FAST: Disk Encryption and Beyond

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Abstract. This work introduces FAST which is a new family of cryptographic primitives. Several instantiations of FAST are described. These are targeted towards two goals, the specific task of disk encryption and a more general scheme suitable for a wide variety of practical applications. Some of these applications are novel real-life use cases which are not covered by previously known cryptographic constructions. Detailed and careful implementations of several instantiations of FAST have been carried out in both software and hardware. For disk encryption, the results from the implementations show that FAST compares very favourably to the IEEE disk encryption standards XCB and EME2. Formally, FAST is a new family of tweakable enciphering schemes. It is built using a fixed input length pseudo-random function and an appropriate hash function. FAST uses a single-block key, is parallelisable and can be instantiated using only the encryption function of a block cipher. The hash function can be instantiated using either the Horner's rule based usual polynomial hashing or hashing based on the more efficient Bernstein-Rabin-Winograd polynomials. Security of FAST has been rigorously analysed using the standard provable security approach and concrete security bounds have been derived. Based on our implementation results, we put forward FAST as a serious candidate for standardisation and deployment.

Keywords: tweakable enciphering schemes, pseudo-random function, Horner, BRW.

1 Introduction

There is a huge amount of data residing on various kinds of storage devices. For example, the Indian national repository of biometric data called Aadhaar runs into several petabytes\textsuperscript{3}. In today's world, much of the data at rest are sensitive and require encryption to be protected from unwanted access or tampering. The solution is to use full disk encryption where the storage device holds the encryption of the data under a secret key. Reading from the disk requires decrypting the relevant portion of the disk, while writing to the disk requires encrypting the data and then storing it at an appropriate location on the disk. The tasks of encryption and decryption are performed using a disk encryption algorithm. To be useful in practice a disk encryption algorithm needs to be both secure and efficient. The goal of security is to ensure that unwanted access or tampering is indeed not feasible while the goal of efficiency is to ensure that there is no noticeable slowdown in the process of reading from or writing to the disk.

A logical level view of a hard disk and most other storage devices is as a collection of sectors where each sector can store a fixed number of bytes. For example, present day hard disks have 4096-byte sectors while some of the older disks had 512-byte sectors\textsuperscript{4}. Each sector has a unique address. A read or write operation on a disk works at the granularity of sectors. A read operation will specify a bunch of sector addresses and the complete contents of those sectors will be returned.

\textsuperscript{3} https://www.cse.iitb.ac.in/~comad/2010/pdf/Industry_Sessions/UID_Pramod_Varma.pdf

\textsuperscript{4} https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_sector
Similarly, a write operation will specify the data and a bunch of sector addresses and the contents of the corresponding sectors will be overwritten with the new data.

A disk encryption algorithm proceeds sector by sector. The content of a sector is encrypted using the secret key and stored in-place, i.e., the content of the sector is overwritten using the encrypted content. The original unencrypted content is not stored anywhere. Just encryption is not sufficient for security as can be seen from the following simple attack. Suppose that the contents of two successive sectors \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \) are \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \) corresponding to plaintexts \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) respectively. An adversary may simply swap \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \). Subsequent decryption will show \( s_1 \) containing \( P_1 \) and \( s_2 \) containing \( P_2 \). If it turns out that \( s_1 \) containing \( P_2 \) and \( s_2 \) containing \( P_1 \) is meaningful data, then by a simple swap operation, the adversary has been able to alter the content of the disk to a meaningful data which was not originally stored on the disk.

To prevent the above possibility, the encryption of the content of a sector needs to be somehow tied to the sector address. Decryption of any adversarially modified content of a sector should result in a random looking string which is unlikely to be meaningful data.

Viewed in this manner, a disk encryption mechanism is an example of a length preserving encryption where the length of the ciphertext is equal to the length of the plaintext. Further, there is another quantity (which is the sector address in case of disk encryption) which determines the ciphertext but, is itself not encrypted. In the literature this quantity has been called a tweak. The functionality of a tweak-based length preserving encryption has been called a tweakable enciphering scheme (TES) [23].

While disk encryption is a very important application of a TES, the full functionality of a TES is much more broader than just disk encryption. For the specific case of disk encryption, messages are contents of a sector and so are fixed length strings. A TES can have a more general message space consisting of binary strings of different lengths. Similarly, in the case of disk encryption, the tweak is a sector address and can be encoded using a short fixed length string. More generally, the tweak space in a TES can also consist of strings of different lengths or even consist of vectors of strings.

**Our Contributions**

This paper describes a new family of tweakable enciphering schemes called FAST which is built using a pseudo-random function (PRF) and a hash function with provably low collision and differential properties. The domain and the range of the pseudo-random function are both equal to the set of all \( n \)-bit binary strings for an appropriately chosen \( n \). The hash function is built using arithmetic over the finite field \( GF(2^n) \). Some of the salient aspects of FAST are described below.

**Wide range of applications:** FAST can be used in the following settings.

*Fixed length setting:* This setting is targeted towards disk encryption application. It supports an \( n \)-bit tweak and messages whose lengths are a fixed multiple of the block size \( n \).

*General setting:* This setting is very general. Messages are allowed to have different lengths and tweaks are allowed to be vectors of binary strings where the numbers of components in the vectors can vary. The richness of the tweak space provides considerable flexibility in applications where there is a message and an associated set of attributes. The message is to be encrypted while the attributes are to be in the clear but the ciphertext needs to be bound to the attributes. We mention two possible applications for such a functionality.
1. The message is a data packet that is stored at a destination node while the vector of attributes encode the path taken by the data packet to reach the destination node with the components of the vector identifying the intermediate nodes.

2. The message consists of biometric information while the attributes are date-time, gender and other related information. A possible application would be to the Aadhaar database mentioned earlier.

We note that the idea of having associated data to be a vector of strings was earlier proposed in [33] in the context of deterministic authenticated encryption. To the best of our knowledge, no previous construction of TES supports such a general tweak space.

**Software and hardware implementations:** A major contribution of this paper is to provide detailed software and hardware implementations of several variants of FAST.

1. The software implementation is targeted towards the Intel Skylake processor and is in Intel intrinsics using the specialised AES-NI instructions and the pclmulqdq instruction. The code for the software implementation is publicly available from https://github.com/sebatighosh/FAST. The software implementation covers both the fixed length and the general settings.

2. The hardware implementation is based on FPGA and is targeted towards the disk encryption application.

Results arising from the implementations show that the new proposal compares favourably to the previous and standardised constructions in both software and hardware. For the fixed length setting, the best speed achieved by FAST on the Intel Skylake platform is 1.25 cycles per byte. In comparison, the IEEE standards XCB and EME2 achieve speeds of 1.92 cycles per byte and 2.07 cycles per byte respectively.

On the Virtex 5 FPGA platform, the best speed achieved by FAST is 29.51 Gbps while XCB and EME2 achieve speeds of 28.05 Gbps and 24.77 Gbps respectively. Further, FAST is better than both XCB and EME2 in terms of number of slices and the throughput per area measure. Similar performance improvement is obtained for the Virtex 7 FPGA.

For the general setting, the software implementation on the Skylake platform achieves speeds between 1.28 to 1.70 cycles per byte for message lengths varying from 512 bytes to 8192 bytes and with 2 to 4 components in the tweak vector. Since there is no previously known construction of TES supporting a vector valued tweak, we are unable to provide comparative results.

**Dispensing with invertibility:** There are several concrete TES proposals in the literature. Most of these proposals including the ones that have been standardised are modes of operations of a block cipher and use both the encryption and the decryption functions of the underlying block cipher. FAST, on the other hand, uses a PRF and does not require the invertibility property of a block cipher. The PRF itself may be instantiated using the encryption function of a block cipher such as AES. This provides two distinct advantages.

1. From a practical point of view, the advantage is that the decryption function of the block cipher does not require to be implemented. This is an advantage in hardware implementation since it results in a smaller hardware. A software implementation also benefits by requiring a smaller size code.

2. From a theoretical point of view, a block cipher is modelled as a strong pseudo-random permutation (SPRP). A PRF assumption on the encryption function of a block cipher is a weaker assumption than an SPRP assumption on the block cipher. So security of FAST can be based on a weaker assumption on the underlying block cipher.
We note that a previous work [36] had pointed out the possibility of using only the encryption function of a block cipher to build a TES. The work was more at a conceptual level using generic components and some unnecessary operations. It did not provide any specific instantiation or implementation. Subsequent to [36], a work [7] proposed a single key TES using only the encryption function of the block cipher. This construction, however, is essentially sequential and again practical implementation results for either hardware or software were not provided. Later we discuss in more details several issues regarding the comparison of FAST to previous schemes.

**Parallelisable:** At a top level, the construction applies a Feistel layer of encryption on the first two message blocks and sandwiches a counter type mode of operation in-between two layers of hashing for the rest of the message. The counter mode is fully parallelisable. This leads to efficient implementations in both hardware and software.

**Design of hash functions:** We provide instantiations using two kinds of hash functions both of which are based on arithmetic over the finite field $GF(2^n)$. The first kind of hash function is based on the usual polynomial based hashing using Horner’s rule. The second kind is based on a class of polynomials introduced in [6] and called BRW polynomials in [35]. For tackling variable length inputs, a combination of BRW and Horner based hashing called Hash2L [9] turns out to be advantageous. For the fixed length setting, we show instantiations using Horner and BRW while for the general setting, we use the vector version vecHorner of Horner and the vector version vecHash2L of Hash2L.

**Provable security treatment:** The security of the proposed scheme is analysed following the standard provable security methodology. The theoretical notion of security of a TES is shown to hold under the assumption that the encryption function of the underlying block cipher is a PRF. The proof requires the hash functions to satisfy certain properties. We show that the hash functions obtained from Horner, vecHorner, BRW and vecHash2L satisfy the required properties. Concrete security bounds are derived for the different instantiations. These bounds show that the security of FAST is adequate for practical purposes and is comparable to those achieved in previous designs.

**Previous Works on TES**

The first proposal for the construction of a strong pseudorandom permutation using a hash-ECB-hash approach was by Naor and Reingold [30]. This work, though, did not consider tweaks since the paper predates the formal introduction of the notion of a TES. The notion of a tweakable block cipher and its security was formalised by Liskov, Rivest and Wagner [26]. This was followed by a formalisation of the notion of a tweakable enciphering scheme by Halevi and Rogaway in [23]. This paper also described a TES called CMC which is based on the CBC mode of operation. A subsequent work [24] by the same authors introduced a TES called EME which is a parallelisable mode of operation of a block cipher. EME was extended to handle arbitrary length messages by Halevi [20] and the resulting scheme was called EME*. The EME family of TESs does not require finite field multiplication. The main cost of encryption is roughly two block cipher calls per block of the message.

Construction of a TES using a counter based mode of operation of a block cipher and a Horner type hash function was first proposed by McGrew and Fluhrer [27]. This scheme was called XCB.

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5 We note that [7] does not refer to [36] even though [36] appeared several years earlier than [7].
later variant [28] of XCB was proposed to improve efficiency and reduce key size. Various security problems for XCB have been pointed out in [10].

There have been a number of works proposing different constructions of TESs. Examples are PEP [15], ABL [29], HCTR [37], HCH [16], TET [21] and HEH [35]. An improved security analysis of HCTR was presented in [14]. A generalisation of EME using a general masking scheme was proposed in [34]. As mentioned earlier, the work [36] suggested the conceptual possibility of constructing a TES from a PRF and hence using only the encryption function of a block cipher. A subsequent work [7] also proposed a TES construction from a PRF which is sequential in nature. The possibility of constructing TESs from stream ciphers was indicated in [36]. Concrete proposals and detailed FPGA implementations of stream cipher based TESs have been described in [13].

Another line of investigation has been the construction of ciphers that can securely enciphers their own keys [22, 4]. The work [4] provides a generic method to convert a conventional TES to one which can be proved to be secure even under the possibility of encrypting its own key. This generic method has been applied to EME2 in [4]. We note that the method can equally well be applied to the construction FAST proposed in the present work. So the present work complements the construction in [4] rather than being competitive with it.

**Related Primitives**

Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) [25, 5] encrypts a message under a key and a nonce to produce a ciphertext. The ciphertext is longer than the message and contains a tag which serves the purpose of authentication. Generating and maintaining the security of nonces can be a problem. The notion of deterministic authenticated encryption with associated data (DAEAD) does away with the nonce [33]. In terms of known constructions, AEAD schemes turn out to be the most efficient, followed by DAEAD schemes and then TESs. The difficulty of using AEAD schemes for disk encryption and the possibility of indeed using DAEAD schemes for this purpose have been discussed in details in [12].

**Standards and Patents**

IEEE [3] has standardised two tweakable enciphering schemes, namely EME2 and XCB. Essentially the variant of EME described in [20] has been standardised as EME2 while the variant of XCB described in [28] has been standardised as XCB. Both EME and XCB are patented algorithms. Till date there is no unpatented algorithm which has been standardised. Apart from offering superior performance guarantees with respect to XCB and EME2, it is our hope that FAST will also fill the gap of providing an attractive solution which is unencumbered by intellectual property claims.

An earlier IEEE standard is XTS [2] which has also been standardised [17] by NIST of USA. This is based on the XEX construction of Rogaway [32]. The security provided by XTS is not adequate for disk encryption application. Rogaway [1] himself mentioned that XTS only provides light security and should be preferred only when there is an overriding concern for speed. We note, on the other hand, that if the speed of a TES (guaranteeing full security) is sufficient for achieving the disk read/write rate, then there is no justification for using XTS. Indeed the scheme FAST that we propose in this work provides adequate speed of encryption/decryption to match with the read/write speed of the presently fastest disks.

## 2 Preliminaries

Throughout the paper, we fix a positive integer $n$ and a positive integer $\eta \geq 3$. 


Notation: Let $X$ and $Y$ be binary strings.

- The length of $X$ will be denoted as $\text{len}(X)$.
- The concatenation of $X$ and $Y$ will be denoted as $X||Y$.
- For an integer $i$ with $0 \leq i < 2^n$, $\text{bin}_n(i)$ denotes the $n$-bit binary representation of $i$.

We define the following terminology.

- For a positive integer $n$, let $\mathbb{F}_n$ be the finite field of $2^n$ elements. Using a fixed irreducible polynomial of degree $n$ over $\mathbb{F}_2$ to represent $\mathbb{F}$, the elements of $\mathbb{F}$ can be identified with the binary strings of length $n$. Viewed in this manner, an $n$-bit binary string will be considered to be an element of $\mathbb{F}$. The addition operation over $\mathbb{F}$ will be denoted by $\oplus$; for $X, Y \in \mathbb{F}$, the product will be denoted as $XY$. The additive identity of $\mathbb{F}$ will be denoted as $0$ and will be represented as $0^n$; the multiplicative identity of $\mathbb{F}$ will be denoted as $1$ and will be represented as $0^{n-1}$.

Pseudo-random function: The construction requires a family of functions where each function in the family maps $n$-bit strings to $n$-bit strings. More precisely, let $\{\mathbf{F}_K\}_{K \in \mathcal{K}}$ where for $K \in \mathcal{K}$, $\mathbf{F}_K : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ be a family of functions. Here $\mathcal{K}$ is the key space of $\mathbf{F}$. The security requirement on $\{\mathbf{F}_K\}_{K \in \mathcal{K}}$ is that of a pseudo-random function family. Informally this means, for a randomly chosen $K$, on distinct inputs, the outputs of $\mathbf{F}_K(\cdot)$ appear independent and uniformly distributed to a computationally bounded adversary. We provide the formal definition later. It is possible to instantiate $\mathbf{F}$ using the encryption (or the decryption) function of a block cipher. In particular, one may use the encryption function of AES to instantiate $\mathbf{F}$. This, however, is an overkill, since the invertibility property of the block cipher is not required by the construction.
Counter mode: The PRF $\mathbf{F}$ can handle only $n$-bit strings. Longer strings are handled in the following manner. Let $X$ be a non-empty binary string. For $K \in \mathcal{K}$ and $S \in \{0,1\}^n$, we define $\text{Ctr}_{K,S}(X)$ in the following manner.

$$\text{Ctr}_{K,S}(X) = (S_1 \oplus X_1, \ldots, S_{m-1} \oplus X_{m-1}, \text{first}_r(S_m) \oplus X_m)$$

(1)

where $(X_1, \ldots, X_m) \leftarrow \text{format}_r(X)$, $\text{len}(X_m) = r$ and $S_i = \mathbf{F}_K(S \oplus \text{bin}_n(i))$. This variant of the counter mode was originally used in [37]. Note that the PRF $\mathbf{F}$ is used to define the counter mode, but, the counter mode itself as defined here is not a PRF.

3 Hash Functions

We define two standard hash functions.

Polynomials: For $m \geq 0$, let $\text{Horner} : \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ be defined as follows.

$$\text{Horner}(\tau, X_1, \ldots, X_m) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } m = 0; \\ X_1\tau^{m-1} \oplus X_2\tau^{m-2} \oplus \cdots \oplus X_{m-1}\tau \oplus X_m, & \text{if } m > 0. \end{cases}$$

We write $\text{Horner}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_m)$ to denote $\text{Horner}(\tau, X_1, \ldots, X_m)$. The degree of $\text{Horner}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_m)$ as a polynomial in $\tau$ is at most $m-1$. For $m > 0$, $\text{Horner}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_m) = \tau \text{Horner}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_{m-1}) \oplus X_m$ and so $\text{Horner}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_m)$ can be evaluated using $m-1$ field multiplications.

BRW polynomials: In [6], Bernstein defined a family of polynomials based on a previous work by Rabin and Winograd [31] (these have been called the BRW polynomials [35]). For $m \geq 0$, let $\text{BRW} : \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ be defined as follows. We write $\text{BRW}_r(\cdots)$ to denote $\text{BRW}(\tau, \cdots)$.

- $\text{BRW}_r() = 0$;
- $\text{BRW}_r(X_1) = X_1$;
- $\text{BRW}_r(X_1, X_2) = X_1\tau \oplus X_2$;
- $\text{BRW}_r(X_1, X_2, X_3) = (\tau \oplus X_1)(\tau^2 \oplus X_2) \oplus X_3$;
- $\text{BRW}_r(X_1, X_2, \cdots, X_m) =$ $\text{BRW}_r(X_1, \cdots, X_{t-1})\tau^t \oplus X_t)$ $\oplus \text{BRW}_r(X_{t+1}, \cdots, X_m)$ if $t \in \{4, 8, 16, 32, \cdots\}$ and $t \leq m < 2t$.

From the definition it follows that for $m \geq 3$, $\text{BRW}_r(X_1, X_2, \cdots, X_m)$ is a monic polynomial and for $m = 0, 1, 2$, $\text{BRW}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_m) = \text{Horner}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_m)$. We further note the following points about BRW polynomials proved in [6].

1. For $m \geq 3$, $\text{BRW}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_m)$ can be computed using $\lfloor m/2 \rfloor$ field multiplications and $\lfloor \lg m \rfloor$ additional field squarings to compute $\tau^2, \tau^4, \ldots$.

2. Let $\vartheta(m)$ denote the degree of $\text{BRW}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_m)$. For $m \geq 3$, $\vartheta(m) = 2\lfloor \lg m \rfloor + 1 - 1$ and so $\vartheta(m) \leq 2m - 1$; equality is achieved if and only if $m = 2^a$; and $\vartheta(m) = m$ if and only if $m = 2^a - 1$; for some integer $a \geq 2$.

