ABSTRACT

Protocols for secure multiparty computation enable a set of parties to compute a function of their inputs without revealing anything but the output. The security properties of the protocol must be preserved in the presence of adversarial behavior. The two classic adversary models considered are semi-honest (where the adversary follows the protocol specification but tries to learn more than allowed by examining the protocol transcript) and malicious (where the adversary may follow any arbitrary attack strategy). Protocols for semi-honest adversaries are often far more efficient, but in many cases the security guarantees are not strong enough.

In this paper, we present a new efficient method for “compiling” a large class of protocols that are secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries into protocols that are secure in the presence of malicious adversaries. Our method assumes an honest majority (i.e., \( t < n/2 \) where \( t \) is the number of corrupted parties and \( n \) is the number of parties overall), and is applicable to many semi-honest protocols based on secret-sharing. In order to achieve high efficiency, our protocol is secure with abort and does not achieve fairness, meaning that the adversary may receive output while the honest parties do not.

We present a number of instantiations of our compiler, and obtain protocol variants that are very efficient for both a small and large number of parties. We implemented our protocol variants and ran extensive experiments to compare them with each other. Our results show that secure computation with an honest majority can be practical, even with security in the presence of malicious adversaries. For example, we securely compute a large arithmetic circuit of depth 20 with 1,000,000 multiplication gates, in approximately 0.5 seconds with three parties, and approximately 29 seconds with 50 parties, and just under 1 minute with 90 parties.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Protocols for secure computation enable a set of parties with private inputs to compute a joint function of their inputs while revealing nothing but the output. The security properties typically required from secure computation protocols include privacy (meaning that nothing but the output is revealed), correctness (meaning that the output is correctly computed), independence of inputs (meaning that a party cannot choose its input as a function of the other parties’ inputs), fairness (meaning that if one party gets output then so do all), and guaranteed output delivery (meaning that all parties always receive output). Formally, the security of a protocol is proven by showing that it behaves like an ideal execution with an incorruptible trusted party who computes the function for the parties [10]. In some cases, fairness and guaranteed output delivery are not required. This is standard in the case of no honest majority (since not all functions can be computed fairly without an honest majority), but can also be the case otherwise in order to aid the construction of highly efficient protocols.

Protocols for secure computation must remain secure in the face of adversarial behavior. There are many parameters determining the adversary:

- **Adversarial behavior**: If the adversary is semi-honest, then it follows the protocol specification but may try to learn more than is allowed by inspecting the protocol transcript. If the adversary is malicious, then it may follow an arbitrary attack strategy in its attempt to break the protocol.
- **Adversarial power**: If the protocol is guaranteed to remain secure even if the adversary is computationally unlimited, then the protocol is said to be information-theoretically secure. If the adversary is bounded to probabilistic polynomial-time, then the protocol is computationally secure.
- **Number of corruptions**: Denote by \( t \) the number of corrupted parties and by \( n \) the overall number of parties. There are typically three main thresholds that are considered in the literature: \( t < n \) (meaning any number of parties may be corrupted), \( t < n/2 \) (meaning that there is an honest majority), and \( t < n/3 \) (meaning that less than a third of the parties are corrupted).
- **Corruption strategy**: If the set of corrupted parties is determined at the onset of the protocol, then we say that the adversary is static. If the adversary can determine who to corrupt throughout the execution, then it is adaptive.

In the late 1980s, it was shown that any function can be securely computed. This was demonstrated in the computational setting for any \( t < n \) [24, 36], in the information-theoretic setting with \( t < n/3 \) [7, 11], and in the information-theoretic setting with \( t < n/2 \) assuming a broadcast channel [34]. These feasibility results demonstrate that secure computation is possible. However, significant improvements are necessary to make it efficient enough to use in practice.
1.2 Our Protocol Framework

In this paper, we consider the problem of constructing highly efficient protocols that are secure in the presence of static malicious adversaries who control at most \( t < n/2 \) corrupted parties. Our protocol is fundamentally information-theoretic, but some efficient instantiations are computational. In the aim of achieving high efficiency, our protocols do not achieve fairness (even though this is possible in our setting where \( t < n/2 \)).

We construct two protocol frameworks that can be used to compile a large class of semi-honest protocols based on secret sharing (for the case of \( t < n/2 \)) into protocols that are secure in the presence of malicious adversaries. Our protocols are designed for arithmetic circuits over a field \( \mathbb{F} \). Our protocol compiler works by computing a circuit using a semi-honest protocol and then running a verification step that ensures that the honest parties detect cheating with high probability. We follow the Beaver multiplication triple methodology [4] in which the parties generate shares of triples \((a, b, c)\) where \( c = a \cdot b \). Such triples are very useful as they can be used to carry out multiplication efficiently, and to verify that multiplications were carried out correctly. We present two ways of verifying multiplication, and show how to construct a tightly optimized protocol that uses these methods. Our verification methods involve inserting fresh randomness into the process, which enables us to detect cheating even if the multiplication triples are incorrect. Previous works that used the Beaver method required the multiplications triples to be correct in order to be able to detect cheating. The fact that we are able to detect cheating even if they are not correct enables much faster generation of these triples. We believe that this technique is of independent interest and will be useful in other protocols as well.

We present two frameworks; one that is better suited when working over "large" fields and one that is better suited to "small" fields. Then, we provide efficient instantiations of the semi-honest protocols, that when plugged into our frameworks yield highly efficient protocols that are secure for malicious adversaries. We consider two main instantiations: one based on Shamir sharing for any number of parties, and one based on replicated secret sharing for the specific case of three parties. For the case of Shamir sharing, we have several different instantiations; for example, multiplication can be computed using [25] or [17], verification can be carried out in one of two methods, and so on. We focus on two of the instantiations here: the first that is best for a small number of parties, and the second that is best for a large number of parties. We summarize our best instantiations with the following theorems. Our protocols have statistical error \( 2^{-\sigma} \). For the sake of simplicity, we consider the case that the field for the arithmetic circuit has the property that \( |\mathbb{F}| > 2^\sigma \) (this is not necessary for our framework, but it yields the highest efficiency).

The first theorem is suited for a large number of parties, and is based on Shamir sharing.

**Theorem 1.1 (large number of parties).** Let \( n \) be any number of parties, and let \( f \) be an \( n \)-party functionality. Then, there exists a protocol \( \pi \) that computes \( f \) with computational security in the presence of a malicious adversary controlling up to \( t < n/2 \) corrupted parties, where each party sends \( 42 \) field elements per multiplication gate.

The next theorem is also based on Shamir sharing. However, it uses the PRSS methodology of [13] for generating random shares that is only computationally secure. In addition, it involves local work by each party that is exponential in the number of parties. Thus, it is only efficient for small values of \( n \).

**Theorem 1.2 (small number of parties).** Let \( n \) be any number of parties, and let \( f \) be an \( n \)-party functionality. Then, there exists a protocol \( \pi \) that computes \( f \) with computational security in the presence of a malicious adversary controlling up to \( t < n/2 \) corrupted parties, where each party sends \( 5(n-1) \) field elements per multiplication gate.

Note that the protocol of Theorem 1.1 is preferable for a large number of parties since the number of elements sent per gate is constant (this holds even if PRSS is not used in the protocol for a small number of parties). Observe that when \( n > 9 \) it holds that \( 5(n-1) > 42 \), and thus the constant is smaller than the linear function. Finally, we state our result that is specific to 3 parties and uses replicated sharing.

**Theorem 1.3 (three parties).** Let \( f \) be a 3-party functionality. Then, there exists a protocol \( \pi \) that computes \( f \) with computational security in the presence of a malicious adversary controlling up to 1 corrupted party, where each party sends 4 field elements per multiplication gate.

Observe that for the case of 3 parties, in the protocol of Theorem 1.2 each party sends 10 elements per multiplication gate, versus just 4 elements in the protocol of Theorem 1.3.

1.3 Experimental Results

We implemented our protocol versions in C++ and ran our protocols on Azure in a single region, with a ping time of approximately 1ms. Each machine is a 2.4GHz Intel Xeon E5-2673 v3, with 4 cores and 8GB RAM; our code is single-threaded so does not utilize more than one core. We ran extensive experiments to analyze the efficiency of the different protocols for different numbers of parties. All of our protocols scale linearly in the size and depth of the circuit, and we therefore ran all of our experiments on a depth-20 arithmetic circuit over a 61-bit field with 1,000,000 multiplication gates. Our experiments show that our protocols have very good performance for all ranges of numbers of parties. In particular, this large circuit can be computed in half a second with three parties, 4 seconds with 9 parties, 29 seconds with 50 parties and 59 seconds with 90 parties. Thus, our protocols can be used in practice to compute arithmetic computations (like joint statistics) between many parties, while providing malicious security.

1.4 Related Work

There has been a huge amount of work that focuses on improving the efficiency of secure computation protocols. This work is roughly divided up into constructions of concretely efficient and asymptotically efficient protocols. Concretely efficient protocols are often implemented and aim to obtain the best overall running time, even if the protocol is not asymptotically optimal (e.g., it may have quadratic complexity and not linear complexity, but for a small number of parties the constants are such that the quadratic protocol is faster). Asymptotically efficient protocols aim to reduce the cost of
certain parts of the protocols (rounds, communication complexity, etc.), and are often not concretely very efficient. However, in many cases, asymptotically efficient protocols provide techniques that inform the construction of concretely efficient protocols.

As explained earlier, there are two main thresholds considered for an honest majority: $t < n/2$ and $t < n/3$. For the case of $t < n/3$, it was shown in [17] and [6] how to achieve unconditional and perfect security in the presence of a malicious adversary, with communication that grows linearly with the number of parties. The VIFF protocol [14], provided the first concretely efficient implementation for $t < n/3$. VIFF has quadratic communication complexity, and thus is suitable for a small number of parties. Although their execution times are 3-4 orders of magnitude slower than ours (for 4 players, they report on 200 multiplications per second), we estimate that an optimized implementation on modern machines and a network identical to ours would achieve similar times.

We stress, however, that for malicious adversaries, it is considerably harder to achieve a similar level of efficiency with $t < n/2$ since there is far less redundancy in the secret sharing. (To be exact, with $t < n/3$ it is possible to multiply two polynomials together and the degree is still less that $2n/3$, in contrast to the case of $t < n/2$.) Thus, techniques like those used in [6] do not apply to our case. Clearly, it is always best to guarantee security against more powerful adversaries, and thus a protocol that is secure for $t < n/2$ is preferable to a protocol that requires $t < n/3$. Furthermore, in practice, this is of great significance for a small number of parties. Specifically, for $n = 3$ it is not possible to run a protocol that requires $t < n/3$, and for $n = 9$ a protocol with $t < n/2$ can tolerate up to 4 corrupted parties whereas a protocol with $t < n/3$ can tolerate only 2 corrupted parties. Thus, protocols that are secure for $t < n/2$ are preferable.

For $t < n/2$ corrupted parties, it is much harder to achieve linear complexity without relying on cryptographic assumptions. This was first achieved in [23] using additively-homomorphic encryption [33] which is far from concretely efficient. Secure computation that scales linearly with the number of parties was also presented in [15], but this protocol requires that $t < n/2 - O(n)$, and its focus is on asymptotic and not concretely efficient. Thus, both protocols, although achieving full security, are much more expensive than ours. The protocol of [5] is the only protocol, to the best of our knowledge, that achieves near-linear communication complexity per multiplication gate, namely $O(n\log n)$, in the information-theoretic model and with full security. This protocol uses expensive techniques for player elimination and computing authentication tags, and is therefore also not concretely efficient. However, it achieves full security, whereas we do not guarantee fairness. Recently, [21, 22] show how to compile semi-honest protocols into maliciously secure protocols for a variety of parameters, and also achieve linear complexity for the case of $t < n/2$. No concrete cost analysis or implementation was given in [21, 22], and thus it is difficult to estimate the concrete efficiency on specific instantiations. However, the constants are significantly higher than ours. At the core, [22] requires 16 semi-honest multiplications per gate in contrast to 6 in our best protocol; in addition, [22] requires more communication. We stress, however, that [21, 22] is far more general and also works in the dishonest majority setting, unlike our compiler. The work of [12] also considers the setting of $t < n/2$, malicious adversaries and arithmetic circuits. Their protocol works in a very different way to ours. In particular, they do not follow the Beaver triples methodology [4] in order to achieve security for malicious adversaries. Rather, they carry out the computation redundantly on the input and on the input multiplied by a secret (shared) random value. Correctness of the computation is validated by verifying that the different computation outputs fulfill a given equation. In [12], the majority of the work is in the circuit computation phase and the verification step is cheap, whereas in our work the majority of the work is in the verification and the circuit computation phase is cheap. The setting of $t < n/2$ and malicious adversaries was also studied in [1, 31], including implementations. However, they consider only three parties and Boolean circuits.

Finally, we remark that concrete efficiency for the case of a dishonest majority has also been studied [8, 16, 18, 28, 32]. This setting is considerably harder, and thus protocols are naturally far less efficient. The state-of-the-art MASCOT protocol [28] achieves a rate of below 1,000 multiplication gates (for 3 parties), which is orders of magnitude slower than what can be achieved in the honest-majority setting.

2 PRELIMINARIES

Notation. Let $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ denote the $n$ parties participating in the computation, and let $t$ denote the number of corrupted parties. Since we assume an honest majority, it follows that $t < \frac{n}{2}$. Finally, let $\mathbb{F}$ be a finite field and let $\mathbb{P}$ denote its size.

2.1 Threshold Secret Sharing

A secret sharing scheme with threshold $t$ enables $n$ parties to share a secret $v \in \mathbb{F}$ among $n$ parties so that no subset of $t$ parties can learn any information about it, whereas any subset of $t + 1$ parties can reconstruct it. We require that the scheme used in our protocol supports the following procedures:

- $\text{share}(v)$: In this procedure, a dealer shares a value $v \in \mathbb{F}$. For simplicity, we consider non-interactive secret sharing, and thus there exists a probabilistic algorithm $D$ that receives $v$ (and some randomness) and outputs shares $v_1, \ldots, v_n$, where $v_i$ is the share intended for party $P_i$. We denote the sharing of a value $v$ by $[v]$. We stress that if the dealer is corrupted, then the shares received by the parties may not be correct. Nevertheless, we abuse notation and say that the parties hold shares $[v]$ even if these are not correct. Informally, we call a sharing correct if it defines a single valid secret; we will define this more formally below.

- $\text{reconstruct}([v], i)$: Given a sharing of $v$ and an index $i$ held by the parties, this interactive protocol guarantees that if $[v]$ is not correct (see formal definition below), then $P_i$ will output $\perp$ and abort. Otherwise, if $[v]$ is correct, then $P_i$ will either output $v$ or will abort.

- $\text{open}([v])$: Given a sharing of $v$ held by the parties, this procedure guarantees that at the end of the execution, if $[v]$ is not correct, then all the honest parties will abort. Otherwise, if $[v]$ is correct, then each party will either output $v$ or will abort. Clearly, open can be run by any subset of $t + 1$ or more parties. We require that if any subset of $J$ of $t + 1$ honest parties output a value $v$, then any superset of $J$ will output either $v$ or $\perp$ (but no other value).
We now define what it means for a sharing to be correct. The natural way to define this is to say that the honest parties’ shares are the valid output of an execution of $D$. Formally, let $H \subseteq \{P_1, \ldots, P_n\}$ denote the set of honest parties. Then, a sharing $[v]$ is correct if for every $i \in H$ it holds that $v_i$ is the $i$th share output by the dealer algorithm $D$ with input $v'$ and randomness $r$. Although natural, we will actually require only a more relaxed version of correctness. For a subset of honest parties $J$ of size $t + 1$, we denote by $\text{val}([v])_J$ the value obtained by these parties after running the open procedure (and where no corrupted parties or additional honest parties participate). Note that $\text{val}([v])_J$ may equal $\perp$ if the shares held by the honest parties are not valid. We are now ready to formally define correctness.

