] has already broken the confidentiality of OCB2.
in the sense of IND-CCA. The result of this note shows that the confidentiality can also be broken in the sense of plaintext recovery. We also showed that if the adversary has access to the encryption and decryption oracles of OCB2, it can simulate the decryption oracle of the underlying block cipher.

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References