Abstract

Proof systems for verifiable computation (VC) have the potential to make cloud outsourcing more trustworthy. Recent schemes enable a verifier with limited resources to delegate large computations and verify their outcome based on succinct arguments: verification complexity is linear in the size of the inputs and outputs (not the size of the computation). However, cloud computing also often involves large amounts of data, which may exceed the local storage and I/O capabilities of the verifier, and thus limit the use of VC.

In this paper, we investigate multi-relation hash & prove schemes for verifiable computations that operate on succinct data hashes. Hence, the verifier delegates both storage and computation to an untrusted worker. She uploads data and keeps hashes; exchanges hashes with other parties; verifies arguments that consume and produce hashes; and selectively downloads the actual data she needs to access.

Existing instantiations that fit our definition either target restricted classes of computations or employ relatively inefficient techniques. Instead, we propose efficient constructions that lift classes of existing arguments schemes for fixed relations to multi-relation hash & prove schemes. Our schemes (1) rely on hash algorithms that run linearly in the size of the input; (2) enable constant-time verification of arguments on hashed inputs; (3) incur minimal overhead for the prover. Their main benefit is to amortize the linear cost for the verifier across all relations with shared I/O. Concretely, compared to solutions that can be obtained from prior work, our new hash & prove constructions yield a 1,400x speed-up for provers. We also explain how to further reduce the linear verification costs by partially outsourcing the hash computation itself, obtaining a 480x speed-up when applied to existing VC schemes, even on single-relation executions.

1 Introduction

Cryptographic proof systems let a verifier check that the computation executed by an untrusted prover was performed correctly [28]. These systems are appealing in a variety of scenarios, such as cloud computing, where a user outsources computations and wishes to verify their integrity given their inputs and outputs (I/O) [2, 25], or privacy-preserving applications, where a
user owns sensitive data and wishes to release partial information with both confidentiality and integrity guarantees [42, 24]. Typically, these systems require the prover to perform considerable additional work to produce a proof that can be easily checked by the verifier.

Recent advances in verifiable computations have crossed an important practical threshold: verifying a proof given some I/O is faster than performing the computation locally [40, 7, 43, 45]. While these systems perform well when delegating computation-intensive algorithms, they do not help much with data-intensive applications, inasmuch as verification remains linear in the application’s I/O.

Although some linear work is unavoidable when uploading data, ideally one would like to pay this price just once, rather than every time one verifies a computation that takes this data as input. This is particularly relevant for cloud computing on big data, where the verifier may not have enough local resources to encode and upload the whole database each time she delegates a query or, more generally, where many parties contribute data over a long period of time.

Approaches providing amortized verification do exist for limited classes of computations, such as data retrieval. For instance, the user may keep the root of a Merkle hash tree, and use it to verify the retrieved content. Unfortunately, as explained below, embeddings of this approach into generic proof systems incur large overheads for the prover.

Our goal is to enable practical verifiable computation for data-intensive applications. In particular, we wish to design schemes where verification time is independent of both the size of the delegated computations and the size of their I/O. Moreover, we wish to preserve the expressiveness of existing VC schemes (e.g., supporting NP relations) without adding to the prover’s burden, which is already several orders of magnitude higher than the original computation.

Modelling Hash & Prove (HP) We first propose a model that captures the idea of hashing and uploading data once and then using the resulting hashes across multiple verifiable computations. In this model, the verifier needs only to keep track of hashes, while the prover stores the corresponding data. The prover can use the data to perform computations and then (selectively) return results in plaintext to the verifier. As described below, hashes yield several benefits when delegating verifiable computations.

Flexible Reuse Hashes depend only on the data and are not tied to any particular computation. Hence, once a data hash is computed, it can be used to verify any computation that uses the corresponding data. It can also be used with different proof systems, as long as they rely on the same hash format.

Sharing Hashes are a compact representation of the data that can be easily shared and authenticated. Hence, verifiers can delegate computations on someone else’s hashes, or chain multiple computations using intermediate hashes, without ever seeing or receiving the corresponding data.

Provenance A record of an input hash, an output hash, and a proof can serve as a succinct provenance token that can be easily and independently verified.

Confidentiality The verifier checks arguments on hashes of data that she may never see in plaintext; hence randomized hashes enable zero-knowledge arguments.

Updates If the hash mechanism also supports efficient updates, that is, given $\text{hash}(x)$, one can compute $\text{hash}(x')$ in time that depends only on the difference between $x$ and $x'$, then it also enables applications with dynamic data and streaming. For instance, a hashed database may be updated by uploading the new data and locally updating the hash.

Our hash & prove model extends non-interactive proof systems, with an intermediate hash algorithm between the input and the proof verification, and with the possibility of proving multiple
relations. It is inspired by multi-function verifiable computation \([41, 23]\), with relations instead of functions so that we can capture more general use cases, notably those where the prover provides its own (private) input to the computation.

**Instantiating Hash & Prove** Now equipped with a model for outsourcing multiple computations on authenticated data, we survey how existing solutions could be used to instantiate HP schemes. In particular, we observe that existing solutions have limitations either in efficiency or in generality.

Some prior work \([11, 26, 5, 16]\) considers the idea of proving the correctness of a computation on data succinctly represented by a hash. This approach consists of encoding the verification of the hash as part of a relation for the underlying proof system. Namely, if \( y = f(x) \) is the statement to be proved, then one actually proves an extended statement of the form \( y = f(x) \land \sigma = \text{hash}(x) \), essentially treating \( x \) as an additional witness. We henceforth refer to this method as an **inner encoding**. Inner encodings are simple and general, and can also be extended to more general data encodings such as Merkle trees or authenticated data structures (ADS) \([44, 22]\). On the other hand, inner encodings incur a significant overhead for the prover—indeed, unless \( \text{hash} \) is carefully tuned to the proof system, its verifiable evaluation on large inputs may dominate the prover costs.

Other works address reusability and succinct data representation by using different data encoding approaches that we will call **outer encodings**. The basic idea of outer encodings is that proofs are produced for the original statement, e.g., \( y = f(x) \), and are linked to the encoded data \( x \) using some external mechanism. Works that can be explained under this approach are commit & prove schemes \([33, 17, 20]\) and homomorphic authenticators \([4, 18, 29]\). While we discuss them in detail in Section 7, the main observation is that all these works fall short in generality; i.e., they limit the class of computations that can be executed on an hash value. While commit & prove schemes can achieve greater generality by using universal relations (as, e.g., in \([5, 7, 9]\)), this typically entails a significant penalty in concrete efficiency.

**New Hash & Prove Constructions** Our main technical contributions are efficient, general HP constructions. Compared to general inner encoding solutions, ours incurs minimal overheads for the prover. Compared to prior outer encoding solutions, ours is fully general, in the sense that one can hash data first, without any restriction on the functions that may later be executed and verified on it.

We instantiate multi-relation hash & prove schemes both in the public and designated verifier settings. Our solutions are built in a semi-generic fashion by combining

1. a verifiable computation (VC) or succinct non interactive argument (SNARG) scheme, and
2. an HP scheme for simple, specific computations.

At a high level, our construction uses an **outer** data encoding, where general computation integrity is handled by (1), whereas data authentication and linking to the computation is handled by (2). As expected from an outer approach, this combination does not add any overhead in the use of (1), and the overhead introduced by (2) can be very low.

More specifically, for (1) we use any scheme where the input-processing part of the verification consists of a multi-exponentiation, that is, anything resembling a Pedersen commitment of the form \( c_x = \prod_i F_i^{x_i} \), a property of virtually all modern, efficient SNARGs \([40, 7, 20, 9, 31]\). Our generic construction then outsources to the prover the original computation of (1) as well as the input-processing part of SNARG verification, \( c_x = \prod_i F_i^{x_i} \). We then ask the prover to show the correctness of \( c_x \) using the auxiliary HP scheme (2). To this end, we only need a scheme that handles multi-exponentiation computations. We propose our own efficient constructions for such HP schemes. For the designated verifier setting, we adapt a multi-function VC scheme from prior
work [23]. For public verifiability, we develop a new scheme, which requires new techniques to achieve adaptive security.

Our analysis in Section 6 shows that, in comparison to the inner encoding solution mentioned earlier, our HP scheme yields a $1,400 \times$ speed-up for provers, as well as public (proving) keys that are shorter by the same factor.

**Speeding up Hashing and Verification** As mentioned above, VC schemes involve a verification effort linear in the size of the I/O. Concretely, this verification step is expensive because it relies on public-key operations (e.g., a few elliptic-curve multiplications for each word of I/O). With Hash & Prove, this linear work is first shifted to computing the hash, and then amortized across multiple computations, but the hash still has to be computed once.

When using inner encodings, one can choose standard, very efficient hash functions such as SHA2, which considerably reduces the effort of the verifier, at the expenses of the prover. Other trade-offs between verifier and prover costs are possible, e.g., by using algebraic hash constructions [1, 8, 16]. When using outer encodings, the choice of a hash function is more constrained. For instance, in Geppetto or in our HP scheme, the encoding still consists of a multi-exponentiation (i.e., $n$ elliptic-curve multiplications where $n$ is the size of the input).

As another contribution, we provide a technique to outsource such (relatively) expensive data encodings, at a moderate additional cost for the prover, while requiring only a trivial amount of linear work from the verifier: an arbitrary (fast) hash such as SHA2, and a few cheap field additions and multiplications, instead of elliptic curve operations. Concretely, this technique saves two orders of magnitude in verification time. It applies not only to our HP scheme, but also to existing VC systems [40, 20, 9].

**Other Data Encodings** In our presentation, we focus on plain hashes as a simple data encoding for all I/O, but many alternatives and variations are possible, depending on the needs of a given application. As a first example, the I/O can naturally be partitioned into several variables, each independently hashed and verified, to separate inputs from different parties, or with different live spans. (In a data-intensive application, for instance, one may use a hash for the whole database, and a separate hash for the query and its response.) More advanced examples include authenticated data structures, and more specific tools such as accumulators. To illustrate potential extensions of our work, we show that the HP model, and our generic HP construction, can be extended to work with such outer encodings. Concretely, we consider accumulators [37] and polynomial commitments [32], with set operations [38] and batch openings as restricted proof systems, respectively. By adapting our constructions, we obtain a new accumulate & prove system.

**Contents** The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines our notations, reviews assumptions we rely on, and recalls definitions of succinct non-interactive argument systems. Section 3 defines our hash & prove model, shows that some of the existing work satisfies it, and discusses their overhead for the prover. Section 4 presents our efficient HP construction and instantiates it for public and designated verifier settings. Section 5 presents the definition and construction of a hash & prove variant that supports hash outsourcing. Section 6 analyze the performance of our constructions. Section 7 discusses related work.

In the Appendix, we provide auxiliary definitions, detailed proofs, and an extension of our work from hashes to cryptographic accumulators.
2 Preliminaries

Notation. Given two functions \( f, g : \mathbb{N} \to [0, 1] \) we write \( f(\lambda) \approx g(\lambda) \) when \( |f(\lambda) - g(\lambda)| = \lambda^{-\omega(1)} \). In other words, for all \( k \), there exists an integer \( n_0 \) such that for all \( \lambda > n_0 \), we have \( |f(\lambda) - g(\lambda)| < \frac{1}{\lambda^k} \). We say that \( f \) is negligible when \( f(\lambda) \approx 0 \).

Algebraic Tools and Complexity Assumptions. All our constructions make use of asymmetric bilinear prime-order groups \( \mathcal{G}_\lambda = (e, G_1, G_2, \mathcal{G}_T, p, g_1, g_2) \) with an admissible bilinear map \( e : G_1 \times G_2 \to \mathcal{G}_T \). We use fixed groups for every value of the security parameter; this lets us compose schemes that use them without requiring a joint setup algorithm. Even when pairings are not required, we define schemes for group \( G_1 \) and generator \( g_1 \) to anticipate their usage in later constructions. Our constructions are proven secure under the following assumptions.

Assumption 1 (Strong External Diffie-Hellman [39]). The Strong External Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption holds if every p.p.t. adversary solves the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problems in \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \) only with a negligible advantage.

We introduce the Flexible co-CDH assumption and prove that it is implied by the above SXDH assumption.

Assumption 2 (Flexible co-CDH). The Flexible co-CDH assumption holds if, given \( (g_2, g_2^a) \) where \( g_2 \overset{\$}{\in} G_2, a \overset{\$}{\in} \mathbb{Z}_p \), every p.p.t. adversary outputs a tuple \( (h, h^a) \in G_1^2 \) such that \( h \neq 1 \) only with negligible probability.

Lemma 2.1. Strong External Diffie-Hellman implies Flexible co-CDH.

Proof. Given \( A \) that solves Flexible co-CDH with non-negligible advantage, we show how to build an adversary \( A' \) for DDH in \( G_2 \). \( A' \) is given a DDH instance \( (g, g^a, g^b, C) \in G_1^4 \) and has to decide if \( C = g^{ab} \). \( A' \) runs \( A \) with input \( (g, g^a) \). Let \( A \) output \( (h, h^a) \). Then \( A' \) can check if \( C = g^{ab} \) by checking if \( e(h^a, g^b) = e(h, C) \) holds. Hence \( A' \) succeeds in solving the DDH instance with \( A \)'s success probability. \( \square \)

For extractability, we optionally require the following assumption parameterized by hash size \( n \):

Assumption 3 (Bilinear \( n \)-Knowledge of Exponent). The Bilinear \( n \)-Knowledge of Exponent assumption holds if, for every p.p.t. adversary \( A \), there exists a p.p.t. extractor \( E \) such that for all large enough \( \lambda \) and ‘benign’ auxiliary input \( \text{aux} \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\lambda)} \)

\[
\Pr \left[ \text{pp} = \mathcal{G}_\lambda; H_i \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_1; \omega \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p; (A, B; (x_1, \ldots, x_n)) \leftarrow (A\|E)(\text{pp}, \{H_i, H_i^\omega\}_{i=1}^n, \text{aux}) : A^\omega = B \land A \neq \prod_{i=1}^n H_i^{x_i} \right] \approx 0
\]

In the game above, \( (u; w) \leftarrow (A\|E) \) indicates running both algorithms on the same inputs and random tape, and assigning their results to \( u \) and to \( w \), respectively. This assumption can been seen as an \( n \)-Knowledge of Exponent Assumption [11] but for the general group model. Indeed the authors of [11] use the argument by Groth [30] to conjecture that their assumption must hold independently of the bilinear structure. Auxiliary input is required to be drawn from a ‘benign distribution’ to avoid impossibility of certain knowledge assumptions [12, 10].
2.1 Online-Offline SNARKs

We recall the definition of succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARG) and arguments of knowledge (SNARK) as used by our constructions.

Let \( \{R_\lambda\}_\lambda \) be a sequence of families of efficiently decidable relations \( R \in \mathcal{R}_\lambda \), with \( R \subset U_R \times W_R \). For pairs \((u; w) \in R\), we call \( u \) the instance and \( w \) the witness; we are interested in producing and verifying arguments that \( \exists w. R(u; w) \) holds. We require that all instances include some data in a fixed format. That is, for each \( R \in \mathcal{R}_\lambda \), we have \( U_R = X \times V_R \) and instances are of the form \((x, v)\). For example, \( u \) may consist of the input \( x \) and output \( y \) of a function with domain \( X \), i.e., \( y = f(x) \). More generally, \( u \) may consist of the inputs \( x, y \) and output \( z \) of functions whose domains include \( X \), i.e., \( z = f(x, y) \).

For any sequence of families of efficiently decidable relations \( \{R_\lambda\}_\lambda \) as defined above, SNARGs and SNARKs consist of 3 algorithms \( \mathcal{VC} = \langle \text{KeyGen, Prove, Verify} \rangle \), as follows.

\[(\text{EK, VK}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda, R) \text{ takes the security parameter and a relation } R \in \mathcal{R}_\lambda \text{ and computes evaluation and verification keys.} \]

\[\Pi \leftarrow \text{Prove}(\text{EK}, u; w) \text{ takes an evaluation key for } R, \text{ an instance } u, \text{ and a witness } w \text{ such that } R(u; w) \text{ holds, and returns a proof.} \]

\[b \leftarrow \text{Verify}(\text{VK}, u, \Pi) \text{ takes a verification key and an instance } u, \text{ and either accepts } (b = 1) \text{ or rejects } (b = 0) \text{ the proof } \Pi. \]

\[(\text{EK, VK}) \text{ are also referred to as the common reference string.} \]

**Definition 2.1 (Soundness).** A VC scheme is sound if, for all sequences \( \{R_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) in \( \{\mathcal{R}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) and all p.p.t. adversaries \( \mathcal{A} \), we have

\[
\Pr\left[\begin{array}{c}
\text{EK, VK} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda, R_\lambda); \\
\Pi \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{EK, VK, R}_\lambda); \\
\text{Verify}(\text{VK}, u, \Pi) \land \neg \exists w. R_\lambda(u; w)
\end{array}\right] \approx 0.
\]

**Online-Offline Verification** ¹ The verification algorithm of many SNARG constructions can be split into offline and online computations. Specifically, for many SNARGs, there exists algorithms \((\text{Online, Offline})\) such that:

\[\text{Verify}(\text{VK}, u, \Pi) = \text{Online}(\text{VK, Offline}(\text{VK}, x), v, \Pi).\]

The offline phase can be seen as the computation of one or more Pedersen-like commitments \( c_x \) (here, \( c_x = \text{Offline}(\text{VK}, x) \)), some of which may be computed by the prover, and possibly never opened by the verifier. On their own, such commitments are not perfectly binding, so this involves modelling adversaries that do not output \((u, w)\) but still must ‘know’ the value they are committing to. For such cases, we require the existence of an algorithm \( \mathcal{E} \) that can extract \( x \) and \( w \) from a verifying proof.