**Definition 2.1.** Let $H \subseteq \{P_1, \ldots, P_n\}$ denote the set of honest parties. A sharing $[v]$ is correct if there exists a value $v' \in \mathbb{F}(v' \neq \perp)$ such that for every $J \subseteq H$ with $|J| = t + 1$ it holds that $\text{val}([v])_J = v'$.

Observe that if a sharing $[v]$ is incorrect then either (a) there exists a subset of $t + 1$ honest parties $J \subseteq H$ such that $\text{val}([v])_J = \perp$, or (b) there exist two subsets of $t + 1$ honest parties $J_1, J_2 \subseteq H$ such that $\text{val}([v])_{J_1} \neq \text{val}([v])_{J_2}$. In case (a) occurs we say that $[v]$ is invalid; in case (b) occurs we say that $[v]$ is value-inconsistent. If a sharing is not invalid, then we say that it is valid.

In some cases, like Shamir’s secret sharing, for every $J$ of size $t + 1$ the shares of the parties define a valid value. However, in some other cases, like replicated secret sharing, this is not necessarily the case. In such cases, we need an additional requirement on the secret sharing scheme, as follows. A secret sharing scheme is robustly-linear if for every pair of invalid shares $[u]$ and $[v]$ (as defined above) it holds that there exists a unique $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}$ such that $\alpha \cdot [u] + [v]$ is valid when computed via local operations (and thus when $\alpha$ is chosen randomly, $\alpha \cdot [u] + [v]$ is almost always invalid). Note that if a secret sharing scheme has no invalid sharings, like Shamir’s secret sharing, then it is trivially robustly-linear.

We now prove some useful claims about such secret sharing schemes. The first claim is a triviality and follows from the fact that addition and scalar multiplication are local operations, and so the honest parties’ values are not influenced by the adversary.

**Claim 2.2.** If $[u]$ and $[v]$ are correct sharings, then for every $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}$ it holds that $[w] = \alpha \cdot [u] + [v]$ is correct.

We derive the following corollary by taking the contrapositive:

**Corollary 2.3.** Let $[u]$ and $[v]$ be sharings and let $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}$. If $[w] = \alpha \cdot [u] + [v]$ is not correct, then $[u]$ or $[v]$ are incorrect.

The following lemma is used for checking correctness.

**Lemma 2.4.** Let $[u]$ be an incorrect sharing of a robustly-linear secret sharing scheme and let $[v]$ be any sharing. Then, the probability that $[w] = \alpha \cdot [u] + [v]$ is a correct sharing where $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}\setminus\{0\}$ is randomly chosen, is at most $\frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}| - 1}$.

**Proof.** First, consider the case that $[z]$ is correct, and assume by contradiction that $[w] = \alpha \cdot [u] + [v]$ is correct. By Claim 2.2, this implies that $[w] - [v]$ is correct and thus that $[u] = \alpha^{-1} \cdot ([w] - [v])$ is correct, in contradiction.

Next, consider the case that $[v]$ is not correct, and thus both $[u]$ and $[v]$ are incorrect. There are two cases regarding the incorrectness of $[w]$ (recall that $[w]$ may be invalid or value-inconsistent, as defined above):

1. **Case 1** $[u]$ is invalid: Let $J$ be a subset of $t + 1$ honest parties such that $\text{val}([u])_J = \perp$. There are two subcases:
   a. If $[v]$ is valid, then $\text{val}([v])_J \neq \perp$, and by the same argument as Corollary 2.3 it must hold that $\text{val}([w])_J = \perp$. Thus, $[w]$ is invalid and so incorrect.
   b. If $[v]$ is invalid, then we have that both $[u]$ and $[v]$ are invalid. By the assumption that the secret sharing scheme is robustly-linear, there exists a unique $\alpha$ such that $[w] = \alpha \cdot [u] + [v]$ is valid. Since $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}\setminus\{0\}$, we have that the unique $\alpha$ making the result valid is chosen with probability only $\frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}| - 1}$.

2. **Case 2** $[u]$ is value-inconsistent: Let $u_1, u_2 \in \mathbb{F}$ be distinct values and let $J_1$ and $J_2$ be subsets of $t + 1$ honest parties such that $\text{val}([u])_{J_1} = u_1$ and $\text{val}([u])_{J_2} = u_2$. If $\text{val}([v])_{J_1} = \perp$, then by the same reasoning as in Corollary 2.3, it follows that $\text{val}([u] + [v])_{J_1} = \perp$ and thus $\text{val}([w]) = \perp$; likewise if $\text{val}([v])_{J_2} = \perp$. We therefore proceed to analyze the case that for some $v_1, v_2 \in \mathbb{F}$ it holds that $v_1 = \text{val}([v])_{J_1}$ and $v_2 = \text{val}([v])_{J_2}$. There are two subcases:
   a. If $v_1 = v_2$ then $\alpha \cdot u_1 + v_1 = \alpha \cdot u_2 + v_2$ (this holds since $v_1 = v_2$, $\alpha \neq 0$ and $u_1 \neq u_2$), and thus $\text{val}([\alpha \cdot [u] + [v]])_{J_1} = \perp$, implying that $[w]$ is incorrect.
   b. If $v_1 \neq v_2$ then $\text{val}([w])_{J_1} = \text{val}([w])_{J_2}$ if and only if $\alpha \cdot [u] + [v] = \alpha \cdot u_1 + v_2$ which holds if and only if $\alpha = \frac{(v_2 - v_1) \cdot (u_1 - u_2)^{-1}}{v_2 - v_1}$. (Note that this is well defined since $u_1 \neq u_2$.) Since $\alpha$ is random in $\mathbb{F}\setminus\{0\}$, this equality holds with probability only $\frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}| - 1}$.

We therefore conclude that $[w]$ is correct with probability at most $\frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}| - 1}$, as required.

**2.2 Definitions**

**Privacy for malicious adversaries.** Our protocol works by running a multiplication protocol (for multiplying two shares $[x]$ and $[y]$) that is secure for semi-honest adversaries, and then compiling it into a protocol that is secure for malicious adversaries by adding a verification step that allows the honest parties to detect cheating. For our compiler, it is necessary that the semi-honest multiplication protocol used achieves privacy in the presence of malicious adversaries. We use the formulation of this notion as provided in [3]. As we will see, this condition is easily met by all standard secret sharing based semi-honest multiplication protocols.

Let $\text{View}_{A_i, l, \pi}(\tilde{x}, \kappa)$ denote the view of an adversary $A_i$ who controls parties $\{P_l\}_{l \in I}$ (with $I \subset \{1, \ldots, n\}$) in a real execution of the $n$-party protocol $\pi$, with inputs $\tilde{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ and security parameter $\kappa$. Loosely speaking, a protocol is private in the presence of $t$ malicious corrupted parties if the view of the corrupted parties when the input is $\tilde{x}$ is computationally indistinguishable from its view when the input is $\tilde{x}'$. In order to rule out a trivial protocol
where nothing is exchanged, we also require correctness, which means that when all parties are honest they obtain the correct output.

**Definition 2.5.** Let \( f : \mathbb{F}^n \to \mathbb{F}^n \) be an \( n \)-party functionality and let \( \pi \) be an \( n \)-party protocol. We say that \( \pi \) \( t \)-privately computes \( f \) in the presence of malicious adversaries if it is correct and if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary \( A \), every \( I \subset \{1, \ldots, n\} \) with \( |I| \leq t \), and every two vectors \( \vec{x}, \vec{x}' \in \mathbb{F}^n \)

\[
\{ \text{VIEW}_{A,I,\pi}(\vec{x}, \kappa) \}_{\kappa \in \mathbb{F}} \equiv \{ \text{VIEW}_{A,I,\pi}(\vec{x}', \kappa) \}_{\kappa \in \mathbb{F}}
\]

where all elements of \( \vec{x} \) and \( \vec{x}' \) are of the same length.

We say that a protocol is *private semi-honest* if it is private in the presence of malicious adversaries (as in Definition 2.5) and secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries (under the standard definition of security).

**Security in the presence of malicious adversaries.** We use the standard ideal-real paradigm to prove security. We stress that our protocol provides security with abort only and not full security, despite the fact that an honest majority exists. For details, see Appendix A.

**Security up to additive attacks.** In one of the variants of our compiler (Section 3.4), we will need a stronger notion than just privacy. We say that a protocol is secure up to additive attacks in the presence of malicious adversaries if, in addition to privacy as defined above, it guarantees that a malicious adversary can only cheat by (obliviously) adding a value to the output.

Formally, consider the case that exactly \( t + 1 \) parties are honest. Then, define an ideal functionality for multiplication that receives shares of \( x, y \) from the honest parties and a value \( d \) from the adversary, and gives the parties shares of \( x \cdot y + d \) for output. Then, a multiplication protocol is secure up to additive attacks in the presence of malicious adversaries if it securely computes this ideal functionality in the presence of malicious adversaries (under the standard definition). Note that we define it here for multiplication only, since that is what we need. More information about this model and definitions can be found in [21].

We stress that many semi-honest protocols based on secret sharing actually achieve security up to additive attacks. Specifically, it was proven in [21] that the BGW [7], GMW [24] and DN [17] semi-honest protocols, are all secure up to additive attacks. We utilize this in Section 6, where we present instantiations of our protocol.

### 3 SUB-PROTOCOLS AND BUILDING BLOCKS

In this section, we present the main building blocks that are used in our protocol.

#### 3.1 Generating Random Value and Shares

**Generating random shares.** We use an ideal functionality \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}} \) to generate a sharing \( [r] \) of a random \( r \in \mathbb{F} \), defined as follows. \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}} \) receives \( t \) shares from the adversary, chooses a random value \( r \in \mathbb{F} \), defines the honest parties’ shares accordingly and provides each party with its share. In the instantiation section (Section 6), we will discuss different ways to realize it, depending on the secret sharing scheme that is being used.

**Generating random coins.** The functionality \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{coin}} \) can be used to securely compute a functionality \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{coin}} \) that chooses a random element from \( \mathbb{F} \setminus \{0\} \) and hands it to the parties. This functionality can be easily realized by having the parties call \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}} \) once and then open the result (if the sharing received from \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}} \) is \( 0 \), then the parties simply repeat the process). We remark that \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{coin}} \) can actually be realized even if the random share that is generated is not correct, and thus it is not required to use \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}} \). This follows from the fact that the generated share is opened, and by the definition of the open procedure, if the result is not correct then all parties abort.

#### 3.2 Correctness Check of Shares

In this section, we show how to verify that a series of \( m \) shares are correct. This is needed, for example, to ensure that the shares of the inputs provided by the parties at the onset of the protocol are correct. The verification method follows the approach of [12] and is formally described in Protocol 3.1. The idea is to choose random coefficients and then use them to compute a linear combination of the shares. Since the values of the coefficients are not known before the shares were generated, it follows that if there exists a sharing that is not correct, then the resulting share is correct with small probability (utilizing Lemma 2.4). In order to preserve the privacy of the shared values, the parties also add a random sharing to the linear combination, so that when the resulted sharing is open, nothing can be learned about the inputs of the parties.

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**PROTOCOL 3.1 (Batch Correctness Check of Shares).**

- **Inputs:** The parties hold \( m \) shares \( [x_1], \ldots, [x_m] \).
- **The protocol:**
  1. (1) The parties call \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{coin}} \) to receive random elements \( \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_m \in \mathbb{F} \setminus \{0\} \).
  2. (2) The parties call \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}} \) and obtain a sharing \( [r] \).
  3. (3) The parties locally compute \( [v] = \rho_1 \cdot [x_1] + \cdots + \rho_m \cdot [x_m] + [r] \).
  4. (4) The parties run open(\([v]\))
  5. (5) If no abort message was received, then the parties output accept.

**Lemma 3.2.** If there exists \( j \in [m] \) such that \( [x_j] \) is not correct, then the honest parties output accept in Protocol 3.1 with probability at most \( \frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|} \).

**Proof.** Assume that there exists an index \( j \in [m] \) such that \( [x_j] \) is not correct. Let \( [x] = \sum_{i \in [m]} [x_i] \cdot [\rho_i] + [\mu] \), and observe that \( [v] = \rho_j \cdot [x_j] + [\mu] \). Then, since \( [x_j] \) is not correct, we have by Lemma 2.4 that \( [v] \) is correct with probability at most \( \frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|} \) as required. Finally, recall that the open procedure guarantees that all parties abort (and so don’t output accept) if an incorrect sharing is opened.

We do not prove full security of this protocol; rather, we directly simulate it in the main protocol. Although this is a less modular approach, it actually significantly simplifies the proof. For example, formalizing this as an ideal functionality would require knowing how to generate the inconsistent messages for the case that some shares are inconsistent. This requires the simulator knowing the
honest parties' shares in the case that they are inconsistent, which leads to an unnatural modeling of the functionality. In the full protocol simulation, the simulator already knows the honest parties' shares since it generated them itself (albeit as shares of 0, but the distribution over the messages in the simulation is not dependent on the value).

3.3 Triple Verification Based on the Open Procedure

A multiplication triple is a triple of shares \((\alpha, [b], [c])\) with the property that \(c = a \cdot b\). We say that a multiplication triple is random if \([a]\) and \([b]\) are sharings of random values in \(\mathbb{F}\). We define correctness, as follows:

**Definition 3.3.** \((\alpha, [b], [c])\) is a correct multiplication triple if \((\alpha, [b] \text{ and } [c])\) are correct sharings and \(c = a \cdot b\).

In this section, we show how to verify that a multiplication triple is correct without revealing anything about its values, by using (and wasting) an additional random multiplication triple. We use the same method as \([16, 18]\), described in Protocol 3.4. The idea behind the protocol is as follows. Given shares of \(x\), \(y\), \(z\) and \(a\), \(b\), \(c\) the parties compute and open sharings of \(\rho = \alpha \cdot x + a\) and \(\sigma = y + b\), where \(\alpha\) is a random element generated at the beginning of the protocol. These values reveal nothing about \(x\) and \(y\) since \(a\) and \(b\) are random. In addition, from the way opening is defined, it follows that all the honest parties hold the same values for \(\rho\) and \(\sigma\). As we will see in the proof below, if \((\alpha, [b], [c])\) is a correct triple and \((\alpha, [y], [z])\) is not, then \([\alpha z - [c] + \sigma [a] + \rho [b] - \rho \sigma]\) is either incorrect or a sharing of some element \(d \neq 0\). Thus, by computing and opening this share, the honest parties can detect cheating and abort. In the case where \((\alpha, [b], [c])\) is also incorrect, we show that the multiplication of \([z]\) by the random \(\alpha\) ensures that the probability that the parties obtain a correct sharing of 0 is bounded by \(\frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|-1}\). As can be seen, the communication cost of this protocol is due to the three executions of the open procedure.

**Protocol 3.4 (Triple Verification Using Open).**

- **Inputs:** The parties hold a triple \((x, [y], [z])\) to verify and an additional random triple \((\alpha, [b], [c])\).
- **The protocol:**
  1. The parties call \(\mathcal{T}_{\text{coin}}\) to generate a random \(\alpha \in \mathbb{F} \setminus \{0\}\).
  2. Each party locally computes \(\rho = \alpha \cdot [x] + [a]\) and \(\sigma = [y] + [b]\).
  3. The parties run open(\(\rho\)) and open(\(\sigma\)), as defined in Section 2, to receive \(\rho\) and \(\sigma\). If a party receives \(\perp\) in an opening, then it sends \(\perp\) to all the other parties and aborts.
  4. Each party locally computes \([v] = \alpha [z] - [c] + \sigma [a] + \rho [b] - \rho \sigma\).
  5. The parties run the open(\(v\)) procedure to receive \(v\). If a party receives \(\perp\) in the opening, then it sends \(\perp\) to all the other parties and aborts.
  6. Each party checks that \(v = 0\). If not, then it sends \(\perp\) to the other parties and aborts.
  7. If no abort messages are received, then the parties output accept.

We now prove the security guarantee provided by Protocol 3.4.

