(In-)Secure messaging with the Silent Circle instant messaging protocol

Sebastian R. Verschoor  
David R. Chariton School of Computer Science  
and Institute for Quantum Computing,  
University of Waterloo  
serverschoor@uwaterloo.ca

Tanja Lange  
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven  
tanja@hyperelliptic.org

ABSTRACT
Silent Text, the instant messaging application by the company Silent Circle, provides its users with end-to-end encrypted communication on the Blackphone and other smartphones. The underlying protocol, SCimp, has received many extensions during the update to version 2, but has not been subjected to critical review from the cryptographic community. In this paper, we analyze both the design and implementation of SCimp by inspection of the documentation (to the extent it exists) and code. Many of the security properties of SCimp version 1 are found to be secure, however many of the extensions contain vulnerabilities and the implementation contains bugs that affect the overall security.

These problems were fed back to the SCimp maintainers and some bugs were fixed in the code base. In September 2015, Silent Circle replaced SCimp with a new protocol based on the Signal Protocol.

Keywords
SCimp, Silent Circle, Instant Messaging Protocol

1. INTRODUCTION
Blackphone by Silent Circle is an Android-based smart phone running the Silent OS operating system, with current versions (Blackphone 2) selling at a hefty 799 USD. The phone promises its users higher security and privacy: “Blackphone puts privacy first”. The Blackphone 1, costing more than 600 USD, was rolled out in summer 2014 and came with service subscriptions for encrypted phone (Silent Phone) and chat (Silent Text). Silent Circle’s “Products and Solutions” page [25] advertised Silent Text as providing unlimited encrypted texts on any Silent OS, iOS or Android device. Use the burn feature to set messages to automatically self-destruct after a set time period. Silent Text also offers secure file transfers of up to 100MB and voice memo functionality.

Silent Text was available for free on Apple’s App store (since 2012) and on Google Play (since 2013) but users needed to buy a subscription for using the servers, with prices starting at 9.95 USD per month. Given these prices one could expect some security analysis of the services, but only after an intense online discussion, started by Zooko Wilcox-O’Hearn’s open letter to Phil Zimmermann and Jon Callas [31], did Silent Circle post source code for Silent Text for iOS on GitHub [27] allowing inspection of their code base. We are not aware of any public analysis of SCimp.

1.1 History of SCimp
Silent Text uses XMPP for transportation and adds a crypto layer to generate shared keys between communicating parties. Messages are passed (and temporarily stored if necessary) by Silent Circle’s server. Instead of deploying OTR, the Off-The-Record protocol [6] by Borisov, Goldberg and Brewer, Silent Circle started from SecureSMS, introduced in Belvin’s masters’ thesis [3], and adapted it to the XMPP setting. The resulting protocol by Moscaritolo, Belvin, and Zimmermann from 2012 is called SCimp: “Silent Circle instant messaging protocol”. SCimp is described on Silent Circle’s web page [24] and in a white paper [21]; some source code and explanations are available on GitHub. In 2014 Silent Text 2.0 was rolled out [20] “to improve the security and refine the user experience of our customers”. This update changes how parties provide keys, most importantly it allows Alice to start a communication with an offline Bob, and added functionalities for group messaging and encrypted file storage.

1.2 Advertised security properties
SCimp is designed to provide end-to-end encryption in such a way that no intermediary—such as the Silent Circle server—needs to be trusted in order for the communication to be secure. SCimp supports erasure of old keys, so that a potential device compromise does not leak old messages (which is also known as forward secrecy), by updating the encryption key for every message and rekeying every once in a while. The protocol allows for deniability of all communication, which means that nobody, including the users Alice and Bob themselves, can provide any proof to convince a third party about what was said over SCimp or even provide any proof that a conversation took place in the first place. The last important property of SCimp is that it provides future secrecy through key continuity: an attacker who compromises key material shared between users, but misses the opportunity to set up a man-in-the-middle attack during rekeying, cannot decrypt future messages. This property is advertised as the “self-healing property”.

1.3 Results
SCimp version 2 was in use since May 2014 [20], but the details have only been released in August 2015 [27], and then only upon our request. Our paper shows that the update introduced new vulnerabilities, most remarkably that a man-in-the middle attacker Eve can arbitrarily delay authentication between Alice and Bob and thus remain undetected. Eve can also easily interrupt communications and force a
new key exchange, which she then can man-in-the-middle. This interruption also destroys the advertised self-healing property of key continuity (version 1 and 2).