**Definition 2.2 (Online Knowledge Soundness).** A VC scheme is online knowledge sound if, for all sequences \( \{R_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) in \( \{\mathcal{R}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) and all p.p.t. adversaries \( \mathcal{A} \), there exists a p.p.t. extractor \( \mathcal{E} \) such that

\[
\Pr\left[\begin{array}{c}
\text{EK, VK} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda, R_\lambda); \\
(c_x, v, \Pi; x, w) \leftarrow (\mathcal{A}||\mathcal{E})(\text{EK, VK, R}_\lambda); \\
\text{Online}(\text{VK, c}_x, v, \Pi) = 1 \land \neg R_\lambda(x, v; w)
\end{array}\right] \approx 0
\]

¹The offline phase is not to be confused with input-independent precomputation steps of the verifier in [8, 9].
Instantiations of Online-Offline SNARKs Many succinct verifiable-computation constructions [21, 7, 9, 31] can be presented in a style that make more apparent their reliance on commitments on their inputs, outputs, and internal witnesses. We may instantiate VC using, for example, the Geppetto construction [20], which explicitly separates (offline) commitments and (online) proofs and provides online knowledge soundness.

Instantiation of Offline Verification In our work, we consider schemes where the offline computations consist purely of multi-exponentiations in $G_1$ over the instance $u$, followed by online computations that accept or reject the proof. As mentioned above, we consider the case when $U_R$ splits into $X, V_R$. More specifically, we assume that $X = \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ and $\text{Offline}(VK, x) = \prod_i F_i^{x_i}$ from $X$ to $G_1$, where the group elements $(F_1, F_2, \ldots, F_n) \in G_1^n$ are part of the keys. The VC schemes discussed above follow this format.

3 Multi-Relation Hash & Prove Schemes (HP)

We define our schemes for efficiently decidable relations $R \in \mathcal{R}_\lambda$, with $R \subseteq U_R \times W_R$. Recall that we are interested in producing and verifying arguments that $\exists w. R(u; w)$ holds for pairs $(u; w) \in R$, where $u$ is the instance and $w$ the witness. The witness can often speed up verification by providing a non-deterministic hint, as verification is often more efficient than computation, notably in the case of relations for NP complete languages. We keep the witness implicit when they can be efficiently computed from the instance. As in Section 2.1, we consider relations where $U_R$ splits into $X, V_R$.

A multi-relation hash & prove scheme consists of 5 algorithms $\text{HP} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Hash}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$, as follows.

$\text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ takes the security parameter and generates the public parameter for the scheme;
$\sigma_x \leftarrow \text{Hash}(\text{pp}, x)$ produces a hash given some data $x \in X$;
$E_{K_R}, V_{K_R} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{pp}, R)$ generates evaluation key $E_{K_R}$ and verification key $V_{K_R}$ given a relation $R \in \mathcal{R}_\lambda$;
$\Pi_R \leftarrow \text{Prove}(E_{K_R}, x, v; w)$ produces a proof of $R(x, v; w)$ given an instance and witness that satisfy the relation.
$b \leftarrow \text{Verify}(V_{K_R}, \sigma_x, v, \Pi_R)$ either accepts ($b = 1$) or rejects ($b = 0$) a proof of $R$ given a hash of $x$ and the rest of its instance $v$.

Note that hashes of inputs and the keys of a relation can be computed independently. In particular, $\sigma_x$ can be computed `offline’, before generating keys, proving, or verifying instances of relations; and can be shared between all these operations.

3.1 Adaptive Soundness

We describe our intended security properties for an HP scheme, distinguishing two cases. We first define adaptive soundness with multiple relations and public verifiability, then describe a variant with a single relation.

Definition 3.1 (Adaptive Soundness). A multi-relation hash & prove scheme HP is adaptively sound if every p.p.t. adversary with access to oracle $\text{KEYGEN}$ wins the game below with negligible
Adaptive Forgery Game

\( \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \)
\( R, x, v, \Pi \leftarrow A^{\text{KeyGen}}(1^\lambda, pp) \)
\( A \) wins if \( \text{Verify}(R, x, v, \Pi) = 1 \) and \( \neg \exists w.R(x, v; w) \)

KEYGEN\((R)\)
- if \( VK(R) \) exists, return \( \bot \)
- \( \text{EK}, \text{VK} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pp, R) \)
- \( VK(R) := \text{VK} \)
- return \((\text{EK}, \text{VK})\)

VERIFY\((R, x, v, \Pi)\)
- if \( VK(R) \) undefined, return \( 0 \)
- \( \sigma \leftarrow \text{Hash}(pp, x) \)
- return \( \text{Verify}(VK(R), \sigma, v, \Pi) \)

The designated-verifier variant of adaptive soundness is obtained by having \( \text{KEYGEN} \) return only \( \text{EK} \), and giving \( A \) oracle access to \( \text{VERIFY} \). The single-relation variant is obtained by requesting that the adversary calls \( \text{KEYGEN} \) once.

Informally, adaptive soundness means that an adversary that interacts with a verifier on any number of chosen instances of relations supported by \( \text{HP} \) cannot forge any argument. Although the \( \text{VERIFY} \) procedure in the experiment always recomputes \( \sigma_x \), this hash can of course be shared between verifications of multiple instances that use the same \( x \).

Unfolding the definition, the single-relation, public verifiability game is defined by

Adaptive Forgery Game (single relation, public verifiability) \( \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \)
\( R, \text{state} \leftarrow A_0(1^\lambda, pp) \)
\( \text{EK}, \text{VK} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pp, R) \)
\( x, v, \Pi \leftarrow A_1(\text{state}, \text{EK}, \text{VK}) \)
\( A \) wins if \( \text{Verify}(VK, \text{Hash}(pp, x), v, \Pi) = 1 \) and \( \neg \exists w. R(x, v; w) \)

This simpler, single-relation game is still adaptive, in the sense that the relation \( R \) can be chosen by \( A \) with knowledge of \( pp \), and the instance \( x, v \) can depend on \( \text{EK}, \text{VK} \). Using a standard hybrid argument, we confirm that adaptive single-relation soundness implies adaptive soundness.

**Theorem 3.1** (Security of multi-relation \( \text{HP} \)). A \( \text{HP} \) scheme that is \( \epsilon \)-secure as per Definition 3.1 for a single relation is \( q \epsilon \)-secure for multiple relations, where \( q \) bounds the number of calls to \( \text{KEYGEN} \) made by the adversary.

The proof is in Appendix D.1.

### 3.2 Accepting Hashes from the Adversary

In the definition of adaptive soundness, all hash outputs need to be trusted: at some point, the verifier is given \( x \) and honestly computes its hash \( \sigma_x \), or (equivalently) receives \( \sigma_x \) from a trusted party. However, there are cases where the verifier may be given \( \sigma_x \) but not \( x \). As an example, a composite argument that there exists an intermediate \( x \in X \) such that \( f(z) = x \) and \( g(x) = r \) may consist of \( z, \sigma_x, r, \Pi_f, \Pi_g \) where \( \Pi_f \) and \( \Pi_g \) prove the two functional relations above. Passing an ‘opaque’ hash \( \sigma_x \) may be more efficient than passing \( x \), and may enable the prover to keep \( x \) secret.

Similarly, one may see \( \sigma_x \) as a binding commitment to some \( x \), received from the adversary, then later used in arguments that disclose some of its contents. Definition 3.1 does not account for such arguments.
In order for HP to support arguments on hashes provided by the adversary, we further require that its Hash algorithm is an extractable collision-resistant hash function. The extractability property guarantees that $\sigma_x$ was indeed produced by Hash on some input $x$. The collision-resistance property guarantees that it is hard to produce two inputs for which Hash produces the same output.

**Definition 3.2 (Hash Extractability [11]).** A hash function Hash is extractable when, for any p.p.t. adversary $A$, there exists a p.p.t. extractor $E$ such that, for a large enough security parameter $\lambda$ and ‘benign’ auxiliary input $\text{aux} \in \{0,1\}^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$, the adversary wins the game below with negligible probability.

**Hash Extraction Game**

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{pp} &\leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\
(\sigma; x_e) &\leftarrow (A\parallel E)(\text{pp}, \text{aux}) \\
A \text{ wins if } \exists x. \text{Hash}(\text{pp}, x) = \sigma \land \sigma \neq \text{Hash}(\text{pp}, x_e)
\end{align*}
\]

and there is a p.p.t. algorithm Check$(\text{pp}, \sigma)$ that returns 1 if $\exists x. \text{Hash}(\text{pp}, x) = \sigma$ and 0 otherwise.

(In the game above, $(A\parallel E)$ indicates running both algorithms on the same inputs and random tape, and assigning their results to $\sigma$ and to $x_e$, respectively.) In contrast with the original definition of [11], we require the existence of Check so that our verifiers can check the well-formedness of hashes received from the adversary.

Adaptive soundness for HP schemes guarantees collision-resistance for Hash as long as, for all $x_0 \neq x_1$, there exists a relation $R \in \mathcal{R}_\lambda$ and $v \in \mathcal{V}_R$ to separate them, that is, $\exists w.R(x_1, v; w) \land \neg \exists w.R(x_0, v; w)$. On the other hand, adaptive soundness does not guarantee that $\sigma$ is unique, nor does it exclude adversaries able to forge $\sigma$ that pass verification.

Complementarily, hash extraction enables us to verify arguments that include opaque hashes provided by the adversary by first extracting their content then applying adaptive soundness. To formalize this idea, we complete our definitions with a more generally useful notion of soundness, called **adaptive hash soundness**.

At a high level, an adaptively hash sound HP scheme allows us to verify a composite argument whose instances mix plaintext values $x \in X$ and opaque hashes $\sigma \in \Sigma$, where $\Sigma$ is a finite set of hashes; importantly, the same $\sigma$ can occur in multiple instances. To verify the argument, the verifier checks each proof using hashes that are either recomputed from $x \in X$ (once for each $x$, similar to Definition 3.1), or checked for well-formedness.

Our main result for this property is that any scheme HP that is both adaptively sound and hash extractable is also adaptively hash sound. This result relies on soundness of HP, provided that one has access to preimages of the hash values $\sigma \in \Sigma$; in turn, this requirement is guaranteed by the hash extractability property.

We provide a formal definition as well as the proof of the result above in Appendix A.

**Stronger Security Notions for HP** Our security definitions for HP schemes model adaptive soundness and extractability of hash inputs, but not extractability of witnesses, i.e., an equivalent of knowledge soundness for HP schemes. While adaptive soundness is sufficient for applications such as verifiable computation in which the input data is supplied by the verifier, knowledge soundness can be useful when using HP schemes in larger cryptographic protocols and in applications where the prover also provides some input. Elaborating such a definition of knowledge soundness for HP schemes (and proving a construction using it) raises subtleties related to defining an extractor for an adversary that has adaptive access to the KEYGEN oracle. We believe this is an interesting direction, which we leave for future work. Another useful security notion that may be considered is zero-knowledge, which intuitively guarantees that proofs do not reveal any non-trivial information about the witnesses. A zero-knowledge definition for HP schemes is provided in Appendix B.
3.3 Hash & Prove Scheme via Inner Encoding

In the introduction, we distinguished between two ways of embedding data representation inside VC schemes: inner and outer encodings. Here we describe a construction proposed in [11, 26, 5, 16] which serves as an example of inner encoding. We call this scheme $\text{HP}_{\text{inn}}$. The construction is presented for completeness (to show that it formally adheres our new definitions), and to facilitate the comparison with our new constructions of Section 4.

The construction uses a keyed, collision-resistant hash scheme with domain $X$, consisting of two algorithms $k \leftarrow \text{keygen}(1^\lambda)$ and $\sigma \leftarrow \text{hash}_k(x)$, together with a succinct argument VC for a family of relations $R'$, defined next.

Intuitively, we check the computation $\sigma = \text{hash}_k(x)$ within the proof system: to argue on a relation $R$ in $\text{HP}_{\text{inn}}$, our construction uses VC on a relation $R'$:

$$R'(\sigma_x, x, w) = R(x, v; w) \land (\sigma_x = \text{hash}_k(x)).$$

Compared with $R$, the relation $R'$ uses $\sigma_x$ instead of $x$ in the instance, and takes $x$ as an additional witness. (Presumably, $\sigma_x$ is smaller than $x$ and easier to process in proof verifications.) We define $\text{HP}_{\text{inn}}$ as follows:

- Setup($1^\lambda$) samples $k \leftarrow \text{keygen}(1^\lambda)$ and returns $k$ as pp;
- Hash(pp, x) computes $\sigma_x \leftarrow \text{hash}_pp(x)$;
- KeyGen(pp, $R'$) generates ($EK_{R'}, VK_{R'}$) $\leftarrow$ VC.KeyGen($1^\lambda$, $R'$);
- Prove($EK_{R'}, x, v; w$) returns $\Pi \leftarrow$ VC.Prove($EK_{R'}, v, \sigma_x; x, w$) for $\sigma_x = \text{hash}_pp(x)$;
- Verify($VK_{R'}, \sigma_x, v, \Pi$) returns VC.Verify($VK_{R'}, \sigma_x, v, \Pi$).

**Theorem 3.2.** If VC is knowledge-sound and hash is collision-resistant, then $\text{HP}_{\text{inn}}$ is adaptively sound (Definition 3.1 for multiple relations).

The proof can be found in Appendix D.2.

**Hash Extractability.** The construction above naturally extends to extractable hashes, by applying VC to the relation that checks the hash computation, defined by

$$R_{k}(\sigma; x) = (\sigma = \text{hash}_k(x)).$$

We write $\text{HP}_{E}$ for the resulting scheme, obtained from $\text{HP}_{\text{inn}}$ above by extending the Setup and Hash algorithms and adding a Check algorithm:

- Setup$_E$(1$^\lambda$) samples $k \leftarrow \text{keygen}(1^\lambda)$; generates $EK_{pp}, VK_{pp} \leftarrow$ VC.KeyGen(pp, $R_k$); and returns $pp = (k, EK_{pp}, VK_{pp})$;
- Hash$_E$(pp, x) computes $\sigma_x \leftarrow \text{hash}_k(x)$; $\Pi \leftarrow$ VC.Prove($EK_{pp}, \sigma_x; x$) and returns $\sigma = (\sigma_x, \Pi)$.
- Check(pp, $\sigma$) parses $\sigma$ as $(\sigma_x, \Pi)$ and returns VC.Verify($VK_{pp}, \sigma_x, v, \Pi$).

**Theorem 3.3.** If VC is knowledge-sound, then $\text{HP}_{E}$ is hash extractable (Definition 3.2).

The proof of Theorem 3.3 follows from the existence of the VC extractor.

By using a separate VC scheme on a new relation $R_k$, rather than re-using a VC scheme on one of the relations $R'$, we can use knowledge soundness in a completely standard manner, taking only the key $k$ as ‘benign’ auxiliary input.
**Discussion.** The HP_{inn} construction is simple, and can be extended to Merkle trees [16] to provide logarithmic random access in data structures. Its main practical drawback is that the relation to be verified now includes a hash computation, which adds tens of thousands of cryptographic operations to the prover’s workload for each block of input when using standard algorithms such as SHA2 (Section 6). To lower this considerable cost for the prover, one pragmatically chooses custom, algebraic hash functions, which in turn increases the cost for the verifier that computes the digest. In the following sections we present constructions that are efficient for both the prover and the verifier.

### 4 Hash & Prove Constructions

In this section we present our main technical contribution: two efficient multi-relation hash & prove schemes for families of relations $R_\lambda$. We let $R(x, v; w)$ range over these relations.

Our two schemes are obtained via a generic hash & prove construction that relies on two main building blocks: (i) any SNARK scheme that has offline/online verification algorithms (cf. Section 2.1) and where the offline verification consists of a multi-exponentiation in a group $G_1$; (ii) any HP scheme that allows to prove the correctness of such multi-exponentiations.