**Lemma 3.5.** If \([x]\) and \([y]\) are correct sharings, and \((\alpha, [y], [z])\) is not a correct triple, then:

1. If \((\alpha, [b], [c])\) is a correct triple, then all honest parties abort in Protocol 3.4 with probability 1.
2. If \((\alpha, [b], [c])\) is not a correct triple, then the honest parties output accept in Protocol 3.4 with probability at most \(\frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|-1}\).

**Proof.** Assume that \([x]\), \([y]\) are correct sharings and that the triple \((\alpha, [y], [z])\) is not correct. First, observe that by the definition of the open procedure, if Step 3 concluded without the honest parties aborting, then it is guaranteed that \([\rho]\) and \([\sigma]\) are correct and that all the honest parties hold the same values \(\rho\) and \(\sigma\). By Claim 2.2, this implies that \([a]\) and \([b]\) are correct shares as well. Thus, for the remainder of the proof, we can assume that \([x]\), \([y]\), \([a]\) and \([b]\) are all correct and that all the honest parties hold the correct values \(\rho = \alpha \cdot x + a\) and \(\sigma = y + b\). Recall that since \((\alpha, [y], [z])\) is not correct, either \([z]\) is not correct or \(z \neq x \cdot y\).

To prove Item 1 in the lemma, assume that \((\alpha, [b], [c])\) is a correct multiplication triple, i.e., all the shares are correct and \(c = a \cdot b\). Then, by Claim 2.2, \([a] = [c] + \sigma [a] + \rho [b] - \rho \sigma\) is correct. If \([z]\) is not correct, then \([v]\) is not correct (since \([z] = \alpha^{-1} \cdot ([v] + \rho \sigma]\) and by Claim 2.2, correctness of \([y]\) would imply correctness of \([z]\)). Thus, the honest parties would all abort when running the open(\(v\)) procedure. Else, if \([v]\) is correct but \(z \neq x \cdot y\), then it holds that \(z = x \cdot y + d\) for some \(d \in \mathbb{F} \setminus \{0\}\). Then, when the parties locally compute \([v]\), it holds that:

\[
[v] = \alpha [z] - [c] + \sigma [a] + \rho [b] - \rho \sigma = [az - c + (y + b)a + (ax + a)b - (ax + a)(y + b)] = [az - c + ya + ab + axb + ab - axy - ay - axb - ab] = [az - axy + ab - c] = [\alpha(z - xy) - (c - ab)].
\]

(1)

Since \(c = a \cdot b\) and \(z = x \cdot y + d\), it follows that \([z] = [a \cdot d] \neq 0\), and thus the honest parties abort in Step 6 with probability 1, as required.

Next, we prove Item 2 in the lemma, where \((\alpha, [b], [c])\) is not a correct triple. Since we are guaranteed that \([a]\) and \([b]\) are correct, this means that either \([c]\) is not correct or that \(c \neq a \cdot b\). Note that in both cases, we are guaranteed that \([a] = \sigma [a] + \rho [b] - \rho \sigma\) is correct. Now, if the parties do not abort in Step 5, then it follows that \([c] = \alpha [z] - [c] + [u]\) is a correct sharing of 0. Since \([u]\) is correct, then it follows from Claim 2.2 that \(\alpha [z] - [c]\) is also correct. Using Claim 2.2 yet again, we have that this can happen only if both \([z]\) and \([c]\) are incorrect or both are correct. If they are both incorrect, then by Lemma 2.4, the probability that \(\alpha [z] - [c]\) is correct is bounded by \(\frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|-1}\), as required. If both \([z]\) and \([c]\) are correct, we have that \(c = a \cdot b + d\) and \(z = x \cdot y + d_1\) for some \(d_1, d_2 \in \mathbb{F} \setminus \{0\}\). Plugging this into Eq. (1), we have that \([v]\) = \([a \cdot d_1 - d_2]\). By Step 6 of the protocol, the honest parties output accept only if \(\alpha [d_1 - d_2] = 0\), which holds if only if \(\alpha = d_2 \cdot d_2^{-1}\). Since \(\alpha\) is distributed uniformly in \(\mathbb{F} \setminus \{0\}\) and independent of \(d_1, d_2\) (since it is chosen randomly after \(d_1\) and \(d_2\) are fixed), we have that the honest parties output accept with probability at most \(\frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|-1}\). We conclude that in all cases the probability that the protocol ends with the honest parties outputting accept is bounded by \(\frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|-1}\). □
As with Protocol 3.1, we do not prove the security of the protocol with respect to an ideal functionality. This is because such an ideal functionality would actually be very complex. For example, the ideal functionality would have to deal with the case that \([x], [y]\) may not be correct. However, this case can never actually happen in our protocol (due to the way that \([x], [y]\) are generated). Thus, it is preferable to not complicate matters with such a functionality.

### 3.4 Triple Verification Based on Multiplication Secure Up to Additive Attacks

In this section, we present a different protocol for verifying that a multiplication triple is correct. The protocol is similar to that of the previous section, except that here we use a multiplication protocol that is guaranteed to be secure up to additive attacks (as defined in Section 2.2) instead of the open procedure. In more detail, in Protocol 3.4, the parties compute shares of

\[
v = \alpha \cdot z + c + \sigma \cdot a + \rho \cdot b - \rho \cdot \sigma
\]

where \(\rho = \alpha x + a\) and \(\sigma = y + b\), and verify that it equals 0. This is computed by first computing \(\rho, \sigma\) and opening them, and then using (local) scalar multiplication to obtain shares of \(v\). However, openings are expensive operations, and in many cases are actually more expensive than semi-honest multiplication (this is true in the 3-party case, as well as when multiplying using the protocol of [17] as discussed in Section 6.1). Thus, in the protocol in this section, the parties compute shares of \(v\) by carrying out all of the multiplications using a secure protocol, and then only opening \(v\). Thus, we construct two verification protocols that are based on different building blocks; one that is based on invocations of the open procedure and another that is based on a semi-honest multiplication protocol that is secure up to additive attacks [21]. As we will see later, this enables us to obtain different protocols that are better suited for different settings, depending on the number of parties, secret sharing method used, and so on.

We present the protocol based on multiplication in two steps. First, we introduce a protocol that still requires one opening for each triple verification; namely the parties open \([v]\) to verify that it equals 0. Next, we show how to check that many shares are all equal to 0 with a single opening. Since only one open procedure is run for many executions, this yields a protocol where the amortized cost per triple depends only on the cost of the multiplication and the random sharing generation protocols.

As mentioned above, in this protocol, the values of \(\rho\) and \(\sigma\) are not opened as in the previous protocol. Instead, we compute the sharing

\[
[v] = [\alpha] \cdot [z] - [c] + [\sigma] \cdot [a] + [\rho] \cdot [b] - [\rho] \cdot [\sigma]
\]

using secure multiplication (where the equality holds because \(\sigma = y + b\) and so \(b - \sigma = -y\)), which equals 0 if the triple is correct (and all other shares). Intuitively, this protocol is secure for the same reason as Protocol 3.4 that uses opening, since the multiplications are used to compute the same equation. However, we note that in this case we need to generate a random sharing \([\alpha]\) that is kept secret, and we cannot let its value be publicly known. To see why this is necessary, assume that \(([a], [b], [c])\) is a correct multiplication triple and \([x], [y]\) and \([z]\) are all correct sharings, but \(z \neq x \cdot y\), i.e., \(z = x \cdot y + d\) for some \(d \neq 0\) known to the adversary. If the value of \(\alpha\) is known to the adversary, then it knows that \(\alpha \cdot z\) is a sharing of \(\alpha \cdot x\cdot y + \alpha \cdot d\). Then, when computing \([\alpha] = [c] + [\sigma] \cdot [a] + [\rho] \cdot [b] - [\rho] \cdot [\sigma]\) the adversary can cheat in one of the multiplications and make \([\alpha]\) be a sharing of \((c + \sigma \cdot a + \rho \cdot b - \rho \cdot \sigma) + \alpha \cdot d\), thus causing \([v] = \alpha \cdot z - [u]\) to be a sharing of 0, even if the triple is incorrect. In contrast, when \(\alpha\) is not known, this attack cannot be carried out.

At first sight, it may seem that this is enough; the parties can open \([v]\) and verify that it equals 0. Indeed, this does suffice to guarantee that the triple \(([x], [y], [z])\) is correct; however, it may reveal information about \(y\) and thus is not secure. In order to see why, consider an adversary who follows the specification of the multiplication protocol in all its invocations except for the one used to compute \([\rho] = [\alpha] \cdot [x] + [a]\); in this computation it causes the result to equal thereby obtaining a sharing of \([\rho] = [\alpha] \cdot [x] + [a] + d\) for some \(d \neq 0\) that it knows (it can do this since the multiplication protocol is vulnerable to an additive attack). Then, plugging \(\rho = \alpha \cdot x + a + d\) instead of \(\alpha \cdot x + a\) in Eq. (2), we have that the result will be \(v = -d \cdot y\) (everything else cancels out as shown in Eq. (1)). Since \(\pi_{\text{mult}}\) is vulnerable to an additive attack, the adversary can determine the value of \(d\), and then when \(v\) is opened it can compute \(y = \frac{\pi_{\text{mult}}}{v}\), breaking the privacy of the protocol. (Observe that in this attack, the triple is actually correct, but privacy is broken.)

This problem can be solved by running a subprotocol to verify if the share \([v]\) equals 0 or does not equal 0, without revealing anything else (since then \([v]\) is never actually opened). Unfortunately, this does not suffice since it still reveals whether or not \(y\) itself equals 0 or not; note that if \(y = 0\) then \(v = 0\) irrespective of the value of \(d\), and if \(y \neq 0\) then \(v \neq 0\). Thus, merely revealing whether or not \(v = 0\) reveals whether or not \(y = 0\). This is solved by generating a new triple from \((x], [y], [z])\), as follows. The parties generate a publicly known random element \(\delta \in \mathbb{F}\) and then each locally define the triple \(([x'], [y'], [z'])\) = \((x], [y], [z + \delta \cdot x])\). Then, the correctness of this triple \(([x'], [y'], [z'])\) is verified, instead of the original triple \((x], [y], [z])\). Observe that if \((x], [y], [z])\) is correct then so is \((x'], [y'], [z'])\) because

\[
z' \equiv \frac{v}{\rho} + \delta \cdot x = x \cdot y + \delta \cdot x = x \cdot (y + \delta) \equiv x' \cdot y'.
\]

Furthermore, \(y' = 0\) with probability \(1/|\mathbb{F}|\) (only when \(\delta = -y\)). Thus, \(y'\) will not equal 0 except with negligible probability, and revealing this fact gives no additional information to the adversary. We remark that the verification procedure of \((x]', [y'], [z'])\) is correct since

\[
v = \alpha \cdot (z + \delta \cdot x) - c + \sigma \cdot a - \rho \cdot (y + \delta)
\]

\[
= \alpha \cdot (x \cdot y + \delta \cdot x) - a \cdot b + (y + \delta + b) \cdot a - (a \cdot x + a) \cdot (y + \delta)
\]

\[
= \alpha \cdot x \cdot y + a \cdot x \cdot \delta - a \cdot b + a \cdot y + a \cdot \delta + a \cdot b - a \cdot x \cdot y
\]

\[
= -a \cdot y - a \cdot x \cdot \delta - a \cdot \delta = 0
\]

as required.

It remains to show how we check if the share \([v]\) equals 0 or not, without revealing anything else. This is achieved by generating an

\footnote{In the ACM CCS 2017 proceedings version of this paper, the protocol presented worked by indeed opening \([v]\) and verifying that it equals 0. Thus, it was vulnerable to the attack mentioned here.}
additional random sharing \([r]\) using \(F_{\text{rand}}\) and multiplying it with \([v]\) before opening the result. Clearly, if \([v]\) is a sharing of 0, then multiplying it with a random value makes no difference and the result remains 0. In contrast, if \([v]\) is not a sharing of 0, then the opening of \(r \cdot v\) reveals no information about \(v\) (since \(r\) is random and unknown).

**PROTOCOL 3.6 (Triple Verification Based on Multiplication).**

Let \(\pi_{\text{mul}}\) be a multiplication protocol that is secure up to additive attack, as described in Section 2.

- **Inputs:** The parties hold a triple \([(x), (y), (z)]\) to verify, and an additional random triple \([(a), (b), (c)]\).

- **The protocol:**
  1. The parties call \(F_{\text{coin}}\) to receive a random \(\delta \in \mathbb{F}\). Then, the parties define the triple \([(x', y'), (z')]\) by computing locally \([x'] = [x], [y'] = [y] + \delta \text{ and } [z'] = [z] + \delta \cdot [x]\).
  2. The parties execute \(F_{\text{rand}}\) to generate a random sharing \([w]\).
  3. The parties execute \(\pi_{\text{mul}}\) on \([x']\) and \([z]\) to obtain \([a \cdot x']\).
  4. Each party locally computes \([\rho] = [a \cdot x'] + [a] \text{ and } [\sigma] = [y'] + [b]\).
  5. The parties execute \(\pi_{\text{mul}}\) on \([z']\) and \([\delta]\) to obtain \([a \cdot \delta]\).
  6. The parties execute \(\pi_{\text{mul}}\) on \([\rho]\) and \([\delta]\) to obtain \([\rho \cdot \delta]\).
  7. Each party locally computes

\[
[v] = [\alpha \cdot z' - [c] + [\sigma \cdot a] - [\rho \cdot y']]
\]

8. The parties call \(F_{\text{rand}}\) to generate a random sharing \([r]\).
9. The parties execute \(\pi_{\text{mul}}\) on \([r]\) and \([v]\) to obtain \([w] = [r \cdot v]\).
10. The parties run the open([\(w]\)]) procedure to receive \(w\). If a party receives \(w\) in the opening, then it sends \(\bot\) to all the other parties and aborts.
11. Each party checks that \(w = 0\). If not, then it sends \(\bot\) to the other parties and aborts.
12. If no abort messages are received, then output accept.

The protocol can be proven secure as long as all shares of the input are guaranteed to be valid (but not necessarily value-consistent or form correct triples). Thus, this method is only suited for protocols where validity is always guaranteed.

The following lemma shows the security provided by Protocol 3.6.

**Lemma 3.7.** Let \([a], [b], [c]\) be valid shares and let \(\pi_{\text{mul}}\) be a multiplication protocol that is secure up to additive attacks. If \([x],[y]\) are correct shares and \([z]\) is valid, but \([x],[y],[z]\) is not a correct multiplication triple, the honest parties output accept in Protocol 3.6 with probability at most negligibly greater than \(\frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|}\).

**Proof:** Assume that \([x],[y]\) are correct shares, that \([z]\) is valid (meaning that all subsets of honest parties of size \(t+1\) reconstruct to a value, and not to \(\bot\)) and that the triple \([(x), [y], [z]]\) is not correct (note that since \(x\) and \(y\) are well defined, then so is \(x \cdot y\)). This implies that either \([z]\) is value-inconsistent or that \(z\) is correct but \(z \neq x \cdot y\). In both cases, there exists a subset \(J_0\) of \(t+1\) honest parties such that \(\text{val}([z])_{J_0} = x \cdot y + d\text{ where } d \in \mathbb{F}\). Thus, \(\text{val}([z'])_{J_0} = x \cdot y + \delta \cdot x + \delta \cdot d\).

We consider the values \(\text{val}([a])_{J_0} = a_{J_0} = a_{J_0} \cdot b_{J_0} + d_1\) for some \(d_1 \in \mathbb{F}\) (note that \(d_1\) may equal 0).

