Attribute-Based Signatures for Turing Machines

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Abstract. Attribute-based signatures (ABS) support restricted signing keys which allow signers to sign messages with respect to specific signing credentials or attributes that are accepted by the signing policies embedded within the signing keys. This paper presents the first ABS scheme supporting signing policies representable by Turing machines (TM), based on indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) for circuits. Our work places no constraint on the types of TM’s that can be associated with the signing keys in the sense that the TM’s can accept signing attribute strings of unbounded polynomial length and there is no limit on the description size or space complexity of the TM’s. Prior ABS schemes could support at most circuit-realizable signing policies, and consequently could deal with signing attribute strings whose lengths are fixed during setup.

Keywords: attribute-based signatures, Turing machines, indistinguishability obfuscation

1 Introduction

In a traditional digital signature scheme, each signer possesses a secret signing key and publishes its corresponding verification key. A signature on some message issued by a certain signer is verified with respect to the public verification key of the respective signer, and hence during the verification process, the explicit signer gets identified. In other words, standard digital signatures can guarantee no privacy in the relationship between signers and claims attested by signatures due to the tight correspondence between the signing and verification keys.

Attribute-based signatures (ABS), introduced by Maji et al. [12], aims to relax such a firm relationship between signers and signatures issued by them, thereby ensuring some form of signer privacy. ABS comes in two flavors, namely, key-policy and ciphertext-policy. In a key-policy ABS scheme, a setup authority holds a master signing key and publishes system public parameters. Using its master signing key, the authority can distribute restricted signing keys corresponding to specific signing policies. Such a constrained signing key enables a signer to sign messages with respect to only those signing attributes which are accepted by the signing policy embedded within the signing key. The signatures are verifiable by anyone using solely the public parameters. By verifying a signature on some message with respect to some signing attributes, a verifier gets convinced that the signature is indeed generated by a signer possessing a signing key corresponding to some signing policy that accepts the signing attributes. However, the verifier cannot trace the exact signer or signing policy used to generate the signature. The ciphertext-policy variant interchanges the roles of signing attributes and signing policies. Other than being an exciting primitive in its own right, ABS has countless interesting practical applications such as attribute-based messaging, attribute-based authentication, anonymous credential systems, trust negotiation, and leaking secrets.

A central theme of research in the field of ABS has been to expand the class of admissible signing policies in view of implementing ABS in scenarios where the correspondence between signers and signatures is more and more sophisticated. Starting with the initial work of Maji et al. [12], which supports signing policies realizable by monotone span programs, the family of supported signing policies has been progressively enlarged by Okamoto and Takashima [14] to admit non-monotone span programs, and further by Tang et al. [18] as well as Sakai et al. [17] to realize arbitrary polynomial-size circuits. Bellare and Fuchsbauer [2] have put forth a versatile cryptographic primitive termed as policy-based signatures (PBS) and have exhibited a generic transformation from PBS to ABS. Their generic conversion can be used in conjunction with their proposed PBS construction to instantiate ABS for general circuits. However, due to the use of span programs or circuits, all the existing ABS constructions are limited to signing attributes expressible as binary strings of bounded length, where the bound is determined during the setup. This is a serious bottleneck not only for ABS itself, but also for all the aforementioned applications of ABS.
Our Contribution: In this paper, we overcome the restriction of apriori bounded length signing attributes. More specifically, we present the first ever key-policy ABS scheme realizing the most general type of signing policies along with unconstrained polynomial-length signing attribute strings. Our ABS construction is relies on indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) for circuits, injective pseudorandom generators, and certain additional IO-compatible cryptographic tools. We note that other than IO, all the cryptographic building blocks employed in our construction have efficient instantiations base on standard number theoretic assumptions or one-way functions. In our ABS construction, signing policies are represented as Turing machines (TM), which can deal with signing attribute strings of arbitrary polynomial length as opposed to circuits. On a more positive note, we place no restriction on the description size or space complexity of the signing policy TM’s, thereby, are able to capture the highly general form of signing policies. Our ABS construction is shown to possess strong signer privacy and existential unforgeability against selective attribute adaptive chosen message attacks. Our principal technical contribution lies in innovating new elegant ideas to extend the intricate techniques of Koppula et al. [11] for constructing a message-hiding encoding scheme for Turing machines and those of Deshpande et al. [5] for building constrained pseudorandom functions (CPRF) for unconstrained-length inputs secure in the selective challenge selective constraints model, to deal with the adaptive signing key queries of the adversary in our unforgeability experiment. At this point we would like to mention that many recent works [11,5] have also extended the techniques of [11,5] to adaptive settings to address various interesting open problems of modern cryptography. Those techniques may be employed to solve the problem considered in this paper as well. However, observe that the techniques developed in [11,5] involve the use of more advanced variants of the cryptographic tools employed in [11,5] such as adaptive or history-less positional accumulators.

2 Preliminaries

Here we give the necessary background on various cryptographic tools which we will be using in the sequel. Let $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ denotes the security parameter. For $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $a, b \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\}$ (with $a < b$), we let $[n] = \{1, \ldots, n\}$ and $[a, b] = \{a, \ldots, b\}$. For any set $S$, $v \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} S$ represents the uniform random variable on $S$. For a randomized algorithm $R$, we denote by $\psi = R(v; \rho)$ the random variable defined by the output of $R$ on input $v$ and randomness $\rho$, while $\psi \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} R(v)$ has the same meaning with the randomness suppressed. Also, if $R$ is a deterministic algorithm $\psi = R(v)$ denotes the output of $R$ on input $v$. We will use the alternative notation $R(v) \rightarrow \psi$ as well to represent the output of the algorithm $R$, whether randomized or deterministic, on input $v$. For any string $s \in \{0,1\}^*$, $|s|$ represents the length of the string $s$. For any two strings $s, s' \in \{0,1\}^*,$ $s || s'$ represents the concatenation of $s$ and $s'$. A function $\text{negl}$ is negligible if for every integer $c$, there exists an integer $k$ such that for all $\lambda > k$, $|\text{negl}(\lambda)| < 1/X^c$.

2.1 Turing Machines

A Turing machine (TM) $M$ is a 7-tuple $M = (Q, \Sigma_{\text{INS}}, \Sigma_{\text{TAP}}, \delta, q_0, q_{\text{AC}}, q_{\text{REJ}})$ with the following semantics:

- $Q$: The finite set of possible states of $M$.
- $\Sigma_{\text{INS}}$: The finite set of input symbols.
- $\Sigma_{\text{TAP}}$: The finite set of tape symbols such that $\Sigma_{\text{INS}} \subset \Sigma_{\text{TAP}}$ and there exists a special blank symbol $\cdot$ $\in \Sigma_{\text{TAP}} \setminus \Sigma_{\text{INS}}$.
- $\delta : Q \times \Sigma_{\text{TAP}} \rightarrow Q \times \Sigma_{\text{TAP}} \times \{+1, -1\}$: The transition function of $M$.  
- $q_0 \in Q$: The designated start state.
- $q_{\text{AC}} \in Q$: The designated accept state.
- $q_{\text{REJ}}(\neq q_{\text{AC}}) \in Q$: The distinguished reject state.

For any $t \in [T = 2^\lambda]$, we define the following variables for $M$, while running on some input (without the explicit mention of the input in the notations):

- $\text{POS}_{M,t}$: An integer which denotes the position of the header of $M$ after the $t^{th}$ step. Initially, $\text{POS}_{M,0} = 0$. 

Definition 2.1 (Indistinguishability Obfuscation: IO) An indistinguishability obfuscator (IO) \( \mathcal{IO} \) for a circuit class \( \{C_\lambda\}_\lambda \) is a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) uniform algorithm satisfying the following conditions:

- **Correctness**: \( \mathcal{IO}(1^\lambda, C) \) preserves the functionality of the input circuit \( C \), i.e., for any \( C \in C_\lambda \) if we compute \( C' = \mathcal{IO}(1^\lambda, C) \), then \( C'(v) = C(v) \) for all inputs \( v \).

- **Indistinguishability**: For any security parameter \( \lambda \) and any two circuits \( C_0, C_1 \in C_\lambda \) with same functionality, the circuits \( \mathcal{IO}(1^\lambda, C_0) \) and \( \mathcal{IO}(1^\lambda, C_1) \) are computationally indistinguishable. More precisely, for all (not necessarily uniform) PPT adversaries \( D = (D_1, D_2) \), there exists a negligible function \( \negl \) such that, if

\[
\Pr[(C_0, C_1, \xi) \leftarrow D_1(1^\lambda) : \forall v, C_0(v) = C_1(v)] \geq 1 - \negl(\lambda),
\]

then

\[
\left| \Pr[D_2(\xi, \mathcal{IO}(1^\lambda, C_0)) = 1] - \Pr[D_2(\xi, \mathcal{IO}(1^\lambda, C_1)) = 1] \right| \leq \negl(\lambda).
\]

We remark that the two distinct algorithms \( D_1 \) and \( D_2 \), which pass state \( \xi \), can be viewed equivalently as a single stateful algorithm \( D \). In this paper we employ the latter approach, although here we present the definition as it appears in [6]. When clear from the context, we will drop \( 1^\lambda \) as an input to \( \mathcal{IO} \).

The circuit class we are interested in are polynomial-size circuits, i.e., when \( C_\lambda \) is the collection of all circuits of size at most \( \lambda \). This circuit class is denoted by \( \mathcal{P} / \mathcal{P} \). The first candidate construction of \( \mathcal{IO} \) for \( \mathcal{P} / \mathcal{P} \) was presented by Garg et al. [6] in a generic model of encoded matrices. Later, Pass et al. [15] and Gentry et al. [8] have shown that \( \mathcal{IO} \) for \( \mathcal{P} / \mathcal{P} \) can be developed based on a single instance-independent assumption.

2.3 IO-Compatible Cryptographic Primitives

In this section, we describe the notions of certain IO-friendly cryptographic tools used in our ABS construction.

2.3.1 Puncturable Pseudorandom Function

A puncturable pseudorandom function, introduced by Sahai and Waters [16], is a pseudorandom function (PRF) with the additional property that given a master PRF key, it is possible to derive punctured PRF keys that enable the evaluation of the PRF at all points of the input domain except the punctured points, whereas given such a punctured key, the PRF output still remains pseudorandom at the punctured point.

Definition 2.2 (Puncturable Pseudorandom Function: PPRF) A puncturable pseudorandom function (PPRF) \( \mathcal{F} : K_{\text{PPRF}} \times X_{\text{PRF}} \rightarrow Y_{\text{PPRF}} \) consists of an additional punctured key space \( K_{\text{PPRF-punc}} \) other than the usual key space \( K_{\text{PPRF}} \) and the PPT algorithms \( (\mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}, \mathcal{F}.\text{Eval}, \mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}, \mathcal{F}.\text{Eval-Punctured}) \) described below. Here, \( X_{\text{PRF}} = \{0,1\}^{\ell_{\text{PRF-skip}}} \) and \( Y_{\text{PPRF}} = \{0,1\}^{\ell_{\text{PRF-output}}} \), where \( \ell_{\text{PRF-skip}} \) and \( \ell_{\text{PRF-output}} \) are polynomials in the security parameter \( \lambda \).

\( \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow K \): The setup authority takes as input the security parameter \( 1^\lambda \) and uniformly samples a PPRF key \( K \in K_{\text{PPRF}} \).
The algorithms have the following syntax:

\[ \mathcal{F}.\text{Eval}(K, x) \rightarrow r : \text{The setup authority takes as input a PPRF key } K \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{PPRF}} \text{ along with an input } x \in \mathcal{X}_{\text{PPRF}}. \text{ It outputs the PPRF value } r \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{PPRF}} \text{ on } x. \text{ For simplicity, we will represent by } \mathcal{F}(K, x) \text{ the output of this algorithm.} \]

\[ \mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}(K, x) \rightarrow K\{x\} : \text{Taking as input a PPRF key } K \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{PPRF}} \text{ along with an element } x \in \mathcal{X}_{\text{PPRF}}, \text{ the setup authority outputs a punctured key } K\{x\} \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{PPRF-PUNC}}. \]

\[ \mathcal{F}.\text{Eval-Punctured}(K\{x\}, x') \rightarrow r \text{ or } \bot : \text{An evaluator takes as input a punctured key } K\{x\} \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{PPRF-PUNC}} \text{ along with an input } x' \in \mathcal{X}_{\text{PPRF}}. \text{ It outputs either a value } r \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{PPRF}} \text{ or a distinguished symbol } \bot \text{ indicating failure. For simplicity, we will represent by } \mathcal{F}(K\{x\}, x') \text{ the output of this algorithm.} \]

The algorithms \( \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup} \) and \( \mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture} \) are randomized, whereas, \( \mathcal{F}.\text{Eval} \) and \( \mathcal{F}.\text{Eval-Punctured} \) are deterministic.

\textbf{Correctness under Puncturing:} Consider any security parameter } \lambda \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{PPRF}}, x \in \mathcal{X}_{\text{PPRF}}, \text{ and } K\{x\} \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{PPRF}}. \text{ Then it must hold that}

\[ \mathcal{F}(K\{x\}, x') = \begin{cases} \mathcal{F}(K, x'), & \text{if } x' \neq x \\ \bot, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \]

\textbf{Selective Pseudorandomness at Punctured Points:} This property of a PPRF is defined through the following experiment between an adversary } \mathcal{B} \text{ and a challenger } \mathcal{C}:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \( \mathcal{B} \) submits a challenge input } x^* \in \mathcal{X}_{\text{PPRF}} \text{ to } \mathcal{C}.
  \item \( \mathcal{C} \) chooses uniformly at random a PPRF key } K^* \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_{\text{PPRF}} \text{ and a random bit } \hat{b} \in \{0, 1\}. \text{ It computes the punctured key } K^*\{x^*\} \leftarrow \mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}(K^*, x^*). \text{ If } \hat{b} = 0, \text{ it sets } r^* = \mathcal{F}(K^*, x^*). \text{ Otherwise, it selects } r^* \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}_{\text{PPRF}}. \text{ It sends back } (K^*\{x^*\}, r^*) \text{ to } \mathcal{B}.
  \item \( \mathcal{B} \) outputs a guess } \hat{b}' \in \{0, 1\}. \text{ The PPRF } \mathcal{F} \text{ is selectively pseudorandom at punctured points if for any PPT adversary } \mathcal{B}, \text{ for any security parameter } \lambda,
\end{itemize}

\[ \text{Adv}_B^{\mathcal{F}^{\text{SEL-PR}}} (\lambda) = |\Pr[\hat{b} = \hat{b}'] - 1/2| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda) \]

for some negligible function } \text{neg}. \text{ Bonch and Waters } [3], \text{ have shown that the tree-based PRF constructed by Goldreich et al. } [9] \text{ can be readily modified to build a PPRF from one-way functions.}

\subsection{Somewhere Statistically Binding Hash Function}

We provide the definition of somewhere statistically binding hash function as defined by Hubacek et al. [10]. A somewhere statistically binding hash can be used to create a short digest of some long string. A hashing key is created by specifying a special binding index and the generated hashing key gets the property that the hash value of some string created with the hashing key is statistically binding for the specified index, meaning that the hash value completely determines the symbol of the hashed input at that index. In other words, even if some hash value has several pre-images, all of those pre-images agree in the symbol at the specified index. The index on which the hash is statistically binding should remain computationally hidden given the hashing key. Moreover, it is possible to prove that the input string underlying a given hash value contains a specific symbol at a particular index, by providing a short opening value.

\textbf{Definition 2.3 (Somewhere Statistically Binding Hash Function: SSB Hash) } [10][13]. A somewhere statistically binding (SSB) hash consists of the PPT algorithms (SSB.Gen, \( \mathcal{H} \), SSB.Open, SSB.Verify) along with a block alphabet } \Sigma_{\text{SSB-BLK}} = \{0, 1\}^\ell_{\text{SSB-BLK}}, \text{ output size } \ell_{\text{SSB-HASH}}, \text{ and opening space } \Pi_{\text{SSB}} = \{0, 1\}^\ell_{\text{SSB-OPEN}}, \text{ where } \ell_{\text{SSB-BLK}}, \ell_{\text{SSB-HASH}}, \ell_{\text{SSB-OPEN}} \text{ are some polynomials in the security parameter } \lambda. \text{ The algorithms have the following syntax:}

SSB.Gen(\lambda, n_{\text{SSB-BLK}}, i^*) \rightarrow HK : \text{The setup authority takes as input the security parameter } \lambda, \text{ an integer } n_{\text{SSB-BLK}} \leq 2^\lambda \text{ representing the maximum number of blocks that can be hashed, and an index } i^* \in [0, n_{\text{SSB-BLK}} - 1] \text{ and publishes a public hashing key } HK.

SSB.Open : x \in S_{\text{SSB-BLK}} \rightarrow h \in \{0, 1\}^\ell_{\text{SSB-OPEN}} : \text{This is a deterministic function that has the hash key } HK \text{ hardwired. A user runs this function on input } x = x_0 \ldots x_{n_{\text{SSB-BLK}} - 1} \in \Sigma_{\text{SSB-BLK}} \text{ to obtain as output } h = SSB.HK(x) \in \{0, 1\}^\ell_{\text{SSB-OPEN}}.
Correctness: For any security parameter $\lambda$, integer $n_{\text{ssb-blk}} \leq 2^\lambda$, $i, i^* \in [0, n_{\text{ssb-blk}} - 1]$, and submits them to $C$.

$\mathcal{B}$ eventually outputs a guess bit $\hat{b} \in \{0, 1\}$.

The SSBS hash is said to be index hiding if for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{B}$, for any security parameter $\lambda$,

$$Adv_{\text{SSB}}(\lambda) = \left| \Pr[\hat{b} = \hat{b}'] - 1/2 \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

for some negligible function $\text{negl}$.

Somewhere Statistically Binding: An SSBS hash key $HK$ is said to be statistically binding for an index $i^* \in [0, n_{\text{ssb-blk}} - 1]$ if there do not exist any $h \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{ssb-hash}}}$, $u \neq u' \in \Sigma_{\text{ssb-blk}}$, such that

$$SSB.\text{Verify}(h, i^*, u, \pi_{\text{ssb}}) = 1 \Rightarrow SSB.\text{Verify}(h, i^*, u', \pi'_{\text{ssb}}).$$

The SSBS hash is defined to be somewhere statistically binding if for any security parameter $\lambda$, integer $n_{\text{ssb-blk}} \leq 2^\lambda$, index $i^* \in [0, n_{\text{ssb-blk}} - 1]$, the hash key $HK \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} SSB.\text{Gen}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ssb-blk}}, i^*)$ is statistically binding for $i^*$. Note that this is an information theoretic property.

The first construction of an SSBS hash is presented by Hubacek et al. [10]. Their construction is based on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [7]. Recently, Okamoto et al. [13] provides alternative constructions of SSBS hash based on various standard number theoretic assumptions. Such as the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. In this paper, we consider $\ell_{\text{ssb-blk}} = 1$ and $n_{\text{ssb-blk}} = 2^\lambda$.

2.3.3 Positional Accumulator

We will now present the notion of a positional accumulator as defined by Koppula et al. [11]. Intuitively, a positional accumulator is a cryptographic data structure that maintains two values, namely, a storage value and an accumulator value. The storage value is allowed to grow comparatively large, while the accumulator value is constrained to be short. Message symbols can be written to various positions in the underlying storage, and new accumulated values can be computed as a string, knowing only the previous accumulator value and the newly written symbol together with its position in the data structure. Since the accumulator values are small, one cannot hope to recover everything written in the storage from the accumulator value alone. However, there are additional helper algorithms which essentially allow a party who is maintaining the full storage to help a more restricted party maintaining only the accumulator value recover the data currently written at an arbitrary location. The helper is not necessarily trusted, so the party maintaining the accumulator value performs a verification procedure in order to be convinced that it is indeed reading the correct symbols.

Definition 2.4 (Positional Accumulator [11]). A positional accumulator consists of the PPT algorithms (ACC.Setup, ACC.Setup-Enforce-Read, ACC.Setup-Enforce-Write, ACC.Prep-Read, ACC.Prep-Write, ACC.Verify-Read, ACC.Write-Store, ACC.Update) along with a block alphabet $\Sigma_{\text{acc-blk}} = \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{acc-blk}}}$, accumulator size $\ell_{\text{acc-accumulate}}$, proof space $H_{\text{acc}} = \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{acc-proof}}}$ where $\ell_{\text{acc-blk}}, \ell_{\text{acc-accumulate}}, \ell_{\text{acc-proof}}$ are some polynomials in the security parameter $\lambda$. The algorithms have the following syntax:

$$\text{ACC.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{acc-blk}}) \rightarrow (\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0) : \text{The setup authority takes as input the security parameter } 1^\lambda \text{ and an integer } n_{\text{acc-blk}} \leq 2^\lambda \text{ representing the maximum number of blocks that can be accumulated. It outputs the public parameters } \text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, \text{an initial accumulator value } w_0, \text{and an initial storage value } \text{STORE}_0.$$
The following correctness properties are required to be satisfied: 

\[ \lambda \]

\[ \text{ACC.Setup-Enforce-Read}(\lambda^\ast, n_{\text{acc-blk}}, ((x_1, i_1), \ldots, (x_\kappa, i_\kappa)), i^\ast) \rightarrow (\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0) : \] Taking as input the security parameter \( \lambda^\ast \), an integer \( n_{\text{acc-blk}} \leq 2^\lambda \) representing the maximum number of blocks that can be accumulated, a sequence of symbol-index pairs \( ((x_1, i_1), \ldots, (x_\kappa, i_\kappa)) \in (\Sigma_{\text{acc-blk}} \times [0, n_{\text{acc-blk}} - 1])^\kappa \), and an additional index \( i^\ast \in [0, n_{\text{acc-blk}} - 1] \), the setup authority publishes the public parameters \( \text{PP}_{\text{acc}} \), an initial accumulator value \( w_0 \), together with an initial storage value \( \text{STORE}_0 \).

\[ \text{ACC.Setup-Enforce-Write}(\lambda^\ast, n_{\text{acc-blk}}, ((x_1, i_1), \ldots, (x_\kappa, i_\kappa)), \text{STORE}_0) : \] On input the security parameter \( \lambda^\ast \), an integer \( n_{\text{acc-blk}} \leq 2^\lambda \) denoting the maximum number of blocks that can be accumulate, and a sequence of symbol-index pairs \( ((x_1, i_1), \ldots, (x_\kappa, i_\kappa)) \in (\Sigma_{\text{acc-blk}} \times [0, n_{\text{acc-blk}} - 1])^\kappa \), the setup authority publishes the public parameters \( \text{PP}_{\text{acc}} \), an initial accumulator value \( w_0 \), as well as, an initial storage value \( \text{STORE}_0 \).

\[ \text{ACC.Prepare-Read}(\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, \text{STORE}_0, i_\lambda) \rightarrow (x_{\text{out}}, \pi_{\text{acc}}) : \] A storage-maintaining party takes as input the public parameters \( \text{PP}_{\text{acc}} \), a storage value \( \text{STORE}_0 \), and an index \( i_\lambda \in [0, n_{\text{acc-blk}} - 1] \). It outputs a symbol \( x_{\text{out}} \in \Sigma_{\text{acc-blk}} \cup \{ \epsilon \} \) (\( \epsilon \) being the empty string) and a proof \( \pi_{\text{acc}} \in \Pi_{\text{acc}} \).

\[ \text{ACC.Write-Store}(\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, \text{STORE}_0, i_\lambda, x_{\text{in}}) \rightarrow \text{STORE}_0^\ast : \] On input the public parameters \( \text{PP}_{\text{acc}} \), a storage value \( \text{STORE}_0 \), an index \( i_\lambda \in [0, n_{\text{acc-blk}} - 1] \), and a symbol \( x_{\text{in}} \in \Sigma_{\text{acc-blk}} \), a storage-maintaining party computes a new storage value \( \text{STORE}_0^\ast \).

\[ \text{ACC.Update}(\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, \text{STORE}_0, i_\lambda, \text{AUX}) \rightarrow \text{STORE}_0^\ast_\lambda : \] An accumulator-updating party takes as input the public parameters \( \text{PP}_{\text{acc}} \), an accumulator value \( \text{STORE}_0 \), an index \( i_\lambda \in [0, n_{\text{acc-blk}} - 1] \), and an auxiliary value \( \text{AUX} \). It outputs the updated accumulator value \( \text{STORE}_0^\ast_\lambda \) along with \( \text{STORE}_0^\ast_\lambda \).

Following [11][8], in this paper we will consider the algorithms \( \text{ACC.Setup}, \text{ACC.Setup-Enforce-Read}, \text{ACC.Setup-Enforce-Write} \) as randomized while all other algorithms as deterministic.

**Correctness:** Consider any symbol-index pair sequence \(( (x_1, i_1), \ldots, (x_\kappa, i_\kappa)) \in (\Sigma_{\text{acc-blk}} \times [0, n_{\text{acc-blk}} - 1])^\kappa \). Fix any \(( \text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0 ) \triangleq \text{ACC.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{acc-blk}}) \). For \( j = 1, \ldots, \kappa \), iteratively define the following:

\begin{align*}
- & \text{STORE}_j = \text{ACC.Write-Store}(\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, \text{STORE}_{j-1}, i_j, x_j) \\
- & \text{AUX}_j = \text{ACC.Prepare-Write}(\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, \text{STORE}_{j-1}, i_j) \\
- & w_j = \text{ACC.Update}(\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, w_{j-1}, i_j, \text{AUX}_j)
\end{align*}

The following correctness properties are required to be satisfied:

i) For any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( n_{\text{acc-blk}} \leq 2^\lambda \), index \( i^\ast \in [0, n_{\text{acc-blk}} - 1] \), sequence of symbol-index pairs \(( (x_1, i_1), \ldots, (x_\kappa, i_\kappa)) \in (\Sigma_{\text{acc-blk}} \times [0, n_{\text{acc-blk}} - 1])^\kappa \), and \(( \text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0 ) \triangleq \text{ACC.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{acc-blk}}) \), if \( \text{STORE}_\kappa \) is computed as above, then \( \text{ACC.Prepare-Read}(\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, \text{STORE}_\kappa, i^\ast) \) returns \(( x_j, \pi_{\text{acc}} ) \) where \( j \) is the largest value in \( [\kappa] \) such that \( i_j = i^\ast \).

ii) For any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( n_{\text{acc-blk}} \leq 2^\lambda \), sequence of symbol-index pairs \(( (x_1, i_1), \ldots, (x_\kappa, i_\kappa)) \in (\Sigma_{\text{acc-blk}} \times [0, n_{\text{acc-blk}} - 1])^\kappa \), \( i^\ast \in [0, n_{\text{acc-blk}} - 1] \), and \(( \text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0 ) \triangleq \text{ACC.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{acc-blk}}) \), if \( \text{STORE}_\kappa \) and \( w_\kappa \) are computed as above and \(( x_{\text{out}}, \pi_{\text{acc}} ) = \text{ACC.Prepare-Read}(\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, \text{STORE}_\kappa, i^\ast) \), then \( \text{ACC.Verify-Read}(\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, w_\kappa, x_{\text{out}}, i^\ast, \pi_{\text{acc}}) = 1 \).

**Indistinguishability of Read Setup:** This property of a positional accumulator is defined through the following experiment between an adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) and a challenger \( \mathcal{C} \):

- \( \mathcal{B} \) chooses a bound \( n_{\text{acc-blk}} \leq 2^\lambda \) of the number of blocks, \( \kappa \) symbol-index pairs \(( (x_1, i_1), \ldots, (x_\kappa, i_\kappa)) \in (\Sigma_{\text{acc-blk}} \times [0, n_{\text{acc-blk}} - 1])^\kappa \), and an index \( i^\ast \in [0, n_{\text{acc-blk}} - 1] \). It submits all of those to \( \mathcal{C} \).
- \( \mathcal{C} \) selects a random bit \( \hat{b} \triangleq 0, 1 \). If \( \hat{b} = 0 \), \( \mathcal{C} \) generates \(( \text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0 ) \triangleq \text{ACC.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{acc-blk}}) \).

Otherwise, \( \mathcal{C} \) forms \(( \text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0 ) \triangleq \text{ACC.Setup-Enforce-Read}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{acc-blk}}, ((x_1, i_1), \ldots, (x_\kappa, i_\kappa)), i^\ast) \). It returns \(( \text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0 ) \) to \( \mathcal{B} \).

- \( \mathcal{B} \) outputs a guess bit \( \hat{b}' \in \{0, 1\} \),
The positional accumulator is said to satisfy indistinguishability of read setup if for any PPT adversary $B$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, we have

$$\text{Adv}^\text{ACC.IND-READ}_B(\lambda) = \left| \Pr[b = \hat{b}'] - 1/2 \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

for some negligible function $\text{negl}$.

**Indistinguishability of Write Setup:** This property of a positional accumulator is defined through the following experiment between an adversary $B$ and a challenger $C$:

- $B$ chooses a bound $n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} \leq 2^\lambda$ of the number of blocks, and $\kappa$ symbol-index pairs $((x_1, i_1), \ldots, (x_\kappa, i_\kappa)) \in (\Sigma_{\text{ACC-BLK}} \times [0, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} - 1])^\kappa$. It submits all of those to $C$.

- $C$ selects a random bit $\hat{b} \in \{0, 1\}$. If $\hat{b} = 0$, $C$ generates $(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0) \xleftarrow{\}$ $\text{ACC.Setup}(\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}})$. Otherwise, $C$ generates $(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0) \xleftarrow{\}$ $\text{ACC.Setup-Enforce-Write}(\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}}, ((x_1, i_1), \ldots, (x_\kappa, i_\kappa)))$. It returns $(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0)$ to $B$.

- $B$ outputs a guess bit $\hat{b}' \in \{0, 1\}$.

A positional accumulator is said to satisfy indistinguishability of write setup if for any PPT adversary $B$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, we have

$$\text{Adv}^\text{ACC.IND-WRITE}_B(\lambda) = \left| \Pr[b = \hat{b}'] - 1/2 \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

for some negligible function $\text{negl}$.

**Read Enforcing:** Consider any security parameter $\lambda$, $n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} \leq 2^\lambda$, and $\kappa$ symbol-index pairs $((x_1, i_1), \ldots, (x_\kappa, i_\kappa)) \in (\Sigma_{\text{ACC-BLK}} \times [0, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} - 1])^\kappa$. Let $(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0) \xleftarrow{\}$ $\text{ACC.Setup-Enforce-Read}(\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}}, ((x_1, i_1), \ldots, (x_\kappa, i_\kappa)))$. For $j = 1, \ldots, \kappa$, iteratively define the following:

- $\text{STORE}_j = \text{ACC.Write-Store}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{j-1}, i_j, x_j)$
- $\text{AUX}_j = \text{ACC.Prepare-Write}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{j-1}, i_j)$
- $w_j = \text{ACC.Update}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_{j-1}, x_j, i_j, \text{AUX}_j)$

The positional accumulator is said to be read enforcing if $\text{ACC.Verify-Read}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_n, x_\text{IN}, i^*, \pi_{\text{ACC}}) = 1$ implies either $[i^* \notin \{i_1, \ldots, i_\kappa]\} \land [x_\text{IN} = \epsilon] \lor [x_\text{IN} = x_j]$ for the largest $j \in [\kappa]$ such that $i_j = i^*$. Note that this is an information theoretic property.

**Write Enforcing:** Consider any security parameter $\lambda$, $n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} \leq 2^\lambda$, and $\kappa$ symbol-index pairs $((x_1, i_1), \ldots, (x_\kappa, i_\kappa)) \in (\Sigma_{\text{ACC-BLK}} \times [0, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} - 1])^\kappa$. Let $(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0) \xleftarrow{\}$ $\text{ACC.Setup-Enforce-Write}(\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}}, ((x_1, i_1), \ldots, (x_\kappa, i_\kappa)))$. For $j = 1, \ldots, \kappa$, iteratively define the following:

- $\text{STORE}_j = \text{ACC.Write-Store}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{j-1}, i_j, x_j)$
- $\text{AUX}_j = \text{ACC.Prepare-Write}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{j-1}, i_j)$
- $w_j = \text{ACC.Update}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_{j-1}, x_j, i_j, \text{AUX}_j)$

The positional accumulator is defined to be write enforcing if $\text{ACC.Update}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_{n-1}, x_\kappa, \kappa, \text{AUX}) = w_\text{OUT} \neq \bot$, for any AUX, implies $w_\text{OUT} = w_n$. Observe that this is an information theoretic property as well.


### 2.3.4 Iterator

Here, we define cryptographic iterators again following [11]. Informally speaking, a cryptographic iterator consists of a small state that is updated in an iterative fashion as messages are received. An update to incorporate a new message given the current state is performed with the help of some public parameters. Since, states are relatively small regardless of the number of messages that have been iteratively incorporated, there is in general many sequences of messages that lead to the same state. However, the security property requires that the normal public parameters should be computationally indistinguishable from specially constructed enforcing parameters which ensure that a particular state can only be obtained as the outcome of an update to precisely one other state-message pair. Note that this enforcement is a very localized property to a specific state and hence can be achieved information-theoretically when it is fixed ahead of time where exactly this enforcement is desired.
Definition 2.5 (Iterator \cite{Koppula2021}). A cryptographic iterator consists of the PPT algorithms (ITR.Setup, ITR.Setup-Enforce, ITR.Iterate) along with a message space $\mathcal{M}_{\text{ITR}} = \{0,1\}^{\ell_{\text{ITR},\text{msg}}}$ and iterator state size $\ell_{\text{ITR},\text{st}}$, where $\ell_{\text{ITR},\text{msg}}, \ell_{\text{ITR},\text{st}}$ are some polynomials in the security parameter $\lambda$. Algorithms have the following syntax:

- **ITR.Setup**: $\lambda, n_{\text{ITR}} \rightarrow (\mathbb{P}_{\text{ITR}}, v_0)$: The setup authority takes as input the security parameter $1^\lambda$ along with an integer bound $n_{\text{ITR}} \leq 2^\lambda$ on the number of iterations. It outputs the public parameters $\mathbb{P}_{\text{ITR}}$ and an initial state $v_0 \in \{0,1\}^{\ell_{\text{ITR},\text{st}}}$.
- **ITR.Setup-Enforce**: $(\lambda, n_{\text{ITR}}, (\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_k)) \rightarrow (\mathbb{P}_{\text{ITR}}, v_0)$: Taking as input the security parameter $1^\lambda$, an integer bound $n_{\text{ITR}} \leq 2^\lambda$, together with a sequence of $k$ messages $(\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_k) \in \mathcal{M}_{\text{ITR}}^k$, the setup authority publishes the public parameters $\mathbb{P}_{\text{ITR}}$ and an initial state $v_0 \in \{0,1\}^{\ell_{\text{ITR},\text{st}}}$.
- **ITR.Iterate**: $(\mathbb{P}_{\text{ITR}}, v_{\text{in}} \in \{0,1\}^{\ell_{\text{ITR},\text{msg}}}, \mu) \rightarrow v_{\text{out}}$: On input the public parameters $\mathbb{P}_{\text{ITR}}$, a state $v_{\text{in}}$, and a message $\mu \in \mathcal{M}_{\text{ITR}}$, an iterator outputs an updated state $v_{\text{out}} \in \{0,1\}^{\ell_{\text{ITR},\text{st}}}$. For any integer $k \leq n_{\text{ITR}}$, we will write $\text{ITR.Iterate}^k(\mathbb{P}_{\text{ITR}}, v_{\text{in}}, (\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_k))$ to denote ITR.Iterate$(\mathbb{P}_{\text{ITR}}, v_{\text{in}}, (\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_k))$.

The algorithm ITR.Iterate is deterministic, while the other two are randomized.

**Indistinguishability of Enforcing Setup**: This property of a cryptographic iterator is defined through the following experiment between an adversary $B$ and a challenger $C$:

- $B$ chooses an integer bound $n_{\text{ITR}} \leq 2^\lambda$, along with a sequence of $k$ messages $(\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_k) \in \mathcal{M}_{\text{ITR}}^k$, and submits them to $C$.
- $C$ selects a random bit $b \in \{0,1\}$. If $b = 0$, $C$ generates $(\mathbb{P}_{\text{ITR}}, v_0) \leftarrow \text{ITR.Setup}(\lambda, n_{\text{ITR}})$. Else, $C$ generates $(\mathbb{P}_{\text{ITR}}, v_0) \leftarrow \text{ITR.Setup-Enforce}(\lambda^\lambda, n_{\text{ITR}}, (\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_k))$. It sends back $(\mathbb{P}_{\text{ITR}}, v_0)$ to $B$.
- $B$ outputs a guess bit $\hat{b} \in \{0,1\}$.

The cryptographic iterator is said to satisfy indistinguishability of enforcing setup if for any PPT adversary $B$, for any security parameter $\lambda$,

$$\text{Adv}_B^{\text{ITR,IND-ENF}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\hat{b} = \hat{b}'] - 1/2| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

for some negligible function $\text{negl}$.

**Enforcing**: Consider any security parameter $\lambda$, $n_{\text{ITR}} \leq 2^\lambda$, $k \leq n_{\text{ITR}}$, and $(\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_k) \in \mathcal{M}_{\text{ITR}}^k$. Let $(\mathbb{P}_{\text{ITR}}, v_0) \leftarrow \text{ITR.Setup}(\lambda, n_{\text{ITR}}, (\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_k))$ and $v_j = \text{ITR.Iterate}(\mathbb{P}_{\text{ITR}}, v_{j-1}, (\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_k))$ for all $j \in [k]$. The cryptographic iterator is said to be enforcing if $v_k = \text{ITR.Iterate}(\mathbb{P}_{\text{ITR}}, v', (\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_k))$ implies $(v', (\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_k)) = (v_{k-1}, (\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_k))$. Note that this is an information theoretic property.

Koppula et al. \cite{Koppula2021} have presented a construction of cryptographic iterators from IO and one-way function.

### 2.3.5 Splittable Signature

The following background on splittable signatures is taken verbatim from Koppula et al. \cite{Koppula2021} as well. A splittable signature scheme is essentially a normal signature scheme augmented by some additional algorithms that produce alternative signing and verification keys with different capabilities. More precisely, there are “all-but-one” signing and verification keys which work correctly for all messages except for a specific one, as well as there are “one” signing and verification keys which work only for a particular message. Additionally, there are “reject” verification keys which always reject signatures.

**Definition 2.6 (Splittable Signature: SPS \cite{Koppula2021})**: A splittable signature scheme (SPS) for message space $\mathcal{M}_{\text{SPS}} = \{0,1\}^{\ell_{\text{SPS},\text{msg}}}$ and signature space $\mathcal{S}_{\text{SPS}} = \{0,1\}^{\ell_{\text{SPS},\text{sig}}}$, where $\ell_{\text{SPS},\text{msg}}, \ell_{\text{SPS},\text{sig}}$ are some polynomials in the security parameter $\lambda$, consists of the PPT algorithms (SPS.Setup, SPS.Sign, SPS.Verify, SPS.Split, SPS.Sign-ABO) which are described below:

- **SPS.Setup**: $\lambda \rightarrow (\mathbb{S}_{\text{SPS}}, \mathbb{V}_{\text{SPS}}, \mathbb{V}_{\text{SPS},\text{REJ}})$: The setup authority takes as input the security parameter $1^\lambda$ and generates a signing key $\mathbb{S}_{\text{SPS}}$, a verification key $\mathbb{V}_{\text{SPS}}$, together with a reject verification key $\mathbb{V}_{\text{SPS},\text{REJ}}$.
- **SPS.Sign** $(\mathbb{S}_{\text{SPS}}, m) \rightarrow \sigma_{\text{SPS}}$: A signer given a signing key $\mathbb{S}_{\text{SPS}}$ along with a message $m \in \mathcal{M}_{\text{SPS}}$, produces a signature $\sigma_{\text{SPS}} \in \mathcal{S}_{\text{SPS}}$. 


SPS.Verify(VK_{SPS}, m, σ_{SPS}) → ̂β ∈ {0, 1}: A verifier takes as input a verification key VK_{SPS}, a message m ∈ M_{SPS}, and a signature σ_{SPS} ∈ S_{SPS}. It outputs a bit ̂β ∈ {0, 1}.

SPS.Split(SK_{SPS}, m*) → (σ_{SPS-one,m*}, VK_{SPS-one}, SK_{SPS-ABO}, VK_{SPS-ABO}): On input a signing key SK_{SPS} along with a message m* ∈ M_{SPS}, the setup authority generates a signature σ_{SPS-one,m*} = SPS.Sign(SK_{SPS}, m*), a one-message verification key VK_{SPS-one}, and all-but-one signing-verification key pair (SK_{SPS-ABO}, VK_{SPS-ABO}).

SPS.Sign-ABO(SK_{SPS-ABO}, m) → σ_{SPS} or ⊥: An all-but-one signer given an all-but-one signing key SK_{SPS-ABO} and a message m ∈ M_{SPS}, outputs a signature σ_{SPS} ∈ S_{SPS} or a distinguished string ⊥ to indicate failure. For simplicity of notation, we will often use SPS.Sign(SK_{SPS-ABO}, m) to represent the output of this algorithm.

We note that among the algorithms described above, SPS.Setup and SPS.Split are randomized while all the others are deterministic.

**Correctness:** For any security parameter λ, message m* ∈ M_{SPS}, (SK_{SPS}, VK_{SPS}, VK_{SPS-rej}) ← SPS.Setup(1^λ), and (σ_{SPS-one,m*}, VK_{SPS-one}, SK_{SPS-ABO}, VK_{SPS-ABO}) ← SPS.Split(SK_{SPS}, m*) the following correctness conditions hold:

i) ∀ m ∈ M_{SPS}, SPS.Verify(VK_{SPS}, m, SPS.Sign(SK_{SPS}, m)) = 1.

ii) ∀ m ≠ m* ∈ M_{SPS}, SPS.Sign(SK_{SPS}, m) = SPS.Sign-ABO(SK_{SPS-ABO}, m).

iii) ∀ σ_{SPS} ∈ S_{SPS}, SPS.Verify(VK_{SPS-one,m*}, σ_{SPS}) = SPS.Verify(VK_{SPS}, m*, σ_{SPS}).

iv) ∀ m ≠ m* ∈ M_{SPS}, σ_{SPS} ∈ S_{SPS}, SPS.Verify(VK_{SPS-ABO}, m, σ_{SPS}) = SPS.Verify(VK_{SPS}, m, σ_{SPS}).

v) ∀ m ≠ m* ∈ M_{SPS}, σ_{SPS} ∈ S_{SPS}, SPS.Verify(VK_{SPS-one}, m, σ_{SPS}) = 0.

vi) ∀ σ_{SPS} ∈ S_{SPS}, SPS.Verify(VK_{SPS-ABO}, m*, σ_{SPS}) = 0.

vii) ∀ m ∈ M_{SPS}, σ_{SPS} ∈ S_{SPS}, SPS.Verify(VK_{SPS-rej}, m, σ_{SPS}) = 0.

**VK_{SPS-rej} Indistinguishability:** This property of a splittable signature scheme is defined through the following experiment between an adversary B and a challenger C:

- C generates (SK_{SPS}, VK_{SPS}, VK_{SPS-rej}) ← SPS.Setup(1^λ). Next it chooses a random bit ̂b ← {0, 1}. If ̂b = 0, it sends VK_{SPS} to B. Otherwise, it sends VK_{SPS-rej} to B.
- B outputs a guess bit ̂b’ ∈ {0, 1}.

The splittable signature scheme is said to be VK_{SPS-rej} indistinguishable if for any PPT adversary B, for any security parameter λ,

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{SPS-ind-rej}}_{B}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\hat{b} = \hat{b}’] - 1/2| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

for some negligible function negl.

**VK_{SPS-one} Indistinguishability:** This feature of a splittable signature scheme is defined through the following experiment between an adversary B and a challenger C:

- B submits a message m* ∈ M_{SPS} to C.
- C generates (SK_{SPS}, VK_{SPS}, VK_{SPS-rej}) ← SPS.Setup(1^λ). Next it computes (σ_{SPS-one,m*}, VK_{SPS-one}, SK_{SPS-ABO}, VK_{SPS-ABO}) ← SPS.Split(SK_{SPS}, m*). Then it chooses a random bit ̂b ← {0, 1}. If ̂b = 0, it returns (σ_{SPS-one,m*}, VK_{SPS-one}) to B. Else, it returns (σ_{SPS-one,m*}, VK_{SPS}) to B.
- B outputs a guess bit ̂b’ ∈ {0, 1}.

The splittable signature scheme is said to be VK_{SPS-one} indistinguishable if for any PPT adversary B, for any security parameter λ,

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{SPS-ind-one}}_{B}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\hat{b} = \hat{b}’] - 1/2| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

for some negligible function negl.

**VK_{SPS-ABO} Indistinguishability:** This feature of a splittable signature scheme is defined through the following experiment between an adversary B and a challenger C:

- B submits a message m* ∈ M_{SPS} to C.
C generates \((SK_{SPS}, VK_{SPS}, VK_{SPS-REI}) \xleftarrow{\$} SPS.Setup(1^\lambda)\). Next it computes \((\sigma_{SPS-ONE,m^*}, VK_{SPS-ONE}, SK_{SPS-ABO}, VK_{SPS-ABO}) \xleftarrow{\$} SPS.Split(SK_{SPS}, m^*)\). Then it chooses a random bit \(\hat{b} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}\). If \(\hat{b} = 0\), it returns \((SK_{SPS-ABO}, VK_{SPS-ABO})\) to \(B\). Else, it returns \((SK_{SPS-ABO}, VK_{SPS})\) to \(B\).

\(B\) outputs a guess bit \(\hat{b}' \in \{0, 1\}\).

The splittable signature scheme is said to be indistinguishable if for any PPT adversary \(B\), for any security parameter \(\lambda\),

\[\operatorname{Adv}^\text{SPS-IND-ABO}_B(\lambda) = |Pr[\hat{b} = \hat{b}'] - 1/2| \leq \operatorname{negl}(\lambda)\]

for some negligible function \(\operatorname{negl}\).

— Splitting Indistinguishability: This feature of a splittable signature scheme is defined through the following experiment between an adversary \(B\) and a challenger \(C\):

- \(B\) submits a message \(m^* \in M_{SPS}\) to \(C\).
- \(C\) forms \((SK_{SPS}, VK_{SPS}, VK_{SPS-REI}) \xleftarrow{\$} SPS.Setup(1^\lambda), (SK_{SPS}, VK_{SPS}, VK_{SPS-REI}) \xleftarrow{\$} SPS.Setup(1^\lambda)\). Next it computes \((\sigma'_{SPS-ONE,m^*}, VK'_{SPS-ONE}, SK'_{SPS-ABO}, VK'_{SPS-ABO}) \xleftarrow{\$} SPS.Split(SK_{SPS}, m^*)\) as well as \((\sigma'_{SPS-ONE,m^*}, VK'_{SPS-ONE}, SK'_{SPS-ABO}, VK'_{SPS-ABO}) \xleftarrow{\$} SPS.Split(SK'_{SPS}, m^*)\). Then it chooses a random bit \(\hat{b} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}\). If \(\hat{b} = 0\), it returns \((\sigma_{SPS-ONE,m^*}, VK_{SPS-ONE}, SK_{SPS-ABO}, VK_{SPS-ABO})\) to \(B\). Else, it returns \((\sigma'_{SPS-ONE,m^*}, VK'_{SPS-ONE}, SK'_{SPS-ABO}, VK'_{SPS-ABO})\) to \(B\).
- \(B\) outputs a guess bit \(\hat{b}' \in \{0, 1\}\).

The splittable signature scheme is said to be splitting indistinguishable if for any PPT adversary \(B\), for any security parameter \(\lambda\),

\[\operatorname{Adv}^\text{SPS-IND-SPS}_B(\lambda) = |Pr[\hat{b} = \hat{b}'] - 1/2| \leq \operatorname{negl}(\lambda)\]

for some negligible function \(\operatorname{negl}\).

Koppula et al. [11] have constructed a splittable signature scheme using IO and one-way function.

3 Our Attribute-Based Signature for Turing Machines

3.1 Notion

Here we will formally define the notion of an attribute-based signature scheme where signing policies are associated with TM’s. This definition is similar to that defined in [18, 17] for circuits. However, due to the use of TM’s as opposed to circuits, such a scheme can handle signing attribute strings of arbitrary polynomial length.

Definition 3.1 (Attribute-Based Signature for Turing Machines: ABS). Let \(M_\lambda\) be a class of TM’s, the members of which have (worst-case) running time bounded by \(T = 2^\lambda\). An attribute-based signature (ABS) scheme for signing policies associated with the TM’s in \(M_\lambda\) comprises of an attribute universe \(U_{ABS} \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*\), a message space \(M_{ABS} = \{0, 1\}^{l_{ABS-MSG}}\), a signature space \(S_{ABS} = \{0, 1\}^{l_{ABS-SIG}}\), where \(l_{ABS-MSG}, l_{ABS-SIG}\) are some polynomials in the security parameter \(\lambda\), and the PPT algorithms (ABS.Setup, ABS.KeyGen, ABS.Sign, ABS.Verify) described below:

ABS.Setup(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (PP_{ABS}, MSK_{ABS}) : The setup authority takes as input the security parameter \(1^\lambda\). It publishes the public parameters \(PP_{ABS}\) while generates a master secret key \(MSK_{ABS}\) for itself.

ABS.KeyGen(MSK_{ABS}, M) \rightarrow SK_{ABS}(M) : Taking as input the master secret key \(MSK_{ABS}\) and a signing policy \(TM M \in M_\lambda\) of a signer, the setup authority provides the corresponding signing key \(SK_{ABS}(M)\) to the legitimate signer.