3. The map from $\mathbb{F}^m$ to $\mathbb{F}[\tau]$ given by $(X_1, \ldots, X_m) \mapsto \text{BRW}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_m)$ is injective.
3.1 Hash Function \texttt{vecHorner}

Let

$$\mathcal{VD} = \bigcup_{k=0}^{255} \{(M_1, \ldots, M_k) : M_i \in \{0, 1\}^*, \ 0 \leq \text{len}(M_i) \leq 2^{n-16} - 1\}. \quad (2)$$

The upper bound of 255 on \(k\) ensures that the value of \(k\) fits in a byte and the upper bound of \(2^{n-16} - 1\) on the lengths of strings ensures that the lengths of such strings fit into an \((n-16)\)-bit binary string. The definition of \texttt{vecHorner} : \(\mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{VD} \rightarrow \mathcal{F}\) is shown in Table 1 where we write \texttt{vecHorner}_{\tau}(\cdot) to denote \texttt{vecHorner}(\tau, \cdot). The degree of \texttt{vecHorner}_{\tau}(M_1, \ldots, M_k) is at most \(k + \sum_{i=1}^k m_i\) and its constant term is 0. Note that the values of \(m_1, \ldots, m_k\) are defined by the algorithm to compute \texttt{vecHorner} shown in Table 1.

\textbf{Table 1.} Computations of \texttt{vecHorner} and \texttt{vecHash2L}. The string 1\(^n\) denotes the element of \(\mathcal{F}\) whose binary representation consists of the all-one string.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>\texttt{vecHorner}_{\tau}(M_1, \ldots, M_k)</th>
<th>\texttt{vecHash2L}_{\tau}(M_1, \ldots, M_k)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>if (k = 0) return 1(^n); \hspace{1cm} digest \leftarrow 0;</td>
<td>if (k = 0) return 1(^n); \hspace{1cm} digest \leftarrow 0;</td>
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<tr>
<td>for (i \leftarrow 1, \ldots, k - 1) do</td>
<td>for (i \leftarrow 1, \ldots, k - 1) do</td>
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<tr>
<td>((M_{i,1}, \ldots, M_{i,m_i}) \leftarrow \text{format}_n(\text{pad}_n(M_i));</td>
<td>((M_{i,1}, \ldots, M_{i,\ell_i}) \leftarrow \text{superBlks}_{n,\eta}(M_i);</td>
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<td>\hspace{1cm} L_i \leftarrow \text{bin}_n(\text{len}(M_i));</td>
<td>\hspace{1cm} L_i \leftarrow \text{bin}_n(\text{len}(M_i));</td>
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<td>\hspace{1cm} \hspace{1cm} digest \leftarrow \tau \text{digest} \oplus M_{i,j};</td>
<td>\hspace{1cm} \hspace{1cm} digest \leftarrow \tau \text{digest} \oplus \text{BRW}<em>{\tau}(M</em>{i,j});</td>
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\textbf{Proposition 1.} Let \(k \geq k' \geq 0; M = (M_1, \ldots, M_k)\) and \(M' = (M'_1, \ldots, M'_{k'})\) be two distinct vectors in \(\mathcal{VD}\) and \(\alpha \in \mathcal{F}\). For a uniform random \(\tau \in \mathcal{F}_{2^n}\),

\[\Pr_{\tau} \left[ \texttt{vecHorner}_{\tau}(M) \oplus \texttt{vecHorner}_{\tau}(M') = \alpha \right] \leq \frac{\max \left( k + \sum_{i=1}^k m_i, k' + \sum_{j=1}^{k'} m'_j \right)}{2^n} \quad (3)\]

where \(m_i\) (resp. \(m'_j\)) is the number of \(n\)-bit blocks in \(\text{pad}_n(M_i)\) (resp. \(\text{pad}_n(M'_j)\)).

\textit{Proof.} Let \(p(\tau) = \texttt{vecHorner}_{\tau}(M) \oplus \texttt{vecHorner}_{\tau}(M') \oplus \alpha\). If \(p(\tau)\) is a non-zero polynomial, then the degree of \(p(\tau)\) is at most \(\max \left( k + \sum_{i=1}^k m_i, k' + \sum_{j=1}^{k'} m'_j \right)\). The probability that a uniform random \(\tau\) is a root of \(p(\tau)\) is at most the stated bound. So, it is sufficient to argue that \(p(\tau)\) is non-zero.
If \( k' = 0 \), then, as \( M \neq M' \), \( k > 0 \). In this case, \( \text{vecHorner}_\tau(M') = 1^n \tau \) and the coefficient of \( \tau \) in \( \text{vecHorner}_\tau(M) \) is \( L_k \neq 1^n \). Hence, in this case \( p(\tau) \) is a non-zero polynomial.

Let \( M_{i_1,i_2} \) (resp. \( M'_{j_1,j_2} \)) be the \( n \)-bit blocks obtained from \( M \) (resp. \( M' \)) using \textit{format}. If \( k > k' > 0 \), then the coefficient of \( \tau \) in \( p(\tau) \) is \( L_k \oplus L'_k \neq 0 \) and so \( p(\tau) \) is a non-zero polynomial. So, suppose \( k = k' \). If there is an \( i \) such that \( L_i \neq L'_i \) let \( i \) be the maximum such index. Using the maximality of \( i \) it is possible to argue that \( L_i \oplus L'_i \) occurs as a coefficient of some power of \( \tau \) in \( p(\tau) \) and again it follows that \( p(\tau) \) is a non-zero polynomial. So, now suppose that \( L_i = L'_i \) for all \( 1 \leq i \leq k = k' \). Since \( M \neq M' \), there must be an \( i \) and \( j \) such that \( M_{i,j} \neq M'_{i,j} \) again showing that \( p(\tau) \) is a non-zero polynomial. \( \square \)

### 3.2 Hash Function \( \text{vecHash2L} \) [9]

Two hash functions, namely \( \text{Hash2L} \) and \( \text{vecHash2L} \), have been defined in [9]. Here we only recall the definition of \( \text{vecHash2L} \) since we will not be using the hash function \( \text{Hash2L} \) in this work. The definition of \( \text{vecHash2L} : F \times VD \rightarrow F \) is given in Table 1 where we write \( \text{vecHash2L}_{\tau}(\cdot) \) to denote \( \text{vecHash2L}(\tau, \cdot) \). The degree of \( \text{vecHash2L}_{\tau}(M_1, \ldots, M_k) \) is at most \((d(\eta) + 1)(\ell_1 + \cdots + \ell_k) + k\), and its constant term is 0. Theorem 2 of [9] shows the following. Let \( k \geq k' \geq 0 \); \( M = (M_1, \ldots, M_k) \) and \( M' = (M'_1, \ldots, M'_{k'}) \) be two distinct vectors in \( VD \). For a uniform random \( \tau \in F_{2^n} \) and for any \( \alpha \in F_{2^n} \),

\[
\Pr_{\tau} \left[ \text{vecHash2L}_{\tau}(M) \oplus \text{vecHash2L}_{\tau}(M') = \alpha \right] \leq \frac{\max (k + (d(\eta) + 1)A, k' + (d(\eta) + 1)A')}{2^n}
\]

where \( A = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \ell_i \) and \( A' = \sum_{j=1}^{k'} \ell'_j \); \( \ell_i \) (resp. \( \ell'_j \)) is the number of super-blocks in \( M_i \) (resp. \( M'_j \)).

Note that the hash function \( \text{vecHash2L} \) is parameterised by the value of \( \eta \). \textit{In the rest of the paper, we will assume that \( \eta + 1 \) is a power of two so that the degree \( d(\eta) \) of \( \text{BRW}_{\tau}(X_1, \ldots, X_\eta) \) is \( \eta \).}

### 4 Construction

Formally, \( \text{FAST} = (\text{FAST.Encrypt}, \text{FAST.Decrypt}) \) where

\[
\text{FAST.Encrypt}, \text{FAST.Decrypt} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}
\]

and

- \( \mathcal{K} \) is a finite non-empty set called the key space,
- \( \mathcal{T} \) is a finite non-empty set called the tweak space and
- \( \mathcal{P} \) denotes both the message and the ciphertext spaces such that for any string \( P \in \mathcal{P} \), \( \text{len}(P) > 2n \). So, for any \( P \in \mathcal{P} \), the number of \( n \)-bit blocks in \( \text{pad}_n(P) \) is at least three. This requirement will be called the \textit{length condition} on \( \mathcal{P} \).

We emphasise that \( \mathcal{P} \) does not necessarily contain all strings of lengths greater than \( 2n \). We provide the precise definitions of \( \mathcal{P} \) for specific instantiations later.

For \( K \in \mathcal{K}, T \in \mathcal{T} \) and \( P \in \mathcal{P} \), we will write \( \text{FAST.Encrypt}_K(T, P) \) to denote \( \text{FAST.Encrypt}(K, T, P) \); for \( K \in \mathcal{K}, T \in \mathcal{T} \) and \( C \in \mathcal{P} \), we will write \( \text{FAST.Decrypt}_K(T, C) \) to denote \( \text{FAST.Decrypt}(K, T, C) \). The definitions of \( \text{FAST.Encrypt}_K(T, P) \) and \( \text{FAST.Decrypt}_K(T, C) \) are given in Table 2. These require the following components.
1. Two hash functions

\[ h, h' : \mathbb{F} \times T \times M \rightarrow \mathbb{F}, \quad (6) \]

where

\[ M = \{ x : w | x \in \mathcal{P} \text{ for some } w \in \{0,1\}^{2n} \}; \quad (7) \]

\( \mathbb{F} \) is the key space and also the digest space, \( T \) is the tweak space and \( M \) is the message space for the hash functions. For \( \tau \in \mathbb{F}, T \in T \) and \( M \in M \), we will write \( h_\tau(T, M) \) (resp. \( h'_\tau(T, M) \)) to denote \( h(\tau, T, M) \) (resp. \( h'(\tau, T, M) \)). Note that in \( \text{FAST} \), both \( h \) and \( h' \) share the same key \( \tau \). Later we discuss the properties required for the pair of hash functions \((h, h')\) and how to construct such pairs using standard hash functions.

2. A PRF \( \{ F_K \}_{K \in \mathcal{K}} \) where for \( K \in \mathcal{K}, F_K : \{0,1\}^{n} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n} \). The PRF is used in the \( \text{Ctr} \) mode. Since strings in \( \mathcal{P} \) are of length greater than 2\( n \), the \( \text{Ctr} \) mode is applied to non-empty strings.

3. A fixed \( n \)-bit string \( \text{fStr} \).

4. Sub-routines \( \text{Feistel} \) and \( \text{Feistel}^{-1} \) which are shown in Table 3.

From the descriptions of \( \text{FAST.Encrypt}_K(T, P) \) and \( \text{FAST.Decrypt}_K(T, C) \) in Table 2, the following two facts are easy to verify. For \( K \in \mathcal{K}, T \in T \) and \( P \in \mathcal{P} \),

\[ \text{FAST.Decrypt}_K(T, \text{FAST.Encrypt}_K(T, P)) = P; \quad (8) \]

\[ \text{len} (\text{FAST.Encrypt}_K(T, P)) = \text{len}(P). \quad (9) \]

From (8), it follows that the decryption function of \( \text{FAST} \) is the inverse of the encryption function, while (9) shows that the length of the ciphertext produced by the encryption function is equal to the length of the plaintext.

5 Instantiations of \( \text{FAST} \)

Certain properties are required from the pair of hash functions \((h, h')\). These properties will be used in the security argument to show that in an information theoretic setting, the adversary's probability of breaking the security of \( \text{FAST} \) is low. The specific properties that will be required are formalised below.

For \( M \in M \), let \( l(M) \) denote the number of \( n \)-bit blocks in \( M \); for \( T \in T \), let \( t(T) \) denote the number of \( n \)-bit blocks in \( T \).

**Definition 1.** Let \((h, h')\) be a pair of hash functions where \( h, h' : \mathbb{F} \times T \times M \rightarrow \mathbb{F} \) satisfy the following properties. For any \((T, M), (T', M') \in T \times M \), with \((T, M) \neq (T', M')\); any \( \alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{F} \); and \( \tau \) chosen uniformly at random from \( \mathbb{F} \):

\[ \Pr[\tau(h_\tau(T, M) \oplus \alpha) = \beta] \leq \epsilon_1(t, l); \quad (10) \]

\[ \Pr[\tau(h'_\tau(T, M) \oplus \alpha) = \beta] \leq \epsilon_1(t, l); \quad (11) \]

\[ \Pr[\tau(h_\tau(T, M) \oplus h_\tau(T', M') \oplus \alpha) = \beta] \leq \epsilon_2(t, l, t', l'); \quad (12) \]

\[ \Pr[\tau(h'_\tau(T, M) \oplus h'_\tau(T', M') \oplus \alpha) = \beta] \leq \epsilon_2(t, l, t', l'). \quad (13) \]

For any \((T, M), (T', M') \in T \times M \); any \( \alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{F} \); and \( \tau \) chosen uniformly at random from \( \mathbb{F} \):

\[ \Pr[\tau(h_\tau(T, M) \oplus h'_\tau(T', M') \oplus \alpha) = \beta] \leq \epsilon_2(t, l, t', l'). \quad (14) \]

Here \( t \equiv t(T), t' \equiv t(T'), l \equiv l(M), l' \equiv l(M); \) and \( \epsilon_1 \) and \( \epsilon_2 \) are functions of \( t, l, t' \) and \( l' \). Then \((h, h')\) is said to be an \((\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2)\)-eligible pair of hash functions.

The actual definitions of \( h \) and \( h' \) vary depending on whether the intention is to handle fixed or variable length strings. We consider the following two scenarios for \( \text{FAST} \).
Table 2. Encryption and decryption algorithms for FAST.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm FAST.Encrypt(_K)(T, P)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ( \tau \leftarrow F_K(fStr) );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ( (P_1, P_2, P_3) \leftarrow \text{parse}_s(P) );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ( A_1 \leftarrow P_1 \oplus h_\tau(T, P_3) );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ( A_2 \leftarrow P_2 );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ( (B_1, B_2) \leftarrow \text{Feistel}_{K, \tau}(A_1, A_2) );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. ( Z \leftarrow A_2 \oplus B_1 );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. ( C_3 \leftarrow \text{Ctr}_{K, Z}(P_3) );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. ( C_1 \leftarrow B_1 );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. ( C_2 \leftarrow B_2 \oplus h'_\tau(T, C_3) );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. return ((C_1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm FAST.Decrypt(_K)(T, C)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ( \tau \leftarrow F_K(fStr) );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ( (C_1, C_2, C_3) \leftarrow \text{parse}_a(C) );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ( B_1 \leftarrow C_1 );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ( B_2 \leftarrow C_2 \oplus h_\tau(T, C_3) );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ( (A_1, A_2) \leftarrow \text{Feistel}^{-1}_{K, \tau}(B_1, B_2) );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. ( Z \leftarrow A_2 \oplus B_1 );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. ( P_3 \leftarrow \text{Ctr}_{K, Z}(C_3) );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. ( P_1 \leftarrow A_1 \oplus h_\tau(T, P_3) );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. ( P_2 \leftarrow A_2 );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. return ((P_1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. The four-round Feistel construction required in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feistel(_{K, \tau})(A(_1), A(_2))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ( H_1 \leftarrow \tau A_1 );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ( F_1 \leftarrow H_1 \oplus A_2 );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ( F_2 \leftarrow A_1 \oplus F_K(F_1) );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ( B_2 \leftarrow F_1 \oplus F_K(F_2) );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ( H_2 \leftarrow \tau B_2 );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. ( B_1 \leftarrow H_2 \oplus F_2 );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>return ((B_1, B_2)).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feistel(^{-1})(_{K, \tau})(B(_1), B(_2))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ( H_2 \leftarrow \tau B_2 );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ( F_2 \leftarrow B_1 \oplus H_2 );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ( F_1 \leftarrow B_2 \oplus F_K(F_2) );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ( A_1 \leftarrow F_2 \oplus F_K(F_1) );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ( H_1 \leftarrow \tau A_1 );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. ( A_2 \leftarrow H_1 \oplus F_1 );</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>return ((A_1, A_2)).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fixed length setting $F_{x_m}$ for some positive integer $m > 2$: For this setting, in (5), we define

$$\mathcal{T} = \{0, 1\}^n, \quad \mathcal{P} = \{0, 1\}^{mn} \text{ and so } \mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^{n(m-2)}. \quad (15)$$

In other words, a tweak $T$ is an $n$-bit string while plaintexts and ciphertexts consist of $m$ $n$-bit strings. This particular setting is suited for disk encryption application, where for a fixed $n$, the number of blocks $m$ in a message is determined by the size of a disk sector. In this case, for $M \in \mathcal{M}$, $l(M) = m - 2$ and for $T \in \mathcal{T}$, $t(T) = 1$. By the length condition on $\mathcal{P}$, we must have $m \geq 3$.

Consider the encryption and decryption algorithms of FAST. The number of $n$-bit blocks in $P$ (resp. $C$) is $m$ and so the number of $n$-bit blocks in $P_3$ (resp. $C_3$) is $m - 2$. The hash functions $h$ and $h'$ are invoked in FAST as $h(T, P_3)$ and $h'(T, C_3)$. So, in Definition 1, $\mathcal{T} = \mathbb{F}$ and $\mathcal{M} = \mathbb{F}^{m-2}$ and we have

$$h, h': \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F}^{m-2} \to \mathbb{F}. \quad (16)$$

For the setting of $F_{x_m}$, we describe two instantiations of $h$ and $h'$, one with Horner and the other with BRW. The corresponding instantiations of FAST will be denoted as $\text{FAST}[F_{x_m}, \text{Horner}]$ and $\text{FAST}[F_{x_m}, \text{BRW}]$.

**General setting $G_n$:** Let $\ell$ be a fixed integer in the range $\{0, \ldots, 254\}$. For this setting, in (5), we define

$$\mathcal{T} = \bigcup_{k=0}^{2^{n-16}} \{(T_1, \ldots, T_k) : 0 \leq \text{len}(T_i) \leq 2^{n-16} - 1\}; \quad (17)$$

$$\mathcal{P} = \bigcup_{i>2n} \{0, 1\}^i; \text{ and so} \quad (18)$$

$$\mathcal{M} = \bigcup_{i>0} \{0, 1\}^i. \quad (19)$$

A tweak $T$ is a vector $T = (T_1, \ldots, T_k)$ where $0 \leq k \leq \ell$ and each $T_i$ is a binary string. Since $\ell \leq 254$, $\ell + 1 \leq 255$ and so the binary representation of $\ell + 1$ will fit in a byte.

For $P \in \mathcal{P}$, suppose $M \in \mathcal{M}$ is such that $P = X || M$ for some binary string $X$ of length $2n$. Then $l(M) = m - 2$, where $m$ is the number of blocks in $\text{pad}_n(P)$. For a tweak $T = (T_1, \ldots, T_k)$, $t(T) = \sum_{i=1}^{k} m_i$, where $m_i$ is the number of blocks in $\text{pad}_n(T_i)$.

The parameter $\ell$ controls the maximum number of components that can appear in a tweak. This does not imply that the number of components in all the tweaks is equal to $\ell$. Rather, the number of components in a tweak is between 0 and $\ell$. So, the above definition of the tweak space models tweaks as vectors having variable number of components. Since we put an upper bound of 254 on $\ell$, one possibility is to do away with the parameter $\ell$ and replace it with the value 254. The reason we do not do this is the following. The parameter $\ell$ enters the security bound. If we replace $\ell$ by 254, then this value would enter the security bound. If in practice, the actual value of $\ell$ is much less than 254 (as it is likely to be), then using 254 instead of $\ell$ will lead to a looser security bound than what it should actually be. It is to avoid this unnecessary looseness in the security bound that we introduce and work with the parameter $\ell$.

For the setting of $G_n$, we describe two instantiations of $h$ and $h'$. One of these is based on $\text{vecHorner}$ while the other is based on $\text{vecHash2L}$. The parameter $\ell$ is required in both cases.
while the parameter \( \eta \) is required only in the case of \text{vecHash2L}. The instantiations of \text{FAST} in the general setting with \text{vecHorner} and \text{vecHash2L} will be denoted as \text{FAST}[\text{Gn}, \ell, \text{vecHorner}] and \text{FAST}[\text{Gn}, \ell, \eta, \text{vecHash2L}] respectively.