In the protocol, the parties execute \(\pi_{\text{mul}}\) five times. Looking at the shares of parties in \(J_0\), we obtain that there exist \(d_2, \ldots, d_5 \in \mathbb{F}\) such that

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{val}([\alpha \cdot z'])_{J_0} &= \alpha \cdot x + d_2 \\
\text{val}([\alpha \cdot z'])_{J_0} &= \alpha \cdot (x \cdot y + \delta \cdot x + \delta \cdot d) + d_3 \\
\text{val}([\alpha \cdot a])_{J_0} &= (\gamma + \delta \cdot b_{J_0}) \cdot a_{J_0} + d_4 \\
\text{val}([\rho \cdot y'])_{J_0} &= (\alpha \cdot x + d_2 + a_{J_0}) \cdot (y + \delta) + d_5.
\end{align*}
\]

The above holds by the assumption that \(\pi_{\text{mul}}\) is secure up to additive attacks and therefore these \(d_i\) values are well defined (and can be extracted by a simulator). By the properties of the open procedure, if all the honest parties output accept at the end of the protocol, then \([w]\) is a correct sharing of \(0\). We consider two cases:

**Case 1:** \([v]\) is a sharing of \(0\). This implies that for \(J_0\) it holds:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{val}([v])_{J_0} &= \text{val}([\alpha \cdot z'])_{J_0} - \text{val}([\alpha \cdot a])_{J_0} - \text{val}([\rho \cdot y'])_{J_0} \\
&= \alpha \cdot (x \cdot y + \delta \cdot x + \delta \cdot d) + d_3 - (a_{J_0} \cdot b_{J_0} + d_1) \\
&\quad + (y + \delta \cdot b_{J_0}) \cdot a_{J_0} + d_4 - (\alpha \cdot x + d_2 + a_{J_0}) \cdot (y + \delta) - d_5 \\
&= \alpha \cdot d - d_1 - d_2 \cdot (y + \delta) + d_4 - d_5 = 0.
\end{align*}
\]

This holds if and only if

\[
\alpha \cdot d = d_1 + d_2 \cdot (y + \delta) - d_3 - d_4 + d_5.
\]

We claim that for \(x, y, z\) as in the lemma, Eq. (7) holds with probability at most negligibly greater than \(\frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|}\). To see this, assume by contradiction, that there exists an adversary \(A\) who participates in Protocol 3.6 and succeeds in causing Eq. (7) to hold with probability \(\varepsilon\) that is non-negligibly greater than \(\frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|}\). We will show by reduction that if such an \(A\) exists, then this contradicts the security of the secret sharing scheme. Let \([x],[y],[z],[a],[b],[c]\) be inputs for which \(A\) succeeds in having Eq. (7) holds with probability \(\varepsilon\).

Before describing \(\mathcal{S}\), let \(\Pi\) denote Protocol 3.6 where the \(\pi_{\text{mul}}\) executions are replaced with “ideal functionalities” computing multiplication under an additive attack; \(\Pi\) is a “hybrid” protocol containing both regular messages and ideal calls. As described in Section 2.2, this functionality receives \(d\) from the adversary, shares of two values \(x, y\) from the honest parties, and returns shares of \(x \cdot y + d\) to all parties. Now, let \(\mathcal{A}_\Pi\) be the adversary obtained from \(A\) by replacing the \(\pi_{\text{mul}}\) executions with these ideal calls; such an adversary exists by the sequential modular composition theorem of [9]. Accordingly, the probability that Eq. (7) holds when \(\mathcal{A}_\Pi\) runs Protocol 3.6 on input \([x],[y],[z],[a],[b],[c]\) is negligibly close to \(\varepsilon\).

We are now ready to describe \(\mathcal{S}\) who breaks the security of the secret sharing scheme. Adversary \(\mathcal{S}\) chooses \(t < n/2\) shares, hands them to it’s challenger, which chooses a random element \(\alpha\) and define the remaining \(n - t\) shares accordingly. The goal of \(\mathcal{S}\) is to guess \(\alpha\). \(\mathcal{S}\) internally plays the honest parties in set \(J_0\) running the hybrid protocol \(\Pi\) with \(\mathcal{A}_\Pi\), using inputs \([x],[y],[z],[a],[b],[c]\), up to and including Step 7. \(\mathcal{S}\) chooses a random \(\delta\), and hands it to \(\mathcal{A}_\Pi\). Then, it obtains \(t\) shares from \(\mathcal{A}_\Pi\) playing the role of \(F_{\text{rand}}\) and send them to its challenger. Then, it obtains \(d_2, d_3, d_4, d_5\) from \(\mathcal{A}_\Pi\) during the internal simulation, computes \(d = z - x \cdot y\) and \(d_1 = c - a \cdot b\). Then, \(\mathcal{S}\) outputs

\[
\alpha' = (d_1 + d_2 \cdot (y + \delta) - d_3 - d_4 + d_5) \cdot d^{-1}.
\]
By the assumption that \( z \neq x \cdot y \), we have \( \tilde{d} \neq 0 \) and thus \( \tilde{d}^{-1} \) is well defined. Furthermore, if Eq. (7) holds, then \( \tilde{a}' = a \) and so \( S \) outputs the secret value, despite knowing less than \( n/2 \) shares. By the assumption on \( \mathcal{A} \), we have that \( S \) succeeds with probability that is negligibly close to \( e \). This contradicts the security of the secret sharing scheme if \( e \) is non-negligibly greater than \( 1/|F| \).

**Case 2:** \([z] \) is a NOT a sharing 0. As before, this means that there exists a subset \( J_0 \) of size \( t + 1 \) of honest parties, such that \( \text{val}([z])_{J_0} = e \) for some \( e \in F \setminus \{0\} \). By the assumption on \( \pi_{\text{mul}} \), this implies that for \( J_0 \) there exists \( d_0 \in F \) such that:

\[
\text{val}([w])_{J_0} = r \cdot e + d_0 = 0,
\]
which holds if and only if

\[
r \cdot e = -d_0 \tag{8}
\]

Similarly to the previous case, assume in contradiction that there exists an adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) who succeeds in causing Eq. (8) to hold with probability \( e \) negligibly greater than \( 1/|F| \) on inputs \([x], [y], [z], [a], [b], [c] \).

Replacing yet again the \( \pi_{\text{mul}} \) executions with ideal functionalities computing multiplication under additive attack, we can construct an adversary \( \mathcal{S} \) who uses the adversary \( \mathcal{A} \), which exists by the assumption in the hybrid protocol, to break the secret sharing scheme. This time \( S \) runs the hybrid protocol with \( \mathcal{A} \) up to and include Step 10. \( S \) begins by handing a random \( \delta \) to \( \mathcal{A} \) to receive back \( t \) shares which are used by him to define \([x']\) for some random \( x \in F \) as would do \( \mathcal{T}_\text{rand} \). Then, \( S \) receives \( d_1, d_2, d_3, d_4, d_5 \) from \( \mathcal{A} \) during the simulation, computes \( d \) and \( d_1 \) and thus can compute \( e = \text{val}([z])_{J_0} = a \cdot d - d_3 - d_2 \cdot (y + \delta) + d_1 + d_4 - d_5 \). Then, it receives \( e \) shares from \( \mathcal{A} \) for generating \([r] \) which is sent to its challenger. Finally, it receives \( d_6 \) from \( \mathcal{A} \), and outputs \( r' = -d_6 \cdot e^{-1} \). If Eq. (8) holds, then \( r' = r \) and \( S \) succeeds with probability which is negligibly close to \( e \), in contradiction to the security of the secret sharing scheme.

This completes the proof of the lemma. \( \square \)

**Removing the remaining call to the open procedure.** Protocol 3.6 requires one execution of the open procedure. Stated differently, each verification of a triple requires one invocation of the open procedure. We now show how to verify many triples with just one call to the open procedure. The idea behind this improvement is straightforward: compute a random linear combination of many \([v]\)‘s, multiply the result with a random sharing and then open the result. If any \([v] \neq 0 \), then the coefficients are random, the final result will not equal \( 0 \), except with probability \( 1/(|F| - 1) \). By doing this, we also reduce the number of \( \pi_{\text{mul}} \) by 1, since the multiplications with a random sharing before opening is required only once. The idea is specified in Protocol 3.8. Observe that this method also applies to Protocol 3.4, thereby reducing the number of openings there from 3 to 2. From an asymptotic view, this is less significant, as the overhead of the protocol still depends on the cost of the open procedure.

**Lemma 3.9.** Let \([(a_i), (b_i), (c_i)]_{i=1}^L \) be valid shares and let \( \pi_{\text{mul}} \) be a protocol that is secure up to additive attack. If \([(x_i), [y_i]]_{i=1}^L \) are correct, but there exists some \( k \in \{1, \ldots, L\} \) such that \([z_k] \) is valid and \([(x_k), [y_k], [z_k]] \) is not a correct multiplication triple, then the honest parties output accept in Protocol 3.8 with probability at most negligibly greater than \( 1/|F| - 1 \).

**Proof.** Assume that \([(x_i), [y_i]]_{i=1}^L \) are correct, and that \( \exists k \in \{1, \ldots, L\} \) such that \([z_k] \) is valid and \([(x_k), [y_k], [z_k]] \) is not a correct multiplication triple. If the honest parties output accept at the end of the protocol, then by the properties of the open procedure, \([w] \) is a correct sharing of \( 0 \). There are three cases to consider:

1. \([v_k] \) is a correct sharing of 0. By exactly the same argument if the proof of Lemma 3.7 (case 1), the probability that this happens is at most negligibly greater than \( \frac{1}{|F| - 1} \).
2. \([v_k] \) is not sharing of 0, but \([v] \) is a correct sharing of 0. If \([v_k] \) is not a correct sharing, then, by Lemma 2.4, the probability that \([v] \) is a correct sharing is at most \( \frac{1}{|F| - 1} \). Otherwise, \([v_k] \) is a correct sharing of some \( d_k \in F \setminus \{0\} \). Let \([u] = \sum_{j \in \{1, \ldots, L\} \setminus \{k\}} \rho_j \cdot [v_j] \). Then, we have that \([v] = [u] + \rho_k [v_k] \). Since \([v] \) and \([v_k] \) are both correct, it follows from the linear property of the scheme that \([u] \) is also correct. Thus, if \( v = 0 \) then it must hold that \( 0 = u + \rho_k \cdot d_k \), which in turn holds only if \( \rho_k = -u \cdot d_k^{-1} \). Since \( \rho_k \in F \setminus \{0\} \) is random, this happens with probability of at most \( \frac{1}{|F| - 1} \).
3. \([v] \) is not a sharing of 0, but \([w] \) is a sharing of 0. This is exactly case 2 of Lemma 3.7, where it is shown that the probability that this happens is at most negligibly greater than \( \frac{1}{|F| - 1} \).

Thus, in all cases, the honest parties accept with probability at most \( \frac{1}{|F| - 1} \), as required. \( \square \)

**4 THE PROTOCOL FRAMEWORK FOR LARGE FIELDS**

In this section, we present our protocol for large fields (the protocol works for any field, but as we will see it is most efficient for large fields). The protocol has a set-up phase to generate random triples and an online phase to compute any arithmetic circuit.

The set-up protocol is presented in Protocol 4.1. In this protocol, we utilize the fact that the random triples \([(a_i), (b_i), (c_i)] \) used in the verification protocols only need to be valid (but not necessarily correct). This enables us to generate the tuples very efficiently, using a private semi-honest multiplication protocol.

We now proceed to the main protocol, that computes an arithmetic circuit on the private inputs of the parties. The protocol
works by computing the circuit using a private semi-honest protocol, and then running a verification step where the computations of all multiplication gates are verified using the random triples from the offline phase. A full description appears in Protocol 4.2. Note that the verification stage of the protocol has two versions, as we have two protocols for verifying triples: the first uses share opening whereas the second uses semi-honest multiplication. If the second verification protocol is used, then \( \pi_{\text{mult}} \) also needs to be secure up to an additive attack.

We now prove the security of the protocol. The proof follow a straightforward simulation strategy, with the simulator providing shares of random values throughout (except for the output phase). The fact that the simulation works is due to the proofs already carried out that the adversary can cheat with only negligible probability.

**Theorem 4.3.** Let \( f \) be a \( n \)-party functionality and let \( \pi_{\text{mult}} \) be a private semi-honest multiplication protocol (if \( \text{VERSION 2} \) is used: that is secure up to additive attack). Then, Protocol 4.2 securely computes \( f \) with abort in the \((F_{\text{coin}}, F_{\text{rand}})\)-hybrid model with statistical error \( 2^{-\sigma} \), in the presence of a malicious adversary controlling \( t < \frac{n}{2} \) parties.

**Proof Sketch.** We first show that if the adversary cheats it succeeds with probability of at most \( p = \left(\frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|-1}\right)^{\delta} \). Specifically, if it provides incorrect shares in the “input sharing” step of the online protocol, then by Lemma 3.2, it is not caught with probability at most \( p \) (it is undetected with probability \( 1/(|\mathbb{F}|-1) \) in each of the \( \delta \) iterations). If it cheats in the multiplication gate computation in the circuit emulation phase, then regardless of the version of verification step used, it is also caught with probability \( p \) by Lemma 3.9. Note that in both cases, this holds regardless of whether or not the triples obtained from the offline protocol are correct.

Denote by \( \text{bad} \), the event that the adversary succeeds in cheating without being caught, by either dealing incorrect shares for its inputs or by cheating in the computation of at least one multiplication gate. Then, \( \Pr[\text{bad}] \leq \left(\frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|-1}\right)^{\delta} \). Since \( \delta \cdot \log(|\mathbb{F}|-1) \geq \sigma \), it follows that \( (|\mathbb{F}|-1)^{\delta} \geq 2^\sigma \) and so \( \left(\frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|-1}\right)^{\delta} \leq 2^{-\sigma} \). Thus, \( \Pr[\text{bad}] \leq 2^{-\sigma} \).

We now show to simulate the protocol; the simulation will be “good” assuming that the \( \text{bad} \) event does not occur. Let \( \mathcal{A} \) be the adversary. The simulator \( \mathcal{S} \) works as follows:

1. \( \mathcal{S} \) extracts the (correct) input values \( v \) shared by \( \mathcal{A} \) for the corrupted parties, and hands \( \mathcal{A} \) the honest parties’ messages computed using 0 as the input on every wire associated with an honest party’s input.

2. \( \mathcal{S} \) simulates the input correctness check by running the honest parties’ instructions based on the messages from the previous round. If any of the input shares dealt by the adversary is not correct, but the honest parties’ simulated by \( \mathcal{S} \) do not catch \( \mathcal{A} \) in any iteration, then \( \mathcal{S} \) outputs fail. Otherwise, \( \mathcal{S} \) simulates the honest parties aborting at the relevant point, sends abort to the trusted party, and outputs whatever \( \mathcal{A} \) outputs.

3. \( \mathcal{S} \) runs the honest parties’ instructions as above in the circuit emulation phase. If \( \mathcal{A} \) cheats in any of the multiplication protocols, then \( \mathcal{S} \) records in which multiplications cheating took place (\( \mathcal{S} \) knows the shares held by \( \mathcal{A} \) on the wires and so can determine if \( \mathcal{A} \) sends incorrect messages).

4. \( \mathcal{S} \) runs the honest parties’ instructions in the verification stage. If there is a multiplication that \( \mathcal{A} \) cheated in, but was not detected at any point by the honest parties in the simulated verification, then \( \mathcal{S} \) outputs fail and halts. Otherwise or if \( \mathcal{A} \) did not cheat in any multiplication but still causes an abort in the verification, \( \mathcal{S} \) simulates the honest parties aborting at the relevant point, sends abort to the trusted party, and outputs whatever \( \mathcal{A} \) outputs.

5. If there was no cheating, then \( \mathcal{S} \) sends the trusted party the extracted input values, and receives back the corrupted parties’ outputs. Then, \( \mathcal{S} \) simulates the reconstruction so that \( \mathcal{A} \) receives these outputs for all corrupted parties. This is achieved by choosing “new” shares for the honest parties such that the reconstruct procedure will yield the correct output.

6. \( \mathcal{S} \) receives the messages from \( \mathcal{A} \) for the reconstructions to the honest parties. If any of the messages for honest \( P_j \) are incorrect (i.e., the shares are not correct), then \( \mathcal{S} \) sends abort to instruct the trusted party to not send the output to \( P_j \). Otherwise, \( \mathcal{S} \) sends continue to the trusted party, instructing it to send \( P_j \) its output.