Before presenting our generic construction in full detail, we provide some intuition. We start from the observation that in offline/online SNARKs the verifier already computes an element $c_x = \prod_i F_i^{x_i}$. Although $c_x$ can be seen as a hash of the input $x$, such hash is relation-specific because the elements $F_i$ depend on the relation $R$ that was used in the SNARK’s KeyGen. Our main idea is to outsource the computation of $c_x$ to the prover in order to obtain an HP scheme where $x$ can be hashed in a relation-independent manner. Then, we ask the prover to show the correctness of $c_x$ using an HP scheme (where hashes are indeed relation-independent) that supports relations of the form $(x, c_x) : c_x = \prod_i F_i^{x_i}$.

Building an HP scheme from another HP scheme may look silly at first, however the key point is that we require an HP that supports a specific class of relations: only multi-exponentiations. Conversely, our method can be seen as a way to bootstrap, via SNARKs, an HP scheme that supports one specific class of computations into another one that can support arbitrary computations.

Following the generic HP construction from a hash & prove scheme for multi-exponentiation, we propose new constructions to instantiate the latter. The first, called XP₁, is publicly verifiable, whereas the second one, called XP₂, is in the designated verifier model but enjoys better efficiency. The two new schemes are significantly more efficient than what could be obtained using known techniques (e.g., the construction based on inner encoding in Section 3.3).

As a result, the instantiation of our generic construction with state-of-the-art SNARKs and our new HP for multi-exponentiation yields an HP system that, compared to the solution in Section 3.3, is at least $1,400 \times$ times faster for the prover and the key generator (cf. Section 6).

The rest of the section is organized as follows. In Section 4.1 we describe the generic construction; in Section 4.2 we give our publicly verifiable HP scheme for multi-exponentiation, and in Section 4.3 we give the designated verifier one. Finally, in Section 4.4 we outline additional properties of our constructions, including data updates and extension of HP to accumulators.

#### 4.1 Generic Hash & Prove Scheme (HP\_gen)

Let $VC = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$ be a SNARG scheme that supports a sequence of relations $\{R_\lambda\}_\lambda$ and that has offline/online verification, as described in Section 2.1: we assume that every verification key $VK$ of $VC$ includes group elements $F_1, \ldots, F_n \in G_1$ and that $\text{Offline}(VK, x) = \prod_{i=1}^n F_i^{x_i}$ computes a commitment $c_x$. 

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Let \( \text{XP} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Hash}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify}) \) be an HP scheme that supports relations \( F \subseteq U \times \emptyset \) where \( u \) is \( \mathbb{Z}_p^n \times \mathbb{G}_1 \), every \( F \in F \) is defined by a vector \( F = (F_1, \ldots, F_n) \in \mathbb{G}_1^n \), and a pair \( (x, c_x) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n \times \mathbb{G}_1 \) is in \( F \) iff \( \prod_{i=1}^n F_i^{x_i} = c_x \).

We use \( \text{XP} \) and \( \text{VC} \) to construct a scheme \( \text{HP}_{\text{gen}} \) that supports any combination of relations \( R(x, v; w) \) supported by \( \text{VC} \). The only requirement is that both schemes have compatible (or identical) public parameters. Namely, they share the same bilinear group setting, and the number of inputs in \( x, n, \) should be the same as in \( \text{XP} \).

\( \text{HP}_{\text{gen}} \) is defined as follows:

- **Setup(\( 1^\lambda \))** runs \( \text{XP.Setup}(\lambda) \) and returns its public parameters \( pp \).
- **Hash(pp, x)** returns \( \sigma_x := \text{XP.Hash}(pp, x) \).
- **KeyGen(pp, R)** takes a relation \( R \) and runs
  
  \[
  \text{EK}, \text{VK} \leftarrow \text{VC.KeyGen}(\lambda, R);
  \]
  
  Let \( F := (F_1, F_2, \ldots, F_n) \) be the ‘offline’ elements in \( \text{VK} \);
  
  \[
  \text{EK}_F, \text{VK}_F \leftarrow \text{XP.KeyGen}(pp, F);
  \]
  
  return \( \text{EK}_R := (\text{EK}, \text{VK}, \text{EK}_F), \text{VK}_R := (\text{VK}, \text{VK}_F) \).

- **Prove(EK_R, x, v; w)** parses \( \text{EK}_R \) as \( (\text{EK}, \text{VK}, \text{EK}_F) \) then runs
  
  \[
  c_x \leftarrow \text{VC.Offline}(\text{VK}, x);
  \]
  
  \[
  \Pi \leftarrow \text{VC.Prove}(\text{EK}, x, v; w);
  \]
  
  \[
  \Phi_x \leftarrow \text{XP.Prove}(\text{EK}_F, x, c_x);
  \]
  
  return \( \Pi_R := (c_x, \Pi, \Phi_x) \).

- **Verify(VK_R, \sigma_x, v, \Pi_R)** parses \( \text{VK}_R \) as \( (\text{VK}, \text{VK}_F) \) and \( \Pi_R \) as \( (c_x, \Pi, \Phi_x) \), and returns
  
  \[
  \text{VC.Online}(\text{VK}, c_x, v, \Pi) \wedge \text{XP.Verify}(\text{VK}_F, \sigma_x, c_x, \Phi_x) \).

Hence, proofs \( \Pi_R \) in \( \text{HP}_{\text{gen}} \) carry three representations of \( x \): its portable hash \( \sigma_x \); its offline relation-specific commitment \( c_x \); and a multi-exponentiation proof \( \Phi_x \) that binds the two. Compared with \( \text{VC} \) proofs, and using our instantiations of \( \text{XP} \) described later in this section, the communication overhead for \( \text{HP}_{\text{gen}} \) proofs is two group elements (or three if we want hash extractability).

The following theorem states the security of \( \text{HP}_{\text{gen}} \).

**Theorem 4.1.** If \( \text{XP} \) is adaptively sound in the publicly verifiable (resp. designated verifier) setting, and \( \text{VC} \) is sound, then the \( \text{HP}_{\text{gen}} \) construction in Section 4.1 is adaptively sound in the publicly verifiable (resp. designated verifier) setting.

The full proof appears in Appendix D.3.

The idea is rather simple: any adversary which breaks \( \text{HP}_{\text{gen}} \) has to either break the security of the underlying \( \text{VC} \) scheme, or cheat on the value of \( c_x \), thus breaking the security of \( \text{XP} \). Our proof shows a reduction for each case.

We also give a corollary that essentially says that, by instantiating our generic construction with a hash extractable \( \text{XP} \) scheme, we can handle arguments with untrusted hashes. It follows by construction of \( \text{HP}_{\text{gen}} \), observing that this scheme uses the hashing algorithm of \( \text{XP} \).

**Corollary 4.1.** If \( \text{XP} \) is hash extractable, then the \( \text{HP}_{\text{gen}} \) construction in Section 4.1 is also hash extractable.
4.2 Our Publicly Verifiable HP Scheme for Multi-Exponentiation (XP₁)

We present our second key technical contribution: a hash & prove scheme, called XP₁, for the class of multi-exponentiation relations \( F \) described above.

For clarity, we write \( \Phi \) instead of \( \Pi \) for restricted proofs.

**Setup(1^λ)** samples \( H_i \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_1 \) for \( i \in [1,n] \) and returns \( \text{pp} = (G_\lambda, H) \) where \( H = (H_1, \ldots, H_n) \).

**Hash(pp, (x₁, \ldots, xₙ))** returns \( \sigma_x \leftarrow \prod_{i \in [1,n]} H_{ix_i} \).

**KeyGen(pp, F)** samples \( u, v, w \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) and computes \( U \leftarrow g_2^u, V \leftarrow g_2^v, W \leftarrow g_2^w \); and computes \( T_i \leftarrow H_{ix_i}^u R_i^v F_i^w \) for \( i \in [1,n] \); and returns \( \text{EK}_F = (F, T, R) \) and \( \text{VK}_F = (U, V, W) \) where \( R = (R_1, \ldots, R_n) \) and \( T = (T_1, \ldots, T_n) \).

**Prove(EK_F, (x₁, \ldots, xₙ), cₓ)** computes \( T_x \leftarrow \prod_{i \in [1,n]} T_{ix_i} \) and \( R_x \leftarrow \prod_{i \in [1,n]} R_{ix_i} \); and returns \( \Phi_x = (T_x, R_x) \).

(Implicitly we require that \( c_x = \prod_{i \in [1,n]} F_{ix_i} \), though the \( c_x \) part of the instance is not used in the computation of the proof.)

**Verify(VK_F, σₓ, cₓ, Φₓ)** parses \( \Phi_x = (T_x, R_x) \) and returns
\[
e(T_x, g_2) = e(\sigma_x, U) e(R_x, V) e(c_x, W).
\]

The following theorem states that XP₁ scheme is secure. Correctness follows by inspection.

**Theorem 4.2** (Adaptive Soundness of XP₁). If the Strong External DDH Assumption holds, then the XP₁ scheme above is adaptively sound (Definition 3.1 for multiple relations).

**Proof Outline.** The proof works by considering the case of a single relation as the extension to multiple relations is obtained by applying Theorem 3.1.

Below we provide the outline of the security proof via a sequence of game hops.

**Game 0:** this is the adaptive soundness game of Definition 3.1 restricted to a single relation.

**Game 1:** this is a modification of Game 0 as follows. When answering the (single) **KEYGEN(F)** oracle query, the challenger sets \( w = \gamma v + \delta \) for random \( \gamma, \delta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \) (instead of sampling \( w \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \)). Next, when the adversary returns the proof \( (x^*, c^*, \Phi^*) \), with \( \Phi^* = (T^*, R^*) \), the challenger computes \( \hat{T} \leftarrow \prod_{i \in [1,n]} T_{ix_i}^* \) and \( \hat{c} \leftarrow \prod_{i \in [1,n]} F_{ix_i}^* \). Then, if \( (T^*/\hat{T})(\hat{c}/c^*)^\delta = 1 \) the outcome of the game is changed so that the adversary does not win.

We claim that Game 0 and Game 1 are statistically indistinguishable. The intuition is that \( \delta \) is information theoretically hidden from the adversary, which implies that the only event which changes the game’s outcome happens with negligible probability.

**Game 2:** this is a modification of Game 1 as follows. When answering the (single) **KEYGEN(F)** oracle query, the challenger sets \( u = \alpha v + \beta \) for random \( \alpha, \beta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \) (instead of sampling \( u \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \)). Second, the challenger computes \( R_i \leftarrow H_{ix_i}^{-\alpha} F_i^{-\gamma} \) and \( T_i \leftarrow H_{ix_i}^\beta F_i^\delta \).

This game is essentially changing the distribution of the evaluation keys returned to the adversary. The distribution in this game however is computationally indistinguishable from the one in Game 1 under the Strong External DDH (SXDH) assumption. Finally, once accounted for this game difference it is possible to show that any p.p.t. adversary has negligible probability of winning in Game 2, under the Flexible co-CDH assumption (which in turn reduces to SXDH).
Detailed proofs for the indistinguishability of the three games as well as a reduction from winning in Game 2 to breaking Flexible co-CDH are in Appendix D.4.

We can make the XP₁ construction hash extractable by adding a knowledge component. The resulting scheme, XPₐ, consists of algorithms KeyGen and Prove from XP₁ together with the following additional algorithms.

\[ \text{Setup}_E(1^λ, F) \text{ samples } H_i \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_1 \text{ for } i \in [1, n] \text{ and } \omega \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \text{ and returns } pp = (G_λ, g_2^ω, \{H_i, \ H_i^ω\}_{i \in [1, n]}). \]

\[ \text{Hash}_E(pp, (x_1, \ldots, x_n)) \text{ computes } A_x \leftarrow \prod_{i \in [1, n]} H_i^{x_i} \text{ and } B_x \leftarrow \prod_{i \in [1, n]} (H_i^ω)^{x_i}. \text{ Returns } σ_x = (A_x, B_x). \]

\[ \text{Check}(pp, σ_x) \text{ takes } g_2 \text{ and } g_2^ω \text{ from } pp; \text{ parses } σ_x \text{ as } (A_x, B_x); \text{ and checks that } e(A_x, g_2^ω) = e(B_x, g_2). \]

\[ \text{Verify}_E(VK_F, σ_x, c_x, Φ_x) \text{ returns Check}(pp, σ_x) \]

\[ \land e(T_x, g_2) = e(A_x, U) \ e(R_x, V) \ e(c_x, W). \]

**Lemma 4.1** (Hash Extractability of XPₐ). *If the Bilinear n-Knowledge of Exponent Assumption holds, then the XPₐ scheme above is hash extractable.*

**Proof.** The existence of an extractor for the Bilinear n-Knowledge of Exponent Assumption implies the existence of an extractor for the XPₐ construction.

### 4.3 Our Designated Verifier HP Scheme for Multi-Exponentiation (XP₂)

We present another hash & prove scheme for multi-exponentiation, called XP₂, which works in the designated verifier setting. XP₂ is similar to XP₁ but requires one less element in the proof and one less multi-exponentiation for the prover.

The XP₂ scheme works for the same class of relations \( F \) supported by XP₁, and the construction is obtained by adapting a multi-function verifiable computation scheme by Fiore and Gennaro [23], which works for a similar restricted class of functions, \( (f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n \). In Appendix C we define XP₂ more generically based on homomorphic weak pseudorandom functions [23]. For simplicity, we describe below the instantiation of the scheme based on the SXDH assumption.

The scheme XP₂ works as follows:

\[ \text{Setup}(1^λ) \text{ samples } H_i \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_1 \text{ for } i \in [1, n] \text{ and returns } pp = (G_λ, H) \text{ where } H = (H_1, \ldots, H_n). \]

\[ \text{Hash}(pp, (x_1, \ldots, x_n)) \text{ returns } σ_x \leftarrow \prod_{i \in [1, n]} H_i^{x_i}. \]

\[ \text{KeyGen}(pp, F) \text{ generates } δ, k \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^* \text{; computes } T_i \leftarrow F_i^δ H_i^k \text{ for } i \in [1, n] \text{; and returns } EK_F = (F, T), VK_F = (δ, k) \text{ where } T = (T_1, \ldots, T_n). \]

\[ \text{Prove}(EK_F, (x_1, \ldots, x_n), c_x) \text{ computes } Φ_x \leftarrow \prod_{i \in [1, n]} T_i^{x_i}; \text{ and returns } Φ_x. \text{ (Implicitly we require that } c_x = \prod_{i \in [1, n]} F_i^{x_i}, \text{ though the } c_x \text{ part of the instance is not used in the computation of the proof.)} \]

\[ \text{Verify}(VK_F, σ_x, c_x, Φ_x) \text{ returns } Φ_x \leftarrow c_x^{δ} \cdot Φ_x^k. \]
**Theorem 4.3** (Adaptive Soundness of XP₂). *If the SXDH assumption holds in \( G_1 \), then the XP₂ construction above is adaptively sound (Definition 3.1 for multiple relations and a designated verifier).*

We outline the intuition behind the proof of the Theorem. The values \((H^k_i)_i\) are pseudorandom (by SXDH), and thus so are \((T_i)_i\). After making a hybrid step where their distribution is changed to random, the value of \( \delta \) becomes information-theoretically hidden from the adversary, making its probability of cheating negligible.

For more details we refer the reader to the proof of Theorem C.1 in Appendix C since Theorem 4.3 can be seen as its SXDH instantiation.

**A publicly verifiable variant in the generic group.** Interestingly, the scheme above can be modified to become publicly verifiable as follows: we publish \((g_{δ}^{\delta}, g_{δ}^{k})\) as part of \( \mathcal{VK}_F \), and use these elements with a pairing in the verification algorithm. The resulting scheme has the advantage of being more efficient than XP₁. As a drawback, we can only argue its security in the generic group model, and leave this analysis for the full version of this work.

**Hash Extractability.** We note that we can make the construction XP₂ hash extractable by incorporating a knowledge component, in the same way as we show for XP₁.

### 4.4 Additional Properties of Our Instantiation

By plugging XP₁ (or XP₂) into the generic HP_{gen} construction of Section 4.1 we obtain an efficient HP scheme that can handle any relation supported by the underlying SNARK system.

A useful property of the hash function of both our constructions XP₁ and XP₂ is its (additive) homomorphism, i.e., \( \text{Hash}(x_1) \cdot \text{Hash}(x_2) = \text{Hash}(x_1 + x_2) \). This property turns out to have several applications, which we summarize below.