In the general setting, the lengths of the plaintexts can vary. Also, the tweak space has a rich structure which provides considerable flexibility in applications. Examples of such applications have been mentioned in the introduction. On the downside, the specific instantiations of the general setting are somewhat slower than the corresponding instantiations for the fixed length setting. So, for targeted applications such as disk encryption, it would be preferable to use the fixed length setting leaving out some of the extra overheads incurred in the general setting.

### 5.1 Hash Functions \( h \) and \( h' \) for \text{FAST}[\text{Fx_m}, \text{Horner}]

Fix a positive integer \( m \geq 3 \) so that the length condition on \( \mathcal{P} \) is satisfied. The hash functions \( h, h' \) are defined using \text{Horner} as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
    h_\tau(T, X_1 \| \cdots \| X_{m-2}) &= \tau \text{Horner}_\tau(1, X_1, \ldots, X_{m-2}, T); & (20) \\
    h'_\tau(T, X_1 \| \cdots \| X_{m-2}) &= \tau^2 \text{Horner}_\tau(1, X_1, \ldots, X_{m-2}, T). & (21)
\end{align*}
\]

Note that \( \text{Horner}_\tau(1, X_1, \ldots, X_{m-2}, T) \) is a monic polynomial in \( \tau \) of degree \( m-1 \). Consequently, \( h \) and \( h' \) are monic polynomials in \( \tau \) of degrees \( m \) and \( m+1 \) respectively whose constant terms are zero.

**Proposition 2.** Let \( m \geq 3 \) be an integer. The pair \((h, h')\) of hash functions defined in \((20)\) and \((21)\) for the construction \text{FAST}[\text{Fx_m}, \text{Horner}] is an \((\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2)\)-eligible pair, where \( \epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = (m+2)/2^n \).

**Proof.** In this case, for \( M \in \mathcal{M} \), \( l(M) = m - 2 \) and for \( T \in \mathcal{T}, t(T) = 1 \). We write \( t \) and \( t' \) instead of \( t(M) \) and \( t(T) \).

The polynomials \( \tau(h_\tau(T, X_1 \| \cdots \| X_{m-2}) \oplus \alpha) \oplus \beta \) and \( \tau(h'_\tau(T, X_1 \| \cdots \| X_{m-2}) \oplus \alpha) \oplus \beta \) are monic polynomials of degrees \( l + t + 2 = m + 1 \) and \( l + t + 3 = m + 2 \) in \( \tau \) respectively. So, the probability that a uniform random \( \tau \) in \( \mathbb{F} \) is a root of \( \tau(h_\tau(T, X_1 \| \cdots \| X_{m-2}) \oplus \alpha) \oplus \beta \) (resp. \( \tau(h'_\tau(T, X_1 \| \cdots \| X_{m-2}) \oplus \alpha) \oplus \beta \)) is \((l + t + 2)/2^n = (m + 1)/2^n\) (resp. \((l + t + 3)/2^n = (m + 2)/2^n\)). This shows the value of \( \epsilon_1 \).

Let \( X = X_1 \| \cdots \| X_{m-2} \) and \( X' = X'_1 \| \cdots \| X'_{m-2} \) and \( T, T' \) be such that \((T, X) \neq (T', X')\). Then \( h_\tau(T, X) \oplus h_\tau(T', X') \) is a non-zero polynomial of degree at most \( l + t = m - 1 \) whose constant term is zero. This is because the leading terms of \( h_\tau(T, X) \) and \( h_\tau(T', X') \) will cancel out in the sum \( h_\tau(T, X) \oplus h_\tau(T', X') \) so that its degree will be at most \( m - 1 \). \( (T, X) \neq (T', X') \) ensures that \( h_\tau(T, X) \oplus h_\tau(T', X') \) is a non-zero polynomial; and the constant terms of both \( h_\tau(T, X) \) and \( h_\tau(T', X') \) are zero. As a result, \( \tau(h_\tau(T, X) \oplus h_\tau(T', X') \oplus \alpha) \oplus \beta \) is a non-zero polynomial in \( \tau \) of degree at most \( m \). So, the probability that a uniform random \( \tau \) is a root of this polynomial is at most \((l + t + 1)/2^n = m/2^n\). A similar reasoning shows that the probability that a uniform random \( \tau \) is a root of \( \tau(h'_\tau(T, X) \oplus h'_\tau(T', X') \oplus \alpha) \oplus \beta \) is at most \((l + t + 2)/2^n = (m + 1)/2^n\).

For any \((T, X)\) and \((T', X')\), the polynomial \( h_\tau(T, X) \oplus h'_\tau(T', X') \) is a monic polynomial of degree \( l + t + 2 = m + 1 \) whose constant term is zero. Consequently, the polynomial \( \tau(h_\tau(T, X) \oplus h'_\tau(T', X') \oplus \alpha) \oplus \beta \) is a monic polynomial of degree \( m + 2 \) and so the probability that a uniform random \( \tau \) is a root of this polynomial is \((l + t + 3)/2^n = (m + 2)/2^n\). This shows the value of \( \epsilon_2 \). \( \square \)
5.2 Hash Functions \( h \) and \( h' \) for FAST[\( \text{Fx}_m, \text{BRW} \)]

Fix an integer \( m \geq 4 \). From the length condition on \( \mathcal{P} \), we only need \( m \geq 3 \) and the condition \( m \geq 4 \) is a special requirement for FAST[\( \text{Fx}_m, \text{BRW} \)] as we explain below. In this case, the hash functions \( h, h' \) are defined using \( \text{BRW} \) as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
  h_r(T, X_1|\cdots|X_{m-2}) &= \tau \text{BRW}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_{m-2}, T); \\
  h'_r(T, X_1|\cdots|X_{m-2}) &= \tau^2 \text{BRW}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_{m-2}, T).
\end{align*}
\]

Note that from the definition of \( \text{BRW} \) polynomials, for \( m = 3 \), \( \text{BRW}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_{m-2}, T) \) is not necessarily monic, while for \( m \geq 4 \), \( \text{BRW}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_{m-2}, T) \) is necessarily monic. It is to ensure the monic property that we enforce the condition \( m \geq 4 \) for FAST[\( \text{Fx}_m, \text{BRW} \)]. An alternative would have been to prepend 1 as in the case of FAST[\( \text{Fx}_m, \text{Horner} \)]. This though would create complications which do not seem to be necessary for the fixed length setting. Instead, we use this technique later in the context of the general setting.

Recall that the degree of \( \text{BRW}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_{m-2}, T) \) is denoted as \( \delta(m - 1) \). So, \( h \) and \( h' \) are also monic polynomials of degrees \( 1 + \delta(m - 1) \) and \( 2 + \delta(m - 1) \) respectively whose constant terms are zero.

**Proposition 3.** Let \( m \geq 4 \) be an integer. The pair \((h, h')\) of hash functions defined in (22) and (23) for the construction FAST[\( \text{Fx}_m, \text{BRW} \)] is an \((\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2)\)-eligible pair, where \( \epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = (3 + \delta(m - 1))/2^n \). Further, if \( m \) is a power of two, then \((h, h')\) is an \(((m + 2)/2^n, (m + 2)/2^n)\)-eligible pair.

**Proof.** The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 2. It is required to use the expression \( \delta(m - 1) \) for the degree of \( \text{BRW}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_{m-2}, T) \) and further the injectivity of the map \((X_1, \ldots, X_{m-2}, T) \mapsto \text{BRW}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_{m-2}, T) \) ensures that for \((T, X) \neq (T', X')\), the polynomial \( \text{BRW}_r(X_1, \ldots, X_{m-2}, T) \oplus \text{BRW}_r(X_1', \ldots, X_{m-2}', T') \) is not zero.

The last statement follows from the previously mentioned fact that \( \delta(m - 1) = m - 1 \) if and only if \( m \geq 4 \) is a power of two. \( \square \)

**Remark:** In the case where \( m \) is a power of two, \((h, h')\) is an \(((m + 2)/2^n, (m + 2)/2^n)\)-eligible pair for both FAST[\( \text{Fx}_m, \text{Horner} \)] and FAST[\( \text{Fx}_m, \text{BRW} \)].

5.3 Hash Functions \( h \) and \( h' \) for FAST[\( \text{Gn}, t, \text{vecHorner} \)]

In this setting, we define \( h, h': \mathbb{F} \times \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{M} \to \mathbb{F} \) where \( \mathcal{T} \) and \( \mathcal{M} \) are given by (17) and (19) respectively. For \( T = (T_1, \ldots, T_k) \in \mathcal{T} \) and \( M \in \mathcal{M} \), let \( d = t(T) + t(M) + k + 2 \). We define

\[
\begin{align*}
  h_r(T, M) &= \tau^d \oplus \text{vecHorner}_r(T_1, \ldots, T_k, M); \\
  h'_r(T, M) &= \tau(\tau^d \oplus \text{vecHorner}_r(T_1, \ldots, T_k, M)).
\end{align*}
\]

It is easy to see that \( h \) and \( h' \) are monic polynomials of degrees \( d \) and \( d + 1 \) respectively whose constant terms are zero. The computation of \( \tau^d \oplus \text{vecHorner}_r(T_1, \ldots, T_k, M) \) can be done by the following simple modification of the algorithm for computing \( \text{vecHorner} \) shown in Table 1. The initialisation of digest using digest = 0 is to be replaced with digest = 1.

**Proposition 4.** The hash functions \( h \) and \( h' \) defined in (24) and (25) respectively for the construction FAST[\( \text{Gn}, t, \text{vecHorner} \)] form an \((\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2)\)-eligible pair, where

\[
\epsilon_1 = \frac{t + t + l + 4}{2^n}; \quad \epsilon_2 = \frac{\max(t + t, l + l') + t + 4}{2^n}.
\]
Proof. For $T = (T_1, \ldots, T_k)$, recall that $t = t(T) = \sum_{i=1}^{k} m_i$ where $m_i$ is the number of $n$-bit blocks in $\text{pad}_n(T_i)$. Also, $l = l(M)$ is the number of $n$-bit blocks in $\text{pad}_n(M)$.

The degree of $h_r(T, M)$ is $d = t + l + k + 2 \leq t + l + \ell + 3$ and the degree of $h'_r(T, M)$ is $d + 1 = t + l + k + 3 \leq t + l + \ell + 3$. So, the polynomial $\tau(h_r(T, M) + \alpha) \oplus \beta$ is a monic polynomial of degree at most $t + l + \ell + 3$ and the polynomial $\tau(h'_r(T, M) + \alpha) \oplus \beta$ is a monic polynomial of degree at most $t + l + \ell + 4$. This shows the value of $\epsilon_1$.

Consider $(T', M') \neq (T, M)$ where $T' = (T'_1, \ldots, T'_k)$, $t' = t(T')$ and $l' = l(M')$. Without loss of generality assume that $k \geq k'$. Let $p(\tau) = \tau(h_r(T, M) \oplus h_r(T', M') + \alpha) \oplus \beta$. If the degrees of $h_r(T, M)$ and $h_r(T', M')$ are not equal, then $p(\tau)$ is a polynomial of degree $\max(t + l + k + 3, t' + l' + k' + 3) \leq \max(t + l + \ell + 3, t' + l' + \ell + 3)$. So, suppose that the degrees of $h_r(T, M)$ and $h_r(T', M')$ are equal. The leading monic terms of the two polynomials cancel out. If $p(\tau)$ is a non-zero polynomial, then it has maximum degree $\max(t + l + \ell + 2, t' + l' + \ell + 2)$. So, it is sufficient to show that $p(\tau)$ is a non-zero polynomial. This argument is similar to that of Proposition 1. Further, a similar argument applies for $h'$ where the degree of $\tau(h'_r(T, M) \oplus h'_r(T', M') + \alpha) \oplus \beta$ is at most $\max(t + l + \ell + 4, t' + l' + \ell + 4)$.

Now consider $(T, M)$ and $(T', M')$ which are not necessarily distinct and let $p(\tau) = \tau(h_r(T, M) \oplus h_r(T', M') + \alpha) \oplus \beta$. The coefficient of $\tau$ in $h_r(T, M)$ is $L = \text{bin}_8(k + 1)||0^8||\text{bin}_{n-16}(|\text{len}(M)|) \neq 0$ which is the coefficient of $\tau^2$ in $\tau h_r$. The coefficient of $\tau^2$ in $\tau h'_r(T', M')$ is 0 and so the coefficient of $\tau^2$ in $p(\tau)$ is $L \neq 0$. So, $p(\tau)$ is a non-zero polynomial. The degree of $p(\tau)$ is at most $\max(t + l + \ell + 3, t' + l' + \ell + 4)$.

This completes the proof. \qed

5.4 Hash Functions $h$ and $h'$ for $\text{FAST}[G_n, \ell, \eta, \text{vecHash2L}]$

In this setting, we define $h, h' : \mathbb{F} \times T \times M \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ where $T$ and $M$ are given by (17) and (19) respectively. For $T = (T_1, \ldots, T_k) \in T$ and $M \in M$ let $d = (\vartheta(\eta) + 1)(\ell_1 + \cdots + \ell_k + \ell) + k + 2$. We define

\begin{align*}
h_r(T, M) &= \tau^d \oplus \text{vecHash2L}_r(T_1, \ldots, T_k, M); \\
h'_r(T, M) &= \tau(\tau^d \oplus \text{vecHash2L}_r(T_1, \ldots, T_k, M)).
\end{align*}

The definition of $\text{vecHash2L}$ requires choosing the value $\eta$. As mentioned earlier, we will assume that $\eta$ is chosen so that $\eta + 1$ is a power of two and so $\vartheta(\eta) = \eta$. The computation of $\tau^d \oplus \text{vecHash2L}_r(T_1, \ldots, T_k, M)$ can be done by the following simple modification of the algorithm for computing $\text{vecHash2L}$ shown in Table 1. The initialisation of digest using digest = 0 is to be replaced with digest = 1.

Proposition 5. Let the parameter $\eta \geq 3$ required in the definition of $\text{vecHash2L}$ be such that $\eta + 1$ is a power of two. The hash functions $h$ and $h'$ defined in (26) and (27) respectively for the construction $\text{FAST}[G_n, \ell, \eta, \text{vecHash2L}]$ form an $(\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2)$-eligible pair, where

\begin{align*}
\epsilon_1 &= \frac{((\eta + 1)/\eta)(t + 1) + (\ell + 1)(\eta + 2) + 3}{2^n} ; \\
\epsilon_2 &= \frac{((\eta + 1)/\eta)\max(t + l, t' + l') + (\ell + 1)(\eta + 2) + 3}{2^n}.
\end{align*}

Proof. Since $\eta + 1 \geq 4$ is a power of two, $\vartheta(\eta) = \eta$.

For $i = 1, \ldots, k$, let the number of super-blocks in $\text{pad}_n(T_i)$ be $\ell_i$ and the number of super-blocks in $\text{pad}_n(M)$ be $\ell$. For $i = 1, \ldots, k$, let the number of $n$-bit blocks in $\text{pad}_n(T_i)$ be $m_i$, so that
So, the degree of \( \tau h_T(T, M) \) is \( d + 1 \) which is at most \((\eta + 1)/\eta)(t + 1) + (t + 1)(\eta + 2) + 2\) and the degree of \( \tau h'_T(T, M) \) is \( d + 2 \) which is at most \((\eta + 1)/\eta)(t + 1) + (t + 1)(\eta + 2) + 3\). This shows the value of \( \epsilon_1 \).

Consider \((T', M') \neq (T, M)\) where \( T' = (T'_1, \ldots, T'_k), t' = t(T') \) and \( t' = t(M') \). Let \( d' \) be the degree of \( h_T(T', M') \). For any \( \alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{F} \), we wish to bound the probability (over uniform random choice of \( \tau \) in \( \mathbb{F} \)) that the polynomial \( p_1(\tau) = \tau(h_T(T, M) \oplus h_T(T', M') \oplus \alpha) \oplus \beta \) is zero. If \( d \neq d' \), then \( p_1(\tau) \) is a monic polynomial of degree max\((d + 1, d' + 1)\) and so the probability that it is zero is at most max\((d + 1, d' + 1)/2^n\). If \( d = d' \), then \( p_1(\tau) \) is zero if and only if the polynomial

\[
p_2(\tau) = \tau(\text{vecHash2L}(T_1, \ldots, T_k, M) \oplus \text{vecHash2L}(T'_1, \ldots, T'_k, M') \oplus \alpha) \oplus \beta
\]

is zero. Using Theorem 2 of [9] (see (4)), we have this probability to be at most max\((d, d')/2^n\). So, the probability that \( p_1(\tau) \) is zero is at most max\((d + 1, d' + 1)/2^n\). Similarly, the probability that \( \tau(h'_T(T, M) \oplus h'_T(T', M') \oplus \alpha) \oplus \beta \) is zero is at most max\((d + 2, d' + 2)/2^n\).

Now consider \((T, M)\) and \((T', M')\) which are not necessarily distinct. Fix \( \alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{F} \) and consider \( p(\tau) = \tau(h_T(T, M) \oplus h'_T(T', M') \oplus \alpha) \oplus \beta \). The coefficient of \( \tau \) in \( h_T(T, M) = \tau^d \oplus \text{vecHash2L}(T_1, \ldots, T_k, M) \) is

\[
L = \text{bin}_8(k + 1) || 0^8 || \text{bin}_{n-16}(\text{len}(M)) \neq 0
\]

which is the coefficient of \( \tau^2 \) in \( \tau h_T(T, M) \). The coefficient of \( \tau^2 \) in \( \tau h'_T(T', M') \) is \( 0 \) and so the coefficient of \( \tau^2 \) in \( p(\tau) \) is \( L \neq 0 \). So, \( p(\tau) \) is a non-zero polynomial. The degree of \( p(\tau) \) is at most max\((d + 1, d' + 2) \leq \text{max}(d + 2, d' + 2)\). This shows the value of \( \epsilon_2 \). \(\square\)

6 Security

In this section, we provide the formal definitions and the formal security statement for FAST. The detailed security proof is provided in the Appendix.

An adversary \( A \) is a possibly probabilistic algorithm with access to one or more oracles. The output of an algorithm is a single bit. The notation \( A^{O_1, O_2, \ldots} \Rightarrow 1 \) denotes the fact that \( A \) outputs the bit 1 after interacting with the oracles \( O_1, O_2, \ldots \). The interaction of \( A \) with its oracles is allowed to be adaptive, i.e., the adversary is allowed to choose an oracle and a query to be made to this oracle based on the responses it has received to its previous queries.

The important parameters of an adversary are its running time \( T \), the number of queries \( q \) that it makes to all its oracles and its query complexity \( \sigma \). The query complexity is defined later.

The bulk of the actual security analysis will be in the information theoretic sense which in particular means that there is no restriction on the resources of the adversary. For such analysis, it is sufficient to consider the adversary to be a deterministic algorithm.
6.1 Pseudo-Random Function

Let \( \{ F_K \}_{K \in \mathcal{K}} \) be a family of functions where for each \( K \in \mathcal{K}, F_K : \mathcal{D} \to \mathcal{R} \). Here \( \mathcal{K} \) is the keyspace, \( \mathcal{D} \) is the domain and \( \mathcal{R} \) is the range. We require that all three of \( \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{D} \) and \( \mathcal{R} \) are finite non-empty sets.

Let \( \rho \) be a function chosen uniformly at random from the set of all functions from \( \mathcal{D} \) to \( \mathcal{R} \). An equivalent and more convenient view of \( \rho \) is the following. For distinct elements \( X_1, \ldots, X_q \) from \( \mathcal{D} \), the elements \( \rho(X_1), \ldots, \rho(X_q) \) are independent and uniformly distributed elements of \( \mathcal{R} \).