Observe that the probability that \( \mathcal{S} \) outputs fail is exactly the probability that the event \( \text{bad} \) occurs. Furthermore, when this does not occur, the only difference between the real and simulated execution is due to the fact that \( \mathcal{S} \) used 0 for all honest inputs instead of the real values. By the information-theoretic security of secret sharing, this makes no difference in the input sharing phase. Furthermore, by the privacy of the checking correctness of shares and the multiplication protocols, the view of \( \mathcal{A} \) in the correctness check of shares step and simulated circuit emulation phase is indistinguishable from its view in the real phase. Then, in the verification step, the view of the adversary consists of messages sent when opening (in both versions) and when executing \( \pi_{\text{mult}} \) (in the second version). Due to the privacy of \( \pi_{\text{mult}} \) and the fact that only randomly distributed values are opened (in both versions, every value is masked with a random sharing before opening it), the view of \( \mathcal{A} \) in the simulation is indistinguishable from its view in the real phase in this step as well. Finally, the output phase is once again perfectly simulated, by the information-theoretic properties of the secret sharing scheme. 

\[ \square \]

**Using pseudo-randomness to reduce the number of calls to \( F_{\text{coin}} \).** Observe that in some phases, we need to generate many random elements at once. Instead of calling \( F_{\text{coin}} \) for every value, it suffices
PROTOCOL 4.2 (Computing an Arithmetic Circuit Over Finite Fields).

Let \( \pi_{\text{mult}} \) be private semi-honest multiplication protocol. If VERSION 2 is used, then \( \pi_{\text{mult}} \) must also be secure up to additive attack.

- **Inputs:** Each party \( P_j \) (\( j \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \)) holds an input \( x_j \in \mathbb{F}^\ell \).
- **Auxiliary Input:** The parties hold a description of an arithmetic circuit \( C \) that computes \( f \) on inputs of length \( \ell \cdot n \). Let \( N \) be the number of multiplication gates in \( C \). In addition, the parties hold a statistical security parameter \( \sigma \).

- **The protocol:**
  1. (Precomputation): Each party sets \( \delta \) to be the smallest value for which \( \delta \geq \sigma / \log(\vert \mathbb{F} \vert) - 1 \). The parties then run \( \delta \) executions of Protocol 4.1 with input \( N \), and obtain vectors \( \vec{d}_1, \ldots, \vec{d}_N \) of \( N \) triples.
  2. (Sharing the inputs): For each input wire with an input \( v \), the parties run \( \pi_{\text{mult}} \) with the dealer being the party whose input is associated with that wire.
  3. (Correctness checking of inputs): Let \( [v_1], \ldots, [v_m] \) be the shares on the input wires, generated in the previous step. Repeat \( \delta \) times: The parties run Protocol 3.1 on \( [v_1], \ldots, [v_m] \).
      - If there exists an execution in which a party did not output accept, it sends \( \bot \) to the other parties and halts.
  4. (Circuit emulation): Let \( G_1, \ldots, G_L \) be a predetermined topological ordering of the gates of the circuit. For \( k = 1, \ldots, L \) the parties work as follows:
      - **VERSION 1:**
        For \( k = 1, \ldots, N \): The parties run Protocol 3.4 on input \( ([x_k], [y_k], [z_k]) \) and \( ([a^*_k], [b^*_k], [c^*_k]) \) to verify \( ([x_k], [y_k], [z_k]) \).
        (Observe that all executions of Protocol 3.4 can be run in parallel).
      - **VERSION 2:**
        The parties run Protocol 3.8 on \( ([x_k], [y_k], [z_k]) \) and \( ([a^*_k], [b^*_k], [c^*_k]) \) to verify \( ([x_k], [y_k], [z_k]) \).
        If a party did not output accept in every execution, it sends \( \bot \) to the other parties and outputs \( \bot \).
  5. (Verification stage): Before the secrets on the output wires are reconstructed, the parties verify that all the multiplications were carried out correctly, as follows. Let \( \{(x_k), (y_k), (z_k)\} \) be the triples generated by computing multiplication gates (i.e., \( [x_k] \) and \( [y_k] \) are the shares on the input wires of the \( k \)th multiplication gate and \( [z_k] \) is the share on the output wire), and let \( \vec{d}_k \) be the triples generated in \( \delta \)th iteration of the offline phase.
      - For \( i = 1 \) to \( \delta \), the parties work as follows:
        - **VERSION 1:**
          For \( k = 1, \ldots, N \): The parties run Protocol 3.4 on input \( ([x_k], [y_k], [z_k]) \) and \( ([a^*_k], [b^*_k], [c^*_k]) \) to verify \( ([x_k], [y_k], [z_k]) \).
        (Observe that all executions of Protocol 3.4 can be run in parallel).
      - **VERSION 2:**
        The parties run Protocol 3.8 on \( ([x_k], [y_k], [z_k]) \) and \( ([a^*_k], [b^*_k], [c^*_k]) \) to verify \( ([x_k], [y_k], [z_k]) \).
        If a party did not output accept in every execution, it sends \( \bot \) to the other parties and outputs \( \bot \).
  6. (Output reconstruction): For each output wire of the circuit, the parties run reconstruct(\( [v], j \)), where \( [v] \) is the sharing of the value on the output wire, and \( P_j \) is the party whose output is on the wire.
  7. (Output): If a party has not output \( \bot \), then it outputs the values it received on its output wires.

Note that this is not as immediate as it seems since the adversary has the seed/key as well, and so at this point the pseudorandom property is actually lost. However, the checks work by generating the randomness after everything else is finished (see Protocol 3.8) and then verifying that some equality holds, or that the results are correct. These properties are actually determined before the key is revealed, and thus security is maintained even after the key is revealed.

Efficiency. We analyze the performance of our protocol. As the protocol takes black-box building blocks (such as \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}}, \pi_{\text{mult}} \) and the open procedure), and compiles them into a maliciously secure protocol, we measure the cost as a function of these building blocks. In addition, we focus on the cost that increases with the size of the circuit, and so the cost of input sharing and output reconstruction is ignored (these steps are very cheap in practice anyway). Since addition and multiplication-by-a-constant gates are computed locally, this reduces to measuring the cost per multiplication gate.

For computing multiplication gates, the protocol requires one execution of a semi-honest multiplication when emulating the circuit. In addition, for each gate, \( \delta \) random multiplication triples are generated in the offline phase. This comes at the cost of generating two random shares using \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}} \) and multiplying them using one semi-honest multiplication.

Next, for the first version of the verification step, three opening of shares. Thus, overall, the cost of version 1 of the protocol per each multiplication gate is

\[(1 + \delta) \cdot t(\pi_{\text{mult}}) + 2\delta \cdot t(\mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}}) + 3\delta \cdot t(\text{open})\]  

where \( t(X) \) denotes the cost of running procedure \( X \).

In contrast, the second version of the verification step, requires 4 semi-honest multiplications in each iteration plus one addition call to \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}} \) to generate \([a]\), instead of the three openings. Thus,
the overall cost per multiplication gate in this protocol version is

\[ (1 + 5\delta) \cdot t_{\text{mult}} + 3\delta \cdot t(F_{\text{rand}}). \]

Observe that when using a field \( F \) with \( |F| > 2^r \) (e.g., \( F = \mathbb{Z}_p \) with \( p \) being a 40-bit prime, and where the allowed statistic error is \( 2^{-40} \)), it suffices to take \( \delta = 1 \). In this case, the cost of the first version of the protocol is \( 2 \cdot t_{\text{mult}} + 2 \cdot t(F_{\text{rand}}) \) and the cost of the second version is \( 6 \cdot t_{\text{mult}} + 3 \cdot t(F_{\text{rand}}) \). Thus, when 4 semi-honest multiplications plus one random-share generation are cheaper than 3 openings, the second protocol version is preferable.

5 THE PROTOCOL FRAMEWORK FOR SMALL FIELDS

In this section, we describe a protocol for generating multiplication triples in small fields, that combines the verification method of Section 4 together with the “cut-and-choose” methodology designed for Boolean circuits in [19]. Informally speaking, the parties start by generating \( NB + C \) random triples by calling \( F_{\text{rand}} \) and running the semi-honest multiplication protocol \( \pi_{\text{mult}} \) for each triple. Next, the parties randomly permute the triples. Then, the parties open the first \( C \) triples, so that if one of the opened triples is incorrect, the honest parties will detect it and abort. The remaining triples are divided into \( N \) bucket of size \( B \), and the first triple in each bucket is verified using the other \( B - 1 \) triples. The required property in this check is that if one of the bucket is “mixed”, i.e., contains both correct and incorrect triples, then the honest parties will detect cheating with probability 1. The important observation is that this verification of triples in a bucket can be carried out using Protocol 3.4 (verification based on openings), since by Lemma 3.5 if an incorrect triple is verified by a correct triple, then the honest parties will abort with probability 1. However, the result is much stronger than that achieved in [19]. Specifically, when considering Boolean circuits, the adversary can evade detection if a bucket contains only incorrect triples. However, in our setting where \( |F| > 2 \), even if a bucket has only bad triples, the adversary can still get caught. Thus, the cheating probability of the adversary is much lower.

For the formal description, we define the \( F_{\text{perm}} \) ideal functionality that receives a vector from all the parties and returns a random permutation of it to the parties. The functionality can be securely computed by generating randomness via \( F_{\text{coin}} \) and then using that randomness to compute a permutation using the Fisher-Yates algorithm [20]. The pre-processing protocol for fields of small size is formally described in Protocol 5.1.

We now prove that the main protocol securely computes any functionality in the presence of a malicious adversary who controls a minority of the parties, when using Protocol 5.1 in its offline phase.

THEOREM 5.2. Let \( f \) be a \( n \)-party functionality, assume that \( C \geq B \) and let \( \delta, B \) and \( C \) be such that \( \delta \cdot \log \left( \frac{(NB+C)(|F|-1)^B}{N} \right) \geq \sigma \). Then, Protocol 4.2, when using Protocol 5.1 for its offline phase, securely computes \( f \) with abort in the \( (F_{\text{coin}}, F_{\text{rand}}, F_{\text{perm}})-h \) hybrid model with statistical error \( 2^{-\sigma} \), in the presence of a malicious adversary controlling \( t < \frac{n}{2} \) parties.

PROTOCOL 5.1 (GENERATING RANDOM MULTIPLICATION TRIPLES USING CUT-AND-CHOOSE).

Let \( \pi_{\text{mult}} \) be a private semi-honest multiplication protocol according to Definition 2.5.

- **Input:** The number \( N \) of triples to be generated.
- **Auxiliary input:** Parameters \( B \) and \( C \).

**The Protocol:**

1. **Generate random sharings:** The parties invoke \( 2(NB + C) \) calls to \( F_{\text{rand}} \) to denote the shares that they receive by \([([a_i], [b_i]], [c_i])\) from \( F_{\text{perm}} \).

2. **Generate multiplication triples:** For \( i = 1, \ldots, NB + C \), the parties run \( \pi_{\text{mult}} \) to compute \([a_i], [b_i] \rightarrow [c_i] \). Denote \( \tilde{D} = ([a_1], [b_1], [c_1]) \).

3. **Cut and bucket:** Let \( M = NB + C \). In this stage, the parties perform a first verification that the triples were generated correctly by opening \( C \) triples, and then randomly divide the remainder into buckets.
   
   a. The parties call \( F_{\text{perm}} \) with vector \( \tilde{D} \).
   
   b. For \( i = 1, \ldots, C \), the parties run open([a_i]), open([b_i]) and open([c_i]) and then each party checks that \( c_i = a_i \cdot b_i \). If not, then the party sends \( \bot \) to all the other parties and aborts.
   
   c. If a party did not output accept in all the open procedure executions, it sends \( \bot \) to the other parties and outputs \( \bot \).

4. **Check buckets:** The parties initialize a vector \( \tilde{d} \) of length \( N \).
   
   a. Denote the triples in \( \tilde{D}_k \) by \([([a_i], [b_i], [c_i]), \ldots, ([a_N], [b_N], [c_N])\).
   
   b. For \( j = 2, \ldots, B \), the parties run Protocol 3.4 (triple verification based on openings) on input \([([a_i], [b_i], [c_i]), ([a_j], [b_j], [c_j])\), to verify \([a_i] \cdot b_i = c_i \).
   
   c. If a party did not output accept in every execution, it sends \( \bot \) to the other parties and outputs \( \bot \).

- **Output:** The parties output \( \tilde{d} \).

PROOF SKETCH. We first bound the probability that the adversary cheats without being caught. Denote this event by \( \text{bad} \). Then, \( \text{bad} = \text{bad}_1 \land \text{bad}_2 \land \text{bad}_3 \), where:

- **bad_1** is the event that there are exactly \( t \) buckets that have only bad triples; i.e., the adversary corrupted \( tB \) triples that were not chosen to be opened and these were placed by the permutation in exactly \( t \) buckets.

- **bad_2** is the event that no cheating is detected in the verification step in the pre-processing phase, given that there are \( t \) fully bad buckets; i.e., the \( t \cdot (B - 1) \) executions of the triples verification protocol where a bad triple is verified, ended without detecting cheating.
• bads is the event that the adversary cheated in the computation of \( t \) multiplication gates and was not caught, given that there are \( t \) bad random triples output from the pre-processing phase.

We remark that these bad events cover all possibilities. In particular, if the number of bad buckets does not match the number of bad multiplications, then the adversary will be caught with probability 1. Thus, we only consider the case that the number \( t \) is the same in both events.

From [19, Theorem 5.2] it follows that

\[
\Pr[bad] = \left( \frac{N}{t} \right) \left( \frac{NB + C}{tB} \right)^{-1}.
\]

By Lemma 3.5, we have that

\[
\Pr[bad] = \frac{1}{(|F| - 1)B \cdot \left( \frac{N}{t} \right) \left( \frac{NB + C}{tB} \right)^{-1}}
\]

since the adversary is not caught in a single verification with probability \( 1/(|F| - 1) \) and \( B - 1 \) verifications are carried out per bucket. Furthermore, since the adversary evades detection each time with probability \( 1/(|F| - 1) \) and there are \( t \) bad multiplications. Since the online verification stage is run \( \delta \) times, we obtain that

\[
\Pr[bad] = \left( \frac{1}{(|F| - 1)B \cdot \left( \frac{N}{t} \right) \left( \frac{NB + C}{tB} \right)^{-1}} \right)^{\delta}.
\]

Now, since both \( \frac{1}{(|F| - 1)B} \) and \( \left( \frac{N}{t} \right) \left( \frac{NB + C}{tB} \right)^{-1} \) are maximized when \( t = 1 \) (where the latter was proven in [19, Theorem 5.3] assuming that \( c \geq B \), we have that

\[
\Pr[bad] \leq \left( \frac{1}{(|F| - 1)B} \cdot \left( \frac{N}{t} \right) \left( \frac{NB + C}{tB} \right)^{-1} \right)^{\delta}.
\]

Therefore, we obtain that assuming that \( C \geq B \), it holds that

\[
\Pr[bad] \leq 2^{-\sigma} \text{ when } 2^{\sigma} \leq \left( \frac{1}{(|F| - 1)B} \cdot \left( \frac{N}{t} \right) \left( \frac{NB + C}{tB} \right)^{-1} \right)^{\delta}.
\]

Taking log of both sides yields that \( \sigma \leq \delta \cdot \log \left( \frac{1}{(|F| - 1)B} \cdot \left( \frac{N}{t} \right) \left( \frac{NB + C}{tB} \right)^{-1} \right) \) as stated in the theorem.

