Post-quantum RSA

Daniel J.  Bernstein; Nadia Heninger; Paul Lou; Luke Valenta

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Paper 2017/351

Post-quantum RSA

Daniel J. Bernstein, Nadia Heninger, Paul Lou, and Luke Valenta

Abstract

This paper proposes RSA parameters for which (1) key generation, encryption, decryption, signing, and verification are feasible on today's computers while (2) all known attacks are infeasible, even assuming highly scalable quantum computers. As part of the performance analysis, this paper introduces a new algorithm to generate a batch of primes. As part of the attack analysis, this paper introduces a new quantum factorization algorithm that is often much faster than Shor's algorithm and much faster than pre-quantum factorization algorithms. Initial pqRSA implementation results are provided.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. PQCrypto 2017
Keywords: post-quantum cryptography RSA scalability Shor's algorithm ECM Grover's algorithm Make RSA Great Again
Contact author(s): authorcontact-pqrsa @ box cr yp to
History: 2017-04-26: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2017/351
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/351,
      author = {Daniel J.  Bernstein and Nadia Heninger and Paul Lou and Luke Valenta},
      title = {Post-quantum RSA},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/351},
      year = {2017},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/351}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/351}
}