Roughly speaking, the function family \( \{ F_K \}_{K \in \mathcal{K}} \) is said to be a PRF if for a uniform random \( K \in \mathcal{K} \), the outputs of \( F_K(\cdot) \) on distinct elements of \( \mathcal{D} \) are computationally indistinguishable from the outputs of \( \rho \). This is formalised in the following manner. An adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) has access to an oracle and can make queries to its oracle in an adaptive manner. We will assume that \( \mathcal{A} \) does not repeat a query. The advantage of the adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) in breaking the PRF-property of \( \{ F_K \}_{K \in \mathcal{K}} \) is defined as follows.

\[
\text{Adv}_{F}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[K \leftarrow \mathcal{K} : \mathcal{A}^{F_K(\cdot) \Rightarrow 1}] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\rho(\cdot) \Rightarrow 1}].
\] (29)

Suppose \( \mathcal{A} \) makes a total of \( q \) queries which are \( X^{(1)}, \ldots, X^{(q)} \). The query complexity of \( \mathcal{A} \) is the sum total of the number of \( n \)-bit blocks in \( \text{pad}_n(X^{(s)}), s = 1, \ldots, q \).

By \( \text{Adv}_{F}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{T}, q, \sigma) \) we denote the maximum of \( \text{Adv}_{F}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{A}) \) over all adversaries \( \mathcal{A} \) which run in time \( \mathcal{T} \), make \( q \) queries and have query complexity \( \sigma \). The function family \( \{ F_K \}_{K \in \mathcal{K}} \) (or, more simply \( F \)) is said to be a \((\mathcal{T}, q, \sigma, \varepsilon)\)-PRF if \( \text{Adv}_{F}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \varepsilon \) for all \( \mathcal{A} \) running in time \( \mathcal{T} \) and making \( q \) queries with query complexity \( \sigma \).

6.2 Tweakable Enciphering Scheme

A tweakable enciphering scheme is a pair \( \text{TES} = (\text{TES.Encrypt}, \text{TES.Decrypt}) \) where

\[ \text{TES.Encrypt}, \text{TES.Decrypt} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{P} \]

for finite non-empty sets \( \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{T} \) and \( \mathcal{P} \). The set \( \mathcal{K} \) is called the key space, \( \mathcal{T} \) is called the tweak space and \( \mathcal{P} \) is called the message/ciphertext space. We write \( \text{TES.Encrypt}_{K}(\cdot, \cdot) \) (resp. \( \text{TES.Decrypt}_{K}(\cdot, \cdot) \)) to denote \( \text{TES.Encrypt}(K, \cdot, \cdot) \) (resp. \( \text{TES.Decrypt}(K, \cdot, \cdot) \)). The functions \( \text{TES.Encrypt} \) and \( \text{TES.Decrypt} \) satisfy the following two properties. For \( K \in \mathcal{K}, T \in \mathcal{T} \) and \( P \in \mathcal{P} \),

1. \( \text{TES.Decrypt}_{K}(T, \text{TES.Encrypt}_{K}(T, P)) = P \);
2. \( \text{len}(\text{TES.Encrypt}_{K}(T, P)) = \text{len}(P) \).

The first property states that the encrypt and the decrypt functions are inverses while the second property states that the length of the ciphertext is equal to the length of the plaintext. In other words, \( \text{TES.Encrypt}_{K}(T, \cdot) \) is a length preserving permutation of \( \mathcal{P} \).

The notion of security for a TES that we consider is that of indistinguishability from uniform random strings. This implies other notions of security (see [23]). Let \( \mathcal{F} \) be the set of all functions \( f \) from \( \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{P} \) to \( \mathcal{P} \) such that for any \( T \in \mathcal{T} \) and \( P \in \mathcal{P}, \text{len}(f(T, P)) = \text{len}(P) \). Let \( \rho_1 \) and \( \rho_2 \) be two functions chosen independently and uniformly at random from \( \mathcal{F} \).

An adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) attacking a TES has access to two oracles which we will call the left and the right oracles. Both the oracles are functions from \( \mathcal{F} \). An input to the left oracle is of the form \((T, P)\) and the response is \( C \), while an input to the right oracle is of the form \((T, C)\) and the response is
The adversary $A$ adaptively queries its oracles possibly interweaving its queries to its left and right oracles. At the end, $A$ outputs a bit.

We assume that the adversary does not make any pointless query. This means that $A$ does not repeat a query to any of its oracles; does not query the right oracle with $(T, C)$ if it received $C$ in response to a query $(T, P)$ made to its left oracle; and does not query the left oracle with $(T, P)$ if it received $P$ in response to a query $(T, C)$ made to its right oracle. The advantage of $A$ in breaking TES is defined as follows:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{TES}}^{\pm \text{rand}}(A) = \Pr[K \leftarrow \mathcal{K} : A \text{TES.Encrypt}_{K} \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[A \text{TES.Decrypt}_{K} \Rightarrow 1].$$

(30)

Suppose $A$ makes $q$ queries $(T^{(1)}, X^{(1)}), \ldots, (T^{(q)}, X^{(q)})$ where $T^{(s)} = (T_{1}^{(s)}, \ldots, T_{k(s)}^{(s)})$ and $X^{(s)}$ is either $P^{(s)}$ or $C^{(s)}$. For $j = 1, \ldots, k^{(s)}$, let $m^{(s)}$ be the number of $n$-bit blocks in $\text{pad}_{n}(T_{j}^{(s)})$ and let $m^{(t)}$ be the number of $n$-bit blocks in $\text{pad}_{n}(X^{(t)})$. We will write $t^{(s)}$ to denote $t(T^{(s)})$. Let $X^{(s)} = X_{1}^{(s)} || X_{2}^{(s)} || X_{3}^{(s)}$ with $\text{len}(X_{1}^{(s)}) = \text{len}(X_{2}^{(s)}) = n$ and $\text{len}(X_{3}^{(s)}) \geq 1$. Then $X_{3}^{(s)} \in \mathcal{M}$ and $t(X_{3}^{(s)}) = m^{(s)} - 2$. We will write $t^{(s)}$ to denote $t(X_{3}^{(s)})$.

The tweak query complexity $\theta$, the message query complexity $\omega$ and the total query complexity $\sigma$ are defined as follows.

$$\theta = \sum_{s=1}^{q} t^{(s)};$$

$$\omega = \sum_{t=1}^{q} m^{(t)};$$

$$\sigma = \theta + \omega.$$ (33)

By $\text{Adv}_{\text{TES}}^{\pm \text{rand}}(\mathcal{F}, q, \theta, \omega)$ we denote the maximum of $\text{Adv}_{\text{TES}}^{\pm \text{rand}}(A)$ over all adversaries $A$ which run in time $\mathcal{F}$, make $q$ queries and have tweak query complexity $\theta$ and message query complexity $\omega$. TES is said to be $(\mathcal{F}, q, \theta, \omega, \varepsilon)$-secure if $\text{Adv}_{\text{TES}}^{\pm \text{rand}}(A) \leq \varepsilon$ for all $A$ running in time $\mathcal{F}$, making a total of $q$ queries with tweak query complexity $\theta$ and message query complexity $\omega$.

### 6.3 Security of FAST

The security statement for FAST is the following.

**Theorem 1.** Let $n$ be a positive integer; $\mathcal{F} = GF(2^{n})$ is represented using some fixed irreducible polynomial of degree $n$ over $GF(2)$; $\{F_{K}\}_{K \in \mathcal{K}}$ where for $K \in \mathcal{K}$, $F_{K} : \{0,1\}^{n} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n}$; $(h, h')$ is an $(\epsilon_{1}, \epsilon_{2})$-eligible pair of hash functions, where $h, h' : \mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{F}$; and $f\text{Str}$ is a fixed $n$-bit string used to build the TES

$$\text{FAST} = (\text{FAST.Encrypt}, \text{FAST.Decrypt})$$

given in Table 2. Fix $q$, $\omega \geq q$ to be positive integers and $\theta$ to be a non-negative integer. For all $\mathcal{F} > 0$,

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{FAST}}^{\pm \text{rand}}(\mathcal{F}, q, \theta, \omega) \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{F}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{F} + \mathcal{F}', \omega + 1, \omega + 1) + \Delta(\text{FAST}),$$

where

$$\Delta(\text{FAST}) = 2\omega \left( \sum_{s=1}^{q} \epsilon_{1}^{(s)} \right) + 3 \sum_{1 \leq s < t \leq q} \epsilon_{2}^{(s,t)} + \sum_{s=1}^{q} \epsilon_{2}^{(s,s)} + \frac{3\omega^2}{2n};$$

(34)
\( \mathcal{T}' \) is the time required to answer \( q \) queries with tweak query complexity \( \theta \) and message query complexity \( \omega \) plus some bookkeeping time; and for \( 1 \leq s, \ell \leq q, \varepsilon^{(s)}_1 = \varepsilon_1(t^{(s)}, \ell^{(s)}), \varepsilon^{(s, \ell)}_2 = \varepsilon_2(t^{(s)}, \ell^{(s)}, t^{(\ell)}), \varepsilon^{(s, \ell)}_3 = \varepsilon_3(t^{(s)}, \ell^{(s)}, t^{(\ell)}). \)

We have the following consequences of Theorem 1 for the specific instantiations of FAST.

**Corollary 1.** Let \( m \geq 3 \) be a fixed positive integer. Let \( q \) and \( \sigma \geq q \) be positive integers and \( \omega = \sigma - q \). Consider the instantiations \( \text{FAST}[\text{Brake}, \text{Horner}] \) and \( \text{FAST}[\text{Brake}, \text{BRW}] \) of FAST. Then for all \( \mathcal{T} > 0 \),

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{FAST}[\text{Brake}, \text{Horner}]}^{{+,-}\text{rand}}(\mathcal{T}, q, q, \omega) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{F}}^{{+,-}\text{rand}}(\mathcal{T} + \mathcal{T}', \omega + 1, \omega + 1) + \frac{14\omega(\omega + 1)}{2^{(\omega + 1)}}; \tag{35}
\]

If \( m \geq 4 \), then for all \( \mathcal{T} > 0 \),

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{FAST}[\text{Brake}, \text{BRW}]}^{{+,-}\text{rand}}(\mathcal{T}, q, q, \omega) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{F}}^{{+,-}\text{rand}}(\mathcal{T} + \mathcal{T}', \omega + 1, \omega + 1) + \frac{1}{2^{(\omega + 1)}}(14\omega(\omega + 1) + 4\omega^2\sigma(m - 1)). \tag{36}
\]

Further, if \( m \geq 4 \) is a power of two, then

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{FAST}[\text{Brake}, \text{BRW}]}^{{+,-}\text{rand}}(\mathcal{T}, q, q, \omega) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{F}}^{{+,-}\text{rand}}(\mathcal{T} + \mathcal{T}', \omega + 1, \omega + 1) + \frac{14\omega(\omega + 1)}{2^{(\omega + 1)}}. \tag{37}
\]

**Proof.** Let \( \Delta(\text{FAST}[\text{Brake}, \text{Horner}]) \) and \( \Delta(\text{FAST}[\text{Brake}, \text{BRW}]) \) denote the expressions for \( \Delta \) in (34) when \( \text{FAST}[\text{Brake}, \text{Horner}] \) and \( \text{FAST}[\text{Brake}, \text{BRW}] \) are respectively used.

In the setting of \( \text{Fm} \), each query consists of a single \( n \)-bit block for the tweak and \( m \)-bit blocks for the plaintext or the ciphertext, i.e., \( m^{(s)} = m \) for all \( 1 \leq s \leq q \). So, \( \theta = q, \omega = qm \) and \( \sigma = \theta + \omega = q(m + 1) \). Also, \( m \geq 3 \) and \( q \geq 1 \) imply that \( q < \omega \) and \( m \leq \omega \).

From Proposition 2, we have \( \varepsilon^{(s)}_1 = \varepsilon^{(s, \ell)}_2 = (m + 2)/2^{(m + 1)} \) for \( 1 \leq s, \ell \leq q \). Using these, \( \Delta(\text{FAST}[\text{Brake}, \text{Horner}]) \) can be upper bounded by \( (14\omega(\omega + 1))/2^{(\omega + 1)} \).

From Proposition 3, we have \( \varepsilon^{(s)}_1 = \varepsilon^{(s, \ell)}_2 = (3 + \sigma(m - 1))/2^{(m + 1)} \) for \( 1 \leq s, \ell \leq q \). Using these, \( \Delta(\text{FAST}[\text{Brake}, \text{BRW}]) \) achieves the stated bound.

In the case where \( m \geq 4 \) is a power of two, from Proposition 3, we have \( \varepsilon^{(s)}_1 = \varepsilon^{(s, \ell)}_2 = (m + 2)/2^{(m + 1)} \) and so \( \Delta(\text{FAST}[\text{Brake}, \text{BRW}]) = \Delta(\text{FAST}[\text{Brake}, \text{Horner}]) \) which shows the second statement.

**Corollary 2.** Let \( q, \omega \geq q \) be positive integers and \( \theta \) be a non-negative integer. Consider the instantiations \( \text{FAST}[\text{Generation}, t, \text{vecHorner}] \) and \( \text{FAST}[\text{Generation}, t, \eta, \text{vecHash2L}] \) of FAST. Then

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{FAST}[\text{Generation}, t, \text{vecHorner}]}^{{+,-}\text{rand}}(\mathcal{T}, q, q, \omega, \theta, \eta) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{F}}^{{+,-}\text{rand}}((\mathcal{T} + \mathcal{T}'), \omega + 1, \omega + 1, \theta) + \frac{5\omega^2 + 2\omega \theta + \omega + \theta}{2^{(\omega + 1)}} + \frac{3q(\theta + \omega) + (t + 2)(2\omega + 1)q + 3q^2 + 6q^2}{2^{(\omega + 1)}}; \tag{38}
\]

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{FAST}[\text{Generation}, t, \eta, \text{vecHash2L}]}^{{+,-}\text{rand}}(\mathcal{T}, q, q, \omega, \theta, \eta) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{F}}^{{+,-}\text{rand}}((\mathcal{T} + \mathcal{T}'), \omega + 1, \omega + 1, \theta) + \frac{(3 + 2(\eta + 1)/\eta)\omega^2 + (2(\eta + 1)/\eta)\omega \theta + ((\eta + 1)/\eta)(\omega + \theta)}{2^{(\omega + 1)}} + \frac{3q((\eta + 1)/\eta)(\theta + \omega) + ((2\omega + 1)q + 3q^2)(t + 1)(\eta + 2) + 3q(2\omega + 1) + 9q^2}{2^{(\omega + 1)}}. \tag{39}
\]

**Proof.** Let \( \Delta(\text{FAST}[\text{Generation}, t, \text{vecHorner}]) \) and \( \Delta(\text{FAST}[\text{Generation}, t, \eta, \text{vecHash2L}]) \) denote the expressions for \( \Delta \) in (34) when \( \text{FAST}[\text{Generation}, t, \text{vecHorner}] \) and \( \text{FAST}[\text{Generation}, t, \eta, \text{vecHash2L}] \) are respectively used.
First consider \( \text{FAST}[G_n, \epsilon, \text{vecHorner}] \). From Proposition 4, \( \epsilon_1^{(s)} = \frac{(t^{(s)} + l^{(s)} + \epsilon + 4)}{2^n} \) and \( \epsilon_2^{(s,t)} = \frac{(\max(t^{(s)} + l^{(t)}, t^{(l)} + l^{(l)}) + \epsilon + 4)}{2^n} \). So, \( \epsilon_2^{(s,s)} = \epsilon_1^{(s)} \). We have

\[
\sum_{s=1}^{q} \epsilon_1^{(s)} = \sum_{s=1}^{q} \frac{t^{(s)} + l^{(s)} + \epsilon + 4}{2^n} = \frac{\theta + \omega + q(\epsilon + 2)}{2^n};
\]

\[
\sum_{1 \leq s < t \leq q} \epsilon_2^{(s,t)} \leq \sum_{1 \leq s < t \leq q} \frac{\max(t^{(s)} + l^{(s)}, t^{(l)} + l^{(l)}) + \epsilon + 4}{2^n} \leq \frac{q(\theta + \omega)}{2^n} + \frac{q^2(\epsilon + 4)}{2^n}.
\]

Using these in Theorem 1, we obtain

\[
\Delta(\text{FAST}[G_n, \epsilon, \text{vecHorner}]) \leq \frac{5\omega^2 + 2\omega\theta + \omega + \theta}{2^n} + \frac{3q(\theta + \omega) + (\epsilon + 2)((2\omega + 1)q + 3q^2) + 6q^2}{2^n}.
\]

Now consider \( \text{FAST}[G_n, \epsilon, \eta, \text{vecHash2L}] \). From Proposition 5,

\[
\epsilon_1^{(s)} = \frac{(\eta + 1)/\eta)(t^{(s)} + l^{(s)}) + (\epsilon + 1)(\eta + 2) + 3}{2^n};
\]

\[
\epsilon_2^{(s,t)} = \frac{(\eta + 1)/\eta)(\max(t^{(s)} + l^{(s)}, t^{(l)} + l^{(l)}) + (\epsilon + 1)(\eta + 2) + 3}{2^n}.
\]

So, \( \epsilon_2^{(s,s)} = \epsilon_1^{(s)} \). We have

\[
\sum_{s=1}^{q} \epsilon_1^{(s)} \leq \frac{(\eta + 1)/\eta)(\theta + \omega) + q(\epsilon + 1)(\eta + 2) + 3q}{2^n};
\]

\[
\sum_{1 \leq s < t \leq q} \epsilon_2^{(s,t)} \leq \frac{q((\eta + 1)/\eta)(\theta + \omega) + q^2(\epsilon + 1)(\eta + 2) + 3q^2}{2^n};
\]

Using these in Theorem 1, we obtain

\[
\Delta(\text{FAST}[G_n, \epsilon, \eta, \text{vecHash2L}]) \leq \frac{(3 + 2(\eta + 1)/\eta)\omega^2 + (2(\eta + 1)/\eta)\omega\theta + ((\eta + 1)/\eta)(\omega + \theta)}{2^n}
\]

\[
+ \frac{3q((\eta + 1)/\eta)(\theta + \omega) + ((2\omega + 1)q + 3q^2)(\epsilon + 1)(\eta + 2) + 3q(2\omega + 1) + 9q^2}{2^n}.
\]

\[\square\]

7 Comparison

This section provides a comparison of the design features of FAST with previously proposed TESs. Several block cipher based TES constructions essentially use a layer of encryption using a mode of operation of the block cipher sandwiched between two layers of hashing. Differences arise in the choice of the mode of operation, the choice of the hash functions and other details.

1. For the mode of operation, the electronic codebook mode (ECB) has been suggested in TET [21] and HEH [35] while some form of the counter mode of operation has been used in XCB [27, 28], HCTR [37] and HCH [16]. In this paper, we use the counter mode of operation as described in [37].

20
2. For the hash functions, XCB, HCTR and HCH essentially use polynomial hashing based on Horner’s rule. The cost of hashing in TET is higher. BRW based hashing has been suggested for HEH and implemented in hardware for fixed length messages in [11].

All of the above mentioned TESs require both the encryption and the decryption functions of the block cipher. The work [36] suggested the possibility of using only the encryption function of a block cipher to build a TES. The present work is based upon the idea in [36]. In terms of similarity, both [36] and the present work use a Feistel layer on the first two blocks and a counter mode of operation on the rest of the blocks. There are several differences in the two constructions.

1. In [36], inside the Feistel layer, the hash function \( h \) is used to process \( A_1 \) and \( B_2 \). The key for this hash function is \( \tau' \) which is independent of the key \( \tau \) which is used for the hash function outside the Feistel layer. In contrast, FAST replaces the applications of \( h \) to \( A_1 \) and \( B_2 \) with multiplications by \( \tau \) and further this \( \tau \) is the key for the hash function used outside the Feistel layer. In summary, [36] uses two hash keys while FAST uses a single hash key.

2. In [36], the hash of \( P_3 \) is masked with \( \beta_1 \) and XORed to both \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) and the hash of \( C_3 \) is masked with \( \beta_2 \) and XORed to both \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \). FAST does away with the maskings with \( \beta_1 \) and \( \beta_2 \); the hash of \( P_3 \) is XORed to only \( P_1 \); and the hash of \( C_3 \) is XORed to only \( C_2 \).

