### A Black-Box Construction of Non-Malleable Encryption from Semantically Secure Encryption

Seung Geol Choi, Dana Dachman-Soled, Tal Malkin, and Hoeteck Wee

##### Abstract

We show how to transform any semantically secure encryption scheme into a non-malleable one, with a black-box construction that achieves a quasi-linear blow-up in the size of the ciphertext. This improves upon the previous non-black-box construction of Pass, Shelat and Vaikuntanathan (Crypto '06). Our construction also extends readily to guarantee non-malleability under a bounded-CCA2 attack, thereby simultaneously improving on both results in the work of Cramer et al. (Asiacrypt '07). Our construction departs from the oft-used paradigm of re-encrypting the same message with different keys and then proving consistency of encryption. Instead, we encrypt an encoding of the message; the encoding is based on an error-correcting code with certain properties of reconstruction and secrecy from partial views, satisfied, e.g., by a Reed-Solomon code.

Note: An extended abstract [CDMW08] appeared in TCC 2008 under the title “Black-Box Construction of a Non- malleable Encryption Scheme from Any Semantically Secure One”

Available format(s)
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in JOC 2017
DOI
10.1007/s00145-017-9254-z
Contact author(s)
choi @ usna edu
History
2017-03-16: revised
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/720

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/720,
author = {Seung Geol Choi and Dana Dachman-Soled and Tal Malkin and Hoeteck Wee},
title = {A Black-Box Construction of Non-Malleable Encryption from Semantically Secure Encryption},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/720},
year = {2016},
doi = {10.1007/s00145-017-9254-z},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/720}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/720}
}

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