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Paper 2017/231

EHE: nonce misuse-resistant message authentication

Sergey Agievich

Abstract

We propose a nonce misuse-resistant message authentication scheme called EHE (Encrypt-Hash-Encrypt). In EHE, a message-dependent polynomial is evaluated at the point which is an encrypted nonce. The resulting polynomial hash value is encrypted again and becomes an authentication tag. We prove the prf-security of the EHE scheme and extend it to two authenticated encryption modes which follow the "encrypt-then-authenticate" paradigm.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
message authenticationauthenticated encryptionpolynomial hashingprf-security
Contact author(s)
agievich @ bsu by
History
2020-03-16: last of 2 revisions
2017-03-08: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/231
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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