**Incremental hashing for data streaming applications.** The hash of our construction can be computed incrementally as \( \sigma_i \leftarrow \sigma_{i-1} \cdot H^{x_i}_i \) (with \( \sigma_0 = 1 \)). This is particularly useful in applications where a resource-constrained device outsources a data stream \( x_1, x_2, \ldots \) to a remote server while keeping locally only a small digest \( \sigma_i \) computed as above. Later, at any point, the client will be able to verify a computation on the stream \( x_1, \ldots, x_i \) by only using \( \sigma_i \). Furthermore, when hash extractability is not needed, the XP₁ construction can be modified by letting \( H_i = \text{RO}(i) \) where RO is a hash function that in the security proof is modeled as a random oracle (we omit a proof for this case which is straightforward: simply simulate RO(i) as the \( H_i \) in the current proof). This simple trick allows for constant-size public parameters and, more interestingly, to work with a potentially unbounded input size \( n \)—a feature particularly useful in streaming scenarios.

**Efficient hash updates.** Another application of the homomorphic property is efficient hash updates. Given a hash \( \sigma_x = \prod_i H^{x_i}_i \) on a vector \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \), one can easily update the \( i \)-th location from \( x_i \) to \( x'_i \). Instead of recomputing the hash from scratch (which would require work linear in \( n \)), one simply does a constant-time computation \( \sigma_{x'} = \sigma_x \cdot H^{x'_i-x_i}_i \). This trick also generalizes to updating multiple locations in time linear only in the number of locations that require an update.

**Multiple data sources.** The homomorphic property also implies that the hash can be computed in a distributed manner. For instance, one user computes \( \sigma_{x,k} = \prod_{i \in [1,k]} H^{x_i}_i \), a second user computes \( \sigma_{x,\ell} = \prod_{i \in [k+1,\ell]} H^{x_i}_i \), and then a verifier who receives \( \sigma_{x,k} \) and \( \sigma_{x,\ell} \) can reconstruct the full digest on \( (x_1, \ldots, x_\ell) \) with a single multiplication. This feature is useful in those applications where the data is provided by multiple trusted sources, in which case only small digests have to be communicated. (For example, consider training a machine learning model using different datasets.)
Randomizing hash values. If one of the $x_i$ inputs of the hash is uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_p$, then the output of $\text{Hash}(pp, x)$ is a uniformly random element in $\mathbb{G}_1$. Showing that SNARK systems randomized in this fashion do not leak anything about their hashed data is less trivial as the same randomness is reused by $\sigma_x$ and the $c_x$ values of different relations. This is akin to randomness reuse in ElGamal encryption, which is permissible. However, in most SNARK systems the group elements used for commitment randomization have structure, precluding a straightforward reduction to DDH. A detailed analysis of a multi-relation zero-knowledge property for specific VC schemes is thus an interesting open problem.

From hashes to accumulators. Accumulators are often used as succinct representations of sets that enable fast, limited, verifiable processing. For example, one can efficiently prove and verify arguments on set operations by exploiting the structure of accumulators [38], with better performance than by relying on a general-purpose VC scheme. To this end, we offer schemes that allow one to transition between proof systems that operate on hashes and accumulators. In particular, we introduce Accumulate & Prove scheme which is a variant of HP that operates on accumulators and builds on HP and XP (to verify that the hash and the accumulator were computed from same data). We provide the detailed scheme in Appendix E.

5 Outsourcing Hash Computations

In our efficient HP constructions of Section 4, the Hash algorithm computes a succinct digest $\sigma_x$ using one exponentiation for every element of $x$. Hence, when using instantiations with XP1 or XP2, an HP$_\text{gen}$ verifier that wishes to relate computations verified using $\sigma_x$ to their actual inputs $x$ must still perform $|x|$ exponentiations, or trust some data provider that associates $\sigma_x$ to $x$. Though the same $\sigma_x$ could be used to verify many computations that involve $x$, thereby amortizing the cost of hash computation, we are looking to further optimize this cost.

Next, we describe a complementary technique to outsource hash computations to an untrusted party such that the verifier (or its trusted data provider) only needs to perform $|x|$ field multiplications and one efficient cryptographic hash on $x$, say SHA2, typically saving two orders of magnitude.

We present our construction, called HP*, as a generic extension of any HP system to which it adds support for verifiable outsourcing of hash computations. The main benefit of this extension is that the verifier does not need to run the Hash algorithm: instead, it can upload $x$ to the untrusted prover; obtain its hash $\sigma_x$ together with a proof of hashing $\Pi_h$, verify them; and finally keep $\sigma_x$. Intuitively, the verifier can then use $\sigma_x$ to refer to $x$ as if it had computed it itself.

5.1 Definition

We define HP* as an extension of a given hash & prove scheme HP. In particular, the functionality of the trusted Hash algorithm is supplemented with a pair of new algorithms, HashProve and HashVerify, run respectively by the untrusted prover and by the verifier. HashProve computes a hash of data $x$ and augments it with a proof that the hash is computed correctly (that is, it is computed according to Hash algorithm). HashVerify then accepts $\sigma_x$ as the hash if the proof verifies correctly.

Formally, HP* is a multi-relation hash & prove scheme that supports hash outsourcing and consists of 7 algorithms $\text{HP}^* = (\text{Setup}, \text{Hash}, \text{HashProve}, \text{HashVerify}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$. For completeness, we list Setup, Hash, KeyGen, Prove and Verify, however they are defined identically to those in HP (cf. Section 3).
pp, vp ← Setup(1^λ) takes the security parameter and generates the public parameter for the scheme;
σ_x ← Hash(pp, x) produces a hash given some data x ∈ X;
Π_h ← HashProve(pp, x, σ_x) produces a proof of R_{Hash}(x, σ_x) = (σ_x = Hash(pp, x)) given some data
x ∈ X and hash σ_x;
b_h ← HashVerify(vp, x, σ_x, Π_h) either accepts (b_h = 1) or rejects (b_h = 0) a proof that σ_x is a hash
of data x.
EK_R, VK_R ← KeyGen(pp, R) generates evaluation key EK_R and verification key VK_R given a relation
R ∈ R_λ;
Π_R ← Prove(EK_R, x, v; w) produces a proof of R(x, v; w) given an instance and a witness that
satisfy the relation.
b ← Verify(VK_R, σ_x, v, Π_R) either accepts (b = 1) or rejects (b = 0) a proof of R given a hash of x
and the rest of its instance v.
In addition to being a Hash & Prove scheme (i.e., satisfying adaptive soundness or adaptive hash soundness), HP* must be secure with regards to outsourcing, as defined below.

Definition 5.1 (Sound Hash Outsourcing). Outsourcing of HP* hash computation is secure if every
p.p.t. adversaries wins the game below only with negligible probability.

\begin{align*}
\text{Outsourced Hash Game} \\
&pp, vp ← Setup(1^λ) \\
x, σ_x^*, Π_h ← A(1^λ, pp, vp) \\
&.A wins if HashVerify(vp, x, σ_x^*, Π_h) = 1 and σ_x^* ≠ Hash(pp, x)
\end{align*}

This game is similar to the Hash Extraction game, but it does not involve extraction, as the
verifier is given both x and σ_x^*. (The designated-verifiability variant is obtained by keeping vp
private and, instead, giving the adversary oracle access to HashVerify.)

Hash outsourcing ensures that, when verifying composite arguments as in adaptive hash sound
schemes (cf. Section 3.2), one can safely replace calls to Hash with calls to HashVerify. In particular,
with HP*, an argument can be passed to a relation either as data x, as a hash σ or as (x, σ^*). Our
definition can be trivially satisfied by ignoring Π_h and setting HashVerify(pp, x, σ, Π_h) = (σ =
Hash(pp, x)) but of course we are looking for more efficient constructions.

5.2 Efficient Construction (HP*)

We build HP* out of any hash & prove scheme HP, and two additional tools: an almost universal
hash function h (recalled below) and a regular hash function H (that will be modeled as a random
oracle).

Almost Universal Hash Functions. An ϵ-almost universal hash function h is such that, for all
x ≠ x' chosen before h is sampled, we have Pr[h(x) = h(x')] ≤ ϵ [13]. We will use such functions
from \mathbb{Z}^n_p to \mathbb{Z}_p, instantiated by h_α(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \alpha^{i-1} and keyed with a random α ∈ \mathbb{Z}_p.
These functions can be computed as h_α(x) = x_1 + α(x_2 + ... + α(x_{n-1} + αx_n)) using n additions and n − 1
multiplications by α, which is particularly efficient in verifiable-computation schemes for arithmetic
circuits.

Lemma 5.1. h_α is (n − 1)/p-almost universal.
Proof. Expanding the collision equality, we get \( \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \alpha_i^{-1} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x'_i \alpha_i^{-1} \), that is, \( \sum_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - x'_i) \alpha_i^{-1} = 0 \). If \( x \neq x' \), we have a non-zero polynomial in \( \alpha \) of degree at most \( n - 1 \), with at most \( n - 1 \) roots, so this equality holds with probability at most \( (n - 1)/p \).

Before delving into the details of the construction, let us describe its main ideas. The first idea is to build \( \text{HP}^* \) by extending any HP with algorithms \( \text{HashProve} \) and \( \text{HashVerify} \) that allow to prove and verify the correctness of \( \sigma_x = \text{Hash}(x) \). Notably, \( \text{HashVerify} \) must be significantly faster than recomputing \( \text{Hash}(x) \). To this end, our second idea is to let \( \text{HashProve} \) compute a (freshly sampled) universal hash function \( h_\alpha(x) \) and generate a proof \( \Pi_h \) that links \( h_\alpha(x) \) to the correct \( \sigma_x \). Then our \( \text{HashVerify} \) simply checks \( \Pi_h \) (in constant time) and recomputes the universal hash \( h_\alpha(x) \), which is much faster than the multi-exponentiation \( \text{Hash} \). The security of universal hash functions relies on their input being chosen before \( h_\alpha \) is sampled. To this end, we require that \( h_\alpha \) depend on the input \( x \) by setting \( \alpha = H(x, \sigma_x) \) where \( H \) is a hash function.

We are now ready to give our \( \text{HP}^* \) construction. Let \( R_h \) be the relation defined by \( R_h(x, \alpha, \mu) = (\mu, h_\alpha(x)) \), and let \( H \) be a hash function. We build \( \text{HP}^* \) using any HP that supports relation \( R_h \) and is hash-extractable.

**Setup** \((1^3)\) runs setup and generates keys for outsourcing \( h \):

\[
\begin{align*}
pp' & \leftarrow \text{HP.Setup}(1^3); \\
EK_h, VK_h & \leftarrow \text{HP.KeyGen}(pp', R_h); \\
\text{return } pp = (pp', EK_h) \text{ and } vp = VK_h; \\
\end{align*}
\]

\( \text{HashProve}(pp, x, \sigma_x) \) computes \( \alpha = H(x, \sigma_x); \mu = h_\alpha(x); \Pi_h \leftarrow \text{HP.Prove}(EK_h, x, (\alpha, \mu)) \) and returns \( \Pi_h; \)

\( \text{HashVerify}(vp, x, \sigma_x, \Pi_h) \) computes \( \alpha = H(x, \sigma_x); \mu = h_\alpha(x) \) and checks \( \text{HP.Verify}(VK_h, \sigma_x, (\alpha, \mu), \Pi_h) \).

We omit \( \text{Hash}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Prove} \) and \( \text{Verify} \) algorithms as they are simply calls to their counterparts in the HP scheme (for example, \( \text{HP}^*, \text{KeyGen} \) calls \( \text{HP}.\text{KeyGen}(pp', R) \)).

We stress that, even if asymptotically our new construction is not better than the original one (the verifier performs \( \Theta(n) \) operations), in practice, the operations performed by the verifier in \( \text{HP}^*, \text{HashVerify} \) are orders of magnitude faster than those in \( \text{HP.Hash} \).

**Discussion.** Applying \( \text{HP}^* \) to our efficient constructions of Section 4 (either public or designated verifier), our proofs now carry a *fourth* representation \( \mu = h_\alpha(x) \) of \( x \) in addition to its hash \( \sigma_x \), its commitment \( c_x \), and a proof \( \Phi_x \). Note that we rely on extraction only for the witnesses \( x \) of the fixed relation \( R_h \).

To avoid random oracles, we can use an interactive, designated verifier variant of \( \text{HP}^* \), whereby (1) the prover commits to \( x \) and \( \sigma_x \); (2) the verifier sends a fresh random \( \alpha \); (3) the prover produces a proof of \( R_h \); (4) the verifier checks the proof against \( x \) and \( \sigma_x \), as above.

**Security.** We finally state the security of hash outsourcing:

**Theorem 5.1.** In the random oracle model for \( H \), if \( h_\alpha \) is an \( \epsilon \)-almost universal hash function, \( \text{HP} \) is adaptively sound and hash-extractable in publicly verifiable (resp. designated verifier) setting, then \( \text{HP}^* \) is sound for outsourcing of hash computations as per Definition 5.1 in publicly verifiable (resp. designated verifier) setting.

**Proof Outline.** Assuming \( H \) is a random oracle, the proof proceeds in a sequence of games. Let \( A \) be the adversary in Definition 5.1 and \( x, \sigma_x^*, \Pi_h \) be his forgery.
Theorem 5.1) and can be used for secure hash outsourcing.

6 Evaluation

In this section, we analyze and measure the performance of our new HP constructions compared to previous solutions.

Our evaluation is twofold. First we analyze the efficiency of our scheme HP_gen from Section 4 (instantiate with Geppetto [20] and XP_1) and we compare it against the inner encoding construction HP_inn of Section 3.3 (also instantiate with Geppetto and various choices of the hash function). Second, we report on the impact of our hash outsourcing technique of Section 5 in speeding up hashing and verification time.

6.1 Microbenchmarks

We performed a series of microbenchmarks on a single core of a 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2620 with 32 GB of RAM. The table below gives the time for individual operations on the fields and elliptic curves used by Geppetto. The cost of multi-exponentiation and for SHA-256 is reported for each 254-bit word of input.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>operation</th>
<th>time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>field addition</td>
<td>45.2 ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>field multiplication</td>
<td>316.7 ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multi-exponentiation</td>
<td>231.2 µs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pairing</td>
<td>0.7 ms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-256</td>
<td>193.6 ns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2 Inner vs. Outer Encodings

We compare the asymptotic performance of inner and outer encodings and summarize the results in Figure 1.

In our evaluation, we make a distinction between different types of verifier effort, depending on whether the verifier’s input to the computation is passed by value or by reference via a hash (referred to as an opaque hash for HP schemes in §3.2). In the figure, they are denoted as “Verify I/O” and “Verify Intermediate Commitments”, respectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generality</th>
<th>Verify</th>
<th>Verify</th>
<th>Verify</th>
<th>Prover</th>
<th>Proof Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>proof</td>
<td>I/O</td>
<td>Intern. Commit</td>
<td>Effort (group elts.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HP\textsubscript{inn} (Ajtai)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12 pairings</td>
<td>Ajtai(n) + 1 MultiExp</td>
<td>1 MultiExp</td>
<td>O(D log D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geppetto [20]</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>12 pairings</td>
<td>3n MultiExp</td>
<td>5 pairings</td>
<td>O(d log d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HP\textsubscript{gen}</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12 pairings</td>
<td>n MultiExp</td>
<td>4 pairings</td>
<td>O(d log d) + 2n MultiExp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HP\textsubscript{gen} (extract)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12 pairings</td>
<td>n MultiExp</td>
<td>6 pairings</td>
<td>O(d log d) + 3n MultiExp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HP\textsuperscript{*}</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12 pairings</td>
<td>SHA(n) + n MulAdd + 16 pairings + 6 MultiExp</td>
<td>4 pairings</td>
<td>O(d log d) + 2n MultiExp + UHash(n)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Asymptotic Performance. Comparison of our schemes and prior work. For our schemes, we assume the use of our publicly verifiable XP\textsubscript{1} scheme, and HP\textsuperscript{*} is instantiated with HP\textsubscript{gen}. We use n for the size of the inputs/outputs (I/O), d \gg n for the degree of the QAP used for the outsourced computation, and D = d + 350n. MultiExp is the cost of a multi-exponentiation, and MulAdd is the cost of a simple field multiplication and addition. Ajtai(x) and SHA(x) is the time needed to compute an Ajtai (resp. SHA-256) hash on x words of input, and UHash(x) = O(x log x), i.e., the time necessary to compute and prove correct a universal hash.

When the verifier’s input is passed by value, she (or someone she trusts) must directly handle each I/O value, so the cost depends on the size, n, of the I/O. Note that for any particular verifier, such computation is required only once for a given I/O value, as the computed commitment (or hash) can be reused in subsequent computations.

When a verifier uses I/O values passed by reference, she verifies a proof using a commitment or hash of the I/O values without handling them directly. Since the commitment/hash values are constant size, the verification effort is also constant. A verifier may use I/O values passed by reference when the corresponding hash comes from a trusted source (e.g., the verifier herself), or when it represents intermediate values in a computation (e.g., between mappers and reducers in a MapReduce computation) where the verifier merely needs to check the consistency of the I/O, rather than the values themselves.

