Paper 2016/720

A Black-Box Construction of Non-Malleable Encryption from Semantically Secure Encryption

Seung Geol Choi, Dana Dachman-Soled, Tal Malkin, and Hoeteck Wee


We show how to transform any semantically secure encryption scheme into a non-malleable one, with a black-box construction that achieves a quasi-linear blow-up in the size of the ciphertext. This improves upon the previous non-black-box construction of Pass, Shelat and Vaikuntanathan (Crypto '06). Our construction also extends readily to guarantee non-malleability under a bounded-CCA2 attack, thereby simultaneously improving on both results in the work of Cramer et al. (Asiacrypt '07). Our construction departs from the oft-used paradigm of re-encrypting the same message with different keys and then proving consistency of encryption. Instead, we encrypt an encoding of the message; the encoding is based on an error-correcting code with certain properties of reconstruction and secrecy from partial views, satisfied, e.g., by a Reed-Solomon code.

Note: An extended abstract [CDMW08] appeared in TCC 2008 under the title “Black-Box Construction of a Non- malleable Encryption Scheme from Any Semantically Secure One”

Available format(s)
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in JOC 2017
Contact author(s)
choi @ usna edu
2017-03-16: revised
2016-07-21: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Seung Geol Choi and Dana Dachman-Soled and Tal Malkin and Hoeteck Wee},
      title = {A Black-Box Construction of Non-Malleable Encryption from Semantically Secure Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/720},
      year = {2016},
      doi = {10.1007/s00145-017-9254-z},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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