PAPEETE: Private, Authorized, and Fast Personal Genomic Testing

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Abstract

Over the past few years, the increased affordability of genome sequencing and the ensuing availability of genetic data have propelled important progress in precision medicine and enabled a market for personal genomic testing. This yields exciting new opportunities for faster and more accurate diagnosis, personalized treatments, and genetically tailored wellness plans. At the same time, however, it also creates important security and privacy threats.

In this paper, we present a new cryptographic protocol, PAPEETE (Private, Authorized, fast PErsonal gEnomic TEsting) suitable for running different types of tests on users’ genetic data (specifically, SNPs). The protocol, which builds on top of additively homomorphic encryption, provides privacy for both users and test facilities, and it guarantees that the test is authorized by an appropriate authority such as the FDA. Finally, we present a prototype implementation of PAPEETE, and an experimental evaluation that attests to the real-world practicality of our techniques.

1 Introduction

Over the past few years, progress in DNA sequencing and genomics has paved the way for a not-so-distant future where large chunks of the population in developed countries will have access to genetic testing. Sequencing is actually not the only way to analyze the genome, as in-vitro techniques have long been used to look for known genetic differences using biomarkers. However, the availability of affordable sequencing makes it possible to perform genetic testing via computer algorithms, more easily and at a lower cost. Individuals will soon be able to get their genome fully sequenced once, then, all tests can be done in computation over digitized copies of the genomes.

This progress is also fostering a new “direct-to-consumer” (DTC) personal genomic market, with companies offering genetic testing for a few hundred US dollars or less. Most DTC companies require individuals to provide a saliva sample via mail, and then perform either genotyping or whole exome sequencing to extract relevant genetic information and provide their customers with access to personalized reports related to health (i.e., the individual’s susceptibility to Parkinson’s disease), carrier status, wellness (i.e., how well they metabolize caffeine), and ancestry/genealogy.

Moreover, besides well-known efforts aimed to recruit participants to voluntarily make their genome available for research purposes¹, pundits and policymakers have also begun to advocate that we completely replace in-vitro testing with sequencing, motivated by a possible reduction in life-time costs [17].

Alas, widespread availability of genomic data prompts ethical, security, and privacy concerns. A full genome sequence not only identifies its owner, but also contains information related to ethnic heritage, disease predispositions, and many other phenotypic traits [7]. Furthermore, due to its hereditary nature, access to one’s genome also implies access to close relatives’ genomes. Therefore, disclosing genomic data of a single individual might put at risk the privacy of more people and for a long period, since genomes do not change much over time and across generations [11].

1.1 Private & Authorized Personal Genomic Testing

In this paper, we focus on personal genomic tests: these are somewhat similar to those performed by DTC companies and essentially work by analyzing an individual’s set of SNPs (Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms). SNPs are the most common DNA variations across individuals: more precisely, a SNP is a variation at a single position, occurring in 1% or more of a population. They constitute the genetic feature that is most commonly studied, and are used in the majority of applications of genetic testing [21].

We assume that users undergo sequencing/genotyping and obtain the list of the SNPs they carry; users can then allow doctors and testing facilities to perform genomic tests for a variety of reasons, including personalized medicine [15] as well as any kinds of test depending on their SNPs. Consider, for instance, the following products already offered today:

- Personalized nutrition plans by the company Nutrigenomix, which tests 45 genetic SNPs [13];
- Analysis and personalization of diet, lifestyle, exercise, cardiovascular and mental activities by GeneSNP, testing 61 SNPs [8];
- Genetic health risks and carrier status by 23andMe, testing a few hundred SNPs [1];

¹See, for instance, the 100K Genomes Project in the UK [10], the Precision Medicine initiative in the US [20], or the Personal Genome Project [16].
Overall, we focus on tests that can be expressed as a weighted average computed over the SNPs and some importance factors (weights). Specifically, the result \( R \) to test \( X \) is computed as:

\[
R(X) = \frac{\sum_i w_i \cdot Pr[X|SNP_i]}{\sum_i w_i}
\]  

(1)

where, for each of \( SNP_i \), \( w_i \) is the weight and \( Pr[X|SNP_i \in \{0, 1, 2\}] \) a SNP-dependent weight. \( \{0, 1, 2\} \) represents, respectively, the presence of the SNP in no, one, or both chromosomes.