HP\textsubscript{inn}. We consider the construction HP\textsubscript{inn} given in Section 3.3 instantiated with Geppetto and either SHA-1, SHA-256, or Ajtai’s [1] hash function. On the positive side, HP\textsubscript{inn} has the same number of elements in the proof as Geppetto; its online verification cost is the same as in Geppetto, while offline verification consists of one hash computation plus a multi-exponentiation on a fixed size word. On the negative side, to support a relation \( R \), HP\textsubscript{inn} forces Geppetto to work with a relation \( R' \) which (on top of encoding \( R \)) encodes hash computations. The latter adds significantly to the evaluation key size and the prover’s work, which scale linearly and quasilinearly respectively in the number of quadratic equations needed to represent the computation. Concretely, Geppetto includes libraries for verifiably computing SHA-1 and SHA-256 hashes. For each 254-bit I/O element, these libraries require approximately 22,400 equations for SHA-1 or 35,000 for SHA-256. Similar libraries for Ajtai require only 300–400 equations per word of input, but they increase the cost for the verifier and may not suffice for privacy applications that require stronger randomness properties from the hash function [16].

Geppetto. Geppetto is an example of an outer encoding scheme which avoids the expenses incurred by inner encodings. For example, compared with the hundreds or thousands of equations used for inner encodings, Geppetto only adds one equation per word of input, and hence they report improving prover performance by two orders of magnitude for processing I/Os [20]. However, Geppetto’s approach requires the verifier to compute commitments using a multi-exponentiation (versus a hash in HP\textsubscript{inn}) that is linear in the I/O size. Furthermore, Geppetto must specify which computations will be supported at setup time, before data is selected for said computations.

Our HP\textsubscript{gen} Scheme. Unlike Geppetto, which fixes at setup which computations will be supported for committed data, our HP\textsubscript{gen} scheme offers full generality; i.e., data can be hashed completely.
independently of the computations to be performed, and indeed, new and fully general computations can be verified over previously hashed data.

HP\textsubscript{gen}’s new generality comes at a modest computational cost relative to Geppetto. In terms of communication, HP\textsubscript{gen} proofs include two more elements (three with hash extractability); the evaluation key and the verification key of every relation contain, respectively, 2n and 3 extra elements. In terms of computation, our prover has to perform two additional n-way multi-exponentiations. The verifier’s online cost is the same as in Geppetto, whereas offline verification requires one hash computation (i.e., one n-multi-exponentiation) plus four pairings. If we wish to support hash extractability, then this adds an additional group element to the proof, an additional multi-exponentiation for the prover, and an additional pairing for the verifier. Overall, the additional burden (linear in the I/O size n) that HP\textsubscript{gen} adds relative to Geppetto is quite small, since both the size of the evaluation key and the prover’s effort are typically dominated by the complexity of the outsourced computation, which, in most applications, is much larger than n.

Compared with inner encodings like HP\textsubscript{inn}, however, HP\textsubscript{gen} saves the prover significant effort. Concretely, if we instantiate HP\textsubscript{inn} with Ajtai’s hash, then HP\textsubscript{gen} is 1,400× faster per I/O word (e.g., for n = 1,000, HP\textsubscript{inn} takes 10 minutes while HP\textsubscript{gen} takes half a second), while for SHA-256, the difference is closer to 140,000× (e.g., HP\textsubscript{inn} takes 18 hours).

Our HP\textsuperscript{*} Scheme: Outsourcing Hash Computations. Compared with HP\textsubscript{gen}, HP\textsuperscript{*} drastically improves the verifier’s I/O processing time. For the verifier, whereas HP\textsubscript{gen} required a multi-exponentiation linear in the I/O, with HP\textsuperscript{*}, the linear costs consist of (1) a symmetric, fast SHA-256 hash computation to compute the key α; and (2) for each word, n additions and n−1 multiplications over \(\mathbb{Z}_p\). A conservative comparison based on the results from Section 6.1 shows that (2) is 654× cheaper per I/O word than a multi-exponentiation, and that (1) using SHA-256 is even cheaper than (2). Overall, compared with its current I/O processing, HP\textsuperscript{*} thus reduces the linear costs of the Geppetto verifier by two orders of magnitude. As a concrete example, with n = 1,000,000, HP\textsubscript{gen} takes 4 minutes to process the I/O, while HP\textsuperscript{*} needs half a second. Compared with Pantry, (2) takes one multiplication per word, which is also significantly cheaper than computing Ajtai’s algebraic hash function on each word. An additional benefit of HP\textsuperscript{*} is that the verifier’s key becomes constant size (a few group elements for encoding α and \(\mu\)) rather than linear in n.

These benefits come at a low cost: HP\textsuperscript{*} increases the size of the proof from 11 to 20 elements. For the prover, the proof cost increases by just 2n field operations and a SHA-256 hash computation, plus the cost of generating Π\textsubscript{h}, which only depends on n and is independent of the overall relation to be proven.

6.3 Application Performance

To evaluate the impact of our schemes at the application level, we evaluated them on two applications.

Statistics has a data generator commit to n 64-bit words. Later, clients can outsource various statistical calculations on that data; for example, we experiment with computing K-bucket histograms.

DNA matching creates a commitment to a string of n nucleotides, against which a client can then outsource queries, such as looking for a match for a length K substring.

The performance results for both applications appear in Figure 2. As expected, I/O verification in HP\textsubscript{inn} is more efficient compared to the outer encodings schemes. Among outer encodings, our HP\textsuperscript{*} outperforms others as the size of the input grows and n multi-exponentiations start dominating the cost of verifying hash outsourcing in HP\textsuperscript{*}. On the other hand, the outer encodings schemes are more prover-friendly. In particular, the prover’s total effort (I/O plus computation) is 1.02-2.3x
Verify proof Verify I/O Prover Effort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistics ((n = 256, K = 8))</th>
<th>Verify proof</th>
<th>Verify I/O</th>
<th>Prover Effort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\text{HP}_{\text{inn}}) (Ajtai)</td>
<td>17ms</td>
<td>0.070ms</td>
<td>117s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geppetto [20]</td>
<td>17ms</td>
<td>1380ms</td>
<td>113s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{HP}_{\text{gen}})</td>
<td>17ms</td>
<td>557ms</td>
<td>114s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{HP}^*)</td>
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<td>31ms</td>
<td>114s</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistics ((n = 1024, K = 8))</th>
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<th>Verify I/O</th>
<th>Prover Effort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\text{HP}_{\text{inn}}) (Ajtai)</td>
<td>17ms</td>
<td>0.3ms</td>
<td>2,100s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geppetto [20]</td>
<td>17ms</td>
<td>6,267ms</td>
<td>2,084s</td>
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<tr>
<td>(\text{HP}_{\text{gen}})</td>
<td>17ms</td>
<td>2,096ms</td>
<td>2,085s</td>
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<tr>
<td>(\text{HP}^*)</td>
<td>17ms</td>
<td>30ms</td>
<td>2,092s</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DNA Search ((n = 600, K = 4))</th>
<th>Verify proof</th>
<th>Verify I/O</th>
<th>Prover Effort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\text{HP}_{\text{inn}}) (Ajtai)</td>
<td>17ms</td>
<td>0.079ms</td>
<td>13.64s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geppetto [20]</td>
<td>17ms</td>
<td>1611ms</td>
<td>5.00s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{HP}_{\text{gen}})</td>
<td>17ms</td>
<td>574ms</td>
<td>5.01s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{HP}^*)</td>
<td>17ms</td>
<td>31ms</td>
<td>6.07s</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DNA Search ((n = 60,000, K = 4))</th>
<th>Verify proof</th>
<th>Verify I/O</th>
<th>Prover Effort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\text{HP}_{\text{inn}}) (Ajtai)</td>
<td>17ms</td>
<td>6.4ms</td>
<td>1,695s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geppetto [20]</td>
<td>17ms</td>
<td>46,980ms</td>
<td>706s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{HP}_{\text{gen}})</td>
<td>17ms</td>
<td>15,636ms</td>
<td>710s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{HP}^*)</td>
<td>17ms</td>
<td>104ms</td>
<td>931s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: Application Performance. Comparison of our schemes and prior work for two example applications.

higher for \(\text{HP}_{\text{inn}}\) than for \(\text{HP}^*\) (note that even though our schemes significantly reduce the prover’s burden for I/O, they do not affect the effort for the computation itself, and hence Amdahl’s law limits the overall impact). Finally, the results for \(\text{HP}^*\) show that the additional computation the scheme imposes on the prover pays off: verification is 18–150x more efficient than for \(\text{HP}_{\text{gen}}\) with at most a 30% increase in the prover’s efforts.

7 Related work

Cryptographic proof systems come in a variety of shapes, with inherent trade-offs between the efficiency of their provers and verifiers and the expressiveness of the statements being proven. One particularly interesting point in the design space are computationally-sound non-interactive proof systems, also known as argument systems [15], that can be verified faster than by directly checking NP witnesses. Starting with the work of Micali [36], there has been much progress [11, 30, 6, 26, 21, 31] leading to succinct non-interactive argument systems often referred to as SNARKs or SNARGs, depending on whether they establish knowledge rather than just existence of the NP witness. Significant theoretical improvements have been complemented with nearly-practical general-purpose implementations [40, 7, 20, 9, 47].

As noted in Section 1 and Section 3.3, some prior work fits our hash & prove model with data verification embedded via inner and outer encodings. Here we review other solutions that follow the outer encoding approach.

In commit & prove schemes [33, 17], one can create a commitment to the data, and use it in multiple proofs. Costello et al. [20] and implicitly Lipmaa [35] use this idea for verifiable computation to efficiently share data between proofs. However, in this approach all computations have to be fixed before one creates commitments to data. In other words, one has to know a-priori which computations will be executed on the data, which may not be the case in applications like MapRe-
duce. This issue can be mitigated by fixing a universal relation, i.e., a relation which contains all relations that can be executed within a fixed time bound. However, this generality comes at a performance cost.

Several works by Ben-Sasson et al. investigate how to efficiently build universal relations for predicates described as random-access machine algorithms [5, 7, 9]. For instance, they describe a SNARK scheme [9] supporting bounded-length executions on a universal von Neumann RISC machine with support for data dependent memory access, but this generality comes at a cost [20]. To achieve full generality, the bound on the execution length can be removed via proof bootstrapping [46]. Despite recent improvements and innovation [8], such bootstrapping is costly.

Memory delegation [19] also models a scenario where one outsources memory and only later chooses computations (including updates) to be executed on it in a verifiable way. In this model, after a preprocessing phase whose cost is linear in the memory size, the verifier’s work in the online verification phase is sublinear in the memory size. In contrast, with HP schemes the verifier also needs to do linear work once to hash the input, but then the verification cost is constant with respect to the the input size.

Another possibility to address computation on previously outsourced data is to use homomorphic message authenticators [4] or signatures [18, 29]. With the former, data is flexibly authenticated when uploaded and then multiple functions can be executed and proved on it. Homomorphic authenticators share the limitation of commit & prove schemes: the class of computations has to be fixed before the data can be authenticated. Moreover, homomorphic authenticator constructions that offer more practical efficiency [4] work only for quite restricted classes of computations (low degree polynomials). The approach based on leveled homomorphic signatures [29] is more expressive but still very expensive in practice, as the size of the proof (i.e., evaluated signature) is polynomial in the depth of the computation’s circuit.

AD-SNARKs [3] provide a functionality similar to homomorphic authenticators, working efficiently for arbitrary computations, but even in their case the set of computations has to be fixed a priori. As a further restriction, the model of both homomorphic authenticators and AD-SNARKs requires a secret key for data outsourcing, and it only supports append-only data uploading (i.e., it does not support changing the uploaded data). In contrast, the hash & prove model considered by this work supports delegating computation on public data, since hashes are publicly computable.

Finally, TRUESET [34] uses a Merkle hash tree over I/O commitments in a VC scheme to support computations on a subset of committed inputs (namely, a collection of sets). While this adds flexibility as to which inputs can be used in the computation, these inputs still have to be fixed a-priori.

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References


A Adaptive Hash Soundness

In this section we formally define adaptive hash soundness as mentioned in Section 3.

Hash extraction (Definition 3.2) enables us to use an HP scheme to verify arguments that include opaque hashes $\sigma$ provided by the adversary by first extracting their content $x \in X$ then applying adaptive soundness. To formalize this idea, we complete our definitions with a more generally useful notion of soundness that follows from the composition of the simpler definitions in Section 3. Indeed, as we show in Theorem A.1 below, any scheme $HP$ that is both adaptively sound and hash extractable is also adaptively hash sound.

**Definition A.1** (Adaptive Hash Soundness). A multi-relation scheme $HP$ is secure if every p.p.t. adversary with access to oracle $KEYGEN$ has negligible success probability in the game:

$$\text{Adaptive Hash Forgery Game}$$

$$\begin{align*}
pp & \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\
(R_i, \rho_i, v_i, \Pi_i)^t_{i=1}, \Sigma & \leftarrow A^{\text{KEYGEN}}(1^\lambda, pp) \\
A \text{ wins if } & \\
\text{VK}(R) & \text{ exists, return } \bot \\
\text{EK, VK} & \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pp, R) \\
\text{VERIFY}(R, \rho, v) & \text{ undefined, return } 0 \\
VK(R) & := \text{VK}; \text{return EK, VK} \\
\text{if } \forall x. \exists w_i. R_i(x(\rho_i), v_i; w_i) & \\
\exists x_i & \exists w_i. R_i(x(\rho_i), v_i; w_i) \\
\wedge & \\
\forall \sigma \in \Sigma \text{ Check}(pp, \sigma) = 1 \\
\wedge & \\
\forall i \forall \sigma \in \Sigma \text{ Check}(pp, \sigma) = 1 \\
\wedge & \\
\forall i \exists x_i \exists w_i. R_i(x(\rho_i), v_i; w_i)
\end{align*}$$
where $\Sigma$ is a finite set of hashes; $\rho$ ranges over the disjoint union of $X \uplus \Sigma$ (intuitively, an argument passed either as data or as a hash); $x$ is a function from $X \uplus \Sigma$ to $X$ that maps data $x$ to $x$ and hashes $\sigma$ to some data in $X$. (intuitively, $x$ includes an extractor from hashes to data); and $h$ is a function from $X \uplus \Sigma$ to hashes that maps data $x$ to $\text{Hash}(pp, x)$ and hashes $\sigma$ to $\sigma$.

The designated-verifier variant is obtained as in Definition 3.1.

In the definition, the adversary builds a composite argument whose instances mix plaintext values $x_i \in X$ and opaque hashes $\sigma \in \Sigma$; importantly, the same $\sigma$ can occur in multiple instances. To verify the argument, the verifier checks all proofs $\Pi_i$ using hashes that are either recomputed from $x \in X$ or checked for well-formedness. The adversary wins if the hashes in $\Sigma$ cannot be opened in a consistent manner to satisfy all the relations of the argument.

**Theorem A.1.** If HP is adaptively sound and hash extractable, then HP is adaptively hash sound.

*Proof Outline.* The argument is structured in terms of game hops.

**Game 0** is the same as the Adaptive Hash Forgery Game.

**Game 1** Let $A_j$ be the adversary that takes $pp$ as input and runs $A$ from Game 0 and the oracles for $\text{KEYGEN}$ (and $\text{VERIFY}$ in the designated verifier setting) internally. Finally, $A_j$ outputs $\sigma_j$ and the corresponding hash function extractor $E_j$ returns $x_j$ for $j \in [1, |\Sigma|]$. Note that $A_j$ does not take auxiliary input since it takes $pp$ as input and runs from the beginning of the experiment.

Game 1 is the same as Game 0 except that for every $A$ we run $E_1, \ldots, E_{|\Sigma|}$ in parallel to the challenger and we abort if $\text{Check}(pp, \sigma_j) = 1$ but $\sigma_j \neq \text{Hash}(pp, x_j)$.

Let $G_i(A)$ be the output of Game $i$ run with adversary $A$. We prove the following claims.

**Claim A.1.** $\Pr[G_0(A) = 1] \approx \Pr[G_1(A) = 1]$.

$E_j$ must exist since Hash is an extractable hash function.

**Claim A.2.** $\Pr[G_1(A) = 1] \approx 0$.

We can build an adversary $A_{AS}$ that breaks adaptive soundness of the HP scheme using $A$ as follows. $A_{AS}$ forwards his $pp$ to $A$. It replies $\text{KEYGEN}$ queries using his own oracle. (In the designated verifier case, on $\text{VERIFY}(R, \rho, v, \Pi)$ he queries his own verify oracle sending $x(\rho)$ instead of $\rho$. We note that well-defined $x$ exists in this game.) Once $A$ returns a forgery, $A_{AS}$ chooses $i$ at random and returns $R_i, x(\rho_i), v_i, \Pi_i$ as his forgery. Since $A$ could have forged on any of the $R_i$, the probability of $A_{AS}$ winning is $\epsilon/t$ where $\epsilon$ is the success probability of $A$ winning Game 1.

