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Paper 2017/691

Universal Forgery and Key Recovery Attacks: Application to FKS, FKD and Keyak

Fanbao Liu and Fengmei Liu

Abstract

In this paper, we provide a security analysis of the Full-State Keyed Sponge (FKS), Full-State Keyed Duplex (FKD) and Keyak, one of the third-round CAESAR candidates, in the classic setting and the quantum model, respectively. In the classic setting, we present an universal forgery attack that can be implemented in $O(2^{c/2})$ queries, where $c$ is the capacity. In the quantum model, by utilizing the Simon's algorithm, we propose an efficient universal forgery attack to FKS, FKD and Keyak with complexity of $O(c)$. Moreover, we also propose an efficient key recovery attack that can be implemented in $O(c)$. Such attacks show that FKS, FKD and Keyak is completely broken in the quantum model.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s)
lfbjantie @ 163 com
History
2017-07-21: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/691
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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