**Privacy.** Our goal is to support testing in such a way that the only information revealed is the outcome of the test. No other information is leaked, for both the user and the test owner. This is crucial for both parties: the former so that testing can be performed on their genomic data without having to expose the whole genome; the latter as test specifics might need to be kept confidential, as they likely constitute valuable intellectual property.

**Authorization.** Furthermore, we argue that the test itself – specifically, the weights in Eq. 1 as well as their position – needs to be authorized by an appropriate authority, such as the FDA. This is just as important as privacy in order to guarantee the user that, while the test specifics are concealed for confidentiality reasons, the test has actually been verified by an appropriate authority so that the testing facility cannot dishonestly learn SNPs information from the user. As discussed below, this is a crucial issue that has been overlooked in previous work [2, 4].

**PAPEETE.** With this motivation in mind, we present PAPEETE (Private, Authorized, fast PErsonal gEnomic TEsting). As illustrated in Fig. 1, the protocol involves three entities: (1) a Testing Facility, which wants to run a test on user’s genomic data without revealing which positions are being tested and the weights associated to them; (2) a User, who allows the Testing Facility to run the test, if authorized, without revealing her SNPs; and (3) a Certification Authority, which is trusted to authorize the Testing Facility’s test, specifically, the weights and their positions. The protocol is formed by two main blocks, one for the authorization and one for the actual test, built on top of Additively Homomorphic Elliptic Curve El-Gamal, both incurring complexity linear in the number of the SNP dictionary. We also implement a protocol prototype, demonstrating that our authorization mechanism introduces a negligible overhead compared to related work yielding non-authorized protocols [2, 4].

1.2 Related Work

Our work aims to support personal genomic testing, expressed as a weighted average computed over SNPs, while simultaneously guaranteeing privacy, authenticity, and efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, prior work has not produced any solution that simultaneously achieves all of our requirements.

Baldi et al. [3] introduce a protocol for private personalized medicine testing, guaranteeing authorization and privacy; they only support testing for the presence of some SNPs in the user’s genome, but not more complex operations like weighted average. Their protocol relies on Authorized Private Set Intersection [5] and can operate on full genomes, but can achieve efficiency by means of offline pre-computation. Ayday et al. [2] introduce Private Disease Susceptibility (PDS) testing which, similar to our work, aims to perform a weighted average over a patient’s SNPs. They use Pailler [14] to privately compute the weighted average and rely on a semi-trusted authority (Storage & Processing Unit, or SPU) to store and retrieve the user’s encrypted SNPs. Their protocol is relatively slow when considering hundreds of thousand/million SNPs and, more importantly, does not provide any mechanism for authorizing the weights. Then, Danezis and De Cristofaro [4] present an improvement over [2], introducing a different encoding allowing them to replace Pailler with Additively Homomorphic El-Gamal cryptosystem [6], reducing computational and communication complexities. Their protocol does not support authorization either. The difference between PAPEETE and previous work is also summarized in Table 1.

Finally, Naveed et al. [12] introduce a primitive called Controlled Functional Encryption (C-FE) and use it to let individuals authorize use of their genetic data for specific research purposes. C-FE is used to encrypt the user’s genome under a public key issued by a central authority; then, testing facilities can run tests using a one-time function key, obtained by the authority, which corresponds to a specific function. In other words, the authorization mechanism determines whether or not a function can be executed, without any control on the data being tested or the weights used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Privacy</th>
<th>Authorization</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Weighted Avg</th>
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<tr>
<td>Baldi et al.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayday et al.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
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<td>Danezis et al.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAPEETE</td>
<td>✓</td>
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Table 1: Comparison to previous work.
2 Preliminaries

We now review relevant cryptography background information.

Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). Let \( E \) be an elliptic curve of order \( q \) with generator \( g \). Informally, given points \( P, Q \in E \), such that \( Q \in \langle P \rangle \), the ECDLP assumption states that determining \( k \) s.t. \( Q = P^k \) is computationally infeasible.

Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH). Let \( E \) be an elliptic curve of order \( q \) with generator \( g \). Informally, the DDH assumption states that, given \( g^a \) and \( g^b \) for uniformly and independently chosen \( a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q \), the value \( g^{ab} \) is indistinguishable from a random element in \( E \).

Additively Homomorphic Elliptic Curve based El-Gamal (AH-ECC). The AH-ECC cryptosystem [6] involves three algorithms:

1. KeyGen(1\(^\lambda\)): On input a security parameter \( \lambda \), select an appropriate elliptic curve \( E \) of order \( q \) and public generator \( g \). Choose random private key \( x \in \mathbb{Z}_q \), define the public key as \( pk = g^x \), and output public parameters \( (E, g, pk) \).