3. In [36], the seed to the counter mode is generated as \( A_1 \oplus A_2 \oplus B_1 \oplus B_2 \). FAST generates the seed to the counter mode as \( A_2 \oplus B_1 = P_2 \oplus C_1 \).

Some of the above differences such as reducing the hash key size are important from a practical point of view while the others are simplifications obtained by removing unnecessary operations. Keeping the similarities and the differences in mind, it would be proper to view the present work as a fine-tuned version of the design in [36]. This fine tuning is required from an engineering point of view where the goal is to obtain an efficient and clean design. More importantly, this work presents detailed implementations in both software and hardware and thereby actually demonstrates the advantages of the new proposal in comparison to the previous works.

Another class of block cipher based TESs such as CMC [23], EME [24, 20] and FMix [7] essentially uses two layers of encryption using a mode of operation of a block cipher. These TESs do not use any hash function. Out of these CMC and FMix are essentially sequential while EME is parallelisable. FMix requires only the encryption function of the underlying block cipher whereas CMC and EME require both the encryption and the decryption functions of the block cipher. The cost of encryption is roughly two block cipher calls per block of the message. Since EME is parallelisable while CMC and FMix are not, any reasonable implementation of EME will be faster than both CMC and FMix. Later we provide implementtion results which show the superiority of FAST in comparison to EME in both software and hardware and hence also imply the superiority of FAST over CMC and FMix.

Table 4 compares FAST to previously proposed schemes. From the viewpoint of efficiency, it is preferable to have schemes which are parallelisable. This would eliminate CMC and FMix from the comparison. Further, again from an efficiency point of view it would be preferable to have schemes which use only the encryption module of a block cipher. This restricts the comparison to only the construction in [36]. As explained above, the current construction is a fine-tuned version of the construction in [36] and Table 4 shows the comparative advantage in terms of operation counts and key size. The inherent simplification of the design is not captured by these parameters.

While various schemes have been proposed, only XCB and EME2 (which is essentially EME*) have been standardised. So, it is important to provide more detailed comparison to these two schemes. Below we provide details of the implementations of FAST in both software and hardware
Table 4. Comparison of different tweakable enciphering schemes. The block size is $n$ bits, the tweak is a single $n$-bit block and the number of blocks $m \geq 3$ in the message is fixed. [BC] denotes the number of block cipher calls; [M] denotes the number of field multiplications; [BCK] denotes the number of block cipher keys; and [HK] denotes the number of blocks in the hash key.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>[BC]</th>
<th>[M]</th>
<th>[BCK]</th>
<th>[HK]</th>
<th>dec module</th>
<th>parallel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMC [23]</td>
<td>$2m + 1$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>reqd</td>
<td>no</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EME* [20]</td>
<td>$2m + 1 + m/n$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>reqd</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XCB [27]</td>
<td>$m + 1$</td>
<td>$2(m + 3)$</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>reqd</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCTR [37]</td>
<td>$m$</td>
<td>$2(m + 1)$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>reqd</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCHfp [16]</td>
<td>$m + 2$</td>
<td>$2(m - 1)$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>reqd</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TET [21]</td>
<td>$m + 1$</td>
<td>$2m$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>reqd</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEH-BRW[35]</td>
<td>$m + 1$</td>
<td>$2 + 2\left\lfloor (m - 1)/2\right\rfloor$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>reqd</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[36] with BRW</td>
<td>$m + 1$</td>
<td>$4 + 2\left\lfloor (m - 1)/2\right\rfloor$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>not reqd</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMix [7]</td>
<td>$2m + 1$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>not reqd</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAST [$F_{x_n}$, Horner]</td>
<td>$m + 1$</td>
<td>$2m + 1$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>not reqd</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAST [$F_{x_n}$, BRW]</td>
<td>$m + 1$</td>
<td>$2 + 2\left\lfloor (m - 1)/2\right\rfloor$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>not reqd</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and the performance results of these implementations in comparison to those of XCB and EME2. For the purpose of such comparison, we have made efficient implementations of XCB and EME2 in both software and hardware.

8 Software Implementation

In this section, we describe our implementations of the various instantiations of FAST in software. For the implementation, we set $n = 128$ and so $\mathbb{F} = GF(2^{128})$. The implementation of the PRF $F$ was done using the encryption function of AES.

Our target platform for software implementation was the Intel processor Skylake. This processor provides instruction set support for computing the AES and also for computing polynomial multiplication. The Intel instructions for these two main tasks are the following.

**Computation of AES:** The relevant instructions are `aeskeygenassist` (for round key generation); `aesenc` (for one round of AES encryption) and `aesenclast` (for the last round of AES encryption). There are additional instructions for AES decryption. We do not mention these, since we do not require the AES decryption module.

**Computation of polynomial multiplication:** The relevant instruction is `pclmulqdq`. This instruction takes as input two 64-bit unsigned integers representing two polynomials each of maximum degree 63 over $GF(2)$ and returns a 128-bit quantity which represents the product of these two polynomials over $GF(2)$.

For software implementation, the two relevant parameters are latency and throughput. These are defined\(^6\) as follows: “Latency is the number of processor clocks it takes for an instruction to have its data available for use by another instruction. Throughput is the number of processor clocks it takes for an instruction to execute or perform its calculations.” On Skylake the latency/throughput figures of `aesenc`, `aesenclast` and `pclmulqdq` are 4/1.

8.1 Implementation of the Hash Functions

The several variants of the hash functions used in this work are all based on finite field computations over $\mathbb{F} = GF(2^n)$ with $n = 128$. Addition over this field is a simple XOR operation of 128-bit data types. Multiplication, on the other hand, is more involved.

We consider the field $\mathbb{F}$ to be represented using the irreducible polynomial $\psi(x) = x^{128} + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1$ over $GF(2)$. The elements of $\mathbb{F}$ are represented using polynomials over $GF(2)$ of degrees at most 127. Let $a(x)$ and $b(x)$ be two such polynomials. The multiplication of $a(x)$ and $b(x)$ in $\mathbb{F}$ consists of the following two operations. Compute the polynomial multiplication of $a(x)$ and $b(x)$ over $GF(2)$ and let $c(x)$ be the result. Then $c(x)$ is a polynomial over $GF(2)$ of degree at most 254. The product of $a(x)$ and $b(x)$ over $\mathbb{F}$ is $c(x) \mod \psi(x)$. The above computation consists of two distinct steps, namely polynomial multiplication followed by reduction.

**Polynomial multiplication:** The instruction pclmulqdq multiplies two polynomials over $GF(2)$ of degrees at most 63 each and returns a polynomial of degree at most 126. This is a 64-bit polynomial multiplication over $GF(2)$. Our requirement is a 128-bit polynomial multiplication over $GF(2)$. Using the direct schoolbook method, a 128-bit polynomial multiplication can be computed using four 64-bit polynomial multiplications and hence using four pclmulqdq calls. Karatsuba’s algorithm, on the other hand, allows the computation of a 128-bit polynomial multiplication using three pclmulqdq calls at the cost of a few extra XOR operations. Due to the low latency of pclmulqdq on Skylake processors, it turns out that schoolbook is faster than Karatsuba. This has been reported by Gueron\(^7\) and we also observed this in our experiments. So, we opted to implement 128-bit polynomial multiplication using the schoolbook method.

**Reduction:** Efficient computation of $c(x) \mod \psi(x)$ has been discussed in [18]. It was shown that this operation can be efficiently computed using two pclmulqdq instructions along with a few other shifts and xors. A description of this procedure can also be found in [9]. We implemented reduction using this method.

**Horner:** As mentioned earlier, Horner\(_r\)(X\(_1\),...,X\(_m\)) can be computed using $m - 1$ multiplications in $\mathbb{F}$. Each multiplication consists of a polynomial multiplication followed by a reduction. Doing this directly, would lead to a count of $m - 1$ polynomial multiplications and $m - 1$ reductions.

The efficiency can be improved by using a delayed (or lazy) reduction strategy. Let $i > 1$ be a positive integer and suppose the powers $1, \tau, \tau^2, \ldots, \tau^{i-1}, \tau^i$ are available (i.e., the powers $\tau^2, \ldots, \tau^{i-1}, \tau^i$ have been pre-computed and stored). The expression $X_1\tau^i + \cdots + X_{i-1}\tau + X_i$ over $\mathbb{F}$ can be computed using $i - 1$ polynomial multiplications followed by a single reduction. Extension to handle arbitrary number of blocks is easy. For simplicity, assume that $i|m$ and $\lambda = m/i$. The $m$ blocks are divided into $\lambda$ groups of $i$ blocks each. Each group of $i$ blocks is processed and suppose the outputs are $Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_\lambda$. Then Horner\(_r\)(X\(_1\),...,X\(_m\)) = $\tau^i(\cdots(\tau^i(Y_1 + Y_2) + \cdots + Y_{i-1}) + Y_i)$. Processing of a single such group of $i$ blocks requires $i - 1$ polynomial multiplications and a single reduction plus a multiplication by $\tau^i$. Note that the computation of $\tau^iY_1 + Y_2$ is done by performing the polynomial multiplication of $\tau^i$ and $Y_1$, computing $Y_2$ without the final reduction, adding the two results and then performing a reduction. Further, this strategy is also carried out for the intermediate computations. So, processing a group of $i$ blocks requires $i$ polynomial multiplications and a single reduction except for the last group. In the case where $i$ does not divide $m$, it is easy to modify this strategy to handle this case. We have implemented this strategy for $i = 8$ (for use

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\(^7\) https://github.com/Shay-Gueron/AES-GCM-SIV/
in Horner and vecHorner) and \( i = 9 \) (for use in vecHash2L). This strategy of delayed reduction has been earlier used in [19] in the context of evaluation of POLYVAL which is a variant of Horner.

There is another technique which can result in efficiency improvement. The sequence \( X_1, \ldots, X_m \) is decimated into \( j \) subsequences \( X_1, X_{j+1}, \ldots; X_2, X_{j+2}, \ldots; X_j, X_{2j}, \ldots; \) each subsequence is computed as a polynomial in \( \tau^j \) and then the results are combined together to obtain the final result. This is a well known technique and we provide further details as part of the discussion on hardware implementation. The advantage of this technique is that the \( j \) sub-sequences can be computed in parallel. This is a distinct advantage in hardware while in software the ability to batch \( j \) independent multiplications allows the processor to efficiently pre-fetch and pipeline the corresponding operations. We have experimented with \( j = 1, 2 \) and \( j = 3 \) and we later report timing results for \( j = 3 \). There are cases, however, where \( j = 1 \) provides slightly better performance than \( j = 3 \).

vecHorner: The computation of vecHorner essentially boils down to Horner computation on several different blocks. The implementation of Horner is extended to implement the computation of vecHorner.

BRW: The implementation of BRW arises as part of the implementation of FAST \([Fx_m, BRW]\). For this implementation, we chose \( m = 256 \) and \( n = 128 \) (corresponding to a 4096-byte disk sector to be encrypted using AES). With \( m = 256 \), BRW is invoked on \( m - 2 + 1 = 255 \) (the first two message blocks are not hashed while the single tweak block is hashed) blocks. The implementation of BRW on 255 blocks has been done in the following manner. Write

\[
BRW_{\tau}(X_1, \ldots, X_{255}) = BRW_{\tau}(X_1, \ldots, X_{127})(X_{128} \oplus \tau^{128}) \oplus BRW_{\tau}(X_{129}, \ldots, X_{255}).
\]

This shows that the 255-block BRW computation can be broken down into 2 127-block BRW computations. Continuing, we break up the 255-block BRW computation into 8 31-block BRW computations. A completely loop unrolled 31-block BRW computation can be implemented using 15 polynomial multiplications and 8 reductions [9]. We use this implementation of 31-block BRW computation to build the 255-block BRW computation. This strategy requires 127 polynomial multiplications and 71 reductions. Following the delayed reduction strategy for BRW computation described in [9], it is possible to have a completely loop unrolled 255-block BRW computation requiring 127 polynomial multiplications and 64 reductions. The code for such a loop unrolled implementation would be quite complex and could lead to a substantial performance penalty. This is the reason why we have chosen to build the 255-block BRW computation from the (loop unrolled) implementation of the 31-block BRW computation.

vecHash2L: The hash function vecHash2L is parameterised by two quantities, namely the block size \( n \) and the super-block size \( \eta \). The use of AES fixes \( n \) to be 128. We have taken \( \eta = 31 \). This requires the implementations of 31-block BRW and also \( i \)-block BRW for \( i = 1, \ldots, 30 \) to tackle the last super-block which can possibly have less than 31 blocks. As mentioned earlier, an implementation of Hash2L for \( n = 128 \) and \( \eta = 31 \) was reported in [9]. The implementation of vecHash2L was not given in [9]. The computation of vecHash2L can be conceptually seen as 31-block BRW computations whose outputs are combined using Horner. Additionally, after each component, the length block is processed. As discussed above, the computation of Horner can be improved by using the delayed reduction strategy and the decimation technique. We have experimented with various combinations and later we report the results for 3-decimated implementations with and without the delayed reduction strategy.
8.2 Implementation of FAST

We have described several variants of FAST. Software implementations of these variants are built from the implementation of AES and the implementations of the various hash functions. The AES based parts consist of the Ctr mode and the Feistel layer while the hash functions are built from either Horner or BRW in case of the fixed length setting and are built from either vecHorner or vecHash2L in the general setting. We describe these aspects below.

Key schedule generation: All versions of FAST use a single key $K$ which is the key to the underlying PRF $F_K$. Instantiating $F_K$ with the encryption function of AES requires generating the round keys. This is a one-time activity and is done using the instruction $\text{aeskeygenassist}$. The generated round keys are stored and used in both the Ctr mode and the Feistel layer.

Ctr: The Ctr mode requires a PRF $F$ which is implemented using the encryption function of AES. Each invocation of the encryption function can be implemented using $\text{aesenc}$ followed by $\text{aesenclast}$. The invocations of $\text{aesenc}$ can be speeded up using an interleaving of multiple AES invocations. The AES encryption calls in the Ctr mode are fully parallelisable. Let $i \geq 1$ be a positive integer. The computations of the AES calls in the Ctr mode are done in batches of $i$ calls each. The inputs to one batch of $i$ encryptions are prepared; then the first rounds of AES encryptions of this batch of $i$ encryptions are computed using $i$ calls to $\text{aesenc}$; this is followed by the second rounds of this batch of $i$ encryptions again using $\text{aesenc}$ and so on. This ensures that the second round of any AES encryption does not have to wait to obtain the output of the first round. This interleaved strategy leads to substantial speed-up over computing the complete AES encryptions one after another. In our implementation, we have used $i = 8$ which follows the earlier work by Gueron\(^8\).

Feistel: The Feistel layer has two calls to AES encryptions. These calls are not parallelisable. So, these calls are implemented using a sequence of $\text{aesenc}$ followed by a single call to $\text{aesenclast}$ to perform the computation of a single AES encryption. Additionally, Feistel also has two field multiplications by $\tau$. These multiplications also need to be computed sequentially each using a polynomial multiplication followed by a reduction.

Hash key generation: The hash key $\tau$ is obtained by applying $F_K$ to $fStr$. This is a one-time operation and the value of $\tau$ does not change during the life-time of $K$. So, it is possible to generate $\tau$ once and store it securely along with $K$. More generally, it is also possible to use a uniform random $\tau$ as the hash key instead of generating it by applying $F_K$ to $fStr$. This will not affect the security analysis, but, will increase the key storage requirement. Alternatively, it is possible to generate $\tau$ once per session. The cost of generating $\tau$ is amortised over all the encryptions/decryptions per session and hence is negligible. Timing results provided later include the time for generating $\tau$.

FAST[$F_{x_m}$, Horner]: In the setting of $F_{x_m}$, tweaks consist of a single $n$-bit block and plaintexts/ciphertexts consist of $m$ $n$-bit blocks. In our implementation, we have taken $m = 256$ so that the total number of bytes in a plaintext/ciphertext is 4096. As mentioned earlier, this corresponds to the size of a modern disk sector. In this case, $P_3 = (P_{3,1}, \ldots, P_{3,m-2})$ consists of $(m-2)$ $n$-bit blocks and the hash function $\text{Horner}_\tau(1, P_{3,1}, \ldots, P_{3,m-2}, T)$ needs to be computed. An implementation of Horner as mentioned above is used. This requires a total of 255 polynomial multiplications and a total of

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\(^8\)Interleaving of 8 AES encryptions has been called a sweat point in https://crypto.stanford.edu/RealWorldCrypto/slides/gueron.pdf
32 reductions. Counting a single polynomial multiplication as 4 \texttt{pclmulqdq} and a reduction as 2 \texttt{pclmulqdq}, the total number of \texttt{pclmulqdq} calls required is 1084.

\begin{align*}
\text{FAST}[F_{x_m}, \text{BRW}]: & \quad \text{As above, we take } m = 256 \text{ and the requirement is to compute } \text{BRW}_\tau(P_{3,1}, \ldots, P_{3,m-2}, T). \\
& \text{This is done as described above requiring 127 polynomial multiplications and 71 reductions. The total number of } \text{pclmulqdq} \text{ calls required is 650. This is 434 calls lesser than that required for computing } \text{Horner}_\tau(1, P_{3,1}, \ldots, P_{3,m-2}, T). \text{ So, one would expect } \text{FAST}[F_{x_m}, \text{BRW}] \text{ to be faster than } \text{FAST}[F_{x_m}, \text{Horner}]. \text{ Our implementation shows a speed-up, but, not as much as one might expect from the count of } \text{pclmulqdq} \text{ calls. Indeed instruction cache and pipelining are rather complicated issues and precise information about these issues for Intel processors are not easily available}\footnote{https://blog.cr.yp.to/20140517-insns.html}. \text{ So, it is possible that the code for BRW that we have developed can be tuned further to obtain speed improvements.}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{FAST}[G_{n, \xi}, \text{vecHorner}]: & \quad \text{This requires the implementation of the hash function } \text{vecHorner} \text{ which is an easy extension of the implementation of } \text{Horner}.
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{FAST}[G_{n, \eta, \text{vecHash2L}}]: & \quad \text{This requires the implementation of the hash function } \text{vecHash2L}. \text{ The implementation of this hash function has been discussed above.}
\end{align*}

\subsection{8.3 Timing Results}

In this section, we provide timing results for the software implementations of all the four variants of \text{FAST}. The corresponding code is available at \url{https://github.com/sebatighosh/FAST}. The timing results for \text{FAST} are for two settings. The first is in the setting of \text{Fx} while the second is in the setting of \text{Gn}.

1. In the setting of \text{Fx}, messages are 4096 bytes long, i.e., each message consists of 256 128-bit blocks and the tweak is a single 128-bit block.
2. In the setting of \text{Gn}, timing measurements are separately reported for messages of lengths 512, 1024, 4096 and 8192 bytes. For tweaks, the number of components has been considered to be 2, 3 and 4: for tweaks with 2 components, each component contains 512 bytes; for tweaks with 3 components, the components contain 336, 336 and 352 bytes; whereas for tweaks with 4 components, each component contains 256 bytes. Two columns of measurements are shown for \text{FAST}[G_{n, \xi, \eta, \text{vecHash2L}}]. The column with the heading ‘delayed’ reports measurements for the case where the Horner layer in \text{vecHash2L} has been implemented using the delayed reduction strategy while the column with the heading ‘normal’ reports measurements for the case where the Horner layer in \text{vecHash2L} has been implemented without using the delayed reduction strategy.

The timing measurements were on Intel Core i7-6500U Skylake @ 2.5GHz. The operating system was 64-bit Ubuntu-14.04-LTS and the C codes were compiled using GCC version 4.8.4.

Based on Tables 5 and 6, we make the following observations.