ABS.Sign(SK_{ABS}(M), x, msg) \rightarrow \sigma_{ABS} or ⊥ : On input the signing key \(SK_{ABS}(M)\) corresponding to the legitimate signing policy \(TM M \in M_\lambda\), a signing attribute string \(x \in U_{ABS}\), and a message \(msg \in M_{ABS}\), a signer outputs either a signature \(\sigma_{ABS} \in S_{ABS}\) or ⊥ indicating failure.

ABS.Verify(PP_{ABS}, x, msg, \sigma_{ABS}) \rightarrow \hat{\beta} \in \{0, 1\} : A verifier takes as input the public parameters \(PP_{ABS}\), a signing attribute string \(x \in U_{ABS}\), a message \(msg \in M_{ABS}\), and a purported signature \(\sigma_{ABS} \in S_{ABS}\). It outputs a bit \(\hat{\beta} \in \{0, 1\}\).
We note that all the algorithms described above except ABS.Verify are randomized. The algorithms satisfy the following properties:

- **Correctness**: For any security parameter \( \lambda \), \((\text{PP}_{\text{ABS}}, \text{MSK}_{\text{ABS}}) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ABS}\text{-Setup}(1^\lambda)\), \( M \in \mathbb{M}_\lambda \), \( \text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}(M) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ABS}\text{-KeyGen} (\text{MSK}_{\text{ABS}}, M), x \in \mathcal{U}_{\text{ABS}} \), and \( \text{msg} \in \mathcal{M}_{\text{ABS}} \), if \( M(x) = 1 \), then \( \text{ABS}\text{-Sign}(\text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}(M), x, \text{msg}) \) outputs \( \sigma_{\text{ABS}} \in \mathcal{S}_{\text{ABS}} \) such that \( \text{ABS}\text{-Verify}(\text{PP}_{\text{ABS}}, x, \text{msg}, \sigma_{\text{ABS}}) = 1 \).

- **Signer Privacy**: An \( \text{ABS} \) scheme is said to provide signer privacy if for any security parameter \( \lambda \), message \( \text{msg} \in \mathcal{M}_{\text{ABS}} \), \((\text{PP}_{\text{ABS}}, \text{MSK}_{\text{ABS}}) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ABS}\text{-Setup}(1^\lambda)\), signing policies \( M, M' \in \mathbb{M}_\lambda \), signing keys \( \text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}(M) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ABS}\text{-KeyGen} (\text{MSK}_{\text{ABS}}, M), \text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}(M') \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ABS}\text{-KeyGen} (\text{MSK}_{\text{ABS}}, M') \), \( x \in \mathcal{U}_{\text{ABS}} \) such that \( M(x) = 1 = M'(x) \), the distributions of the signatures outputted by \( \text{ABS}\text{-Sign}(\text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}(M), x, \text{msg}) \) and \( \text{ABS}\text{-Sign}(\text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}(M'), x, \text{msg}) \) are identical.

- **Existing Unforgeability against Selective Attribute Adaptive Chosen Message Attack**: This property of an \( \text{ABS} \) scheme is defined through the following experiment between an adversary \( A \) and a challenger \( B \):
  - \( A \) submits a challenge attribute string \( x^* \in \mathcal{U}_{\text{ABS}} \) to \( B \).
  - \( B \) generates \((\text{PP}_{\text{ABS}}, \text{MSK}_{\text{ABS}}) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ABS}\text{-Setup}(1^\lambda)\) and provides \( A \) with \( \text{PP}_{\text{ABS}} \).
  - \( A \) may adaptively make a polynomial number of queries of the following types:
    - **Signing key query**: When \( A \) queries a signing key corresponding to a signing policy \( TM \in \mathbb{M}_\lambda \) subject to the restriction that \( M(x^*) = 0 \), \( B \) gives back \( \text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}(M) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ABS}\text{-KeyGen} (\text{MSK}_{\text{ABS}}, M) \) to \( A \).
    - **Signature query**: When \( A \) queries a signature on a message \( \text{msg} \in \mathcal{M}_{\text{ABS}} \) under an attribute string \( x \in \mathcal{U}_{\text{ABS}} \), \( B \) samples a signing policy \( TM \in \mathbb{M}_\lambda \) such that \( M(x) = 1 \), creates a signing key \( \text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}(M) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ABS}\text{-KeyGen} (\text{MSK}_{\text{ABS}}, M) \), and generates a signature \( \sigma_{\text{ABS}} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ABS}\text{-Sign}(\text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}(M), x, \text{msg}) \), which \( B \) returns to \( A \).
  - At the end of interaction \( A \) outputs a message-signature pair \((\text{msg}^*, \sigma_{\text{ABS}}^*)\). \( A \) wins if the following hold simultaneously:
    i) \( \text{ABS}\text{-Verify}(\text{PP}_{\text{ABS}}, x^*, \text{msg}^*, \sigma_{\text{ABS}}^*) = 1 \).
    ii) \( A \) has not made any signature query on \( \text{msg}^* \) under \( x^* \).

The \( \text{ABS} \) scheme is said to be existentially unforgeable against selective attribute adaptive chosen message attack if for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \),

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{ABS,UF-CMA}}_A(\lambda) = \Pr[A \text{ wins}] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]

for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).

**Remark 3.1.** Note that in the existential unforgeability experiment above without loss of generality, we can consider signature queries on messages only under the challenge attribute string \( x^* \). This is because any signature query under some attribute string \( x \neq x^* \) can be replaced by a signing key query for a signing policy \( TM \in \mathbb{M}_\lambda \) that accepts only the string \( x \). Since \( x \neq x^* \), \( M_x(x^*) = 0 \), and thus \( M_x \) forms a valid signing key query. We will use this simplification in our proof.

### 3.2 Principal Ideas behind Our \( \text{ABS} \) Scheme

Here we give an overview of our \( \text{ABS} \) scheme. To generate an \( \text{ABS} \) signature, we use a \( \text{PPRF} \), an SSB hash function, and a standard existentially unforgeable digital signature scheme \( \text{SIG} \) for the same message space \( \mathcal{M}_{\text{ABS}} = \{0,1\}^{|\text{msg}|} \) of the \( \text{ABS} \) scheme. A high level description of the structure of our \( \text{ABS} \) signatures and the signature verification process is presented below:

a) The master signing key \( \text{MSK}_{\text{ABS}} \) of our \( \text{ABS} \) scheme consists of a key \( K \) for the \( \text{PPRF} \) \( F \) and an SSB hash key \( hK \).

b) The \( \text{ABS} \) signature on a message \( \text{msg} \in \mathcal{M}_{\text{ABS}} \) under certain signing attribute string \( x = x_0 \ldots x_{t_x-1} \in \mathcal{U}_{\text{ABS}} \subset \{0,1\}^* \) of length \( |x| = t_x \) is \( \sigma_{\text{ABS}} = (\text{VK}_{\text{SIG}}, \sigma_{\text{SIG}}) \), which consists of a verification key \( \text{VK}_{\text{SIG}} \) and a signature \( \sigma_{\text{SIG}} \) of the digital signature scheme \( \text{SIG} \), computed as follows:

The signing attribute string \( x \) is hashed using the SSB hash key \( hK \) to form a fixed length hash value \( h \). Next, a pseudorandom string \( r_{\text{SIG}} = F(K, h) \) is computed using the \( \text{PPRF} \). The setup algorithm of \( \text{SIG} \) is then executed with the randomness \( r_{\text{SIG}} \) to generate the \( \text{SIG} \) verification key \( \text{VK}_{\text{SIG}} \) along with its corresponding \( \text{SIG} \) signing key \( \text{SK}_{\text{SIG}} \). The \( \text{SIG} \) signing key \( \text{SK}_{\text{SIG}} \) is utilized to generate the \( \text{SIG} \) signature \( \sigma_{\text{SIG}} \) on the message \( \text{msg} \) by running the \( \text{SIG} \) signing algorithm.
c) The public parameters $pp_{\text{ABS}}$ corresponding to the master signing key $\text{MSK}_{\text{ABS}}$ is comprised of the SSB hash key $hk$ together with an IO-obfuscated program $\mathcal{V}_{\text{ABS}}$, known as the verifying program (see Fig. 3.1). The verifying program $\mathcal{V}_{\text{ABS}}$ has the PPRF key $K$ hardwired in it, and takes as input an SSB hash value $h$. The program $\mathcal{V}_{\text{ABS}}$ generates the pseudorandom string $\mathcal{v}_{\text{SIG}} = F(K, h)$, performs the SIG setup algorithm using $\mathcal{v}_{\text{SIG}}$ as the randomness, and outputs the resulting SIG verification key $\text{VK}_{\text{SIG}}$.

d) A verifier checks a purported signature $\sigma_{\text{ABS}} = (\text{VK}_{\text{SIG}}, \sigma_{\text{SIG}})$ on some message $m \in \mathcal{M}_{\text{ABS}}$ under some signing attribute string $x = x_0 \ldots x_{\ell_x-1} \in \mathcal{U}_{\text{ABS}}$ with $|x| = \ell_x$ using the public parameters $pp_{\text{ABS}}$ as follows:

It first hashes $x$ using the SSB hash key $hk$ forming the hash value $h$. Next, it obtains an SIG verification key $\text{VK}_{\text{SIG}}$ by running the obfuscated verifying program $\mathcal{V}_{\text{ABS}}$ on input the hash value $h$. The verifier accepts the signature $\sigma_{\text{ABS}}$ if the SIG verification key $\text{VK}_{\text{SIG}}$ outputted by the program $\mathcal{V}_{\text{ABS}}$ matches $\text{VK}_{\text{SIG}}$ and the SIG signature $\sigma_{\text{SIG}}$ is verified for $m$ with respect to $\text{VK}_{\text{SIG}}$. The correctness of the verification process is immediate from the correctness of SIG along with the functional property of the PPRF $F$ and the SSB hash function.

We now explain the structure of the ABS signing keys associated with specific signing policy $TM$'s and justify the utility of the IO-obfuscated programs included in our ABS signing keys. The first intuition is to design the signing key corresponding to certain signing policy $TM$ in such a way that while attempting to sign any message with respect to some signing attribute string $x \in \mathcal{U}_{\text{ABS}}$, the signer is forced to execute $M$ on $x$ and succeeds in obtaining a valid signature if and only if $M$ accepts $x$. We plan to make this idea work by providing an IO-obfuscated program $\mathcal{P}_{\text{ABS}}$, called the next step program (see Fig. 3.5). We sketch the functionality of $\mathcal{P}_{\text{ABS}}$ below:

i) The program $\mathcal{P}_{\text{ABS}}$ has the PPRF key $K$ hardwired in it. It takes as input a state and header position of $M$, together with an input symbol and an SSB hash value. It computes the next step function of $M$ on the input state-symbol pair. In case $M$ enters the accepting state, the program outputs the desired SIG signing key-verification key pair as follows:

It first generates a pseudorandom string by applying the PPRF $F$ with key $K$ on the input SSB hash value. Next, it runs the SIG setup algorithm utilizing the generated pseudorandom string to produce the SIG signing key-verification key pair to be outputted. Observe that once the required SIG signing key-verification key is obtained, the signer can itself compute an SIG signature on any message.

ii) To prevent illegal inputs across successive invocations, the program $\mathcal{P}_{\text{ABS}}$ must perform certain authenticity checks before executing the next step function of $M$. A natural choice would be to maintain a short authenticated commitment of the current tape configuration of the TM $M$ that is updated and re-authenticated at each invocation of $\mathcal{P}_{\text{ABS}}$. For this, we make use of a positional accumulator $\text{ACC}$ and a splittable signature scheme $\text{SPS}$. Our security proof crucially relies on various features of splittable signatures in the hybrid transformations. We include a fresh set of public parameters $pp_{\text{ACC}}$ of the positional accumulator within each ABS signing key. We design the program $\mathcal{P}_{\text{ABS}}$ to additionally take as input an accumulator value, a proof for the accumulator value, together with an SPS signature on the input state, header position, and the input accumulator value.

iii) The program $\mathcal{P}_{\text{ABS}}$ verifies the SPS signature and checks the accumulator proof to get convinced that the input symbol is indeed the one placed at the input header position of the underlying storage of the input accumulator value.

iv) If all these verifications pass, then $\mathcal{P}_{\text{ABS}}$ determines the next state and header position of $M$, as well as computes the new symbol that needs to be written to the input header position. The program $\mathcal{P}_{\text{ABS}}$ then updates the accumulator value by placing the new symbol at the input header position, and generates an SPS signature on the updated accumulator value along with the computed next state and header position of $M$. In order to deal with the positional accumulator related verifications and updates, $\mathcal{P}_{\text{ABS}}$ has $pp_{\text{ACC}}$ hardwired.

Now, observe that before starting the repeated execution of $\mathcal{P}_{\text{ABS}}$, the signer would require an SPS signature on the initial accumulator value formed by accumulating the bits of the signing attribute string along with the initial state and header position of $M$. For this, we include another IO-obfuscated program $\mathcal{P}_1$, known as the initial signing program (see Fig. 3.2). It takes as input an accumulator value and outputs an SPS signature on the tuple of the input accumulator value, initial state, and initial header position of $M$. The idea is that while signing some message under some signing attribute string $x$ using a signing key corresponding to some TM $M$, the signer would proceed as follows:

a) It would first compute the SSB hash value $h$ by hashing $x$ using the system wide SSB hash key $hk$, which is part of the public parameters $pp_{\text{ABS}}$. 

b) The signer would also compute the accumulator value $w_{\text{inp}}$ by accumulating the bits of $x$ using the public parameters $PP_{\text{ACC}}$ of positional accumulator included in the ABS signing key.

c) Then, using the obfuscated initial signing program $P_1$, included in the signing key, the signer would obtain an SPS signature on $w_{\text{inp}}$ along with the initial state and header position of $M$.

d) Finally, the signer would repeatedly run the obfuscated next step program $P_{\text{ABS}}$, included in the signing key, each time giving as input all the quantities as mentioned above. Note that the hash value that needs to be given as input to $P_{\text{ABS}}$ in each iteration is $h$. In case $P_{\text{ABS}}$ reaches the accepting state, it would require $h$ to apply $F$ for producing the pseudorandom string to be used in the SIG setup algorithm.

However, this approach is not completely sound yet. Observe that, a possibly malicious signer can compute the SSB hash value $h$ on the signing attribute string $x$, under which it wishes to produce the ABS signature, although $M$ does not accepts it, and initiates the signing process by accumulating the bits of only a substring of $x$ or some entirely different signing attribute string, which is accepted by $M$. To prevent such malicious behavior, we include another IO-obfuscated program $P_2$ within the ABS signing key, known as the accumulating program (see Fig. 3.3), whose purpose is to restrict the signer from accumulating the bits of a different signing input string rather than the hashed one. The program $P_2$ functions as follows:

i) The program $P_2$ takes as input an SSB hash value $h$, an index $i$, a symbol, an accumulator value, an SPS signature on the input accumulator value (along with the initial state and header position of $M$), and an opening value for SSB.

ii) The program $P_2$ verifies the SPS signature. Using the input opening value for SSB, it also checks whether the input symbol is indeed present at the index $i$ of the string that has been hashed to form $h$, using the input opening value.

iii) If all of these verifications pass, then $P_2$ updates the input accumulator value by writing the input symbol at the $i^{th}$ position of the accumulator storage.

We also modify the obfuscated initial signing program $P_1$, included in the signing key, to take as input an SSB hash value rather than an accumulator value and output an SPS signature on the accumulator value corresponding to the empty accumulator storage, along with the initial state and header position of $M$.

To forbid the signer from performing the signature generation by accumulating an $M$-accepted substring of the hashed signing attribute string, we generate the pseudorandom string to be used in the SIG setup algorithm by evaluating $F$ on hash value-length pair of the signing attribute string instead of the hash value only. Without loss of generality, we set the upper bound of the length of signing attribute strings to be $2^\lambda$, where $\lambda$ is the underlying security parameter. Note that by suitably choosing $\lambda$, we can accommodate signing attribute strings of any polynomial length. Now, as the length of the signing attribute strings is bounded by $2^\lambda$, it can be expressed as a bit strings of length $\lambda$. Thus, the signing attribute string length can be safely fed to $F$ along with the SSB hash value of the signing attribute string. Hence, the obfuscated next step programs $P_{\text{ABS}}$ included in our signing keys must also take as input the length of the attribute string for generating the pseudorandom string for the SIG setup algorithm if reaching to the accepting state. For the same reason, the verifying program $V_{\text{ABS}}$ included in the public parameters $PP_{\text{ABS}}$ also needs to be modified to take as input the length of signing attribute strings along with their SSB hash values.

Therefore, in our ABS scheme, to generate an ABS signature on some message under certain signing attribute string using a signing key, corresponding to some TM $M$, a signer does the following:

a) It first hashes the signing attribute string.

b) It also obtains a SPS signature on the empty accumulator value included in the signing key, by running the obfuscated initial signing program $P_1$ on input the computed hash value.

c) Next, it repeatedly runs the obfuscated accumulating program $P_2$ to accumulate the bits of the signing attribute string.

d) It then runs the obfuscated next step program $P_{\text{ABS}}$ iteratively on the current accumulator value along with other legitimate inputs until it obtains either the desired SIG signing key-verification key pair or \(\perp\).

e) Finally, it uses the obtained SIG signing key to generate an SIG signature on the message it wishes to sign and outputs the pair of the SIG verification key obtained from $P_{\text{ABS}}$ and the computed SIG signature on the message as the purported ABS signature.
To cope up with certain issues in the security proof we further include another IO-obfuscated program \( P_A \) in our ABS signing keys, known as the signature changing program (see Fig. 3.4). It changes the SPS signature on the accumulation of the bits of the signing attribute string before starting the iterative computation with the obfuscated next step program \( P_{ABS} \).

### 3.3 Formal Description of our ABS Construction

Let \( \lambda \) be the underlying security parameter. Let \( \mathcal{M}_\lambda \) denote a family of TM’s, the members of which have (worst case) running time bounded by \( T = 2^\lambda \), input alphabet \( \Sigma_{inp} = \{0, 1\} \), and tape alphabet \( \Sigma_{tape} = \{0, 1, \ldots\} \). Our ABS construction supporting signing attribute universe \( \mathcal{U}_{abs} \subset \{0, 1\}^* \), signing policies representable by TM’s in \( \mathcal{M}_\lambda \), and message space \( \mathcal{M}_{abs} = \{0, 1\}^l_{abs-len} \) utilizes the following cryptographic building blocks:

1. **IO**: An indistinguishability obfuscator for general polynomial-size circuits.
2. **SSB** = (SSB.Gen, \( \mathcal{H} \), SSB.Open, SSB.Verify): A somewhere statistically binding hash function with \( \Sigma_{ssb-blk} = \{0, 1\} \).
3. **ACC** = (ACC.Setup, ACC.Setup-Enforce-Read, ACC.Setup-Enforce-Write, ACC.Prep-Read, ACC.Prep-Write, ACC.Verify-Read, ACC.Write-Store, ACC.Update): A positional accumulator with \( \Sigma_{acc-blk} = \{0, 1, \ldots\} \).
4. **ITR** = (ITR.Setup, ITR.Setup-Enforce, ITR.Iterate): A cryptographic iterator with an appropriate message space \( \mathcal{M}_{itr} \).
5. **SPS** = (SPS.Setup, SPS.Sign-ABO, SPS.Verify, SPS.Split, SPS.Sign-ABO): A splittable signature scheme with an appropriate message space \( \mathcal{M}_{sps} \).
6. **PRG** : \( \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda} \), A length-doubling pseudorandom generator.
7. **\( \mathcal{F} \)** = (**\( \mathcal{F} \).Setup, \( \mathcal{F} \).Puncture, \( \mathcal{F} \).Eval): A puncturable pseudorandom function whose domain and range are chosen appropriately. For simplicity, we assume that \( \mathcal{F} \) has inputs and outputs of bounded length instead of fixed length inputs and outputs. This assumption can be easily removed by using different \( \mathcal{F} \)’s for different input and output lengths.
8. **SIG** = (**SIG.Setup, SIG.Sign, SIG.Verify**): A digital signature scheme with associated message space \( \mathcal{M}_{sig} = \{0, 1\}^{l_{sig}} \) that is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attack (CMA).

The formal description of our ABS construction follows:

**ABS.Setup**\( (\lambda) \rightarrow (pp_{ABS} = (HK, V_{ABS}), MSK_{ABS} = (HK, V_{ABS})) \): The setup authority takes as input the security parameter \( \lambda \) and proceeds as follows:

1. It first chooses a \( \mathcal{F} \) key \( \lambda \) \( \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}.Setup(\lambda) \).
2. Next it generates \( HK \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}.Setup(\lambda) \).
3. After that, it forms the obfuscated program \( V_{ABS} = IO(Verify.Prog_{ABS}[K]) \), where the program \( Verify.Prog_{ABS} \) is described in Fig. 3.1.
4. It keeps the master secret key \( MSK_{ABS} = (HK, V_{ABS}) \) and publishes the public parameters \( PP_{ABS} = (HK, V_{ABS}) \).

**ABS.KeyGen**\( (MSK_{ABS}, M) \rightarrow sk_{abs}(M) = (HK, PP_{ACC}, w_0, STORE_0, PP_{itr}, v_0, P_1, P_2, P_3, P_{ABS}) \): On input the master secret key \( MSK_{ABS} = (HK, V_{ABS}) \) and a signing policy \( TM = (Q, \Sigma_{inp}, \Sigma_{tape}, \delta, q_0, q_{ac}, q_{blk}) \in \mathcal{M}_{\lambda} \), the setup authority performs the following steps:

1. At first, it selects PPRF keys \( K_1, \ldots, K_{\lambda}, K_{sps,A}, K_{sps,E} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}.Setup(\lambda) \).
2. Next, it forms \( PP_{ACC}, w_0, STORE_0 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} ACC.Setup(\lambda^3, n_{acc-blk} = 2^\lambda) \) and \( PP_{itr}, v_0 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} ITR.Setup(\lambda^3, n_{itr} = 2^\lambda) \).
3. Then, it constructs the obfuscated programs
   - \( P_1 = IO(Init-SPS.Prog[q_0, w_0, v_0, K_{sps,E}], P_2 = IO(Accumulate.Prog[n_{ssb-blk} = 2^\lambda, HK, PP_{ACC}, PP_{itr}, K_{sps,E}], P_3 = IO(Change-SPS.Prog[K_{sps,A}, K_{sps,E}]), \}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig3.1.pdf}
\caption{Verify.Prog_{ABS}}
\end{figure}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Constants} & \textbf{PPRF key key} \\
\hline
\textbf{Inputs} & SSB hash value \( h \), Length \( l_{sig} \) \\
\hline
\textbf{Output} & SIG verification key \( \tilde{vk}_{abs} \) \\
\hline
1. Compute \( r_{abs} = \mathcal{F}(K, (h, l_{sig})) \), \( (\tilde{vk}_{abs}, \tilde{vk}_{abs}) = SIG.Setup(\lambda; r_{abs}) \). & \\
2. Output \( \tilde{vk}_{abs} \). & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
4. It provides the constrained key $SK_{\text{ABS}}(M) = (HK, PP_{\text{ACC}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0, PP_{\text{TR}}, v_0, P_1, P_2, P_3, P_{\text{ABS}})$ to a legitimate signer.

**Fig. 3.2. Init-SPS.Prog**

**Constants:** Maximum n of keys for SSB $n_{\text{SSB-key}} = 2^\lambda$, SSB hash key $HK$, Public parameters for positional accumulator $PP_{\text{acc}}$, Public parameters for iterator $PP_{\text{itr}}$, PRF key $K_{\text{PRF,E}}$

**Inputs:** Index $i$, Symbol $SYM_{ii,i}$, TM state $st_i$, Accumulator value $w_i$, Auxiliary value $aux_i$, Iterator value $v_i$, Signature $\sigma_{\text{SIS,IN}}$, SSB hash value $h$, SSB opening value $\tau$

**Output:** Signature $\sigma_{\text{SIS,IN}}$ or $\perp$

1. Compute $\tau_i = F(K_{\text{PRF,E}}, (h, i))$, $(SK_{\text{PRF,E}}, VK_{\text{PRF,E}}, VK_{\text{SSB,E}}) = SP\text{S.Setup}(\lambda, \tau_i)$.
2. If $\text{SSB.Verify}(HK, i, \lambda, SYM_{ii,i}, aux_i) = 0$, output $\perp$.
3. Compute $m_{\text{ini}} = \text{ACC.Update}(PP_{\text{acc}}, w_i, SYM_{ii,i}, aux_i)$. If $m_{\text{ini}} = \perp$, output $\perp$.
4. Compute $\tau_{i+1} = F(K_{\text{PRF,E}}, (h, i + 1))$, $(SK_{\text{PRF,E}}, VK_{\text{PRF,E}}, VK_{\text{SSB,E}}) = SP\text{S.Setup}(\lambda, \tau_{i+1})$.
5. Set $m_{\text{ini}} = (v_i, st_i, w_i, 0)$. Compute $\sigma_{\text{SIS,IN}} = SP\text{S.Sign}(SK_{\text{PRF,E}}, w_i, \lambda, aux_i)$.

**Fig. 3.3. Accumulate.Prog**

**Constants:** $PP_{\text{keys}}$ keys $K_{\text{PP',A}}, K_{\text{PRF,E}}$

**Inputs:** TM state $st_i$, Accumulator value $w_i$, Iterator value $v_i$, SSB hash value $h$, Length $\ell_{\text{msg}}$, Signature $\sigma_{\text{SIS,IN}}$

**Output:** Signature $\sigma_{\text{SIS,IN}}$ or $\perp$

1. Compute $\tau_i = F(K_{\text{PRF,E}}, (h, i))$, $(SK_{\text{PRF,E}}, VK_{\text{PRF,E}}, VK_{\text{SSB,E}}) = SP\text{S.Setup}(\lambda, \tau_i)$.
2. If $\text{SSB.Verify}(HK, i, \lambda, SYM_{ii,i}, aux_i) = 0$, output $\perp$.
3. Compute $m_{\text{ini}} = \text{ACC.Update}(PP_{\text{acc}}, w_i, SYM_{ii,i}, aux_i) = 0$, output $\perp$.
4. Compute $\tau_{i+1} = F(K_{\text{PRF,E}}, (h, i + 1))$, $(SK_{\text{PRF,E}}, VK_{\text{PRF,E}}, VK_{\text{SSB,E}}) = SP\text{S.Setup}(\lambda, \tau_{i+1})$.
5. Set $m_{\text{ini}} = (v_i, st_i, w_i, 0)$. Compute $\sigma_{\text{SIS,IN}} = SP\text{S.Sign}(SK_{\text{PRF,E}}, w_i, \lambda, aux_i)$.

**Fig. 3.4. Change-SPS.Prog**

**Constants:** TM $T = (Q, \Sigma, \Sigma_{\text{Gen}}, \delta, q_0, q_{\text{accept}}, q_{\text{reject}})$, TM state $st_i$, Accumulator value $w_i$, Accumulator proof $\sigma_{\text{acc}}$, Auxiliary value $aux_i$, Iterator value $v_i$, SSB hash value $h$, Length $\ell_{\text{msg}}$, Signature $\sigma_{\text{SIS,IN}}$

**Output:** Signature $\sigma_{\text{SIS,IN}}$ or $\perp$

1. Identify a string $\tau$ such that $2^\tau \leq t < 2^{\tau+1}$. If $\text{PRG}([\text{seed}_0, \text{seed}]) \neq \text{PRG}([K_{\text{PRF,E}}, (h, i)])$ for $t > 1$, output $\perp$.
2. If $\text{ACC.Verify-Read}(PP_{\text{acc}}, w_i, SYM_{ii,i}, \text{POSI}_0, \sigma_{\text{acc}}) = 0$, output $\perp$.
3. Compute $\tau_i = F(K_{\text{PRF,E}}, (h, i))$, $(SK_{\text{PRF,E}}, VK_{\text{PRF,E}}, VK_{\text{SSB,E}}) = SP\text{S.Setup}(\lambda, \tau_i)$.
4. If $\text{SSB.Verify}(HK, i, \lambda, SYM_{ii,i}, aux_i) = 0$, output $\perp$.
5. Compute $\tau_{i+1} = F(K_{\text{PRF,E}}, (h, i))$, $(SK_{\text{PRF,E}}, VK_{\text{PRF,E}}, VK_{\text{SSB,E}}) = SP\text{S.Setup}(\lambda, \tau_{i+1})$
6. If $t + 1 = 2^n$, for some integer $\tau$, set $\text{seed} = F(K_{\text{PRF,E}}, (h, i))$. Else, set $\text{seed} = \epsilon$.
7. Output $(\text{POSI}_{\text{OUT}}, SYM_{\text{OUT}}, st_{\text{OUT}}, w_{\text{OUT}}, v_{\text{OUT}}, \sigma_{\text{SIS,OUT}}, \text{SEED}_{\text{OUT}})$.

**Fig. 3.5. Constrained-Key.Prog_{\text{ABS}}**
ABS.Sign(\(SK_{ABS}(M), x, msg\)) \rightarrow \sigma_{ABS} = (VK_{SIG}, \sigma_{SIG}) or \bot: A signer takes as input its signing key \(SK_{ABS}(M) = (HK, PPRF_{ACC}, q_0, T_0, P_1, P_2, P_3, \mathcal{P}_{ABS})\), corresponding to its legitimate signing policy \(TM\) \(M = (Q, \Sigma_{INP}, \Sigma_{VALUE}, \delta, q_0, (Q_{ACC}, Q_{RBL})) \in \mathbb{M}_{\lambda}\), an attribute string \(x = x_0 \ldots x_{\ell_{x}}-1 \in \mathcal{U}_{ABS}\) with \(|x| = \ell_{x}\), and a message \(msg \in \mathcal{M}_{ABS}\). If \(M(x) = 0\), it outputs \bot. Otherwise, it proceeds as follows:

1. It first computes \(h = H_{SIG}(x)\).
2. Next, it computes \(\sigma_{SPS,0} = \mathcal{P}_{1}(h)\).
3. Then for \(j = 1, \ldots, \ell_{x}\), it iteratively performs the following:
   (a) It computes \(\pi_{SB, j-1} = SSB\text{-Open}(HK, x, j - 1)\).
   (b) It computes \(AUX_{j} = ACC\text{-Prep-Write}(P_{ACC}, STORE_{j-1}, j - 1)\).
   (c) It computes \(OUT = \mathcal{P}_{2}(j - 1, x_{j-1}, q_{0}, w_{j-1}, AUX_{j}, v_{j-1}, \sigma_{SPS,j-1}, h, \pi_{SB,j-1})\).
   (d) If \(OUT = \bot\), it outputs \(OUT\). Else, it parses \(OUT\) as \(OUT = (w_{j}, v_{j}, \sigma_{SPS,j})\).
   (e) It computes \(STORE_{j} = ACC\text{-Write-Store}(P_{ACC}, STORE_{j-1}, j - 1, x_{j-1})\).
4. It computes \(\sigma_{SPS,0} = \mathcal{P}_{3}(q_{0}, w_{\ell_{x}}, v_{\ell_{x}}, h, \ell_{x}, \sigma_{SPS,\ell_{x}})\).
5. It sets \(POS_{M,0} = 0\) and \(SEED_{0} = \epsilon\).
6. Suppose, \(M\) accepts \(x\) in \(t_{x}\) steps. For \(t = 1, \ldots, t_{x}\), it iteratively performs the following steps:
   (a) It computes \((SYM_{M,t-1}, \pi_{ACC,t-1}) = ACC\text{-Prep-Read}(P_{ACC}, STORE_{t-1}, POS_{M,t-1})\).
   (b) It computes \(AUX_{t} = ACC\text{-Prep-Write}(P_{ACC}, STORE_{t-1}, POS_{M,t-1})\).
   (c) It computes \(OUT = \mathcal{P}_{4}(t, SEED_{t-1}, POS_{M,t-1}, SYM_{M,t-1}, ST_{M,t-1}, w_{\ell_{x}+t-1}, \pi_{ACC,t-1}, AUX_{t}, v_{\ell_{x}+t-1}, \ell_{x}, \sigma_{SPS,t-1})\).
   (d) If \(t = t_{x}\), it parses \(OUT\) as \(OUT = (SK_{SIG}, VK_{SIG})\). Otherwise, it parses \(OUT\) as \(OUT = (POS_{M,t}, SYM_{M,t}, ST_{M,t}, v_{\ell_{x}+t}, w_{\ell_{x}+t}, \sigma_{SPS,t}, SEED_{t})\).
   (e) It computes \(STORE_{\ell_{x}+t} = ACC\text{-Write-Store}(P_{ACC}, STORE_{t}, POS_{M,t-1}, SYM_{M,t})\).
7. Finally, it computes \(\sigma_{SIG} = SIG\text{-Sign}(SK_{SIG}, msg)\).
8. It outputs the signature \(\sigma_{ABS} = (VK_{SIG}, \sigma_{SIG}) \in \mathcal{S}_{ABS}\).

ABS.Verify(\(PP_{ABS}, x, msg, \sigma_{ABS}\)) \rightarrow \hat{\beta} \in \{0, 1\}: A verifier takes as input the public parameters \(PP_{ABS} = (HK, V_{ABS})\), an attribute string \(x = x_{0} \ldots x_{\ell_{x}}-1 \in \mathcal{U}_{ABS}\), where \(|x| = \ell_{x}\), a message \(msg \in \mathcal{M}_{ABS}\), together with a signature \(\sigma_{ABS} = (VK_{SIG}, \sigma_{SIG}) \in \mathcal{S}_{ABS}\). It executes the following:

1. It first computes \(h = H_{SIG}(x)\).
2. Next, it computes \(VK_{SIG} = V_{ABS}(h, \ell_{x})\).
3. If \([VK_{SIG} = VK_{SIG}] \land [SIG\text{-Verify}(VK_{SIG}, msg, \sigma_{SIG}) = 1]\), it outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.

### 3.4 Security Analysis

**Theorem 3.1 (Security of the ABS Scheme of Section 3.3).** Assuming \(IO\) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \(P/poly\), \(F\) is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, \(SSB\) is a somewhere statistically binding hash function, \(ACC\) is a secure positional accumulator, \(ITR\) is a secure cryptographic iterator, \(SPS\) is a secure splittable signature scheme, \(PRG\) is a secure injective pseudorandom generator, and \(SIG\) is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attack, the ABS scheme of Section 3.3 satisfies signer privacy and existential unforgeability against selective attribute adaptive chosen message attack.

**Proof Overview**

The signer privacy property of our ABS construction follows readily from the following observation: Note that the signatures only depend on the PPRF key \(K\), the SSB hash of the signing attribute strings with respect to which the signatures are issued, and the signed messages. The latter two have no connection with the signing keys at all, while the PPRF key \(K\) is shared among all the signing keys.

The proof of existential unforgeability is rather complicated. This is where we employ our new technical ideas to enrich the techniques of [13, 3] to deal with adaptive key queries of the adversary. The actual proof of unforgeability involves many subtleties. However, here we would like to sketch a bird’s eye view of our proof ideas. In order to prove unforgeability in selective attribute adaptive chosen message attack model described in Section 3.1, we aim to modify the signing keys given to the adversary \(A\) during the experiment to embed the punctured PPRF key \(K\{h^*, \ell^*\}\) punctured at \((h^*, \ell^*)\) instead of the full PPRF key \(K\), which is part of the master ABS key sampled by the challenger \(B\). Here, \(h^*\) and \(\ell^*\) respectively denotes the SSB hash value (under the hash key \(HK\) sampled by \(B\) while performing the setup) and length of the challenge signing attribute string \(x^*\) submitted by the adversary \(A\). Once this substitution is made, the unforgeability can be argued employing the selective pseudorandomness of the
PPRF $\mathcal{F}$ and the existential unforgeability of the digital signature scheme $\text{SIG}$. Now, in order to make this substitution, it is to be ensured that the obfuscated next step programs included in the constrained keys never evaluates the PPRF $\mathcal{F}$ for inputs corresponding to $(h^*, \ell^*)$ even if reaching the accepting state. Our proof transforms the signing keys one at a time through multiple hybrid steps. Suppose that the total number of signing keys queried by $A$ be $\hat{q}_{\text{KEY}}$. Consider the transformation of the $\nu^\text{th}$ signing key (1 $\leq \nu \leq \hat{q}_{\text{KEY}}$) corresponding to the TM $M^{(\nu)}$ that runs on the challenge signing attribute string $x^*$ for $\tau^{(\nu)}$ steps and reaches the rejecting state. In the course of transformation, the obfuscated next step program $P_{\text{ABS}}^{(\nu)}$ of the $\nu^\text{th}$ signing key is first altered to one that never evaluates the PPRF $\mathcal{F}$ for inputs corresponding to $(h^*, \ell^*)$ within the first $\tau^{(\nu)}$ steps. The idea of transforming the signing keys in this way is analogous to that of [11,5].

However, [11,5] could achieve the key transition only based on the properties of positional accumulators and splittable signatures. At a very high level, [11,5] used a system-wide public parameters for the positional accumulators and used it as the tool for compressing the arbitrary length input strings. Unfortunately, the technique of [11,5] does not work if the key queries are adaptive as in our case. This is because, while performing the transition of the $\nu^\text{th}$ queried signing key, the challenger $B$ at various stages needs to generate the accumulator public parameters in read/write enforcing mode where the enforcing property is tailored to the steps of execution of the specific TM $M^{(\nu)}$ on $x^*$. Evidently, $B$ can determine those execution steps only after receiving the $\nu^\text{th}$ signing key query from $A$. However, if a system-wide set of public parameters for the positional accumulator is used, then $B$ would also require it while creating the signing keys queried by $A$ before making the $\nu^\text{th}$ signing key query. Thus, it is immediate that $B$ must generate the set of public parameters for positional accumulator prior to receiving the $\nu^\text{th}$ query from $A$.

This is impossible as setting the accumulator public parameters in read/write enforcing mode requires the knowledge of the TM $M^{(\nu)}$, which is not available before the $\nu^\text{th}$ signing key query of $A$. We resolve this issue by generating distinct set of public parameters of the positional accumulator for each signing key. However, we must provision for a system-wide compressing tool for compressing the arbitrary-length signing attribute strings. Here, the SSB hash comes to our rescue. However, using two different kinds of compressing tools, one system-wide and the other signing key specific, causes additional complications in the security proof. We overcome these challenges by using several tricks, which would be clear while going through our formal unforgeability proof.

We follow the same novel technique introduced in [5] for handling the tail hybrids in the final stage of transformation of the signing keys in our unforgeability experiment. Note that as in [5], we are also considering TM’s which run for at most $T = 2^\lambda$ steps on any input. Unlike [11], the authors of [5] have devised an elegant approach to obtain an end to end polynomial reduction to the security of IO for the tail hybrids by means of an injective pseudorandom generator (PRG). We directly adopt that technique to deal with the tail hybrids in our unforgeability proof. A high level overview of the approach is outlined below.

Let us call the time step $2^\tau$ as the $\tau^\text{th}$ landmark and the interval $[2^\tau, 2^\tau+1 - 1]$ as the $\tau^\text{th}$ interval. Like [5], our obfuscated next step programs $P_{\text{ABS}}$ included within the signing keys take an additional PRG seed as input at each time step, and perform additional checks on the input PRG seed. At time steps just before a landmark, the programs output a new pseudorandomly generated PRG seed, which is then used in the next interval. Using standard IO techniques, it can be shown that for inputs corresponding to $(h^*, \ell^*)$, if the program $P_{\text{ABS}}$ outputs $\bot$, for all time steps up to the one just before a landmark, then we can alter the program indistinguishably so that it outputs $\bot$ at all time steps in the next interval. Employing this technique, we can move across an exponential number of time steps at a single switch of the next step program $P_{\text{ABS}}$.

### Formal Proof

#### Signer Privacy: Observe that for any message $\text{msg} \in \mathcal{M}_{\text{ABS}}$, $(\text{PP}_{\text{ABS}} = (\text{hK}, \mathcal{I}O(\text{Verify.Prog}_{\text{ABS}}[K])))$, $\text{MSK}_{\text{ABS}} = (K, \text{hK}) \overset{\$$}{\leftarrow} \text{ABS.Setup}(1^\lambda)$, and $x \in U_{\text{ABS}}$ with $|x| = \ell_x$, a signature on $\text{msg}$ under $x$ is of the form $\sigma_{\text{ABS}} = (\text{VSIG}, \text{SIG})$, where $(\text{VSIG}, \text{VSIG}) = \text{SIG.Setup}(1^\lambda; h(\text{hK}(x), \ell_x)))$, $\text{SIG} = \text{SIG.Sign}(\text{SK}_{\text{SIG}}, \text{msg})$. Here, $\text{hK} \overset{\$$}{\leftarrow} \text{SSB.Gen}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{SSB-blk}} = 2^\lambda, i^* = 0)$ and $K \overset{\$$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$. Thus, the distribution of the signature $\sigma_{\text{ABS}}$ is clearly the same regardless of the signing key $\text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}(M)$ that is used to compute it.

#### Existential Unforgeability: We will prove the existential unforgeability of the ABS construction of Section 3.3 against selective attribute adaptive chosen message attack by means of a sequence of hybrid experiments. We will demonstrate based on the security of various primitives that the advantage of any PPT adversary $A$ in consecutive hybrid experiments differs only negligibly as well as that in the final
hybrid experiment is negligible. We note that due to the selective attribute setting, the challenger B
knows the challenge attribute string \( x^* = x^*_0 \ldots x^*_{l-1} \in \mathcal{U}_{\text{ABS}} \) and the SSB hash value \( h^* = \mathcal{H}_{\text{SSB}}(x^*) \) before receiving any signing key or signature query from the adversary A. Suppose, the total number of
signing key query and signature query made by the adversary A be \( q_{\text{key}} \) and \( q_{\text{sign}} \) respectively. As noted in
Remark 5.1, without loss of generality we will assume that A only queries signatures on messages
under the challenge attribute string \( x^* \). The description of the hybrid experiments follows:

**Sequence of Hybrid Experiments**

**Hyb\(_0\):** This experiment corresponds to the real selective attribute adaptive chosen message unforgeability experiment described in Section 3.3. More precisely, this experiment proceeds as follows:

- A submits a challenge attribute string \( x^* = x^*_0 \ldots x^*_{l-1} \in \mathcal{U}_{\text{ABS}} \) with \( |x^*| = \ell^* \) to B.
- B generates \( (\mathcal{P}_{\text{key}} = (\mathcal{H}(\mathcal{I})(\text{Verify.Prog}_{\text{ABS}}[\mathcal{K}]), \mathcal{M}_{\text{key}} = (\mathcal{H}(\mathcal{I}), \mathcal{K})) \) as described in Section 3.3 and provides \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{key}} \) to A.
- For \( \eta = 1, \ldots, q_{\text{key}} \), in response to the \( \eta^\text{th} \) signing key query corresponding to signing policy \( \mathcal{M}_{\eta}^{(\eta)} = (\mathcal{Q}^{(\eta)}, \mathcal{S}_{\text{inp}}, \mathcal{S}_{\text{attr}}, \mathcal{S}_{\text{rep}}, \mathcal{S}^{(\eta)}, \mathcal{q}^{(\eta)}, \mathcal{q}_{\text{sig}}, \mathcal{q}_{\text{sign}}, \mathcal{E}) \in \mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{L}} \) with \( M^{(\eta)}(x^*) = 0 \), B creates

\[
\mathcal{S}_{\text{key}}(M^{(\eta)}) = \begin{cases}
\mathcal{H}(\mathcal{I}), \mathcal{P}_{\text{key}}^{(\eta)}, \mathcal{U}_{\text{store}}^{(\eta)}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{attr}}^{(\eta)}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{rep}}^{(\eta)}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{sign}}^{(\eta)} \\
\mathcal{I}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog})^{(\eta)}(\mathcal{K}_{\text{Sps}}, \mathcal{E}) \\
\mathcal{I}(\text{Accumulate.Prog})^{(\eta)}(\mathcal{K}_{\text{Sps}}, \mathcal{E}) \\
\mathcal{I}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog})^{(\eta)}(\mathcal{K}_{\text{Sps}}, \mathcal{E}) \\
\mathcal{I}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog})^{(\eta)}(\mathcal{K}_{\text{Sps}}, \mathcal{E})
\end{cases}
\]

as described in Section 3.3 and returns \( \mathcal{S}_{\text{key}}(M^{(\eta)}) \) to A.

- For \( \theta = 1, \ldots, q_{\text{sign}} \), in reply to the \( \theta^\text{th} \) signature query on message \( \mathcal{M}_{\eta}^{(\eta)} \) under attribute string \( x^* \), B
identifies some \( \mathcal{M}_{\eta}^* \in \mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{L}} \) such that \( M_{\eta}^*(x^*) = 1 \), generates \( \mathcal{S}_{\text{key}}(M^*) \) as described in Section 3.3, and computes \( \mathcal{S}_{\text{key}}(M^*) = (\mathcal{V}_{\text{sign}}, \mathcal{S}_{\text{sign}}) \) \( \mathcal{S}_{\text{sign}}(\mathcal{M}_{\eta}^{(\eta)}(x^*), \mathcal{M}_{\eta}^*) \) as described in Section 3.3. B
gives back \( \mathcal{S}_{\text{sign}}(\mathcal{M}_{\eta}^{(\eta)}(x^*), \mathcal{M}_{\eta}^*) \) to A.

- Finally, A outputs a forged signature \( \mathcal{S}_{\text{key}}(M_{\mathcal{L}}^*) \) on some message \( \mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{L}}^* \) under attribute string \( x^* \).

**Hyb\(_{0,\nu}\) (\( \nu = 1, \ldots, q_{\text{key}} \)):** This experiment is similar to Hyb\(_0\) except that for \( \eta \in [q_{\text{key}}] \), in reply to the
\( \eta^\text{th} \) signing key query of A corresponding to signing policy \( \mathcal{M}_{\eta}^{(\eta)} \in \mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{L}} \) with \( M^{(\eta)}(x^*) = 0 \), B returns the signing key

\[
\mathcal{S}_{\text{key}}(M^{(\eta)}) = \begin{cases}
\mathcal{H}(\mathcal{I}), \mathcal{P}_{\text{key}}^{(\eta)}, \mathcal{U}_{\text{store}}^{(\eta)}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{attr}}^{(\eta)}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{rep}}^{(\eta)}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{sign}}^{(\eta)} \\
\mathcal{I}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog})^{(\eta)}(\mathcal{K}_{\text{Sps}}, \mathcal{E}) \\
\mathcal{I}(\text{Accumulate.Prog})^{(\eta)}(\mathcal{K}_{\text{Sps}}, \mathcal{E}) \\
\mathcal{I}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog})^{(\eta)}(\mathcal{K}_{\text{Sps}}, \mathcal{E}) \\
\mathcal{I}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog})^{(\eta)}(\mathcal{K}_{\text{Sps}}, \mathcal{E})
\end{cases}
\]

if \( \eta \leq \nu \), where the program Constrained-Key.Prog\(_{\mathcal{L}}^* \) is an alteration of the program Constrained-Key.Prog\(_{\mathcal{L}} \) (Fig. 3.5) and is described in Fig. 3.6 while it returns the signing key

\[
\mathcal{S}_{\text{key}}(M^{(\eta)}) = \begin{cases}
\mathcal{H}(\mathcal{I}), \mathcal{P}_{\text{key}}^{(\eta)}, \mathcal{U}_{\text{store}}^{(\eta)}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{attr}}^{(\eta)}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{rep}}^{(\eta)}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{sign}}^{(\eta)} \\
\mathcal{I}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog})^{(\eta)}(\mathcal{K}_{\text{Sps}}, \mathcal{E}) \\
\mathcal{I}(\text{Accumulate.Prog})^{(\eta)}(\mathcal{K}_{\text{Sps}}, \mathcal{E}) \\
\mathcal{I}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog})^{(\eta)}(\mathcal{K}_{\text{Sps}}, \mathcal{E}) \\
\mathcal{I}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog})^{(\eta)}(\mathcal{K}_{\text{Sps}}, \mathcal{E})
\end{cases}
\]
if \( \eta > \nu \). Observe that Hyb\(_{b,0}\) coincides with Hyb\(_{b}\).

**Hyb\(_{1}\)**: This experiment coincides with Hyb\(_{b,\delta_{\text{hyb}}} \). More formally, in this experiment for \( \eta = 1, \ldots, \delta_{\text{key}} \), in reply to the \( \eta \)'th signing key query of \( \mathcal{A} \) corresponding to signing policy \( \mathcal{T} M^{(\eta)} \in \mathcal{M}_x \) with \( M^{(\eta)}(x^*) = 0 \), \( \mathcal{B} \) generates all the components of the signing key as in Hyb\(_{b}\), however, it returns the signing key

\[
\text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}(M^{(\eta)}) = \\
\left( H_k, PP_{\text{ACC}}^{(\eta)}, \text{STORE}^{(\eta)}, PP_{\text{TR}h}^{(\eta)}, v_0^{(\eta)} \right),
\mathcal{IO}\{\text{Init-SPS.Prog}^{(\eta)}(\lambda), v_0^{(\eta)}, v_0^{(\eta)}; F_{\text{SPS-E}} \}
\mathcal{IO}\{\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(\eta)}(\lambda), H_k, PP_{\text{ACC}}^{(\eta)}, PP_{\text{TR}h}^{(\eta)}, K^{(\eta)} \}
\mathcal{IO}\{\text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(\eta)}(K^{(\eta)}), \lambda \}
\mathcal{IO}\{\text{Constrained-Key.Prog}_{\text{ABS}}^{(\eta)}(M^{(\eta)}), T = 2^\lambda, PP_{\text{ACC}}^{(\eta)}, PP_{\text{TR}h}^{(\eta)}, K, K^{(\eta)} \}
\]

The rest of the experiment is analogous to Hyb\(_{b}\).