Simulation works as in the proof of Theorem 4.3, and we omit the details here. \( \square \)

**Efficiency:** Each multiplication gate requires running the semi-honest multiplication protocol once in the online computation and \( B \delta \) times in the offline phase (to generate a bucket of \( B \) triples for each verification iteration). In addition, for each gate the parties run the verification protocol \( \delta(B - 1) \) times on the off-line and \( \delta \) times in the online, at the cost of 3 openings per execution. Finally, to generate \( B \) random triples, the parties need to call \( t \) exactly \( 2B \cdot \delta \) times. Thus, the overall cost per multiplication gate is

\[
(1 + \delta B) \cdot t(\pi_{mult}) + 2B \cdot \delta \cdot t(t_{rand}) + 3 \cdot \delta B \cdot t(open).
\]

At first sight, this looks much higher than the overhead of the protocol of the previous section. However, the idea here is to choose a smaller \( \delta \), thus reducing the overall cost. For example, assume that \( \sigma = 40 \) and \(|F| = 2^8\) (e.g., computing an AES circuit over \( GF(2^8) \)). If we were to use the large-field protocol of Section 4, we would have to set \( \delta = 5 \) in order to have \( \delta \cdot \log(|F|) \geq 40 \). The cost per gate in this case, assuming we use the first version of the protocol, is

\[
6 \cdot t(\pi_{mult}) + 60 \cdot t(t_{rand}) + 15 \cdot t(open).
\]

In contrast, if we need to produce \( 2^{10} \) triples, we can set \( \delta = 5 \) and \( B = C = 3 \), resulting in having \(|F| - 1|B = (2^8)^3 = 2^{24} \) and

\[
\frac{1}{N} \left( \frac{NB + C}{B} \right) = 2^{-10} \left( \frac{2^{20} - 3}{3} \right) \geq \left( \frac{2^{20}/3}{3} \right) \geq 2^{20} \text{ and so}
\]

\[
\delta \cdot \log \left( \frac{|F| - 1}{B} \cdot \left( \frac{NB + C}{B} \right) \right) \geq \log(2^{24} \cdot 2^{20}) = 40.
\]

For these parameters, the cost per gate is

\[
4 \cdot t(\pi_{mult}) + 6 \cdot t(t_{rand}) + 9 \cdot t(open),
\]

which is lower than using the protocol of Section 4.

### 6 Instantiations

Our protocol/compiler is generic and can be instantiated in many ways (with different secret sharing schemes, multiplication protocols, and more). Clearly, the efficiency of our protocol depends significantly on the instantiations. In this section, we present two main instantiations of our protocol, with different options for some of the subprotocols within. The first instantiation is for the general case of any number of parties \( n \), and we use Shamir’s secret sharing [35] for this instantiation. We provide different approaches to implementing the basic building blocks, including the open procedure, randomness generation \( t_{rand} \), and semi-honest multiplication \( \pi_{mult} \) and analyze their efficiency. The second instantiation is for the specific case of three parties, and utilizes tools from the highly efficient semi-honest protocol of [3]. Using our compiler, we show that it is possible to obtain a protocol that is secure in the presence of a malicious adversary with very low communication; specifically, only a few field elements are sent for each multiplication gate. For simplicity, we analyze our instantiations using the protocol of Section 4 for large fields only; similar analysis using the protocol for small fields of Section 5 can be easily obtained.

#### 6.1 Multi-Party Computation Based on Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme

Most secure computation protocols with an honest majority use Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [35]. In this scheme, a secret is distributed among \( n \) parties with a threshold of \( t \), by defining a polynomial of degree \( t \), and handing each party a point on this polynomial. Formally, given a secret \( v \), the dealer chooses random coefficients \( q_1, \ldots, q_t \in \mathbb{F} \) and defines a polynomial \( q(x) = v + \sum_{j=1}^{t} q_j x^j \). Then, each party \( P_i \) is given the value \( q(i) \).

It is well known that the network of \( t \) parties can compute the secret by themselves, but a subset of \( t + 1 \) parties can compute the secret, as any \( t + 1 \) points uniquely define one polynomial of degree \( t \).

For this secret sharing scheme, a sharing \( [v] \) is correct if there exists a single polynomial \( q(x) \) of degree \( \leq t \) such that for every honest party \( P_i \) holding value \( v_i \), it holds that \( q(i) = v_i \). Therefore, a sharing \( [v] \) is incorrect if for every polynomial \( q(x) \) of degree at most \( t \), there exists an honest party \( P_i \) holding \( v_i \) such that \( q(i) \neq v_i \). Note that for this scheme, if the sharing \( [v] \) is not correct, then it is value-inconsistent (see Section 2). This holds since any subset of \( t + 1 \) parties shares defines a \( t \)-degree polynomial, and thus for any subset

\[\text{More generally, we associate a unique } a_i \in \mathbb{F} \text{ for the } i\text{th party. For simplicity, we will consider } \mathbb{F} = \mathbb{Z}_p \text{ for a prime } p, \text{ in which case } i \in \mathbb{F}.\]
of \( t + 1 \) honest parties \( J \) it holds that \( \text{val}([v])_J \neq \perp \). (Technically, for this to work, all honest parties must hold some share in the field \( F \). Thus, if an honest party receives a value in any protocol that does not define a value in \( F \), it replaces it with some default field value.)

Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is linear, and enable parties locally add shares and multiply them by a constant, as required for our protocol.

### 6.1.1 The Basic Procedures and Sub-Protocols.

The share([v]) procedure. As explained above, in this procedure the dealer chooses a random polynomial \( q(x) \) of degree \( t \) under the constraint that \( q(0) = v \), and then sends each \( P_i \) the point \( q(i) \). Recall that our protocol does not require the share sent by the corrupted parties to be correct, and thus this is sufficient (in places where correctness is required, we run a separate check).

The reconstruct([v], i) and open([v]) procedures. In order to reconstruct to party \( P_i \), each party sends its share to \( P_i \). Then, \( P_i \) uses any of the \( t + 1 \) shares to compute the unique degree-\( t \) polynomial defined by the points, and checks that all other shares lie on the same polynomial. If not, then it sends \( \perp \) to all the other parties and halts. Since there are at least \( t + 1 \) honest parties (whose shares uniquely define a polynomial and so the value to be reconstructed), we are guaranteed that the corrupted parties cannot cause \( P_i \) to output an incorrect value.

The open procedure simply works by running reconstruct([v], i) for all \( P_i \). Since each party sends \( n - 1 \) elements, the overall complexity of the open procedure is quadratic in the number of parties.

\( \mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}} \) - generating shares of random values. We describe two ways of implementing \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}} \). The first method of generating random shares is the PRSS method of [13], which enables the parties to generate a sharing of a pseudorandom element without any interaction. This is done by distributing random keys among the parties via replicated secret sharing (i.e., for each subset of \( t \) parties, all the parties in the complement subset receive a key). These random keys are used to generate pseudorandom values that are then converted to Shamir shares. Since this protocol is non-interactive, it is easy to see that generated shares are always correct, and the adversary cannot learn anything about the shared value. Thus, this protocol securely realizes \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}} \). The problem with this approach is that the number of keys held by each party grows exponentially in the number of parties, which dramatically increases the computational work of generating the shares. Thus, this method is only efficient when the number of parties in the protocol is small. A full description of this method appears in Appendix B.1 (Protocol B.1).

We now describe a second way of generating random shares due to [17], in which each party sends only a constant number of elements per random share. This method uses a Vandermonde matrix, which can be used to “extract randomness” from \( n \) shares into \( n - t \) new shares. The protocol works by having each party share a random element to the other parties. Then, upon holding a vector of \( n \) shares, each party locally multiplies this vector of size \( n \) with a Vandermonde matrix of size \( n - t \) rows and \( n \) columns to receive a vector of \( n - t \) “new” random shares. By the randomness extraction property, we have that the new shares are sharings of random elements in \( F \). Since \( t < \frac{n}{2} \), we have that each party obtain at least \( \frac{n}{2} + 1 \) shares, in a process that requires sending \( n - 1 \) elements by each party. Thus, the amortized communication cost per random share is roughly 2 elements per party. A full description is in Appendix B.1 (Protocol B.2); for more details on the method see [17]. We stress that this protocol, as described above, does not securely realize \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}} \), as malicious parties may cheat and cause the resulting sharing to be incorrect. However, by adding a step at the final stage of the protocol, where the shares are checked for correctness using Protocol 3.1, we obtain a protocol that securely computes \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}} \) (note that since \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}} \) itself is called in Protocol 3.1 to generate a random sharing \( [r] \), we cannot use the protocol as is. However, by Lemma 2.4, we have that the cheating probability in Protocol 3.1 is still at most \( \frac{1}{|F|} \) even if \([r]\) is not a correct sharing. Thus, for the use of Protocol 3.1 here, we can remove the calls to \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}} \) by taking one of the random shares generated by the vandermonde protocol as the “masking” share). This can be easily proven via straight-forward simulation where the simulator plays the honest parties by following the protocol instructions. Since no private inputs are involved, the view of the adversary in the real execution is identically distributed to its view in the simulation. At the end of the simulation, if the correctness check of shares was successful, the simulator can use the shares it holds to compute the corrupted parties’ shares (since an honest majority is assumed) and sends them to the trusted party as required by the definition of \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{rand}} \).

### 6.2 Multiplication Improvement

\( \pi_{\text{mult}} \) - semi-honest multiplication that is private and secure up to additive attack. The first instantiation for \( \pi_{\text{mult}} \) is the GRR multiplication improvement [25] of the BGW protocol [7]. This protocol enables \( n \) parties with \( t < \frac{n}{2} \) semi-honest corrupted parties, to compute a multiplication gate with quadratic communication complexity overall. Specifically, it works by each party locally multiplying its shares on the input wires and sending shares of the result to all other parties. Then, each party locally computes a linear combination of the shares it received. The overall communication is thus exactly \( n - 1 \) elements sent by each party per multiplication gate. This protocol is very efficient for a small number of parties.

The second instantiation is more efficient for a large number of parties. The semi-honest multiplication protocol with the best asymptotic efficiency to our knowledge is the DN protocol presented in [17], that has amortized constant communication complexity per party. We optimized the protocol even further, cutting the communication by half. The difference is due to the fact that [17] generate correct multiplication triples and use them to carry out the multiplications in the circuit. In contrast, we generate just one share (under degree-\( t \) and degree-2\( t \)) and use this to multiply directly. Their method is preferable for minimizing the online time, but ours yields a faster overall time. Our optimized version of the [17] protocol works as follows. A set of random shares is generated in a preprocessing step, and later used to multiply two elements that are shared among the parties. Specifically, the parties generate two random shares \( [r_1] \) and \( [r_2] \) for each multiplication gate, where the former is a sharing of \( r \) using a degree-\( t \) polynomial, and the latter is a sharing of the same \( r \), but this time using a degree-2\( t \) polynomial. Then, to multiply \( x \) and \( y \), the parties locally multiply their shares to obtain \([x \cdot y]_2 \) (the result is of degree-2\( t \) since two degree-\( t \) polynomials are multiplied). Then, the parties locally
compute \(x \cdot y - r\) in the clear, and sends it to all the other parties. Finally, each party locally computes \(x \cdot y - r + [r]_2\) to obtain \([x \cdot y]_2\), as required (the result is a degree-\(t\) polynomial with constant term \(x \cdot y\) since the constant term of \([r] - r = 0\). If we use the "Vandermonde" protocol for generating the random shares, we obtain that each party needs to send only 6 field elements per multiplication gate.

Both semi-honest multiplication protocols are presented in Appendix B.2 (Protocol B.3 and Protocol B.4). We claim that these two protocols prevent any leakage of information, and are private in the presence of malicious adversaries according to Definition 2.5. For the GRR protocol, this follows from the fact that the adversary’s view consists of random shares or of values that are a masking of some secret using a random value, thus once again revealing nothing about the actual values.

In instantiations that rely on multiplication-based verification, we will only use the DN protocol, as these instantiations yield higher performance when the computation involves large number of parties, and the DN protocol, with its constant communication per party, is clearly preferable in this case over the GRR protocol. Thus, it is required that this protocol be secure up to additive attack. Fortunately, it was already proven in [21, Corollary 5.6] that the DN protocol has this property.

**6.12 Protocol Variants.** We have described two protocols for generating random shares and two semi-honest multiplication protocols. Together with the two versions of our protocol (verification via opening in Section 3.3 and via multiplication in Section 3.4), we have six variants of our multiparty protocol with Shamir’s secret sharing (recall that we did not prove that the GRR protocol can be used with the multiplication-based verification). We analyze two of these variants; one is best for a small number of parties and the other is best for a large number of parties.

* A protocol for a small number of parties. When the number of parties is small, we use the PRSS protocol to generate random shares (with zero communication cost), the GRR multiplication protocol (with \(n - 1\) elements sent per party) and version 1 of our protocol (which uses verification based on opening of shares). The reason why we use verification via opening of shares is that the open procedure is very efficient for a small number of parties and thus is preferable here (here, each party sends \(n - 1\) elements for both multiplication and opening).

  For large fields where \(|F| > 2^{-\sigma}\) we can set \(\delta = 1\). In this case, referring to Eq. (9), we obtain that the overall communication cost is \(5(n - 1)\) field elements sent by each party for each multiplication gate (due to 2 semi-honest multiplications and 3 openings). This therefore proves Theorem 1.2 from the Introduction.

* A protocol for a large number of parties. When considering a large number of parties, the PRSS protocol cannot be used (since the computational cost of the PRSS protocol blows up exponentially). We therefore use the "Vandermonde" protocol for generating random shares. Likewise, we use the optimized DN [17] protocol for semi-honest multiplication and the second version of our protocol (which is based on semi-honest multiplications). For large fields, where we can set \(\delta = 1\), we obtain that by Eq. (10), each party needs to send 42 elements per multiplication gate (due to 6 semi-honest multiplications at a cost of 6 elements each, and 3 random share generations at a cost of 2 elements each). This therefore proves Theorem 1.1 from the Introduction.

The threshold. Based on the above, when \(5(n - 1) < 42\) the first protocol is better. Thus, the first protocol should perform better when the number of parties is \(n \leq 9\), and the second protocol should perform better when \(n > 9\). This theoretical analysis is validated experimentally in Section 7 and confirms this exactly. In Table 1, the protocol labeled PRSS_GRR_open is the first protocol, whereas van_DN_mult is the last protocol. As can be seen, PRSS_GRR_open is better than van_DN_mult up to 9 parties. As shown in Section 7, other protocol variants are however better between 9 and 70 parties.

**6.2 Three-Party Computation Based on Replicated Secret Sharing**

In [3], a three-party protocol based on a type of replicated secret sharing was presented, in which each party sends a single field element per multiplication gate. In this section, we instantiate our protocol compiler with the semi-honest protocol of [3] (for arithmetic circuits) to obtain a highly efficient protocol with security in the presence of a malicious adversary corrupting at most 1 party. We stress that protocols that require that less than 1/3 of the parties are corrupted cannot be used at all for the case of 3 parties.

We begin by presenting the replicated secret-sharing scheme, prove some properties of it, and characterize correctness. Our replicated secret-sharing is a simplified version of that presented in [3], and the multiplication protocol has the same complexity as theirs. We also show how to optimize Protocol 4.2 even further in this specific case.

We stress that for Boolean circuits (i.e., the field \(\mathbb{F}_2\)), a malicious version for the semi-honest protocol of [3], was already presented in [19]. However, our construction for large fields is fundamentally different from theirs, as it is tailored for large fields.

**6.2.1 The Secret Sharing Scheme and Its Properties.**

Replicated secret-sharing. In order to share an element \(v \in \mathbb{F}\), the dealer chooses three random elements \(r_1, r_2, r_3 \in \mathbb{F}\) under the constraint that \(r_1 + r_2 + r_3 = v\). Then, the dealer shares the secret so that \(P_1\)‘s share is \((r_1, r_1)\), \(P_2\)‘s share is \((r_2, r_1)\) and \(P_3\)’s share is \((r_3, r_2)\). We abuse notation and denote \(P_i\)’s share by \((r_i, r_{i-1})\), even for \(i = 1\). It is easy to see that this is a valid secret sharing scheme that preserves privacy. In addition, the secret together with the share of any one party fully determines the shares of the other parties. We use \([v]\) to denote a sharing of \(v\) according to this scheme.