1. In the setting of \text{Fx}, \text{FAST}[F_{x_{256}}, \text{Horner}] and \text{FAST}[F_{x_{256}}, \text{BRW}] are faster than both \text{XCB} and EME2 with \text{FAST}[F_{x_{256}}, \text{BRW}] being faster than \text{FAST}[F_{x_{256}}, \text{Horner}]. \text{ We note that XCB also uses hashing based on Horner’s rule and we have used the same delayed reduction strategy in the implementation of this hashing as we did in the implementation of the hash function for } \text{FAST}[F_{x_{256}}, \text{Horner}].
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>scheme</th>
<th>performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XCB</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EME2</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAST [Fx_{256}, \text{Horner}]</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAST [Fx_{256}, \text{BRW}]</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.** Comparison of the cycles per byte measure of FAST with those of XCB and EME2 in the setting of \(Fx_{256}\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>msg len in bytes</th>
<th>vecHorner (delayed)</th>
<th>vecHash2L (normal)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>512</td>
<td>2 1.40 1.37</td>
<td>3 1.43 1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1024</td>
<td>2 1.43 1.37</td>
<td>3 1.43 1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4096</td>
<td>2 1.44 1.56</td>
<td>3 1.43 1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8192</td>
<td>2 1.52 1.30</td>
<td>3 1.53 1.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.** Report of cycles per byte measure for the setting of \(Gn\) for FAST\[Gn, \tau, \text{vecHorner}\] and FAST\[Gn, \tau, 31, \text{vecHash2L}\].

2. In the setting of \(Gn\), for vecHorner the speed decreases with both increase in message length and increase in the number of components while for vecHash2L the speed increases with increase in message length and for the same message length the speed decreases a bit as the number of components in the tweak increases. In the case of vecHash2L, using the delayed reduction strategy for implementing the Horner layer in vecHash2L is slower than an implementation without using delayed reduction. This is due to the fact that the overhead of pre-computing the required powers of \(\tau\) becomes significant. For obtaining the effect of delayed reduction, it is required to increase the message length beyond the 8192 bytes that has been considered. Overall, in most cases, FAST\[Gn, \tau, 31, \text{vecHash2L}\] is faster than FAST\[Gn, \tau, \text{vecHorner}\].

9 Hardware Implementation

We have implemented the fixed length variants of FAST, i.e., FAST\[Fx_m, \text{Horner}\] and FAST\[Fx_m, \text{BRW}\] in reconfigurable hardware. The implementations were done keeping in mind the application of disk encryption. The design decisions that were made are as follows:

1. **PRF:** For the PRF \(F\), we have used the encryption function of AES. So, the block length \(n = 128\).

2. **Message and tweak lengths:** We have assumed a message length of 4096 bytes. As mentioned earlier, this is the current sector size of commercially available hard disks. For \(n = 128\), 4096 bytes correspond to 256 blocks, i.e., \(m = 256\). For disk encryption application, the tweaks are sector addresses and we have assumed the tweak to be a single \(n\)-bit block. So, our implementations are those of FAST\[Fx_{256}, \text{Horner}\] and FAST\[Fx_{256}, \text{BRW}\].

3. **Choice of FPGA:** The basic design goal was speed and so the implementations were optimized for speed. Nevertheless, we tried to keep the area metric reasonable. The target device was a
high end fast FPGA. In particular, we have optimized our design for the Xilinx Virtex 5 and Virtex 7 families.

With \( m = 256 \) and a single block tweak, the numbers of blocks in the inputs to the hash functions \( h \) and \( h' \) are both 255. The 255 blocks comprise of 254 blocks arising from \( P_3 \) or \( C_3 \) and one block from the tweak. Since 255 blocks are to be hashed, for \( \text{FAST}\{ F_{x_{256}}, \text{Horner}\} \), the requirement is to implement 255-block Horner while for \( \text{FAST}\{ F_{x_{256}}, \text{BRW}\} \), the requirement is to implement 255-block BRW.

For both \( \text{FAST}\{ F_{x_{256}}, \text{Horner}\} \) and \( \text{FAST}\{ F_{x_{256}}, \text{BRW}\} \), we have implemented two variants, one with a single core of the AES encryption module and the other with two cores of the AES encryption module. We will denote variants of \( \text{FAST}\{ F_{x_{256}}, \text{Horner}\} \) and \( \text{FAST}\{ F_{x_{256}}, \text{BRW}\} \) using a single AES core as \( \text{FAST}\{ \text{AES,Horner}\}\)-1 and \( \text{FAST}\{ \text{AES,BRW}\}\)-1 respectively. The variants of \( \text{FAST}\{ F_{x_{256}}, \text{Horner}\} \) and \( \text{FAST}\{ F_{x_{256}}, \text{BRW}\} \) using two AES cores will be denoted as \( \text{FAST}\{ \text{AES,Horner}\}\)-2 and \( \text{FAST}\{ \text{AES,BRW}\}\)-2 respectively.

The two basic building blocks for all of these designs are the encryption function of the AES and a finite field multiplier.

In our implementations, we have used pipelined AES encryption cores. An AES encryption core requires a key generation module. For the two-core designs the same key generation module is shared by both the cores. The latency of each AES core is 11 cycles, i.e., the first block of ciphertext is produced after a delay of 11 cycles and thereafter one cipher block is obtained in each cycle. The design of the AES cores adopts some interesting ideas reported in [8]. The design in [8] was that of a sequential AES design tailored for the Virtex 5 family of devices. An important aspect of this design is that the S-boxes are implemented as \( 256 \times 8 \) multiplexers and one S-box fits into 32 six-input LUTs which are available in Virtex 5 FPGAs. We have used the same idea to design the S-boxes of our pipelined AES core.

With \( n = 128 \), the requirement is to compute products in \( GF(2^{128}) \). For this, we have used a 4-stage pipelined Karatsuba multiplier. The number of stages was selected to match the maximum frequency of the AES encryption core, which is the only other significant component in the circuits. The multiplier design is the same as reported in [12].

To use the pipelined multiplier efficiently, it is important to schedule the multiplications in such a way that pipeline delays are minimised. The BRW computation is amenable to a very efficient pipelined implementation. This requires identifying an “optimal” order of the multiplications so that both pipeline delays and the necessity to store intermediate results are minimised. In [11], a detailed study of such an optimal ordering was done. A circuit for computing BRW polynomials on 31 blocks of inputs using a 3-stage pipelined Karatsuba multiplier was presented in [11]. In this work, the requirement is to compute BRW polynomials on 255 blocks using a 4-stage pipelined multiplier. We scale up the design in [11] suitably for our purpose.

For computing Horner using a pipelined multiplier the idea of decimation is used. This has been briefly mentioned in the context of software implementation. We provide some more details here. Let \( (X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_m) \) and a positive integer \( d \) be given. Let \( \chi_i = m - i \mod d \). The \( d \)-decimated Horner computation [9] is based on the following observation.

\[
\text{Horner}_\tau(X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_m) = \tau^{\chi_1}\text{Horner}_{\tau^d}(X_1, X_{1+d}, X_{1+2d}, \ldots) \oplus \cdots \oplus \tau^{\chi_d}\text{Horner}_{\tau^d}(X_d, X_{2d}, X_{3d}, \ldots).
\]

So, \( \text{Horner}_\tau(X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_m) \) can be computed by evaluating \( d \) independent polynomials at \( \tau^d \) and then combining the results. This representation allows efficient use of a \( d \)-stage pipelined multiplier, as in each clock \( d \) independent multiplications can be scheduled.
In what follows, we give a detailed description of the architecture of FAST[AES, BRW]-2 followed by a short description of the architecture of FAST[AES, Horner]-2.

9.1 Architecture for FAST[AES, BRW]-2

FAST[AES, BRW]-2 uses two pipelined AES encryption cores and a 4-stage pipelined multiplier. An overview of the architecture is shown in Figure 1. We briefly describe its components and functioning.

The basic components of the architecture are the two AES encryption cores which are denoted as AESodd and AESeven. The module for the BRW polynomial evaluation using a 4-stage Karatsuba multiplier is shown as BRWPoly_eval.

The two AES cores, two multiplexers M1 and M2 and a counter named Counter are enclosed inside a dashed rectangle. This constitutes a module which implements the counter mode. The module can also perform AES encryption of a single block. The AESeven core is used only in counter mode whereas the AESodd core is used for both encryption in the counter mode and to encrypt single blocks. According to the algorithms in Tables 2 and 3, encryption of a single block is required for the blocks $F_1$ and $F_2$ in the Feistel function and for $f_{Str}$ in the main function.

The counter has two outputs, one for the odd values and the other for the even ones. The even values are fed directly to the AESeven core and the odd values are fed to the AESodd core through the multiplexer M1. The block BRWPoly_eval performs the 255-block BRW computation. Additionally, this block also computes the single multiplications by $\tau$ to compute $H_1$ and $H_2$ which are required in the Feistel layer (see Table 3).

The registers $Z$, $A_1$, $A_2$, $F_1$, $F_2$ and $B_2$ are used to store the intermediate values and these correspond to the variables $Z, A_1, A_2, F_1, F_2$ and $B_2$ respectively of the algorithms described in Tables 2 and 3.

The input ports Podd and Peven are used to feed in the odd numbered message blocks and even numbered message blocks respectively. The tweak is also fed in through Podd. The hash key is fed in through a separate port. The output ports Ceven and Codd output the even and odd numbered cipher blocks respectively.

The multiplexer M5 selects the input to AESodd from one of the four possible inputs, namely, Podd, F1, F2 or the string fStr. The multiplexer M1 selects either the output of M5 or $Z \oplus i$, where $i$ is the output from the odd port of Counter. This input design to the AESodd core through the multiplexers M1 and M5 allows AESodd to encrypt in the counter mode and also to encrypt the required single blocks.

The BRW computation module BRWPoly_eval is required to be fed two blocks of plaintext or ciphertext in each cycle. The multiplexer M3 provides the first input to BRWPoly_eval. This input is selected by M3 to be one of Podd, Codd, A1 or B2. The inputs Podd and Codd are relevant for BRW while the inputs A1 and B2 are relevant when a single-block multiplication is required. The second input to BRWPoly_eval is the output of the multiplexer M4 and can be either Peven or Ceven.

The final outputs of the circuit are selected using multiplexers M6 and M7. Control signals are generated using a finite state machine which follows the algorithm of FAST.

Timing analysis: In Figure 2 we show the timing diagram for the architecture for FAST[AES, BRW]-2. The first 11 clock cycles are required to compute the hash key $\tau$ by applying the AES encryption module to fStr. The computation of the hash function $h$ (see (22)) requires a 255-block BRW computation and a field multiplication by $\tau$ for a total of 128 field multiplications. The 4-stage multiplier
Fig. 1. Architecture for FAST[AES, BRW]-2.
has a latency of 4 cycles. This latency arises twice, once for the first field multiplication and also at the end when the multiplication by \( \tau \) is dependent on all the blocks. The computation of \( h() \) is completed in 136 cycles. The Feistel network is computed in 34 clock cycles: 22 cycles for the two AES encryption calls plus 8 cycles for the two multiplications and four additional cycles for synchronization. After the Feistel computation is over, \( C_3 \) can be computed with the counter mode. Eleven clock cycles after the counter mode is initiated, two blocks of \( C_3 \) become available and then onwards two blocks of the ciphertext become available at each clock cycle. So, 11 clock cycles after the counter mode is initiated, the second hash can start. After a total of 330 clock cycles the last block of the ciphertext is produced.

![Fig. 2. Time diagram for encryption using FAST[AES,BRW]-2.](image)

9.2 Architecture for FAST[AES,Horner]-2

To take the advantage of two AES cores in the design of FAST[AES,Horner]-2 it becomes necessary to use two multipliers. The reason is the following. The crucial parallelisation is in computing the second hash layer (see Line 9 in Table 2), where the hash of the ciphertexts produced by the counter mode is computed. Since two pipelined AES cores are used to implement the counter mode, after an initial delay, in each clock cycle two blocks of ciphertexts are produced. So, the hash module has to be capable of processing two ciphertext blocks in each cycle. For BRW based hashing, each multiplication involves two ciphertext blocks. On the other hand, in the case of Horner, each multiplication involves a single block. So, to process two ciphertext blocks in each cycle it is required to use two multipliers. Each multiplier operates in a 4-stage pipeline. For proper scheduling using the two multipliers, it is required to use a 8-decimated version of Horner. This allows the scheduling of four independent multiplications to each multiplier in every clock cycle.

9.3 Experimental Results

We present performance data for four implementations of FAST: The results are compared with the implementations of the disk encryption standards XCB and EME2 [3] as reported in [12]. In [12] the performance of two architectures for each of EME2 and XCB are reported. These are named EME2-1, EME2-2 and XCB-1, XCB-2 respectively. The hardware resources utilized in these constructions along with those used in the different architectures for FAST are summarized in Table 7.
Table 7. Summary of the main hardware resources in the architectures of FAST, EME2 and XCB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Pipelined AES encryption core</th>
<th>Pipelined AES decryption core</th>
<th>Sequential AES decryption core</th>
<th>Pipelined multiplier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAST[AES,BRW]-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAST[AES,Horner]-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EME2-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XCB-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAST[AES,BRW]-2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAST[AES,Horner]-2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EME2-2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XCB-2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some important aspects of the architectures of EME2 and XCB are as follows:

1. The encryption cores and the multipliers utilised in FAST are the same as those utilised in XCB and EME. The sequential decryption core required in XCB was optimised for speed. To match the critical path of the AES encryption core the sequential decryption core was implemented using T-boxes.

2. EME2 is an encrypt-mask-encrypt type construction which consists of two ECB layers with an intermediate masking. The ECB layers can be implemented with pipelined AES cores. For decryption, ECB in decryption mode is required; hence for efficient decryption functionality pipelined AES decryption cores are required to be used. The second layer of ECB in EME2 can only be computed once the first layer has been completed and so the intermediate results of the first layer of ECB encryption are required to be stored. Block RAMs are used for this purpose.

3. XCB is a hash-counter-hash type mode which involves a counter mode of operation sandwiched between two polynomial hash layers. The main encryption/decryption in XCB takes place through a variant of the counter mode (which is different from the counter mode used in FAST). The counter mode can be implemented using only the encryption module of AES. One call to the decryption module of AES is required in XCB for both encryption and decryption. For this, a sequential AES decryption core is utilised. Thus, XCB-2 uses two pipelined AES encryption cores which does the bulk encryption and in addition uses a sequential AES decryption core.

4. The polynomial hash layers in XCB consist of Horner computations. The second Horner computation in XCB can be computed in parallel with the counter mode. As in case of FAST[AES,Horner]-2 the counter mode in XCB-2 is implemented using two AES cores. So, in each clock cycle, two blocks of ciphertexts are obtained and to utilise this parallelisation two multipliers are required.

The performance results presented in Table 8 are obtained after place and route process in ISE 14.7. The target device was xc5vlx330t-2ff1738. We tried many timing restrictions and the best case is reported.

The first part of Table 8 shows the performance of the basic modules, i.e., the pipelined encryption core (PEC), the pipelined decryption core (PDC), the sequential decryption core (SDC) and the 128-bit pipelined Karatsuba multiplier. The decryption cores are not required in FAST. The pipelined decryption core is required for EME2 and the sequential decryption core is required.
for XCB. The results for individual AES cores in Table 8 include the area required for the key schedule module. For the implementations of modes of operation we have implemented only one key schedule, and it is shared between all the AES cores presented in the architecture.

From the results in Table 8 we observe the following:

1. Comparison of area.
   (a) Among the two-core architectures, FAST\[AES, BRW\]-2 is the smallest in terms of area while among the single-core architectures, FAST\[AES, Horner\]-1 is the smallest.
   (b) In comparison to Horner, the module for implementing BRW requires more registers and also circuits for squaring. As a result, FAST\[AES, BRW\]-1 requires 653 slices more than FAST\[AES, Horner\]-1.
   (c) For the two-core architectures, FAST\[AES, Horner\]-2 requires more area than FAST\[AES, BRW\]-2 since the implementation of FAST\[AES, Horner\]-2 requires two multipliers while the implementation of FAST\[AES, BRW\]-2 requires a single multiplier.
   (d) EME2 is the costliest in terms of area in both categories of single core and double core architectures. This is because it requires two AES decryption cores for its functionality. Further both EME2-1 and EME2-2 require four block RAMs in addition to the slices reported in Table 8.
   (e) The overall architecture of XCB is very similar to that of FAST\[AES, Horner\]. The main difference is that XCB requires an additional sequential AES decryption core and this results in XCB being costlier than FAST\[AES, Horner\] in terms of area.

2. Comparison of throughput.
   (a) Among the two-core architectures, FAST\[AES,Horner\]-2 has the highest throughput while among the single-core architectures, FAST\[AES,BRW\]-1 has the highest throughput.
   (b) As computing BRW requires about half the number of multiplications required for computing Horner, in comparison to FAST\[AES,Horner\]-1, a significant number of clocks can be saved in computing the first hash in case of FAST\[AES,BRW\]-1. As a result, the total number of clocks required by FAST\[AES,BRW\]-1 is smaller than that required by FAST\[AES,Horner\]-1 and this leads to a better throughput for FAST\[AES,BRW\]-1.
(c) FAST[AES, Horner]-2 is marginally better than FAST[AES, BRW]-2 in terms of throughput. This is due to the following reason. FAST[AES, Horner]-2 uses two multipliers which compensates for the gain from the use of BRW polynomials. Overall, FAST[AES, Horner]-2 requires slightly lesser number of clocks and slightly higher frequency.

(d) Both version of XCB operate at a lower frequency than the corresponding versions of FAST. This leads to lower throughput of XCB compared to FAST. The lower frequency of XCB is essentially due to the use of the sequential AES decryption core which is not present in the architectures for FAST. EME2 has the lowest throughput due to its reduced frequency for the use of the pipelined decryption core, which is absent in all other architectures.

3. Comparison of throughput per area (TPA) metric.
(a) The TPA is the highest for FAST[AES, BRW]-1 which is slightly higher than that of FAST[AES, BRW]-2.
(b) XCB has a better TPA than EME for both versions. This is due to the significantly higher operation frequency (EME is limited by the frequency of pipelined AES decryption core).

To confirm the comparative performance of the different designs, we have also obtained result for the high end modern Virtex 7 FPGA. The target device was xc7vx690t-3ffg1930. The results are presented in Table 9. Based on Table 9, we make the following observations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Area (slices)</th>
<th>Frequency (MHz)</th>
<th>Clock cycles</th>
<th>Throughput (Gbps)</th>
<th>TPA (Mbps/slice)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AES-PEC</td>
<td>2093</td>
<td>405.02</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-PDC</td>
<td>2352</td>
<td>352.19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-SDC</td>
<td>1575</td>
<td>390.056</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128-bit pipelined Karatsuba multiplier</td>
<td>1884</td>
<td>404.86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51.82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAST[AES, BRW]-2</td>
<td>7202</td>
<td>375.43</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>37.28</td>
<td>5.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAST[AES, Horner]-2</td>
<td>8906</td>
<td>377.03</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>38.37</td>
<td>4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XCB-2</td>
<td>9330</td>
<td>358.84</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>37.21</td>
<td>3.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EME2-2</td>
<td>11800</td>
<td>315.58</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>33.90</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAST[AES, BRW]-1</td>
<td>5024</td>
<td>377.87</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>26.57</td>
<td>5.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAST[AES, Horner]-1</td>
<td>4781</td>
<td>379.25</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>21.57</td>
<td>5.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XCB-1</td>
<td>5875</td>
<td>360.67</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>20.77</td>
<td>3.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EME2-1</td>
<td>6350</td>
<td>319.74</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>18.67</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Implementation results for Virtex 7 FPGA.

1. The frequency grows significantly in comparison with Virtex 5 results. This is basically a direct effect of the difference of the fabrication technology between the two families. While Virtex 5 family is built with 65 nm technology, Virtex 7 is built with 28 nm technology.
2. The number of slices for the AES cores is significantly lesser than the corresponding implementations in Virtex 5. This is due to the fact that slices in Virtex 7 include 8 Flip-Flops which is 4 more than that in Virtex 5.
3. In some cases, the number of slices grows in comparison with the Virtex 5. Examples are the 128-bit multiplier and FAST[AES, Horner]-1. This behaviour can be attributed to the optimisation performed by the tool. In general, the designs were optimised for speed. We tried many restriction and have reported the best results. During the implementation experiments, we have
observed that the differences in area and frequency are really significant for two different timing restrictions. When the area increases the reason is that the tool could find better paths for routing, using more slices just to complete such paths. Another strategy to increase the performance could be to replicate some parts of the circuit leading to an increase in the area.