**Hyb\(_{b}\)**: This experiment is identical to Hyb\(_{1}\) other than the following exceptions:

(I) Upon receiving the challenge attribute string \( x^* \), \( \mathcal{B} \) proceeds as follows:

1. It selects a PPRF key \( K \leftarrow \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \) and generates \( H_k \leftarrow \text{SSB.Gen}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{SB-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, i^* = 0) \) just as in Hyb\(_{1}\),
2. It then computes \( h^* = H_{\text{in}}(x^*) \) and creates the punctured PPRF key \( K\{(h^*, \ell^*)\} \leftarrow \mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}(K, (h^*, \ell^*)) \).
3. It computes \( \tilde{r}_{\text{SIG}} = \mathcal{F}(K, (h^*, \ell^*)) \), forms \( (\tilde{\text{SK}}_{\text{SIG}}, \tilde{\nu}_{\text{SIG}}) = \text{SIG.Setup}(1^\lambda; \tilde{r}_{\text{SIG}}) \).
4. It sets the public parameters \( PP_{\text{ABS}} \) to be given to \( \mathcal{A} \) as \( PP_{\text{ABS}} = (H_k, \mathcal{IO}\{\text{Verify.Prog}_{\text{ABS}}^{(\eta)}[K\{(h^*, \ell^*)\}], \nu_{\text{SIG}}, h^*, \ell^*]) \), where the program Verify.Prog\(_{\text{ABS}}^{(\eta)} \) is an alteration of the program Verify.Prog\(_{\text{ABS}} \) (Fig. 3.1) and is depicted in Fig. 3.3.
For \( \eta = 1, \ldots, \hat{q}_{\text{REV}} \), in response to the \( \eta \)th signing key query of \( \mathcal{A} \) corresponding to signing policy \( \text{TM} \) \( M^{(n)} \in \mathcal{M}_{\lambda} \) with \( M^{(n)}(x^*) = 0 \), \( \mathcal{B} \) provides \( \mathcal{A} \) with the signing key

\[
\text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}(M^{(n)}) = \left( \text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\text{ABS}}^{(n)}, \text{STORE}^{(n)}, \text{PP}_{\text{TR}}^{(n)}, \text{PP}_{\text{TR}}^{(n)}, \text{IO}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog}^{q_{\text{REV}}^{(n)}, w_{0}^{(n)}, v_{0}^{(n)}, K_{|^{(n)}}^{(n)}}) \right),
\]

\[
\text{IO}(\text{Accumulate.Prog})^{(h_{\text{REV}} = 2^{\lambda}, \text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\text{ABS}}^{(n)}, \text{PP}_{\text{TR}}^{(n)}, K_{|^{(n)}}^{(n)})} \right)
\]

\[
\text{IO}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog})^{(\text{pp}_{\text{ABS}}, K_{|^{(n)}}^{(n)})} \right)
\]

\[
\text{IO}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog})^{(M^{(n)}, T = 2^{\lambda}, \text{pp}_{\text{ABS}}^{(n)}, \text{pp}_{\text{TR}}^{(n)}, K_{|^{(n)}}^{(n)}, K_{|^{(n)}}^{(n)}, \ldots, K_{|^{(n)}}^{(n)}, h^{*}, \ell^{*})}
\]

**Hyb_{2}:** This experiment is similar to Hyb_{2} with the only exception that \( \mathcal{B} \) selects \( \hat{r}_{\text{SIG}} \) \( \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{Y} \text{PPRF} \). More formally, this experiment has the following deviations from hyb_{2}:

(I) In this experiment \( \mathcal{B} \) creates the punctured PPRF key \( K\{h^{*}, \ell^{*}\} \) as in hyb_{2}, however, it generates \( (\text{SK}_{\text{SIG}}^{+}, \text{VK}_{\text{SIG}}^{+}) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{SIG.Setup}(1^\lambda) \). It includes the obfuscated program \( \text{IO}(\text{Verify.Prog})^{M^{(n)}, \{h^{*}, \ell^{*}\}} \) within the public parameters \( \text{PP}_{\text{ABS}} \) to be provided to \( \mathcal{A} \) as earlier.

(II) Also, for \( \theta = 1, \ldots, \hat{q}_{\text{SIG}} \), to answer the \( \theta \)th signature query of \( \mathcal{A} \) on message \( \text{msg}^{(\theta)} \in \mathcal{M}_{\text{ABS}} \) under attribute string \( x^{*} \), \( \mathcal{B} \) computes \( \sigma_{\text{SIG}}^{(\theta)} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{SIG.Sign}(\text{SK}_{\text{SIG}}, \text{msg}^{(\theta)}) \) and returns \( \sigma_{\text{SIG}}^{(\theta)} = (\text{VK}_{\text{SIG}}^{+}, \sigma_{\text{SIG}}^{(\theta)}) \) to \( \mathcal{A} \).

**Analysis**

Let \( \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0)}(\lambda), \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1)}(\lambda), \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(2)}(\lambda) \) and \( \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3)}(\lambda) \) represent respectively the advantage of the adversary \( \mathcal{A} \), i.e., \( \mathcal{A} \)'s probability of successfully outputting a valid forgery, in Hyb_{0}, Hyb_{0,p}, \( (\nu = 1, \ldots, \hat{q}_{\text{REV}}), \text{Hyb}_{1}, \text{Hyb}_{2}, \text{Hyb}_{3} \) respectively. Then, by the description of the hybrid experiments it follows that \( \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0)}(\lambda) \equiv \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0)}(\lambda) \equiv \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0)}(\lambda) \equiv \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0)}(\lambda) \), and \( \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3)}(\lambda) \) represent respectively the advantage of the adversary \( \mathcal{A} \), i.e., \( \mathcal{A} \)'s probability of successfully outputting a valid forgery, in Hyb_{0}, Hyb_{0,p}, \( (\nu = 1, \ldots, \hat{q}_{\text{REV}}), \text{Hyb}_{1}, \text{Hyb}_{2}, \text{Hyb}_{3} \) respectively. Then, by the description of the hybrid experiments it follows that \( \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0)}(\lambda) \equiv \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0)}(\lambda) \equiv \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0)}(\lambda) \equiv \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0)}(\lambda) \). Hence, we have

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0)}(\lambda) \leq \sum_{\nu = 1}^{\hat{q}_{\text{REV}}} |\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0)}(\lambda)| + \sum_{j=1}^{2} |\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(j)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(j+1)}(\lambda)| + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3)}(\lambda).
\]

Let \( \Delta[1] \) and \( \Delta[3] \) presented in Appendix \( \[3] \) will show that the RHS of Eq. (3.1) is negligible and thus the existential unforgeability of the ABS construction of Section \( \[3] \) follows.

4 Conclusion

In this paper, we construct the first ABS scheme supporting signing polices expressible as *Turing machines* (TM) which can handle signing attribute strings of *arbitrary polynomial length*. On the technical side, we devise new ideas to empower the techniques of [1],[5] to deal with adaptive key queries.

**References**

Appendix

A Lemmas for the Proof of Theorem 3.1

Lemma A.1. Assuming $\mathcal{IO}$ is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for $P/poly$, $\mathcal{F}$ is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, $\text{SSB}$ is a secure somewhere statistically binding hash function, $\text{ACC}$ is a secure positional accumulator, $\text{ITR}$ is a secure cryptographic iterator, $\text{SPS}$ is a secure splittable signature scheme, and $\text{PRG}$ is a secure injective pseudorandom generator, for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|\text{Adv}^{(0,\nu-1)}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{(0,\nu)}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function $\text{negl}$.

Proof. The proof of our Lemma A.1 extends the ideas involved in the security proof for the message-hiding encoding of [11]. Lemma 1 in the security proof of the CPRF construction of [5] also employs a similar technique. However, as mentioned earlier, we elegantly extend the technique of [5] to support adaptive signing key queries of the adversary as stipulated in our unforgeability experiment. We will first provide a complete description of the sequence of hybrid experiments involved in the proof of Lemma A.1 and then provide the analysis of those hybrid experiments providing the details for only those segments which are technically distinct from [5].

Let $t^*(\nu)$ denotes the running time of the TM $M^{(\nu)} \in \mathbb{M}_\lambda$, queried by the adversary $\mathcal{A}$, on input the challenge string $x^*$ and $2^t^*(\nu)$ be the smallest power of two greater than $t^*(\nu)$. The sequence of intermediate hybrid experiments between $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu}$ are described below:

Sequence of Intermediate Hybrids between $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu}$

$\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,0}$: This experiment coincides with $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1}$.

$\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1}$: This experiment is analogous to $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,0}$ except that to answer the $\nu^\text{th}$ signing key query of $\mathcal{A}$ corresponding to TM $M^{(\nu)} \in \mathbb{M}_\lambda$ with $M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0$, $\mathcal{B}$ proceeds as follows:

1. It first picks PPRF keys $K^{(\nu)}_1, \ldots, K^{(\nu)}_{\nu}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS,A}}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS,B}}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS,E}} \leftarrow \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$.
2. After that, it generates $(\text{pp}^{(\nu)}_{\text{ACC}}, u^{(\nu)}_0, \text{store}^{(\nu)}_0) \leftarrow \mathcal{ACC}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, n^{\text{ACC-BLK}} = 2^\lambda)$ and $(\text{pp}^{(\nu)}_{\text{ITR}}, v^{(\nu)}_0) \leftarrow \text{ITR.\text{Setup}}(1^\lambda, n^{\text{ITR}} = 2^\lambda)$.
3. It provides $\mathcal{A}$ with the signing key $\text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}\{M^{(\nu)}\} = (\text{HK}, \text{pp}^{(\nu)}_{\text{ACC}}, u^{(\nu)}_0, \text{store}^{(\nu)}_0, \text{pp}^{(\nu)}_{\text{ITR}}, v^{(\nu)}_0, I\mathcal{O}(\text{Init-SPS.\text{Prog}}(u^{(\nu)}_0, v^{(\nu)}_0, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS,E}})), I\mathcal{O}(\text{Accumulate.\text{Prog}}(n^{\text{SSB-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, \text{HK}, \text{pp}^{(\nu)}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{pp}^{(\nu)}_{\text{ITR}}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS,E}})), I\mathcal{O}(\text{Change-SPS.\text{Prog}}(K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS,A}}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS,E}})), I\mathcal{O}(\text{Constrained-Key.\text{Prog}}^{(1)}_{\text{Abs}}(\nu, M^{(\nu)}, T = 2^\lambda, t^*(\nu), \text{pp}^{(\nu)}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{pp}^{(\nu)}_{\text{ITR}}, K, K^{(\nu)}_1, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS,A}}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS,B}})$),

where the program $\text{Constrained-Key.\text{Prog}}^{(1)}_{\text{Abs}}$ is a modification of the program $\text{Constrained-Key.\text{Prog}}^{(1)}_{\text{Abs}}$ (Fig. 3.6) and is depicted in Fig. A.1.

$\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,2}$: In this experiment, in response to the $\nu^\text{th}$ signing key query of $\mathcal{A}$ corresponding to TM $M^{(\nu)} \in \mathbb{M}_\lambda$ with $M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0$, $\mathcal{B}$ performs the following steps:

1. It first chooses PPRF keys $K^{(\nu)}_1, \ldots, K^{(\nu)}_{\nu}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS,A}}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS,B}}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS,E}}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS,F}} \leftarrow \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$.
2. After that, it generates $(\text{pp}^{(\nu)}_{\text{ACC}}, u^{(\nu)}_0, \text{store}^{(\nu)}_0) \leftarrow \mathcal{ACC}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, n^{\text{ACC-BLK}} = 2^\lambda)$ and $(\text{pp}^{(\nu)}_{\text{ITR}}, v^{(\nu)}_0) \leftarrow \text{ITR.\text{Setup}}(1^\lambda, n^{\text{ITR}} = 2^\lambda)$. 
3. It provides \( T = 2^\lambda \), Running time on challenge input \( t^* \).

### Inputs:
- Time \( t \), String \( \text{seed}_{\text{acc}} \), Header position \( \text{pos}_{\text{acc}} \), Symbol \( \text{sym}_{\text{acc}} \), TM state \( \text{st}_{\text{acc}} \), Accumulator value \( w_{\text{acc}} \), Accumulator proof \( \pi_{\text{acc}} \), Auxiliary value \( \text{aux}_{\text{acc}} \), Iteration value \( \text{itr}_{\text{acc}} \), String \( \text{seed}_{\text{itr}} \).
- \( \{ K, K_1, \ldots, K_n, \text{ssb-blk}, \text{ssb-rej} \} \), SSB hash value of challenge input \( h^* \), Length of challenge input \( t^* \).

### Output:
- \( \text{CPF} \) evaluation \( \mathcal{F}(K, (h, \text{seed}_{\text{acc}})) \) or (Header Position \( \text{pos}_{\text{acc}} \), Symbol \( \text{sym}_{\text{acc}} \), TM state \( \text{st}_{\text{acc}} \), Accumulator value \( w_{\text{acc}} \), Accumulator proof \( \pi_{\text{acc}} \), Auxiliary value \( \text{aux}_{\text{acc}} \), Iteration value \( \text{itr}_{\text{acc}} \), String \( \text{seed}_{\text{itr}} \)), or \( \perp \).

1. Identify an integer \( \tau \) such that \( 2^\tau \leq t < 2^{\tau+1} \). If \( \mathcal{PRG}(\text{seed}_{\text{acc}}) \neq \mathcal{PRG}(\mathcal{F}(K, (h, \text{seed}_{\text{acc}}))) \) \& \( |t| > 1 \), output \( \perp \).
2. If \( \mathcal{ACC} \cdot \text{Verify}(\text{prod}, \text{w}_{\text{acc}}, \text{sym}_{\text{acc}}, \text{pos}_{\text{acc}}, 0) \) = 0, output \( \perp \).
3. Compute \( (\text{r}_{\text{acc}})_{\text{acc}} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{acc}}, (h, \text{seed}_{\text{acc}}, t-1)) \) \& \((\text{sk}_{\text{acc}})_{\text{acc}}, \text{sym}_{\text{acc}}, (\text{sk}_{\text{acc}})_{\text{acc}}, \text{sym}_{\text{acc}}) = \text{SPS}\cdot\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, r_{\text{acc}})\).
4. Compute \( \text{r}_{\text{acc}}, \text{sk}_{\text{acc}} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{acc}}, (h, \text{seed}_{\text{acc}}, t)) \) \& \((\text{sk}_{\text{acc}})_{\text{acc}}, \text{sym}_{\text{acc}}, (\text{sk}_{\text{acc}})_{\text{acc}}, \text{sym}_{\text{acc}}) = \text{SPS}\cdot\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, r_{\text{acc}})\).
5. Set \( m_{\text{acc}} = (v_{\text{acc}}, \text{st}_{\text{acc}}, \text{pos}_{\text{acc}}) \), \( \alpha = \lambda \).
6. If \( \text{SPS}\cdot\text{Verify}(\text{sk}_{\text{acc}}, m_{\text{acc}}, \alpha) = 1 \), set \( \alpha = \lambda' \).
7. If \( \alpha = \lambda \), output \( \perp \).
8. Compute \( (\text{st}_{\text{acc}}, \text{sym}_{\text{acc}}, \beta) = \delta((\text{st}_{\text{acc}}, \text{sym}_{\text{acc}})) \) and \( \text{pos}_{\text{acc}} = \text{pos}_{\text{acc}} + \beta \).
9. If \( \text{st}_{\text{acc}} = \text{q}_{\text{acc}} \), output \( \perp \).
10. Compute \( \text{sig}_{\text{acc}} = \text{SIG}\cdot\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, r_{\text{acc}}) \).
11. Compute \( \text{out}_{\text{acc}} = \text{SIG}\cdot\text{Sign}(\text{sk}_{\text{acc}}, m_{\text{acc}}) \).
12. If \( t + 1 = 2^{\lambda} \), for some integer \( \lambda' \), set \( \text{seed}_{\text{acc}} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\lambda'}, (h, \text{seed}_{\text{acc}})) \).

### Fig. A.1. Constrained-Key.Prog\textsubscript{AB} \( T \)

The rest of the experiment proceeds in the same way as in Hyb_{\text{0,0}}^{\text{0,0}}.
Constants: Maximum number of blocks for SSB hash $n_{ssb-max} = 2^λ$, SSB hash key $hk$, Public parameters for positional accumulator $PP_{acc}$, Public parameters for iterator $PP_{itr}$, PRF keys $K_{ssb,E}$, $K_{sps,E}$, SSB hash value of challenge input $h^*$, Length of challenge input $|č|$.

Inputs: Index $i$, Symbol $s_{ssb}$, TM state $st$, Accumulator value $w_{st}$, Auxiliary value $aux$, Iterator value $v_{ssb}$, Signature $σ_{acc,ssb}$, SSB hash value $h^*$, SSB opening value $σ_{ssb}$.

Output: (Accumulator value $w_{acc}$, Iterator value $v_{acc}$, Signature $σ_{acc,ssb}$), or ⊥

1. (a) Compute $r_{∀,E} = F(K_{ssb,E}, (h, i))$. $(s_{ssb}, v_{ssb}, w_{ssb}, h^*; s_{ssb}) = SPS.Setup(λ; r_{∀,E})$.
   (b) Compute $r_{∀,E} = F(K_{ssb,E}, (h, i))$. $(s_{ssb}, v_{ssb}, w_{ssb}, h^*; s_{ssb}) = SPS.Setup(λ; r_{∀,E})$.
   (c) Set $m_0 = (ν, σ_{acc,ssb}, 0)$ and $α = w_{st}$.
   (d) If $SPS.Verify(w_{ssb}, m_0, σ_{acc,ssb}) = 1$, set $α = F'$.
   (e) If $[α = w_{st} ∧ [[α ≠ F'] ∨ [h ≠ h^*]]]$, output ⊥.
   (f) If $α = w_{st}$, output ⊥.

2. If SSB $Verify(hk, i, s_{ssb}, σ_{ssb}) = 0$, output ⊥.

(a) Compute $w_{acc} = ACC.Update(PP_{acc}, ν, σ_{acc,ssb}, τ, w_{st}, 0)$. If $w_{acc} = ⊥$, output ⊥.
(b) Compute $v_{ssb} = ITR.Iterate(PP_{itr}, ν, (st, w_{st}, 0))$.
(c) Compute $r_{∀,E} = F(K_{ssb,E}, (h, i + 1))$. $(s_{ssb}, v_{ssb}, w_{ssb}, h^*; s_{ssb}) = SPS.Setup(λ; r_{∀,E})$.
(d) Set $m_0 = (τ_{acc,ssb}, st, w_{acc}, 0)$. Compute $σ_{acc,ssb} = SPS.Sign(s_{ssb}, m_0)$.
(e) Output $(w_{acc}, v_{ssb}, σ_{acc,ssb})$.

Fig. A.2. Accumulate.Prog\(^{(1)}\)

Fig. A.3. Change-SPS.Prog\(^{(1)}\)

where the programs Accumulate.Prog\(^{(2)}\) and Change-SPS.Prog\(^{(2)}\) are modifications of the programs Accumulate.Prog\(^{(1)}\) and Change-SPS.Prog\(^{(1)}\) (Figs. A.2 and A.3) and are depicted in Figs. A.4 and A.5 respectively. The remaining part of the experiment is similar to $Hyb_{0,ν−1,2}$.

$Hyb_{0,ν−1,3,3, λ}$ ($λ = 0, \ldots, λ^* − 1$): In this hybrid experiment, to answer the $ν^{th}$ signing key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M(ν) ∈ M_λ$ with $M(ν)(x^*) = 0$, $B$ proceeds as follows:

1. It first generates all the PRPF keys as well as the public parameters for the positional accumulator and the iterator as in $Hyb_{0,ν−1,3}$.

2. Next, it sets $m_{0,ν} = (ν, q_0, w_{st}, 0)$. For $j = 1, \ldots, ν$, it iteratively computes the following:

   \[
   \begin{align*}
   \text{AUX}^{(ν)}_{j} & = ACC.PrepareWrite(PP_{acc}^{(ν)}, j, j - 1) \\
   \text{w}^{(ν)}_{j} & = ACC.Update(PP_{acc}^{(ν)}, w^{(ν)}_{j-1}, x_s^{j-1}, 0, α_{j}^{(ν)}) \\
   \text{STORE}^{(ν)}_{j} & = ACC.WriteStore(PP_{acc}^{(ν)}, j, j - 1, x_s^{j-1}) \\
   \text{v}^{(ν)}_{j} & = ITR.Iterate(PP_{itr}^{(ν)}, v^{(ν)}_{j-1}, (q_0^{(ν)}, w^{(ν)}_{j-1}, 0))
   \end{align*}
   \]

   It sets $m_{ν,0} = (ν, q_0, w_{st}, 0)$.\]
3. It gives $A$ the signing key

$$SK_{SRS} \{ M^{(v)} \} =$$

\[
\begin{align*}
&:\text{HK, PP}_{AC}^{(v)}, T_{SRS}^{(v)}, PP_{TR}^{(v)},\nu_{0}^{(v)}, \\
&:\text{IO}\{\text{Init-SPS.Prog}\}(0,0,0), \nu_{0}^{(v)}, K_{SRS}^{(v)}), \\
&:\text{IO}\{\text{Accumulate.Prog}\}(3.1)\{M^{(v)} \in \lambda, \text{HK, PP}_{AC}^{(v)}, T_{SRS}^{(v)}, PP_{TR}^{(v)}, K_{SRS}^{(v)}, M^{(v)}, h^{*}, \ell^{*}\}) \\
&:\text{IO}\{\text{Change-SPS.Prog}\}(3.3)\{M^{(v)} \in \lambda, B_{SRS}^{(v)}, B_{SRS}^{(v)}, K_{SRS}^{(v)}, M^{(v)}, h^{*}, \ell^{*}\}) \\
&:\text{IO}\{\text{Constrained-Key.Prog}\}(1)\{M^{(v)} \in \lambda, T^{(v)}, PP_{AC}^{(v)}, PP_{TR}^{(v)}, K, K_{SRS}^{(v)}, \ldots, K_{SRS}^{(v)}, \ell^{*}\}) \\
\end{align*}
\]

where the programs Accumulate.Prog$^{(3.1)}$ and Change-SPS.Prog$^{(3.3)}$ are alterations of the programs Accumulate.Prog$^{(2)}$ and Change-SPS.Prog$^{(2)}$ (Figs. A.4 and A.5) and are described in Figs. A.6 and A.7 respectively.

The remaining part of the experiment is analogous to $Hyb_{0,v-1,3}$.

$Hyb_{0,v-1,3'}$ ($v = 0, \ldots, \ell^{*} - 1$): This experiment is identical to $Hyb_{0,v-1,3}$ except that in response to the $v$th signing key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(v)} \in \lambda$ with $M^{(v)}(x^{*}) = 0$, $B$ executes the following steps:

1. It first generates all the PPRF keys as well as the public parameters for the positional accumulator and the iterator as in $Hyb_{0,v-1,3}$.
Constants: Maximum number of blocks for SSB hash $\eta_{sbb-blk} = 2^{λ}$, SSB hash key $hk$, Public parameters for positional accumulator $\mathbb{P}_{\mathbb{ACC}}$, Public parameters for iterator $\mathbb{P}_{\mathbb{ITER}}$. PPRF keys $K_{\mathbb{ACC},E}$, $K_{\mathbb{ITER},F}$, Message $m_{\text{aux}}$, SSB hash value of challenge input $h^*$, Length of challenge input $ℓ^*$

Inputs: Index $i$, Symbol $\nu$, TM state $st$, Accumulator value $w_0$, Auxiliary value $\nu_{\text{aux}}$, Iteration value $\nu_{\text{iter}}$, Signature $\sigma_{\text{aux-in}}$, SSB hash value $h$, SSB opening value $\nu_{\text{open}}$

Output: (Accumulator value $w_{\text{aux}}$, Iterator value $\nu_{\text{iter}}$, Signature $\sigma_{\text{aux-out}}$), or ⊥

1. (a) Compute $\nu_{\text{aux}} = F(K_{\mathbb{ACC},E}; (h, i))$, $(\mathbb{K}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}) = \mathbb{S}_{\text{PS}}\text{Setup}(1^λ; \nu_{\text{aux}})$. 
   (b) Compute $\nu_{\text{aux}} = F(K_{\mathbb{ACC},F}; (h, i))$, $(\mathbb{K}_{\mathbb{ACC},F}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},F}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},F}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}) = \mathbb{S}_{\text{PS}}\text{Setup}(1^λ; \nu_{\text{aux}})$. 
   (c) Set $m_0 = (w_0, st, w_0, 0)$ and $α=\cdot$. 
   (d) If $\mathbb{S}_{\text{PS}}\text{Verify}(\mathbb{K}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, m_0, \sigma_{\text{aux-in}}) = 1$, set $α = \nu_{\text{aux}}'$. 
   (e) If $[\alpha = \cdot] \land [i > ℓ^*] \lor [0 \leq i < ℓ^*] \land (h \neq h^*)$, output ⊥. 
   Else if $[\alpha = \cdot] \land [\mathbb{S}_{\text{PS}}\text{Verify}(\mathbb{K}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, m_0, \sigma_{\text{aux-in}}) = 1]$, set $α = \nu_{\text{aux}}'$. 
   (f) If $\alpha = \cdot$, output ⊥.
2. If $\mathbb{S}_{\text{PS}}\text{Verify}(hk, h, i, \text{sysmsg}, ξ_{\text{aux}}) = 0$, output ⊥.
3. Compute $\nu_{\text{aux}} = \mathbb{A}_{\text{ACC}}\text{Update}(\mathbb{P}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, w_0, \nu_{\text{sysmsg}}, i, \text{AUX})$. If $\nu_{\text{aux}} = ⊥$, output ⊥.
4. Compute $\nu_{\text{aux}} = \mathbb{I}_{\text{ITER}}\text{Iterate}(\mathbb{P}_{\mathbb{ITER},E}, \nu_{\text{sysmsg}}, (0, w_0), 0)$. 
5. Output $(w_{\text{aux}}; \nu_{\text{iter}}; \sigma_{\text{aux-out}})$.

Fig. A.6. Accumulate.Prog$^{(3,λ)}$

Constants: PPRF keys $K_{\mathbb{ACC},E}$, $K_{\mathbb{ACC},F}$, $K_{\mathbb{ITER},E}$, $K_{\mathbb{ITER},F}$, SSB hash value of challenge input $h^*$, Length of challenge input $ℓ^*$

Inputs: TM state $st$, Accumulator value $w_0$, Iterator value $v_0$, SSB hash value $h$, Length $ℓ_{\text{aux}}$, Signature $\sigma_{\text{aux-in}}$

Output: Signature $\sigma_{\text{aux-out}}$ or ⊥

1. Compute $\nu_{\text{aux}} = F(K_{\mathbb{ACC},E}; (h, ℓ_{\text{aux}}))$, $(\mathbb{K}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}) = \mathbb{S}_{\text{PS}}\text{Setup}(1^λ; \nu_{\text{aux}})$. 
2. Compute $\nu_{\text{aux}} = F(K_{\mathbb{ACC},F}; (h, ℓ_{\text{aux}}))$, $(\mathbb{K}_{\mathbb{ACC},F}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},F}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},F}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}) = \mathbb{S}_{\text{PS}}\text{Setup}(1^λ; \nu_{\text{aux}})$. 
3. Set $m_0 = (w_0, st, w_0, 0)$ and $α=\cdot$. 
4. If $\mathbb{S}_{\text{PS}}\text{Verify}(\mathbb{K}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, m_0, \sigma_{\text{aux-in}}) = 1$, set $α = \nu_{\text{aux}}'$. 
5. If $[\alpha = \cdot] \land [\mathbb{S}_{\text{PS}}\text{Verify}(\mathbb{K}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, m_0, \sigma_{\text{aux-in}}) = 1]$, set $α = \nu_{\text{aux}}'$. 
6. If $\alpha = \cdot$, output ⊥.

2. (a) Compute $\nu_{\text{aux}} = F(K_{\mathbb{ACC},E}; (h, ℓ_{\text{aux}})), (\mathbb{K}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}) = \mathbb{S}_{\text{PS}}\text{Setup}(1^λ; \nu_{\text{aux}})$. 
(b) Compute $\nu_{\text{aux}} = F(K_{\mathbb{ACC},F}; (h, ℓ_{\text{aux}})), (\mathbb{K}_{\mathbb{ACC},F}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},F}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},F}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, \mathbb{V}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}) = \mathbb{S}_{\text{PS}}\text{Setup}(1^λ; \nu_{\text{aux}})$. 
(c) If $\mathbb{S}_{\text{PS}}\text{Verify}(\mathbb{K}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, m_0, \sigma_{\text{aux-in}}) = 1$, set $α = \nu_{\text{aux}}'$. 
   Else if $\alpha = \cdot$, output $\sigma_{\text{aux-out}} = \mathbb{S}_{\text{PS}}\text{Sign}(\mathbb{K}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, m_0)$. 
   Else if $i < ℓ^*$, compute $\sigma_{\text{aux-out}} = \mathbb{S}_{\text{PS}}\text{Sign}(\mathbb{K}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, m_0)$. 
   Else, compute $\sigma_{\text{aux-out}} = \mathbb{S}_{\text{PS}}\text{Sign}(\mathbb{K}_{\mathbb{ACC},E}, m_0)$. 

Fig. A.7. Change-SPS.Prog$^{(3,λ)}$
Fig. A.8. Accumulate.Prog\((3,4')\)

\textbf{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,4'}: This experiment is identical to \textbf{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3,\rho-(\nu-1)'} with the exception that now in response to the \(\nu\)th signing key query of \(A\) corresponding to TM \(M^{(\nu)} \in M_\lambda\) with \(M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0, B\) does not generate the PPRF key \(K_{\textup{SPS},B}\), and gives \(A\) the signing key

\[
\text{SK}_{\textup{AB}}\{M^{(\nu)}\} = \\
\begin{bmatrix}
\text{HK}, \text{PP}^{(\nu)}_{\text{ACC}}, w_0^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}^{(\nu)}, \text{PP}^{(\nu)}_{\text{ITR}}, v_0^{(\nu)}, \\
\text{IO}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog}\{0\}^{(\nu)}, w_0^{(\nu)}, \text{NSYM}, i_0, \text{aux}) \\
\text{IO}(\text{Accumulate.Prog}\{r_{\text{SSB},\text{BLK}} = 2^\lambda, \text{HK}, \text{PP}^{(\nu)}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PP}^{(\nu)}_{\text{ITR}}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS},E}\}) \\
\text{IO}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog}\{4\}^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS},A}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS},B}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS},E}, m_0^{(\nu)}, h^*, F^*\}) \\
\text{IO}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog}\{3\}^{(\nu)}_{\text{AB}}(M^{(\nu)}, T = 2^\lambda, t^{(\nu)}_0, \text{pp}^{(\nu)}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{pp}^{(\nu)}_{\text{ITR}}, K, K_1^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_{\lambda}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},A}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},B}^{(\nu)})
\end{bmatrix}
\]

where the program \text{Accumulate.Prog} is shown in Fig. 3.3 while the program \text{Change-SPS.Prog}\((4)\) is a modification of the program \text{Change-SPS.Prog}\((3)\) (Fig. A.7), is depicted in Fig. A.9.

Fig. A.9. Change-SPS.Prog\((4)\)

\textbf{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,4}(\gamma = 1, \ldots, t^{(\nu)}(\nu) - 1): This experiment is analogous to \textbf{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,4} except that in response
to the $v^\text{th}$ signing key query of $A$ corresponding to $\text{TM} M^{(v)} \in \mathbb{M}_\lambda$ with $M^{(v)}(x^*) = 0$, $B$ proceeds as follows:

1. It first generates all the PPRF keys as well as the public parameters for the positional accumulator and the iterater as in $\text{Hyb}_{0,v,1,4}^{\text{v},\gamma}$.  

2. Next, it sets $m_{0,0}^{(v)} = (v_0^{(v)}, q_0^{(v)}, w_0^{(v)})$. For $j = 1, \ldots, \ell^*$, it iteratively computes the following:
   
   $\text{AUX}^{(v)}_j = \text{ACC-Prep-Write}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{j-1}^{(v)}, j - 1)$
   
   $u_j^{(v)} = \text{ACC-Update}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_j^{(v)}, x_j^{(v)}, j - 1, \text{AUX}_j^{(v)})$
   
   $\text{STORE}^{(v)}_j = \text{ACC-Write-Store}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{j-1}^{(v)}, j - 1, x_j^{(v)})$
   
   $v_j^{(v)} = \text{ITR-Later}(\text{PP}_{\text{TR}}, v_j^{(v)}, (0, w_j^{(v)}, 0))$

3. Then, $B$ sets $\text{ST}_{M^{(v)},0}^{(v)} = q_0^{(v)}$, $\text{POS}_{M^{(v)},0} = 0$, and for $t = 1, \ldots, \gamma$, computes the following:
   
   $\text{AUX}^{(v)}_{t,\gamma}^{(v)} = \text{ACC-Prep-Write}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}^{(v)}_{t,\gamma}, \text{POS}_{M^{(v)},t,\gamma})$
   
   $\text{ST}^{(v)}_{M^{(v)},t,\gamma} = \text{ACC-Prep-Read}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{t,\gamma}^{(v)}, \text{POS}_{M^{(v)},t,\gamma})$
   
   $\text{AUX}^{(v)}_{t,\gamma}^{(v)} = \text{ACC-Prep-Write}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{t,\gamma}^{(v)}, \text{POS}_{M^{(v)},t,\gamma})$
   
   $\text{ST}^{(v)}_{M^{(v)},t,\gamma} = \text{ACC-Prep-Read}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{t,\gamma}^{(v)}, \text{POS}_{M^{(v)},t,\gamma})$

4. $B$ provides $A$ with the signing key $\text{SK}_{A\{M^{(v)}\}} = \text{IO}(\text{Init-SPS-Prog}[0^{(v)}, v_0^{(v)}, v_0^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPS},E}^{(v)}], \text{IO}(\text{Accumulate-Prog}[0^{(v)}, v_0^{(v)}, v_0^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPS},E}^{(v)}], \text{IO}(\text{Change-SPS-Prog}[0^{(v)}, v_0^{(v)}, v_0^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPS},E}^{(v)}]), \text{IO}(\text{Constrained-Key-Prog}[\text{ABSH}^{(v)}, T = 2^k, t^{(v)}, v_0^{(v)}, v_0^{(v)}, K_1^{(v)}, \ldots, K_{\lambda}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPS},A}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPS},B}^{(v)}], m_{t,\gamma}^{(v)}, h^{(v)}))$ where the program $\text{Change-SPS-Prog}$ is described in Fig. 3.4 and the program $\text{Constrained-Key-Prog}(2,\gamma)$, a modification of program $\text{Constrained-Key-Prog}(1,\gamma)$ (Fig. A.1), is described in Fig. A.10. 

$\text{Hyb}_{0,v,1,4}^{\text{v},\gamma} (\gamma = 0, \ldots, \ell^* (v) - 1)$: This experiment is identical to $\text{Hyb}_{0,v,1,4}^{\text{v},\gamma}$ except that in response to the $v^\text{th}$ signing key query of $A$ corresponding to $\text{TM} M^{(v)} \in \mathbb{M}_\lambda$ with $M^{(v)}(x^*) = 0$, $B$ proceeds as follows:

1. It first generates all the PPRF keys as well as the public parameters for the positional accumulator and the iterater as in $\text{Hyb}_{0,v,1,4}^{\text{v},\gamma}$.

2. Next, it sets $m_{0,0}^{(v)} = (0, q_0^{(v)}, w_0^{(v)})$. For $j = 1, \ldots, \ell^*$, it iteratively computes the following:
   
   $\text{AUX}^{(v)}_j = \text{ACC-Prep-Write}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{j-1}^{(v)}, j - 1)$
   
   $u_j^{(v)} = \text{ACC-Update}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_j^{(v)}, x_j^{(v)}, j - 1, \text{AUX}_j^{(v)})$
   
   $\text{STORE}^{(v)}_j = \text{ACC-Write-Store}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{j-1}^{(v)}, j - 1, x_j^{(v)})$
   
   $v_j^{(v)} = \text{ITR-Later}(\text{PP}_{\text{TR}}, v_j^{(v)}, (0, w_j^{(v)}, 0))$

3. Then, $B$ sets $\text{ST}_{M^{(v)},0}^{(v)} = q_0^{(v)}$, $\text{POS}_{M^{(v)},0} = 0$, and for $t = 1, \ldots, \gamma$, computes the following:
   
   $\text{AUX}^{(v)}_{t,\gamma}^{(v)} = \text{ACC-Prep-Write}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{t,\gamma}^{(v)}, \text{POS}_{M^{(v)},t,\gamma})$
   
   $\text{ST}^{(v)}_{M^{(v)},t,\gamma} = \text{ACC-Prep-Read}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{t,\gamma}^{(v)}, \text{POS}_{M^{(v)},t,\gamma})$
   
   $\text{AUX}^{(v)}_{t,\gamma}^{(v)} = \text{ACC-Prep-Write}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{t,\gamma}^{(v)}, \text{POS}_{M^{(v)},t,\gamma})$
   
   $\text{ST}^{(v)}_{M^{(v)},t,\gamma} = \text{ACC-Prep-Read}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{t,\gamma}^{(v)}, \text{POS}_{M^{(v)},t,\gamma})$

   $\text{AUX}^{(v)}_{t,\gamma}^{(v)} = \text{ACC-Prep-Write}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{t,\gamma}^{(v)}, \text{POS}_{M^{(v)},t,\gamma})$

   $\text{AUX}^{(v)}_{t,\gamma}^{(v)} = \text{ACC-Prep-Write}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{t,\gamma}^{(v)}, \text{POS}_{M^{(v)},t,\gamma})$

   $\text{AUX}^{(v)}_{t,\gamma}^{(v)} = \text{ACC-Prep-Write}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{t,\gamma}^{(v)}, \text{POS}_{M^{(v)},t,\gamma})$
Constants: TM $M = (Q, \Sigma_{in}, \Sigma_{out}, \delta, q_0, q_\text{accept}, q_\text{reject})$, Time bound $T = 2^\lambda$, Running time on challenge input $t^\star$. Public parameters for positional accumulator $\mathcal{PA}_{pos}$. Public parameters for iterator $\mathcal{PA}_{iter}$, PRF keys $K, K_1, \ldots, K_\lambda, K_{\text{acc}}, K_{\text{acc}}, K_{\text{acc}}, K_{\text{acc}}$. Message $\eta$, SSB hash value of challenge input $h^\star$, Length of challenge input $t^\star$.

Inputs: Time $\tau$, String $\text{SEED}_{\eta}$, Header position $\text{POS}_{\eta}$, Symbol $\text{SYM}_{\eta}$, TM state $\text{ST}_{\eta}$, Accumulator value $\text{w}_{\eta}$, Accumulator proof $\text{proof}_{\eta}$, Auxiliary value $\text{Aux}$, Iterator value $\text{V}_{\eta}$, SSB hash value $h$, Length $t_\eta$, Signature $\sigma_{\eta_{\text{SEED}_{\eta}}}$

Output: PRF evaluation $\mathcal{F}(K, (h, t_{\eta}))$, or (Header Position $\text{POS}_{\eta}$, Symbol $\text{SYM}_{\eta}$, TM state $\text{ST}_{\eta}$, Accumulator value $\text{w}_{\eta}$, Iterator value $\text{V}_{\eta}$, Signature $\sigma_{\eta_{\text{POS}_{\eta}}}$, String $\text{SEED}_{\eta}$), or $\bot$.

1. Identify an integer $\tau$ such that $2^\tau < t < 2^\tau+1$; if $\mathcal{PRG}(\text{SEED}_{\eta}) \neq \mathcal{PRG}(\mathcal{F}(K, (h, t_{\eta})))$ then $\bot$.
2. If $\mathcal{ACC}.\text{Verify-Read}(\mathcal{PA}_{pos}, \text{w}_{\eta}, \text{SYM}_{\eta}, \text{POS}_{\eta}, \text{proof}_{\eta}) = 0$, output $\bot$.
3. Compute $r_{\text{pos}, A} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{acc}}, (h, t_{\eta}, (t-1)))$, $(\text{SK}_{\text{acc}}_{\text{A}}, \text{VK}_{\text{acc}}_{\text{A}}, \text{VK}_{\text{acc}}_{\text{B}, \text{A}}) = \mathcal{SPS}.\text{Setup}(1^\tau; r_{\text{pos}, A})$.
4. Compute $r_{\text{pos}, B} = \mathcal{F}(\text{Ker}, (h, t_{\eta}, (t-1)))$, $(\text{SK}_{\text{acc}}_{\text{B}, \text{A}}, \text{VK}_{\text{acc}}_{\text{B}, \text{A}}, \text{VK}_{\text{acc}}_{\text{B}, \text{B}, \text{A}}) = \mathcal{SPS}.\text{Setup}(1^\tau; r_{\text{pos}, B})$.
5. Set $m_{\eta} = (v_0, \text{ST}_{\eta}, \text{WS}_{\eta}, \text{POS}_{\eta})$ and $\alpha = \bot$.
6. If $\mathcal{SPPS}.\text{Verify}(\text{SK}_{\text{acc}}_{\text{A}}, m_{\eta}, \sigma_{\eta_{\text{pos}, \eta}}) = 1$, set $\alpha = A$.
7. If $\mathcal{SPPS}.\text{Verify}(\text{SK}_{\text{acc}}_{\text{B}}, m_{\eta}, \sigma_{\eta_{\text{pos}, \eta}}) = 1$, set $\alpha = B$.
8. Compute $\text{ST}_{\eta}, \text{SYM}_{\eta}, \beta = \delta(\text{ST}_{\eta}, \text{SYM}_{\eta})$ and $\text{POS}_{\eta} = \text{POS}_{\eta} + \beta$.
9. If $\text{ST}_{\eta} = \text{q}_{\text{acc}}$, output $\bot$.
10. Else, if $\text{ST}_{\eta} = \text{q}_{\text{acc}}$, output $\bot$.
11. Else, if $\text{ST}_{\eta} = \text{q}_{\text{acc}}$, output $\bot$.
12. Else, if $\text{ST}_{\eta} = \text{q}_{\text{acc}}$, output $\bot$.
13. Else, if $\text{ST}_{\eta} = \text{q}_{\text{acc}}$, output $\bot$.
14. Else, compute $\text{ST}_{\eta}, \text{SYM}_{\eta}, \beta = \delta(\text{ST}_{\eta}, \text{SYM}_{\eta})$ and $\text{POS}_{\eta} = \text{POS}_{\eta} + \beta$.
15. Compute $r_{\eta} = \mathcal{F}(K, (h, t_{\eta}), ((\text{SK}_{\text{acc}}_{\text{A}}, \text{VK}_{\text{acc}}_{\text{A}}) = \mathcal{SPS}.\text{Setup}(1^\tau; r_{\text{pos}, A})$.
16. Compute $(\text{SK}_{\text{acc}}_{\text{B}}, \text{VK}_{\text{acc}}_{\text{B}, \text{A}}) = \mathcal{SPS}.\text{Setup}(1^\tau; r_{\text{pos}, B})$.
17. If $[([h, t_{\eta}, t] = (h^*, t^\star)] \land [m_{\eta} = m_{\eta}^* + \gamma])$, compute $\sigma_{\eta_{\text{pos}, \eta}} = \mathcal{SPS}.\text{Sign}(\text{SK}_{\text{acc}}_{\text{B}, \text{A}}, m_{\eta})$.
18. Else, compute $\sigma_{\eta_{\text{pos}, \eta}} = \mathcal{SPS}.\text{Sign}(\text{SK}_{\text{acc}}_{\text{B}, \text{A}}, m_{\eta})$.
19. If $t + 1 = 2^\tau$, for some integer $\tau$, set $\text{SEED}_{\eta} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{acc}}, (h, t_{\eta}))$.
20. Else, set $\text{SEED}_{\eta} = \epsilon$.
21. Output $(\text{POS}_{\eta}, \text{SYM}_{\eta}, \text{ST}_{\eta}, \text{w}_{\eta}, \text{V}_{\eta}, \text{SEED}_{\eta}, \text{SEED}_{\eta})$.

Fig. A.10. Constrained-Key.Prog$^{(2, \gamma)}$

$$v_{t^* + \tau} = \text{ITR}.\text{Iterate}(\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, v_{t^* + \tau - 1}, (\text{ST}_{\eta}, t^\star - 1, v_{t^* + \tau - 1}, \text{POS}_{\eta}, \text{SYM}_{\eta}))$$

Store$(v_{t^* + \tau}) = \text{ACC}.\text{Write-Store}(\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, v_{t^* + \tau - 1}, \text{POS}_{\eta}, \text{SYM}_{\eta})$$

POS$_{\eta}(v_{t^* + \tau}) = \text{PO}_{\eta}(v_{t^* + \tau} \land \beta$)

B sets $m_{t^* + \gamma} = (v_{t^* + \gamma}, \text{ST}_{\eta}, \gamma, v_{t^* + \gamma}, \text{POS}_{\eta}, \gamma)$.

4. B provides $\mathcal{A}$ with the signing key $\text{SK}_{\eta} = (\text{PK}_{\eta}, \text{SK}_{\eta})$

where the program Constrained-Key.Prog$^{(2, \gamma)}$ is an alteration of the program Constrained-Key.Prog$^{(2, \gamma)}$ (Fig. A.10) and is described in Fig. A.11.

Hyb$_{0, \tau-1.5}$: This experiment is similar to Hyb$_{0, \tau-1.4}((t^\tau - 1))$ with the exception that in responding to the $\nu$th signing key query of $\mathcal{A}$ corresponding to TM $\eta$, $M(\nu) \in M_{\lambda}$ with $M(\nu)(x^*) = 0$, $B$ gives $\mathcal{A}$ the signing
Fig. A.11. Constrained-Key.Prog\(^{(2, γ)}\)
Constants: \( M = (Q, \Sigma_{\text{in}}, \Sigma_{\text{out}}, \delta, \text{q}_{0}, \text{q}_{\text{accept}}, \text{q}_{\text{reject}}) \), Time bound \( T = 2^\lambda \), Running time on challenge input \( t^* \).
Public parameters for positional accumulator \( PP_{\text{pos}, \text{acc}} \), Public parameters for iterator \( PP_{\text{itr}, \text{iter}} \), \( PPRF \) keys
\( K_{\text{PP}}, 1 \leq i \leq \ell \), \( K_{\text{TP}} \), \( K_{\text{TM}} \), \( \text{SSB} \) hash value of challenge input \( h^* \), Length of challenge input \( \ell^* \)

Inputs: Time \( t \), String \( \text{seed}_{\text{in}} \), Head position \( \text{pos}_{\text{in}} \), Symbol \( \text{sym}_{\text{in}} \), TM state \( \text{state}_{\text{in}} \), Accumulator value \( w_{\text{acc}} \), Accumulator \( \text{value}_{\text{acc}} \), Auxiliary value \( \text{aux}_{\text{acc}} \), Iteration value \( \text{iter}_{\text{acc}} \), \( \text{SSB} \) hash value \( h \), Length \( \ell_{\text{out}} \), Signature \( \sigma_{\text{out}} \)

Output: CPRF evaluation \( \mathcal{F}(K, (h, \ell_{\text{out}})) \), or (Header Position \( \text{pos}_{\text{out}}, \text{Symbol} \text{sym}_{\text{out}} \), TM state \( \text{state}_{\text{out}} \), Accumulator value \( w_{\text{out}} \), Iteration value \( \text{iter}_{\text{out}} \), Signature \( \sigma_{\text{out}} \), String \( \text{seed}_{\text{out}} \), or \( \bot \).

1. Identify an integer \( r \) such that \( 2^r \leq t < 2^{r+1} \).
2. If \( \text{ACC.Verify}(\text{seed}_{\text{in}}, K_{\text{PP}}, \text{pos}_{\text{in}}, \text{state}_{\text{in}}) = 0 \), output \( \bot \).
3. Compute \( \text{seed}_{\text{out}} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{PP}}, (h, \ell_{\text{out}}, t - 1)) \).
4. If \( \text{SSB.Verify}(\text{sym}_{\text{in}}, \text{sym}_{\text{out}}, \text{hash}_{\text{in}}, \text{hash}_{\text{out}}) = 0 \), output \( \bot \).
5. Compute \( \text{state}_{\text{out}} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{TM}}, (h, \ell_{\text{out}}, t^*)) \).
6. Compute \( w_{\text{acc}} = \text{ACC.Update}(\text{seed}_{\text{acc}}, \text{state}_{\text{acc}}, \text{pos}_{\text{acc}}, \text{aux}_{\text{acc}}) \).
7. Compute \( \text{seed}_{\text{out}} = \mathcal{F}(\ell_{\text{out}}, \ell_{\text{out}}) \).
8. Output \( \text{SSA}_{\text{out}}, \text{state}_{\text{out}}, \text{pos}_{\text{out}}, \text{iter}_{\text{out}}, \text{ssb}_{\text{out}}, \text{seed}_{\text{out}} \).

\[ \text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1),0}_{\text{A}}(\lambda) \text{ and } \text{Adv}^{(0,\ell)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda) \equiv \text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,6)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda) \text{. Thus we have,} \]

\[ |\text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{(0,\ell)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda)| \leq \]

\[ |\text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda) | \leq |\text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,1)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda) + |\text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,2)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda)| + \]

\[ |\text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,3)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda) | \leq |\text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,3,0)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda)| + \]

\[ \sum_{i=0}^{t^* - 1} |\text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,3,i)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,3,i+1)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda)| + \sum_{i=0}^{t^* - 2} |\text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,3,i)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,3,i+1)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda)| \]

\[ |\text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,3,t^*-1)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,4)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda)| + |\text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,4)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,4,0)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda)| + \]

\[ \sum_{i=0}^{t^* - 1} |\text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,4,i-1)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,4,\gamma)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda)| + \sum_{i=0}^{t^* - 2} |\text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,4,\gamma)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,4,\gamma+1)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda)| \]

\[ |\text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,4,t^* - 1)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,5)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda)| + |\text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,5)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{(0,\ell-1,6)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda)| \]

Lemmas \[ B.1, B.12 \] provided in Appendix \[ B \] will prove that the RHS of Eq. \[ A.1 \] is negligible and hence Lemma \[ A.1 \] follows.