Linearity. We define the following local operations on shares:

- **Addition** \([v_1] + [v_2]\): Given a share \((r_1, r_{1-1})\) of \(v_1\) and a share \((r_2, r_{2-1})\) of \(v_2\), the sum of the shares is obtained by each party \(P_i\) computing: \((r_i, r_{i-1}) = (r_1 + r_2, r_{1-1} + r_{2-1})\).
- **Multiplication by a scalar \(\sigma\)**: Given a share \((r_1, r_{1-1})\) of \(v\) and a value \(\sigma \in \mathbb{F}\), each party \(P_i\) computes \((\sigma \cdot r_{i}, \sigma \cdot r_{i-1})\).
• **Addition of a scalar** $[\nu] + \sigma$: Given a share $(r_i, r_{i-1})$ of $\nu$ and a value $\sigma \in \mathbb{F}$, party $P_1$ computes $(r_1 + \sigma, r_3)$, party $P_2$ computes $(r_2, r_1 + \sigma)$, and party $P_3$ leaves its share as is.

Note that when writing $[v_1] + [v_2]$ the symbol “+” is an operator on shares and not addition of two numbers, whereas when we write $v_1 + v_2$ the symbol “+” is addition in the field, likewise for the product notation. The following claim states that these operators are correct, and is straightforward to prove.

**Claim 6.1.** Let $[v_1]$, $[v_2]$ be shares and let $\sigma \in \mathbb{F}$ be a scalar. Then:

1. $[v_1] + [v_2] = [v_1 + v_2]$,
2. $\sigma [v_1] = [\sigma \cdot v_1]$, and
3. $[v_1] + \sigma = [v_1 + \sigma]$.

**Correctness.** In the three parties setting, it is not possible to have shares that are value-inconsistent, since there is only one ever subset of $t + 1$ honest parties. However, the sharing might be invalid. This is the exact opposite situation to Shamir shares which are always valid but may be value-inconsistent when $n > 3$.

It will be useful to characterize the correctness of shares in this case. Consider the case that $P_1$ is corrupted. Then, $P_2$ is supposed to hold $(r_2, r_1)$ and $P_3$ is supposed to hold $(r_3, r_2)$. Thus, the sharing is valid (and thus correct) if and only if the first element held by $P_2$ equals the second element held by $P_3$.

**Claim 6.2.** Let $(r_1, s_1), (r_2, s_2)$ and $(r_3, s_3)$ be the shares held by parties $P_1, P_2$ and $P_3$, respectively, and let $P_1$ be the corrupted party.

Then, the shares are correct if and only if $r_{i+1} = s_i$.

**6.2.2 Basic Building Blocks and Sub-Protocols.**

$F_{\text{rand}}$ - Generating shares of random values. The parties can generate shares of random values non-interactively in the following way. Let $F_k(\cdot)$ be a pseudorandom function. Then:

- **Initialization:** Each party $P_i$ chooses a random key $k_i$ and sends it to $P_{i+1}$. Each party initializes a counter $id = 0$.

- **Share generation:** Upon each request to generate a sharing, each party $P_i$ holding two keys $k_i$ and $k_{i-1}$ sets $id = id + 1$ and computes $r_{i-3} = F_{k_{i-1}}(id)$ and $r_i = F_k(id)$. Then, $P_i$ outputs the share $(r_i, r_{i-1})$.

Note that the random sharing output from the protocol is guaranteed to be correct, since the protocol requires no communication.

It is not difficult to show that this protocol securely realizes $F_{\text{rand}}$.

$\pi_{\text{multi}}$ - Semi-Honest Multiplication Protocol. We describe the multiplication protocol in which each party sends only one field element. Let $(r_1, r_3), (r_2, r_1), (r_3, r_2)$ be a secret sharing of $v_1$, and let $(s_1, s_3), (s_2, s_1), (s_3, s_2)$ be a secret sharing of $v_2$. We assume that the parties $P_1, P_2, P_3$ hold correlated randomness $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3$, respectively, where $\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha_3 = 0$. The parties compute shares of $v_1 \cdot v_2$ as follows:

1. **Step 1 - compute $(\beta)_{\text{sharing}}$:** Each party $P_i$ computes $t_1 = r_i s_1 + r_i s_{i+1} + r_{i-1} s_i + \alpha_i$ and sends it to $P_{i+1}$. These messages are computed and sent in parallel.

2. **Step 2 - compute $(\gamma)_{\text{sharing}}$:** Party $P_i$ computed $t_1$ and received $t_{i-1}$ from $P_{i-1}$; party $P_i$ outputs $(t_1, t_{i-1})$ as its share on the output wire. (If $P_i$ received $t_{i-1} \notin \mathbb{F}$ then it sets $t_{i-1}$ to a default element in $\mathbb{F}$.)

Observe that $t_1 + t_2 + t_3 = \sum_{i=1}^3 (r_i s_i + r_i s_{i+1} + r_{i-1} s_i + \alpha_i) = v_1 \cdot v_2$, where the equality follows since $\sum_{i=1}^3 \alpha_i = 0$ and $v_1 \cdot v_2 = (r_1 + r_2 + r_3)(s_1 + s_2 + s_3)$. Thus, when the parties are honest, the obtained sharing is a correct sharing of $v_1 \cdot v_2$. In addition, the protocol achieves privacy in the presence of a malicious adversary according to Definition 2.5, as the adversary’s view consists of one element that looks random, due to the fact that it is masked using a random element $\alpha_i$. We now show that the above multiplication protocol (for semi-honest adversaries) always yields correct shares, even when run in the presence of a malicious adversary. Specifically, the result is either a correct sharing of the product or of a different field element (depending on the adversary), but it is always correct.

**Lemma 6.3.** If $[v_1]$ and $[v_2]$ are correct and $[v_3]$ was generated by executing the (semi-honest) multiplication protocol on $[v_1]$ and $[v_2]$ in the presence of one malicious party, then $[v_3]$ is a correct sharing of either $v_1 \cdot v_2$ or of some element $\nu \in \mathbb{F}$.

**Proof.** If the corrupted party follows the protocol specification then $[v_3]$ is a correct sharing of $v_1 \cdot v_2$. Else, since the multiplication protocol is symmetric, assume without loss of generality that $P_1$ is the corrupted party. Then, the only way that $P_1$ can deviate from the protocol specification is by sending an incorrect element $t_1$ to the honest $P_2$ instead of $t_1$, and in this case $P_2$ will define its share to be $(t_2, t_1)$. Meanwhile, $P_3$ defines its share to be $(t_3, t_2)$, since it receives $t_2$ from the honest $P_2$. By Claim 6.2 the shares are correct, since the first element of $P_2$’s share equals the second element of $P_3$’s share. Furthermore, the shares that $P_2$ and $P_3$ hold define the secret $\nu = t_1 + t_2 + t_3 \in \mathbb{F}$, as required.

Using similar arguments as in Lemma 6.3, it can be shown that the semi-honest multiplication protocol is also secure up to additive attack. However, we won’t be needing this property in this instantiation as explained below.

**Generating correlated randomness non-interactively.** Generating elements $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3 \in \mathbb{F}$ under the constraint that $\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha_3 = 0$ can be done in an almost identical way as generating shares of random values described above. In a set-up step, each party $P_i$ chooses a key $k_i$ and sends it to $P_{i+1}$. Then, in order to generate correlated randomness, each party computes $\alpha_i = F_{k_{i-1}}(id) - F_{k_i}(id)$ using the two keys it holds (and after incrementing id); observe that $\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha_3 = 0$, but each party knows nothing beyond its own $\alpha$. Using this method, the parties can generate all the correlated randomness needed at the cost of one exchange of keys.

**The open and reconstruct procedures.** We use the fact that the protocols described so far guarantee that correctness of shares is maintained even in the presence of a malicious adversary, to construct these procedures in an efficient way.

The open([v]) procedure (the opening of a share to all parties) works in the following way: Holding the share $(r_1, r_{i-1})$, each party $P_i$ sends the element $r_{i-1}$ to party $P_{i+1}$. Then, upon receiving $r_{i-2}$ (i.e., $r_{i-1}$) from $P_{i-1}$, party $P_i$ computes $v = r_1 + r_j + r_{i-1}$. Note that this does not guarantee that the parties will hold the same correct value. However, if the sharing is correct, then we are guaranteed that one of the honest parties will hold the correct value, and thus the parties can compare their views to detect cheating.

Let compareview(\(v\)) be a procedure where each party $P_i$ sends $v_i$
to $P_{i+1}$. Then, $P_i$ checks that $v_i \equiv v_{i-1}$ and aborts if not. Adding this comparison to the open procedure doubles the communication. However, in the protocol, we can reduce communication by deferring all view comparisons to the end of the protocol, and then compare a hash of all of the values to be compared throughout the execution. This method of deferring comparisons to the end is similar to the deferred MAC verification of the TinyOT and SPDZ protocols [16, 18, 32]; we use this method throughout. Thus, we conclude that the procedure requires each party to send 1 field element only per multiplication gate.

The reconstruct([v],i) procedure works by having party $P_{i-1}$ send $r_{i-2}$ to $P_i$ and party $P_{i+1}$ send $r_{i+1}$ to $P_i$. Then, $P_i$ checks that $r_{i-2} = r_{i+1}$. If not, it sends ⊥ and aborts. If yes, it computes $v = r_{i-2} + r_{i-1} + r_i$. This works since, if the corrupted party cheats and sends the wrong value, then it will be detected by $P_i$. As before, this procedure works only when [v] is correct. If this is not guaranteed, then reconstruction can be carried out by both parties sending $P_i$ their entire share (at double the communication cost).

The share(v) procedure. We define this procedure in a similar way to [19], relying on the fact that the protocol for generating random shares provides correct sharings. First, the parties generate a random sharing [r]. Then, they run reconstruct([r],i). Holding r, the dealer $P_i$ sends $b = v - r$ to the other parties. Finally, the parties run compareview(b) to ensure that the dealer sent them the same value (recall that in the protocol we defer the view comparisons to the end and then only send a single hash value, so this does not require communication). If no ⊥ message was received, the parties define their share of v to be $[r] + b$ (as defined above).

Since we are guaranteed that [r] is correct, then $[v] = [r] + b$ is also correct, assuming that the honest parties hold the same b as ensured by running compareview(b).

6.2.3 Optimizing the Protocol - Reducing the Communication. With the building blocks that we presented in the previous subsection, the protocol is now completely defined. However, we can improve the performance even further, using an optimization that is unique to the secret sharing scheme used in this instantiation.

Before proceeding, observe that the cost of the opening procedure and the semi-honest multiplicative protocol are identical (one element sent per party). Thus, it is clear that in the three-party case, Protocol 3.4 (triple verification based on opening shares) is cheaper than Protocol 3.8 (triple verification based on multiplication), as the former requires 3 openings whereas the latter requires 4 multiplications per gate. We now present an optimization that reduces the number of openings in Protocol 3.4 from 3 to 2, reducing the communication per multiplication gate by 1 field element. Recall that in Protocol 3.4 the parties compute a sharing [v], and then open it and verify that it is a sharing 0. In addition, recall that in the sharing scheme, each party $P_i$ holds a pair $(r_i, r_{i-1})$. Thus, if $v = 0$, then $r_{i-1} + r_i + r_{i+1} = 0$ and so $r_{i-1} + r_i = -r_{i+1}$. Now, since we are guaranteed that the parties hold a correct sharing of v (the triples that are input to the multiplication protocol are correct and all operations during the protocol maintain this property), the only question that remains is whether [v] is a sharing of 0 or of some other value in the field. This can be verified by having each pair of parties $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$ compare the values of $r_{i-1} + r_i$ and $-r_{i+1}$. Thus, it is possible to include these values in the view comparison hash that is verified at the end of the entire protocol, instead of running open([v]) at each multiplication gate. This single comparison can be done efficiently by comparing the hash values of the strings that hold the shares from all Protocol 3.4 executions. Specifically, each party $P_i$ needs to hold two strings; in the first string, it stores the $r_{i-1} + r_i$ from the [v] shares it viewed, whereas in the second, it stores $-r_{i+1}$ from these shares. The hash of the first string is compared with the hash value of party $P_{i+1}$, and the hash of the second string is compared with the hash value of $P_{i-1}$. For completeness we present the resulted verification protocol in Appendix C.

6.2.4 Putting It All Together.

The protocol. For the three-party setting based on replicated secret sharing, we obtain a single protocol (unlike the Shamir case). First, observe that using our sharing procedure presented above, there is no need to run the input correctness-checking step. In addition, the parties run the optimized verification protocol explained in the previous section. Finally, we add an additional step before the output reconstruction, where the parties compare their views by sending each other a hash of their views. This step comes with constant small communication cost, and thus does not change the cost per gate. The full protocol is presented in Appendix C.

Efficiency. As generation of random shares is essentially free, the cost of the protocol per multiplication gate involves two semi-honest multiplications and two openings for verification. Thus, $1 + 3δ$ elements are sent by each party per gate, as both opening and multiplication involves sending one element per party.

In large fields, where $|F| > 2^{α}$ and $δ = 1$, we obtain that each party needs to send only 4 field elements per multiplication gate. This therefore proves Theorem 1.3 from the Introduction.
DN [17]; (3) verification via opening (Section 3.3) or via multiplication (Section 3.4). Since the verification via multiplication requires that the semi-honest multiplication protocol be secure up to additive attacks for malicious adversaries, this is only relevant for the [17] protocol. Thus, there are 6 possible options. We denote the random generation options by PRSS and van, the multiplication options by GRR and DN, and the verification options by open and mult. Using this notation, we denote by van_DN_mult the protocol that uses Vandermonde randomness generation, DN multiplication and verification via multiplication. We ran only 4 versions of the protocol. Specifically, we did not run the versions combining PRSS randomness generation and DN multiplication. This is because PRSS randomness generation works only for a small number of parties (it is exponential in the number of parties and therefore was run only for up to 11 parties) whereas DN multiplication is only better for a large number of parties. Thus, this combination is not optimal. In addition, we implemented our three-party protocol using replication sharing, from Section 6.2. We denote this protocol by replicated.

See Table 1 for the results of these protocol executions. Our results clearly validate our theoretical analysis that our 3-party protocol based on replicated sharing is the best for 3 parties, that PRSS randomness generation is best for only a very small number of parties (n ≤ 7), that DN multiplication becomes better than GRR multiplication only for a large number of parties (n > 11), and that verification with multiplication is preferred for a very large number of parties (n > 70) since it is asymptotically linear.

Figure 1 below shows the comparison of the 4 different Shamir-based protocols for 3 to 90 parties. The graph clearly demonstrates the linear complexity of the van_DN_mult protocol, and thus it is less efficient for a small number of parties but far more efficient as the number of parties grows. In contrast, the PRSS protocol increases exponentially, and the others quadratically (at different rates). In order to more closely see the behavior of the protocols for a small number of parties, see Figure 2 below.

**Field size.** As mentioned above, we ran experiments both for the 31-bit and 61-bit fields. As can be seen in Figure 3, the running time is very similar when using a 61-bit field (and taking δ = 1) versus using a 31-bit field (and taking δ = 2). This makes sense because by Equations (9) and (10), the communication is almost linear in δ. Thus, the number of field elements sent when δ = 2 is approximately twice the number of field elements sent when δ = 1. Since the size of a single 61-bit field element is approximately twice the size of a 31-bit field element, we have that the communication is similar. Having said the above, we do observe that the protocol using a 61-bit field is slightly better for a small number of parties (n ≤ 9), whereas the protocol using a 31-bit field is slightly better for a larger number of parties (n ≥ 11). This can be explained by the fact that communication costs are more significant for a larger number of parties, and two times Eq. (9) with δ = 1 is slightly higher than one times Eq. (9) with δ = 2. Concretely, in van_DN_open the number of field elements is t(δ_open) = 6, t(δ_rand) = 2 and t(open) = n − 1; thus, for n = 11, we have that 46 group elements are sent with δ = 1 and 86 group elements are sent with δ = 2. Given that each group element is twice the size for δ = 1, we have that this is 7% more communication.

<table>
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<th>Protocol version</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>90</th>
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<td>replicated (3 party)</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6719</td>
<td>18024</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>58966</td>
<td>72096</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Execution time in milliseconds of the circuit with a 61-bit prime, for different numbers of parties. The best time for each number of parties is highlighted.
We thank the anonymous reviewers and Mike Rosulek for helpful comments and discussion. We also thank Meital Levy and Hila Dathi for the protocol implementation, and Lior Koskas for running the experiments.