10 Conclusion

In this paper we have presented a tweakable enciphering scheme called FAST. Instantiations of the scheme for both fixed length messages with single block tweaks and variable length messages with very general tweaks have been described. A detailed security analysis in the style of reductionist security proof has been provided. Software implementations of both kinds of instantiations have been made. The instantiation for fixed length messages with single block tweaks is appropriate for low-level disk encryption. An FPGA based hardware implementation has been done for this application. Both the software and the hardware implementations show that the new scheme outperforms previous schemes and make the scheme an attractive option for designers and standardisation bodies.

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank Mridul Nandi for his comments on an earlier version of the paper.

References


A Proof of Theorem 1

This section provides the proof of Theorem 1.

Proof. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary attacking FAST. We use $\mathcal{A}$ to build an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ attacking the PRF-property of $F$. $\mathcal{B}$ has access to an oracle which is either $F_K(\cdot)$ for a uniform random $K$ in $\mathcal{K}$, or the oracle is $\rho$ which is a uniform random function from $\{0,1\}^n$ to $\{0,1\}^n$. Adversary $\mathcal{B}$ uses the $(\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2)$-eligible pair of hash functions $(h, h')$ to set up an instance of FAST and invokes $\mathcal{A}$ to attack this instance. $\mathcal{A}$ makes a number of oracle queries to the encryption and decryption oracles of FAST. $\mathcal{B}$ uses its own oracle and the hash functions $h$ and $h'$ to compute the responses which it provides to $\mathcal{A}$. At the end, $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a bit and $\mathcal{B}$ outputs the same bit. Note that both encryption and decryption queries by $\mathcal{A}$ can be answered using the oracle of $\mathcal{B}$ and the hash functions $h, h'$.

The running time of $\mathcal{B}$ is the running time of $\mathcal{A}$ along with the time required to compute the responses to the queries made by $\mathcal{A}$ using $\mathcal{B}$'s oracle plus some bookkeeping time which includes the time for set-up. So, the total running time of $\mathcal{B}$ is $\omega + \omega'$ as desired. Further, to answer $\mathcal{A}$'s queries, $\mathcal{B}$ needs to make a query to its oracle on $\text{fStr}$ and to answer the $s$-th query, it needs to make $m(s)$ queries to its oracle. So, the total number of times $\mathcal{B}$ queries its oracle is $1 + \sum_{s=1}^{\omega} m(s) = \omega + 1$. Since each query of $\mathcal{B}$ consists of a single $n$-bit block, the query complexity is also $\omega + 1$.

If the oracle to $\mathcal{B}$ is the real oracle, i.e., the oracle is $F_K$, then $\mathcal{A}$ gets to interact with the real encryption and decryption oracles of FAST. So,

$$\Pr \left[ K \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K} : B^{F_K(\cdot)} \Rightarrow 1 \right] = \Pr \left[ K \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K} : A^{\text{FAST.Encrypt}(\cdot)}.\text{FAST.Decrypt}(\cdot) \Rightarrow 1 \right].$$

(40)

Denote by $\text{FAST}_\rho$ the instance of FAST where $F_K$ is replaced by $\rho$. If the oracle to $\mathcal{B}$ is the random oracle, i.e., the oracle is $\rho$, then

$$\Pr \left[ B^{\rho(\cdot)} \Rightarrow 1 \right] = \Pr \left[ A^{\text{FAST}_\rho.\text{Encrypt}(\cdot)}.\text{FAST}_\rho.\text{Decrypt}(\cdot) \Rightarrow 1 \right].$$

(41)

So,

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{prf}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathcal{B}) = \Pr \left[ K \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K} : B^{F_K(\cdot)} \Rightarrow 1 \right] - \Pr \left[ B^{\rho(\cdot)} \Rightarrow 1 \right]$$

$$= \Pr \left[ K \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K} : A^{\text{FAST.Encrypt}(\cdot)}.\text{FAST.Decrypt}(\cdot) \Rightarrow 1 \right]$$

$$- \Pr \left[ A^{\text{FAST}_\rho.\text{Encrypt}(\cdot)}.\text{FAST}_\rho.\text{Decrypt}(\cdot) \Rightarrow 1 \right].$$

(42)

The advantages of $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ are related as follows. Recall that $\mathcal{F}$ is the set of all functions $f$ from $T \times \mathcal{P}$ to $\mathcal{P}$ such that for any $T \in T$ and $P \in \mathcal{P}$, $\text{len}(f(T, P)) = \text{len}(P)$. Let $\rho_1(\cdot, \cdot)$ and $\rho_2(\cdot, \cdot)$ be two independent and uniform random functions from $\mathcal{F}$.

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{rnd}}_{\text{FAST}}(\mathcal{A})$$

$$= \Pr \left[ K \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K} : A^{\text{FAST.Encrypt}(\cdot)}.\text{FAST.Decrypt}(\cdot) \Rightarrow 1 \right] - \Pr \left[ A^{\rho_1(\cdot, \cdot),\rho_2(\cdot, \cdot)} \Rightarrow 1 \right]$$

$$= \Pr \left[ K \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K} : A^{\text{FAST.Encrypt}(\cdot)}.\text{FAST.Decrypt}(\cdot) \Rightarrow 1 \right] - \Pr \left[ A^{\text{FAST}_\rho.\text{Encrypt}(\cdot)}.\text{FAST}_\rho.\text{Decrypt}(\cdot) \Rightarrow 1 \right]$$

$$+ \Pr \left[ A^{\text{FAST}_\rho.\text{Encrypt}(\cdot)}.\text{FAST}_\rho.\text{Decrypt}(\cdot) \Rightarrow 1 \right] - \Pr \left[ A^{\rho_1(\cdot, \cdot),\rho_2(\cdot, \cdot)} \Rightarrow 1 \right]$$

$$= \Pr \left[ A^{\text{FAST}_\rho.\text{Encrypt}(\cdot)}.\text{FAST}_\rho.\text{Decrypt}(\cdot) \Rightarrow 1 \right] - \Pr \left[ A^{\rho_1(\cdot, \cdot),\rho_2(\cdot, \cdot)} \Rightarrow 1 \right] + \text{Adv}^{\text{prf}}_{\mathcal{F}}(\mathcal{B}).$$

(43)

There are two events to consider, namely,
Consider the event $A^{\text{FAST}_{\rho}, \text{Encrypt}(\cdot, \cdot), \text{FAST}_{\rho}, \text{Decrypt}(\cdot, \cdot)} \Rightarrow 1$ and $A^{\rho_1(\cdot, \cdot), \rho_2(\cdot, \cdot)} \Rightarrow 1$. Suppose $A$ makes a total of $q$ queries with tweak query complexity $\theta$ and message query complexity $\omega$. For $1 \leq s \leq q$, let $\text{ty}(s) = \text{enc}$ if the $s$-th query is an encryption query and $\text{ty}(s) = \text{dec}$ if the $s$-th query is a decryption query. Denote the tweak, the plaintext and the ciphertext associated with the $s$-th query by $T^{(s)}$, $P^{(s)} = P_1^{(s)} || P_2^{(s)} || P_3^{(s)}$ and $C^{(s)} = C_1^{(s)} || C_2^{(s)} || C_3^{(s)}$ respectively. We have $t^{(s)} = t(T^{(s)})$ and $m^{(s)}$ is the number of $n$-bit blocks in $\text{pad}_n(P^{(s)})$ and $\text{pad}_n(C^{(s)})$. Also, $l^{(s)} = l(P_3^{(s)}) = l(C_3^{(s)}) = m^{(s)} - 2$.

The interaction of $A$ with the oracle in this setting is given by the game $G_{\text{real}}$ which is shown in Table 10. In this game, the random function $\rho$ is built incrementally. Whenever a “new” input to $\rho$ is received, the output is chosen independently and uniformly at random. The variable $\text{bad}$ is set to $\text{true}$ if it turns out that two inputs to $\rho$ collide. Let $\text{Bad}_{\text{real}}(A)$ be the event that $\text{bad}$ is set to $\text{true}$ in the game $G_{\text{real}}$. Also, by $A^{G_{\text{real}}} \Rightarrow 1$ we denote the event that $A$ outputs 1 in the game $G_{\text{real}}$. Note that $A^{G_{\text{real}}} \Rightarrow 1$ is exactly the event $A^{\text{FAST}_{\rho}, \text{Encrypt}(\cdot, \cdot), \text{FAST}_{\rho}, \text{Decrypt}(\cdot, \cdot)} \Rightarrow 1$.

If $\text{Bad}_{\text{real}}(A)$ does not occur, then the boxed instruction in game $G_{\text{real}}$ is not executed. The absence of the boxed instruction does not affect the probability of $\text{Bad}_{\text{real}}(A)$. We consider the distributions of the plaintexts and ciphertexts when $\text{Bad}_{\text{real}}(A)$ does not occur. Let $Y_1^{(s)}$ denote the output of $\text{Ch}_{\rho}(F_1^{(s)})$ and $Y_2^{(s)}$ denote the output of $\text{Ch}_{\rho}(F_2^{(s)})$. Suppose $\text{ty}(s) = \text{enc}$, i.e., the $s$-th query is an encryption query. Then from game $G_{\text{real}}$, we can write

$$
C_1^{(s)} = Y_1^{(s)} \oplus P_1^{(s)} \oplus \tau C_2^{(s)} \oplus \tau h'_r(T^{(s)}, C_3^{(s)}) \oplus h_r(T^{(s)}, P_3^{(s)});
$$

$$
C_2^{(s)} = Y_2^{(s)} \oplus P_2^{(s)} \oplus \tau P_1^{(s)} \oplus h'_r(T^{(s)}, C_3^{(s)}) \oplus \tau h_r(T^{(s)}, P_3^{(s)});
$$

$$
C_3^{(s)} = S_i^{(s)} \oplus P_3^{(s)} \quad \text{for } i = 1, \ldots, m^{(s)} - 3;
$$

$$
C_{3,m^{(s)}-2}^{(s)} = \text{first}_{r^{(s)}}(D^{(s)}) \oplus P_3^{(s)} \quad \text{for } 3,m^{(s)}-2.
$$

When $\text{Bad}_{\text{real}}(A)$ does not occur, $Y_1^{(s)}, Y_2^{(s)}, S_i^{(s)}, (i = 1, \ldots, m^{(s)} - 3), D^{(s)}$ are independent and uniform random strings. From the above relations, it is easy to argue that the ciphertext $C^{(s)}$ is also independent and uniform random. A similar argument shows that when $\text{ty}(s) = \text{dec}$, i.e., the query is a decryption query, then $P^{(s)}$ is an independent and uniform random string. So, if $\text{Bad}_{\text{real}}(A)$ does not occur, then the adversary obtains independent and uniform random strings as responses to all its queries.

In the next step, the game $G_{\text{real}}$ is modified to the game $G_{\text{int}}$. This game is shown in Table 11. In this game, the outputs of $\rho$ are not chosen directly. Instead, these are defined from the plaintexts and the ciphertexts. For an enciphering query, the ciphertext is chosen independently and uniformly at random while for a deciphering query, the plaintext is chosen independently and uniformly at random. The outputs of $\rho$ are defined from these in the following manner.

$$
\rho(F_1^{(s)}) = Y_1^{(s)} \leftarrow C_1^{(s)} \oplus P_1^{(s)} \oplus \tau C_2^{(s)} \oplus \tau h'_r(T^{(s)}, C_3^{(s)}) \oplus h_r(T^{(s)}, P_3^{(s)});
$$

$$
\rho(F_2^{(s)}) = Y_2^{(s)} \leftarrow C_2^{(s)} \oplus P_2^{(s)} \oplus \tau P_1^{(s)} \oplus h'_r(T^{(s)}, C_3^{(s)}) \oplus \tau h_r(T^{(s)}, P_3^{(s)});
$$

$$
\rho(J_1^{(s)}) = C_3^{(s)} \oplus P_3^{(s)} \quad \text{for } i = 1, \ldots, m^{(s)} - 3;
$$

$$
\rho(J_{m^{(s)}-2}) = \begin{cases} 
D^{(s)} \oplus (P_{3,m^{(s)}-2}^{(s)}) || 0^{n-r^{(s)}} & \text{if } \text{ty}(s) = \text{enc}; \\
E^{(s)} \oplus (C_{3,m^{(s)}-2}^{(s)}) || 0^{n-r^{(s)}} & \text{if } \text{ty}(s) = \text{dec}; 
\end{cases}
$$

As for an encryption query, $C_1^{(s)}, C_2^{(s)}, C_3^{(s)}, \ldots, C_{3,m^{(s)}-3}, D^{(s)}$ are chosen independently and uniformly at random, from (44) it follows that the outputs of $\rho$ are also independent and uniformly
Claim 2. occurs in the two games are equal. So, we have the following.

Let \( \text{Bad}_\text{int}(A) \) be the event that the variable \( \text{bad} \) is set to \( \text{true} \) in the game \( G_{\text{int}} \). Let \( A^G_{\text{int}} \Rightarrow 1 \) denote the event that \( A \) outputs \( 1 \) in the game \( G_{\text{int}} \). From the description of the games, it follows that if \( \text{bad} \) does not occur, then \( A \)'s views in both \( G_{\text{real}} \) and \( G_{\text{int}} \) are the same. Also, the probabilities that \( \text{bad} \) occurs in the two games are equal. This gives the following.

Claim 1.

\[
\Pr \left[ (A^{G_{\text{real}}} \Rightarrow 1) \land \overline{\text{Bad}_{\text{real}}(A)} \right] = \Pr \left[ (A^{G_{\text{int}}} \Rightarrow 1) \land \overline{\text{Bad}_{\text{int}}(A)} \right];
\]
\[
\Pr [\text{Bad}_{\text{real}}(A)] = \Pr [\text{Bad}_{\text{int}}(A)].
\]

Next, the game \( G_{\text{int}} \) is changed to the game \( G_{\text{rnd}} \) which is shown in Table 12. In this game, there is no \( \rho \). For an enciphering query, the ciphertext is chosen independently and uniformly at random and for a deciphering query, the plaintext is chosen independently and uniformly at random. These are returned to \( A \). After the interaction is over, in the finalisation step, the internal random variables are included in \( D \) and \( \text{bad} \) is set to \( \text{true} \) if there is a collision in \( D \). Let \( \text{Bad}_{\text{rnd}}(A) \) be the event that the variable \( \text{bad} \) is set to \( \text{true} \) in the game \( G_{\text{rnd}} \). Let \( A^{G_{\text{rnd}}} \Rightarrow 1 \) denote the event that \( A \) outputs \( 1 \) in the game \( G_{\text{rnd}} \). If \( \text{bad} \) does not occur, then in both the games \( G_{\text{int}} \) and \( G_{\text{rnd}} \), \( A \) obtains independent and uniform random strings as responses to all its queries. Also, the probabilities that \( \text{bad} \) occurs in the two games are equal. So, we have the following.

Claim 2.

\[
\Pr \left[ (A^{G_{\text{int}}} \Rightarrow 1) \land \overline{\text{Bad}_{\text{int}}(A)} \right] = \Pr \left[ (A^{G_{\text{rnd}}} \Rightarrow 1) \land \overline{\text{Bad}_{\text{rnd}}(A)} \right];
\]
\[
\Pr [\text{Bad}_{\text{int}}(A)] = \Pr [\text{Bad}_{\text{rnd}}(A)].
\]

Note that the event \( A^{G_{\text{rnd}}} \Rightarrow 1 \) is exactly the event \( A^{\rho_1(\cdot),\rho_2(\cdot)} \Rightarrow 1 \).

Using (43) along with Claims 1 and 2, we have the following.

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{FAST}}(\Delta) = \Pr [\text{FAST}_\rho.\text{Encrypt}(\cdot),\text{FAST}_\rho.\text{Decrypt}(\cdot) \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr [A^{\rho_1(\cdot),\rho_2(\cdot)} \Rightarrow 1] + \text{Adv}_{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{B})
\]
\[
\leq \text{Adv}_{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{B}) + \Pr [(A^{G_{\text{real}}} \Rightarrow 1) \land \overline{\text{Bad}_{\text{real}}(A)}] + \Pr [\overline{\text{Bad}_{\text{real}}(A)}] - \Pr [(A^{G_{\text{int}}} \Rightarrow 1) \land \overline{\text{Bad}_{\text{int}}(A)}] + \Pr [\text{Bad}_{\text{int}}(A)] - \Pr [(A^{G_{\text{int}}} \Rightarrow 1) \land \overline{\text{Bad}_{\text{int}}(A)}] = \text{Adv}_{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{B}) + \Pr [\text{Bad}_{\text{rnd}}(A)].
\]

Adversary \( \Delta \) runs in time \( \mathcal{T} \). We instead consider an adversary \( C \) which is allowed unbounded runtime and also unbounded memory. Consider the interaction of \( C \) with the oracle in the game \( G_{\text{rnd}} \) and define the event \( \Pr [\text{Bad}_{\text{rd}}(C)] \) in a manner analogous to \( \Pr [\text{Bad}_{\text{rnd}}(A)] \). Clearly, we have

\[
\Pr [\text{Bad}_{\text{rd}}(A)] \leq \Pr [\text{Bad}_{\text{rd}}(C)].
\]

So, it is sufficient to upper bound \( \Pr [\text{Bad}_{\text{rd}}(C)] \). Since \( C \) has unbounded computational power, without loss of generality, we may assume that \( C \) is deterministic.
Upper bound on $\Pr[\text{Bad}_{\text{rd}}(C)]$: An upper bound on $\Pr[\text{Bad}_{\text{rd}}(C)]$ is obtained by showing that in the game $G_{\text{rd}}$ the event that two random variables in $\mathcal{D}$ are equal occurs with low probability. The main crux of the whole proof is to argue the various cases that occur in considering the different pairs of random variables occurring in $\mathcal{D}$. The claims below tackle all the different cases that can arise.

Claim 3. For $1 \leq s \leq q$, $\Pr[F_1^{(s)} = \text{fStr}] \leq \epsilon_1^{(s)}$.

Proof.

$$\Pr[F_1^{(s)} = \text{fStr}] = \Pr[\tau P_1^{(s)} \oplus \tau h_\tau(T^{(s)}, P_3^{(s)}) = P_2^{(s)} \oplus \text{fStr}]$$

$$= \Pr[\tau (h_\tau(T^{(s)}, P_3^{(s)}) \oplus P_1^{(s)}) = P_2^{(s)} \oplus \text{fStr}] \leq \epsilon_1^{(s)}.$$ 

The last inequality follows from (10).

Claim 4. For $1 \leq s \leq q$, $\Pr[F_2^{(s)} = \text{fStr}] \leq \epsilon_1^{(s)}$.

Proof.

$$\Pr[F_2^{(s)} = \text{fStr}] = \Pr[\tau C_2^{(s)} \oplus \tau h_\tau(T^{(s)}, C_3^{(s)}) \oplus C_1^{(s)} = \text{fStr}]$$

$$= \Pr[\tau (h_\tau(T^{(s)}, C_3^{(s)}) \oplus C_2^{(s)}) = C_1^{(s)} \oplus \text{fStr}] \leq \epsilon_1^{(s)}.$$ 

The last inequality follows from (11).

Claim 5. For $1 \leq s \leq q$, $1 \leq i \leq m^{(s)} - 2$, $\Pr[J_i^{(s)} = \text{fStr}] = 1/2^n$.