**Lemma A.2.** Assuming \( \text{IO} \) is a secure indistinguishability obscurator for \( \text{P} / \text{poly} \) and \( \mathcal{F} \) satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary \( \text{A} \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}^{(1)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{(2)}_{\text{A}}(\lambda)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{neg} \).

**Proof.** The two differences between \( \text{Hyb}_1 \) and \( \text{Hyb}_2 \) are the following:

\( \text{I} \) In \( \text{Hyb}_1 \), \( \text{B} \) includes \( \text{IO}(\text{V}_{\lambda}) \) within the public parameters \( \text{PP}_{\text{ABS}} \) provided to \( \text{A} \), whereas, in \( \text{Hyb}_2 \), \( \text{B} \) includes the program \( \text{IO}(\text{V}_{\lambda}) \) within \( \text{PP}_{\text{ABS}} \), where

\( \text{V}_{\lambda} = \text{Verify.Prog}_{\text{ABS}}[K] \) (Fig. \[ 3.1 \])

\( \text{V}_{\lambda} = \text{Verify.Prog}_{\text{ABS}}[\{h^*, \ell^\*\}, \text{PP}_{\text{ABS}, h^*, \ell^*}] \) (Fig. \[ 3.7 \]).

\( \text{II} \) For \( \eta = 1, \ldots, \text{q}_{\text{end}} \), the signing key \( \text{sk}_{\text{ABS}}(\text{M}(\eta)) \) returned by \( \text{B} \) corresponding to signing policy \( \text{TM} \) \( M(\eta) \in M_{\lambda} \) with \( M(\eta)(x^*) = 0 \), includes the program \( \text{IO}(\text{P}_{0}(\eta)) \) in the experiment \( \text{Hyb}_1 \), whereas \( \text{sk}_{\text{ABS}}(\text{M}(\eta)) \) includes the program \( \text{IO}(\text{P}_{1}(\eta)) \) in \( \text{Hyb}_2 \), where

\( \text{P}_{0}(\eta) = \text{Constrained.Key.Prog}_{\text{ABS}}[\text{M}(\eta), T = 2^\lambda, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PP}_{\text{TM}}, K, K_{\lambda}^1, \ldots, K_{\lambda}^\text{sp}_{\text{A}, h^*, \ell^*}] \).
\(P_1^{(n)} = \text{Constrained-Key.Prog}^{(n)}_{\text{ABS}}[M^{(n)}, T = 2^λ, \text{PPF}^{(n)}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PPF}^{(n)}_{\text{TR}}, K\{(h^*, ℓ^*)\}, K^{(n)}_1, \ldots, K^{(n)}_λ, K^{(n)}_{\text{SPS-A}}, h^*, ℓ^*]\), the program Constrained-Key.Prog\(^{(n)}_{\text{ABS}}\) being described in Fig. 3.6.

Now, observe that on input \((h, ℓ_{\text{INS}}) \neq (h^*, ℓ^*)\), both the programs \(V_0\) and \(V_1\) operates in the same manner only that the latter one uses the punctured PPRF key \(K\{(h^*, ℓ^*)\}\) for computing the string \(r^{\text{sig}}\) instead of the full PPRF key \(K\) used by the former program. Therefore, by the correctness under puncturing property of PPRF \(\mathcal{F}\), it follows that for all inputs \((h, ℓ_{\text{INS}}) \neq (h^*, ℓ^*)\), both the programs have identical output. Moreover, on input \((h^*, ℓ^*)\), \(V_1\) outputs the hardwired SIG verification key \(\overline{VK}^{\text{sig}}\) which is computed as \((\overline{SK}^{\text{sig}}, \overline{VK}^{\text{sig}}) = \text{SIG.Setup}(1^λ; r^{\text{sig}})\), where \(r^{\text{sig}} = \mathcal{F}(K^*(h^*, ℓ^*))\). Notice that these values are exactly the same as those outputed \(V_0\) on input \((h^*, ℓ^*)\). Thus, the two programs are functionally equivalent.

Further, note that the program Constrained-Key.Prog\(^{(n)}_{\text{ABS}}\) computes \(\mathcal{F}(K, (h, ℓ_{\text{INS}}))\) if and only if \((h, ℓ_{\text{INS}}) \neq (h^*, ℓ^*)\). Thus, again by the correctness under puncturing property of PPRF \(\mathcal{F}\), the programs \(P_0^{(n)}\) and \(P_1^{(n)}\) are functionally equivalent as well for all \(η \in \{\hat{η}_{\text{KEV}}\}\).

Thus the security of \(\mathcal{I}_O\), Lemma 3.2 follows. Observe that to prove this lemma we would actually have to proceed through a sequence of intermediate hybrid experiments where in each hybrid experiment we switch the programs one at a time. \(\square\)

**Lemma A.3.** Assuming \(\mathcal{F}\) is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, for any PPT adversary \(A\), for any security parameter \(λ\), \(\text{Adv}_{\Lambda}^{(2)}(λ) - \text{Adv}_{\Lambda}^{(3)}(λ)\) ≤ \(\text{negl}(λ)\) for some negligible function \(\text{negl}\).

**Proof.** Suppose there exists a PPT adversary \(A\) for which \(\text{Adv}_{\Lambda}^{(2)}(λ) - \text{Adv}_{\Lambda}^{(3)}(λ)\) is non-negligible. Below we construct a PPT adversary \(B\) that breaks the selective pseudorandomness of the PPRF \(\mathcal{F}\) using \(A\) as a sub-routine.

- \(B\) initializes \(A\) on input \(1^λ\) and receives a challenge attribute string \(x^* = x_0^* \ldots x_{ℓ^* - 1}^* \in \mathcal{U}_{\text{ABS}}\) with \(|x^*| = ℓ^*\) from \(A\).
- After receiving \(x^*\), \(B\) proceeds as follows:
  1. \(B\) first generates \(HK \leftarrow \text{SSB.Gen}(1^λ, n_{\text{SB-SLBK}} = 2^λ, i^* = 0)\) and computes \(h^* = H_{\text{HK}}(x^*)\).
  2. \(B\) sends \((h^*, ℓ^*)\) as the challenge input to its PPRF selective pseudorandomness challenger \(C\) and receives back a punctured PPRF key \(K^*\{(h^*, ℓ^*)\}\) along with a challenge value \(r^* \in \mathcal{V}_{\text{PPRF}}\), where either \(r^* = \mathcal{F}(K^*, (h^*, ℓ^*))\) or \(r^* \xleftarrow{} \mathcal{Y}_{\text{PPRF}}\). \(B\) implicitly views the key \(K^*\) as the key \(K\).
  3. Then \(B\) creates \((\overline{SK}^{\text{sig}}, \overline{VK}^{\text{sig}}) = \text{SIG.Setup}(1^λ; r^*)\).
  4. Next, \(B\) sets the public parameters \(\text{PPF}^{(n)}_{\text{ABS}} = (HK, \mathcal{I}_O(\text{Verify.Prog}^{(n)}_{\text{ABS}}[K^*\{(h^*, ℓ^*)\}, \overline{VK}^{\text{sig}}; h^*, ℓ^*]))\) and gives it to \(A\).
- For \(η = 1, \ldots, \hat{η}_{\text{KEV}}\), to answer the \(η\) th signing key query of \(A\) corresponding to signing policy \(\text{TM} M^{(n)} ∈ \mathcal{M}_X\) with \(M^{(n)}(x^*) = 0\), \(B\) executes the following steps:
  1. At first, \(B\) chooses PPRF keys \(K^{(n)}_1, \ldots, K^{(n)}_λ, K^{(n)}_{\text{SPS-A}}, K^{(n)}_{\text{SPS-E}} \leftarrow \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(1^λ)\).
  2. Next, \(B\) generates \((\text{PPF}^{(n)}_{\text{ACC}}, u^{(n)}_0, \text{STORE}^{(n)}_0) \xleftarrow{} \text{ACC.\text{Setup}}(1^λ, n_{\text{ACC-SLBK}} = 2^λ)\) and \((\text{PPF}^{(n)}_{\text{TR}}, v^{(n)}_0) \xleftarrow{} \text{ITR.\text{Setup}}(1^λ, n_{\text{ITR}} = 2^λ)\).
  3. \(B\) returns \(A\) the signing key \(\text{SK}^{(n)}_{\text{ABS}}(M^{(n)}) = (HK, \text{PPF}^{(n)}_{\text{ACC}}, u^{(n)}_0, \text{STORE}^{(n)}_0, \text{PPF}^{(n)}_{\text{TR}}, v^{(n)}_0, K^{(n)}_1, \ldots, K^{(n)}_λ, K^{(n)}_{\text{SPS-A}}, K^{(n)}_{\text{SPS-E}})\).

- For \(θ = 1, \ldots, \hat{η}_{\text{SIGN}}\), in response to the \(θ\) th signature query of \(A\) on message \(msg^{(θ)} ∈ \mathcal{M}_{\text{ABS}}\) under attribute string \(x^*\), \(B\) computes \(σ^{(θ)}_{\text{sig}} \xleftarrow{} \text{SIG.Sign}(\text{SK}^{*}, msg^{(θ)})\) and provides \(A\) with \(σ^{(θ)}_{\text{ABS}} = (\overline{VK}_{\text{sig}}, σ^{(θ)}_{\text{sig}})\).
- Finally, \(A\) output a signature \(σ^{(θ)}_{\text{ABS}}\) on some message \(msg^*\) under attribute string \(x^*\). \(B\) outputs \(b^* = 1\) as its guess bit in its PPRF selective pseudorandomness experiment if \(A\) wins, i.e., if \(\text{ABS.Verify}(\text{PPF}^{(n)}_{\text{ABS}}, x^*, msg^*, σ^{(θ)}_{\text{ABS}}) = 1\) and \(msg^* \neq msg^{(θ)}\) for any \(θ \in \{\hat{η}_{\text{SIGN}}\}\). Otherwise, \(B\) outputs \(b^* = 0\) in its PPRF selective pseudorandomness experiment.
Notice that if \( r^* = f(K^*, (h^*, \ell^*)) \), then \( B \) perfectly simulates \( hyb_2 \). On the other hand, if \( r^* \not\equiv y_{pprf} \), then \( B \) perfectly simulates \( hyb_3 \). This completes the proof of Lemma A.3.

**Lemma A.4.** Assuming \( SIG \) is existentially unforgeable against CMA, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( \text{Adv}^{(3)}_{\lambda}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).

**Proof.** Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary \( A \) for which \( \text{Adv}^{(3)}_{\lambda}(\lambda) \) is non-negligible. We construct a PPT adversary \( B \) that breaks the existential unforgeability of \( SIG \) using \( A \) as a sub-routine. The description \( B \) is as follows:

1. \( B \) receives a \( SIG \) verification key \( \text{VK}_{\text{ SIG }} \) from its \( SIG \) existential unforgeability challenger \( C \). Then, \( B \) runs \( A \) on input \( 1^\lambda \) and receives a challenge attribute string \( x^* = x_0^* \ldots x_{\ell^* -1}^* \in U_{\text{abs}} \) with \( |x^*| = \ell^* \) from \( A \).
2. After receiving \( x^* \), \( B \) proceeds as follows:
   1. \( B \) first generates \( hK \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{SSB.Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{nssb-blk} = 2^\lambda, i^* = 0) \) and computes \( h^* = H(hK(x^*)) \).
   2. Next, it selects a PPRF key \( K \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \) and creates the punctured PPRF key \( K\{(h^*, \ell^*)\} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}(K, (h^*, \ell^*)) \).
   3. Next, \( B \) sets the public parameters \( \text{PPR}_\text{abs} = (hK, \mathcal{I}O.\text{Verify.Prog}_{\text{abs}}\{K\{(h^*, \ell^*)\}, \text{VK}_{\text{ SIG }}, h^*, \ell^*\}) \) and gives it to \( A \).
3. For \( \eta = 1, \ldots, \hat{q}_{\text{KEY}} \), to answer the \( \eta \)th signing key query of \( A \) corresponding to signing policy \( TM \in M_\text{abs} \) with \( M(\eta) = 0 \) = \( 0 \), \( B \) executes the following steps:
   1. At first, \( B \) chooses PPRF keys \( K_1(\eta), \ldots, K_{\lambda}(\eta), K_{\text{SPS-A}}(\eta), K_{\text{SPS-E}}(\eta) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \).
   2. Next, \( B \) generates \( (\text{PP}_\text{acc}^{(\eta)}, w_0^{(\eta)}, \text{STORE}_0^{(\eta)}) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ACC.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{nacc-blk} = 2^\lambda) \) and \( (\text{PP}_\text{itr}^{(\eta)}, v_0^{(\eta)}) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ITR.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{nitr} = 2^\lambda) \).
   3. \( B \) returns \( A \) the signing key

   \[
   \text{sk}_{\text{abs}}(M(\eta)) = \begin{pmatrix}
   \text{H.K}, \text{PP}_\text{acc}^{(\eta)}, w_0^{(\eta)}, \text{STORE}_0^{(\eta)}, \text{PP}_\text{itr}^{(\eta)}, v_0^{(\eta)}, \\
   \mathcal{I}O.\text{(Init-SPS.Prog)}(d_0^{(\eta)}, w_0^{(\eta)}, v_0^{(\eta)}, K_{\text{SPS-E}}) \\
   \mathcal{I}O.\text{(Accumulate.Prog)}(\text{nssb-blk} = 2^\lambda, \text{H.K}, \text{PP}_\text{acc}^{(\eta)}, \text{PP}_\text{itr}^{(\eta)}, K_{\text{SPS-E}}) \\
   \mathcal{I}O.\text{(Change-SPS.Prog)}(K_{\text{SPS-A}}^{(\eta)}, K_{\text{SPS-E}}^{(\eta)}) \\
   \mathcal{I}O.\text{(Constrained-Key.Prog)}(\text{abs}_{\text{abs}}(M(\eta)), T = 2^\lambda, \text{PP}_\text{acc}^{(\eta)}, \text{PP}_\text{itr}^{(\eta)}, K\{(h^*, \ell^*)\}, K_1^{(\eta)}, \ldots, K_{\lambda}^{(\eta)}, K_{\text{SPS-A}}^{(\eta)})
   \end{pmatrix}
   \]

   - For \( \theta = 1, \ldots, \hat{q}_{\text{SIGN}} \), in response to the \( \theta \)th signature query of \( A \) on message \( \text{msg}^{(\theta)} \in M_\text{abs} \) under attribute string \( x^* \), \( B \) forwards the message \( \text{msg}^{(\theta)} \) to \( C \) and receives back a signature \( \sigma^{(\theta)}_\text{SIG} \) on \( \text{msg}^{(\theta)} \) from \( C \). \( B \) provides, \( \sigma^{(\theta)}_\text{SIG} = (\text{VK}_{\text{ SIG }}, \sigma^{(\theta)}_\text{SIG}) \) to \( A \).
   - At the end of interaction, \( A \) outputs a signature \( \sigma^{(\theta)}_\text{abs} = (\text{VK}_{\text{ SIG }}, \sigma^{(\theta)}_\text{SIG}) \) on some message \( \text{msg}^* \) under attribute string \( x^* \). \( B \) outputs \( (\text{msg}^*, \sigma^{(\theta)}_\text{SIG}) \) as a forgery in its existential unforgeability experiment against \( SIG \).

   Observe that the simulation of the experiment \( hyb_3 \) by \( B \) is perfect. Now, if \( A \) wins in the above simulated experiment, then the following must hold simultaneously:

   (I) \( \text{ABS.Verify}(\text{PP}_\text{abs}, x^*, \text{msg}^*, \sigma^{(\theta)}_\text{abs}) = 1 \).
   (II) \( \text{msg}^* \neq \text{msg}^{(\theta)} \) for any \( \theta \in [\hat{q}_{\text{SIGN}}] \).

   Note that \( \text{ABS.Verify}(\text{PP}_\text{abs}, x^*, \text{msg}^*, \sigma^{(\theta)}_\text{abs}) = 1 \) implies \( (\text{VK}_{\text{ SIG }} = \text{VK}_{\text{ SIG }}) \wedge [\text{SIG.Verify}(\text{VK}_{\text{ SIG }}, \text{msg}^*, \sigma^{(\theta)}_\text{SIG}) = 1] \), i.e., \( \text{SIG.Verify}(\text{VK}_{\text{ SIG }}, \text{msg}^*, \sigma^{(\theta)}_\text{SIG}) = 1 \). Further, notice that \( \text{msg}^{(\theta)} \), for \( \theta \in [\hat{q}_{\text{SIGN}}] \), are the only messages that \( B \) queried a signature on to \( C \). Thus, \( (\text{msg}^*, \sigma^{(\theta)}_\text{SIG}) \) is indeed a valid forgery in the existential unforgeability experiment against \( SIG \).

\[ \square \]

**B Lemmas for the proof of Lemma A.1**

**Lemma B.1.** Assuming \( \text{IO} \) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( \text{P/poly} \), \( \mathcal{F} \) is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, and \( \text{SPS} \) is a splittable signature scheme satisfying \( \forall \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-REE}}, \text{indistinguishability} \), for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}^{(0,\nu-1,0)}_{\lambda}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{(0,\nu-1,1)}_{\lambda}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).
Proof. To establish Lemma 3.1, we introduce \( t^{(\nu)} + 1 \) intermediate hybrid experiments between \( \text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 0} \) and \( \text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 1} \), namely, \( \text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 0, \gamma} \) for \( \gamma \in [0, t^{(\nu)}] \) such that \( \text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 0, \gamma} \) coincides with \( \text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 0} \) and \( \text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 1, 0, \gamma} \) coincides with \( \text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 1} \).

Sequence of Intermediate Hybrids Between \( \text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 0} \) and \( \text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 1} \)

\( \text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 0, \gamma} (\gamma = 0, \ldots, t^{(\nu)}) \): In this experiment in response to the \( \nu \)th signing key query of \( A \) corresponding to TM \( M^{(\nu)} \in M_3 \) with \( M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0 \), \( B \) proceeds as follows:

1. It first picks PPRF keys \( K_1^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_\lambda^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPP}, A}, K_{\text{SPP}, B}, K_{\text{SPP}, E} \) \( \xleftarrow{} F.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \).
2. After that, it generates \( (\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}(u_0^{(\nu)}), \text{STORE}_0^{(\nu)}, \text{PP}_{\text{ITR}}(v_0^{(\nu)}), \text{K}_{\text{SPP}, E}) \) \( \xleftarrow{} \text{ACC.\text{Setup}}(1^\lambda, \text{ACC.\text{BLK}}) = 2^\lambda \) and \( (\text{PP}_{\text{ITR}}(v_0^{(\nu)})) \) \( \xleftarrow{} \text{ITR.\text{Setup}}(1^\lambda, \text{ITR.\text{BLK}}) = 2^\lambda \).
3. It provides \( A \) with the signing key

\[
\text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}(M^{(\nu)}) = \begin{cases} 
\text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, u_0^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_0^{(\nu)}, \text{PP}_{\text{ITR}}, v_0^{(\nu)}, & \text{(Init-SPS.\text{Prog}(q_0^{(\nu)}, u_0^{(\nu)}, v_0^{(\nu)}, \text{K}_{\text{SPP}, E})),} \\
\text{IO}(\text{Accumulate.\text{Prog}(h_{\text{SPP-BLK}})} = 2^\lambda, \text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PP}_{\text{ITR}}, \text{K}_{\text{SPP}, E}), & \text{(Change-SPS.\text{Prog}(h_{\text{SPP-A}}, \text{K}_{\text{SPP}, E})),} \\
\text{IO}(\text{Constrained-Key.\text{Prog}[^0_{\text{ABS}}]} (M^{(\nu)}, T = 2^\lambda, t^{(\nu)}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PP}_{\text{ITR}}, \text{K}, K_1^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_\lambda^{(\nu)}, \text{K}_{\text{SPP-A}}, \text{K}_{\text{SPP-B}})), & \end{cases}
\]

where the program Constrained-Key.\text{Prog}[^0_{\text{ABS}}], depicted in Fig. 3.1, is a modification of the program Constrained-Key.\text{Prog}[^1_{\text{ABS}}] shown in Fig. 3.1

The rest of the experiment is identical to \( \text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 0} \).

**Fig. B.1.** Constrained-Key.\text{Prog}[^0_{\text{ABS}}]
Analysis

Let us denote by $\text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,0,\gamma}(\lambda)$ the advantage of $A$, i.e., the absolute difference between $1/2$ and $A$’s probability of correctly guessing the random bit selected by the challenger $B$, in the hybrid experiment $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,0,\gamma}$, for $\gamma \in [0, \nu]$. Clearly, $\text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,0}(\lambda) \equiv \text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,0,0}(\lambda)$ and $\text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,1}(\lambda) \equiv \text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,0,0}(\lambda)$. Hence, we have

$$|\text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,0}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,1}(\lambda)| \leq \sum_{\gamma=1}^{\nu} |\text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,0,\gamma}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,0,\gamma-1}(\lambda)|.$$  \hspace{1em} (B.1)

Claim B.1 below justifies that the RHS of Eq. (B.1) is negligible and consequently Lemma B.1 follows.

Claim B.1. Assuming $\mathcal{IO}$ is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for $\mathbb{P}/\mathbb{P}$, $\mathcal{F}$ is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, and $\mathcal{SPS}$ is a splittable signature scheme satisfying ‘$\mathbb{VR}_{\mathbb{SPS-BE,}\mathcal{F}}$ indistinguishability’, for any $\mathbb{PPT}$ adversary $A$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|\text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,0,\gamma}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,0,\gamma-1}(\lambda)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function $\text{negl}$.

Proof. The proof of Claim B.1 is similar to that of Claim B.1 of [5]. □

Lemma B.2. Assuming $\mathcal{IO}$ is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for $\mathbb{P}/\mathbb{P}$, $\mathcal{F}$ is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, and $\mathcal{SPS}$ is a splittable signature scheme satisfying ‘$\mathbb{VR}_{\mathbb{SPS-BE,}\mathcal{F}}$ indistinguishability’, for any $\mathbb{PPT}$ adversary $A$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|\text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,1}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,2}(\lambda)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function $\text{negl}$.

Proof. To prove Lemma B.2 we consider the following sequence of intermediate hybrid experiments between $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,2}$:

Sequence of Intermediate Hybrids between $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,2}$

$\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1,0}$: This experiment coincides with $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1}$.

$\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1,1}$: In this experiment, to answer the $\nu^{th}$ signing key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(\nu)} \in \mathbb{M}_\lambda$ with $M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0$, $B$ selects an additional PPRF key $K_{\mathcal{SPS},E}^{(\nu)} \leftarrow \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ along with all the other PPRF keys as well as the public parameters for positional accumulator and iterator as generated in $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1,0}$, providing $A$ with the signing key

$$\text{SK}_{\mathcal{ABS}} \{ M^{(\nu)} \} = \begin{cases} \text{HK, PP}_{\mathcal{AC}}^{(\nu)}, w_0^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}^{(\nu)}, \text{PP}_{\mathcal{TR}}^{(\nu)}, t_0^{(\nu)}, \\ \text{IO}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog})^{(\nu)}, w_0^{(\nu)}, t_0^{(\nu)}, K_{\mathcal{SPS},E}^{(\nu)} \\ \text{IO}(\text{Accumulate.Prog})^{(0,1)}[\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{SBS},\mathcal{H},k} \leftarrow 2^{\lambda}, \text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\mathcal{AC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{PP}_{\mathcal{TR}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\mathcal{SPS},E}^{(\nu)}, K_{\mathcal{SPS},F}^{(\nu)}, h^*, \ell^*], \\ \text{IO}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog})^{(0,1)}[K_{\mathcal{SPS},A}^{(\nu)}, K_{\mathcal{SPS},B}^{(\nu)}, K_{\mathcal{SPS},F}^{(\nu)}, h^*, \ell^*], \\ \text{IO}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog})^{(1)}[\text{SK}_{\mathcal{ABS}} \{ M^{(\nu)} \}, T = 2^{\lambda}, t_0^{(\nu)}, \text{PP}_{\mathcal{AC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{PP}_{\mathcal{TR}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\mathcal{SPS},F}^{(\nu)}, K_{\mathcal{SPS},A}^{(\nu)} = K_{\mathcal{SPS},B}^{(\nu)}] \end{cases}.$$  \hspace{1em}

where the programs $\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(0,1)}$ and $\text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(0,1)}$ are the alternations of the programs $\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(1)}$ and $\text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(1)}$ (Figs. A.2 and A.3) and are depicted in Figs. B.2 and B.3 respectively. The rest of the experiment proceeds in the same way as in $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1,0}$.

$\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1,2}$: In this experiment, in response to the $\nu^{th}$ signing key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(\nu)} \in \mathbb{M}_\lambda$ with $M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0$, $B$ proceeds as follows:

1. It first generates all the PPRF keys as well as the public parameters for the positional accumulator and the iterator just as in $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1,1}$. 

The remaining part of the experiment is analogous to \textit{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1.1}. 

Fig. B.2. Accumulate.Prog^{(0,1)}

Fig. B.3. Change-SPS.Prog^{(0,1)}

2. Next, it creates the punctured PPRF key \(K_{\nu,\nu}', F\{h^*, \ell^*\}\) as well as computes \(r_{\nu,\nu}'^{(\nu,\ell') = F(K_{\nu,\nu}', F(h^*, \ell^*))}\) and \((S_{\nu,\nu}', H), V_{\nu,\nu}', V_{\nu,\nu}'^{(\nu,\ell')}) = \text{SPS.Setup}(1^{\lambda}, r_{\nu,\nu}^{(\nu,\ell')})\).

3. It hands \(A\) the signing key

\[
\begin{align*}
SK_{\nu,\nu} \{ M^{\nu} \} = \\
\{ HK, PP_{\nu,\nu}', \nu^{(\nu)}(\nu), \text{STOR}_{\nu,\nu}'(\nu), PP_{\nu,\nu}'(\nu), \nu^{(\nu)}(\nu), \\
\text{IO}\text{(Init-Sign.Prog)}(\nu, u_{\nu,\nu}', v_{\nu,\nu}'(\nu), K_{\nu,\nu}', \nu^{(\nu)}(\nu)), \\
\text{IO}\text{(Accumulate.Prog)}^{(0,2)}(\nu, 2^n, HK, PP_{\nu,\nu}', PP_{\nu,\nu}'(\nu, K_{\nu,\nu}', \nu^{(\nu)}(\nu)), \\
\text{IO}\text{(Change-SPS.Prog)}^{(0,2)}(\nu, K_{\nu,\nu}', K_{\nu,\nu}', K_{\nu,\nu}', \nu^{(\nu)}(\nu), V_{\nu,\nu}', V_{\nu,\nu}'^{(\nu,\ell')}), \\
\text{IO}\text{(Constrained-Key.Prog)}^{(0,2)}(\nu, 2^n, HK, PP_{\nu,\nu}', PP_{\nu,\nu}'(\nu, K_{\nu,\nu}', \nu^{(\nu)}(\nu)), \\
h^*, \ell^*) \}
\end{align*}
\]

where the programs Accumulate.Prog^{(0,1)} and Change-SPS.Prog^{(0,1)} (Figs. B.2 and B.3) and are described in Figs. B.4 and B.5 respectively.
### Constant Inputs

- **Constants:**
  - Maximum number of blocks for SSB hash \( \sigma_{SSB-SSB} = 2^\lambda \)
  - SSB hash key \( \nu_{SSB} \)
  - Public parameters for positional accumulator \( P_{PosAcc} \)
  - Public parameters for iterator \( P_{Iter} \)
  - Punctured PRPF key \( K_{i_{PRPF}} \)
  - Verification key \( \nu_{SSB} \)

### Output

- **Output:**
  - (Accumulator value \( w_{out} \), Iterator value \( v_{out} \), Signature \( \sigma_{AccOut} \), SSB hash value \( h^* \), SSB opening value \( \tau_{out} \))

### Fig. B.4. Accumulate Prog

\[
\text{Fig. B.4. Accumulate Prog}^{(0,2)}
\]

### Parameters

- **Input:**
  - TM state \( s_{sps} \), Accumulator value \( w_{sps} \), Auxiliary value \( v_{sps} \), Signature \( \sigma_{AccOut} \), SSB hash value \( h^* \), SSB opening value \( \tau_{out} \)
  - Output: (Accumulator value \( w_{out} \), Iterator value \( v_{out} \), Signature \( \sigma_{AccOut} \), or \( \perp \))

1. \( \nu \) computes \( r \)
2. \( \nu \) sets \( \nu_{SSB} = 0 \)
3. \( \nu \) sets \( \nu_{SSB} = 1 \)
4. \( \nu \) updates \( \nu \)
5. \( \nu \) outputs \( \perp \)

### Fig. B.5. Change-SPS.Prog

\[
\text{Fig. B.5. Change-SPS.Prog}^{(0,2)}
\]

### Parameters

- **Input:**
  - TM state \( s_{sps} \), Accumulator value \( w_{sps} \), Auxiliary value \( v_{sps} \), Signature \( \sigma_{AccOut} \)
  - Output: (Signature \( \sigma_{AccOut} \) or \( \perp \))

1. \( \nu \) sets \( \nu_{SSB} = 0 \)
2. \( \nu \) sets \( \nu_{SSB} = 1 \)
3. \( \nu \) updates \( \nu \)
4. \( \nu \) outputs \( \perp \)

### Hyb \(_{0,\nu} - 1, 1, 3\)

This experiment is identical to Hyb \(_{0,\nu} - 1, 1, 2\) except that while creating the \( \nu \)-th signing key queried by \( A \) corresponding to TM \( M^{(\nu)} \in M_\lambda \) with \( M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0 \), \( B \) selects \( v_{\nu_{SSB}, H}^{(\nu)} \leftarrow \mathcal{V}_{PRPF} \), i.e., in other words, \( B \) generates \( (\nu_{SSB,H}, \nu_{sps,H}, \nu_{sps-rej,H}) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{SSB} \), and gives \( A \) the signing key

\[
\text{SK}_{AB}^{(\nu)} = \left( \text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\nu_{SSB}}, \nu_{SSB}, \text{P}_{\nu_{sps}}, \nu_{sps}, \text{I}_{\nu_{sps-rej}}, \nu_{sps-rej}, \text{I}_{\nu_{sps-SSB}}(\nu_{SSB,H}), \text{I}_{\nu_{sps-SSB}}(\nu_{sps,H}), \text{I}_{\nu_{sps-SSB}}(\nu_{sps-rej,H}) \right).
\]

### Hyb \(_{0,\nu} - 1, 1, 4\)

In this experiment, to answer the \( \nu \)-th signing key query of \( A \) corresponding to TM \( M^{(\nu)} \in M_\lambda \) with \( M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0 \), \( B \) creates all the components as in Hyb \(_{0,\nu} - 1, 1, 3\), however, it provides \( A \) with the
signing key

\[ SK_{\text{Abs}}\{M^{(\nu)}\} = \]
\[ \left( HK, PP_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, w_0^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, PP_{\text{TR}}^{(\nu)}, v_0^{(\nu)}, \right. \]
\[ \left. \mathcal{IO}(\text{Init-SPS}.\text{Prog})_{\nu_0}^{(\nu)}, v_0^{(\nu)}, (K_{\text{SPS},E})^{(\nu)} \right) \]
\[ \mathcal{IO}(\text{Accumulate}.\text{Prog})_{(0,2)}^{(\nu)} \left[ \mathcal{F}_{\text{SB-BLK}} = 2^{|h^*|}, \text{HK}, PP_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, PP_{\text{TR}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},E}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},B}^{(\nu)} \right] \]
\[ \mathcal{IO}(\text{Change-SPS}.\text{Prog})_{(0,2)}^{(\nu)} \left[ K_{\text{SPS},A}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},B}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},E}^{(\nu)} \right] \]
\[ \mathcal{IO}(\text{Constrained-Key}.\text{Prog})_{(1)}^{(\nu)}(M^{(\nu)}), T = 2^{|h^*|}, t^{(\nu)}, PP_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, PP_{\text{TR}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},A}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},B}^{(\nu)} \]

The rest of the experiment is the same as \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1.5} \).

\[ \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1.5} \]: In this experiment, in response to the \( \nu \)th signing key query of \( \mathcal{A} \) corresponding to TM \( M^{(\nu)} \in \mathcal{M}_\lambda \) with \( M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0 \), \( \mathcal{B} \) forms all the components as in \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1.4} \) except that it computes \( r_{\text{SPS},H}^{(\nu,\ell^*)} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{SPS},F}^{(\nu)}, (h^*, \ell^*)) \), \( (SK_{\text{SPS},H}, VK_{\text{SPS},H}, VK_{\text{SPS-RES},H}) = \text{SPS.Setup}(\lambda, r_{\text{SPS},H}^{(\nu,\ell^*)}) \), and hands \( \mathcal{A} \) the signing key

\[ SK_{\text{Abs}}\{M^{(\nu)}\} = \]
\[ \left( HK, PP_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, w_0^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, PP_{\text{TR}}^{(\nu)}, v_0^{(\nu)}, \right. \]
\[ \left. \mathcal{IO}(\text{Init-SPS}.\text{Prog})_{\nu_0}^{(\nu)}, v_0^{(\nu)}, (K_{\text{SPS},E})^{(\nu)} \right) \]
\[ \mathcal{IO}(\text{Accumulate}.\text{Prog})_{(0,2)}^{(\nu)} \left[ \mathcal{F}_{\text{SB-BLK}} = 2^{|h^*|}, \text{HK}, PP_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, PP_{\text{TR}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},E}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},F}^{(\nu)} \right] \]
\[ \mathcal{IO}(\text{Change-SPS}.\text{Prog})_{(0,2)}^{(\nu)} \left[ K_{\text{SPS},A}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},B}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},E}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},F}^{(\nu)} \right] \]
\[ \mathcal{IO}(\text{Constrained-Key}.\text{Prog})_{(1)}^{(\nu)}(M^{(\nu)}), T = 2^{|h^*|}, t^{(\nu)}, PP_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, PP_{\text{TR}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},A}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},B}^{(\nu)} \]

The rest of the experiment is analogous to \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1.4} \).

\[ \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1.6} \]: This experiment corresponds to \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,2} \).

**Analysis**

Let \( \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu-1,1,\vartheta)}(\lambda) \) represents the advantage of \( \mathcal{A} \), i.e., the absolute difference between \( 1/2 \) and \( \mathcal{A} \)'s probability of correctly guessing the random bit selected by the challenger, \( \mathcal{B} \), in \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1,\vartheta} \), for \( \vartheta \in [0, 6] \).

By definition, \( \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu-1,1)}(\lambda) = \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu-1,1,0)}(\lambda) \) and \( \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu-1,2)}(\lambda) = \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu-1,1,6)}(\lambda) \). Then, we have

\[ |\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu-1,1)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu-1,2)}(\lambda)| \leq \sum_{\vartheta=1}^{6} |\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu-1,1,\vartheta-1)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu-1,1,\vartheta)}(\lambda)|. \]  

(B.2)

Claims B.2 and B.6 below will demonstrate that the RHS of Eq. (B.2) is negligible and thus Lemma B.2 follows.

**Claim B.2.** Assuming \( \mathcal{IO} \) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( \mathsf{P/Poly} \), for any PPT adversary \( \mathcal{A} \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu-1,1,0)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu-1,1,1)}(\lambda)| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \mathsf{negl} \).

**Proof.** The difference between \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1,0} \) and \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1,1} \) is the following: In \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1,0} \), \( \mathcal{B} \) includes the programs \( \mathcal{I}O(P_0) \) and \( \mathcal{I}O(P_0') \) within the \( \nu \)th signing key returned to \( \mathcal{A} \), while in \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1,1} \), \( \mathcal{B} \) includes the programs \( \mathcal{I}O(P_1) \) and \( \mathcal{I}O(P_1') \) instead, where

\[ P_0 = \text{Accumulate}.\text{Prog}^{(\nu)} \left[ \mathcal{F}_{\text{SB-BLK}} = 2^{|h^*|}, \text{HK}, PP_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, PP_{\text{TR}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},E}^{(\nu)} \right] \]  

(Fig. 3.3),

\[ P_0' = \text{Change-SPS}.\text{Prog}^{(\nu)} \left[ K_{\text{SPS},A}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},E}^{(\nu)} \right] \]  

(Fig. 3.4),

\[ P_1 = \text{Accumulate}.\text{Prog}^{(\nu)} \left[ \mathcal{F}_{\text{SB-BLK}} = 2^{|h^*|}, \text{HK}, PP_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, PP_{\text{TR}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},E}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},F}^{(\nu)} \right] \]  

(Fig. 3.2),

\[ P_1' = \text{Change-SPS}.\text{Prog}^{(\nu)} \left[ K_{\text{SPS},A}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},B}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},E}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS},F}^{(\nu)} \right] \]  

(Fig. 3.3).

Now, observe that the programs \( P_0 \) and \( P_1 \) clearly have identical outputs for inputs corresponding to \((h^*, \ell^*)\). Also, by the correctness [Property (vii)] of splittable signature scheme SPS, both the programs output \( \perp \) in case \( \text{SPS.Verify}(VK_{\text{SPS},E}, m_{\text{IN}}, \sigma_{\text{SPS,IN}}) = 0 \) for inputs corresponding to \((h^*, \ell^*)\).
Thus the programs $P_0$ and $P_1$ are functionally equivalent. A similar argument justifies the functional equivalence of the programs $P_0'$ and $P_1'$.

Thus, by the security of $\mathcal{IO}$, Claim B.2 follows. Of course, we need to consider a sequence of hybrid experiments to arrive at the result where in each hybrid experiment we change the programs one at a time.

**Claim B.3.** Assuming $\mathcal{IO}$ is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for $P$/poly and $\mathcal{F}$ satisfy the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary $A$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|\text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu-1,1,2)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,1,2}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function $\text{negl}$.

**Proof.** The difference between $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1,1}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1,2}$ is the following: In $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1,1}$, $\mathcal{B}$ includes the programs $\mathcal{IO}(P_0)$ and $\mathcal{IO}(P_0')$ within the $\nu$th signing key returned to $A$, while in $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1,2}$, $\mathcal{B}$ includes the programs $\mathcal{IO}(P_1)$ and $\mathcal{IO}(P_1')$ instead, where

- $P_0 = \text{Accumulate.Prog}^{0,1}(\lambda, \text{SSS-BLK} = 2^\lambda, \text{HK}, \text{PP}, \text{PPR}, K_{\text{SPS,F},E}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,H},E}^{(\nu)}, h^*, \ell^*)$ (Fig. B.2),
- $P_0' = \text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{0,1}(\lambda, K_{\text{SPS,A}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,B}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,E},E}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,F},E}^{(\nu)}, h^*, \ell^*)$ (Fig. B.3),
- $P_1 = \text{Accumulate.Prog}^{0,2}(\lambda, \text{SSS-BLK} = 2^\lambda, \text{HK}, \text{PP}, \text{PPR}, K_{\text{SPS,F},E}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,H},E}^{(\nu)}, (h^*, \ell^*), \text{VK}_{\text{SPS,B,E},H}^{(\nu)}, h^*, \ell^*)$ (Fig. B.4),
- $P_1' = \text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{0,2}(\lambda, K_{\text{SPS,A}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,B}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,E},E}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,F},E}^{(\nu)}, (h^*, \ell^*), \text{VK}_{\text{SPS,B,E},H}^{(\nu)}, h^*, \ell^*)$ (Fig. B.5).

Now, by the correctness under puncturing property of the PPRF $\mathcal{F}$, both the programs $P_0$ and $P_1$ have identical outputs on inputs corresponding to $(h, i) \neq (h^*, \ell^*)$. For inputs corresponding to $(h^*, \ell^*)$, $P_1$ uses the hardwired verification key $\text{VK}_{\text{SPS,B,E},H}^{(\nu)}$, where in $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1,2}$, $\text{VK}_{\text{SPS,B,E},H}^{(\nu)}$ is computed as $(\text{SK}_{\text{SPS,F},E}^{(\nu)} \text{VK}_{\text{SPS,E},E}^{(\nu)}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS,B,E},H}^{(\nu)}) = \text{SPS.Setup}(1^\lambda, \nu_{\text{SPS,E},E}^{(\nu)})$ and $r_{\text{SPS,H}}^{(\nu)} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{SPS,F},E}^{(\nu)}, (h^*, \ell^*))$. Observe that these values are exactly the same as those used by the program $P_0$ for inputs corresponding to $(h^*, \ell^*)$. Thus, both programs have identical outputs for inputs corresponding to $(h^*, \ell^*)$ as well. Hence, the two programs are functionally equivalent. A similar argument will justify that the programs $P_0'$ and $P_1'$ are functionally equivalent.

Therefore, by the security of $\mathcal{IO}$, Claim B.3 follows, considering a sequence of hybrid experiments where in each hybrid experiment we change the programs one at a time.

**Claim B.4.** Assuming $\mathcal{F}$ is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, for any PPT adversary $A$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|\text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,1,2}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,1,3}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function $\text{negl}$.

**Proof.** Suppose there exists a PPT adversary $A$ for which $|\text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,1,2}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_A^{0,\nu-1,1,3}(\lambda)|$ is non-negligible. We construct a PPT adversary $B$ that breaks the selective pseudorandomness of the PPRF $\mathcal{F}$ using $A$ as a sub-routine. The description of $B$ follows:

- $B$ initializes $A$ on input $1^\lambda$ and receives a challenge signing attribute string $x^* = x_0^* \ldots x_{\ell-1}^* \in \mathcal{U}_{\text{ABS}}$ with $|x^*| = \ell^*$ from $A$.
- Upon receiving $x^*$, $B$ proceeds as follows:
  1. $B$ generates HK $\leftarrow \$ \text{SSS.Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{SSS-BLK} = 2^\lambda, i^* = 0)$ and computes $h^* = \text{HK}(x^*)$.
  2. Then, $B$ selects a PPRF key $K \leftarrow \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$.
  3. After that, $B$ computes $r_{\text{SIG}}^{(\nu)} = \mathcal{F}(K, (h^*, \ell^*))$ followed by $(\text{SK}_{\text{SIG}}^{\nu}, \text{VK}_{\text{SIG}}^{\nu}) = \text{SIG.Setup}(1^\lambda, r_{\text{SIG}}^{(\nu)})$.
  4. $B$ returns the public parameters $\text{PP}_{\text{ABS}} = (\text{HK}, \text{IO}(\text{Verify.Prog.abs.K}[K]))$ to $A$.
- For $\eta \in \mathcal{H}_{\text{RAC}}$, in response to the $\eta$th signing key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(\eta)}(x^*) = 0$, if $\eta \neq \nu$, then $B$ proceeds exactly as in $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,1,2}$, while if $\eta = \nu$, then $B$ proceeds as follows:
  1. $B$ first selects PPRF keys $K_1^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_{\lambda}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,A}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,B}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,F}}^{(\nu)} \leftarrow \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$.
  2. Next, it generates $(pp_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, v_0^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}(\nu)) \leftarrow \text{ACC.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} = 2^\lambda)$ and $(pp_{\text{STOR}}^{(\nu)}, v_0^{(\nu)}) \leftarrow \text{ITR.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{HTR} = 2^\lambda)$.
  3. Then, $B$ sends $(h^*, \ell^*)$ as the challenge input to its PPRF selective pseudorandomness challenger $\mathcal{C}$ and receives back a punctured PPRF key $K'\{(h^*, \ell^*)\}$ and a value $r^* \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{PPRF}}$, where either $r^* = \mathcal{F}(K^*, (h^*, \ell^*))$ or $r^* \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}_{\text{PPRF}}$. $B$ will implicitly view the key $K^*$ as the key $K_{\text{SPS,F}}^{(\nu)}$.
  4. $B$ generates $(\text{SK}_{\text{SPS,F},E}^{(\nu)}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS,F},E}^{(\nu)}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS,B,E},H}^{(\nu)}) = \text{SPS.Setup}(1^\lambda, r^*)$. 


5. \(B\) gives \(A\) the signing key

\[
\text{SK}_{\text{Abs}}\{M^{(\nu)}\} = \\
(\text{HK, PP}_{\text{Abs}}, u_0^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_0^{(\nu)}, \text{PTT}_0^{(\nu)}, v_0^{(\nu)}, K_{SPP, E}^{(\nu)}), \\
\text{IO}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog}^{(0)}(q_0^{(\nu)}, u_0^{(\nu)}, v_0^{(\nu)}, K_{SPP, E}^{(\nu)})), \\
\text{IO}(\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(0,2)}(\text{t}_{\text{ss-blk}} = 2^\lambda, \text{HK, PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PTT}_0^{(\nu)}, K_{SPP, E}^{(\nu)}, K^{(\nu)} hv, \{h^*, \epsilon^*\}), \\
\text{VK}_{\text{SPP-REJ}, H^*}, \\
\text{IO}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(0,2)}([K_{SPP, A}^{(\nu)}, K_{SPP, B}^{(\nu)}, K_{SPP, E}^{(\nu)}, K^{(\nu)} hv, \{h^*, \epsilon^*\}), \\
\text{VK}_{\text{SPP-REJ}, H^*}, h^*, \epsilon^*), \\
\text{IO}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog}^{(1)}(M^{(\nu)}, T = 2^\lambda, \epsilon^{(\nu)}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PTT}_0^{(\nu)}, K, K_1^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_\lambda^{(\nu)}, K_{SPP, A}^{(\nu)}, K_{SPP, B}^{(\nu)}). \\
\]

- For \(\theta \in [\tilde{q}_\text{SSN}],\) in reply to the \(\theta\)th signature query of \(A\) on message \(\text{msg}^{(\theta)} \in M_{\text{Abs}}\) under attribute string \(x^*\), \(B\) computes \(\sigma^{(\theta)} = \text{SIG.Sign}(\text{SK}_{\text{Abs}}, \text{msg}^{(\theta)})\) and provides \(A\) with \(\sigma^{(\theta)}_{\text{Abs}} = (\text{VK}_{\text{Sig}}, \sigma^{(\theta)}_{\text{Sig}})\).
- Finally, \(A\) outputs a signature \(\sigma^*_{\text{Abs}}\) on some message \(\text{msg}^*\) under attribute string \(x^*\). \(B\) outputs \(b' = 1\) as its guess bit in its PPRF selective pseudorandomness experiment if \(A\) wins, i.e., if \(\text{ABS.Verify}(\text{pp}_{\text{Abs}}, x^*, \text{msg}^*, \sigma^*_{\text{Abs}}) = 1\) and \(\text{msg}^* \neq \text{msg}^{(\theta)}\) for any \(\theta \in [\tilde{q}_\text{SSN}].\) Otherwise, \(B\) outputs \(b' = 0\) in its PPRF selective pseudorandomness experiment.

Note that if \(r^* = F(K^*, \{h^*, \epsilon^*\})\), then \(B\) perfectly simulates \(\text{Hyb}_{b, 1, -1, 1, 1, 2}\). On the other hand, if \(r^* \not\subseteq \gamma^{(\text{PPRF})}\), then \(B\) perfectly simulates \(\text{Hyb}_{b, 1, -1, 1, 1, 3}\). This completes the proof of Claim B.4. \(\square\)

**Claim B.5.** Assuming SPS is a splittable signature scheme satisfying ‘\(\text{VK}_{\text{SPP-REJ}}\) indistinguishability’, for any PPT adversary \(A\), for any security parameter \(\lambda\), \(|\text{Adv}^{(0,\nu)-1,1,3}_A(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{(0,\nu)-1,1,4}_A(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)\) for some negligible function \(\text{negl}\).

**Proof.** Suppose there exists a PPT adversary \(A\) for which \(|\text{Adv}^{(0,\nu)-1,1,3}_A(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{(0,\nu)-1,1,4}_A(\lambda)| \) is non-negligible. Below we construct a PPT adversary \(B\) that breaks the \(\text{VK}_{\text{SPP-REJ}}\) indistinguishability of SPS using \(A\) as a sub-routine.