Due to the insufficient level of documentation (or close to none in the case of SCimp version 2), code review was necessary, though tedious. The implementation of SCimp provided on GitHub had several implementation errors, including cryptographic errors. The SCimp version 2 implementation defines a state machine that leaves the protocol vulnerable to an undetectable man-in-the-middle attack. In addition, the way the state machine is often bypassed in the code leaves the implementation vulnerable to another man-in-the-middle attack.

1.4 Disclosure and updates

Throughout this study we have communicated with Jon Callas and Vinnie Moscaritolo from Silent Circle. In September 2015, Silent Circle announced [26] that they will stop Silent Text on September 28 and change to a messaging application integrated with an updated Silent Phone app which would be based on the Signal Protocol [13]. Jon Callas confirmed that we may say that our analysis motivated their decision to switch. The switch takes care of most of our concerns reported in Section 3 and Section 5, and possibly (but not necessarily) Section 4.

2. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION

This section presents the SCimp protocol and explains the design rationale. We base our analysis on the Silent Circle documentation provided in [21] and [19]. A comparison with the code—showing several inconsistencies—is given in Section 5. The reason for the high level of detail in the protocol description is that the official documentation lacks the required details for proper cryptographic analysis.

SCimp version 1 has two modes of which one, basic Diffie-Hellman (DH) mode, provides encryption. Users do not have certified long-term keys. The protocol uses an ephemeral DH key exchange (explained in Section 2.1) to establish a shared key between two devices. After key negotiation, users need to verify the identity of the other party by confirming a short authentication string (SAS) out-of-band. Sessions are not time limited, so for enhanced security, the users periodically need to renegotiate their keys, which is explained in Section 2.2. SCimp uses the derived keys to perform authenticated encryption to provide confidentiality and integrity of the messages, as explained in Section 2.3.

The main goal of SCimp version 2 is to enhance usability of the protocol. One problem with the first version is that the users need to do a complete DH exchange before they can send the first message. In the asynchronous environment of mobile devices, this can introduce a big delay. To solve this, Silent Circle introduced "Progressive Encryption" (DHv2 mode). In this mode the Silent Circle server also serves as a key server; users have a medium-term DH key pair for which they upload the public key to the server. When Alice wants to send a message to Bob, she downloads his key and derives key material for encryption of the first message, but she also initiates a parallel key negotiation as in basic DH mode. When that key negotiation completes, both users verify each other's identities and thereby confirm that all communication so far has been secure. This mode is explained in Section 2.4. Version 2 also introduces group messages (explained Section 2.5), which require two more SCimp modes: PubKey mode and Symmetric mode.

2.1 Key negotiation

Alice and Bob are both registered by their XMPP addresses: A = “alice@silentcircle.com/blackphone” and B = “bob@silentcircle.com/android”. Without loss of generality, we assume that Alice initiates the key negotiation with Bob.

It is not specified how Alice and Bob learn each others XMPP addresses. Alice needs to know the address (B’), to which she wants to send a message. When Bob receives the first message, he can extract the sender address (A’) from the stanza. For the analysis, we assume that these addresses are not authenticated, meaning that Alice does not know if B’ = B and Bob does not know if A’ = A.

The initial key negotiation is basically an ephemeral elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange (ECDHE) with a subsequent confirmation of knowledge of the derived shared secret. It consists of four messages:

1. Alice commits to her public DH key in the Commit message.
2. Bob sends his public DH key in the DH1 message.
3. Alice opens her commitment and confirms knowledge of the shared secret in the DH2 message.
4. Bob confirms knowledge of the shared secret in the Confirm message.

The key negotiation is depicted in Figure 1, with some details omitted for brevity.

2.1.1. Commit. Alice, as initiator, starts by computing an ephemeral secret key for her DH key pair, which is a random key skA. She computes the public key of her DH key pair pkA = skAG, where G is a fixed base point on the elliptic curve. Alice commits to point pkA by computing hash(pkA), where hash is a hash function.

If Alice and Bob have negotiated keys before, they share a cached secret (cs). They use this value in subsequent key negotiations in order to authenticate to each other. When they do not yet have a shared cs, they substitute cs with a random value and skip the corresponding validations and they authenticate later (see Section 2.1.5).

Alice proves knowledge of cs by sending hcsA: a Message Authentication Code (MAC) using cs as the key. Alice also sends protocol options (in plaintext), such as the cryptographic cipher suite and the method for verifying the SAS.