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REFERENCES


A DEFINITION OF SECURITY

The security parameter is denoted \( \kappa \); negligible functions and computational indistinguishability are defined in the standard way, with respect to non-uniform polynomial-time distinguishers.

Ideal versus real model definition. We use the ideal/real simulation paradigm in order to define security, where an execution in the real world is compared to an execution in an ideal world where an incorruptible trusted party computes the functionality for the
parties [9, 26]. We define security with abort (and without fairness), meaning that the corrupted party may receive output while the honest parties do not. Our definition does not guarantee unanimous abort, meaning that some honest party may receive output while the other does not. It is easy to modify our protocols so that the honest parties unanimously abort by running a single (weak) Byzantine agreement at the end of the execution [27]; we therefore omit this step for simplicity.

Note that with an honest majority, it is possible to achieve fairness (assuming a broadcast channel). Nevertheless, our protocol does not guarantee this, and we do not know how to modify it to guarantee fairness without significantly sacrificing efficiency.

The real model. In the real model, a \( n \)-party protocol \( \pi \) is executed by the parties. For simplicity, we consider a synchronous network that proceeds in rounds and a rushing adversary, meaning that the adversary receives its incoming messages in a round before it sends its outgoing message. The adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) can be malicious; it sends all messages in place of the corrupted party, and can follow any arbitrary strategy. The honest parties follow the instructions of the protocol.

Let \( \mathcal{A} \) be a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary controlling \( t < \frac{n}{2} \) parties. Let \( \text{real}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}(z)}(x_1, \ldots, x_n, \kappa) \) denote the output of the honest parties and \( \mathcal{A} \) in an real execution of \( \pi \), with inputs \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \), auxiliary-input \( z \) for \( \mathcal{A} \), and security parameter \( \kappa \).

The ideal model. We define the ideal model, for any (possibly reactive) functionality \( \mathcal{F} \), receiving inputs from \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) and providing them outputs. Let \( I \subset \{1, \ldots, n\} \) be the set of indices of the corrupted parties controlled by the adversary. The ideal execution proceeds as follows:

- **Send inputs to the trusted party:** Each honest party \( P_j \) sends its specified input \( x_j \) to the trusted party. A corrupted party \( P_i \) controlled by the adversary may either send its specified input \( x_i \), some other \( x_i' \), or an abort message.
- **Early abort option:** If the trusted party received abort from the adversary \( \mathcal{A} \), it sends \( \bot \) to all parties and terminates. Otherwise, it proceeds to the next step.
- **Trusted party sends output to the adversary:** The trusted party computes each party’s output as specified by the functionality \( \mathcal{F} \) based on the inputs received; denote the output of \( P_j \) by \( y_j \). The trusted party then sends \( \{y_i\}_{i \in I} \) to the corrupted parties.
- **Adversary instructs trusted party to continue or halt:** For each \( j \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \) with \( j \notin I \), the adversary sends the trusted party either abort \( j \) or continue \( j \). For each \( j \notin I \):
  - If the trusted party received abort \( j \), then it sends \( P_j \) the abort value \( \bot \) for output.
  - If the trusted party received continue \( j \), then it sends \( P_j \) its output value \( y_j \).

\footnote{This modeling is only for simplicity, since in our protocol, all parties receive and send messages in each round. Thus, by instructing each party to only send their round \( t + 1 \) messages after receiving all round \( t \) messages, we have that an execution of the protocol in an asynchronous network is the same as for a rushing adversary in a synchronous network. Note that we do not guarantee output delivery, so "hanging" of the protocol is also allowed.}

- **Outputs:** The honest parties always output the output value they obtained from the trusted party, and the corrupted parties outputs nothing.

Let \( S \) be a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary controlling parties \( P_i \) for \( i \in I \). Let \( \text{ideal}_{\mathcal{F}, S(z)}(x_1, \ldots, x_n, \kappa) \) denote the output of the honest parties and \( S \) in an ideal execution with the functionality \( \mathcal{F} \), inputs \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) to the parties, auxiliary-input \( z \) to \( S \), and security parameter \( \kappa \).

Security. Informally speaking, the definition says that protocol \( \pi \) securely computes \( f \) if adversaries in the ideal world can simulate executions of the real world protocol. In some of our protocols there is a statistical error that is not dependent on the computational security parameter. As in [30], we formalize security in this model by saying that the distinguisher can distinguish with probability at most this error plus some factor that is negligible in the security parameter. This is formally different from the standard definition of security since the statistical error does not decrease as the security parameter increases.

**Definition A.1.** Let \( \mathcal{F} \) be a \( n \)-party functionality, and let \( \pi \) be a \( n \)-party protocol. We say that \( \pi \) securely computes \( f \) with abort in the presence of an adversary controlling \( t < \frac{n}{2} \) parties, if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) in the real world, there exists a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time simulator/adversary \( S \) in the ideal model with \( \mathcal{F} \), such that for every \( I \subset \{1, \ldots, n\} \) with \( |I| = t \),

\[
\{\text{ideal}_{\mathcal{F}, S(z)}(x_1, \ldots, x_n, \kappa)\} \subseteq \{\text{real}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}(z)}(x_1, \ldots, x_n, \kappa)\}
\]

where \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \in \mathbb{F}^n \) under the constraint that \( |x_1| = \cdots = |x_n| \), \( z \in \mathbb{F}^n \) and \( \kappa \in \mathbb{N} \). We say that \( \pi \) securely computes \( f \) with abort in the presence of one malicious party with statistical error \( 2^{-\sigma} \) if there exists a negligible function \( \mu(\cdot) \) such that the distinguishing probability of the adversary is less than \( 2^{-\sigma} + \mu(\kappa) \).

The hybrid model. We prove the security of our protocols in a hybrid model, where parties run a protocol with real messages and also have access to a trusted party computing a subfunctionality for them. The modular sequential composition theorem of [9] states that one can replace the trusted party computing the subfunctionality with a real secure protocol computing the subfunctionality. When the subfunctionality is \( g \), we say that the protocol works in the \( g \)-hybrid model.

Universal Composability [10]. Protocols that are proven secure in the universal composability framework have the property that they maintain their security when run in parallel and concurrently with other secure and insecure protocols. In [29, Theorem 1.5], it was shown that any protocol that is proven secure with a black-box non-rewinding simulator and also has the property that the inputs of all parties are fixed before the execution begins (called input availability or start synchronization in [29]), is also secure under universal composability. Since the input availability property holds for all of our protocols and subprotocols, it is sufficient to prove security in the classic stand-alone setting and automatically derive universal composability from [29]. We remark that this also enables us to call the protocol and subprotocols that we use in parallel and concurrently (and not just sequentially), enabling us to achieve
more efficient computation (e.g., by running many executions in parallel or running each layer of a circuit in parallel).

B PROTOCOLS FOR COMPUTATION BASED ON SHAMIR’S SECRET SHARING SCHEME

B.1 Protocols For Generating Random Sharings

The PRSS protocol [13]. In this protocol, there is a setup step where the parties generate a random key $k_A$ for each subset $A \subset \{P_1, \ldots, P_n\}$ of $n - t$ parties (known only to the parties in the subset). In addition, for each such subset there is a polynomial $f_A$ of degree $i + 1$ defined by the points: (1) $f_A(0) = 1$; (2) $f_A(i) = 0$ for all $i$ such that $P_i \in \{P_1, \ldots, P_n\} \setminus A$. Then, each party uses the keys it holds to generate random sharings without any interaction. The protocol is described in Protocol B.1.

**PROTOCOL B.1 (The PRSS Protocol for Generating Random Shares).**

Let $F_k()$ be a pseudo-random function with security parameter $k$.

- **Set-up step:** For each $A \subset \{P_1, \ldots, P_n\}$, such that $|A| = n - t$, the party with the smallest lexicographic index chooses a random key $k_A$ and sends it to all the other parties in $A$.

- **Upon request:** For each $A \subset \{P_1, \ldots, P_n\}$, such that $|A| = n - t$, let $f_A$ be a $t + 1$-degree polynomial defined by the points: (1) $f_A(0) = 1$; (2) $f_A(i) = 0$ for all $i$ such that $P_i \in \{P_1, \ldots, P_n\} \setminus A$. Then, each party $P_i$ computes

$$s_i = \sum_{A \subset \{P_1, \ldots, P_n\} \setminus \{P_i\}, |A| = n - t, P_i \in A} F_{k_A}(id) \cdot f_A(i)$$

where $id$ is public counter that is incremented for each new request, and define $s_i$ as its share.

**Batch generation of random shares using hyper-invertible matrices.**

The previous protocol is communication free, but its computational cost grows exponentially with the number of parties, as the number of random keys is $\binom{n}{t}$. The next protocol has linear communication and computational cost. The idea behind the protocol is to use the Vandermonde matrix to extract randomness from $n - t$ random sharings into $n - t$ random sharings. Let $y_1, \ldots, y_n \in \mathbb{F}$ be $n$ distinct non-zero elements. The Vandermonde matrix $V_n \in \mathbb{F}^{n \times n}$ is a matrix of $n$ rows and $\ell$ columns defined by

$$V_n = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & y_1 & \cdots & y_1^{\ell-1} \\ 1 & y_2 & \cdots & y_2^{\ell-1} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 1 & y_n & \cdots & y_n^{\ell-1} \end{bmatrix}$$

We use the notation $V_n^{-1}$ to denote the inverse of the Vandermonde matrix. Likewise, the transpose of the matrix is denoted by $V_n^T$. The Vandermonde matrix has the property that if we take a subset of $\ell$ rows to form a square matrix of $\ell$ rows and $\ell$ columns, then the obtained matrix is guaranteed to be invertible. A matrix with this property is called “hyper-invertible”. A consequence of this property is that the Vandermonde matrix can be used to extract randomness in the following way. First, each party chooses a random element and shares it to the other parties. Then, holding a vector of $n$ shares, the parties generate “new” random shares by multiplying this vector with the Vandermonde matrix. It can be shown that the hyper-invertible property of the matrix implies that the obtained shares are sharings of a random elements in $\mathbb{F}$ [6]. The protocol is described in Protocol B.2.

**PROTOCOL B.2 (Batch Generation of Random Shares Using Vandermonde Matrix).**

Let $V_{n-t}$ be the Vandermonde matrix defined above.

1. Each party $P_i$ chooses a random element $u_i \in \mathbb{F}$ and run share($u_i$).
2. Holding $n$ shares $\{[u_1], \ldots, [u_n]\}$, each party $P_i$ computes $\{[r_1], \ldots, [r_{n-t}]\} = V_{n-t}^T \cdot ([u_1], \ldots, [u_n])$, and defines $\{[r_1], \ldots, [r_{n-t}]\}$ as its output of the protocol.

Note that each party sends $n - 1$ elements to generate $n - t$ shares. Thus, the amortized communication complexity per generated share is roughly 2, since $t < \frac{n}{2}$.

B.2 Protocols For Semi-Honest Multiplication

The GRR protocol. This protocol works by having each party locally multiply its shares of the inputs, and share the result to all the other parties. Then, upon holding $n$ shares, each party locally computes a linear combination of the shares, and define the result as its share on the output wire. The coefficients used for the linear combination are taken from the first row of $V_{n-t}^{-1}$, which is the inverse of the square $n \times n$ Vandermonde matrix defined above. To understand why the protocol is correct see [25]. The protocol is described in Protocol B.3.

**PROTOCOL B.3 (The GRR Semi-Honest Multiplication Protocol).**

Let $V_n$ be the Vandermonde matrix defined above, and let $\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_n$ be the values in the first row of $V_{n-t}^{-1}$.

- **Inputs:** The parties hold sharings $[x]$ and $[y]$.
- **The protocol:**

  1. Let $f_x^1, f_y^1$ be the shares held by party $P_i$. Then, each party $P_i$ computes $v_i = f_x^1 \cdot f_y^1$ and run share($v_i$).
  2. Let $h_f^1$ be the share sent from $P_i$ to $P_j$ in the previous step. Upon receiving shares from all the other parties, each party $P_i$ sets its share of $x \cdot y$ to be the result of the linear combination $\sum_{j=1}^{n} \lambda_j \cdot h_f^j$.

In the protocol, each party sends exactly $n - 1$ elements, and thus the overall communication complexity is quadratic in the number of parties.

The DN protocol. This next protocol, which is an optimized version of [17], requires each party to send few field elements regardless of the number of parties. The protocol has a set-up step where the parties generate two random sharings $[r_1]$ and $[r_{2t}]$ of the same value $r$, using $t$-degree and $2t$-degree polynomials in respectively. These shares are then used to multiply $x$ and $y$ which are shared among the parties. A full description appears in Protocol B.4.

C PROTOCOLS FOR THREE-PARTY COMPUTATION BASED ON REPLICAED SECRET SHARING

Protocol C.1 is the optimized verification of a multiplication triple using another, for the three-party setting. The difference between
Let $V_n$ be the Vandermonde matrix defined above.

- **Inputs**: The parties hold sharings $[x]$ and $[y]$.
- **Setup phase**: The parties generate a list of $n-1$ double random shares $\{[r_k]_1, [r_k]_2\}_{k=1}^{n-1}$ where $[r_k]_1$ is a sharing of $r_k$ using a $t$-degree polynomial and $[r_k]_2$ is a sharing of $r_k$ using a $2t$-degree polynomial. This generation works as follows: Each party chooses a random element $u$ and shares it twice, using a $t$-degree polynomial and a $2t$-degree polynomial. Then, upon holding two vectors of random shares, the parties multiply each of them with $V_n$ as described in Protocol B.2.

**The protocol:**

(1) The parties locally compute $[x] \cdot [y] - [r]_{10}$ and send the result to party $P_1 \{[x] \cdot [y]\}$. Each party locally computes its own share $[x] \cdot [y]$.

(2) Party $P_1$ uses the first $2t$ shares received from the parties and its own share to reconstruct $x \cdot y - r$, and then sends it to all the other parties (Note that this is not the same as in the reconstruct procedure, as here there is no correctness check of the shares!).

(3) The parties locally compute $[r]_x = (x y - r)$. Each party sets its result to be its share of $x \cdot y$.

**The main protocol for the three-party setting is described in Protocol C.2.** Recall that in this protocol, there is no need for the correctness check step after the input are shared, as the share procedure outputs correct shares.

Deferring compareview. In each execution of the open procedure in the verification protocol, the parties are required to compare their views. Instead of comparing the views each time a sub-protocol is executed, we can save communication by having the parties storing their views and comparing them at the end of the entire execution. Specifically, each party $P_j$ will need to hold three strings, denoted by $H_j, H_{j,j+1}$ and $H_{j,j-1}$. The string $H_j$ will be used to store the views in the open procedure. The strings $H_{j,j+1}$ and $H_{j,j-1}$ will store the $t$ and $s$ parts of $[v]$ that were viewed in all the executions of the verification protocol in the way described at the end of Section 6.2 (to replace the last call of the open in the verification protocol).

At the end of the entire execution, each party $P_j$ computes $h_j = HASH(H_j), h_{j,j+1} = HASH(H_{j,j+1})$ and $h_{j,j-1} = HASH(H_{j,j-1})$ where $HASH()$ is collision-resistant hash function. Then, each party $P_j$ sends $h_j$ and $h_{j,j+1}$ to P_{j+1}. Upon receiving $h_{j-1}$ and $h_{j-1,j}$ from P_{j}, party $P_j$ checks that $h_j = h_{j-1}$ and that $h_{j,j-1} = h_{j-1,j}$. If not, party $P_j$ sends $⊥$ to the other parties and aborts. A remark of high importance is that it is required that the comparisons of $h_j$ will be completed before sending $h_{j,j+1}$ to $P_{j+1}$. This is explained by observing that in the proof of the verification protocol, we rely on the fact that cheating in the first two openings was detected before running the last opening. Thus, in order to maintain this property, it is necessary to complete the comparison of the view from the first openings before sending any data viewed in the last opening.