- \(B\) receives a verification key \(vK\) of the splittable signature scheme SPS from its \(\text{VK}_{\text{SPP-REJ}}\) indistinguishability challenger \(C\), where \(vK\) is either a proper verification key \(\text{VK}_{\text{SPS}}\) or a reject verification key \(\text{VK}_{\text{SPP-REJ}}\). Then, \(B\) initializes \(A\) on input \(1^\lambda\) and receives a challenge signing attribute string \(x^* = x_0^* \ldots x_{t^* - 1}^* \in U_{\text{Abs}}\) with \(x^* \vdash \epsilon^*\) from \(A\).
- Upon receiving \(x^*\), \(B\) proceeds as follows:
  1. \(B\) generates \(\text{HK} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{SSB.Gen}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{SSB-blk}} = 2^\lambda, i^* = 0)\) and computes \(h^* = \text{HK}(x^*).
  2. Then, \(B\) selects a PPRF key \(k \xleftarrow{\$} F(\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)).\)
  3. After that, \(B\) computes \(r^* = F(K, (h^*, \epsilon^*))\) followed by \((\text{SK}_{\text{Sig}}, \text{VK}_{\text{Sig}}) = \text{SIG.Sign}(\text{SK}_{\text{Abs}}, \text{msg}^{(\theta)})\) for \(\theta = (\text{VK}_{\text{Sig}}, \sigma^{(\theta)}_{\text{Sig}})\).
  4. \(B\) returns the public parameters \(\text{pp}_{\text{Abs}} = (\text{HK, IO}(\text{Verify.Prog}(\text{pp}_{\text{Abs}})), A)\) to \(A\).
- For \(\eta \in [\tilde{q}_\text{REV}],\) in response to the \(\eta\)th signing key query of \(A\) corresponding to TM \(M^{(\nu)} \in M_{\lambda}\) with \(M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0,\) if \(\eta \neq \nu,\) then \(B\) proceeds exactly as in \(\text{Hyb}_{b, 1, -1, 1, 3, 1}\), while if \(\eta = \nu,\) then \(B\) proceeds as follows:
  1. \(B\) first selects PPRF keys \(K_1^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_\lambda^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS-A}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS-B}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS-E}}^{(\nu)}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{PPS,F}} \xleftarrow{\$} F(\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)).\)
  2. Next, it generates \((\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, v_0^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_0^{(\nu)} ) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{ACC.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-blk}} = 2^\lambda)\) and \((\text{PP}_{\text{TR}}, v_0^{(\nu)}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{ITR.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ITR}} = 2^\lambda).\)
  3. \(B\) creates the punctured PPRF key \(K_{\text{SPS,F}}^{(\nu)}((h^*, \epsilon^*)) \xleftarrow{\$} F.\text{Puncture}(K_{\text{SPS,F}}, (h^*, \epsilon^*)).\)
  4. \(B\) gives \(A\) the signing key

\[
\text{SK}_{\text{Abs}}\{M^{(\nu)}\} = \\
(\text{HK, PP}_{\text{Abs}}, u_0^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_0^{(\nu)}, \text{PTT}_0^{(\nu)}, v_0^{(\nu)}, K_{SPP, E}^{(\nu)}), \\
\text{IO}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog}^{(0)}(q_0^{(\nu)}, u_0^{(\nu)}, v_0^{(\nu)}, K_{SPP, E}^{(\nu)})), \\
\text{IO}(\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(0,2)}(\text{t}_{\text{ss-blk}} = 2^\lambda, \text{HK, PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PTT}_0^{(\nu)}, K_{SPP, E}^{(\nu)}, K^{(\nu)}_{(\nu)} hv, \{h^*, \epsilon^*\}, \text{VK}, h^*, \epsilon^*), \\
\text{IO}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(0,2)}([K_{\text{SPS-A}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS-B}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS-E}}^{(\nu)}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS,F}}((h^*, \epsilon^*)), \text{VK}, h^*, \epsilon^*), \\
\text{IO}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog}^{(1)}(M^{(\nu)}, T = 2^\lambda, \epsilon^{(\nu)}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PTT}_0^{(\nu)}, K, K_1^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_\lambda^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS-A}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS-B}}^{(\nu)}). \\
\]
The rest of the experiment is similar to $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3}$. On the other hand, if $\text{VK} = \text{VK}_\text{SPS}$, then $\mathcal{B}$ perfectly simulates $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,4}$. This completes the proof of Claim B.5.

Claim B.6. Assuming $\mathcal{F}$ is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu-1,4)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu-1,5)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function negl.

Proof. The proof of Claim B.6 is similar to that of Claim B.4 with some appropriate changes which can be readily identified.

Claim B.7. Assuming $\mathcal{I}O$ is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for $\text{P/poly}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu-1,5)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu-1,6)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function negl.

Proof. The proof of Claim B.7 is analogous to that of Claim B.3 with some appropriate changes that are easy to determine.

Lemma B.3. Assuming $\mathcal{I}O$ is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for $\text{P/poly}$, $\mathcal{F}$ is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, and $\text{SPS}$ is a splittable signature scheme satisfying $\text{VK}_{\text{SPS-REJ}}$ indistinguishability, for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu-1,2)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu-1,3)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function negl.

Proof. To prove Lemma B.3 we consider the following sequence of $\ell^*$ intermediate hybrid experiments between $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3}$.

Sequence of Intermediate Hybrids between $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3}$

$\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,2,\ell}$ ($\ell = 0, \ldots, \ell^* - 1$): In this experiment in response to the $\nu$th signing key query of $\mathcal{A}$ corresponding to $\text{TM}(\nu) \in M_\lambda$ with $\text{TM}(\nu)(x^*) = 0$, $\mathcal{B}$ proceeds as follows:

1. It first chooses PPRF keys $K_{\nu}^{(\nu)}$, $K_\lambda^{(\nu)}$, $K_\lambda^{(\nu)}$, $K_\nu^{(\nu)}$, $K_{\text{SPS-A}}^{(\nu)}$, $K_{\text{SPS-B}}^{(\nu)}$, $K_{\text{SPS-E}}^{(\nu)}$, $K_{\text{SPS-F}}^{(\nu)} \leftarrow \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(\lambda)$.
2. After that, it generates $(\text{PPF}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_{\nu}^{(\nu)}) \leftarrow \mathcal{I}O.\text{ACC}.\text{Setup}(\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} = 2^\lambda)$ and $(\text{PPF}_{\text{ITR}}^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_{\nu}^{(\nu)} \leftarrow \mathcal{I}O.\text{ITR}.\text{Setup}(\lambda, n_{\text{ITR}} = 2^\lambda)$.
3. It provides $\mathcal{A}$ with the signing key

$$\text{SK}_{\text{ARS}}\{\text{TM}(\nu)\} = \left(\text{HK}, \text{PPF}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, \text{PPF}_{\text{ITR}}^{(\nu)}, \nu_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, \right.$$

$$\left.\begin{array}{l}
\mathcal{I}O(\text{Init-SPS-Prog}_{(\nu)}, w_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, v_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS-E}}^{(\nu)}), \\
\mathcal{I}O(\text{Accumulate-Prog}_{(1,\nu)}^{(1,\nu)}, \nu_{\text{HBR-BLK}}^{\nu} = 2^\lambda, \text{HK}, \text{PPF}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{PPF}_{\text{ITR}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS-A}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS-B}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS-E}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS-F}}^{(\nu)}, h^*, \ell^*), \\
\mathcal{I}O(\text{Change-SPS-Prog}_{(1,\nu)}^{(1,\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS-A}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS-B}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS-E}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS-F}}^{(\nu)}, h^*, \ell^*), \\
\mathcal{I}O(\text{Constrained-Key-Prog}_{(1,\nu)}^{(1,\nu)}, \text{TM}(\nu), T = 2^\lambda, \nu_{\nu}^{(\nu)} \text{PPF}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{PPF}_{\text{ITR}}^{(\nu)}, K_{1\nu}^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, K_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, h^*, \ell^*), \\
\left.\right)\right),
$$

where the programs $\text{Accumulate-Prog}_{(1,\nu)}^{(1,\nu)}$ and $\text{Change-SPS-Prog}_{(1,\nu)}^{(1,\nu)}$ are the modifications of the programs $\text{Accumulate-Prog}_{(2,\nu)}^{(2,\nu)}$ and $\text{Change-SPS-Prog}_{(2,\nu)}^{(2,\nu)}$ (Figs. A.4 and A.5) and are depicted in Figs. B.6 and B.7 respectively.

The rest of the experiment is similar to $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,2}$. Observe that $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,2,\ell^* - 1}$ coincides with $\text{hyb}_{0,\nu-1,2}$ and $\text{hyb}_{0,\nu-1,2,0}$ corresponds to $\text{hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3}$. 
### Fig. B.6. Accumulate.Prog\(^{(1,\epsilon)}\)

**Constants:** PPRF keys \(K_{ps}, A, K_{ps}, B, K_{ps}, E, K_{ps}, F\); SSB hash value of challenge input \(h^*\), Length of challenge input \(\ell^*\)

**Inputs:** TM state \(st\), Accumulator value \(w_i\), Auxiliary value \(aux\), Iterator value \(\lambda\), Signature \(\sigma_{aux, st}\), SSB hash value \(h\), SSB opening value \(\tau\)

**Output:** Signature \(\sigma_{aux, st}\) or \(\bot\)

1. (a) Compute \(t_{aux} = F(K_{ps, F}; (i, \ell^*))\), \((s_{aux, F}, v_{aux, F}, v_{aux, aux, F}) = SPS.Setup(1; t_{aux})\).
   (b) Compute \(t_{aux, F} = F(K_{ps, F}; (h, \ell^* + 1))\), \((s_{aux, F}, v_{aux, F}, v_{aux, aux, F}) = SPS.Setup(1; t_{aux, F})\).
2. If \(\alpha \equiv 1\), set \(\alpha = F'\).
3. If \(\alpha \equiv \bot\), output \(\bot\).
4. (a) Compute \(t_{aux} = F(K_{ps, B}; (i, \ell^* + 1))\), \((s_{aux, B}, v_{aux, B}, v_{aux, aux, B}) = SPS.Setup(1; t_{aux})\).
   (b) Compute \(t_{aux, B} = F(K_{ps, B}; (h, \ell^* + 1))\), \((s_{aux, B}, v_{aux, B}, v_{aux, aux, B}) = SPS.Setup(1; t_{aux, B})\).
5. Else, output \(\sigma_{aux, st} = SPS.Sign(s_{aux, B}, m)\).

### Fig. B.7. Change-SPS.Prog\(^{(1,\epsilon)}\)

**Analysis**

Let us denote by \(\text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu - 1,2;\epsilon)}(\lambda)\) the advantage of \(A\), i.e., the absolute difference between \(1/2\) and \(A\)'s probability of correctly guessing the random bit selected by the challenger \(B\), in the hybrid experiment \(\text{Hy}_{\nu, 0, \nu - 1,2}^\epsilon\) for \(\epsilon \in [0, \ell^* - 1]\). Clearly, \(\text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu - 1,2;\epsilon)}(\lambda) \equiv \text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu - 1,2;\epsilon - 1)}(\lambda)\) and \(\text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu - 1,2;\ell^* - 1)}(\lambda) \equiv \text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu - 1,2;0)}(\lambda)\). Hence we have,

\[
\text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu - 1,2;\epsilon)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu - 1,3;\epsilon)}(\lambda) \leq \sum_{i=1}^{\ell^* - 1} \left| \text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu - 1,2;i)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu - 1,2;\epsilon - 1)}(\lambda) \right|.
\]

Claim B.8 below justifies that the RHS of Eq. (B.3) is negligible and consequently Lemma B.3 follows.

**Claim B.8.** Assuming \(IO\) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \(P/poly\), \(F\) is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, and \(SPS\) is a splittable signature scheme satisfying ‘\(K_{SPS, SEK}\) indistinguishability’ for any PPT adversary \(A\), for any security parameter \(\lambda\), \(\left| \text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu - 1,2;\epsilon)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu - 1,2;\ell^* - 1)}(\lambda) \right| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda)\) for some negligible function \(\text{neg}\).

**Proof.** The proof of Claim B.8 is similar to that of Lemma B.2 with some appropriate modifications which are easy to find out.

**Lemma B.4.** Assuming \(IO\) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \(P/poly\), \(F\) is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, and \(SPS\) is a splittable signature scheme satisfying ‘\(K_{SPS, ONE}\) indistinguishability’, for any PPT adversary \(A\), for any security parameter \(\lambda\), \(\left| \text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu - 1,3;\epsilon)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu - 1,3;\ell^* - 1)}(\lambda) \right| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda)\) for some negligible function \(\text{neg}\).
Proof. In order to prove Lemma 3.4, we consider the following sequence of intermediate hybrid experiments between $Hyb_{0, \nu - 1, 3}$ and $Hyb_{0, \nu - 1, 3, 0}$.

### Sequence of Intermediate Hybrids between $Hyb_{0, \nu - 1, 3}$ and $Hyb_{0, \nu - 1, 3, 0}$

**$Hyb_{0, \nu - 1, 3}$**: This experiment coincides with $Hyb_{0, \nu - 1, 3}$.

**$Hyb_{0, \nu - 1, 3, 1}$**: In this experiment, to answer the $\nu$th signing key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(\nu)} \in M_{\lambda}$ with $M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0$, $B$ proceeds as follows:

1. It first generates all the PPRF keys together with the public parameters for the positional accumulator and the iterator just as in $hyb_{0, \nu - 1, 3}$.
2. After that, it creates the punctured PPRF key $K_{\nu, E}^{(\nu)}(h^*, 0)$ as well as computes $r_{\nu, G}^{(0)} = F(K_{\nu, E}^{(\nu)}(h^*, 0))$ and $(SK_{\nu, G}, PK_{\nu, G}) = \text{SPS.Setup}(1^\lambda, r_{\nu, G}^{(0)})$.
3. Then, it sets $m_{0,0}^{(\nu)} = (v_0^{(\nu)}, q_0^{(\nu)}, w_0^{(\nu)}, 0)$ and computes $s_{\nu, G}^{(0)} = \text{SPS.Sign}(SK_{\nu, G}, m_{0,0}^{(\nu)})$.
4. $B$ gives $A$ the signing key $SK_{\nu, G} = (HK^{(\nu)}, PK_{\nu, G}^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}^{(\nu)}, \text{PPR}^{(\nu)}, \text{Init-SPS.Prog}^{(\nu)}, \text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(\nu)}, \text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(\nu)}, \text{Constrained-Key.Prog}^{(\nu)})$.

where the programs $\text{Init-SPS.Prog}^{(1)}$ and $\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(2,1)}$ respectively are the alterations of the programs $\text{Init-SPS.Prog}$ and $\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(2)}$ (Figs. 3.2 and A.4) and are depicted in Figs. B.8 and B.9.

The remaining part of the experiment is similar to $Hyb_{0, \nu - 1, 3, 1}$.

---

**Fig. B.8. Init-SPS.Prog**

$hyb_{0, \nu - 1, 3, 1}$: This experiment is analogous to $Hyb_{0, \nu - 1, 3, 1}$ with the only exception that while constructing the $\nu$th signing key queried by $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(\nu)} \in M_{\lambda}$ with $M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0$, $B$ selects $r_{\nu, G}^{(0)} \in \mathbb{Z}_{ppr, G}$. More formally, to answer the $\nu$th signing key query of $A$, $B$ creates all the components as in $Hyb_{0, \nu - 1, 3, 1}$ except that it generates $(SK_{\nu, G}, PK_{\nu, G}) = \text{SPS.Setup}(1^\lambda, r_{\nu, G}^{(0)})$, sets $m_{0,0}^{(\nu)} = (v_0^{(\nu)}, q_0^{(\nu)}, w_0^{(\nu)}, 0)$, computes $s_{\nu, G}^{(0)} = \text{SPS.Sign}(SK_{\nu, G}, m_{0,0}^{(\nu)})$ and provides $A$ with the signing key $SK_{\nu, G} = (HK^{(\nu)}, PK_{\nu, G}^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}^{(\nu)}, \text{PPR}^{(\nu)}, \text{Init-SPS.Prog}^{(\nu)}, \text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(\nu)}, \text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(\nu)}, \text{Constrained-Key.Prog}^{(\nu)})$. 

---

**Fig. B.9. Constrained-Key.Prog**
Constants: Maximum number of blocks for SSB hash $n_{ssb-blk} = 2^λ$, SSB hash key $hk$, Public parameters for positional accumulator $PP_{ACC}$, Public parameters for iterator $PP_{ITR}$, Punctured PPRF key $K_{PPRF}(h^*, 0)$, PPRF key $K_{PPRF}$. Verification key $V_{G_{pp}}$, SSB hash value of challenge input $h^*$, Length of challenge input $e$

Inputs: Index $i$, Symbol $v_{sk}$, TM state $St$. Accumulator value $w_i$, Auxiliary value $aux$, Iterator value $w_{aux}$, Signature $sign_{aux}$, SSB hash value $h$, SSB opening value $τ_{ssb}$

Output: (Accumulator value $v_{aux}$, Iterator value $w_{aux}$, Signature $sign_{aux}$), or ⊥

1. (a) If $(h, i) ≠ (h^*, 0)$, compute $v_{aux, E} = F(K_{ACC}, E\{h^*, 0\}, (h, i))$, $(SK_{E}, E, VK_{E, E}, VK_{E, E, E}) = SPS.Setup(1^λ, τ_{ssb, E})$. Else, set $v_{aux, E} = G_{pp}$.
   (b) Compute $τ_{ssb, F} = F(K_{ACC}, F\{(h, i)\}, (SK_{E}, F, VK_{E, F}, VK_{E, E, F})) = SPS.Setup(1^λ, τ_{ssb, F})$.
   (c) Set $m_{aux} = (v_{aux, E}, τ_{ssb, E})$ and $α = ε$.
   (d) If $SPS.Verify(VK_{E, E}, m_{aux}, σ_{aux}) = 1$, set $α = ε'$. (e) If $α = ε$, set $α = ε'$. (f) If $α = ε'$, output ⊥.

2. If SSB Verify($hk, h, i, SYM_{sk}, τ_{ssb}$) = 0, output ⊥.

3. (a) Compute $w_{aux, E} = ACC.Update(pp_{E}, w_{aux}, SYM_{sk}, i, AUX)$. If $w_{aux, E} = ⊥$, output ⊥.
   (b) Compute $w_{aux, F} = ITR.Invoke(pp_{F}, w_{aux, E}, (St, w_{aux}, 0))$.
   (c) Compute $τ'_{ssb, E} = F(K_{ACC}, E\{(h, i+1)\}, (SK_{E}, E, VK_{E, E}, VK_{E, E, E})) = SPS.Setup(1^λ, τ'_{ssb, E})$.
   (d) Compute $τ'_{ssb, F} = F(K_{ACC}, F\{(h, i+1)\}, (SK_{E}, F, VK_{E, F}, VK_{E, E, F})) = SPS.Setup(1^λ, τ'_{ssb, F})$.
   (e) Set $m_{aux} = (w_{aux, E}, τ_{ssb, E})$. If $i < ℓ$, compute $σ_{aux} = SPS.Sign(sk_{aux}, m_{aux})$.
   Else, compute $σ_{aux} = SPS.Sign(sk_{aux}, τ_{aux})$.

5. Output $(w_{aux, E}, w_{aux, F}, σ_{aux})$.

Fig. B.9. Accumulate.Prog$^{(2,1)}$

**Hyb$_{0,ν}$−1,3-IV:** This experiment is the same as hyb$_{0,ν}$−1,3-III with the exception that in response to the $ν$th signing key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(ν)}(x^*) = 0, B$ proceeds as follows:

1. It first generates the full and punctured PPRF keys together with the public parameters for the positional accumulator and the iterator just as in Hyb$_{0,ν}$−1,3-III.

2. Next, it creates $(SK_{(v_0^{(ν)}), G_{pp}}, VK_{(v_0^{(ν)}), G_{pp}}, VK_{(v_0^{(ν)}), G_{pp}, E}) \leftarrow SPS.Setup(1^λ)$, sets $m_{(v_0^{(ν)})} = (v_0^{(ν)}, q_0^{(ν)}, v_0^{(ν)}, 0)$, and forms $(σ_{(v_0^{(ν)}), G_{pp}, E}, VK_{(v_0^{(ν)}), G_{pp}, E}, VK_{(v_0^{(ν)}), G_{pp}})$ $\leftarrow SPS.Split$($sps_{(v_0^{(ν)}, m_{(v_0^{(ν)})})}$).

3. $B$ hands the signing key $SK_{ssb} = \{σ_{(v_0^{(ν)}), G_{pp}, E}, VK_{(v_0^{(ν)}), G_{pp}, E}, VK_{(v_0^{(ν)}), G_{pp}}\}$

**Hyb$_{0,ν}$−1,3-V:** In this experiment, in reply to the $ν$th signing key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(ν)}(x^*) = 0, B$ generates all the components just as in Hyb$_{0,ν}$−1,3-IV and gives $A$ the signing key $SK_{ssb} = \{σ_{(v_0^{(ν)}), G_{pp}, E}, VK_{(v_0^{(ν)}), G_{pp}, E}, VK_{(v_0^{(ν)}), G_{pp}}\}$ where the program Accumulate.Prog$^{(2,2)}$, described in Fig. B.10 is an alteration of the program Accumulate.Prog$^{(2,1)}$ (Fig. B.9). The rest of the experiment is similar to Hyb$_{0,ν}$−1,3-IV.
Constants: Maximum number of blocks for SSB hash \( n_{SSB-blk} = 2^3 \), SSB hash key \( \text{Hk} \), Public parameters for positional accumulator \( \text{PP}_{\text{acc}} \); Public parameters for iterator \( \text{PP}_{\text{itr}} \); Punctured PPRF key \( K_{\text{acc,E}} \); \( \{h^*, 0\} \); PPRF key \( K_{\text{itr,F}} \).

Input: Index \( i \), Symbol \( \sigma_{\text{SSB}} \), TM state \( \sigma_{\text{st}} \), Accumulator value \( w_i \), Auxiliary value \( \sigma_{\text{aux}} \), Iterator value \( v_{\text{itr}} \), Signature \( \sigma_{\text{sig,sk}} \), SSB hash value \( h, \) SSB opening value \( \sigma_{\text{ssb}} \)

Output: (Accumulator value \( w_{\text{acc}} \), Iterator value \( v_{\text{itr}} \), Signature \( \sigma_{\text{sig,ct}} \), or \( \perp \))

1. If \((h, i) \neq (h^*, 0), \) compute \( r_{\text{acc,E}} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{acc,E}} \{h^*, 0\}), (h, i)) \), \( \{K_{\text{acc,E}}, V_{\text{SSB,E}}, V_{\text{SSB-RED,E}}\} = \text{SPS.Setup}(1^3; r_{\text{acc,E}}) \).

2. Else, set \( V_{\text{acc,E}} = \text{V}_{\text{acc,E}} \).

3. Set \( m = \{w_i, \sigma_{\text{ssb}}, 0\} \) and \( r = \perp \).

4. If \( \text{SPS.Verify}(V_{\text{SSB,E}}, m, \sigma_{\text{sig,ct}}) = 1 \), set \( r = E \).

5. Else if \( r \neq \perp \) \( \wedge \) \[ \{\sigma_{\text{acc,ct}} = 0\} \), output \( \perp \).

6. Else \( \text{SPS.Verify}(V_{\text{SSB,E}}, m, \sigma_{\text{sig,ct}}) = 1 \), set \( r = F \).

7. Else, compute \( \sigma_{\text{sig,ct}} = \text{SPS.Sign}(V_{\text{SSB,E}}, m) \).

8. Else, \( \perp \).

Fig. B.10. Accumulate.Prog\(^{(2,2)}\)

Hyb\(_{0,0^-,1,3-VI}\): In this experiment, in response to the \( \nu^\text{th} \) signing key query of \( \mathcal{A} \) corresponding to TM \( M^{(\nu)} \in \mathcal{M}_{\lambda} \) with \( M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0, B \) proceeds as follows:

1. It first generates all the full and punctured PPRF keys as well as the public parameters for the positional accumulator and its iterator as in Hyb\(_{0,0^-,1,3-V}\).

2. Next, it forms \( (sk^{(0)}_{\text{SPS,G}}, vK^{(0)}_{\text{SSB,E}}, vK^{(0)}_{\text{SSB-RED,E}}) \) \( \leftarrow \) \( \text{SPS.Setup}(1^3) \), sets \( m^{(\nu)}_{0,0} = (v^{(\nu)}_0, q^{(\nu)}_0, w^{(\nu)}_0, 0) \), and computes \( \sigma_{\text{sig,ct}}^{(\nu)} = \text{SPS.Sign}(sk^{(\nu)}_{\text{SSB,E}}, m^{(\nu)}_{0,0}) \).

3. It provides \( \mathcal{A} \) with the signing key

\[
\text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}\{M^{(\nu)}\} =
\begin{pmatrix}
\text{HK, PP}_{\text{ACC}}, 0^{(\nu)}, v_{\text{itr}}^{(\nu)}, v_{\text{acc,E}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{acc,E}}^{(\nu)} \{h^*, 0\}, \sigma_{\text{sig,ct}}^{(\nu)}, w_{\text{acc,E}}^{(\nu)}
\end{pmatrix}
\]

The remaining portion of the experiment is identical to hyb\(_{0,0^-,1,3-V}\).

Hyb\(_{0,0^-,1,3-VII}\): In this experiment, while constructing the \( \nu^\text{th} \) signing key queried by \( \mathcal{A} \) corresponding to TM \( M^{(\nu)} \in \mathcal{M}_{\lambda} \) with \( M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0, \) \( B \) generates everything just as in Hyb\(_{0,0^-,1,3-VI}\) except that it computes \( s^{(\nu)}_{\text{SSB,E}} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{acc,E}}^{(\nu)} \{h^*, 0\}) \), forms \( (sk^{(\nu)}_{\text{SSB,G}}, vK^{(\nu)}_{\text{SSB,E}}, vK^{(\nu)}_{\text{SSB-RED,G}}) = \text{SPS.Setup}(1^3; r^{(\nu)}_{\text{SSB,G}}) \), and
negligible. We construct a PPT

Suppose there exists a
Proof.

Claim B.10.

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The rest of the experiment is analogous to
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Therefore, we have
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\{M(ν)\} =

HK, PP^acc, w_0(ν), PP^{tr}, v_0(ν),

IO(Init-SPS.Prog\{(h^*, 0)\}, K_{SPS,E}(\{h^*, 0\}, σ_{SPS,G}^{(0,0)}, h^*))

IO(Accumulate.Prog\{(2λ), H_{SSB-BLK} = 2^λ, HK, PP^{acc}, PP^{tr}, K_{SPS,E}(\{h^*, 0\}, K_{SPS,F}, \mathcal{V}_{SPS,G}^{(ν,0)}, m(0,0), h^*, \ell^*))

IO(Change-SPS.Prog\{(2λ), K_{SPS,A}, K_{SPS,B}, K_{SPS,E}(\{h^*, 0\}, K_{SPS,F}, h^*, \ell^*))

IO(Constrained-Key.Prog\{(1λ), M(ν), T = 2^λ, t(ν)^{\prime}, \mathcal{P}^{acc}, PP^{tr}, K, K_1(ν), \ldots, K_λ(ν), K_{SPS,A}, K_{SPS,B}, h^*, \ell^*))

Hyb_{0,v-1,3-VIII}: This experiment corresponds to Hyb_{0,v-1,3-0}.

Analysis

Let Adv_A^{(0,v-1,3-0)}(λ) represents the advantage of the adversary A, i.e., the absolute difference between 1/2 and A’s probability of correctly guessing the random bit selected by the challenger B, in Hyb_{0,v-1,3-0}, for ν ∈ {I, . . . , VIII}. Clearly, Adv_A^{(0,v-1,3-0)}(λ) = Adv_A^{(0,v-1,3-I)}(λ) and Adv_A^{(0,v-1,3-0)}(λ) = Adv_A^{(0,v-1,3-VIII)}(λ).

Therefore, we have

Adv_A^{(0,v-1,3-0)}(λ) = Adv_A^{(0,v-1,3-0)}(λ) ≤ Θ(λ) for some negligible function Θ.

Claims B.9, B.15 below will justify that the RHS of Eq. (B.4) is negligible and hence Lemma B.4 follows.

Claim B.9. Assuming IO is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for P/poly and F satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary A, for any security parameter λ,

Adv_A^{(0,v-1,3-0)}(λ) = Adv_A^{(0,v-1,3-0)}(λ) ≤ negl(λ) for some negligible function negl.

Proof. The difference between Hyb_{0,v-1,3-I} and Hyb_{0,v-1,3-II} is the following: In Hyb_{0,v-1,3-I}, B includes the programs I/O(\Pi_0) and I/O(\Pi_0^\prime) within the νth signing key returned to A, while in Hyb_{0,v-1,3-II}, B includes the programs I/O(\Pi_1) and I/O(\Pi_1^\prime) instead, where

− P_0 = Init-SPS.Prog\{(0v), w_0(ν), K_{SPS,E}^\prime\} (Fig. 3.2),

− P_0^\prime = Accumulate.Prog\{(2λ), H_{SSB-BLK} = 2^λ, HK, PP^{acc}, PP^{tr}, K_{SPS,E}^\prime, K_{SPS,F}, h^*, \ell^*) (Fig. A.4),

− P_1 = Init-SPS.Prog\{(1λ), w_0(ν), K_{SPS,E}^\prime(\{h^*, 0\}, σ_{SPS,G}^{(0,0)}, h^*) (Fig. B.8),

− P_1^\prime = Accumulate.Prog\{(2λ), H_{SSB-BLK} = 2^λ, HK, PP^{acc}, PP^{tr}, K_{SPS,E}^\prime(\{h^*, 0\}, K_{SPS,F}, \mathcal{V}_{SPS,G}^{(ν,0)}, h^*, \ell^*) (Fig. B.9).

Now observe that the programs \Pi_0 and \Pi_1 are functionally equivalent since by the correctness under puncturing property of the PPRF F, the PPRF output remains the same at all non-punctured points and at the point of puncturing, i.e., (h^*, 0), the correct signature is hardwired in the program \Pi_1. Similarly, \Pi_0^\prime and \Pi_1^\prime are also functionally equivalent by the correctness under puncturing property of F and the fact that at the point of puncturing i.e., (h^*, 0) the correct verification key is hardwired into the program \Pi_1^\prime.

Therefore, by the security of I/O, Claim B.9 follows.

Claim B.10. Assuming F is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, for any PPT adversary A, for any security parameter λ,

Adv_A^{(0,v-1,3-0)}(λ) = Adv_A^{(0,v-1,3-0)}(λ) ≤ negl(λ) for some negligible function negl.

Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A for which Adv_A^{(0,v-1,3-0)}(λ) = Adv_A^{(0,v-1,3-0)}(λ) is non-negligible. We construct a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} that breaks the selective pseudorandomness of the PPRF F using A as a sub-routine. The description of \mathcal{B} follows:

− \mathcal{B} initializes A on input 1^λ and receives a challenge signing attribute string x^* = x_0^* \ldots x_{\ell^*-1}^* ∈ U_{ABS}

with |x^*| = \ell^* from A.
Claim B.11.

Proof.

• Upon receiving $x^*$, $B$ proceeds as follows:
  1. $B$ generates $HK \xleftarrow{\$} SSB.Gen(1^\lambda, n_{SSB-BLK} = 2^\lambda, i^* = 0)$ and computes $h^* = H_{hk}(x^*)$.
  2. Then, $B$ selects a PPRF key $K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{F}.Setup(1^\lambda)$. 
  3. After that, $B$ computes $r^*_S = \mathcal{F}(K,(h^*, \ell^*))$ followed by $(\widehat{SK}_{SIG}, \widehat{VK}_{SIG}) = SIG.Setup(1^\lambda; r^*_S)$.
  4. $B$ returns the public parameters $PP_{ABS} = (HK, IO(Verify.Prog_{ABS}[K]))$ to $A$.

• For $\eta \in [\widehat{g}_{SGN}]_1$, in response to the $\eta^{th}$ signing key query of $A$ corresponding to $TM M(\eta) \in M_\lambda$ with $M(\eta)(x^*) = 0$, if $\eta \neq \nu$, then $B$ proceeds exactly as in $Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3-II}$, while if $\eta = \nu$, then $B$ proceeds as follows:
  1. $B$ first selects PPRF keys $K_1^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_{\lambda}^{(\nu)}, K_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, K_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, K_{0}^{(\nu)}, K_{0}^{(\nu)}, K_{0}^{(\nu)} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{F}.Setup(1^\lambda)$. 
  2. Next, it generates $(PP_{ACCC}[\nu], PP_{ITR}[0], SSB.Gen(1^\lambda, n_{SSB-BLK} = 2^\lambda))$ and $(PP_{ITR}[\nu], PP_{ITR}[0]) \xleftarrow{\$} ITR.Setup(1^\lambda, n_{ITR} = 2^\lambda)$.
  3. Then, $B$ sends $(h^*, 0)$ as the challenge input to its PPRF selective pseudorandomness challenger $C$ and receives back a punctured PPRF key $K^*{(h^*, 0)}$ and a value $r^* \in \mathcal{Y}_{PPRF}$, where either
     
     $r^* = \mathcal{F}(K^*, (h^*, 0))$ or
     
     $r^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{Y}_{PPRF}$. B implicitly views the key $K^*$ as the key $K_{\nu}^{(\nu)}$.
  4. $B$ generates $(SK_{SSB-G}, VK_{SSB}, VK_{PPP-REL}) = SPS.Setup(1^\lambda, r^*)$.
  5. Then, $B$ sets $m_0^{(\nu)} = (u_0^{(\nu)}, v_0^{(\nu)}, 0)$ and computes $\sigma_0^{(\nu, 0)} = SPS.Sign(SK_{SSB-G}, m_0^{(\nu)})$.
  6. $B$ gives $A$ the signing key

$$SK_{ABS} \{ M^{(\nu)} \} = \begin{pmatrix} HK, PP_{ACCC}, PP_{ITR}, n_{SSB-BLK} = 2^\lambda, \sigma_0^{(\nu, 0)} \in \mathcal{Y}_{ABS} & \mathcal{Y}_{ABS} \end{pmatrix}$$

For $\theta \in [\widehat{g}_{SGN}]_1$, in reply to the $\theta^{th}$ signature query of $A$ on message $msg^{(\theta)} \in M_{ABS}$ under attribute string $x^*$, $B$ computes $\sigma_\theta^{(\nu, 0)} \xleftarrow{\$} SIG.Sign(SK_{SIG}, msg^{(\theta)})$ and provides $A$ with $\sigma_\theta^{(\nu, 0)} = (\widehat{SK}_{SIG}, \sigma_\theta^{(\nu, 0)})$.

Finally, $A$ outputs a signature $\sigma_{\nu}^{ABS}$ on some message $msg^*$ under attribute string $x^*$. $B$ outputs $\tilde{b} = 1$ as its guess in its PPRF selective pseudorandomness experiment if $A$ wins, i.e., if $ABS.Verify(PP_{ABS}, x^*, msg^*, \sigma_{\nu}^{ABS}) = 1$ and $msg^* \neq msg^{(\theta)}$ for any $\theta \in [\widehat{g}_{SGN}]_1$. Otherwise, $B$ outputs $\tilde{b} = 0$ in its PPRF selective pseudorandomness experiment.

Note that if $r^* = \mathcal{F}(K^*, (h^*, 0))$, then $B$ perfectly simulates $Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3-II}$. On the other hand, if $r^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{Y}_{PPRF}$, the $B$ perfectly simulates $Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3-II}$. This completes the proof of Claim B.10. □

Claim B.11. Assuming SPS is a splittable signature scheme satisfying ‘$\nu$-indistinguishability’, for any PPT adversary $A$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|\text{Adv}^{(0,\nu-1,3-III)}_{A} - \text{Adv}^{(0,\nu-1,3-IV)}_{A}| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function $\text{negl}$.

Proof.

Suppose there exists a PPT adversary $A$ for which $|\text{Adv}^{(0,\nu-1,3-III)}_{A} - \text{Adv}^{(0,\nu-1,3-IV)}_{A}| \geq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ is non-negligible. Below we construct a PPT adversary $B$ that breaks the $\nu$-indistinguishability of SPS using $A$ as a sub-routine.

• $B$ initializes $A$ on input $1^\lambda$ and receives a challenge signing attribute string $x^* = x_0^* \ldots x_{\ell^*-1}^* \in U_{ABS}$ with $|x^*| = \ell^*$ from $A$.

• Upon receiving $x^*$, $B$ proceeds as follows:
  1. $B$ generates $HK \xleftarrow{\$} SSB.Gen(1^\lambda, n_{SSB-BLK} = 2^\lambda, i^* = 0)$ and computes $h^* = H_{hk}(x^*)$.
  2. Then, $B$ selects a PPRF key $K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{F}.Setup(1^\lambda)$.
  3. After that, $B$ computes $r^*_S = \mathcal{F}(K,(h^*, \ell^*))$ followed by $(\widehat{SK}_{SIG}, \widehat{VK}_{SIG}) = SIG.Setup(1^\lambda; r^*_S)$.
  4. $B$ returns the public parameters $PP_{ABS} = (HK, IO(Verify.Prog_{ABS}[K]))$ to $A$.

• For $\eta \in [\widehat{g}_{SGN}]_1$, in response to the $\eta^{th}$ signing key query of $A$ corresponding to $TM M(\eta) \in M_\lambda$ with $M(\eta)(x^*) = 0$, if $\eta \neq \nu$, then $B$ proceeds exactly as in $Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3-II}$, while if $\eta = \nu$, then $B$ proceeds as follows:
  1. $B$ first selects PPRF keys $K_1^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_\lambda^{(\nu)}, K_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, K_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, K_{0}^{(\nu)}, K_{0}^{(\nu)}, K_{0}^{(\nu)} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{F}.Setup(1^\lambda)$.
2. Next, it generates \((P_{\text{ACC},v_0}^{(v)}, \text{STORE}_0^{(v)}, \text{STORE}_0^{(v)}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{ACC.Setup}(\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} = 2^\lambda)\) and \((P_{\text{TR},v_0}^{(v)}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{ITR.Setup}(\lambda, n_{\text{TR}} = 2^\lambda)\).

3. Then, \(B\) creates the punctured PPRF key \(K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(v)}((h^*, 0)) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{F}. \text{Puncture}(K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(v)}((h^*, 0))\).

4. After that, \(B\) sends \(m_0^{(v)} = (v_0^{(v)}, \ell_0^{(v)}, w_0^{(v)}, 0)\) as the challenge message to its SPS \(V_{\text{SPS-ONE}}\) indistinguishability challenger \(C\) and receives back a signature-verification key pair \((\sigma_{\text{SPS-ONE}}, m_0^{(v)}, \nu_{k})\), where \(\nu_{k}\) is either a normal verification key \(\nu_{k}\) or a one verification key \(\nu_{k}\) for the message \(m_0^{(v)}\).

5. \(B\) gives \(A\) the signing key

\[
\text{SK}_{\text{AB}}[M^{(v)}] = \begin{cases} (HK, PP_{\text{ACC},v_0}^{(v)}, \text{STORE}_0^{(v)}, PP_{\text{TR},v_0}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(v)}((h^*, 0)), \sigma_{\text{SPS-ONE}}, m_0^{(v)}, \nu_{k}) \\
\text{TO}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog}^{(1)}[\nu_0^{(v)}, v_0^{(v)}, v_0^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(v)}((h^*, 0))], \sigma_{\text{SPS-ONE}}, m_0^{(v)}, \nu_{k}) \\
\text{TO}(\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(2,1)}[n_{\text{SB-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, HK, PP_{\text{ACC},v_0}^{(v)}, PP_{\text{TR},v_0}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(v)}((h^*, 0)), \sigma_{\text{SPS-ONE}}, m_0^{(v)}, \nu_{k}) \\
\text{TO}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(2)}[K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(v)}(\nu_{k}, K_{\text{SPS,F}}^{(v)}((h^*, 0)), \nu_{k}, \ell^*], \sigma_{\text{ABS}}) \\
\text{TO}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog}^{(1)}[A^{(v)}, T = 2^\lambda, t^{(v)}, PP_{\text{ACC},v_0}^{(v)}, PP_{\text{TR},v_0}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPS,F}}^{(v)}(\nu_{k}, \ell^*], \nu_{k}, \ell^*) \\
\end{cases}
\]

- For \(\theta \in [\frac{q_{\text{GNN}}}{2}]\), in reply to the \(\theta\)-th signature query of \(A\) on message \(\text{msg}^{(\theta)} \in M_{\text{ABS}}\) under attribute string \(x^\theta\), \(B\) computes \(\sigma_{\text{ABS}}^{(\theta)} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{SIG.Sign}(\text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}, \text{msg}^{(\theta)})\) and provides \(A\) with \(\sigma_{\text{ABS}}^{(\theta)} \in [\nu_{k}, \sigma_{\text{ABS}}(\nu_{k}, \text{msg}^{(\theta)})]\).

- Finally, \(A\) outputs a signature \(\sigma_{\text{ABS}}^{(\theta)}\) on some message \(\text{msg}^{(\theta)}\) under attribute string \(x^\theta\). \(B\) outputs \(\nu_{k}\) as its guess bit in its \(\nu_{k}\) \(V_{\text{SPS-ONE}}\) indistinguishability experiment if \(A\) wins, i.e., if \(A.B.\text{Verify}(\text{PP}_{\text{ABS},x^\theta}, \ell^*], \sigma_{\text{ABS}}^{(\theta)}, \nu_{k}, \ell^*) = 1\) and \(\sigma_{\text{ABS}}^{(\theta)} = \text{msg}^{(\theta)}\) for any \(\theta \in [\frac{q_{\text{GNN}}}{2}]\). Otherwise, \(B\) outputs \(0\) in its \(\nu_{k}\) \(V_{\text{SPS-ONE}}\) indistinguishability experiment.

Notice that if \(\nu_{k} = \nu_{k}\), then \(B\) perfectly simulates \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu_{k}-1,3,IV}\). On the other hand, if \(\nu_{k} = \nu_{k}\), then \(B\) perfectly simulates \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu_{k}-1,3,IV}\). This completes the proof of Claim B.11. \(\Box\)

Claim B.12. Assuming \(\text{TO}\) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \(P/poly\), for any PPT adversary \(A\), for any security parameter \(\lambda\), \(|\text{Adv}_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu_{k}-1,3,IV)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu_{k}-1,3,IV)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)\) for some negligible function \(\text{negl}\).

Proof. The difference between \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu_{k}-1,3,IV}\) and \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu_{k}-1,3,IV}\) is the following: In \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu_{k}-1,3,IV}\), \(B\) includes the program \(\text{TO}(P_0)\) within the \(\nu_{k}\)-th signing key returned to \(A\), while in \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu_{k}-1,3,IV}\), \(B\) includes the program \(\text{TO}(P_1)\) instead, where

\[
- P_0 = \text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(2,1)}[n_{\text{SB-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, HK, PP_{\text{ACC},v_0}^{(v)}, PP_{\text{TR},v_0}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(v)}((h^*, 0)), K_{\text{SPS,F}}^{(v)}, \nu_{k}] \\
- P_1 = \text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(2,2)}[n_{\text{SB-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, HK, PP_{\text{ACC},v_0}^{(v)}, PP_{\text{TR},v_0}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(v)}((h^*, 0)), K_{\text{SPS,F}}^{(v)}, \nu_{k}] \\
\]

(Fig. B.9, B.10).

Observe that the only inputs for which the programs \(P_0\) and \(P_1\) can possibly differ are those corresponding to \((h, i) = (h^*, 0)\). However, the verification key hardwired in both the programs is \(V_{\text{SPS-ONE},G}\) which only accepts signature for \(m_{\text{Sig}} = m_{\text{Sig}}^{(v)}\) by the correctness [Properties (i), (iii) and (v)]. This ensures that for inputs corresponding to \((h^*, 0)\), if \(m_{\text{Sig}} = m_{\text{Sig}}^{(v)}\) both the programs output an ‘E’ type signature, else, both outputs ⊥. Thus, \(P_0\) and \(P_1\) are functionally equivalent.

Therefore, by the security of \(\text{TO}\), Claim B.12 follows. \(\Box\)

Claim B.13. Assuming SPS is a splittable signature scheme satisfying ‘\(V_{\text{SPS-ONE}}\) indistinguishability’, for any PPT adversary \(A\), for any security parameter \(\lambda\), \(|\text{Adv}_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu_{k}-1,3,IV)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu_{k}-1,3,IV)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)\) for some negligible function \(\text{negl}\).

Proof. The proof of Claim B.13 is similar to that of Claim B.11 with some readily identifiable modifications. \(\Box\)

Claim B.14. Assuming \(F\) is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, for any PPT adversary \(A\), for any security parameter \(\lambda\), \(|\text{Adv}_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu_{k}-1,3,IV)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu_{k}-1,3,IV)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)\) for some negligible function \(\text{negl}\).
Proof. The proof of Claim \[B.14\] is analogous to that of Claim \[B.10\] with some appropriate changes that are easy to find out. 

\[B.15\]  
Assuming \(IO\) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \(P/poly\) and \(F\) satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary \(A\), for any security parameter \(\lambda\), 
\[|\text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu\rightarrow 1,3八年)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu\rightarrow 1,3八年)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)\] 
for some negligible function \(\text{negl}\).

Proof. The proof of Claim \[B.15\] is analogous to that of Claim \[B.9\]. 

\[B.5\]  
Assuming \(IO\) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \(P/poly\), \(SSB\) is a somewhere statistically binding hash function, \(ACC\) is a positional accumulator satisfying ‘indistinguishability of write setup’ and ‘write enforcing’ properties, as well as ITR is a secure cryptographic iterator, for any PPT adversary \(A\), for any security parameter \(\lambda\), 
\[|\text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu\rightarrow 1,3八年)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu\rightarrow 1,3八年)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)\] 
for some negligible function \(\text{negl}\).

Proof. To prove Lemma \[B.5\] we introduce the following sequence of intermediate hybrid experiments between \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu\rightarrow 1,3八年}\) and \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu\rightarrow 1,3八年'}\):

Sequence of Intermediate Hybrids between \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu\rightarrow 1,3八年}\) and \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu\rightarrow 1,3八年'}\)

\(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu\rightarrow 1,3八年,0}^{\text{1}}\): This experiment coincides with \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu\rightarrow 1,3八年}^{\text{0}}\).

\(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu\rightarrow 1,3八年,1}^{\text{1}}\): In this experiment the challenger \(B\) forms the SSB hash key \(HK \leftarrow SSB.\text{Gen}(1^\lambda, n_{SSB-BLK} = 2^\lambda, i^* = t)\). The rest of the experiment proceeds in an analogous fashion to \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu\rightarrow 1,3八年,0}^{\text{1}}\).

\(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu\rightarrow 1,3八年,2}^{\text{2}}\): In this experiment, to answer the \(\nu\)th signing key query of \(A\) corresponding to TM \(M^{(\nu)} \in M_\lambda\) with \(M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0\), \(B\) proceeds as follows:

1. It first generates all the PPRF keys and the public parameters for the iterator just as in \(\text{hyb}_{0,\nu\rightarrow 1,3八年,1}^{\text{1}}\).
2. Next, it forms \((\text{PPR}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}(\nu), \text{w}_{0\nu}^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_{\nu}^{(\nu)}(\nu)) \leftarrow \text{ACC.Setup-Enforce-Write}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, ((x_0^*, 0), \ldots, (x_t^*, t)))\).
3. After that, it sets \(m_{i,0}^{(\nu)} = (v_0^{(\nu)}, q_0^{(\nu)}, w_0^{(\nu)}, 0)\). For \(j = 1, \ldots, t\), it iteratively computes the following:
   - \(\text{AUX}^{(\nu)}_j = \text{ACC.Prep-Write}(\text{PPR}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, j - 1)\)
   - \(w_j^{(\nu)} = \text{ACC.Update}(\text{PPR}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, v_j^{(\nu)}, j - 1, j, \text{AUX}^{(\nu)}_j)\)
   - \(\text{STORE}_j^{(\nu)} = \text{ACC.Write-Store}(\text{PPR}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, v_j^{(\nu)}, j - 1, j, x_j^* - 1)\)
   - \(v_j^{(\nu)} = \text{ITR}.\text{Iterate}(\text{PPR}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, v_j^{(\nu)}, q_j^{(\nu)}, w_j^{(\nu)}, 0)\)
   It sets \(m_{i,0}^{(\nu)} = (v_t^{(\nu)}, q_t^{(\nu)}, w_t^{(\nu)}, 0)\).
4. \(B\) gives \(A\) the signing key:

   \[
   \text{SK}_A^{\nu} = M^{(\nu)} = \begin{pmatrix} HK, \text{PPR}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{w}_{0\nu}^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, \text{K}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \\
   \text{IO}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog}(\nu_0^{(\nu)}, w_0^{(\nu)}, v_0^{(\nu)}, K_{SSP}^{(\nu)})), \\
   \text{IO}(\text{Accumulate.Prog}(3.3) n_{SSB-BLK} = 2^\lambda, HK, \text{PPR}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{PPR}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{K}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{K}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, m_{i,0}^{(\nu)}, h^*, \ell^*) \\
   \text{IO}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog}(3.3) \{K_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, h^*, \ell^*)\}) \\
   \text{IO}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog}_{\text{ACC}}(1.7) M^{(\nu)}(T, \ell^*) \neq 2^\lambda, \text{PPR}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{PPR}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, h^*, \ell^*) \end{pmatrix}
   \]

The rest of the experiment is similar to \(\text{hyb}_{0,\nu\rightarrow 1,3八年,1}^{\text{2}}\). 

\(\text{hyb}_{0,\nu\rightarrow 1,3八年,3}^{\text{3}}\): In this experiment, in response to the \(\nu\)th signing key query of \(A\) corresponding to TM \(M^{(\nu)} \in M_\lambda\) with \(M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0\), \(B\) proceeds as follows:

1. It first generates all the PPRF keys as well as the public parameters for the positional accumulator and the iterator as in \(\text{hyb}_{0,\nu\rightarrow 1,3八年,2}^{\text{2}}\).
2. Next, it sets \(m_{i,0}^{(\nu)} = (v_0^{(\nu)}, q_0^{(\nu)}, w_0^{(\nu)}, 0)\). For \(j = 1, \ldots, t + 1\), it iteratively computes the following:
   - \(\text{AUX}^{(\nu)}_j = \text{ACC.Prep-Write}(\text{PPR}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, j - 1)\)
The rest of the experiment is analogous to Hyb\textsuperscript{0,0}−1,3,1,2.

**Hyb\textsuperscript{0,0}−1,3,4,4**: This experiment is identical to Hyb\textsuperscript{0,0}−1,3,4,3 with the only exception that while construct-

\textbf{Constants}: Maximum number of blocks for SSB hash \( n_{\text{ssb-blk}} \) = 2\(^k\), SSB hash key \( \mathsf{hk} \), Public parameters for positional accumulator \( \mathcal{PP}_\text{acc} \), Public parameters for iterator \( \mathcal{PP}_\text{itr} \), PPRF keys \( \mathcal{K}_{\text{pp}}, \mathcal{K}_{\text{pp}} \), Messages \( m_i, m_i + 1, \ldots \), SSB hash value of challenge input \( h^* \), Length of challenge input \( \ell^* \).

**Inputs**: Index \( i \), Symbol \( y_i \), TM state \( \mathcal{S}_\text{state} \), Accumulator value \( w_{\text{acc}} \), Auxiliary value \( \text{aux} \), Iterator value \( w_{\text{itr}} \), Signature \( \sigma_{\text{ssb}}, \) SSB hash value \( w_{\text{ssb}} \), Output value \( \text{out} \).

