You are looking at a specific version 20180917:080329 of this paper. See the latest version.

Paper 2017/1079

Entropy Reduction for the Correlation-Enhanced Power Analysis Collision Attack

Andreas Wiemers and Dominik Klein

Abstract

Side Channel Attacks are an important attack vector on secure AES implementations. The Correlation-Enhanced Power Analysis Collision Attack by Moradi et al. is a powerful collision attack that exploits leakage caused by collisions in between S-Box computations of AES. The attack yields observations from which the AES key can be inferred. Due to noise, an insufficient number of collisions, or errors in the measurement setup, the attack does not find the correct AES key uniquely in practice, and it is unclear how to determine the key in such a scenario. Based on a theoretical analysis on how to quantify the remaining entropy, we derive a practical search algorithm. Both our theoretical analysis and practical experiments show that even in a setting with high noise or few available traces we can either successfully recover the full AES key or reduce its entropy significantly.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. Proc. IWSEC 2018, LNCS vol 11049
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-97916-8_4
Keywords
implementationAESside channel attackkey search
Contact author(s)
dominik klein @ bsi bund de
History
2019-12-23: last of 2 revisions
2017-11-10: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/1079
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.