**B Zero-knowledge**

Here we provide a notion of zero-knowledge for HP schemes. The notion models zero-knowledge with respect to the witnesses of the relations, and intuitively says that proofs do not reveal any information about the witnesses $w$.

**Definition B.1** (Adaptive Zero-knowledge). A multi-relation hash & prove scheme HP is zero-knowledge if there exists a p.p.t. simulator $S = (S_1, S_2, S_3)$ such that for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, every adversary
A wins the following game with an advantage $2 \Pr[b' = b] - 1$ that is negligible.

**Adaptive Zero-knowledge Game**

$b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$  
$pp_0 \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$;  
$pp_1, st_S \leftarrow S_1(1^\lambda)$;  
$b' \leftarrow A^{\text{KEYGEN,PROVE}}(1^\lambda, pp_b)$  
$A$ wins if $b = b'$

\begin{align*}
\text{KEYGEN}(R) & \quad \text{PROVE}(R, u, w) \\
\text{if } EK(R) \text{ exists, return } \bot & \quad \text{if } EK(R) \text{ undefined, return } \bot \\
EK_0, VK_0 & \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pp, R) \quad \Pi_0 \leftarrow \text{Prove}(EK(R), u, w) \\
EK_1, VK_1, st_S & \leftarrow S_2(st_S, R) \quad \Pi_1, st_S \leftarrow S_3(st_S, R, u) \\
EK(R) & := EK_b \quad \text{return } \Pi_b \\
\text{return } (EK_b, VK_b) &
\end{align*}

C  Designated Verifier HP Scheme from Weak PRFs ($XP_2$)

In this section we present a more abstract definition of the scheme $XP_2$ given in Section 4.3. We recall that $XP_2$ supports the class of multi-exponentiation computations and works in the designated verifier setting.

The main building block of $XP_2$ is a cryptographic primitive, called homomorphic weak pseudorandom functions, that we recall below.

**Homomorphic Weak Pseudo-random Functions.** A homomorphic weak pseudorandom function [23] WPRF consists of algorithms KeyGen and PRF. The key generation KeyGen takes as input the security parameter $1^\lambda$ and outputs a secret key $k$ and some public parameters $pp$ that specify domain $X$ and range $Y$ of the function. On input $X \in X$, $PRF_k(X)$ returns $Y \in Y$. Homomorphic weak pseudorandom function have two properties: weak pseudorandomness and homomorphism.

- **WPRF** is weakly pseudorandom if, for any p.p.t. adversary $A$ and any polynomial $t = t(\lambda)$, we have
  \[
  \Pr[A(1^\lambda, pp, \{X_i, Y_i\}_{i=1}^t)] - \Pr[A(1^\lambda, pp, \{X_i, Z_i\}_{i=1}^t)] \approx 0
  \]
  where $k, pp \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$; $X_i \in X$; $Y_i = PRF_k(X_i)$; and $Z_i \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} Y$ for $i = 1..t$.

- **WPRF** is homomorphic if, for any inputs $X_1, X_2 \in X$ and any integer coefficients $c_1, c_2 \in Z$, it holds that $PRF(X_1^{c_1} X_2^{c_2}) = PRF(X_1)^{c_1} PRF(X_2)^{c_2}$.

We instantiate WPRF for $X = Y = G_1$ as $PRF_k(h) = h^k$. This scheme is weakly pseudorandom in any cyclic prime order group under the DDH assumption.

In presence of asymmetric bilinear groups $G_1$ and $G_2$, this function can be instantiated in $G_1$ and $G_2$ and proven secure under the SXDH assumption [23].

**The $XP_2$ construction.** $XP_2$ is described in terms of a weak homomorphic PRF as defined above.

The scheme $XP_2$ works as follows:

\begin{align*}
\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \text{ samples } H_i & \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_1 \text{ for } i \in [1, n] \text{ and returns } pp = (G_1, p, g_1, H) \text{ where } H = (H_1, \ldots, H_n). \\
\text{Hash}(pp, (x_1, \ldots, x_n)) \text{ returns } \sigma_x & \leftarrow \prod_{i \in [1, n]} H_i^{x_i}.
\end{align*}
KeyGen\((pp, F)\) generates \(\delta, k \leftarrow Z_p^*\); computes \(T_i \leftarrow F_i^\delta \text{PRF}_k(H_i)\) for \(i \in [1, n]\); and returns \(EK_F = (F, T), VK_F = (\delta, k)\) where \(T = (T_1, \ldots, T_n)\).

Prove\((EK_F, (x_1, \ldots, x_n), c_x)\) computes \(\Phi_x \leftarrow \prod_{i \in [1, n]} T_i^{x_i}\); and returns \(\Phi_X\). (Implicitly we require that \(c_x = \prod_{i \in [1, n]} F_i^{x_i}\), though the \(c_x\) part of the instance is not used in the computation of the proof.)

Verify\((VK_F, \sigma_x, c_x, \Phi_x)\) returns \(\Phi_x \overset{?}{=} c_x^\delta \text{PRF}_k(\sigma_x)\).

**Theorem C.1** (Adaptive Soundness of XP\(_2\)). *Assuming the weak pseudorandomness of PRF, the XP\(_2\) construction above is adaptively sound (Definition 3.1 for multiple relations and a designated verifier).*

We prove that XP\(_2\) construction is adaptively sound for a single relation, then apply Theorem 3.1 to extend it to multiple relations. We outline below the games that we use for the proof.

**Game 0:** This game is the same as the adaptive forgery game.

**Game 1:** This game is the same as Game 0 except for the following change in the way the verification queries are answered by the challenger.

Let \((x, c_x, \Phi_x)\) be the query made by the adversary to the VERIFY oracle. Let \(\sigma_x = \text{Hash}(pp, x)\).

Instead of computing \(\text{PRF}_k(\sigma_x)\), the challenger computes \(\sigma_x' = \prod_{i \in [1, n]} \text{PRF}_k(H_i)^{x_i}\) Then, it verifies by checking if \(\Phi_x = c_x^\delta \sigma_x'\) holds.

**Game 2:** During KeyGen, instead of generating a key \(k\) for the weak PRF, the challenger sets each \(T_i\) to \(F_i^\delta Z_i\), where \(Z_i \leftarrow G_1\), and sets \(VK = (\delta, Z_1, \ldots, Z_n)\). Accordingly, for verification queries \((\sigma_x, c_x, \Phi_x)\), where \(\sigma_x\) exists in the challenger’s table with \(\sigma_x = \text{Hash}(pp, x)\), the challenger checks \(\Phi_x = c_x^\delta \prod_{i \in [1, n]} Z_i^{x_i}\).

Let \(G_i(A)\) be the output of Game \(i\) run with adversary \(A\). We prove the following claims:

1. \(\Pr[G_0(A) = 1] = \Pr[G_1(A) = 1]\).
2. \(\Pr[G_1(A) = 1] \approx \Pr[G_2(A) = 1]\).
3. \(\Pr[G_2 = 1] \approx 0\).

**Claim C.1.** \(\Pr[G_0(A) = 1] = \Pr[G_1(A) = 1]\).

**Proof.** By the homomorphic property of the weak PRF, the computation in the verification oracle for Game 1 is equivalent to Game 0 and it does not affect the distribution of the outcome of verification. □

**Claim C.2.** \(\Pr[G_1(A) = 1] \approx \Pr[G_2(A) = 1]\).

**Proof.** The difference between Games 1 and 2 is the substitution of a random element with an element generated by a weak homomorphic PRF. Since values \(H_i\) are chosen as \(H_i \leftarrow G_1\) by a trusted Setup algorithm, one can write a distinguisher for WPRF given a distinguisher of the two games in the claim. □
Claim C.3. $\Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A}) = 1] \leq q/p$ for a (computationally unbounded) adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that makes at most $q$ queries to the verification oracle.

Proof. We first rewrite Game 2 as follows.

**Game 2:**

$(F_1, \ldots, F_n) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$ where $F_i \in \mathbb{G}_p$;

The challenger chooses $\delta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and computes $T_i \leftarrow F_i^\delta g^{r_i}$ where $r_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$;

Define $\mathcal{O}(\Phi, x, c_x)$ to return 1 if $\Phi = c_x \prod_i g^{r_i x_i} \land c_x \neq \prod_i F_i^{x_i}$;

Given oracle access to $\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{A}(\text{state}_\mathcal{A})$ returns 1 if $\mathcal{O}$ returns 1, and 0 otherwise.

Wlog we assume that $\mathcal{A}$ never outputs $(\Phi, (x_i)_i, c_x)$ such that $c_x = \prod_i F_i^{x_i}$ as such outputs do not help the adversary and can be avoided. Therefore, the probability that the experiment outputs 1 is:

$$\Pr[\text{output is 1}] = \Pr\left[\bigcup_j \text{Forgery}_j\right] \leq \sum_j \Pr[\text{Forgery}_j]$$

where the event $\text{Forgery}_j$ is defined as $\Phi^j = c_x^\delta \prod_i g^{r_i x_i} \land c_x \neq \prod_i F_i^{x_i}$ and corresponds to the $j$th query to $\mathcal{O}$.

Now we will bound the probability inside the sum conditioned on a particular value of $F_1, \ldots, F_n, T_1, \ldots, T_n$, and show that no matter what these values are, the probability is at most $1/p$.

Since the adversary is unbounded, wlog we assume $\mathcal{A}$ is deterministic. Now, fix such a value for $F_i$’s and $T_i$’s that happens in the experiment with non-zero probability. Notice that, once the value of $\delta$ is fixed, there is a unique value for $r_1$ that results in the answer $T_1$ for $F_1$. Similarly, there is a unique value of $r_2$ that makes answer to $F_2$, $T_2$ and so on. In other words, there are exactly $p$ possible values of $\delta, r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_n$ that result in these queries and answers, precisely one for each possible choice of $\delta$.

Wlog we omit superscript $j$ below. Since $\Phi = c_x \prod_i g^{r_i x_i} \land c_x \neq \prod_i F_i^{x_i}$, we have the following:

$$\frac{\Phi}{\prod_i T_i^{x_i}} = \left(\frac{c_x}{\prod_i F_i^{x_i}}\right)^\delta \neq 1$$

Therefore, $\delta = \log_A(B) \mod p$ where $A = \prod_i F_i^{x_i}$ and $B = \prod_i T_i^{x_i}$. There is exactly one $\delta$ that satisfies this equation. So, out of the $p$ possible settings of $\delta, r_1, \ldots, r_n$, at most one will result in $\mathcal{A}$’s success. Therefore, we can bound the probability as:

$$\Pr[\text{output is 1}] \leq \sum_j \Pr[\text{Forgery}_j] =$$

$$\sum_j \sum_{F_1, T_1} \Pr[F_1, \ldots, F_n, T_1, \ldots, T_n] \Pr[\text{Forgery}_j \mid F_1, \ldots, F_n, T_1, \ldots, T_n] \leq q/p$$

Though the distribution over different values of $F_1$ and $T_1$ is not known, the above bound holds for value of these variables. 

\[\square\]

### D Security Proofs

#### D.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1

**Theorem 3.1.** A HP scheme that is $\epsilon$-secure as per Definition 3.1 for a single relation is $q\epsilon$-secure for multiple relations, where $q$ bounds the number of calls to $\text{KEYGEN}$ made by the adversary.
Proof. Assume there is an adversary \( A \) that can win the adaptive forgery in the multiple relations case game with non-negligible probability \( \epsilon \) against \( HP \). We construct an adversary \( B \) that can break \( HP \) while querying key generation only for a single relation. We first consider the designated verifier option and then show that the proof extends to the public verifiability option as well.

\( B \) uses his \( pp \) as \( pp \) for \( A \) and initializes a tape \( T \) to store a mapping between \( R \)'s queried by \( A \) and \( EK_R, VK_R \). (\( T \) is stored in \( B \)'s state.) \( A \) makes a forgery on one of the \( q \) relations that he queries \( KEYGEN \) for. Since \( B \) does not know which one, he chooses an index \( i \in [1, q] \) at random.

\( B \) answers \( A \)'s \( KEYGEN(R) \) queries as follows. If \( R \) is in \( T \), return \( \perp \). If \( B \) chooses \( R \) as his forgery, i.e., \( R \) is the \( i \)th relation queried by \( A \), he sets \( R' \) to \( R \) and sends \( R' \) to his challenger, and gets \( EK_{R'} \) back. He stores \( R' \) and \( EK_{R', \perp} \) in \( T \) and returns \( EK_{R'} \) to \( A \). If \( A \) queries for any other \( R \) not in \( T \), \( B \) runs \( HP.KeyGen \) himself, stores \( R \) and corresponding \( EK_R, VK_R \) in \( T \) and returns \( EK_R \) to \( A \).

\( B \) answers \( A \)'s \( VERIFY(R, x, v, \Pi) \) queries as follows. If \( R \) is not in \( T \), he returns \( 0 \). If \( R' = R \), \( B \) queries his own \( VERIFY \) oracle and returns the reply to \( A \). For all other relations, he first runs \( \sigma_x \leftarrow HP.Hash(pp, x) \), looks up \( R \)'s verification key \( VK_R \) in \( T \) and returns the result of \( HP.Verify(VK_R, \sigma_x, v, \Pi) \).

Once \( A \) outputs a forgery \( R^*, x^*, v^*, \Pi_{R^*} \), \( B \) checks if \( R^* = R' \). If yes, he returns \( x^*, v^*, \Pi_{R^*} \) as his forgery, Otherwise he aborts.

Let \( q \) be the number of \( KeyGen \) queries \( A \) requested. Then, \( B \) wins with probability \( \epsilon/q \) which is non-negligible if \( q \) is polynomial in the security parameter.

The proof extends to the public verifiability option as follows. During \( KEYGEN \) queries, \( B \) as before queries his own challenger on \( R' \) and receives back \( EK_{R'} \) as well as \( VK_{R'} \). He forwards both of them to \( A \). Similarly for other \( R \)'s he sends both \( EK_R \) and \( VK_R \) to \( A \). The \( VERIFY \) oracle disappears as a consequence.

\( D.2 \) Proof of Theorem 3.2

**Theorem 3.2.** If \( VC \) is knowledge-sound and hash is collision-resistant, then \( HP_{inn} \) is adaptively sound (Definition 3.1 for multiple relations).

**Proof outline.** The proof of adaptive soundness proceeds in a sequence of game transformations.

**Game 1** This is the original adaptive soundness game.

**Game 2** Let \( A_{VC} \) be the adversary obtained from \( A \) by taking \( pp \) and the randomness used by \( A \) and the challenger up to the point where it queries \( KeyGen \) as auxiliary input. It receives \( EK_R, VK_R \) as input and reruns \( A \) and the experiment from the beginning to restore the state of \( A \) at the time of the query. It then runs \( A \) and returns its proof. We conjecture that the auxiliary input used by \( A_{VC} \) to reproduce the state of \( A \) is benign as it consists of a random hash key and a random tape.

Game 2 is the same as Game 1, except that for each adversary we execute the challenger together with the knowledge extractor \( E_{VC} \) that is guaranteed to exist for every \( A_{VC} \) under the knowledge soundness of \( VC \). The game aborts without \( A \) winning if \( E_{VC} \) fails to extract a valid witness \((x', w)\) for \( R' \).

**Game 3** The same as Game 2, except that we abort if the \( x \) output by \( A \) is different from the \( x' \) extracted by \( E_{VC} \).

In Game 3, the success probability of \( A \) is negligible as otherwise we break the collision resistance property of hash.
D.3 Proof of Theorem 4.1

Theorem 4.1. If $XP$ is adaptively sound in the publicly verifiable (resp. designated verifier) setting, and $VC$ is sound, then the $HP_{gen}$ construction in Section 4.1 is adaptively sound in the publicly verifiable (resp. designated verifier) setting.

To prove Theorem 4.1 we show that if there exists an adversary $A$ that breaks the security of $HP_{gen}$, then using $A$, we can either build an adversary $A_{XP}$ that breaks the security of the $XP$ scheme or an adversary $A_{VC}$ that breaks the security of $VC$ construction. Our proof considers the more general case when $XP$ is designated-verifier: public verifiability is a special case where the $VERIFY$ oracle does not need to be simulated. The proof uses several game hops.

Game 0: This game is the same as the soundness experiment.

Game 1: This game is the same as Game 0 except for the following change. Game 1 aborts without the adversary $A$ winning if $A$ outputs $(R^*, x^*, v^*, \Pi_{R^*})$ such that $Verify(VK_R, \sigma_{x^*}, v^*, \Pi_{R^*}) = 1$ and $c_x^* \neq \prod_{i=1}^n F_i^{x_i}$, where $\Pi_{R^*} = (c_x^*, \Pi^*, \Phi^*)$.