**Output**: (Accumulator value \( w_{\text{acc}} \), Iterator value \( w_{\text{itr}} \), Signature \( \sigma_{\text{ssb-out}} \)) or ⊥

1. (a) \( \text{Compute } w_0, E = F(K_{\text{acc}}, k_i, (h, i)); (w_0, E, y_i, \mathcal{V}_y, \mathcal{V}_{\text{ssb-rej}}) = \text{SPS.Setup}(\lambda^1; w_0, E) \).

   (b) \( \text{Compute } t_0, \mathcal{E} = F(K_{\text{acc}}, k_i, (h, i)); (\mathcal{E}, w_0, E, \mathcal{V}_{\text{ssb-rej}}) = \text{SPS.Setup}(\lambda^1; t_0, \mathcal{E}) \).

2. (a) If \( \text{SSB.Verify}(\mathcal{V}_y, \mathcal{V}_{\text{ssb-rej}}, \sigma_{\text{ssb}}, \mathcal{V}_{\text{ssb-out}}) = 1 \), set \( \alpha = E^* \).

   (b) If \( \alpha = E^* \), output ⊥.

3. (a) \( \text{Compute } w_1 = \text{ACC.Update}(\mathcal{PP}_{\text{acc}}, w_0, \mathcal{V}_y, \mathcal{V}_{\text{ssb-rej}}, i, \text{AUX}) \), If \( \text{w}_{\text{ssb}} = \perp \), output ⊥.

4. (a) \( \text{Compute } t_1, \mathcal{E} = F(K_{\text{acc}}, k_i, (h, i + 1)); (\mathcal{E}, w_1, E, \mathcal{V}_{\text{ssb-rej}}) = \text{SPS.Setup}(\lambda^1; t_1, \mathcal{E}) \).

5. (a) Set \( m_0 = (\text{w}_{\text{acc}}, \text{w}_{\text{itr}}, \text{w}_0) \).

6. \( \text{If } \left( h, i \right) \in \left( m_0 \right) \cup \left( m_{\text{acc}} = m_{i+1,0} \right) \), compute \( \sigma_{\text{ssb-out}} = \text{SPS.Sign}(\mathcal{V}_{\text{ssb-rej}}, m_0) \).

   \( \text{Else if } \left( h, i \right) \notin \left( \ell^* \right) \), compute \( \sigma_{\text{ssb-out}} = \text{SPS.Sign}(\mathcal{V}_{\text{ssb-rej}}, m_0) \).

   \( \text{Else, compute } \sigma_{\text{ssb-out}} = \text{SPS.Sign}(\mathcal{V}_{\text{ssb-rej}}, m_0) \).

\textbf{Fig. B.11. Accumulate.Prog}\textsuperscript{(3,1)}

\( \mathcal{B} \) generates \( \langle \mathcal{PP}_{\text{acc}}^{(\nu)}, \mathcal{V}^{(\nu)}, \mathcal{V}_{\text{ssb-rej}}^{(\nu)}, i \rangle \) \( \triangleq \) ACC.Setup(\( \lambda^1 \), \( n_{\text{ssb-blk}} = 2^\lambda \)).

\( \mathcal{Hyb}_{0,\nu−1,3,4,5} \): This experiment is identical to Hyb\textsuperscript{0,0}−1,3,4,4 with the only exception that \( \mathcal{B} \) generates \( \mathsf{hk} \) \( \triangleq \) SSB.Gen(\( \lambda^1 \), \( n_{\text{ssb-blk}} = 2^\lambda \), \( i^* = 0 \)).

\( \mathcal{Hyb}_{0,\nu−1,3,4,6} \): In this experiment, in response to the \( \nu \)-th signing key query of \( \mathcal{A} \) corresponding to TM \( M^{(\nu)}(\nu, M^{(\nu)}(x^*)) = 0 \), \( \mathcal{B} \) proceeds as follows:

1. It first generates all the PPRF keys as well as the public parameters for the positional accumulator as in in Hyb\textsuperscript{0,0}−1,3,4,5.
2. For \( j = 1, \ldots, i + 1 \), it iteratively computes the following:

   \[ \text{AUX}_j^{(\nu)} = \text{ACC.Prep.Write}(\mathcal{PP}_{\text{acc}}^{(\nu)}, \mathcal{V}^{(\nu)}, \mathcal{V}_{\text{ssb-rej}}^{(\nu)}, j, 0) \]
− $w_j^{(v)} = \text{ACC.Update}(p_{i,j}^{(v)}, w_{j-1}^{(v)}, x_{j-1}, j = 1, \text{AUX}_j^{(v)})$
− $\text{STORE}_j^{(v)} = \text{ACC.Write-Store}(p_{i,j}^{(v)}, \text{STORE}_j^{(v)}, j = 1, x_{j-1}^{(v)})$

3. Then, it generates $(p_{i,j}^{(v)}, v_j^{(v)}) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ITR.Setup-Enforce}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ITR}} = 2^\lambda, ((q_0^{(v)}, 0), \ldots, (q_{n_{\text{ITR}}}^{(v)}, 0)))$

4. After that, for $j = 1, \ldots, t + 1$, it iteratively computes $v_j^{(v)} = \text{ITR.Iterate}(p_{i,j}^{(v)}, q_j^{(v)}, 0)$

5. It sets $m_j^{(v)} = (v_j^{(v)}, q_j^{(v)}, 0)$ and $m_{j+1,0}^{(v)} = (v_{j+1}^{(v)}, q_{j+1}^{(v)}, 0)$

6. It gives $A$ the signing key

$$\text{SK}_A^{\text{ABS}}(M^{(v)}) = \left(\text{HK}, p_{i,j}^{(v)}, w_{j-1}^{(v)}, \text{STORE}_{j-1}^{(v)}, p_{i,j}^{(v)}, v_j^{(v)}, K_{\text{ACC}, E}^{(v)}\right)$$
$$\text{IO}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog}[q_0^{(v)}, w_0^{(v)}, v_0^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPI, E}}^{(v)})$$
$$\text{IO}(\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(3,1)}[\text{SBS-BLK} = 2^\lambda, \text{HK}, p_{i,j}^{(v)}, \text{PP}_{\text{ITR}}, K_{\text{SPI, E}}, K_{\text{SPI, F}}, m_j^{(v)}, m_{j+1,0}^{(v)}, h^*, \ell^*])$$
$$\text{IO}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(3,1)}[K_{\text{SPI, A}}, K_{\text{SPI, B}}, K_{\text{SPI, E}}, K_{\text{SPI, F}}, h^*, \ell^*])$$
$$\text{IO}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog}^{(1)}[M^{(v)}, T = 2^\lambda, \ell^*(v), \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PP}_{\text{ITR}}, K, K_1^{(v)}, \ldots, K_8^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPI, A}}, K_{\text{SPI, B}}])$$

The rest of the experiment is analogous to $\text{Hyb}_{0,v-1,3,1,5}$. The program $\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(3,1)}$ is depicted in Fig. 3A.8 The rest of the experiment is similar to $\text{Hyb}_{0,v-1,3,1,6}$. $\text{Hyb}_{0,v-1,3,1,7}$: In this experiment, to answer the $\nu$th signing key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(v)} \in M_\lambda$ with $M^{(v)}(x^*) = 0$, $B$ generates everything as in $\text{Hyb}_{0,v-1,3,1,6}$; however, it hands $A$ the signing key

$$\text{SK}_A^{\text{ABS}}(M^{(v)}) = \left(\text{HK}, p_{i,j}^{(v)}, w_{j-1}^{(v)}, \text{STORE}_{j-1}^{(v)}, p_{i,j}^{(v)}, v_j^{(v)}\right)$$
$$\text{IO}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog}[q_0^{(v)}, w_0^{(v)}, v_0^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPI, E}}^{(v)})$$
$$\text{IO}(\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(3,1)}[\text{SBS-BLK} = 2^\lambda, \text{HK}, p_{i,j}^{(v)}, \text{PP}_{\text{ITR}}, K_{\text{SPI, E}}, K_{\text{SPI, F}}, m_j^{(v)}, m_{j+1,0}^{(v)}, h^*, \ell^*])$$
$$\text{IO}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(3,1)}[K_{\text{SPI, A}}, K_{\text{SPI, B}}, K_{\text{SPI, E}}, K_{\text{SPI, F}}, h^*, \ell^*])$$
$$\text{IO}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog}^{(1)}[M^{(v)}, T = 2^\lambda, \ell^*(v), \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PP}_{\text{ITR}}, K, K_1^{(v)}, \ldots, K_8^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPI, A}}, K_{\text{SPI, B}}])$$

where the program $\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(3,1)}$ is depicted in Fig. 3A.8 The rest of the experiment is similar to $\text{Hyb}_{0,v-1,3,1,6}$. $\text{Hyb}_{0,v-1,3,1,8}$: This experiment is analogous to $\text{hyb}_{0,v-1,3,1,7}$ with the only exception that while constructing the $\nu$th signing key queried by $A$, $B$ generates $(p_{i,j}^{(v)}, v_j^{(v)}) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ITR.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ITR}} = 2^\lambda)$. Notice that this experiment coincides with $\text{Hyb}_{0,v-1,3,1,7}$. Analysis

Let $\text{Adv}_A^{(0,v-1,3,1,\theta)}(\lambda)$ represents the advantage of the adversary $A$, i.e., the absolute difference between $1/2$ and $A$’s probability of correctly guessing the random bit selected by the challenger $B$, in $\text{Hyb}_{0,v-1,3,1,\theta}$, for $\theta \in [0, 8]$. From the description of the hybrid experiments it follows that $\text{Adv}_A^{(0,v-1,3,1)}(\lambda) = \text{Adv}_A^{(0,v-1,3,1,0)}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_A^{(0,v-1,3,1,\theta)}(\lambda)$ for $\theta \in [0, 8]$. Hence, we have

$$|\text{Adv}_A^{(0,v-1,3,1)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_A^{(0,v-1,3,1,\theta)}(\lambda)| \leq \sum_{\theta=1}^{8} |\text{Adv}_A^{(0,v-1,3,1,\theta-1)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_A^{(0,v-1,3,1,\theta)}(\lambda)|.$$
• B initializes \( A \) on input \( 1^\lambda \) and receives a challenge signing attribute string \( x^* = x_0^* \ldots x_{\nu - 1}^* \in U_{\text{ABS}} \) with \( |x^*| = \ell^* \) from \( A \).

• Upon receiving \( x^* \), \( B \) proceeds as follows:
  1. \( B \) submits \( n_{\text{SSB-BLK}} = 2^\lambda \) and the pair of indices \((i_0^* = 0, i_1^* = i)\) to its SSB index hiding challenger \( C \) and receives back a hash key \( HK \), where either \( HK \leftarrow \text{SSB.Gen}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{SSB-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, i_0^* = 0) \) or \( HK \leftarrow \text{SSB.Gen}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{SSB-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, i_1^* = i) \).
  2. Next, \( B \) computes \( h^* = H_{\text{BK}}(x^*) \).

  Then, \( B \) selects a PPRF key \( K \leftarrow F.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \).

  After that, \( B \) computes \( r_{\text{SIG}}^* = F(K, (h^*, \ell^*)) \) followed by \( (\overline{SK}_{\text{SIG}}, \overline{VK}_{\text{SIG}}) = \text{SIG.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_{\text{SIG}}^*) \).

  5. \( B \) returns the public parameters \( \text{PP}_{\text{ABS}} = (HK, IO(\text{Verify.Prog}_{\text{ABS}}[K])) \) to \( A \).

  For \( \eta \in [\tilde{\eta}]_{\text{SIG}} \), in response to the \( \eta \)th signing key query of \( A \) corresponding to TM \( M^{(\eta)}(x^*) = 0 \), \( B \) proceeds exactly as in \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3, t, 0} \).

  For \( \theta \in [\tilde{\eta}]_{\text{SIG}} \), in reply to the \( \theta \)th signature key query of \( A \) on message \( \text{msg}^{(\theta)} \in U_{\text{ABS}} \), \( B \) computes \( \sigma^{(\theta)}_{\text{SIG}} \leftarrow \text{SIG.Sign}(\overline{SK}_{\text{SIG}}, \text{msg}^{(\theta)}) \) and provides \( A \) with \( \sigma^{(\theta)}_{\text{ABS}} = (\overline{VK}_{\text{SIG}}, \sigma^{(\eta)}_{\text{SIG}}) \).

  Finally, \( A \) output a signature \( \sigma^{(\eta)}_{\text{ABS}} \) on some message \( \text{msg}^{*} \) under attribute string \( x^* \). \( B \) outputs \( b' = 1 \) as its guess bit in its SSB index hiding experiment if \( A \) wins, i.e., if \( \text{ABS.Verify}(\text{PP}_{\text{ABS}}, x^*, \text{msg}^{*}, \sigma^{(\eta)}_{\text{ABS}}) = 1 \) and \( \text{msg}^{*} \neq \text{msg}^{(\theta)} \) for any \( \theta \in [\tilde{\eta}]_{\text{SIG}} \). Otherwise, \( B \) outputs \( b' = 0 \) in its SSB index experiment.

Note that if \( HK \leftarrow \text{SSB.Gen}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{SSB-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, i_0^* = 0) \), then \( B \) perfectly simulates \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3, t, 0}. \) On the other hand, if \( HK \leftarrow \text{SSB.Gen}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{SSB-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, i_1^* = i) \), then \( B \) perfectly simulates \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3, t, 1}. \) This completes the proof of Claim B.16.

**Claim B.17.** Assuming \( \text{ACC} \) is a positional accumulator satisfying the ‘indistinguishability of write setup’ property, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}^{(0,\nu-1,3, t, 1)}_A(\lambda) − \text{Adv}^{(0,\nu-1,3, t, 2)}_A(\lambda)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \text{neg}.

**Proof.** Suppose there exists a PPT adversary \( A \) for which \( |\text{Adv}^{(0,\nu-1,3, t, 1)}_A(\lambda) − \text{Adv}^{(0,\nu-1,3, t, 2)}_A(\lambda)| \) is non-negligible. We construct a PPT adversary \( B \) that breaks the indistinguishability of write setup property of the positional accumulator \( \text{ACC} \) using \( A \) as a sub-routine. The description of \( B \) follows:

• \( B \) initializes \( A \) on input \( 1^\lambda \) and receives a challenge signing attribute string \( x^* = x_0^* \ldots x_{\nu - 1}^* \in U_{\text{PPR}} \) with \( |x^*| = \ell^* \) from \( A \).

• Upon receiving \( x^* \), \( B \) proceeds as follows:
  1. \( B \) first generates \( HK \leftarrow \text{SSB.Gen}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{SSB-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, i_0^* = i) \) and computes \( h^* = H_{\text{BK}}(x^*) \).
  2. Then, \( B \) selects a PPRF key \( K \leftarrow F.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \).
  3. After that, \( B \) computes \( r_{\text{SIG}}^* = F(K, (h^*, \ell^*)) \) followed by \( (\overline{SK}_{\text{SIG}}, \overline{VK}_{\text{SIG}}) = \text{SIG.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_{\text{SIG}}^*) \).
  4. \( B \) returns the public parameters \( \text{PP}_{\text{ABS}} = (HK, IO(\text{Verify.Prog}_{\text{ABS}}[K])) \) to \( A \).

• For \( \eta \in [\tilde{\eta}]_{\text{SIG}} \), in response to the \( \eta \)th signing key query of \( A \) corresponding to TM \( M^{(\eta)}(x^*) = 0 \), if \( \eta \neq \nu \), then \( B \) proceeds exactly as in \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3, t, 1} \); while if \( \eta = \nu \), then \( B \) proceeds as follows:
  1. \( B \) first selects PPRF keys \( K_1^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, K_{\nu}^{(\nu)} \), \( K_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, K_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, K_{\nu}^{(\nu)}, K_{\nu}^{(\nu)} \) \( \leftarrow F.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \).
  2. After that, \( B \) sends \( n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} = 2^\lambda \) and the sequence of symbol-index pairs \((x_0^*, 0), \ldots, (x_{\nu - 1}^*, i)\) to its ACC write setup indistinguishability challenger \( C \) and receives back \( (\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{w}_{0,\nu-1,3, t, 0}, \text{STORE}_{0}) \), where either \( (\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{w}_{0,\nu-1,3, t, 0}, \text{STORE}_{0}) \) \( \leftarrow \text{ACC.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} = 2^\lambda) \) or \( (\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{w}_{0,\nu-1,3, t, 0}, \text{STORE}_{0}) \) \( \leftarrow \text{ACC.Setup-Enforce-Write}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, (x_0^*, 0), \ldots, (x_{\nu - 1}^*, i)) \).

  3. Next, \( B \) generates \( (\text{PP}_{\nu, t}, \text{w}_{0,\nu-1,3, t, 0}) \) \( \leftarrow \text{ITR.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\nu, t} = 2^\lambda) \).
  4. Then, it sets \( n_{0,\nu} = (w_{0,\nu}^*, q_{0,\nu}^*, w_{0,\nu}, 0) \). For \( j = 1, \ldots, \nu \), it iteratively computes the following.
    - \( \text{Aux}_j^{(\nu)} = \text{ACC.Write}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}_{j-1}, j-1, j) \).
    - \( \text{w}_j = \text{ACC.Update}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{w}_{j-1}, x_{j-1}^*, j-1, \text{Aux}_j^{(\nu)}) \).
    - \( \text{STORE}_{j} = \text{ACC.Write-Store}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}.\text{STORE}_{j-1}, j-1, x_{j-1}^*) \).
    - \( \text{v}_j^{(\nu)} = \text{ITR.Iterate}(\text{PP}_{\nu, t}, \text{v}_{j-1}^{(\nu)}, (w_{j,\nu}^*, 0)) \).

  It sets \( m_{0,\nu} = (w_{0,\nu}^*, q_{0,\nu}^*, \text{w}_{0,\nu}, 0) \).
5. It gives $A$ the signing key

$$s_{A_{\text{pub}}} [M^{(v)}] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0, \text{PP}_{\text{ITR}}^{(v)}, v_0^{(v)}, \\
\text{TO}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog})^{(v)} \left[ w_0^{(v)}, v_0^{(v)}, K_{\text{SBS-BLK}} \right], \\
\text{TO}(\text{Accumulate.Prog})^{(v)} \left[ n_{\text{SBS-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, \text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PP}_{\text{ITR}}, K_{\text{SBS}}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SBS-F}}^{(v)}, m_1^{(v)} \right], \\
\text{TO}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog})^{(v)} \left[ K_{\text{SPs-A}}, K_{\text{SPs-B}}, K_{\text{SBS}}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SBS-F}}^{(v)}, h^*, \ell^* \right], \\
\text{TO}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog})^{(v)} \left[ M^{(v)}, T = 2^\lambda, \ell^*(v), \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PP}_{\text{ITR}}, K_{\text{A}}, K_{\text{c}}^{(v)}, \ldots, K_{\lambda}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPs-A}}, K_{\text{SPs-B}} \right].
\end{array} \right.$$}

- For $\theta \in [\tilde{q}_{\text{BIGN}}]$, in reply to the $\theta$th signature query of $A$ on message $\text{msg}(\theta) \in M_{\text{BIGN}}$ under attribute string $x^*$, $B$ computes $\sigma_{\text{sg}}(\theta) \leftarrow \text{SIG.Sign}(\text{BIGN}, \text{msg}(\theta))$ and provides $A$ with $\sigma_{\text{BIGN}} = (\widetilde{\text{V}}_{\text{SBS}}, \sigma_{\text{sg}}(\theta))$.

- Finally, $A$ outputs a signature $\sigma_{\text{BIGN}}$ on some message $\text{msg}^*$ under attribute string $x^*$. $B$ outputs $\tilde{b}' = 1$ as its guess bit in its ACC write setup indistinguishability experiment if $A$ wins, i.e., if $\text{ABS.Verify}(\text{PP}_{\text{BIGN}}, x^*, \text{msg}^*, \sigma_{\text{BIGN}}) = 1$ and $\text{msg}^* \neq \text{msg}(\theta)$ for any $\theta \in [\tilde{q}_{\text{BIGN}}]$. Otherwise, $B$ outputs $\tilde{b}' = 0$ in its ACC write setup indistinguishability experiment.

Note that if $(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0) \not\xrightarrow{\$} \text{ACC.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} = 2^\lambda)$, then $B$ perfectly simulates $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3,2,1}$. On the other hand, if $(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0) \xrightarrow{\$} \text{ACC.Setup.Enforce-Write}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, (x_0^*, 0, \ldots, (x_n^*, i)))$, then $B$ perfectly simulates $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3,2,2}$. This completes the proof of Claim B.17.

**Claim B.18.** Assuming $\text{TO}$ is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for $P/\text{poly}$, SSB possesses the ‘somewhere statistically binding’ property, and $\text{ACC}$ is a positional accumulator having the ‘write enforcing’ property, for any PPT adversary $A$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,3,1,2)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,3,1,3)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function $\text{neg}$.

**Proof.** The difference between $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3,2,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3,2,1}$ is the following: In $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3,2,2}$, $B$ includes the program $\text{TO}(P_0)$ within the $\nu$th signing key provided to $A$, whereas, in $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3,2,1}$, $B$ includes the program $\text{TO}(P_1)$ instead, where

- $P_0 = \text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(3,0)} [n_{\text{SBS-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, \text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PP}_{\text{ITR}}, K_{\text{SBS}}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SBS-F}}^{(v)}, m_1^{(v)}]$ (Fig. A.6),
- $P_1 = \text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(3,1)} [n_{\text{SBS-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, \text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PP}_{\text{ITR}}, K_{\text{SBS}}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SBS-F}}^{(v)}, m_1^{(v)}, m_{1,i+1}^{(v)}]$ (Fig. B.11).

We will argue that the programs $P_0$ and $P_1$ are functionally equivalent, so that, by the security of $\text{TO}$, Claim B.18 follows. The inputs on which the outputs of the two programs can possibly differ are those corresponding to $(h, i) = (h^*, i)$. For inputs corresponding to $(h^*, i)$, the program $P_1$ performs the additional check ‘$m_{\text{out}} = m_{i+1}^{(v)}$’ to determine the type of the outputted signature. We show that this check is redundant by demonstrating that for inputs corresponding to $(h^*, i)$, if $m_{i} = m_{i}^{(v)}$, then either both the programs output $\bot$ or it must hold that $m_{\text{out}} = m_{i+1}^{(v)}$, and, therefore, both the programs output signatures of the same type. Notice that $m_{1} = m_{1}^{(v)}$ means $v_{1} = v_{1}^{(v)}, s_{T} = q_{0}^{(v)},$ and $w_{1} = w_{1}^{(v)}$. Thus, $v_{\text{out}} = \text{ITR}.\text{Iterate}(\text{PP}_{\text{ITR}}, v_{1}^{(v)}, (s_{T}, w_{1}^{(v)})) = \text{ITR}.\text{Iterate}(\text{PP}_{\text{ITR}}, v_{1}^{(v)}, (q_{1}^{(v)}, w_{1}^{(v)})) = v_{i+1}$. Now, recall that in both experiments $h \not\xrightarrow{\$} \text{SSB.Gen}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{SBS-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, i^* = i)$. Therefore, by the somewhere statistically binding property of SSB it follows that SSB.Verify$(\text{HK}, h^* = H_{\text{SSB}}(x^{*}), t, \text{SYM}_{\text{SSB}}, \text{SSID}) = 1$ if and only if $\text{SYM}_{\text{SN}} = x^{*}$. Thus, for inputs corresponding to $(h^*, i)$, both programs will output $\bot$ in case $\text{SYM}_{\text{SN}} \neq x^{*}$. Further, in both the experiments, $(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_{0}^{(v)}, \text{STORE}_{0}^{(v)}) \not\xrightarrow{\$} \text{ACC.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, ((x_{0}, 0, \ldots, (x_{n}, i))))$. Therefore, by the write enforcing property of ACC it follows that if $w_{1} = w_{1}^{(v)}$ and $\text{SYM}_{\text{SN}} = x^{*}$, then $w_{\text{out}} = \text{ACC.Update}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_{1}^{(v)}, \text{SYM}_{\text{SN}}, \text{SSID}, \text{aux})$ results in $w_{\text{out}} = w_{1}^{(v)}$ or $w_{\text{out}} = \bot$. In case $w_{1} = \bot$, then both the programs output $\bot$. On the other hand, $w_{1} = w_{1}^{(v)}$ implies $m_{\text{out}} = (v_{\text{out}}, s_{T}, w_{\text{out}}, 0) = (v_{i+1}^{(v)}, q_{0}^{(v)}, w_{i+1}^{(v)}) = m_{i+1}^{(v)}$ and the two programs have identical outputs in this case as well.

**Claim B.19.** Assuming ACC is a positional accumulator satisfying the ‘indistinguishability of write setup’ property, for any PPT adversary $A$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,3,1,3)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,3,1,4)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function $\text{neg}$.
Proof. The proof of Claim B.19 is similar to that of Claim B.17 with some appropriate modifications which can be readily figured out. □

Claim B.20. Assuming SSB satisfies the ‘index hiding’ property, for any PPT adversary A, for any security parameter λ, |Adv_A^{(0,υ−1,3,5)}(λ) − Adv_A^{(0,υ−1,3,6)}(λ)| ≤ negl(λ) for some negligible function negl.

Proof. The proof of Claim B.20 is analogous to that of Claim B.16 with certain approximate changes which are easy to determine. □

Claim B.21. Assuming ITR satisfies the ‘indistinguishability of enforcing setup’ property, for any PPT adversary A, for any security parameter λ, |Adv_A^{(0,υ−1,3,5)}(λ) − Adv_A^{(0,υ−1,3,6)}(λ)| ≤ negl(λ) for some negligible function negl.

Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A for which |Adv_A^{(0,υ−1,3,5)}(λ) − Adv_A^{(0,υ−1,3,6)}(λ)| is non-negligible. Below, we construct a PPT adversary B that breaks the indistinguishability of enforcing setup property of the iterator ITR using A as a sub-routine.

- B initializes A on input $1^λ$ and receives a challenge input $x^* = x_0^* \ldots x_{r−1}^* \in U_{Abs}$ with $|x^*| = ℓ^*$ from A.
- Upon receiving $x^*$, B proceeds as follows:
  1. B first generates $HK \leftarrow SSB.Gen(1^λ, n_{SSB−blk} = 2^λ, i^* = 0)$ and computes $h^* = H_{hk}(x^*)$.
  2. Then, B selects a PPRF key $K \leftarrow F.Setup(h^*)$.
  3. After that, B computes $r_{sig}^* = F(K, (h^*, ℓ^*))$ followed by $(\tilde{SK}_{SIG}^*, \tilde{VK}_{SIG}^*) = SIG.Setup(1^λ; r_{sig}^*)$.
  4. B returns the public parameters $PP_{Abs} = (HK, IOT(Verify.Prog_{Abs}[K]))$ to A.
- For $η \in [ν_{Key}]$, in response to the $η$th signing key query of A corresponding to TM $M(ν) ∈ Mathcal{M}_λ$ with $M(ν)(x^*) = 0$, if $η \neq ν$, then B proceeds exactly as in Hyb_{0,ν−1,3,5}, while if $η = ν$, then B proceeds as follows:
  1. B first selects PPRF keys $K_{1(ν)}$, $K_{2(ν)}$, $K_{3(ν)}$, $K_{4(ν)}$, $K_{5(ν)}$, $K_{6(ν)}$, $K_{7(ν)}$.
  2. Next, it generates $(PP_{Abs}^{(ν)}, w_0^{(ν)}, STORE_0^{(ν)}) \leftarrow ACC.Setup(1^λ, n_{ACC−blk} = 2^λ)$.
  3. For $j = 1, \ldots, t+1$, it iteratively computes the following:
     - $ AUX_j^{(ν)} = ACC.Prepare\text{-}Write(PP_{Abs}^{(ν)}, STORE_0^{(ν)}, j−1, j)$
     - $ w_j^{(ν)} = ACC.Update(PP_{Abs}^{(ν)}, w_{j−1}^{(ν)}, x_j^*, j−1, AUX_j^{(ν)})$
     - $ STORE_j^{(ν)} = ACC.Write\text{-}Store(PP_{Abs}^{(ν)}, STORE_0^{(ν)}, j−1, j−1, x_j^*)$
  4. Then, B sends $n_{ITR} = 2^λ$ along with the sequence of messages $((q_0^{(v)}, w_0^{(ν)}, 0), \ldots, (q_t^{(v)}, w_{t}^{(ν)}, 0))$ to its ITR enforcing setup indistinguishability challenger C and receives back $(PP_{ITR}, ν_0)$, where either $(PP_{ITR}, ν_0) \leftarrow ITR.Setup(1^λ, n_{ITR} = 2^λ)$ or $(PP_{ITR}, ν_0) \leftarrow ITR.Setup\text{-}Enforce(1^λ, n_{ITR} = 2^λ, (q_0^{(v)}, w_0^{(ν)}, 0), \ldots, (q_t^{(v)}, w_{t}^{(ν)}, 0)))$.
  5. For $j = 1, \ldots, t+1$, B iteratively computes $ν_j = ITR.Iterate(PP_{ITR}, ν_{j−1}, (q_j^{(v)}, w_j^{(ν)}), 0)$.
  6. It gives A the signing key $SK_{Abs}[M(ν)] = (HK, PP_{Abs}^{(ν)}, STORE_0^{(ν)}, PP_{ITR}, ν_0, IO(Init\text{-}SPS.Prog[q_0^{(ν)}, w_0^{(ν)}, ν_0, K_{Abs}^{(ν)}]), IO(\text{Accumulate}\text{-}\text{Prog}^{(ν)}), \nu_{Abs−blk} = 2^λ, HK, \nu_{Abs−blk}, \nu_{Abs−blk}, K_{Abs−E}, K_{Abs−F}, r_{Abs}, h^*, ℓ^*))$, $IO(\text{Change}\text{-}\text{SPS}\text{−}\text{Prog}^{(ν)}), \nu_{Abs−blk}, \nu_{Abs−blk}, K_{Abs−E}, K_{Abs−F}, h^*, ℓ^*))$, $IO(\text{Constrained}\text{−}\text{Key}\text{−}\text{Prog}^{(ν)}[M(ν), T = 2^λ, t(ν), PP_{Abs}^{(ν)}, PP_{ITR}, K, K_{Abs−A}, \ldots, K_{Abs−A}, K_{Abs−E}, h^*, ℓ^*)]$.
- For $θ \in [\tilde{ν}_{SIG}]$, in reply to the $θ$th signature query of A on message $msg(θ) ∈ Mathcal{M}_{Abs}$ under attribute string $x^*$, B computes $σ^θ_{Abs}(msg(θ))$ and provides A with $σ^θ_{Abs} = (\tilde{VK}_{SIG}^*, σ^θ_{SIG})$.
- Finally, A outputs a signature $σ^∗_{Abs}$ on some message $msg^∗$ under attribute string $x^*$. B outputs $\hat{b} = 1$ as its guess bit in its ITR enforcing setup indistinguishability experiment if A wins, i.e., if $\text{ABS.}Verify(PP_{Abs}, x^*, msg^∗, σ^∗_{Abs}) = 1$ and $msg^∗ \neq msg(θ)$ for any $θ ∈ [\tilde{ν}_{SIG}]$. Otherwise, B outputs $\hat{b} = 0$ in its ITR enforcing setup indistinguishability experiment.
Note that if \((pp_{ITR}, v_0) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{ITR.\text{Setup}}(1^\lambda, n_{ITR} = 2^\lambda)\), then \(B\) perfectly simulates \(\text{Hyb}_{b,0,\nu−1,3,\ell,5}\). On the other hand, if \((pp_{ITR}, t_0) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{ITR.\text{Setup-Enforce}}(1^\lambda, n_{ITR} = 2^\lambda, ((q_0^{(v)}, w_0^{(v)}, 0), \ldots, (q_0^{(v)}, w_{\nu}^{(v)}, 0)))\), then \(B\) perfectly simulates \(\text{Hyb}_{b,0,\nu−1,3,\ell,6}\). This completes the proof of Claim \(\text{B.21}\). \(\square\)

**Claim B.22.** Assuming \(\text{IO}\) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \(P/poly\) and ITR has the ‘enforcing setup’ property, for any PPT adversary \(A\), for any security parameter \(\lambda\), \(|\text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu−1,3,\ell,7)}(\lambda) − \text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu−1,3,\ell,6)}(\lambda)| ≤ \text{negl}(\lambda)\) for some negligible function negl.

**Proof.** The difference between \(\text{Hyb}_{b,0,\nu−1,3,\ell,6}\) and \(\text{Hyb}_{b,0,\nu−1,3,\ell,7}\) is the following: In \(\text{Hyb}_{b,0,\nu−1,3,\ell,6}\) \(B\) includes the program \(\text{IO}(P_0)\) within the \(\nu\)\(^{th}\) signing key provided to \(A\), whereas, in \(\text{Hyb}_{b,0,\nu−1,3,\ell,7}\) \(B\) includes the program \(\text{IO}(P_1)\) instead, where

\[
- P_0 = \text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(3,\ell,1)}[\text{msb-blk} = 2^\lambda, \text{HK}, \text{pp}_{\text{acc}}, \text{pp}_{\text{ITR}}, K^{(v)}_{\text{sss}}, E, K^{(v)}_{\text{sss}, E}, m^{(v)}_i, m^{(v)}_{i+1}, h^*, \ell^*] \quad (\text{Fig. B.11}),
- P_1 = \text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(3,\ell,1)}[\text{msb-blk} = 2^\lambda, \text{HK}, \text{pp}_{\text{acc}}, \text{pp}_{\text{ITR}}, K^{(v)}_{\text{sss}}, E, K^{(v)}_{\text{sss}, E}, m^{(v)}_i, m^{(v)}_{i+1}, h^*, \ell^*] \quad (\text{Fig. A.8}).
\]

We will argue that the programs \(P_0\) and \(P_1\) are functionally identical, so that, by the security of \(\text{IO} \text{Claim B.22}\) follows. The only inputs on which the outputs of the two programs can possibly differ are those corresponding to \((h, i) = (h^*, i)\). For inputs corresponding to \((h^*, i)\), the program \(P_0\) checks whether ‘\(m_{in} = m^{(v)}_i\)’ and ‘\(m_{out} = m^{(v)}_{i+1}\)’ to determine the type of the outputted signature, while the program \(P_1\) only checks whether ‘\(m_{out} = m^{(v)}_{i+1}\)’. Thus, the two programs will be functionally equivalent if we can show that for inputs corresponding to \((h^*, i)\), \(m_{out} = m^{(v)}_{i+1}\) implies \(m_{in} = m^{(v)}_i\). Recall that in both experiment \((\text{pp}_{\text{ITR}}^{(v)}, v_0) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{ITR.\text{Setup-Enforce}}(1^\lambda, n_{ITR} = 2^\lambda, ((q_0^{(v)}, w_0^{(v)}, 0), \ldots, (q_0^{(v)}, w_{\nu}^{(v)}, 0)))\) Now, \(m_{out} = m^{(v)}_{i+1}\) implies \(v_{out} = v_{\nu}^{(v)}\). Therefore, by the enforcing property of ITR it follows that \(v_{\nu} = v^{(v)}_{\nu}\) and \((\text{ST}, w_{\nu}) = (q_0^{(v)}, w_1^{(v)}, 0)\), which in turn implies that \(m_{in} = (v_{\nu}^{(v)}, w_0^{(v)}, 0) = m^{(v)}_{i+1}\).

**Claim B.23.** Assuming \(\text{ITR}\) satisfies the ‘indistinguishability of enforcing setup’ property, for any PPT adversary \(A\), for any security parameter \(\lambda\), \(|\text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu−1,3,\ell,7)}(\lambda) − \text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu−1,3,\ell,8)}(\lambda)| ≤ \text{negl}(\lambda)\) for some negligible function negl.

**Proof.** The proof of Claim \(\text{B.23}\) is analogous to that of Claim \(\text{B.21}\) with some appropriate modifications which are easy to determine. \(\square\)

**Lemma B.6.** Assuming \(\text{IO}\) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \(P/poly\), \(\mathcal{F}\) is a secure puncturable deterministic function, and SPS is a splittable signature function satisfying ‘\(\text{vSps-one indistinguishability}\)’, ‘\(\text{vKps-aro indistinguishability}\)’, as well as ‘splitting indistinguishability’, for any PPT adversary \(A\), for any security parameter \(\lambda\), \(|\text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu−1,3,\ell,7)}(\lambda) − \text{Adv}_A^{(0,\nu−1,3,\ell,1)}(\lambda)| ≤ \text{negl}(\lambda)\) for some negligible function negl.

**Proof.** In order to establish Lemma \(\text{B.6}\) we consider the following sequence of intermediate hybrid experiments between \(\text{Hyb}_{b,0,\nu−1,3,\ell,\tau}\) and \(\text{Hyb}_{b,0,\nu−1,3,\ell,\tau+1}\):

**Sequence of Intermediate Hybrids between \(\text{Hyb}_{b,0,\nu−1,3,\ell,\tau}\) and \(\text{Hyb}_{b,0,\nu−1,3,\ell,\tau+1}\)**

**Hyb\(_{b,0,\nu−1,3,\ell,\tau,0}\):** This experiment coincides with \(\text{Hyb}_{b,0,\nu−1,3,\ell,\tau}\).

**Hyb\(_{b,0,\nu−1,3,\ell,\tau,1}\):** This experiment is identical to \(\text{Hyb}_{b,0,\nu−1,3,\ell,0}\) except that in response to the \(\nu\)\(^{th}\) signing key query of \(A\) corresponding to \(\text{TM} M^{(\tau)} \in \mathcal{M}_3\) with \(M^{(\tau)}(x^*) = 0\), \(B\) executes the following steps:

1. It first generates all the PPRF keys as well as the public parameters for the positional accumulator and the iterator as in \(\text{Hyb}_{b,0,\nu−1,3,\ell,0}\).
2. Then, it creates the punctured PPRF keys \(K^{(v)}_{\text{sss}, E}((h^*, t+1)) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}(K^{(v)}_{\text{sss}, E}, (h^*, t+1))\) and \(K^{(v)}_{\text{sss}, F}((h^*, t+1)) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}(K^{(v)}_{\text{sss}, F}, (h^*, t+1))\).
3. After that, it computes $r_{SPS,G}^{(\nu+1)} = F(K_E^{(\nu)}(h^*, t + 1)), r_{SPS,H}^{(\nu+1)} = F(K_E^{(\nu)}(h^*, t + 1))$, and forms $(SK_{SPS,G}^{(\nu+1)}, VK_{SPS,G}^{(\nu+1)}, VK_{SPS-REJ,G}^{(\nu+1)}) = SPS.Setup(1^\lambda, r_{SPS,H}^{(\nu+1)}))$.

4. Next, it sets $m_0^{(\nu)} = (v_0^{(\nu)}, q_0^{(\nu)}, w_0^{(\nu)}, 0)$. For $j = 1, \ldots, t + 1$, it iteratively computes the following:

- $\text{AUX}_{j}^{(\nu)} = \text{ACC.Prepare-Write}(PP_{ACC}^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_{j-1}, j - 1)$
- $w_{j}^{(\nu)} = \text{ACC.Update}(PP_{ACC}^{(\nu)}, w_{j-1}^{(\nu)}, x_{j-1}^{*}, j - 1, \text{AUX}_{j}^{(\nu)})$
- $\text{STORE}_{j}^{(\nu)} = \text{ACC.Write-Store}(PP_{ACC}^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_{j-1}, j - 1, x_{j-1}^{*})$
- $v_{j}^{(\nu)} = \text{ITR.Iterate}(PP_{ITR}^{(\nu)}, v_{j-1}^{(\nu)}, (q_0^{(\nu)}, w_{j-1}^{(\nu)}, 0))$

It sets $m_{t+1}^{(\nu)} = (v_{t+1}^{(\nu)}, q_0^{(\nu)}, w_{t+1}^{(\nu)}, 0)$.

5. It gives $A$ the signing key

$$SK_{AB}(M^{(\nu)}) = \begin{cases} HK, PP_{ACC}^{(\nu)}, W_0^{(\nu)}, PP_{ITR}^{(\nu)}, V_0^{(\nu)}, \\ \text{IO}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog}(q_0^{(\nu)}, w_0^{(\nu)}, v_0^{(\nu)}, K_E^{(\nu)}(h^*, t + 1))), \\ \text{IO}(\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(j-1, j)}(\text{SPS-BLK}) = 2\lambda, HK, PP_{ACC}^{(\nu)}, PP_{ITR}^{(\nu)}, K_E^{(\nu)}(h^*, t + 1)), K_{SPS,E}^{(\nu)}(h^*, t + 1), \\ \text{IO}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(j-1, j)} \in \text{SPS-A}, K_{SPS,B}^{(\nu)}, K_{SPS,E}^{(\nu)}(h^*, t + 1)), K_{SPS,E}^{(\nu)}(h^*, t + 1), \\ \text{IO}(\text{Constrained-Key-Prog}^{(1)}_{AB}(M^{(\nu)}), T = 2\lambda, t^*, PP_{ACC}^{(\nu)}, PP_{ITR}^{(\nu)}, K_{SPS,A}^{(\nu)}, K_{SPS,B}^{(\nu)}). \\
\end{cases}$$

where the programs $\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(j-1, j)}$ and $\text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(j-1, j)}$ are the modifications of the programs $\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(j)}$ and $\text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(j)}$ (Figs. A.8 and A.7) and are shown in Figs. B.12 and B.13.

$Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3}^{(\nu)}$: This experiment is analogous to $Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3}^{(\nu)}$ with the only exception that while constructing the $\nu$th signing key queried by $A, B$ selects $r_{SPS,G}^{(\nu+1)}$, $r_{SPS,H}^{(\nu+1)} \leftarrow Y_{PRF}$, i.e., in other words, $B$ generates $(SK_{SPS,G}^{(\nu+1)}, VK_{SPS,G}^{(\nu+1)}, VK_{SPS-REJ,G}^{(\nu+1)}), (SK_{SPS,H}^{(\nu+1)}, VK_{SPS,H}^{(\nu+1)}, VK_{SPS-REJ,H}^{(\nu+1)}) \leftarrow SPS.Setup(1^\lambda)$.

$Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3}^{(\nu)}$: This experiment is identical to $Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3}^{(\nu)}$ except that in response to the $\nu$th signing key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(\nu)} \in M_\lambda$ with $M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0$, $B$ executes the following steps:

1. It first generates all the PPRF keys as well as the public parameters for the positional accumulator and the iterator as in $Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3}^{(\nu)}$.
2. Then, it creates the punctured PPRF keys $K_{E}^{(\nu)}(h^*, t + 1)) \leftarrow F.\text{Puncture}(K_{E}^{(\nu)}(h^*, t + 1))$ and $K_{SPS,E}^{(\nu)}(h^*, t + 1)) \leftarrow F.\text{Puncture}(K_{SPS,E}^{(\nu)}(h^*, t + 1))$.
3. After that it forms $(SK_{SPS,G}^{(\nu+1)}, VK_{SPS,G}^{(\nu+1)}, VK_{SPS-REJ,G}^{(\nu+1)}), (SK_{SPS,H}^{(\nu+1)}, VK_{SPS,H}^{(\nu+1)}, VK_{SPS-REJ,H}^{(\nu+1)}) \leftarrow SPS.Setup(1^\lambda)$.
4. Next, it computes $m_{t+1}^{(\nu)} = (u_{t+1}^{(\nu)}, q_0^{(\nu)}, w_{t+1}^{(\nu)}, 0)$ just as in $Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3}^{(\nu)}$.
5. After that, it creates $(\sigma_{SPS-ONE}^{(\nu+1)}, VK_{SPS-ONE,G}^{(\nu+1)}, SK_{SPS-ABO,G}^{(\nu+1)}, VK_{SPS-ABO,G}^{(\nu+1)}) \leftarrow SPS.Split(SK_{SPS,G}^{(\nu+1)}, m_{t+1}^{(\nu)})$

and $(\sigma_{SPS-ONE}^{(\nu+1)}, VK_{SPS-ONE,H}^{(\nu+1)}, SK_{SPS-ABO,H}^{(\nu+1)}, VK_{SPS-ABO,H}^{(\nu+1)}) \leftarrow SPS.Split(SK_{SPS,H}^{(\nu+1)}, m_{t+1}^{(\nu)})$. 

Constants: Maximum number of blocks for SSB hash \( n_{\text{SSB-MAC}} = 2^k \), SSB hash key \( \text{hik} \), Public parameters for positional accumulator \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{acc}} \), Public parameters for iterator \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{itr}} \), Punctured PPRF keys \( K_{\text{pp}}(\ell'(h^*,i+1)) \), \( K_{\text{pp}}(h^*,i+1) \), Signing keys \( h^* \), \( \text{v_k} \), Verification keys \( \text{v_k} \), \( \alpha \), \( \sigma \), \( \lambda \), \( \text{L} \), \( \text{h} \), \( \text{i} \), \( \text{w} \), Length of challenge input \( h^* \), Length of challenge input \( \ell' \)

Inputs: Index \( i \), Symbol \( s\lambda \), TM state \( s \), Accumulator value \( w_{\text{acc}} \), Auxiliary value \( \text{aux} \), Iterator value \( v_{\text{itr}} \), Signature \( \sigma_{\text{argv,itr}} \), SSB hash value \( h \), SSB opening value \( \tau_{\text{open}} \)

Output: (Accumulator value \( w_{\text{acc}} \), Iterator value \( v_{\text{itr}} \), Signature \( \sigma_{\text{argv,itr}} \), or \( \perp \))

1. (a) If \((h, i) \neq (h^*, i + 1)\), compute \( r_{\text{argv}, E} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{argv}, E}(\{h^*, i + 1\}, (h, i))) \)

(b) If \((h, i) \neq (h^*, i + 1)\), compute \( r_{\text{argv}, E} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{argv}, E}(\{h^*, i + 1\}, (h, i))) \)

(c) If \((h, i) \neq (h^*, i + 1)\), compute \( r_{\text{argv}, E} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{argv}, E}(\{h^*, i + 1\}, (h, i))) \)

(d) If \(s\lambda = \perp\), \( s\lambda = \perp\), \( s\lambda = \perp\), \( s\lambda = \perp\), \( s\lambda = \perp\)

2. If \(s\lambda = \perp\), \( s\lambda = \perp\), \( s\lambda = \perp\), \( s\lambda = \perp\), \( s\lambda = \perp\)

3. (a) Compute \( w_{\text{acc}} = \mathcal{A}_{\text{acc}}(\mathcal{P}_{\text{acc}}, w_{\text{acc}}, s\lambda, \text{aux}) \).

(b) Compute \( v_{\text{itr}} = \mathcal{I}_{\text{itr}}(\mathcal{P}_{\text{itr}}, v_{\text{itr}}, (h, i, 0)) \).

(c) If \((h, i) \neq (h^*, i)\), compute \( r_{\text{argv}, E} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{argv}, E}(\{h^*, i + 1\}, (h, i + 1))) \)

4. (a) If \((h, i) \neq (h^*, i)\), compute \( r_{\text{argv}, E} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{argv}, E}(\{h^*, i + 1\}, (h, i + 1))) \)

(b) If \((h, i) \neq (h^*, i)\), compute \( r_{\text{argv}, E} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{argv}, E}(\{h^*, i + 1\}, (h, i + 1))) \)

(c) If \((h, i) \neq (h^*, i)\), compute \( r_{\text{argv}, E} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{argv}, E}(\{h^*, i + 1\}, (h, i + 1))) \)

5. Output \((w_{\text{acc}}, v_{\text{itr}}, \sigma_{\text{argv,itr}})\).

\[ \text{Fig. B.12. Accumulate.Prog}^{(3, i', 1)} \]

Constants: PPRF keys \( K_{\text{pp}}(h^*, i + 1) \), \( K_{\text{pp}}(h^*, i + 1) \), Verification keys \( \text{v_k} \), \( \text{v_k} \), \( \text{v_k} \), \( \text{v_k} \), \( \text{v_k} \), SSB hash value of challenge input \( h^* \), Length of challenge input \( \ell' \)

Inputs: TM state \( s \), Accumulator value \( w_{\text{acc}} \), Iterator value \( v_{\text{itr}} \), SSB hash value \( h \), Length \( \ell_{\text{itr}} \), Signature \( \sigma_{\text{argv,itr}} \)

Output: Signature \( \sigma_{\text{argv,itr}} \), or \( \perp \)

1. (a) If \((h, \ell_{\text{itr}}) \neq (h^*, i + 1)\), compute \( r_{\text{argv}, E} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{argv}, E}(\{h^*, i + 1\}, (h, \ell_{\text{itr}}))) \)

(b) If \((h, \ell_{\text{itr}}) \neq (h^*, i + 1)\), compute \( r_{\text{argv}, E} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{argv}, E}(\{h^*, i + 1\}, (h, \ell_{\text{itr}}))) \)

(c) If \((h, \ell_{\text{itr}}) \neq (h^*, i + 1)\), compute \( r_{\text{argv}, E} = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{argv}, E}(\{h^*, i + 1\}, (h, \ell_{\text{itr}}))) \)

\[ \text{Fig. B.13. Change-SPS.Prog}^{(3, i', 1)} \]
6. It gives \( A \) the signing key

\[
\text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}(M^{(v)}) = \\
(HK, PP_{\text{ACC}}^{(v)}, w_0^{(v)}, \text{STORE}^{(v)}, PP_{\text{TR}}^{(v)}, t_0^{(v)}, \\
\text{IO}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog})^{(v)}, v_0^{(v)}, K^{(v)}, \sigma^{(v+1)}_{\text{SPS-ONE}, m_{1+1}^G}, G, S_{\text{ABS}}, \nu, T, \ell, t'), \\
\text{IO}(\text{Accumulate.Prog})^{(3,i',2)}[\text{SSB-BLK} = 2^\lambda, HK, PP_{\text{ACC}}^{(v)}, PP_{\text{TR}}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPS}, E}^{(v)}, \{h^i + 1\}, K_{\text{SPS}, F}^{(v), (h^i + 1)}, \nu^{(v+1)}, \sigma^{(v+1)}_{\text{SPS-ONE}, m_{1+1}^G}, G, S_{\text{ABS}}, \nu, T, \ell, t'), \\
\text{IO}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog})^{(3,i',1)}[K_{\text{SPS}, A}, K_{\text{SPS}, B}, K^{(v)}_{\text{SPS}, E}^{(v), (h^i + 1)}, K^{(v)}_{\text{SPS}, F}^{(v), (h^i + 1)}], V_{\nu^{(v+1)}, \sigma^{(v+1)}_{\text{SPS-ONE}, m_{1+1}^G}, G}, \\
\text{IO}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog})^{(1)}[\text{Abs}, T = 2^\lambda, t^*(v), PP_{\text{ACC}}, PP_{\text{TR}}, K, K_{1}^{(v)}, \ldots, K_{\lambda}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPS}, A}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPS}, B}^{(v)}] \\
h^i, \ell^i)
\]

where the program Accumulate.Prog\(^{3,i',2}\) is an alteration of the program Accumulate.Prog\(^{3,i',1}\) (Fig. B.12) and is shown in Fig. B.14.