2. Encrypt(\( m, pk \)): The message \( m \) is encrypted by drawing a random element \( k \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) and computing two EC-points as \( (A, B) = (g^k, pk^k \cdot g^m) \). The output ciphertext is \( (A, B) \).

3. Decrypt(\( A, B, x \)): Compute the element \( g^m = B \cdot A^{-x} \). A pre-computed table of discrete logarithms may then be used to recover \( m \) from \( g^m \) (which is practical for small ranges of \( m \)).

The cryptosystem is additively homomorphic, as \( (A_1, B_1) \cdot (A_2, B_2) = (A_1 \cdot A_2, B_1 \cdot B_2) = (g^{k_1+k_2} \cdot pk^{k_1+k_2} \cdot g^{m_1+m_2}) \).

3 The PAPEETE Protocol

We now present the PAPEETE (Private, Authorized, fast PErsonal gEnomic TESting) protocol.

Entities. PAPEETE involves the following parties:

- User (\( U \)), on input their genomic data \( \{SNP_1, \ldots, SNP_n\} \), stored on their device and encoded as 3-bit binary vectors – e.g., if \( SNP_i = 1 \), it is encoded as 010;
- Testing Unity (\( T \)), on input weights, \( w_1, \ldots, w_n \), to be assigned to each SNP; and
- Certification Authority (\( CA \)).

Authorization. As illustrated in Fig. 2, \( T \) needs to obtain, from the \( CA \), the authorization to use weights \( \{w_1, \ldots, w_n\} \) to conduct personal genomic testing on users. Public parameters include an elliptic curve \( E \) of order \( q \), a generator \( G \), as well as the number of SNPs \( n \). We also assume that \( T \) and \( CA \) can establish a secure and authenticated channel, using standard network security techniques.

\( CA \) generates a keypair \( (e, d) \) s.t. \( e = 1/d \) (mod \( q \)), and keeps both values secret. Granting authorization to use weight \( w_i \) at position \( i \) essentially corresponds to \( CA \) performing an exponentiation, using her exponent \( e \), over \( w_i \) and \( i \). Note that \( CA \) needs to authorize the test only once (independently from the number of users), hence, we consider this to be part of an “offline” phase. Also, \( T \) can pre-compute the encryption of the (authorized) weights to speed up the online phase presented next.

Test. Fig. 3 shows how to execute a private and authorized test on \( U \)’s SNPs. \( T \) sends each encrypted and authorized weight, \( ct_i \), to \( U \), which, in a streaming fashion, computes the encrypted result of the test \( (ct_{res}) \). \( U \) also computes the sum of the positions of the SNPs \( (p_{res}) \), and sends it, together with \( ct_{res} \), to \( CA \). The latter needs to unmask the result before sending it back to \( T \).

Correctness. It is easy to observe that the protocol is correct:

\[
Res = \left( B_{res}^d \cdot G^{-p_{res}} \cdot A_{res}^{-x} \right)_{res} = G^{d \cdot x \cdot \sum k_j} \cdot G^{d \cdot e \cdot \sum i_j} \cdot G^{d \cdot e \cdot \sum w_j} \cdot G^{-p_{res}} \cdot G^{-d \cdot x \cdot \sum k_j}
\]

If \( \sum i_j = p_{res} \), the equation above will be equal to \( G^{-\sum w_j} \).

Security. To ease presentation, we do not include a complete security proof of the protocol, as it actually stems straightforwardly from ECDLP and DDH assumptions, respectively, for the authorization step and the underlying encryption scheme. As for the former, note that even if \( T \) could somehow calculate both \( G^{d} \) and \( G^{e} \) in some way, it would still not be able to sign weights, or remove the authorization exponent \( e \) from previously signed weights or results.
and performed 1,000 runs to evaluate real-world running times

A code base, available upon request, is written in Java, using the

Samy network (40Mbps) using TCP sockets. Our

An i5 2.4 GHz processor and 8GB of RAM memory, while U on

We have implemented our protocols

Offline operations. We start by analyzing the complexity of the authorization phase (Fig. 2), which is linear in the number of SNPs considered. CA needs to perform \( n \) exponentiations to authorize \( n \) weights (step (3)), while T performs \( O(n) \) exponentiations to encrypt the authorized weights (5). Note that T can reuse the same values \( (ct_i) \) for multiple tests. Communication complexity is also linear, as in steps (2) and (4), \( O(n) \) values are transferred between T and CA. Finally, we observe that all operations can be pipelined, which means that, unless T and CA are connected via a very slow link, authorizing the test (3) does not introduce a significant overhead on top of the weight encryption (5).