Now we prove the following claims.

1. $Pr[G_0(A) = 1] \approx Pr[G_1(A) = 1]$. 
2. $Pr[G_1(A) = 1] \approx 0$.

Claim D.1. $Pr[G_0(A) = 1] \approx Pr[G_1(A) = 1]$. 

Proof. $A_{XP}$ uses $A$ to create a forgery for his challenger $C_{XP}$ as follows.

$A_{XP}$ receives $pp$ from $C_{XP}$ and forwards it to $A$. While answering $A$'s oracle queries, $A_{XP}$ maintains a tape $T$ initialized to $\emptyset$.

$A_{XP}$ answers $A$’s $KEYGEN(R)$ queries as follows. If $R$ has been queried before (i.e., exists in $T$), $A_{XP}$ returns $\bot$. Otherwise, $A_{XP}$ runs $VC.KeyGen$ algorithm as in the real scheme to generate $EK$ and $VK$ himself. Let $F = (F_1, \ldots, F_n)$ be part of $VK$. $A_{XP}$ queries $C_{XP}$ on $KEYGEN(F)$. Let $EK_F$ be the response of $C_{XP}$. $A_{XP}$ saves $EK_R := (EK, VK, EK_F)$ and $VK_R := (VK, \cdot)$ in $T$ and sends $EK_R$ to $A$.

$A_{XP}$ answers $A$’s $VERIFY(R, x, v, \Pi_R)$ queries as follows. If $R$ is not in $T$, return 0. Else parse $\Pi_R$ as $(c_x, \Pi, \Phi_x)$ and compute $\sigma_x$ using $XP.Hash(pp, x)$. Then, run $VC.Verify(VK_R, c_x, v, \Pi)$ locally and invoke $C_{XP}$ on $VERIFY(F, \sigma_x, c_x, \Phi_x)$, where $F$ is part of $VK$ from $T$. If both verifications pass, return 1. Else return 0.

Finally $A$ comes up with a forgery $(R^*, x^*, v^*, \Pi_{R^*})$ such that $R^*$ is in $T$. $A_{XP}$ parses $\Pi_{R^*}$ as $(c_x^*, \Pi^*, \Phi^*)$ and checks if $c_x^* = \prod_{i=1}^n F_i^{x_i}$ where $F = (F_1, \ldots, F_n)$ is part of the $VK$ for relation $R^*$. If $c_x^* \neq \prod_{i=1}^n F_i^{x_i}$, then output $(F, x^*, c_x^*, \Phi^*)$ as a forgery to $C_{XP}$.

Success Probability: Let us say $A$ succeeds with probability $\epsilon_A$. Then, $A_{XP}$ breaks the security of $XP$ scheme with probability $\epsilon_A$. Hence if $\epsilon_A$ is non-negligible, then $A_{XP}$ has non-negligible probability of success too.

Claim D.2. $Pr[G_1(A) = 1] \approx 0$. 

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Proof. $\mathcal{A}_V$ will use a VC challenger on one of the relations queried by $\mathcal{A}$ since he does not know which relation $\mathcal{A}$ will forge on. Let $R'$ be the relation that $\mathcal{A}_V$ will choose from $q$ relations that $\mathcal{A}_V$ queries to the KEYGEN oracle. $\mathcal{A}_V$ begins by generating $pp$ himself and forwarding it to $\mathcal{A}$. While answering oracle queries of $\mathcal{A}$, he maintains a tape $T$ initialized to $\emptyset$.

$\mathcal{A}_V$ answers $\mathcal{A}$’s KEYGEN($R$) queries as follows. If $R$ is in $T$, return $\perp$. Otherwise, if $R$ is the relation that $\mathcal{A}_V$ chooses for his forgery (i.e., set $R'$ to $R$), he sends $R$ to his own challenger $\mathcal{C}_V$. $\mathcal{A}_V$ receives $(EK, VK)$ back, runs $XP.KeyGen(pp, F)$ where $F$ is part of $VK$, saves $EK_R = (EK, VK, EK_F)$ and $VK_R = (VK, VK_F)$ to $T$ and sends $EK_R$ to $\mathcal{A}$. Finally, if $R$ has not been queried before and $\mathcal{A}_V$ does not choose it as his forgery, he runs $HP.KeyGen$, saves $EK_R$ and $VK_R$ in $T$ and sends $EK_R$ to $\mathcal{A}$.

$\mathcal{A}_V$ answers $\mathcal{A}$’s VERIFY($R, x, v, \Pi_R$) queries as follows. If $R$ is not in $T$ return $0$. Otherwise, $\mathcal{A}_V$ invokes $HP.Verify$ and returns its result. Note that he can run the verification for $R'$ as well since the VC scheme is publicly verifiable.

Finally $\mathcal{A}$ comes up with a forgery ($R^*, x^*, v^*, \Pi_{R^*}$) such that $R^*$ is in $T$. $\mathcal{A}_V$ parses $\Pi_{R^*}$ as $(x^*, \Pi^*, \Phi^*)$ and checks if $R^* = R'$. If not, it aborts. Otherwise, $\mathcal{A}_XP$ outputs $(x^*, v^*, \Pi^*)$ as a forgery for VC.

Success Probability: Let us say $\mathcal{A}$ succeeds with probability $\epsilon_A$. Then, $\mathcal{A}_V$ breaks the security of the VC scheme with probability $\epsilon_A/q$. Hence, if $\mathcal{A}$ has non-negligible probability of success then $\epsilon_A/q$ is non-negligible too. $\square$

D.4 Proof of Theorem 4.2

Theorem 4.2. If the Strong External DDH Assumption holds, then the $XP_1$ scheme above is adaptively sound (Definition 3.1 for multiple relations).

We prove that the $XP_1$ construction is adaptively sound for a single relation, then one can apply Theorem 3.1 to extend it to multiple relations.

To prove the theorem we define the following chain of hybrid games, and we denote by $G_i(\mathcal{A})$ the output of Game $i$ run with adversary $\mathcal{A}$.

Recall the games defined in Section 4.2 for Theorem 4.2.

Game 0: this is the adaptive soundness game of Definition 3.1 restricted to a single relation.

Game 1: this is a modification of Game 0 as follows. When answering the (single) KEYGEN($F$) oracle query, the challenger sets $w = \gamma v + \delta$ for random $\gamma, \delta \xleftarrow{\$} Z_p$ (instead of sampling $w \xleftarrow{\$} Z_p$). Next, when the adversary returns the proof $(x^*, c^*, \Phi^*)$, with $\Phi^* = (T^*, R^*)$, the challenger computes $\hat{T} \leftarrow \prod_{i \in [1, n]} T_i^{x_i^*}$ and $\hat{c} \leftarrow \prod_{i \in [1, n]} F_i^{c_i^*}$. Then, if $(T^*/\hat{T})(\hat{c}/c^*)^\delta = 1$ the outcome of the game is changed so that the adversary does not win.

As we show in Claim 1, Game 0 and Game 1 are statistically indistinguishable. The intuition is that $\delta$ is information theoretically hidden from the adversary, which implies that the only event which changes the game’s outcome happens with negligible probability.

Game 2: this is a modification of Game 1 as follows. When answering the (single) KEYGEN($F$) oracle query, the challenger sets $u = \alpha v + \beta$ for random $\alpha, \beta \xleftarrow{\$} Z_p$ (instead of sampling $u \xleftarrow{\$} Z_p$). Second, the challenger computes $R_i \leftarrow H_i^{-\alpha} F_i^{-\gamma}$ and $T_i \leftarrow H_i^\beta F_i^\delta$.

---

2Precisely, $\mathcal{A}_V$ only needs to guess the index of the query in which $R'$ will be asked.
In Claim 2 we show that Game 2 is computationally indistinguishable from Game 1 under the Strong External DDH assumption. Finally, in Claim 3 we show that any p.p.t. adversary has negligible probability of winning in Game 2, under the Flexible co-CDH assumption (which in turn reduces to Strong External DDH).

In what follows we prove the claims bounding the difference between the games and the probability of the adversary winning in Game 2.

**Claim 1.** $|\Pr[G_0(A) = 1] - \Pr[G_1(A) = 1]| \leq 1/p$.

**Proof.** The proof is rather easy and follows by observing that the only noticeable difference in the outcome of Game 0 and Game 1 occurs when $A$ would win in Game 0 but it does not in Game 1. Notice that such event is the one where $\hat{c} \neq c^*$ (this holds by the winning condition in Game 0) and the equation $(T^*/T)(\hat{c}/c^*)^\delta = 1$ is satisfied. We claim that this event happens with probability at most $1/p$ over the random choice of $\delta \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. This follows immediately by the fact that $\delta$ is information theoretically hidden to $A$. \hfill $\blacksquare$

**Claim 2.** If the Strong External DDH Assumption holds, then $\Pr[G_1(A) = 1] \approx \Pr[G_2(A) = 1]$.

**Proof.** To prove the claim we actually use the assumption that for any p.p.t. adversary $D$ (which receives also full bilinear groups parameters), it holds

$$\Pr[D(g_{11}^\vec{\eta}, g_{11}^\vec{\rho}) = 1] \approx \Pr[D(g_{11}^\vec{\eta}, g_{11}^{\alpha \vec{\eta}}) = 1]$$

where $\alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, $\vec{\eta}, \vec{\rho} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^n$, $n$ is any integer of size bounded by $\text{poly}(\lambda)$, and $g_{11}^{\vec{\eta}}$ is a shorthand for $(g_{11}^{n_1}, \ldots, g_{11}^{n_t}) \in G_1^n$.

By using a simple hybrid argument, it is not hard to see that the above assumption can be reduced to the DDH assumption in $G_1$ with a $1/n$ loss factor.

Therefore, we proceed by showing that any adversary $A$ for which $|\Pr[G_1(A) = 1] - \Pr[G_2(A) = 1]| > \epsilon$ can be used to build an adversary $D$ that distinguishes the above distributions with the same probability $\epsilon$ (and thus can break DDH with probability $\epsilon/n$).

$D$ receives the bilinear groups parameters $(\epsilon, G_1, G_2, G_T; p, g_1, g_2)$ and a pair of vectors $(g_{11}^{\vec{\eta}}, g_{11}^{\vec{\rho}}) \in G_1^n \times G_1^n$, where $\vec{\rho}$ is either $\alpha \cdot \vec{\eta}$, or random and independent.

First of all, $D$ sets $H = g_{11}^{\vec{\eta}}$ and gives $pp = (\epsilon, G_1, G_2, G_T; p, g_1, g_2, H)$ to $A$.

Next, on input the key generation query $F$ from $A$, $D$ simulates $EK_F = (F, T, R), VK_F = (U, V, W)$ as follows. $D$ samples $u, v, \gamma, \delta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, sets $U \leftarrow g_{22}^u, V \leftarrow g_{22}^v, W \leftarrow V^\gamma g_{22}^\delta$. For $i \in [1, n]$, it computes $R_i \leftarrow g_{i1}^{-\alpha_i} F_i^{-\gamma}$ and $T_i \leftarrow H_{i1}^\alpha R_i^u F_i^w$. Finally, if $A$ wins, $D$ outputs 1.

Note that the elements $U, V, W \in G_2$ are all uniformly random distributed as is the case in both Game 1 and Game 2. If every $\rho_i$ is random and independent so is every $R_i$, and thus $D$ simulates Game 1 to $A$, i.e., $\Pr[D(g_{11}^{\vec{\eta}}, g_{11}^{\vec{\rho}}) = 1] = \Pr[G_1(A) = 1]$. Otherwise, if $\rho_i = \alpha \cdot \eta_i$, one can see that, by letting $u = \alpha v + \beta$,3

$$R_i = g_{i1}^{-\alpha_i} F_i^{-\gamma} = H_{i1}^{-\alpha_i} F_i^{-\gamma},$$

$$T_i = H_{i1}^\alpha R_i^u F_i^w = H_{i1}^{\alpha v + \beta} (H_{i1}^{-\alpha_i} F_i^{-\gamma})^v F_i^{\gamma \alpha v + \beta} = H_{i1}^{\beta} F_i^{\delta}$$

which follow exactly the distribution of Game 2, and thus $\Pr[D(g_{11}^{\vec{\eta}}, g_{11}^{\alpha \vec{\eta}}) = 1] = \Pr[G_2(A) = 1]$. Therefore, we have that $\Pr[D(g_{11}^{\vec{\eta}}, g_{11}^{\vec{\rho}}) = 1] - \Pr[D(g_{11}^{\vec{\eta}}, g_{11}^{\alpha \vec{\eta}}) = 1] > \epsilon$, which concludes the proof of the claim. \hfill $\blacksquare$
Claim 3. If the Flexible co-CDH Assumption holds, then $\Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A}) = 1] \approx 0$.

Proof. We prove the claim by contradiction, by showing that for every p.p.t. $\mathcal{A}$ such that $Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A}) = 1] > \epsilon$ is non-negligible, there is a p.p.t. $\mathcal{A}'$ that breaks the co-CDH assumption.

$\mathcal{A}'$ receives the bilinear groups parameters $(e, G_1, G_2, G_T, p, g_1, g_2)$ and an element $g_2^e$. We recall that the goal of $\mathcal{A}'$ is to return a pair $(Z, Z') \in G_1^2$ such that $Z \neq 1$ and $Z' = Z^\circ$. $\mathcal{A}'$ works as follows.

First of all, $\mathcal{A}'$ samples $\eta_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$, sets $H_i \leftarrow g_1^{\eta_i}$ for $i \in [1, n]$, and gives $pp = (e, G_1, G_2, G_T, p, g_1, g_2, H)$ to $\mathcal{A}$, where $H = (H_1, \ldots, H_n)$.

Next, on input the key generation query $F$ from $\mathcal{A}$, $\mathcal{A}'$ simulates $EK_F = (F, T, R), VK_F = (U, V, W)$ in the following way. $\mathcal{A}'$ samples $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$, sets $V \leftarrow g_2^\alpha, U \leftarrow V^\alpha g_2^\beta, W \leftarrow V^\gamma g_2^\delta$. For $i \in [1, n]$, it computes $R_i \leftarrow g_1^{-\alpha_i} F_i^{-\gamma}$ and $T_i \leftarrow g_1^{\beta_i} F_i^{\delta}$. At this point let us observe that the view of $\mathcal{A}$ in the simulation provided by $\mathcal{A}'$ is identical to the one in Game 2.

Let $(x^*, c^*, \Phi^*)$, with $\Phi^* = (T^*, R^*)$, be the proof returned by $\mathcal{A}$. If $\mathcal{A}$ is successful, its proof must verify and $c^* \neq \hat{c} = \prod_{i \in [1, n]} T_i^{x_i^*}$. Recall that the successful verification of $(x^*, c^*, \Phi^*)$ means

$$e(T^*, g_2) = e\left( \prod_{i \in [1, n]} H_i^{x_i^*}, U \right) e(R^*, V) e(c^*, W).$$

Next, $\mathcal{A}'$ computes $\hat{T} \leftarrow \prod_{i \in [1, n]} T_i^{x_i^*}$ and $\hat{R} \leftarrow \prod_{i \in [1, n]} R_i^{x_i^*}$. By correctness of the XP1 scheme we have that

$$e(\hat{T}, g_2) = e\left( \prod_{i \in [1, n]} H_i^{x_i^*}, U \right) e(\hat{R}, V) e(\hat{c}, W)$$

holds. Dividing the two equations above one can see that it holds

$$T^*/\hat{T}(\hat{c}/c^*)^\delta = [(R^*/\hat{R})(c^*/\hat{c})^\gamma]^\alpha$$

with the guarantee that the element on the left hand side of the equation is not 1 (by the winning condition introduced in Game 1). Therefore, $\mathcal{A}'$ computes $Z \leftarrow R^*/\hat{R}(c^*/\hat{c})^\gamma$ and $Z' \leftarrow T^*/\hat{T}(\hat{c}/c^*)^\delta$, and returns $(Z, Z') \in G_1^2$ as a solution for the Flexible co-CDH assumption. One can see that, as long as $\mathcal{A}$ wins in Game 2, the solution will be valid, as $Z' = Z^\circ$ and $Z' \neq 1$. \qed

By putting together the above claims we have that any p.p.t. $\mathcal{A}$ has at most negligible probability of winning in Game 0.

D.5 Proof of Theorem 5.1

Theorem 5.1. In the random oracle model for $H$, if $h_\alpha$ is an $\epsilon$-almost universal hash function, HP is adaptively sound and hash extractable in publicly verifiable (resp. designated verifier) setting, then HP* is sound for outsourcing of hash computations as per Definition 5.1 in publicly verifiable (resp. designated verifier) setting.