**Fig. B.14. Accumulate.Prog\(^{3,i',2}\)**

**Hyb\(_{0,v-1,3,i',4}\):** In this experiment, in response to the \( v \)th signing key query of \( A \) corresponding to TM \( M^{(v)} \in \mathcal{M}_4 \) with \( M^{(v)}(x^v) = 0 \), \( B \) generates everything as in hyb\(_{0,v-1,3,i',3}\), however, it hands \( A \) the signing key

\[
\text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}(M^{(v)}) = \\
(HK, PP_{\text{ACC}}^{(v)}, w_0^{(v)}, \text{STORE}^{(v)}, PP_{\text{TR}}^{(v)}, t_0^{(v)}, \\
\text{IO}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog})^{(v)}, v_0^{(v)}, K^{(v)}, \sigma^{(v+1)}_{\text{SPS-ONE}, m_{1+1}^G}, G, S_{\text{ABS}}, \nu, T, \ell, t'), \\
\text{IO}(\text{Accumulate.Prog})^{(3,i',2)}[\text{SSB-BLK} = 2^\lambda, HK, PP_{\text{ACC}}^{(v)}, PP_{\text{TR}}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPS}, E}^{(v)}, \{h^i + 1\}, K_{\text{SPS}, F}^{(v), (h^i + 1)}, \nu^{(v+1)}, \sigma^{(v+1)}_{\text{SPS-ONE}, m_{1+1}^G}, G, S_{\text{ABS}}, \nu, T, \ell, t'), \\
\text{IO}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog})^{(3,i',1)}[K_{\text{SPS}, A}, K_{\text{SPS}, B}, K^{(v)}_{\text{SPS}, E}^{(v), (h^i + 1)}, K^{(v)}_{\text{SPS}, F}^{(v), (h^i + 1)}], V_{\nu^{(v+1)}, \sigma^{(v+1)}_{\text{SPS-ONE}, m_{1+1}^G}, G}, \\
\text{IO}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog})^{(1)}[\text{Abs}, T = 2^\lambda, t^*(v), PP_{\text{ACC}}, PP_{\text{TR}}, K, K_{1}^{(v)}, \ldots, K_{\lambda}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPS}, A}^{(v)}, K_{\text{SPS}, B}^{(v)}] \\
h^i, \ell^i)
\]
The rest of the experiment is analogous to $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3,\nu',5}$.

$\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3,\nu',5}$: In this experiment, in response to the $\nu$th signing key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(\nu)} \in M_\Lambda$ with $M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0$, $B$ forms all the components just as in $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3,\nu',4}$, however, it gives $A$ the signing key

\[
\text{SK}_{\text{ARS}} \{ M^{(\nu)} \} = \\
\text{I}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog})_{\nu-1,3,\nu',5}[g_0^{(\nu)}, w_0^{(\nu)}, v_0^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}(\nu,0)], \\
\text{I}(\text{Accumulate.Prog})_{\nu-1,3,\nu',5}[\text{BBBBB}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}(\nu,0)], \\
\text{I}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog})_{\nu-1,3,\nu',5}[\text{CCCCC}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}(\nu,0)], \\
\text{I}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog})_{\nu-1,3,\nu',5}[M^{(\nu)}, T = 2^\nu, \nu^*(\nu), PP_{\text{ACC}}, PP_{\text{TRI}}, K, K_1^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_{\Lambda}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,A}}, K_{\text{SPS,B}}, h^*, \xi^*]
\]

The rest of the experiment is analogous to $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3,\nu',4}$.

$\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3,\nu',6}$: In this experiment, to answer the $\nu$th signing key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(\nu)} \in M_\Lambda$ with $M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0$, $B$ creates all the components as in $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3,\nu',5}$, however, it returns the signing key

\[
\text{SK}_{\text{ARS}} \{ M^{(\nu)} \} = \\
\text{I}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog})_{\nu-1,3,\nu',6}[g_0^{(\nu)}, w_0^{(\nu)}, v_0^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}(\nu,0)], \\
\text{I}(\text{Accumulate.Prog})_{\nu-1,3,\nu',6}[\text{BBBBB}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}(\nu,0)], \\
\text{I}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog})_{\nu-1,3,\nu',6}[\text{CCCCC}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}(\nu,0)], \\
\text{I}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog})_{\nu-1,3,\nu',6}[M^{(\nu)}, T = 2^\nu, \nu^*(\nu), PP_{\text{ACC}}, PP_{\text{TRI}}, K, K_1^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_{\Lambda}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,A}}, K_{\text{SPS,B}}, h^*, \xi^*]
\]

to $A$, where the program $\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(3,\nu',3)}$ is a modification of the program $\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(3,\nu',2)}$ (Fig. B.14) and is depicted in Fig. B.15. The remaining part of the experiment is identical to $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3,\nu',5}$.

$\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3,\nu',7}$: In this experiment, to answer the $\nu$th signing key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(\nu)} \in M_\Lambda$ with $M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0$, $B$ generates all the components exactly as in $\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3,\nu',6}$ except that it does not generate $\{\nu,0\}$ ($\sigma_{\nu,0}^{(\nu)}$) and provides $A$ with the signing key

\[
\text{SK}_{\text{ARS}} \{ M^{(\nu)} \} = \\
\text{I}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog})_{\nu-1,3,\nu',7}[g_0^{(\nu)}, w_0^{(\nu)}, v_0^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}(\nu,0)], \\
\text{I}(\text{Accumulate.Prog})_{\nu-1,3,\nu',7}[\text{BBBBB}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}(\nu,0)], \\
\text{I}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog})_{\nu-1,3,\nu',7}[\text{CCCCC}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}(\nu,0)], \\
\text{I}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog})_{\nu-1,3,\nu',7}[M^{(\nu)}, T = 2^\nu, \nu^*(\nu), PP_{\text{ACC}}, PP_{\text{TRI}}, K, K_1^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_{\Lambda}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,A}}, K_{\text{SPS,B}}, h^*, \xi^*]
\]
**Fig. B.15. Accumulate.Prog(3,i',3)**

The rest of the experiment is the same as Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3,i',6}.

**Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3,i',8}:** In this experiment, in response to the $\nu^{th}$ signing key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(\nu)} \in M_{\lambda}$ with $M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0$, $B$ generates all the components as in hyb_{0,\nu-1,3,i',7}, however, it returns the signing key

$$SK_{ABS}(M^{(\nu)}) =$$

$$\begin{align*}
\text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}(M^{(\nu)}) & = \\
& = \left(\text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}^{(\nu)}, \text{PP}_{\text{TR}}, v^{(\nu)} \right), \\
& = \text{IO}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog}(\theta_{0}^{(\nu)}, \nu_{0}^{(\nu)}, \{K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(h^{*}, t + 1)}\})), \\
& = \text{IO}(\text{Accumulate.Prog}(3,i',4)(\text{ssb-blk} = 2^{l}, \text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PP}_{\text{TR}}, \{K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(h^{*}, t + 1)}\}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(h^{*}, t + 1)}), \\
& = \text{SK}_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(3,i',4)}(\{K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(h^{*}, t + 1)}\}, m_{\nu-1}^{(i',4)}), h^{*}, t^{*}), \\
& = \text{IO}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog}(3,i',4)(K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(h^{*}, t + 1)})), \\
& = \text{IO}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog}(3,i',4)(M^{(\nu)}) \rightarrow 2^{l}, t^{*}(\nu), \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PP}_{\text{TR}}, K_{\lambda}^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_{\lambda}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(h^{*}, t + 1)})), \\
& = \text{IO}(\text{Accumulate.Prog}(3,i',4)(M^{(\nu)}) \rightarrow 2^{l}, t^{*}(\nu), \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PP}_{\text{TR}}, K_{\lambda}^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_{\lambda}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(h^{*}, t + 1)})) \\
\end{align*}$$

to $A$, where the programs Accumulate.Prog(3,i',4) and Change-SPS.Prog(3,i',2) respectively are the modifications of the programs Accumulate.Prog(3,i',4) and Change-SPS.Prog(3,i',1) (Figs. B.15 and B.13) and are shown in Figs. B.16 and B.17. The rest of the experiment if identical to Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3,i',7}.

**Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3,i',9}:** This experiments analogous to hyb_{0,\nu-1,3,i',8} with the only exception that while constructing the $\nu^{th}$ signing key queried by $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(\nu)} \in M_{\lambda}$ with $M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0$, $B$ generates

$$SK_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(3,i',4)}(\{K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(h^{*}, t + 1)}\}, m_{\nu-1}^{(i',4)}), h^{*}, t^{*}) = \text{SK}_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(3,i',4)}(\{K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(h^{*}, t + 1)}\}, m_{\nu-1}^{(i',4)}), h^{*}, t^{*}) = \text{SK}_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(3,i',4)}(\{K_{\text{SPS,E}}^{(h^{*}, t + 1)}\}, m_{\nu-1}^{(i',4)}), h^{*}, t^{*})$$

**Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3,i',10}:** This experiment corresponds to hyb_{0,\nu-1,3,i',1}.

**Analysis**

Let $Adv_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,3,i',\lambda)}(\lambda)$ represents the advantage of the adversary $A$, i.e., the absolute difference between $1/2$ and $A$'s probability of correctly guessing the random bit selected by the challenger $B$, in Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3,i',\lambda},
for \( \theta \in [0, 10] \). From the description of the hybrid experiments it follows that \( \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, \theta)}(0) = \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, \theta)}(1) \). Hence, we have

\[
|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, \theta)}(0) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, \theta)}(1)| \leq 10 \sum_{\theta=1}^{10} |\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, \theta-1)}(1) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, \theta)}(0)|.
\]  

(B.6)

Claims B.24, B.33 below will show that the RHS of Eq. (B.6) is negligible and thus Lemma B.6 follows.

Claim B.24. Assuming \( IO \) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( P/poly \) and \( S \) satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \),

\[
|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 0)}(0) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 1)}(1)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda) \text{ for some negligible function negl}.
\]

Claim B.24. Assuming \( IO \) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( P/poly \) and \( S \) satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \),

\[
|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 0)}(0) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 1)}(1)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda) \text{ for some negligible function negl}.
\]

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\[
|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 0)}(0) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 1)}(1)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda) \text{ for some negligible function negl}.
\]

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\[
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\]

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\[
|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 0)}(0) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 1)}(1)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda) \text{ for some negligible function negl}.
\]

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\[
|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 0)}(0) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 1)}(1)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda) \text{ for some negligible function negl}.
\]

Claim B.24. Assuming \( IO \) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( P/poly \) and \( S \) satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \),

\[
|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 0)}(0) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 1)}(1)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda) \text{ for some negligible function negl}.
\]

Claim B.24. Assuming \( IO \) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( P/poly \) and \( S \) satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \),

\[
|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 0)}(0) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 1)}(1)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda) \text{ for some negligible function negl}.
\]

Claim B.24. Assuming \( IO \) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( P/poly \) and \( S \) satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \),

\[
|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 0)}(0) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 1)}(1)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda) \text{ for some negligible function negl}.
\]

Claim B.24. Assuming \( IO \) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( P/poly \) and \( S \) satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \),

\[
|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 0)}(0) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 1)}(1)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda) \text{ for some negligible function negl}.
\]

Claim B.24. Assuming \( IO \) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( P/poly \) and \( S \) satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \),

\[
|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 0)}(0) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 1)}(1)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda) \text{ for some negligible function negl}.
\]

Claim B.24. Assuming \( IO \) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( P/poly \) and \( S \) satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \),

\[
|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 0)}(0) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 1)}(1)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda) \text{ for some negligible function negl}.
\]

Claim B.24. Assuming \( IO \) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( P/poly \) and \( S \) satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \),

\[
|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 0)}(0) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 1)}(1)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda) \text{ for some negligible function negl}.
\]

Claim B.24. Assuming \( IO \) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( P/poly \) and \( S \) satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \),

\[
|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 0)}(0) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 1)}(1)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda) \text{ for some negligible function negl}.
\]

Claim B.24. Assuming \( IO \) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( P/poly \) and \( S \) satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \),

\[
|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 0)}(0) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0, \nu-1, 3, \ell, 1)}(1)| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda) \text{ for some negligible function negl}.
\]

for inputs corresponding to \((h, i) \neq (h^*, i)\) and \((h, i) \neq (h^*, i + 1)\). For inputs corresponding to \((h^*, i)\), the program \(P_2\) uses the hardwired signing keys which are exactly same as those computed by the program \(P_0\). The same is true for the hardwired verification keys used by \(P_1\) for inputs corresponding to \((h^*, i + 1)\). Thus, the programs \(P_0\) and \(P_1\) are functionally equivalent. A similar argument shows that the same is correct for programs \(P_2^*\) and \(P_1^*\). Therefore, by the security of \(\mathcal{I}O\), Claim B.24 follows. Of course, we need to consider a sequence of intermediate hybrid experiments to switch the programs one at a time.

Claim B.25. Assuming \(F\) is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, for any PPT adversary \(A\), for any security parameter \(\lambda\),

\[
|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,v-1,3',\ell)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,v-1,3',\ell,2)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad \text{for some negligible function negl.}
\]

Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary \(A\) for which \(|\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,v-1,3',\ell)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,v-1,3',\ell,2)}(\lambda)|\) is non-negligible. We construct a PPT adversary \(B\) that breaks the selective pseudorandomness of the PPF \(F\) using \(A\) as a sub-routine. The description of \(B\) is given below. We note that in the following we work in a model of selective pseudorandomness for PPF involving two independent punctured keys and two challenge values for a challenge input, one under each key. However, this model is clearly equivalent to the original single punctured key and single challenge value model described in Definition 2.2 through a hybrid argument.

- \(B\) initializes \(A\) on input \(1^\lambda\) and receives a challenge signing attribute string \(x^* = x_0^* \ldots x_{\ell-1}^* \in \mathcal{U}_{\text{ABS}}\) with \(|x^*| = \ell^*\) from \(A\).
- Upon receiving \(x^*\), \(B\) proceeds as follows:
  1. \(B\) first generates \(HK \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{SSB.Gen}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{SSB-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, i^* = 0)\) and computes \(h^* = \mathcal{H}(x^*)\).
  2. Then, \(B\) selects a PPF key \(K \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} F.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)\).
  3. After that, \(B\) computes \(s_{\text{SIG}}^* = F(K, (h^*, \ell^*))\) followed by \((\overset{\$}{\text{SSB}}_{\text{SIG}}^*, \overset{\$}{\text{VK}}_{\text{SIG}}^*) = \text{SIG.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_{\text{SIG}}^*)\).
  4. \(B\) returns the public parameters \(\text{PP}_{\text{ABS}} = (HK, \mathcal{I}O(\text{Verify.Prog}_{\text{ABS}}[K]))\) to \(A\).
- For \(\eta \in \mathcal{I}_{\text{REV}}\), in response to the \(\eta\)th signing key query of \(A\) corresponding to \(TM \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{M}_\lambda\) with \(M(\eta)(x^*) = 0\), if \(\eta \neq \nu\), then \(B\) proceeds exactly as in \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu-1,3',\ell+1}\), while if \(\eta = \nu\), then \(B\) proceeds as follows:
  1. \(B\) first selects PPF keys \(K_1^\nu, \ldots, K_\nu^\nu, K_{\text{SSP.A}}, K_{\text{SSP.B}} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} F.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)\).
  2. Next, it generates \((\overset{\$}{\text{PR}}^\nu_{\text{ACC}, j, \nu}, \overset{\$}{\text{STORE}}^\nu_{\text{ACS}, j, \nu}) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ACC.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} = 2^\lambda)\) and \((\overset{\$}{\text{PR}}^\nu_{\text{ITR}, 0, \nu}, \overset{\$}{\text{ST}}^\nu_{\text{ITR}, 0, \nu}) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ITR.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ITR}} = 2^\lambda)\).
  3. \(B\) sends \((h^*, \ell^*) + 1\) as the challenge input to its PPF selective pseudorandomness challenger \(C\) and receives back two punctured PPF keys \(K_1^* = \{h^*, \ell^* + 1\}\) and \(K_2^* = \{h^*, \ell^* + 1\}\) and two values \(r_1^*, r_2^* \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{PPF}}\), where either \(r_1^* = \mathcal{F}(K_1^*, (h^*, \ell^* + 1))\) or \(r_2^* = \mathcal{F}(K_2^*, (h^*, \ell^* + 1))\) or \(r_1^*, r_2^* \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{Y}_{\text{PPF}}\). \(B\) implicitly views the keys \(K_1^*\) and \(K_2^*\) as the keys \(K_{\text{SSP.E}}\) and \(K_{\text{SSP.B}}\) respectively.
  4. Next, \(B\) generates \((\overset{\$}{\text{SPS}}^\nu_{\text{SSP.G}}, \overset{\$}{\text{VK}}^\nu_{\text{SSP.G}}, \overset{\$}{\text{VK}}^\nu_{\text{SSP.REJ,G}}) = \text{SPS.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_1^*)\) and \((\overset{\$}{\text{SPS}}^\nu_{\text{SSP.H}}, \overset{\$}{\text{VK}}^\nu_{\text{SSP.H}}, \overset{\$}{\text{VK}}^\nu_{\text{SSP.REJ,H}}) = \text{SPS.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_2^*)\).
  5. After that, it sets \(m_{\nu, 0, 0}^\nu = (v_0^\nu, q_0^\nu, w_0^\nu, 0)\). For \(j = 1, \ldots, \ell + 1\), it iteratively computes the following:
    - \(\overset{\$}{\text{S}}^\nu_{\text{ACC}}(j, \nu) = \text{ACC.Prepare-W.r.t.}(\overset{\$}{\text{PP}}^\nu_{\text{ACC}}, \overset{\$}{\text{STORE}}^\nu_{\text{ACS}, j, \nu})\)
    - \(w_{\nu, j}^\nu = \text{ACC.Update}(\overset{\$}{\text{PP}}^\nu_{\text{ACC}}, w_{\nu, j-1}^\nu, x_{\nu, j-1}^\nu, j-1, \text{ACC}(\nu, \nu))\)
    - \(\overset{\$}{\text{STORE}}^\nu_{\text{ACS}, j, \nu} = \text{ACC.Write-Store}(\overset{\$}{\text{PP}}^\nu_{\text{ACC}}, \overset{\$}{\text{STORE}}^\nu_{\text{ACS}, j, \nu})\)
    - \(\overset{\$}{\text{C}}^\nu_{\text{ITR}}(j, \nu) = \text{ITR.Iterate}(\overset{\$}{\text{PP}}^\nu_{\text{ITR}}, \overset{\$}{\text{C}}^\nu_{\text{ITR}, j-1, \nu}, q_{\nu, j-1}^\nu, w_{\nu, j-1}^\nu\), 0)\)
  It sets \(m_{\nu, \nu, 0, 0}^\nu = (v_0^\nu, q_0^\nu, w_0^\nu, 1)\).

\(\square\)
6. It gives \( \mathcal{A} \) the signing key
\[
\text{SK}_{\text{abs}}(M^{(\nu)}) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\text{HK, pp}_{\text{abs}}, w_0^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_0^{(\nu)}, \text{pp}_{\text{ITR},0}^{(\nu)},
\mathcal{I} \text{O}(\text{Init-SPS-Prog}^{(0,\nu)} |_{\text{SSB-BLK}} = 2^{2\lambda}, \text{HK, pp}_{\text{acc}}^{(\nu)}, \text{pp}_{\text{ITR},0}^{(\nu)}, K_1^{(\nu)} \{ (h^*, \ell + 1) \}, K_2^{(\nu)} \{ (h^*, \ell + 1) \},
\mathcal{S}_{\text{SPS}, G}, \mathcal{S}_{\text{SPS}, H}, \mathcal{V}_{\text{SPS}, G}, \mathcal{V}_{\text{SPS}, H}, m_{i+1,0}, h^*, \ell^*),
\end{array} \right.
\]

For \( \theta \in \{0\}^{|\text{sgn}|} \), in reply to the \( \theta \)th signature query of \( \mathcal{A} \) on message \( \text{msg}^{(\theta)} \in \mathcal{M}_{\text{abs}} \) under attribute string \( x^* \), \( \mathcal{B} \) computes \( \sigma^{(\theta)}_{\text{abs}} \leftarrow \text{SIG.Sign}(\text{SK}_{\text{sgn}}, \text{msg}^{(\theta)}) \) and provides \( \mathcal{A} \) with \( \sigma^{(\theta)}_{\text{abs}} = (\mathcal{V}_{\text{K}_{\text{SGN}}}, \sigma^{(\theta)}_{\text{sig}}) \).

Finally, \( \mathcal{A} \) outputs a signature \( \sigma^{(\theta)}_{\text{sprf}} \) on some message \( \text{msg}^* \) under attribute string \( x^* \). \( \mathcal{B} \) outputs \( \hat{b} = 1 \) as its guess in its PPRF selective pseudorandomness experiment if \( \mathcal{A} \) wins, i.e., if \( \text{ABS.Verify}(\text{pp}_{\text{sprf}, x^*}, \text{msg}^*, \sigma^{(\theta)}_{\text{sprf}}) = 1 \) and \( \text{msg}^* \neq \text{msg}^{(\theta)} \) for any \( \theta \in \{0\}^{|\text{sgn}|} \). Otherwise, \( \mathcal{B} \) outputs \( \hat{b} = 0 \) in its PPRF selective pseudorandomness experiment.

Note that if \( r_1^* = \mathcal{F}(K_1^{(\nu)}, (h^*, \ell + 1)) \), \( r_2^* = \mathcal{F}(K_2^{(\nu)}, (h^*, \ell + 1)) \), then \( \mathcal{B} \) perfectly simulates \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu−1,3,\nu',1} \).

On the other hand, if \( r_1^* r_2^* \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}_{\text{PPRF}} \), the \( \mathcal{B} \) perfectly simulates \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu−1,3,\nu',2} \). This completes the proof of Claim B.25.

Claim B.26. Assuming \( \mathcal{I} \text{O} \) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( \mathcal{P/\text{poly}} \), for any PPT adversary \( \mathcal{A} \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu−1,3,\nu',2)}(\lambda) − \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu−1,3,\nu',3)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).

Proof. The only difference between \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu−1,3,\nu',2} \) and \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu−1,3,\nu',3} \) is the following: In \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu−1,3,\nu',2} \), \( \mathcal{B} \) includes the program \( \mathcal{I} \text{O}(P_0) \) within the \( \nu \)th signing key provided to \( \mathcal{A} \), while in \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu−1,3,\nu',3} \), it includes the program \( \mathcal{I} \text{O}(P_1) \) instead, where
\[
\begin{align*}
P_0 &= \text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(3,\nu−1,\nu',2)} \left[ \text{SSB-BLK} = 2^{2\lambda}, \text{HK, pp}_{\text{acc}}^{(\nu)}, \text{pp}_{\text{ITR},0}^{(\nu)}, K_1^{(\nu)}, K_2^{(\nu)} \{ (h^*, \ell + 1) \}, K_{\text{SPS,F}}^{(\nu)} \{ (h^*, \ell + 1) \},
\mathcal{S}_{\text{SPS}, G}, \mathcal{S}_{\text{SPS}, H}, \mathcal{V}_{\text{SPS}, G}, \mathcal{V}_{\text{SPS}, H}, m_{i+1,0}, h^*, \ell^* \right] \quad \text{(Fig. B.12)},

P_1 &= \text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(3,\nu−1,\nu',2)} \left[ \text{SSB-BLK} = 2^{2\lambda}, \text{HK, pp}_{\text{acc}}^{(\nu)}, \text{pp}_{\text{ITR},0}^{(\nu)}, K_1^{(\nu)}, K_2^{(\nu)} \{ (h^*, \ell + 1) \}, K_{\text{SPS,F}}^{(\nu)} \{ (h^*, \ell + 1) \},
\mathcal{S}_{\text{SPS}, \text{ONE,m}_{i+1,0}, G}, \mathcal{S}_{\text{SPS,ABS, H}}, \mathcal{V}_{\text{SPS}, G}, \mathcal{V}_{\text{SPS}, H}, m_{i+1,0}, h^*, \ell^* \right] \quad \text{(Fig. B.14)}.
\end{align*}
\]

Now, the only inputs on which the outputs of the two programs can possibly differ are those corresponding to \( (h, i) = (h^*, \ell) \). However, observe that for inputs corresponding to \( (h^*, \ell) \), if \( m_{\text{out}} = m_{i+1,0}^{(\nu')} \), then both programs clearly output the same signature, where \( P_0 \) computes the signature explicitly and \( P_1 \) has the signature hardwired into it. On the other hand, by the correctness [Property (ii)] of the splittable signature SPS defined in Definition 2.6, it follows that the programs \( P_0 \) and \( P_1 \) output same signatures even when \( m_{\text{out}} \neq m_{i+1,0}^{(\nu')} \) for inputs corresponding to \( (h^*, \ell) \). Hence, the two programs are functionally equivalent. Therefore, Claim B.27 follows by the security of \( \mathcal{I} \text{O} \).

Claim B.27. Assuming SPS is a splittable signature scheme satisfying ‘\text{VK}_{\text{SPS,ONE}} indistinguishability’, for any PPT adversary \( \mathcal{A} \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu−1,3,\nu',3)}(\lambda) − \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu−1,3,\nu',4)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).

Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) for which \( |\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu−1,3,\nu',3)}(\lambda) − \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu−1,3,\nu',4)}(\lambda)| \) is non-negligible. Below we construct a PPT adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) that breaks the \( \text{VK}_{\text{SPS,ONE}} \) indistinguishability of SPS using \( \mathcal{A} \) as a sub-routine.

- \( \mathcal{B} \) initializes \( \mathcal{A} \) on input \( 1^\lambda \) and receives a challenge signing attribute string \( x^* = x_0^* \ldots x_{\ell−1}^* \in \mathcal{U}_{\text{ABS}} \) with \( |x^*| = \ell^* \) from \( \mathcal{A} \).
- Upon receiving \( x^* \), \( \mathcal{B} \) proceeds as follows:
  1. \( \mathcal{B} \) first generates \( \text{HK} \leftarrow \text{SSB.Gen}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{SSB-BLK}} = 2^{2\lambda}, i^* = 0) \) and computes \( h^* = \mathcal{H}_{\text{HK}}(x^*) \).
2. Then, $B$ selects a PPRF key $K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(1^λ)$.
3. After that, $B$ computes $r_{vk}^* = \mathcal{F}(K(h^*, \ell^*))$ followed by $(\widetilde{SK_{\text{SIG}}}^*, \widetilde{VK_{\text{SIG}}}^*) = \text{SIG.\text{Setup}}(1^λ; r_{vk}^*)$.
4. $B$ returns the public parameters $\text{PPR}_{\text{ABS}} = (\text{HK}, \text{IO}(\text{Verify.\text{Prog}}_{\text{ABS}}[K]))$ to $A$.

- For $η \in \mathcal{H}_{\text{SIG}}$, in response to the $\eta$th signing key query of $A$ corresponding to $M(\nu) \in \mathbb{M}_x$ with $M(\nu)(x^*) = 0$, if $η \neq ν$, then $B$ proceeds exactly as in $\text{Hyb}_{0,ν−1,3,\ell',3}$. while if $η = ν$, then $B$ proceeds as follows:
  1. $B$ first selects PPRF keys $K_1^{(ν)}, \ldots, K_λ^{(ν)}, K_{\text{ACC},A}^{(ν)}, K_{\text{PPR},B}^{(ν)}, K_{\text{PPR},E}^{(ν)} ≡ \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(1^λ)$. 
  2. Next, it generates $(\text{pp}_{\text{ACC}}, w_0^{(ν)}, \text{storef}_{\text{ACC}}^{(ν)}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{ACC.\text{Setup}}(1^λ, n_{\text{ACC-BLK}} = 2^λ)$ and $(\text{pp}_{\text{TR}}, v_0^{(ν)}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{ITR.\text{Setup}}(1^λ, n_{\text{ITR}} = 2^λ)$.
  3. Then, $B$ creates the punctured PPRF keys $K_{\text{PPR},\text{E}}^{(ν)}(h^*, \ell + 1) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}(K_{\text{PPR},\text{E}}^{(ν)}(h^*, \ell + 1))$ and $K_{\text{PPR},\text{F}}^{(ν)}(h^*, \ell + 1) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}(K_{\text{PPR},\text{F}}^{(ν)}(h^*, \ell + 1))$.
  4. Next, it sets $m_0^{(ν)} = (v_0^{(ν)}, q_0^{(ν)}, w_0^{(ν)}, 0)$. For $j = 1, \ldots, \ell + 1$, iteratively computes the following:
    - $\text{AUX}_{\nu}^{(ν)} = \text{ACC.\text{Prep.\text{Write}}(\text{pp}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{storef}_{\text{ACC}}^{(ν)}, j − 1)$.
    - $w_j^{(ν)} = \text{ACC.\text{Update}}(\text{pp}_{\text{ACC}}, w_j^{(ν)}, x_j^{(ν)}, j − 1, \text{AUX}_{\nu}^{(ν)})$
    - $\text{store}_{\nu}^{(ν)} = \text{ACC.\text{Write.\text{Store}}(\text{pp}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{storef}_{\text{ACC}}^{(ν)}, j − 1, x_j^{(ν)}, j − 1)$.
    - $ϕ_j^{(ν)} = \text{ITR.\text{Iterate}}(\text{pp}_{\text{TR}}, v_j^{(ν)}, (q_0^{(ν)}, w_j^{(ν)}, 0))$
    - It sets $m_{j+1}^{(ν)} = (v_{j+1}^{(ν)}, q_{j+1}^{(ν)}, w_{j+1}^{(ν)}, 0)$.
5. After that, $B$ sends $m_{\ell+1}^{(ν)}$ as the challenge message to its SPS $\text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ONE}}$ indistinguishability challenger $C$ and receives back a signature-verification key pair $(\sigma_{\text{SPS-ONE},m_{\ell+1}^{(ν)},\nu}, \nu)$, where $\nu$ is either the normal verification key $\text{VK}_{\text{SPS}}$ or a one verification key $\text{VK}_{\text{SPS}}$ for the message $m_{\ell+1}^{(ν)}$.
6. $B$ generates $(\text{SK}_{\text{SPS-H}}^{(ν+1)}, \nu, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-H}}, \nu, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-H}−1}, \nu) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{SPS.\text{Setup}}(1^λ)$ and forms $(\sigma_{\text{SPS-ONE},m_{\nu+1}^{(ν)+1}}, \nu)$.
7. $B$ outputs $A$ the signing key

$$\text{SK}_{\text{ABS}}[M(ν)] = \begin{align*}
&\text{HK, PP}_{\text{ACC}}^{(ν)}, \text{storef}_{\text{ACC}}^{(ν)}, \text{pp}_{\text{TR}}^{(ν)}, v_0^{(ν)}, \\
&\text{IO}(\text{Init.\text{SPP.\text{Prog}}}[q_0^{(ν)}, w_0^{(ν)}, 0]) \text{SPP.\text{E}}[(h^*, \ell + 1)]], \\
&\text{IO}(\text{Accumulate.\text{Prog}}[3λ, λ, 2][\nu_{\text{SPP-BLK}} = 2^λ, \text{HK}, \text{pp}_{\text{ACC}}^{(ν)}, \text{pp}_{\text{TR}}^{(ν)}, \nu]) \text{SPP.\text{F}}[(h^*, \ell + 1), K_{\text{SPS}, \text{F}}^{(ν)}[(h^*, \ell + 1)]], \\
&\text{IO}(\text{Change-\text{SPP.\text{Prog}}}[3λ, λ, 2][K_{\text{SPS}, A}^{(ν)}, K_{\text{PPR}, B}^{(ν)}], K_{\text{SPS}, E}^{(ν)}[(h^*, \ell + 1)], K_{\text{SPS}, F}^{(ν)}[(h^*, \ell + 1)], \nu]) \\
&\text{IO}(\text{Constrained-\text{Key.\text{Prog}}}[\nu_{\text{SPP}}^{(ν)}], T = 2^λ, t^{(ν)}, \text{pp}_{\text{ACC}}^{(ν)}, \text{pp}_{\text{TR}}^{(ν)}, K_{\text{SPS}, A}^{(ν)}, \ldots, K_{\text{PPR}, B}^{(ν)}], K_{\text{SPS}, F}^{(ν)}[(h^*, \ell + 1)])
\end{align*}$$

- For $θ \in \mathcal{H}_{\text{SIG}}$, in reply to the $θ$th signature query of $A$ on message $\text{msg}_{\text{SIG}}^{(ν)} \in \mathcal{M}_{\text{SIG}}$ under attribute string $x^*$, $B$ computes $σ_{\text{SIG}}^{(ν)} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{SIG.\text{Sign}}(\text{SK}_{\text{SIG}}^{(ν)}, \text{msg}_{\text{SIG}}^{(ν)})$ and provides $A$ with $σ_{\text{ABS}}^{(ν)} = (\text{SK}_{\text{SIG}}^{(ν)}, σ_{\text{SIG}}^{(ν)})$.
- Finally, $A$ outputs a signature $σ_{\text{ABS}}^{(ν)}$ on some message $\text{msg}^*$ under attribute string $x^*$. $B$ outputs $b' = 1$ as its guess bit in its $\text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ONE}}$ indistinguishability experiment if $A$ wins, i.e., if $A$.BS.\text{Verify}(\text{pp}_{\text{ABS}}, x^*, \text{msg}^*, σ_{\text{ABS}}^{(ν)}) = 1$ and $\text{msg}^* \neq \text{msg}_{\text{SIG}}^{(ν)}$ for any $θ \in \mathcal{H}_{\text{SIG}}$. Otherwise, $B$ outputs $b' = 0$ in its $\text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ONE}}$ indistinguishability experiment.

Notice that if $\nu = \text{VK}_{\text{SPS}}$, then $B$ perfectly simulates $\text{Hyb}_{0,ν−1,3,\ell',3}$. On the other hand, if $\nu = \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ONE}}$, then $B$ perfectly simulates $\text{Hyb}_{0,ν−1,3,\ell',4}$. This completes the proof of Claim B.27.
• \( B \) initializes \( \mathcal{A} \) on input \( 1^\lambda \) and receives a challenge signing attribute string \( x^* = x^*_0, \ldots, x^*_{t-1} \in \mathcal{X}_{\text{PRF}} \) with \( |x^*| = t' \) from \( \mathcal{A} \).

• Upon receiving \( x^* \), \( B \) proceeds as follows:

1. \( B \) first generates \( HK \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{SSB.Gen}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ssb-blk}} = 2^\lambda, i^* = 0) \) and computes \( h^* = H_{HK}(x^*) \).

2. Then, \( B \) selects a PPRF key \( K \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \).

3. After that, \( B \) computes \( r^*_\text{SIG} = \mathcal{F}(\langle K^*, h^* \rangle) \) followed by \( (\overline{SK^*_{\text{SIG}}}, \overline{VK^*_{\text{SIG}}}) = \text{SIG.Setup}(1^\lambda; r^*_\text{SIG}) \).

4. \( B \) returns the public parameters \( PP_{\text{ARS}} = (HK, IO(\text{Verify.Prog}_{\text{ARS}}[K])) \) to \( \mathcal{A} \).

• For \( \eta \in [\frac{1}{\text{negl}}) \), in response to the \( \eta \text{th} \) signing key query of \( \mathcal{A} \) corresponding to TM \( M^{(\eta)}(\nu) = 0 \), if \( \eta \neq \nu \), then \( B \) proceeds exactly as in \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu−1,3',c',4} \) while if \( \eta = \nu \), then \( B \) proceeds as follows:

1. \( B \) first selects PPRF keys \( K^{(\nu)}_1, \ldots, K^{(\nu)}_\lambda, P^{(\nu)}_{\text{PPS},A}, P^{(\nu)}_{\text{PPS},B}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{PPS},E}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{PPS},F} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \).

2. Next, it generates \( (pp^{(\nu)}_{\text{ACC}}, w^{(\nu)}_0, \text{store}^{(\nu)}_0) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ACC.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{acc-blk}} = 2^\lambda) \) and \( (pp^{(\nu)}_{\text{ITR}}, v^{(\nu)}_0) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ITR.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{itr}} = 2^\nu) \).

3. Then, \( B \) creates the punctured PPRF keys \( K^{(\nu)}_{\text{PPS},E}(h^*, t + 1) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}(K^{(\nu)}_{\text{PPS},E}(h^*, t + 1)) \) and \( K^{(\nu)}_{\text{PPS},F}(h^*, t + 1) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}(K^{(\nu)}_{\text{PPS},F}(h^*, t + 1)) \).

4. Next, it sets \( m^{(\nu)}_0 = (v^{(\nu)}_0, w^{(\nu)}_0, 0) \). For \( j = 1, \ldots, t \), it iteratively computes the following:

- \( \text{AUX}^{(\nu)}_j = \text{ACC}.\text{Prep-Write}(pp^{(\nu)}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{store}^{(\nu)}_{j-1}, j - 1) \)

- \( W^{(\nu)}_j = \text{ACC}.\text{Update}(pp^{(\nu)}_{\text{ACC}}, w^{(\nu)}_{j-1}, x^*_j, j - 1, \text{AUX}^{(\nu)}_j) \)

- \( \text{STORE}^{(\nu)}_j = \text{ACC}.\text{Write-Store}(pp^{(\nu)}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{store}^{(\nu)}_{j-1}, j - 1, x^*_j) \)

- \( \text{itr}^{(\nu)}_{j-1} = \text{ITR}.\text{Iterate}(pp^{(\nu)}_{\text{ITR}}, v^{(\nu)}_j - 1, (0, 0, 0, 1)) \)

It sets \( m^{(\nu)}_{t+1} = (v^{(\nu)}_t, w^{(\nu)}_t, 0) \).

5. After that, \( B \) sends \( m^{(\nu)}_{t+1} \) as the challenge message to its SPS \( \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}} \) indistinguishability challenger \( \mathcal{C} \) and receives back an all-but-one signing key-verification key pair \( (\text{SK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}, \text{VK}) \), where \( \text{VK} \) is either a normal verification key \( \text{VK}_{\text{SPS}} \) or an all-but-one verification key \( \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}} \).

6. Next, \( B \) generates \( (\text{SK}_{\text{SPS},G}^{(\nu,\nu + 1)}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS},G}^{(\nu,\nu + 1)}) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{SPS.Setup}(1^\lambda) \) and forms \( \text{SPS.Split}(\text{SK}_{\text{SPS},G}^{(\nu,\nu + 1)}, \text{m}_{\nu + 1,0}) \).

7. \( B \) gives \( \mathcal{A} \) the signing key \( \text{SK}_{\text{ARS}} \).

\[ \text{SK}_{\text{ARS}}(M^{(\nu)}) = \begin{pmatrix} HK, PP^{(\nu)}_{\text{ACC}}, W^{(\nu)}_0, \text{store}^{(\nu)}_0, PP^{(\nu)}_{\text{ITR}}, K^{(\nu)}_0, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{PPS},E}(h^*, t + 1)), \\ IO(\text{Init-SPS.Prog}[g^{(\nu)}_0, w^{(\nu)}_0, v^{(\nu)}_0]), \\ IO(\text{Accumulate.Prog}[\text{SSB.blk} = 2^\lambda, HK, PP^{(\nu)}_{\text{ACC}}, PP^{(\nu)}_{\text{ITR}}, K^{(\nu)}_0, \text{K}_{\text{PPS},E}(h^*, t + 1)), \\ IO(\text{Accumulate.Prog}[\text{SSB.blk} = 2^\lambda, HK, PP^{(\nu)}_{\text{ACC}}, PP^{(\nu)}_{\text{ITR}}, K^{(\nu)}_0, \text{K}_{\text{PPS},E}(h^*, t + 1)), \\ IO(\text{Change-SPS.Prog}[\text{SSB.blk} = 2^\lambda, HK, PP^{(\nu)}_{\text{ACC}}, PP^{(\nu)}_{\text{ITR}}, K^{(\nu)}_0, \text{K}_{\text{PPS},E}(h^*, t + 1)), \\ IO(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog}[\text{SSB.blk} = 2^\lambda, HK, PP^{(\nu)}_{\text{ACC}}, PP^{(\nu)}_{\text{ITR}}, K^{(\nu)}_0, \text{K}_{\text{PPS},E}(h^*, t + 1)), \\ \end{pmatrix} \]

For \( \theta \in [\frac{1}{\text{negl}}) \), in reply to the \( \theta \text{th} \) signature query of \( \mathcal{A} \) on message \( \text{msg}^{(\theta)} \in M_{\text{ARS}} \) under attribute string \( x^* \), \( B \) computes \( \sigma^{(\theta)}_{\text{SIG}} = \text{SIG.Sign}(\text{SK}_{\text{SIG}}, \text{msg}^{(\theta)}) \) and provides \( \mathcal{A} \) with \( \sigma^{(\theta)}_{\text{ARS}} = (\text{VK}^*, \sigma^{(\theta)}_{\text{SIG}}) \).

Finally, \( \mathcal{A} \) outputs a signature \( \sigma^{*}_{\text{ARS}} \) on some message \( \text{msg}^* \) under attribute string \( x^* \). \( B \) outputs \( b' = 1 \) as its guess bit in its \( \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}} \) indistinguishability experiment if \( \mathcal{A} \) wins, i.e., if \( \text{ABS.Verify}(\text{PP}_{\text{ARS}}, x^*, \text{msg}^*, \sigma^{*}_{\text{ARS}}) = 1 \) and \( \text{msg}^* \neq \text{msg}^{(\theta)} \) for any \( \theta \in [\frac{1}{\text{negl}}) \). Otherwise, \( B \) outputs \( b' = 0 \) in its \( \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}} \) indistinguishability experiment.

Notice that if \( \text{VK} = \text{VK}_{\text{SPS}} \), then \( B \) perfectly simulates \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu−1,3',c',4} \). On the other hand, if \( \text{VK} = \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}} \), then \( B \) perfectly simulates \( \text{Hyb}_{0,\nu−1,3',c',5} \). This completes the proof of Claim B.28.

\textbf{Claim B.29.} Assuming \( IO \) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( P/\text{poly} \), for any PPT adversary \( \mathcal{A} \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu−1,3',5)}(\lambda) − \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0,\nu−1,3',6)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).
Proof. The only difference between $Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3',6}$ and $Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3',5}$ is the following: In $Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3',5}$, $B$ includes the program $IO(P_1)$ within the $\nu$th signing key returned to $A$, while in $Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3',6}$, it includes the program $IO(P_1)$ instead, where

$$\begin{align*}
P_0 &= \text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(3',2)}_{\text{SPS-BLK}}[\nu, 2^\lambda, HK, PP_{\text{ACC}}, PP_{\text{ITR}}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS},E}, \{\{h^*, \ell + 1\}, \{h^*, \ell + 1\}, \{\nu, \ell\}], \sigma^{(\nu,1+1)}_{\text{SPS-ONE},m^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}, m^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}, h^{*}, \ell} \} \quad \text{[Fig. B.14]}.
\end{align*}$$

$$\begin{align*}
P_1 &= \text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(3',3)}_{\text{SPS-BLK}}[\nu, 2^\lambda, HK, PP_{\text{ACC}}, PP_{\text{ITR}}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS},E}, \{\{h^*, \ell + 1\}, \{h^*, \ell + 1\}, \{\nu, \ell\}], \sigma^{(\nu,1+1)}_{\text{SPS-ONE},m^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}, m^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}, h^{*}, \ell} \} \quad \text{[Fig. B.15]}.
\end{align*}$$

We will argue that the programs $P_0$ and $P_1$ are functionally equivalent, so that, by the security of $IO$ Claim B.29 holds. First of all observe that the constants hardwired in both the programs are identically generated. Clearly, the inputs on which the outputs of the programs $P_0$ and $P_1$ can possibly differ are those corresponding to $(h, i) = (h^*, \ell + 1)$. For inputs corresponding to $(h^*, \ell + 1)$, let us consider the following two cases:

(I) $(m_{\text{sig}} = m_{\nu+1,0})$: In this case, using the correctness of $\text{Properties [i]}$, [iii] and [vi] of the splittable signature $\text{SPS}$ described in Definition 2.6, it follows that both programs either $\alpha = \nu^*$ or $\alpha = \nu^*$. Now, if $\alpha = \nu^*$, then both programs output $\perp$. On the other hand, if $\alpha = \nu^*$, then $P_0$ outputs the signature $\sigma_{\text{SPS-OUT}} = \text{SPS.Sign}(sk_{\text{SPS},0}, m_{\text{OUT}}) = \text{SPS.Sign}(sk_{\text{SPS},E}, m_{\text{OUT}})$, which is the same signature that $P_1$ is programmed to output in this case. Thus, both programs have identical outputs in this case.

(II) $(m_{\text{sig}} \neq m_{\nu+1,0})$: In this case, we use the correctness of the SPS in Definition 2.6 to conclude that $\alpha \neq \nu^*$ and correctness of $\text{Properties [i]}$ and [iv] of SPS confirms that either $\alpha = \nu^*$ or $\alpha = \nu^*$. Now, if $\alpha = \nu^*$, then both programs output $\perp$ as earlier. Otherwise, if $\alpha = \nu^*$, then $P_0$ outputs $\sigma_{\text{SPS-OUT}} = \text{SPS.Sign}(sk_{\text{SPS},0}, m_{\text{OUT}}) = \text{SPS.Sign}(sk_{\text{SPS},E}, m_{\text{OUT}})$, which $P_1$ is programmed to output in this case. Therefore, both programs are functionally equivalent in this case as well.

\[\square\]

Claim B.30. Assuming SPS is a splittable signature scheme satisfying ‘splitting indistinguishability’, for any PPT adversary $A$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|\text{Adv}^{|A|^{(0,\nu-1,3',6)}_{\text{ACC}}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{|A|^{(0,\nu-1,3',7)}_{\text{ACC}}}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary $A$ for which $|\text{Adv}^{|A|^{(0,\nu-1,3',6)}_{\text{ACC}}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{|A|^{(0,\nu-1,3',7)}_{\text{ACC}}}(\lambda)|$ is non-negligible. Below we construct a PPT adversary $B$ that breaks the splitting indistinguishability of SPS using $A$ as a sub-routine.

- $B$ initializes $A$ on input $1^\lambda$ and receives a challenge signing attribute string $x^* = x_0^* \ldots x_0^* \ldots x_0^* \in \mathcal{X}_{\text{CPFR}}$ with $|x^*| = \ell^*$ from $A$.
- Upon receiving $x^*$, $B$ proceeds as follows:
  1. $B$ first generates HK $\overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{SSB.Gen}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{SB-BLK}} = 2^\lambda, i^* = 0)$ and computes $h^* = \text{Hk}(x^*)$.
  2. Then, $B$ selects a PPRF key $K \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$.
  3. After that, $B$ computes $r_{\text{SIG}} = \mathcal{F}(K, (h^*, \ell^*))$ followed by $(\text{SK}^*_{\text{SIG}}, \text{VK}^*_{\text{SIG}}) = \text{SIG.Setup}(1^\lambda, r_{\text{SIG}})$.
  4. $B$ returns the public parameters $\text{PP}_{\text{ABS}} = (\text{HK}, \text{IO}(\text{Verify.Prog}_{\text{ABS}}[K]))$ to $A$.
- For $\eta \in \{\text{PRF}\}$, in response to the $\eta$th signing key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(\eta)} \in \mathcal{M}_\lambda$ with $M^{(\eta)}(x^*) = 0$, if $\eta \neq \nu$, then $B$ proceeds exactly as in $Hyb_{0,\nu-1,3',6}$, while if $\eta = \nu$, then $B$ proceeds as follows:
  1. $B$ first selects PPRF keys $K^{(\nu)}_1, \ldots, K^{(\nu)}_{\nu'}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS},A}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS},B}, K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS},E}, K^{(\nu)}_s \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$.
  2. Next, it generates $(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}(0^\nu_{\nu'}, 0^\nu_{\nu'}), \text{STORE}_{0}^{(\nu)}(0^\nu_{\nu'})) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ACC.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{SB-BLK}} = 2^\lambda)$ and $(\text{PP}_{\text{ITR}}^{(\nu)}(0^\nu_{\nu'}), \nu_{\nu'}(0^\nu_{\nu'})) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ITR.Setup}(1^\lambda, \nu_{\nu'} = 2^\lambda)$.
  3. Then, $B$ creates the punctured PPRF keys $K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS},E}(h^*, \ell + 1) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}(K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS},E}(h^*, \ell + 1))$ and $K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS},F}(h^*, \ell + 1) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}(K^{(\nu)}_{\text{SPS},F}(h^*, \ell + 1))$.
  4. Next, it sets $m^{(\nu)}_{0,0} = (v_{0,0}^{(\nu)}, 0^\nu_{\nu'})$. For $j = 1, \ldots, \nu + 1$, it iteratively computes the following:
    - $\text{AUX}_{j}^{(\nu)} = \text{ACC}.\text{Prep-Write}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_{j-1}^{(\nu)}, j - 1)$
    - $w_{j}^{(\nu)} = \text{ACC}.\text{Update}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, w_{j-1}^{(\nu)}, x_{j-1}^{*}, j - 1, \text{AUX}_{j}^{(\nu)})$
    - $\text{STORE}_{j}^{(\nu)} = \text{ACC}.\text{Write-Store}(\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{STORE}_{j-1}^{(\nu)}, j - 1, x_{j-1}^{*})$
it includes the programs

\( P \) and \( P \)

\( \text{Fig. B.17).} \)

\( \text{SPS} = \text{vks}_{\text{one}}, \text{SK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}} \)

\( \sigma \text{gives} \)

\( \text{sps-one}_3 \in \nu \}

\( \text{m}, \text{h} \)

\( \text{IO} \}

\( \text{Sps-Split} \}

\( \text{B gives} \ A \)

\( \text{SK}_{\text{ABS}} \{ \text{M}^{(\nu)} \} = \)

\( \text{for} \ \theta \in [\theta_{\text{ABO}}, \text{replo} \text{to} \ \theta^{th} \ 0 \text{signature query of} \ A \) on message \( \text{msg}^{(\theta)} \in \text{M}_{\text{ABS}} \) under attribute

\( \text{x}^* \), \( B \) \( \text{computes} \) \( \sigma_{\text{SIG}}^{(\theta)} \)

\( \text{B outputs} \ \overline{b} = 1 \) as its guess in its \( \text{SPS} \) splitting indistinguishability experiment if \( A \) \( \text{wins} \), i.e., if \( \text{ABS} \) \( \text{Verify} \{ \text{pt}_{\text{ABS}}, \text{x}^*, \text{msg}^* \} = 1 \) \( \text{for any} \ \theta \in [\theta_{\text{SIG}}, \text{otherwise} \), \( B \) \( \text{outputs} \ \overline{b} = 0 \) in its \( \text{SPS} \) splitting indistinguishability experiment.