Online test. Next, we analyze the complexity of the online test (Fig. 3). Both computation and communication complexities are linear in the number of SNPs, and the steps involving CA (3)–(5) only requires the transmission of a constant number of ciphertexts and the computation of a constant number of exponentiations. Once again steps (1)–(2) can be pipelined.

Experimental setting. We have implemented our protocols and performed 1,000 runs to evaluate real-world running times and bandwidth consumption. Both T and CA run on an Apple MacBook Pro (OSX 10.11) equipped with an Intel Core i5 2.4 GHz processor and 8GB of RAM memory, while U on a Google Nexus 5 (Android 6.0.1), with a Qualcomm Snapdragon 800 2.3 GHz CPU and 2GB of RAM memory, all connected over a WiFi network (40Mbps) using TCP sockets. Our code base, available upon request, is written in Java, using the

### Table 2: Execution times and bandwidth consumption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SNPs</th>
<th>Offline</th>
<th>Online</th>
<th>Bandwidth</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAPEETE</td>
<td>PAPEETE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3.88s</td>
<td>0.82s</td>
<td>64.51KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>37.77s</td>
<td>7.03s</td>
<td>645.12KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>6.27m</td>
<td>1.31m</td>
<td>6.3MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>62.77m</td>
<td>18.89m</td>
<td>63MB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Spongy Castle cryptographic library for Android [18] and the Bouncy Castle library for Mac [19].

**Experimental results.** To speed up operations, we have used the following encoding in step (2) in the online test protocol (Fig. 3): if \( SNP_i = 0 \), we jump to the next value, while if \( SNP_i = 1 \), we execute the two computations as described; otherwise \( SNP_i = 2 \), we sum the ciphertexts \( ct_i \) twice. In Table 2, we report the running times as well as bandwidth consumption incurred by the PAPEETE protocol, and compare them against prior work that does not support authorization. More specifically, we have re-implemented and run the protocol in [4] using the same experimental settings discussed above. Note that [4] also has an “offline” step where weights can be pre-encrypted. We vary the number of SNPs considered, assuming that, on average, 20% of them is non-zero, as advised by colleagues in UCL’s Genetics Department.

We note that in all cases, complexities grow linear in the number of SNPs. Above few hundred thousand SNPs, we also observe a small “penalty” on the mobile device that is introduced by Android’s garbage collector, which is executed more often, thus occupying a non-negligible CPU time. With 1 million SNPs, the time required to authorize and encrypt the weights is approximately 1 hour, and anyway this operation needs to be performed only once. The same values can be used to run any number of tests on user’s SNPs, taking only an average time of less than 19 minutes. As for the bandwidth, with 1 million SNPs, 35MB are exchanged during the offline and 63MB during the online parts. We also measure the space required to store the SNPs on U’s smartphone, and for the authorized and encrypted weights on T’s computer. With 1 million SNPs, we need 418.5KB on the smartphone and 63MB on the laptop. Overall, our experiments demonstrate that (1) the overhead incurred by the authorization is negligible, when compared to state-of-the-art [4] (running times are only 1% slower), and (2) our protocol is very efficient and can thus already be used in the real world.

Finally, we perform another experiment aiming to evaluate the impact of non-zero SNPs on the user’s genome. To this end, in Fig. 4, we plot the total running time for the execution of a test using 10,000 SNPs, varying the percentage of non-zero SNPs from 20 (as in the previous experiments) to 50. We observe that performance also grows linearly, similarly to [4], but not to [2], where exponentiations are executed on all the SNPs, even the zero ones.

Somewhat unexpectedly, we find that, if we encode elliptic curve points in byte arrays before transferring them, we unexpectedly get a significant performance slow down. Thus, we encode and send each coordinate of the points individually.
5 Conclusion

In this short paper, we presented PAPEETE, a novel protocol supporting Private, Authorized, fast PErsonal gEnomic TEsting. We implemented a prototype of the protocol and evaluated experimentally, also comparing it against prior work that does not support authorization [4]. Our experiments attested to the real-world practicality of the protocol, which makes us confident that we will soon be able to deploy it in pilot applications in collaboration with geneticists and doctors.

As part of future work, we plan to develop a full-blown graphical user interface and perform user studies to assess the usability and acceptability of our techniques.

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References