Proof. Assuming $H$ is a random oracle, the proof proceeds in a sequence of games. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be the adversary in Definition 5.1 and $x, \sigma^*_x, \Pi_h$ be his forgery.

Game 0: Outsourced Hash Game.

Game 1: Let $\mathcal{A}_\sigma$ be the adversary obtained by taking $pp, vp$ as input, running $\mathcal{A}, H$ internally, and returning $\sigma$. Note that $\mathcal{A}_\sigma$ does not take auxiliary input since it takes $pp, vp$ as input.

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and runs from the beginning of the experiment. (In the designated-verifiability variant, \( A \) runs HashVerify internally as he is not given \( vp \).)

Game 1 is the same as Game 0, except that for every successful adversary we execute the challenger together with the knowledge extractor \( E \) whose existence is guaranteed by hash extractability. The game aborts without \( A \) winning if \( E \) fails to extract a value \( x' \) from which we can reconstruct \( \sigma \).

Game 2: The same as Game 1, except the game aborts if \( \neg R_h(x',\alpha,\mu) \) where \( \alpha \leftarrow H(x,\sigma) \) and \( \mu = h_\alpha(x) \).

Now we prove the following claims.

1. \( \Pr[G_0(A) = 1] \approx \Pr[G_1(A) = 1] \).
2. \( \Pr[G_1(A) = 1] \approx \Pr[G_2(A) = 1] \).
3. \( \Pr[G_2(A)] \approx 0 \).

Claim D.3. \( \Pr[G_0(A) = 1] \approx \Pr[G_1(A) = 1] \).

Let \( A_\sigma \) be the adversary obtained from \( A \), the challenger, and the random oracle simulation that takes \( pp, vp \) as input, runs these three entities internally, and returns \( \sigma \). \( E_\sigma \) is guaranteed to exist for every \( A_\sigma \) by hash extractability of the HP scheme.

Claim D.4. \( \Pr[G_1(A) = 1] \approx \Pr[G_2(A) = 1] \).

We can build an adversary \( A_{HP} \) to break adaptive soundness of HP scheme for a single relation using \( A \) as follows.

\( A_{HP} \) receives \( pp_h \) from his challenger \( C_{HP} \). He fixes \( R_h \) as the relation he will forge on, sends it to \( C_{HP} \) and receives back \( EK_h, VK_h \). He forwards \( pp = (pp_h, EK_h) \) and \( vp = VK_h \) to \( A \). (In the designated verifier setting \( A_{HP} \) receives only \( pp_h \) and \( EK_h \) from \( C_{HP} \) and forwards them to \( A \). He then replies oracle verify queries of \( A \) on \( x, \sigma^*_x, \Pi_h \) by computing \( \alpha \) and \( \mu \) himself and querying \( C_{HP} \).)

Let \( x, \sigma^*_x, \Pi_h \) be \( A \)'s forgery. Let \( \alpha = H(x, \sigma^*_x) \) and \( \mu = h_\alpha(x) \), \( A_{HP} \) sends \( x', \alpha, \mu, \Pi_h \) as his forgery against \( C_{HP} \).

Claim D.5. \( \Pr[G_2(A)] \approx 0 \).

Since \( R_h(x', \alpha, \mu) \) holds for \( \alpha \leftarrow H(x, \sigma) \) \( \mu = h_\alpha(x) \) it must be the case that \( h_\alpha(x) = h_\alpha(x') \). Since \( H \) is a random oracle, \( A \) can determine \( h_\alpha \) only after he chooses \( x \) and \( x' \) to compute \( \sigma \). Hence, the probability of the adversary finding such \( x \) and \( x' \) is \( \epsilon \) since \( h \) is \( \epsilon \)-almost universal hash function.

We note that all \( HP_E \) constructions in Section 4 meet the requirements of Theorem 5.1 and can be used for secure hash outsourcing.

E Accumulate & Prove

In this section, we present a variant of our hash & prove model (and construction) in which the data is encoded by using an accumulator instead of a hash function. We call schemes following this approach Accumulate & Prove schemes. The benefit of adopting an accumulator representation is that the latter enables fast verifiable processing of certain, limited, classes of functions. For
but that relations $R$ where $F$ for some coefficients associated to the roots $x$
we can compute $\text{acc}$.

In this section, we assume that

Techniques for verifiably computing accumulators.

Accumulators hold finite subsets $\{x_1, \ldots, x_n\}$ of $\mathbb{Z}_p$ with at most $n$ elements. We consider Bilinear accumulators [37, 38] that are of the form $\text{acc}(x) = g \prod_{i=1}^{n} (s-x_i)$, where $s$ is usually kept secret. After replacing $s$ with a formal polynomial variable $x$, the exponent in $\text{acc}(x)$ can be developed into

$$
\prod_{i=1}^{n} (x - x_i) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} z_i(x)x^{i-1} + x^n
$$

for some coefficients associated to the roots $x$. Let $z$ be the vector of these coefficients. By definition, we can compute $\text{acc}$ without knowing $s$ as a multi-exponentiation

$$
\prod_{i=1}^{n} (F_{i-1})^{z_i(x)} F_n
$$

where $F_i = g^{(s_i)}$. We use $\text{acc}(F_{\text{acc}}, x)$ to denote this computation where $F_{\text{acc}} = (g, g^s, \ldots, g^{s^n})$.

(Note that Polynomial commitments [32] also fit our approach as they commit to a polynomial described by coefficients $z$.)

Techniques for verifiably computing accumulators. In this section, we assume that $X = \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ but that relations $R(x, v; w)$ treat $x$ as a set, i.e., they are closed under permutation of the $x_i$ in $x$. Given a relation $R(x, v; w)$, our construction composes of two verification mechanisms:

1. A mechanism to verify the computation of $A_x = \text{acc}(F_{\text{acc}}, x)$ from the vector of coefficients $z$ mentioned above, given its hash $\sigma_z$. This is done by using our HP scheme $\text{XP}$ for multi-exponentiations on the function $\text{acc}(F_{\text{acc}}, x)$ defined by $F_{\text{acc}} = (g^{(s_i)})_{i=1..n+1}$. So, the computation of $A_x$ can be proven (and verified) by letting the prover compute $\Phi_{\text{acc}} \leftarrow \text{XP.Prove}(\text{EK}_F, z, A_x)$, and the verifier check that

$$
\text{XP.Verify}(\text{VK}_F, \sigma_z, A_x, \Phi_{\text{acc}}) = 1.
$$

2. A mechanism to verify that the vector of coefficients $z$ used to compute the hash $\sigma_z$ is exactly the one corresponding to the $n$-degree polynomial with roots $x_1, \ldots, x_n$. Recalling that the goal is to prove validity of $R(x, v; w)$, this second verification mechanism is obtained by extending the relation $R$ into a relation $R'(x, \ldots) = R(z, \ldots) \land \text{Coeff}(x, z)$ where $\text{Coeff}$ ensures that $x$ is a set of $n$ elements and $z = (z_1, \ldots, z_n)$ are indeed the coefficients for the roots $x$. We propose two ways of encoding $\text{Coeff}$ using arithmetic circuits in $\mathbb{Z}_p$:

   - We can test the polynomial equation (1) above at $n+1$ distinct points such as $x = 0, \ldots, n$ using the relation

$$
R'(z, v; x, w) = R(x, v; w) \land \bigwedge_{j=0}^{n} (\text{eqn } (1) \text{ with } x = j).
$$

This relation $R'$ can be expressed using $n^2 - 1$ quadratic equations.
Alternatively, we can test equation (1) probabilistically at a random point \( \alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p \). In order to select this random point, we can use the same idea as for hash outsourcing (see \( h_\alpha \) in Section 5), i.e., to rely on a random oracle, \( H \), to achieve public verifiability with an arithmetic circuit, setting \( \alpha = H(\sigma_z, A_x) \) and using the relation

\[
R''(z, v, \alpha; x, w) = R(x, v; w) \wedge (\text{eqn (1)} \text{ with } x = \alpha).
\]  

This second relation \( R'' \) can be expressed using \( 2n - 1 \) quadratic equations.

**Our Accumulate & Prove Construction.** We are now ready to describe our accumulate & prove construction \( \text{HP}_{\text{acc}} \). Recall, this is defined as \( \text{HP} \) with the difference that \( \text{Hash} \) algorithm computes an accumulator. Viewed as an accumulator the values \( x \in X \) now represent sets of cardinality \( n \).

As mentioned before, we make use of an \( \text{HP} \) scheme \( \text{HP} \) and another \( \text{HP} \) scheme \( \text{XP} \) for multi-exponentiation computations. These two \( \text{HP} \) schemes are assumed to share the same set of parameters \( pp \) as well as the same hashing algorithm, i.e., \( \text{HP}.\text{Hash}(pp, \cdot) = \text{XP}.\text{Hash}(pp, \cdot) \).

Our \( \text{HP}_{\text{acc}} \) is instantiated as follows.

\begin{itemize}
  
  \item **Setup(1^\lambda)** generates \( pp_{\text{acc}} \) consisting of the \( pp \) shared between \( \text{HP} \) and \( \text{XP} \) together with a vector of elements \( F_{\text{acc}} = (g, g^a, \ldots, g^{a^n}) \) for computing accumulators from coefficients \( z \).
  
  \item **Hash(\( pp_{\text{acc}}, x \))** returns \( A_x = \text{acc}(F_{\text{acc}}, x) \).
  
  \item **KeyGen(\( pp_{\text{acc}}, R \))** let \( R' \) be defined as in Equation (2) then
    \[
    \begin{align*}
    \text{EK}_{R'}, \text{VK}_{R'} & \leftarrow \text{HP}.\text{KeyGen}(pp, R'); \\
    \text{EK}_F, \text{VK}_F & \leftarrow \text{XP}.\text{KeyGen}(pp, F_{\text{acc}}); \\
    \text{return } \text{EK}_R = (\text{EK}_{R'}, \text{EK}_F) \text{ and } \text{VK}_R = (\text{VK}_{R'}, \text{VK}_F);
    \end{align*}
    \]
    (In the random oracle variant one builds keys for the relation \( R'' \) instead of \( R' \).)
  
  \item **Prove(\( \text{EK}_R, x, v; w \))** computes the coefficients \( z \) of the polynomial with roots \( x \), and its hash \( \sigma_z \); the accumulator \( A_x \); and the proofs \( \Pi \) and \( \Phi_A \):
    \[
    \begin{align*}
    A_x & \leftarrow \text{acc}(F_{\text{acc}}, x); \\
    \sigma_z & \leftarrow \text{HP}.\text{Hash}(pp, z); \\
    \Pi & \leftarrow \text{HP}.\text{Prove}(\text{EK}_{R'}, z, v; x, w); \\
    \Phi_A & \leftarrow \text{XP}.\text{Prove}(\text{EK}_F, z, A_x); \\
    \text{return } \Pi_{\text{acc}} = (\sigma_z, \Pi, \Phi_A);
    \end{align*}
    \]
    (Note that in the verification both \( \text{HP} \) and \( \text{XP} \) use \( \sigma_z \) \( \leftarrow \) \( \text{HP}.\text{Hash}(pp, z) \). In the random oracle construction it computes \( \alpha = \text{RO}(\sigma_z, A_x) \) and proves relations defined by (3) as \( \Pi \leftarrow \text{HP}.\text{Prove}(\text{EK}_{R'}, z, v, \alpha; x, w) \).)
  
  \item **Verify(\( \text{VK}_R, A_x, v, \Pi_{\text{acc}} \))** parses \( \Pi_{\text{acc}} \) as \( (\sigma_z, \Pi, \Phi_{\text{acc}}) \) and returns 1 if
    \[
    \text{HP}.\text{Verify}(\text{VK}_{R'}, \sigma_z, v, \Pi) = 1 \land \text{XP}.\text{Verify}(\text{VK}_F, \sigma_z, A_x, \Phi_{\text{acc}}) = 1
    \]
    and returns 0 otherwise.
\end{itemize}
(In the random oracle construction it computes $\alpha = RO(\sigma_z, A_x)$ and verifies relation defined by (3) as
\[
\text{HP.Verify}(\text{VK}_{R''}, \sigma_z, v, \alpha, \Pi) = 1.
\]

We note that $A_x$ in $\text{HP}_{\text{acc}}$ represents $\sigma_x$ when using HP notation.

**Security proof.** We recall the $n$-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption and prove security of $\text{HP}_{\text{acc}}$.

**Assumption 4** ($n$-Strong Diffie-Hellman [14] (n-SDH)). Let $G_1, G_2, G_T$ be cyclic groups of prime order $p$ generated by $g_1$ and $g_2$ respectively. Given a $(n + 3)$-tuple of elements $(g_1, g_1^{s_1}, g_1^{s_2}, \ldots, g_1^{s_n}, g_2, g_2^s) \in G_1^{n+1} \times G_2^2$, for a p.p.t. adversary it is hard to output a tuple $(c, g_1^{(1/s+c)}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p \times G_1$ for a freely chosen $c \in \mathbb{Z}_p \setminus \{-s\}$.

**Theorem E.1.** If both $\text{HP}$ and $\text{XP}$ are adaptively sound and hash extractable, and the $n$-SDH assumption holds in $G_1$ then $\text{HP}_{\text{acc}}$ is adaptively sound and hash extractable.

**Proof Outline.** The argument is structured in terms of game hops.

**Game 0** is the same as Adaptive Forgery Game.

**Game 1** Let $A_z$ be an adversary that takes pp as input and $F_{\text{acc}}$ as auxiliary input. It runs $A$ from Game 0 and the oracles for KEYGEN and VERIFY internally. Finally, $A_z$ outputs $x$ and $E_z$ returns $z$. Note that the auxiliary input of $A_z$ is of a very specific form and we thus conjecture that it is ‘benign’.

Game 1 is the same as Game 0 except that for every $A$ we run $E_z$ in parallel to the challenger and we abort if $\text{Check}(\text{pp}, \sigma_z) = 1$ but $\sigma_z \neq \text{Hash}(\text{pp}, z)$.

**Game 2** is the same as Game 1 except that $A$ aborts if $A_x \neq F_{\text{acc}}(z)$.

**Game 3** is the same as Game 2 except that $A$ aborts if $\neg \exists x, w. R'(z, v; x, w)$.

Let $G_i(A)$ be the output of Game $i$ run with adversary $A$. We prove the following claims.

**Claim E.1.** $\Pr[G_0(A) = 1] \approx \Pr[G_1(A) = 1]$.

$E_z$ must exist since Hash is an extractable hash function.

**Claim E.2.** $\Pr[G_1(A) = 1] \approx \Pr[G_2(A) = 1]$.

We can build an adversary $A_{\text{XP}}$ that breaks adaptive soundness of $\text{XP}$ scheme using $A$ as follows. $A_{\text{XP}}$ forwards his pp to $A$. $A_{\text{XP}}$ simulates HP as in the construction, but obtains $E_K$ in KEYGEN queries using his own oracle. (In the designated verifier case, he uses his own VERIFY oracle to answer $A$’s queries to VERIFY.) to simulate $\text{XP.Verify}$. Once $A$ returns a forgery, $A_{\text{XP}}$ returns $F_{\text{acc}}, z, A_x, \Phi_{\text{acc}}$ as its forgery. The probability of $A_{\text{XP}}$ winning is the same as the difference between the success probabilities in the two games.

**Claim E.3.** $\Pr[G_2(A) = 1] \approx \Pr[G_3(A) = 1]$.

We can build an adversary $A_{\text{HP}}$ that breaks adaptive soundness of HP scheme using $A$ as follows. $A_{\text{HP}}$ forwards his pp to $A$. $A_{\text{HP}}$ simulates XP as in the construction, but obtains $E_K_{R'}$ in KEYGEN queries using his own oracle. (In the designated verifier case, he uses VERIFY oracle to reply VERIFY queries.) Once $A$ returns a forgery, $A_{\text{HP}}$ returns $R', z, v, \Pi$ as its forgery. The probability of $A_{\text{HP}}$ winning is the same as the difference between the success probabilities in the two games.
Claim E.4. \( \Pr[G_3(A) = 1] \approx 0. \)

As the two relations \( R' \) and \( F_{\text{acc}}(\cdot) \) hold one can now efficiently compute \( x' \) as the roots of the polynomial defined by \( z \) such that \( A_x = \text{acc}(F_{\text{acc}}, x') \). As we already know from the definition of HP_{\text{acc}}.\text{Hash}, that \( A_x = \text{acc}(F_{\text{acc}}, x) \), either \( x \) and \( x' \) define the same set, or we found an accumulator collision. The reduction to the accumulator collision resistance is straight-forward. Given \( F_{\text{acc}} \) simulate both proof systems and return \( x', x, A_x \) as the collision. Accumulator collision resistance in turn can be reduced to the \( n \)-SDH assumption in \( G_1 \) [14].

\qed