Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/720

A Black-Box Construction of Non-Malleable Encryption from Semantically Secure Encryption

Seung Geol Choi and Dana Dachman-Soled and Tal Malkin and Hoeteck Wee

Abstract: We show how to transform any semantically secure encryption scheme into a non-malleable one, with a black-box construction that achieves a quasi-linear blow-up in the size of the ciphertext. This improves upon the previous non-black-box construction of Pass, Shelat and Vaikuntanathan (Crypto '06). Our construction also extends readily to guarantee non-malleability under a bounded-CCA2 attack, thereby simultaneously improving on both results in the work of Cramer et al. (Asiacrypt '07).

Our construction departs from the oft-used paradigm of re-encrypting the same message with different keys and then proving consistency of encryption. Instead, we encrypt an encoding of the message; the encoding is based on an error-correcting code with certain properties of reconstruction and secrecy from partial views, satisfied, e.g., by a Reed-Solomon code.

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Original Publication (with minor differences): IACR-JOC-2017
DOI: 10.1007/s00145-017-9254-z

Date: received 19 Jul 2016, last revised 16 Mar 2017

Contact author: choi at usna edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: An extended abstract [CDMW08] appeared in TCC 2008 under the title “Black-Box Construction of a Non- malleable Encryption Scheme from Any Semantically Secure One”

Version: 20170316:140103 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2016/720