\( \text{Notice that if} \ (\sigma_{\text{SPS-ABO}}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{*}, \text{SK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{*}, \text{SK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}, (\sigma_{\text{SPS-ABO}}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{*}) \) \( \text{then} \ B \) \( \text{perfectly simulates} \overline{\text{Hyb}}_{\nu,\nu-1,3,\nu,7} \). \( \text{On the other hand, if} \ (\sigma_{\text{SPS-ABO}}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{*}) \) \( \text{then} \ B \) \( \text{perfectly simulates} \overline{\text{Hyb}}_{\nu,\nu-1,3,\nu,8} \). \( \text{This completes the proof of Claim B.30} \) \( \square \)

Claim B.31. Assuming \( \text{IO} \) is a secret indistinguishability obfuscator for \( \text{P/poly} \), for any \( \text{PPT} \) adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}_{A}^{\text{0,0,-1,3,0,7}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{\text{0,0,-1,3,0,8}}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).

Proof. The only difference between \( \overline{\text{Hyb}}_{\nu,\nu-1,3,\nu,7} \) and \( \overline{\text{Hyb}}_{\nu,\nu-1,3,\nu,8} \) is the following: In \( \overline{\text{Hyb}}_{\nu,\nu-1,3,\nu,7} \) \( \text{B includes the programs} \text{IO}(P_{0}) \) and \( \text{IO}(P_{1}) \) within the \( \nu^{th} \) signing key returned to \( A \), while in \( \overline{\text{Hyb}}_{\nu,\nu-1,3,\nu,8} \) it includes the programs \( \text{IO}(P_{0}) \) and \( \text{IO}(P_{1}) \) instead, where

\( P_{0} = \text{Accumulate.Prog}_{\nu}^{(3,1,3)}[\text{msg}_{\text{BLK}} = 2^{3}, \text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{PP}_{\text{TRI}}^{(\nu)}, \text{PK}_{\text{SPS}}^{(\nu)}, \text{SK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{(\nu)}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{(\nu)}, \text{SK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{*}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{*}] \)

\( P_{0}' = \text{Change-SPS.Prog}_{\nu}^{(3,1,3)}[\text{msg}_{\text{BLK}} = 2^{3}, \text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{PP}_{\text{TRI}}^{(\nu)}, \text{PK}_{\text{SPS}}^{(\nu)}, \text{SK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{(\nu)}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{(\nu)}, \text{SK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{*}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{*}] \)

\( P_{1} = \text{Accumulate.Prog}_{\nu}^{(3,1,4)}[\text{msg}_{\text{BLK}} = 2^{3}, \text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{PP}_{\text{TRI}}^{(\nu)}, \text{PK}_{\text{SPS}}^{(\nu)}, \text{SK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{(\nu)}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{(\nu)}, \text{SK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{*}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{*}] \)

\( P_{1}' = \text{Change-SPS.Prog}_{\nu}^{(3,1,2)}[\text{msg}_{\text{BLK}} = 2^{3}, \text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}^{(\nu)}, \text{PP}_{\text{TRI}}^{(\nu)}, \text{PK}_{\text{SPS}}^{(\nu)}, \text{SK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{(\nu)}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{(\nu)}, \text{SK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{*}, \text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}^{*}] \)
We will argue that the programs $P_0$ and $P_1$, as well as $P'_0$ and $P'_1$ are functionally equivalent, so that, by the security of $\mathcal{IO}$ Claim B.31 follows. First consider the programs $P_0$ and $P_1$. Clearly the only inputs on which the outputs of the two programs can possibly differ are those corresponding to $(h, i) = (h^*, i)$ and $(h, i) = (h^*, i + 1)$. Now, for inputs corresponding to $(h^*, i)$, the outputs of the two programs are identical due to the correctness [Property (ii)] of the splittable signature $\text{SPS}$ described in Definition 2.6 and the fact that the hardwired signature $\sigma$ of the two programs are identical due to the correctness [Property (ii)] of the splittable signature $\text{SPS}$.

Clearly the only inputs on which the outputs of the two programs can possibly differ are those corresponding to $(h^*, i)$. Clearly the only inputs on which the outputs of the two programs can possibly differ are those corresponding to $(h^*, i)$.

**Claim B.32.** Assuming $F$ is a secure pseudorandom function, for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|\text{Adv}_F^{(0, \nu - 1, 3, \ell', 9)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_F^{(0, \nu - 1, 3, \ell', 9)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function $\text{negl}$.

**Proof.** The proof of Claim B.32 is analogous to that of Claim B.28 with some appropriate modifications that are readily identifiable.

**Claim B.33.** Assuming $\mathcal{IO}$ is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for $\text{PPT}$ and $F$ satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|\text{Adv}_F^{(0, \nu - 1, 3, \ell', 9)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_F^{(0, \nu - 1, 3, \ell', 10)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function $\text{negl}$.

**Proof.** The proof of Claim B.33 is similar to that of Claim B.24 with some appropriate modifications which are easy to find out.

**Lemma B.7.** Assuming $\mathcal{IO}$ is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for $\text{PPT}$, $F$ is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, and $\text{SPS}$ is a secure splittable signature scheme satisfying $\text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ONE}}$ indistinguishability, ‘$\text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}$ indistinguishability’, as well as ‘splitting indistinguishability’, for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0, \nu - 1, 3, \ell', 9)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0, \nu - 1, 3, \ell', 10)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function $\text{negl}$.

**Proof.** The proof of Lemma B.7 is similar to that of Lemma B.6 with certain appropriate changes which can be readily determined.

**Lemma B.8.** Assuming $\mathcal{IO}$ is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for $\text{PPT}$, $F$ is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, $\text{ACC}$ is a secure positional accumulator possessing the ‘indistinguishability of read setup’ as well as ‘read enforcing’, and $\text{SPS}$ is a secure splittable signature scheme satisfying ‘$\text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ONE}}$ indistinguishability’, ‘$\text{VK}_{\text{SPS-ABO}}$ indistinguishability’, as well as ‘splitting indistinguishability’, for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0, \nu - 1, 4)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0, \nu - 1, 4, 0)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function $\text{negl}$.

**Proof.** In order to establish Lemma B.8 we consider the following sequence of intermediate hybrid experiments between $\text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 4}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 4, 0}$:

**Sequence of Intermediate Hybrids between $\text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 4}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 4, 0}$**

**Hyb$^{0, \nu - 1, 4}$:** This experiment coincides with $\text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 4}$.

**Hyb$^{0, \nu - 1, 4, 0}$:** This experiment is identical to $\text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 4}$ except that in response to the $\nu$th signing key query of $\mathcal{A}$ corresponding to TM $M^{(\nu)} \in \mathcal{M}_{\lambda}$ with $M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0$, $\mathcal{B}$ executes the following steps:

1. It first generates all the PPRF keys as well as the public parameters for the positional accumulator and the iterator as in $\text{Hyb}_{0, \nu - 1, 4}$.
2. Then, it creates the punctured PPRF keys \( K_{\text{SPS,A}}^{(v)} \) and \( K_{\text{SPS,B}}^{(v)} \) and \( r_{\text{SPS}}^{(v)} \) by puncturing \( (K_{\text{SPS,A}}^{(v)}, (h^*, \ell^*, 0)) \) and \( (K_{\text{SPS,B}}^{(v)}, (h^*, \ell^*, 0)) \), respectively.

3. After that, it computes \( r_{\text{SPS}}^{(v)} = F(K_{\text{SPS,A}}^{(v)}, (h^*, \ell^*, 0)) \) and \( r_{\text{SPS}}^{(v)} = F(K_{\text{SPS,B}}^{(v)}, (h^*, \ell^*, 0)) \), and forms \( (sk_{\text{SPS-A}}, \ldots) \)

4. Next, it sets \( m_{\ell, j}^{(v)} \) for \( j = 1, \ldots, \ell^* \). For \( j = 1, \ldots, \ell^* \), it iteratively computes the following:

\[ m_{\ell, j}^{(v)} = \text{ACC.Execute}(pp_{\text{ACC}}, (h^*, \ell^*, 0)) \]

\[ m_{\ell, j}^{(v)} = \text{ACC.Write}(pp_{\text{ACC}}, (h^*, \ell^*, 0)) \]

\[ m_{\ell, j}^{(v)} = \text{ITR.Iterate}(pp_{\text{ITR}}, (h^*, \ell^*, 0)) \]

5. It gives \( A \) the signing key

where the programs \( \text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(4,1)} \) and \( \text{Constrained-Key.Prog}_{1}^{(1,0,1)} \) respectively are the modifications of the programs \( \text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(4)} \) and \( \text{Constrained-Key.Prog}_{1}^{(1)} \) (Figs. A.9 and A.1) and are depicted in Figs. B.18 and B.19.

\[
\text{SK}_{\text{ABS}} \{ M^{(v)} \} = \begin{align*}
& \text{IOC}(\text{Initial-Setup}, \text{Prog}_1), \text{IOC}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog}_{1}^{(1,0,1)}), \\
& \text{IOC}(\text{Accumulate.Prog}), \text{IOC}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog})
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\text{Input:} \text{TM state} \ s_T, \text{Accumulator value} \ w, \text{Iterate value} \ v, \text{SSB hash value} \ h, \text{Length of challenge input} \ \ell^*
\]

\[
\text{Output:} \text{Signature} \sigma_{\text{SBS,in}}, \text{Signature} \sigma_{\text{SBS,out}}
\]

\[
1. (a) \text{Compute} r_{\text{perm}, E} = F(K_{\text{perm}, E}, (h, t_{\text{perm}})), (sk_{\text{perm}, E}, \ldots) = \text{SPS.Setup}(1^\lambda, r_{\text{perm}, E}). \\
(b) \text{Set} m = (v, w), (w, v, w).
\]

\[
2. (a) \text{If} (h, t_{\text{perm}}) \neq (h^*, \ell^*), \text{compute} \text{msg}, (\text{msg}, \text{SSB hash value} \ h, \text{Length} \ \ell^*), \text{Signature} \sigma_{\text{SBS,in}}.
\]

\[
\text{Hyb}_{0,v-1,4,III}^{(4,1)}: \text{This experiment is analogous to Hyb}_{0,v-1,4,III}^{(4,1)} \text{ with the only exception that while constructing the } \nu \text{th signing key queried by } A, B \text{ selects } r_{\text{SPS,C}}^{(v)}, r_{\text{SPS,D}}^{(v)} \text{ by puncturing, i.e., in other words, B generates} \]

\[
\text{Hyb}_{0,v-1,4,IV}^{(4,1)}: \text{This experiment is similar to Hyb}_{0,v-1,4,III}^{(4,1)} \text{ except that in response to the } \nu \text{th signing key query of } A \text{ corresponding to } TM F^{(v)}(x^*) = 0, B \text{ executes the following steps:}
\]

1. It first generates all the PPRF keys as well as the public parameters for the positional accumulator and the iterator as in Hyb}_{0,v-1,4,III}^{(4,1)}.
2. Then, it creates the punctured PPRF keys $K^{(v)}_{\text{SPS,A}}(\{h^*, \ell^*, 0\}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}(K^{(v)}_{\text{SPS,A}}, (h^*, \ell^*, 0))$ and $K^{(v)}_{\text{SPS,B}}(\{h^*, \ell^*, 0\}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}(K^{(v)}_{\text{SPS,B}}, (h^*, \ell^*, 0))$.

3. After that it forms $(\sigma^{(v)}_{\text{SPS,A}, \text{C}}), (\sigma^{(v)}_{\text{SPS,B}, \text{C}}), (\sigma^{(v)}_{\text{SPS,A}, \text{REJ-C}}), (\sigma^{(v)}_{\text{SPS,B}, \text{REJ-C}}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{SPS.Setup}(\lambda)$.

4. Next, it computes $m^{(v)}_{\ell^*} = (v^{(v)}_{\ell^*}, 0) \in \mathbb{G}_1$ just as in $\text{Hyb}_{0,v-1,4,4}$.

5. After that, it creates $(\sigma^{(v)}_{\text{SPS,A}, \text{C}}), (\sigma^{(v)}_{\text{SPS,B}, \text{C}}), (\sigma^{(v)}_{\text{SPS,A}, \text{REJ-C}}), (\sigma^{(v)}_{\text{SPS,B}, \text{REJ-C}}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{SPS.Split}(\sigma^{(v)}_{\text{SPS,A}, C}, m^{(v)}_{\ell^*})$ and $(\sigma^{(v)}_{\text{SPS,A}, \text{REJ-C}}, \sigma^{(v)}_{\text{SPS,B}, \text{REJ-C}}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{SPS.Split}(\sigma^{(v)}_{\text{SPS,A}, C}, m^{(v)}_{\ell^*})$.

6. It gives $A$ the signing key $\text{SK}_{\text{ARS}}^{(v)} = (HK, P_{\text{ACC}}^{(v)}, \sigma^{(v)}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{STORE}^{(v)}, \text{P_{TR}}^{(v)}, v^{(v)}_{\ell^*}, \llbracket \lambda \rrbracket_{\text{ARS}}^{(v)})$.

where the program $\text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(4,2)}$ is an alteration of the program $\text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(4,1)}$ (Fig. B.18) and is shown in Fig. B.20.

$\text{Hyb}_{0,v-1,4,4}$: In this experiment, in response to the $v$th signing key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(v)} \in \mathbb{M}_\lambda$ with $M^{(v)}(x^*) = 0$, $B$ generates all the components as in hyb$_{0,v-1,4,4}$; however, it hands $A$
The rest of the experiment is analogous to Hyb_{0,ν−1,4-V}.

Hyb_{0,ν−1,4-V}: In this experiment, in response to the νth signing key query of A corresponding to TM $M(ν) \in M_\lambda$ with $M(ν)(x^*) = 0$, B creates all the components as in Hyb_{0,ν−1,4-V}, however, it hands A the signing key

$$\text{SK}_\text{PPRF}[M(ν)] =$$

$$\left(\text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, u_0^{(ν)}, \text{STORE}^{(ν)}, \text{PP}_{\text{TR}}, k_0^{(ν)}, \text{IO}(\text{Init-SPS.Prog}^{(1)}), u_0^{(ν)}, v_0^{(ν)}, v_0^{(ν)}, K^{(ν)}_{\text{PPRF}}), \text{IO}(\text{Accumulate.Prog}^{(2)}), \text{IO}(\text{Change-SPS.Prog}^{(1)}), \text{IO}(\text{Constrained-Key.Prog}^{(1,ν)}), [K^{(ν)}_{\text{SPS,A}}((h^*, ℓ^*, 0)), K^{(ν)}_{\text{SPS,B}}((h^*, ℓ^*, 0)), \text{SK}^{(ν)}_{\text{ABO}}, m^{(ν)}_{\text{iter}}(0), h^*, ℓ^*) \right)$$

The rest of the experiment is similar to Hyb_{0,ν−1,4-V}.

Hyb_{0,ν−1,4-VII}: In this experiment, to answer the νth signing key query of A corresponding to TM $M(ν) \in M_\lambda$ with $M(ν)(x^*) = 0$, B generates all the components just as in Hyb_{0,ν−1,4-VI}, but it provides
where the program Constrained-Key.Prog$_{ABS}$(1.2) is a modification of the program Constrained-Key.Prog$_{ABS}$(1.0.1) (Fig. B.19) and is shown in Fig. B.21. The rest of the experiment is analogous to Hyb$_{0,p-1.4-VI}$. 

### Constants

- TM $M = (Q, \Sigma, \Sigma_{\text{abs}}, \delta, q_0, q_{\text{acc}}, q_{\text{b}}}$. Time bound $T = 2^\lambda$. Running time on challenge input $t^*$, Public parameters for positional accumulator $PP_{\text{acc}}$, Public parameters for iterator $PP_{\text{itr}}$, PPRF keys $K_{\text{acc}}, K_{\text{itr}}$, $\ldots, K_{\lambda}$, Punctured PPRF keys $K_{\text{acc},A}((h^*, \ell^*, 0)), K_{\text{acc},B}((h^*, \ell^*, 0))$, Verification keys $\nu_{\text{acc}}, \nu_{\text{itr}}$, Message $m_{\text{acc},0,0}$, SSB, hash value of challenge input $h^*$, Length of challenge input $\ell^*$.

### Inputs

- Time $t$, String $\text{seed}_{\text{acc}}$, Header position $\text{pos}_{\text{acc}}$, Symbol $\text{symbol}_{\text{acc}}$, TM state $st_{\text{acc}}$, Accumulator value $w_{\text{acc}}$, Accumulator proof $\sigma_{\text{acc},w_{\text{acc}}}$, Auxiliary value $\text{aux}_{\text{acc}}$, Iteration value $\nu_{\text{acc}}$, String $\text{seed}_{\text{acc}}$, or $\perp$.

### Output

- $\text{CPFR}$ evaluation $\mathcal{F}(K_r, (h, \ell_{\text{acc}}))$, or (Header Position $\text{pos}_{\text{acc}}$, Symbol $\text{symbol}_{\text{acc}}$, TM state $st_{\text{acc}}$, Accumulator value $w_{\text{acc}}$, Iteration value $\nu_{\text{acc}}$, Signature $\sigma_{\text{acc},w_{\text{acc}}}$, String $\text{seed}_{\text{acc}}$).

#### 1. Identify an integer $r$ such that $2^r \leq t < 2^{r+1}$.

#### 2. If $\text{ACC.Read}(\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, w_{\text{acc}}, \text{pos}_{\text{acc}}, \text{iter}_{\text{acc}}) = 0$, output $\perp$.

#### 3. (a) Compute $h, \ell = \mathcal{F}(K_{\text{acc},A}((h^*, \ell^*, 0)), (h, \ell_{\text{acc}}, t - 1))$.

#### 4. Compute $\mathcal{F}(\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, w_{\text{acc}}, \text{pos}_{\text{acc}}, \text{iter}_{\text{acc}})$.

#### 5. Compute $\mathcal{F}(\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, w_{\text{acc}}, \text{pos}_{\text{acc}}, \text{iter}_{\text{acc}})$.

#### 6. Compute $\mathcal{F}(\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, w_{\text{acc}}, \text{pos}_{\text{acc}}, \text{iter}_{\text{acc}})$.

#### 7. If $t + 1 = 2^r$, for some integer $r$, set $\text{seed}_{\text{acc}} = \mathcal{F}(K_r, (h, \ell_{\text{acc}}))$.

### Fig. B.21. Constrained-Key.Prog$_{ABS}$(1.0.2)

**Hyb$_{0,p-1.4-VII}$:** In this experiment, the same as Hyb$_{0,p-1.4-VII}$ with the only exception that while creating the $\nu^\lambda$ signing key queried by $A$, $B$ generates $(\text{PP}_{\text{acc}}, w_{\text{acc}}, \text{store}_{\text{acc}}^{\nu^\lambda}) \leftarrow \text{ACC.Setup-Enforce-Read}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{acc},b}) = 2^\lambda, ((x_{\ell-1}^*, \ldots, (x_{\lambda}^*, 0), \ldots, (x_{\lambda}^*, 0), \ldots, (x_{\lambda}^*, 0), 0), 0)$.

**Hyb$_{0,p-1.4-IX}$:** In this experiment, to answer the $\nu^\lambda$ constrained key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(\nu)} \in M_{\lambda}$ with $M^{(\nu)}(x^*) = 0$, $B$ generates all the components just as in hyb$_{0,p-1.4-VIII}$, however, it gives...
where the program `Constrained-Key.Prog` is a modification of the program `Constrained-Key.Prog` (Fig. B.22) and is shown in Fig. B.22. The rest of the experiment is analogous to `Hyb_{0,\nu=1,4-VIII}`.
hands $A$ the signing key

$$SK_{AB} = \{M^{(ν)} \} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{HK, PPRF,} w_0^{(ν)}, \text{STORE}^{(ν)}, \text{PPF}_{TR}^{(ν)}, \text{SPPS}^{(ν)}, \\
\text{IO(Init-SPS.Prog) (w_0^{(ν)}, t_0^{(ν)}, \text{SK}_{SSPSE})}, \\
\text{IO(Accumulate.Prog) (} \mathcal{M}_{SSPSE-BLK} = 2^λ, \text{HK, PPRF}_{AC}, \text{PPF}_{TR}, \text{K}_{SSPSE}^{(ν)})}, \\
\text{IO(Change-SPS.Prog) (k_{SSPSE}^{(ν)}, \text{K}_{SSPSE} \{h^*, \ell^*, 0\}), \text{K}_{SSPSE}^{(ν)}, \text{SPPS-ONE}^{(ν)}, m_{v}^{(ν)}, C^{*} \}}. \\
\end{array} \right.$$

The rest of the experiment is analogous to $Hyb_{0,ν−1,4−XI}$.

$Hyb_{0,ν−1,4−XI}$: In this experiment, to answer the $ν$th signing key query of $A$ corresponding to TM $M^{(ν)} \in M_λ$ with $M^{(ν)}(x^*) = 0$, $B$ creates all the components as in $Hyb_{0,ν−1,4−XI}$, but it provides $A$ with the signing key

$$SK_{AB} = \{M^{(ν)} \} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{HK, PPRF,} w_0^{(ν)}, \text{STORE}^{(ν)}, \text{PPF}_{TR}^{(ν)}, \text{SPPS}^{(ν)}, \\
\text{IO(Init-SPS.Prog) (w_0^{(ν)}, t_0^{(ν)}, \text{SK}_{SSPSE})}, \\
\text{IO(Accumulate.Prog) (} \mathcal{M}_{SSPSE-BLK} = 2^λ, \text{HK, PPRF}_{AC}, \text{PPF}_{TR}, \text{K}_{SSPSE}^{(ν)})}, \\
\text{IO(Change-SPS.Prog) (k_{SSPSE}^{(ν)}, \text{K}_{SSPSE} \{h^*, \ell^*, 0\}), \text{K}_{SSPSE}^{(ν)}}, \\
\text{IO(Constrained-Key-Prog) (k_{AB}^{(ν)}, T = 2^λ, t^{(ν)}, \text{PPF}_{AC}, \text{PPF}_{TR}, \text{K}, \text{K}_{SSPSE}^{(ν)}),} \\
\text{K}_{SSPSE}^{(ν)} \{h^*, \ell^*, 0\}, \text{K}_{SSPSE}^{(ν)}, \text{SPPS-ONE}^{(ν)}, m_{v}^{(ν)}, C^{*} \}}. \\
\end{array} \right.$$

where the programs Change-SPS.Prog and Constrained-Key-Prog are the alternations of the programs Change-SPS.Prog (Figs. B.20 and B.22) and Constrained-Key-Prog (Figs. B.20 and B.22) and are shown in Figs. B.23 and B.22 respectively. The rest of the experiment is analogous to $Hyb_{0,ν−1,4−XI}$.

### Constants:
- Punctured PPRF key $K_{SSPSE} \{h^*, \ell^*, 0\}$, PPRF key $K_{SSPSE}$, signing key $SK_C$, SSB hash value of challenge input $h^*$, Length of challenge input $\ell^*$
- TM state $σ_{IN}$, Accumulator value $w$, Iterator value $ν$, SSB hash value $h$, Length $f_{SSPSE}$, Signature $σ_{SSPSE}$

### Output:
- Signature $σ_{SSPSE}$, or ⊥
- TM state $σ_{OUT}$, $σ_{SSPSE}$, or ⊥

1. (a) Compute $σ_{SSPSE} = F(K_{SSPSE}, (h, f_{SSPSE}), (SK_{SSPSE}, M_{SSPSE}, V_{SSPSE})) = SPS.Setup(1^λ, (h, f_{SSPSE})).$
2. (a) If $f_{SSPSE} ≠ 0$, compute $σ_{SSPSE} = F(K_{SSPSE}, \{h^*, \ell^*, 0\}, (h, f_{SSPSE}, 0)).$
3. (a) $SK_{SSPSE} = SPS.Sign(SK_{SSPSE}, m).$
4. (a) Else, output $σ_{SSPSE} = SPS.Sign(SK_{SSPSE}, m)$.

### Fig. B.23. Change-SPS.Prog

$Hyb_{0,ν−1,4−XIII}$: This experiment is analogous to $Hyb_{0,ν−1,4−XI}$. except that while creating the $ν$th signing key queried by $A$, $B$ and forms $(SK_{SSPSE}^{(ν)}, V_{SSPSE}^{(ν)}, V_{SSPSE}^{(ν)}, C) = SPS.Setup(1^λ; r^{(ν)}, \text{SK}_{SSPSE}^{(ν)}, \text{SK}_{SSPSE}^{(ν)}, \text{SK}_{SSPSE}^{(ν)}, C) = F(K_{SSPSE}^{(ν)}, \{h^*, \ell^*, 0\})).$

$Hyb_{0,ν−1,4−XIV}$: This experiment corresponds to $Hyb_{0,ν−1,4,0}^\dagger$.

### Analysis

Let $Adv_A^{(0,ν−1,4,0)}(λ)$ represents the advantage of the adversary $A$, i.e., the absolute difference between 1/2 and $A$’s probability of correctly guessing the random bit selected by the challenger $B$, in $Hyb_{0,ν−1,4,0}^\dagger$, for $ν \in \{1, \ldots, XIV\}$. From the description of the hybrid experiments it follows that $Adv_A^{(0,ν−1,4,0)}(λ) \equiv$
**Constants**: TM $M = (Q, \Sigma_{in}, \Sigma_{out}, \delta, q_0, q_{acc}, q_{rej})$, Time bound $T = 2^t$, Running time on challenge input $t^*$, Public parameters for positional accumulator $PPA_{acc}$, Public parameters for iterator $PPA_{iter}$, PPRF keys $K_1, \ldots, K_N$, Punctured PPRF keys $K_{pa,c}, A=(h^c, \ell^c, 0)$, $K_{pa,b}, B=(h^b, \ell^b, 0)$, PRF key $K_{PRF}$, Message $m_{x,y}$, SSB hash value of challenge input $h^c$, Length of challenge input $\ell^c$.

**Inputs**: Time $t$, String $seed_{IO}$, Header position $pos_{in}$, Symbol $Sym_{IO}$, TM state $st_{TM}$, Accumulator value $w_{acc}$, Accumulator proof $\pi_{acc}$, Auxiliary value $aux_{acc}$, Iteration value $\ell_{iter}$, SSB hash value $h$, Length $\ell_{msg}$, Signature $\sigma_{\pi_{acc}}$

**Output**: PPRF evaluation $F(K,(h,\ell))$, (or) Header Position $pos_{io}$, Symbol $sym_{io}$, TM state $st_{TM}$, Accumulator value $w_{acc}$, Iteration value $\ell_{iter}$, Signature $\pi_{acc}$, String $seed_{io}$, or $\perp$

1. Identify an integer $t$ such that $2^t \leq t < 2^{t+1}$.
2. If $\text{PPRF}(seed_{io}) \neq \text{PRF}(F(K,(h,\ell))))$ and $t > 1$, output $\perp$.
3. If $\text{ACC.Verify-Real}(PPA_{acc}, w_{acc}, seed_{io}, \pi_{acc}) = 0$, output $\perp$.
4. If $|h(x,y)| \neq (h^c, h^b, t)$, compute $\pi_{acc,A} = \text{SPS.Setup}(1; h_{pa,c}, A)$.
5. else, set $v_{pa,c} = v_{pa,b}$. \hspace{1cm} (a) Compute $\pi_{acc,A} = F(K_{pa,c}, \ell_{pa,c}, 0)$, $(h_{pa,c}, \ell_{pa,c} \in \{0\}$).
6. else if $h(x,y) = (h^c, h^b, t)$, compute $\pi_{acc,B} = \text{SPS.Setup}(1; h_{pa,b}, B)$.
7. else if $\pi_{acc,B} = \text{SPS.Setup}(1; h_{pa,b}, B)$.
8. else if $|h(x,y)| \neq (h^c, h^b, t)$, output $\perp$.
9. else if $\pi_{acc,B} = \text{SPS.Setup}(1; h_{pa,b}, B)$.
10. If $\pi_{acc,B} = \text{SPS.Setup}(1; h_{pa,b}, B)$.
11. else if $\pi_{acc,B} = \text{SPS.Setup}(1; h_{pa,b}, B)$.

**Fig. B.24. Constrained-Key.Prog_{AIBS}^{(1,0,4)}**

$$Adv_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu-1,4)}(\bar{\lambda}) \text{ and } Adv_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu-1,4-\Pi)}(\bar{\lambda}) \equiv Adv_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu-1,4-XIV)}(\bar{\lambda})$$

Hence, we have

$$|Adv_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu-1,4)}(\bar{\lambda}) - Adv_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu-1,4-\Pi)}(\bar{\lambda})| \leq \sum_{\bar{\lambda}|\lambda} |Adv_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu-1,4-(\bar{\lambda}-1)}(\lambda) - Adv_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu-1,4-\Pi)}(\lambda)|. \hspace{1cm} (B.7)$$

Claims [B.34] [B.46] below will show that the RHS of Eq. (B.7) is negligible and thus Lemma [B.8] follows.

**Claim B.34.** Assuming $IO$ is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for $P/poly$ and $F$ satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary $A$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|Adv_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu-1,4)}(\lambda) - Adv_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu-1,4-\Pi)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function $\text{negl}$.

**Proof.** The proof of Claim [B.34] uses a similar kind of logic as that employed in the proof of Claim [B.24]. We omit the details here.

**Claim B.35.** Assuming $F$ is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, for any PPT adversary $A$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|Adv_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu-1,4-\Pi)}(\lambda) - Adv_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu-1,4-\Pi)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function $\text{negl}$.

**Proof.** The proof of Claim [B.35] resembles that of Claim [B.25] with some suitable changes. The details are omitted.

**Claim B.36.** Assuming $IO$ is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for $P/poly$, for any PPT adversary $A$, for any security parameter $\lambda$, $|Adv_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu-1,4-\Pi)}(\lambda) - Adv_{\lambda}^{(0,\nu-1,4-\Pi)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function $\text{negl}$.

**Proof.** Claim [B.36] can be proven using an analogous logic as that used in the proof of Claim [B.26]. We omit the details here.
Claim B.37. Assuming SPS is a splittable signature scheme satisfying `\( \forall \text{SPS-Sign} \) indistinguishability`, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}_{\lambda, A}^{(0, p, 1, -1, \text{SPS})} (\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\lambda, A}^{(0, p, 1, -1, \text{pp})} (\lambda) | \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).

Proof. The proof of Claim B.37 is similar to that of Claim B.27, and, therefore, we do not provide the details here.

Claim B.38. Assuming SPS is a splittable signature scheme satisfying `\( \forall \text{SPS-ABO} \) indistinguishability`, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}_{\lambda, A}^{(0, p, 1, -1, \text{SPS})} (\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\lambda, A}^{(0, p, 1, -1, \text{pp})} (\lambda) | \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).

Proof. The proof of Claim B.38 proceeds along a similar path to that of Claim B.28. We omit the details here.

Claim B.39. Suppose \( \text{IO} \) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( P/\text{poly} \), for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}_{\lambda, A}^{(0, p, 1, -1, \text{pp})} (\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\lambda, A}^{(0, p, 1, -1, \text{VIII})} (\lambda) | \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).

Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary \( A \) for which \( |\text{Adv}_{\lambda, A}^{(0, p, 1, -1, \text{VIII})} (\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\lambda, A}^{(0, p, 1, -1, \text{pp})} (\lambda) | \) is non-negligible. We construct a PPT adversary \( B \) that breaks the indistinguishability of read setup property of the positional accumulator \( \text{ACC} \) using \( A \) as a sub-routine. The description of \( B \) follows:

- \( B \) initializes \( A \) on input \( 1^\lambda \) and receives a challenge signing attribute string \( x^* = x^*_0 \ldots x^*_{t-1} \in \mathcal{U}_{\text{ARS}} \) with \(| x^* | = \ell^* \) from \( A \).
- Upon receiving \( x^* \), \( B \) proceeds as follows:
  1. \( B \) first generates \( \text{HK} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{SSB.Gen}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{SSB-blk}} = 2^\lambda, i^* = 0) \) and computes \( h^* = \text{H}_{\text{HK}}(x^*) \).
  2. Then, \( B \) selects a PPRF key \( K \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{F.Setup}(1^\lambda) \).
  3. After that, \( B \)computes \( r_{\text{SIG}} = \text{F}(\text{K}(h^*, \ell^*)) \) followed by \( (\text{SIG}.\text{Setup}) = \text{SIG}.\text{Setup}(1\lambda; r_{\text{SIG}}) \).
  4. \( B \) returns the public parameters \( p_{\text{PPS}} = (\text{HK}, \text{IO.(Verify.Prog)} \mathcal{K}) \) to \( A \).
- For \( \eta \in [\eta_{\text{HK}, \text{VIII}}] \), in response to the \( \eta \)th signing key query of \( A \) corresponding to \( \text{TM}^{(n)}(\eta) \in \mathcal{M}_{\lambda} \) with \( M^{(\eta)}(x^*) = 0 \), if \( \eta \neq \nu \), then \( B \) proceeds exactly as in \( \text{Hyb}_{0, p, 1, -1, \text{VIII}} \), while if \( \eta = \nu \), then \( B \) proceeds as follows:
  1. \( B \) selects PPRF keys \( K_{\text{K}}^{(\nu)}, \ldots, K_{\text{K}}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{ssps}, A}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{ssps}, B}^{(\nu)}, K_{\text{ssps}, E}^{(\nu)} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{F.Setup}(1\lambda) \).
  2. Then, it creates the punctured PPRF keys \( K_{\text{K}}^{(\nu)} \{(h^*, \ell^*, 0)\} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{F.Puncture}(K_{\text{K}}^{(\nu)}; \{(h^*, \ell^*, 0)\}) \) and \( K_{\text{ssps}, B} \{(h^*, \ell^*, 0)\} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{F.Puncture}(K_{\text{ssps}, B}^{(\nu)}; \{(h^*, \ell^*, 0)\}) \).
  3. Next, \( B \) sends \( n_{\text{K-ACC-blk}} = 2^\lambda \), the sequence of symbol-index pairs \( ((x^*_0, 0), \ldots, (x^*_{t-1}, \ell^* - 1)) \), and the index \( i^* = 0 \) to its \( \text{ACC} \) read setup indistinguishability challenger \( C \) and receives back \( (p_{\text{ACC}}, \{w_{0, \text{store}_{0}}\}) \), where either \( (p_{\text{ACC}}, \{w_{0, \text{store}_{0}}\}) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ACC.setup}(1\lambda, n_{\text{K-ACC-blk}} = 2^\lambda) \) or \( (p_{\text{ACC}}, \{w_{0, \text{store}_{0}}\}) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ACC.Setup-Enforce-Read}(1\lambda, n_{\text{K-ACC-blk}} = 2^\lambda, (x^*_0, 0), \ldots, (x^*_t, \ell^* - 1), i^* = 0) \).
  4. After that, it generates \( (p_{\text{PPS}}, v^*_0) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ITR.Setup}(1\lambda, n_{\text{ITR}} = 2^\lambda) \).
  5. Then, it sets \( n_{0, j}^{(\nu)} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} (v^*_0, q^*_0, w_{0, j}, 0) \). For \( j = 1, \ldots, \ell^* \), it iteratively computes the following:
    - \( \text{AUX}^{(\nu)} = \text{ACC}, \text{Write-Store}(p_{\text{ACC}}, \text{store}_{j-1}, 1, j - 1) \)
    - \( w^* = \text{ACC.Update}(p_{\text{ACC}}, w_{j-1}, x^*_{j-1}, j - 1, \text{AUX}^{(\nu)}) \)
    - \( \text{store}_{j} = \text{ACC.Write-Store}(p_{\text{ACC}}, \text{store}_{j-1}, 1, j - 1, x^*_j) \)
    - \( v^*_j = \text{ITR.Iterate}(p_{\text{PPS}}, v^*_{j-1}, (q^*_0, \{w_{j-1, 0}\}) \) It sets \( m^*_{\nu, 0} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} (v^*_0, q^*_0, w^*, 0) \).
6. After that, it forms \((SK_{\text{Sps},C}, \text{VK}_{\omega(0)}), (SK_{\text{Sps-RJ},C}, (SK_{\text{PP},D}, \text{VK}_{\omega(0)}), (SK_{\text{Sps-RJ},D}, \text{VK}_{\omega(0)})) \leftarrow \text{Sps.Setup}(\lambda)\) and generates \((\sigma_{\omega(0)}^{\text{Sps-one},m_{\omega(0)}^0}, \text{VK}_{\omega(0)}), (SK_{\text{Sps-one},C}, \text{VK}_{\omega(0)}), (SK_{\text{Sps-RJ},C}, \text{VK}_{\omega(0)})) \leftarrow \text{Sps.Split}(SK_{\text{Sps},C}, m_{\omega(0)}).

7. It gives \(A\) the signing key
\[
\text{SK}_{\text{Abs}} \{M(\nu)\} = \left\langle \text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0, \text{PP}_{\text{itr}}(\nu), \epsilon(\nu), \right\rangle \text{IO}(\text{Init-Sps.Prog}(q_0(\nu), u_0, v_0, K_{\text{Sps,E}})), \text{IO}(\text{Accumulate.Prog}(\nu_{\text{Sps-blk}} = 2^\lambda, \text{HK}, \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PP}_{\text{itr}}(K_{\text{Sps,E}})), \text{IO}(\text{Change-Sps.Prog}(1^{\nu}, [K_{\text{Sps,A}}(\{h^*, \epsilon^*, 0\}), K_{\text{Sps,B}}(\{h^*, \epsilon^*, 0\}), K_{\text{Sps,E}}, \sigma_{\omega(0)}^{\text{Sps-one},m_{\omega(0)}^0}]), \text{SK}_{\text{Sps-RJ,D},m_{\omega(0)}^0,h^*,\epsilon^*}) \right) \right.
\]

- For \(\theta \in [q_{\text{Sgn}}]\), in reply to the \(\theta\)th signature query of \(A\) on message \(msg^{(\theta)} \in M_{\text{Abs}}\) under attribute string \(x^*\), \(B\) computes \(\sigma^{(\theta)}_{\text{Abs}} \leftarrow \text{Sig.Sign}(SK_{\text{Abs}}, msg^{(\theta)})\) and provides \(A\) with \(\sigma^{(\theta)}_{\text{Abs}} = (VK_{\text{Sig}}, \sigma^{(\theta)}_{\text{Sig}})\).

- Finally, \(A\) outputs a signature \(\sigma^{\text{Abs}}\) on some message \(msg^*\) under attribute string \(x^*\). \(B\) outputs \(\hat{y} = 1\) as its guess bit in its ACC read setup indistinguishability experiment if \(A\) wins, i.e., if \(\text{ABS.Verify}(\text{PP}_{\text{Abs}}, x^*, msg^*, \sigma^{\text{Abs}}) = 1\) and \(msg^* \neq msg^{(\theta)}\) for any \(\theta \in [q_{\text{Sgn}}]\). Otherwise, \(B\) outputs \(\hat{y} = 0\) in its ACC read setup indistinguishability experiment.

Note that if \((\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0) \leftarrow \text{ACC.Setup}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-blk}} = 2^\lambda)\), then \(B\) perfectly simulates \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu^1,1,\text{-VII}}\). On the other hand, if \((\text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, w_0, \text{STORE}_0) \leftarrow \text{ACC.Setup-Enforce-Read}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-blk}} = 2^\lambda, ([x^*_1, 0], \ldots, [x^*_n, 1], x_0^* - 1), x^*_n = 0)\), then \(B\) perfectly simulates \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu^1,1,\text{-VII}}\). This completes the proof of Claim B.40

Claim B.41. Assuming \(\text{IO}\) is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \(P/\text{poly}\) and ACC is a positional accumulator satisfying the ‘read enforcing’ property, for any PPT adversary \(A\), for any security parameter \(\lambda\), \(|\text{Adv}_A(\nu^1,1,\text{-VII})^\lambda(\mu) - \text{Adv}_B(\nu^1,1,\text{-IX})^\lambda(\mu)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)\) for some negligible function \(\text{negl}\).

Proof. The only difference between \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu^1,1,\text{-VII}}\) and \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu^1,1,\text{-IX}}\) is the following: In \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu^1,1,\text{-VII}}\), \(B\) includes the program \(\text{IO}(P_0)\) within the \(\nu^1\)th signing key provided to \(A\), while in \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu^1,1,\text{-IX}}\) it includes the program \(\text{IO}(P_1)\) instead, where

- \(P_0 = \text{Constrained-Key.Prog}(1^{\nu}, [M(\nu), T = 2^\lambda, \epsilon^*(\nu), \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PP}_{\text{itr}}(K_{\text{Sps,A}}), K_{\text{Sps,B}}, \ldots, K_{\text{Sps,E}}, \sigma_{\omega(0)}^{\text{Sps-one},m_{\omega(0)}^0}, h^*, \epsilon^*]) \) (Fig. B.21).
- \(P_1 = \text{Constrained-Key.Prog}(1^{\nu}, [M(\nu), T = 2^\lambda, \epsilon^*(\nu), \text{PP}_{\text{ACC}}, \text{PP}_{\text{itr}}(K_{\text{Sps,A}}), K_{\text{Sps,B}}, \ldots, K_{\text{Sps,E}}, \sigma_{\omega(0)}^{\text{Sps-one},m_{\omega(0)}^0}, h^*, \epsilon^*]) \) (Fig. B.22).

We will argue that the programs \(P_0\) and \(P_1\) are functionally equivalent, so that, by the security of \(\text{IO}\) Claim B.41 follows. Clearly, the only inputs for which the outputs of the two programs might differ are those corresponding to \((h^*, \epsilon^*, 1)\). For inputs corresponding to \((h^*, \epsilon^*, 1)\), \(P_0\) is programmed to output \(\perp\) in case \(\text{ST}_{\text{GCT}} = q_{\text{GC}}\) but \(\alpha = 'A'\), whereas, \(P_0\) has no such condition in its programming. Now, observe that for inputs corresponding to \((h^*, \epsilon^*, 1)\), both programs will assign the value ‘1’ to \(\alpha\) if and only if \(\text{Sps.Verify}(VK_{\omega(0)}, m_{\omega(0)}, \sigma_{\omega(0)}^{\text{Abs}}) = 1\), where \(VK_{\omega(0)}, \sigma_{\omega(0)}^{\text{Abs}}\) is generated by running \(\text{Sps.Split}(SK_{\omega(0)}, m_{\omega(0)}).\) Hence, by the correctness [Properties (i), (iii) and (v)] of the splittable signature scheme \(\text{Sps}\), described in Definition 2.6, it is immediate that for inputs corresponding to \((h^*, \epsilon^*, 1)\), both programs will set \(\alpha = 'A'\) only if \(m_{\text{IN}} = m_{\omega(0)}\). Now, \(m_{\text{IN}} = m_{\omega(0)}\) means \(\text{ST}_{\text{GCT}} = q_{\text{GC}}, w_{\text{IN}} = w_{\text{GCT}}, \) and \(\text{POS}_{\text{IN}} = 0\). Further, recall that in both the hybrid experiments \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu^1,1,\text{-VII}}\) and \(\text{Hyb}_{0,\nu^1,1,\text{-IX}}, (\text{PP}_{\omega(0)}, w_{\omega(0)}, \text{STORE}_0) \leftarrow \text{ACC.Setup-Enforce-Read}(1^\lambda, n_{\text{ACC-blk}} = 2^\lambda, ([x^*_1, 0], \ldots, [x^*_n, 1], x_0^* - 1), x^*_n = 0)\), therefore, by the read enforcing property of ACC it follows that if \(w_{\text{IN}} = w_{\text{GCT}}\) and \(\text{POS}_{\text{IN}} = 0\), then \(\text{ACC.Verify-Read}(\text{PP}_{\omega(0)}, w_{\text{IN}}, \text{SYM}_{\text{IN}}, \text{POS}_{\text{IN}}, \sigma_{\text{ACC}}) = 1\) implies \(\text{SYM}_{\text{IN}} = x^*_0.\) Hence, for both the programs,
for inputs corresponding to \( (h^*, \ell^*, 1) \), \( \alpha = \lambda \) implies \( s_{\text{NS}} = q_{\text{NS}}^0 \) and \( \text{SYM}_{\text{NS}} = x_0^n \), which in turn implies \( s_{\text{OTR}} \neq q_{\text{AC}} \). Hence, the two programs have identical outputs for inputs corresponding to \( (h^*, \ell^*, 1) \) as well. Thus, the two programs are functionally equivalent.

**Claim B.42.** Assuming ACC is a positional accumulator satisfying the ‘indistinguishability of read setup’ property, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,4-X)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,4-X)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).

*Proof.* The proof of Claim B.42 is similar to that of Claim B.40 with some appropriate modifications that are easy to figure out.

**Claim B.43.** Assuming SPS is a splittable signature scheme satisfying ‘splitting indistinguishability’, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,4-X)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,4-X)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).

*Proof.* The proof of Claim B.43 proceeds along a similar path as that of the proof of Claim B.30. We omit the details here.

**Claim B.44.** Assuming IO is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( \text{P/poly} \), for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,4-X)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,4-X)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).

*Proof.* The proof of Claim B.44 employs a similar type of logic as that utilized in the proof of Claim B.31. We omit the details in this case as well.

**Claim B.45.** Assuming \( F \) is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,4-X)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,4-X)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).

*Proof.* The proof of Claim B.45 takes an analogous path as that taken by the proof of Claim B.25. The details are omitted.

**Claim B.46.** Assuming IO is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( \text{P/poly} \) and \( F \) satisfies the correctness under puncturing property, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,4-X)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,4-X)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).

*Proof.* The proof of Claim B.46 applies the same kind of logic as that employed in the proof of Claim B.24. The details are again omitted.

**Lemma B.9.** Assuming IO is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( \text{P/poly} \), ACC is a secure positional accumulator, and ITR is a secure cryptographic iterator, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,4,(\gamma-1)^*)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,4,\gamma)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).

*Proof.* The proof of Lemma B.9 follows an analogous path to that of Lemma B.4 of [5] with certain appropriate modifications that are easy to identify.

**Lemma B.10.** Assuming IO is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( \text{P/poly} \), \( F \) is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, ACC is a positional accumulator possessing the ‘indistinguishability of read setup’ as well as ‘read enforcing’ properties, and SPS is a splittable signature scheme satisfying ‘\( \text{VK}_{\text{PS\text{-SPO}}} \) indistinguishability’, ‘\( \text{VK}_{\text{PS\text{-ABO}}} \) indistinguishability’, as well as ‘splitting indistinguishability’ properties, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,4,\gamma)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,4,\gamma)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).

*Proof.* The proof of Lemma B.10 is similar to that of Lemma B.3 of [5] with some appropriate readily identifiable changes.

**Lemma B.11.** Assuming IO is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for \( \text{P/poly} \) and ACC is a positional accumulator having ‘indistinguishability of read setup’ and ‘read enforcing’ properties, for any PPT adversary \( A \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \), \( |\text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,4,(\nu^* - 1)^*)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{(0,\nu-1,5)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \).
Proof. The proof of Lemma B.11 is similar to that of Lemma B.5 of [5] with some appropriate changes that are easy to determine.

Lemma B.12. Assuming IO is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for P/poly, \( \mathcal{F} \) is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function, SPS is a splittable signature scheme possessing the \( \text{\textsc{vksp}-rej} \) indistinguishability property, and PRG is a secure injective pseudorandom generator, for any PPT adversary \( \mathcal{A} \), for any security parameter \( \lambda \),

\[
\left| \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0, \nu-1,3,5)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0, \nu-1,3,6)}(\lambda) \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]

for some negligible function \( \text{negl} \). Proof. The proof of Lemma B.12 is similar to that of Lemma B.6 of [5].