Proof.

$$J_i^{(s)} \oplus \text{fStr} = Z^{(s)} \oplus \text{bin}_n(i) \oplus \text{fStr} = P_2^{(s)} \oplus C_1^{(s)} \oplus \text{bin}_n(i) \oplus \text{fStr}.$$ 

When $\text{ty}^{(s)} = \text{enc}$, then $C_1^{(s)}$ is an $n$-bit uniform random string which is independent of $P_2^{(s)}$ and when $\text{ty}^{(s)} = \text{dec}$, then $P_2^{(s)}$ is an $n$-bit uniform random string which is independent of $C_1^{(s)}$. So in both cases we have the required probability.

Claim 6. For $s \neq t$, $\Pr[F_1^{(s)} = F_1^{(t)}] \leq \max\{\epsilon_2^{(s,t)}, 1/2^n\}$.

Proof.

$$F_1^{(s)} \oplus F_1^{(t)} = \tau(P_1^{(s)} \oplus P_1^{(t)}) \oplus \tau(h_\tau(T^{(s)}, P_3^{(s)}) \oplus h_\tau(T^{(t)}, P_3^{(t)})) \oplus P_2^{(s)} \oplus P_2^{(t)}.$$ 

There are four cases to consider.

Case 1: $\text{ty}^{(s)} = \text{ty}^{(t)} = \text{enc}$. There are two sub-cases.

(a) Case 1a: $(T^{(s)}, P_1^{(s)}, P_3^{(s)}) = (T^{(t)}, P_1^{(t)}, P_3^{(t)})$.

As the adversary is not allowed to repeat a query, hence $(T^{(s)}, P_1^{(s)}, P_3^{(s)}) = (T^{(t)}, P_1^{(t)}, P_3^{(t)})$ implies $P_2^{(s)} \neq P_2^{(t)}$ and so $\Pr[F_1^{(s)} = F_1^{(t)}] = 0$. 

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Claim 9. For $1 \leq s, t \leq q$ and $1 \leq i \leq m(t) - 2$, \( \Pr[F_1^{(s)} = J_1^{(t)}] \leq \epsilon_1^{(s)} \).
Proof.

\[ \Pr[F_1^{(s)} = J_1^{(t)}] = \Pr[\tau(h_\tau(T^{(s)}, P_3^{(s)}) \oplus F_1^{(s)}) = P_2^{(s)} \oplus P_2^{(t)} \oplus C_1^{(t)} \oplus \text{bin}_n(i)] \]
\[ \leq \epsilon_1^{(s)}. \]

The last inequality follows from (10).

\[ \square \]

Claim 10. For \( 1 \leq s, t \leq q \) and \( 1 \leq i \leq m(t) - 2 \), \( \Pr[F_2^{(s)} = J_1^{(t)}] \leq \epsilon_1^{(s)}. \)

The proof is almost the same as the proof of Claim 9.

Claim 11. For \( 1 \leq s, t \leq q \), \( 1 \leq i \leq m(s) - 2 \), \( 1 \leq j \leq m(t) - 2 \) and \( (s, i) \neq (t, j) \), \( \Pr[J_1^{(s)} = J_1^{(t)}] \leq \frac{1}{2^n}. \)

Proof.

\[ J_i^{(s)} \oplus J_j^{(t)} = (P_2^{(s)} \oplus P_2^{(t)}) \oplus (C_1^{(s)} \oplus C_1^{(t)}) \oplus \text{bin}_n(i) \oplus \text{bin}_n(j). \]

If \( s = t \), then \( i \neq j \) and so \( \Pr[J_i^{(s)} = J_j^{(t)}] = 0. \) Suppose that \( s \neq t \) and assume without loss of generality that \( s < t \). There are four cases to consider.

- If \( ty^{(s)} = ty^{(t)} = \text{enc} \), then both \( C_1^{(s)} \) and \( C_1^{(t)} \) are independent and uniform random strings.
- If \( ty^{(s)} = ty^{(t)} = \text{dec} \), then both \( P_2^{(s)} \) and \( P_2^{(t)} \) are independent and uniform random strings.
- If \( ty^{(s)} = \text{enc} \) and \( ty^{(t)} = \text{dec} \), then both \( C_1^{(s)} \) and \( P_2^{(t)} \) are independent and uniform random strings.
- If \( ty^{(s)} = \text{dec} \) and \( ty^{(t)} = \text{enc} \), then both \( P_2^{(s)} \) and \( C_1^{(t)} \) are independent and uniform random strings.

From the above it follows that if \( s \neq t \), then either \( (P_2^{(s)} \oplus P_2^{(t)}) \) or \( (C_1^{(s)} \oplus C_1^{(t)}) \) is an independent and uniform random \( n \)-bit string. Thus the claim follows. \[ \square \]

By Claims 3 to 11 and the union bound we have

\[ \Pr[\text{Bad}_{\text{rand}}(C)] \leq 2 \sum_{s=1}^{q} \epsilon_1^{(s)} + \sum_{s=1}^{q} \left( \frac{m(s) - 2}{2^n} \right) \sum_{1 \leq s \leq t \leq q} 2 \left( \epsilon_2^{(s,t)} + \frac{1}{2^n} \right) \]
\[ + \sum_{1 \leq s \leq t \leq q} \left( \epsilon_2^{(s,t)} + \frac{1}{2^n} \right) + 2 \left( \sum_{s=1}^{q} \epsilon_1^{(s)} \right) \left( \sum_{t=1}^{q} (m(t) - 2) \right) + \frac{1}{2^n} \left( \sum_{s=1}^{q} (m(s) - 2) \right) \]
\[ = 2 \left( \sum_{s=1}^{q} \epsilon_1^{(s)} \right) \left( 1 + \sum_{t=1}^{q} (m(t) - 2) \right) + \frac{3}{2^n} q(q-1) + \frac{q}{2^n} + 3 \sum_{1 \leq s \leq t \leq q} \epsilon_2^{(s,t)} + \sum_{s=1}^{q} \epsilon_2^{(s,s)} \]
\[ + \frac{m(s) - 2}{2^n} + \frac{1}{2^n} \left( \sum_{s=1}^{q} (m(s) - 2) \right) \]
\[ \leq 2 \left( \sum_{s=1}^{q} \epsilon_1^{(s)} \right) \left( 1 + \omega - 2q \right) + \frac{2q^2}{2^n} + 3 \sum_{s=1}^{q} \epsilon_2^{(s,t)} + \sum_{s=1}^{q} \epsilon_2^{(s,s)} \]
\[ + \frac{\omega - 2q}{2^n} + \frac{\omega(\omega - 1)}{2} \]
\[ \leq 2\omega \left( \sum_{s=1}^{q} \epsilon_1^{(s)} \right) + 3 \sum_{1 \leq s \leq t \leq q} \epsilon_2^{(s,t)} + \sum_{s=1}^{q} \epsilon_2^{(s,s)} + \frac{3\omega^2}{2^n}. \quad (47) \]
Putting together (45), (46) and (47) we obtain

$$
\text{Adv}_{\text{FAS}T}(A) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{F}}(B) + 2\omega \left( \sum_{s=1}^{q} \epsilon_{1}^{(s)} \right) + 3 \sum_{1 \leq s < t \leq q} \epsilon_{2}^{(s,t)} + \sum_{s=1}^{q} \epsilon_{2}^{(s,s)} + \frac{3\omega^2}{2n}.
$$

The relations between the resources of $A$ and $B$ have been stated earlier. Maximising the left hand side on the resources shows the required result and completes the proof of Theorem 1. \qed

**Table 10. Game $G_{\text{real}}$.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subroutine Ch-(\rho(X))</th>
<th>ty**(s)** = enc: input ((F^{(s)}, P^{(s)}))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Y \leftarrow {0,1}^n$;</td>
<td>((P^{(s)}_1, P^{(s)}_2, P^{(s)}_3) \leftarrow \text{parse}_n(P^{(s)});)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>if $X \in D$ then $\text{bad} \leftarrow \text{true};$</td>
<td>$Y \leftarrow \rho(X);$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho(X) \leftarrow Y;$</td>
<td>$D \leftarrow D \cup {X};$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>return($Y$);</td>
<td>$\text{return}(Y);$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initialization:</td>
<td>$\tau \leftarrow {0,1}^n;$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau \leftarrow \text{false}.$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ty**(s)** = dec: input ((T^{(s)}, C^{(s)}))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$(C^{(s)}_1, C^{(s)}_2, C^{(s)}_3) \leftarrow \text{parse}_n(C^{(s)});$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B^{(s)}_1 \leftarrow C^{(s)}_1;$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B^{(s)}_2 \leftarrow C^{(s)}<em>2 \oplus h</em>{\tau}(T^{(s)}, C^{(s)}_3);$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H^{(s)}_2 \leftarrow \tau B^{(s)}_2;$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F^{(s)}_2 \leftarrow B^{(s)}_1 \oplus H^{(s)}_2;$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F^{(s)}_1 \leftarrow B^{(s)}_2 \oplus \text{Ch-}\rho(F^{(s)}_2);$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A^{(s)}_1 \leftarrow F^{(s)}_2 \oplus \text{Ch-}\rho(F^{(s)}_1);$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H^{(s)}_1 \leftarrow \tau A^{(s)}_1;$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A^{(s)}_2 \leftarrow H^{(s)}_1 \oplus F^{(s)}_1;$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Z^{(s)} \leftarrow A^{(s)}_2 \oplus B^{(s)}_1;$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for $i = 1$ to $m^{(s)} - 3$ do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$J^{(s)}_i \leftarrow Z^{(s)} \oplus \text{bin}_n(i);$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S^{(s)}_i \leftarrow \text{Ch-}\rho(J^{(s)}_i);$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P^{(s)}_{3,i} \leftarrow \tau S^{(s)}_i;$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>end for;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$J^{(s)}_{m^{(s)}-2} \leftarrow Z^{(s)} \oplus \text{bin}_n(m^{(s)} - 2);$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D^{(s)} \leftarrow \text{Ch-}\rho(J^{(s)}_{m^{(s)}-1});$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C^{(s)}<em>{3,m^{(s)}-2} \leftarrow P^{(s)}</em>{3,m^{(s)}-2} \oplus \text{first}_{\tau}(D^{(s)});$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C^{(s)}_3 \leftarrow B^{(s)}_1;$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C^{(s)}_2 \leftarrow B^{(s)}<em>3 \oplus h</em>{\tau}(T^{(s)}, C^{(s)}_3);$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>return ((C^{(s)}_1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table 11. Game $G_{int}$**

**Subroutine ChkDom($X$)**

if $X \in \mathcal{D}$ then $\text{bad} \leftarrow \text{true}$; endif;

$\mathcal{D} \leftarrow \mathcal{D} \cup \{X\}$;

Initialization:

$\tau \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$; $\mathcal{D} \leftarrow \{\text{fStr}\}$; $\text{bad} \leftarrow \text{false}$.

\[
\text{ty}^{(s)} = \text{enc. input } (T^{(s)}, P^{(s)})
\]

\[
(P_1^{(s)}, P_2^{(s)}, P_3^{(s)}) \leftarrow \text{parse}_n(P^{(s)});
C_1^{(s)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n; C_2^{(s)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n;
\]

for $i = 1, \ldots, m(s) - 3$ do $C_{3,i}^{(s)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$;

$D^{(s)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$; $C_{3,m(s)-2}^{(s)} \leftarrow \text{first}_{m(s)}(D^{(s)})$;

$A_1^{(s)} \leftarrow P_1^{(s)} \oplus h_2(T^{(s)}, P_3^{(s)})$;

$A_2^{(s)} \leftarrow P_2^{(s)}$;

$H_1^{(s)} \leftarrow \tau A_1^{(s)}$;

$F_1^{(s)} \leftarrow H_1^{(s)} \oplus A_2^{(s)}$; ChkDom($F_1^{(s)}$);

$Y_1^{(s)} \leftarrow C_1^{(s)} \oplus P_1^{(s)} \oplus \tau (C_2^{(s)} \oplus h_2(T^{(s)}, C_3^{(s)})$)

$\oplus h_2(T^{(s)}, P_3^{(s)})$;

$\rho(F_1^{(s)}) \leftarrow Y_1^{(s)}$;

$F_2^{(s)} \leftarrow A_1^{(s)} \oplus Y_1^{(s)}$; ChkDom($F_2^{(s)}$);

$Y_2^{(s)} \leftarrow C_2^{(s)} \oplus P_2^{(s)} \oplus \tau P_1^{(s)} \oplus h_2(T^{(s)}, C_3^{(s)})$

$\oplus h_2(T^{(s)}, P_3^{(s)})$;

$\rho(F_2^{(s)}) \leftarrow Y_2^{(s)}$;

$B_2^{(s)} \leftarrow F_1^{(s)} \oplus Y_2^{(s)}$;

$H_2^{(s)} \leftarrow \tau B_2^{(s)}$;

$B_1^{(s)} \leftarrow H_2^{(s)} \oplus F_2^{(s)}$;

$Z^{(s)} \leftarrow A_2^{(s)} \oplus B_1^{(s)}$;

for $i = 1$ to $m(s) - 3$ do

$J_1^{(s)} \leftarrow Z^{(s)} \oplus \text{bin}_n(i)$; ChkDom($J_1^{(s)}$);

$\rho(J_1^{(s)}) \leftarrow C_3^{(s)} \oplus P_3^{(s)}$;

end for;

$J_{m(s)-2}^{(s)} \leftarrow Z^{(s)} \oplus \text{bin}_n(m(s) - 2)$; ChkDom($J_{m(s)-2}^{(s)}$);

$\rho(J_{m(s)-2}^{(s)}) \leftarrow D^{(s)} \oplus (P_{3,m(s)-2}^{(s)}||0^{n-v(s)})$;

return $(C_1^{(s)}||C_2^{(s)}||C_3^{(s)}))$.

\[
\text{ty}^{(s)} = \text{dec. input } (T^{(s)}, C^{(s)})
\]

\[
(C_1^{(s)}, C_2^{(s)}, C_3^{(s)}) \leftarrow \text{parse}_n(C^{(s)});
P_1^{(s)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n; P_2^{(s)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n;
\]

for $i = 1, \ldots, m(s) - 3$ do $P_{3,i}^{(s)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$;

$E^{(s)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$; $P_{3,m(s)-2}^{(s)} \leftarrow \text{first}_{m(s)}(E^{(s)})$;

$B_1^{(s)} \leftarrow C_1^{(s)}$;

$B_2^{(s)} \leftarrow C_2^{(s)} \oplus h_2(T^{(s)}, C_3^{(s)})$;

$H_2^{(s)} \leftarrow \tau B_2^{(s)}$;

$F_2^{(s)} \leftarrow B_1^{(s)} \oplus H_2^{(s)}$; ChkDom($F_2^{(s)}$);

$Y_2^{(s)} \leftarrow C_2^{(s)} \oplus P_2^{(s)} \oplus \tau P_1^{(s)} \oplus h_2(T^{(s)}, C_3^{(s)})$

$\oplus h_2(T^{(s)}, P_3^{(s)})$;

$\rho(F_2^{(s)}) \leftarrow Y_2^{(s)}$;

$F_1^{(s)} \leftarrow B_2^{(s)} \oplus Y_2^{(s)}$; ChkDom($F_1^{(s)}$);

$Y_1^{(s)} \leftarrow C_1^{(s)} \oplus P_1^{(s)} \oplus \tau (C_2^{(s)} \oplus h_2(T^{(s)}, C_3^{(s)})$)

$\oplus h_2(T^{(s)}, P_3^{(s)})$;

$\rho(F_1^{(s)}) \leftarrow Y_1^{(s)}$;

$A_1^{(s)} \leftarrow F_2^{(s)} \oplus Y_1^{(s)}$;

$H_1^{(s)} \leftarrow \tau A_1^{(s)}$;

$A_2^{(s)} \leftarrow H_1^{(s)} \oplus F_1^{(s)}$;

$Z^{(s)} \leftarrow A_2^{(s)} \oplus B_1^{(s)}$;

for $i = 1$ to $m(s) - 3$ do

$J_1^{(s)} \leftarrow Z^{(s)} \oplus \text{bin}_n(i)$; ChkDom($J_1^{(s)}$);

$\rho(J_1^{(s)}) \leftarrow C_3^{(s)} \oplus P_3^{(s)}$;

end for;

$J_{m(s)-2}^{(s)} \leftarrow Z^{(s)} \oplus \text{bin}_n(m(s) - 2)$; ChkDom($J_{m(s)-2}^{(s)}$);

$\rho(J_{m(s)-2}^{(s)}) \leftarrow E^{(s)} \oplus (C_3^{(s)}$)

$\oplus (P_{3,m(s)-2}^{(s)}||0^{n-v(s)})$;

return $(P_1^{(s)}||P_2^{(s)}||P_3^{(s)}))$.

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Table 12. Game $G_{end}$

Respond to the $s^{th}$ adversary query as follows:

- If $y_t(s) = \text{enc}$: $C_1^{(s)}||C_2^{(s)}||C_3^{(s)}|| \ldots ||C_{\text{dec}}^{(s)}||D^{(s)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{n_{m(s)}}$;
- $D_{s, m(s)-2}^{(s)} \leftarrow \text{first}_{y_t(s)}(D^{(s)})$ \textbf{return} $C^{(s)} = C_1^{(s)}||C_2^{(s)}||C_3^{(s)}|| \ldots ||C_{\text{dec}}^{(s)}$;

- If $y_t(s) = \text{dec}$: $P_1^{(s)}||P_2^{(s)}||P_3^{(s)}|| \ldots ||P_{\text{dec}}^{(s)}||E^{(s)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{n_{m(s)}}$;
- $P_{3, m(s)-2}^{(s)} \leftarrow \text{first}_{y_t(s)}(E^{(s)})$ \textbf{return} $P^{(s)} = P_1^{(s)}||P_2^{(s)}||P_3^{(s)}|| \ldots ||P_{\text{dec}}^{(s)}$;

Finalisation:

- $D \leftarrow \{\text{Str}\}; \text{bad} \leftarrow \text{false}; \tau \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{n_{}}$;
- for $s = 1$ to $q$ do
- $A_1^{(s)} \leftarrow P_1^{(s)} \oplus h_T(T^{(s)}, P_3^{(s)})$;
- $A_2^{(s)} \leftarrow P_2^{(s)}$;
- $B_1^{(s)} \leftarrow C_1^{(s)}$;
- $B_2^{(s)} \leftarrow C_2^{(s)} \oplus h'_T(T^{(s)}, C_3^{(s)})$;
- $Z^{(s)} \leftarrow A_2^{(s)} \oplus B_1^{(s)} = P_2^{(s)} \oplus C_1^{(s)}$;
- $E_1^{(s)} \leftarrow h_1^{(s)} \oplus A_2^{(s)} = \tau \oplus P_2^{(s)}$;
- $E_2^{(s)} \leftarrow h_2^{(s)} \oplus B_1^{(s)} = \tau \oplus C_1^{(s)}$;
- $D \leftarrow D \cup \{E_1^{(s)}\}$;
- $P_2^{(s)} \leftarrow B_1^{(s)} \oplus P_3^{(s)} = C_1^{(s)} \oplus \tau \oplus C_3^{(s)}$;
- $D \leftarrow D \cup \{P_2^{(s)}\}$;
- for $i = 1$ to $m(s) - 3$ do
- $J_i^{(s)} \leftarrow Z^{(s)} \oplus \text{bin}_n(i) = P_2^{(s)} \oplus C_1^{(s)} \oplus \text{bin}_n(i)$;
- $D \leftarrow D \cup \{J_i^{(s)}\}$;
- end for;

- if $y_t(s) = \text{enc}$ then $J_{m(s)-2}^{(s)} \leftarrow D^{(s)} \oplus (P_{3, m(s)-2}^{(s)}||0^{n_{-\text{dec}}})$;
- if $y_t(s) = \text{dec}$ then $J_{m(s)-2}^{(s)} \leftarrow E^{(s)} \oplus (C_{3, m(s)-2}^{(s)}||0^{n_{-\text{enc}}})$;
- $D \leftarrow D \cup \{J_{m(s)-2}^{(s)}\}$;

end for;

- if (some value occurs more than once in $D$) then $\text{bad} \leftarrow \text{true}$ end if;