2.1.2. DH1. Upon receiving the Commit message, Bob validates the correctness of the received value hcsA (or ignores it if he shares no cs with Alice) and stores hash(pkA) for later validation. If hcsA is incorrect, the application gives a warning and continues the protocol. He generates his own DH key pair, with the random scalar skB and public key pkB = skBG. Bob sends his reply (DH1) to Alice, containing the value pkB and hcsB.

2.1.3. DH2. After validating hcsB (or ignoring it in the first key negotiation), Alice now has enough information to complete the DH key exchange. First, she checks if the point

\[ ^3 \text{The curve details do not matter for this analysis, version 1 uses NIST P-384.} \]
she received is a valid point on the curve. Next, she computes shared secret \(Z\), which is the \(x\)-coordinate of point \(Z = sk_a pk_b\) on the elliptic curve.

From this value, all other key material is derived using a three-step process. It is adapted from a standard two-step process for creating a Key Derivation Function (KDF): Extract-Expand [9, 17]. An additional Enhance step is added between the steps.

**Extract/Enhance/Expand.** Keys are derived inside the extract/enhance/expand steps using a MAC function that is labeled KDF.\(^2\) Let KDF\(_L\) (label, context, \(L\)) = MAC\(_L\) (0x000000001 || label || 0x00 || context || \(L\)), where \(L\) specifies the output length of the key in bits.

The output of the MAC is truncated to the \(L\) leftmost bits. The first argument, 0x000000001, is a counter that is required by NIST SP 800-108 [9]; if more bits would need to be extracted, this counter would be incremented. The KDF sets a label to describe what the key is used for and a context parameter that can be the same for all keys that are derived. In the extract step, a seed \(h_{\text{total}}\) is computed and a key derivation key is derived: \(kdk = \text{MAC}_2(Z_a)\). For unexplained reasons, the protocol computes two context values, a context variable \(\text{ctx} = \text{len}(A) \parallel A \parallel \text{len}(B) \parallel B \parallel h_{\text{total}}\) and a session variable \(\text{sess} = \text{hash}(\text{len}(A) \parallel A \parallel \text{len}(B) \parallel B)\).

The enhance step is just another extract step: it mixes in the cached secret \(cs\), if such a value is shared between the users: \(kdk_2 = \text{KDF}_2(kdk, \text{“MasterSecret”}, \text{“SCimp-ENHANCE”} \parallel \text{ctx} \parallel \text{cs}, 256)\).

The expand step derives multiple keys from \(kdk_2\), all serving different purposes. This is done by computing the KDF with key \(kdk_2\). Before the DH2 message, only \(mac_a = \text{KDF}_2(kdk_2, \text{“InitiatorMACKey”}, \text{ctx}, 256)\) is derived (and \(kdk_2\) is stored for later use).

Alice sends \(pk_a\), to open up the commitment, and \(mac_a\), to prove that she was able to complete the DH computation. She can now erase the ephemeral value \(sk_a\) from her device.

### 2.1.4. Confirm

Upon receiving the DH2 message, Bob validates that \(pk_a\) matches the commitment hash \(pk_a\) and is valid. After this verification, he completes the DH computation \(Z = sk_a pk_b\).

By the same extract/enhance/expand steps, Bob derives all the necessary keys. Bob expands \(kdk_2\) into all keys that are required for further communication. The keys \(k_{\text{snd},0}\) and \(k_{\text{rcv},0}\) are used to send and receive messages (see also Section 2.3). Bob sets \(k_{\text{snd},0} = \text{KDF}_2(kdk_2, \text{“ResponderMasterKey”}, \text{ctx}, 2f)\), where \(l\) is determined by the key size of the symmetric cipher of the cipher suite. Bob uses \(k_{\text{snd},0}\) to encrypt and authenticate messages to Alice. Bob sets \(k_{\text{rcv},0} = \text{KDF}_2(kdk_2, \text{“InitiatorMasterKey”}, \text{sess}, 2f)\) to decrypt and validate messages from Alice. Alice computes the same values, but of course swaps the \(\text{snd}\) and \(\text{rcv}\) labels.

Note the earlier mentioned asymmetry in the derivation of \(k_{\text{snd},0}\) and \(k_{\text{rcv},0}\). Without justification, the former uses \(\text{ctx}\) and the latter \(\text{sess}\) as context parameter to the KDF.

To identify which key should be used to decrypt the message, an index is attached to each user message. Bob initializes \(i_{\text{rcv},0} = \text{KDF}_2(kdk_2, \text{“InitiatorInitialIndex”}, \text{sess}, 64)\) and \(i_{\text{snd},0} = \text{KDF}_2(kdk_2, \text{“ResponderInitialIndex”}, \text{sess}, 64)\). The indices are necessary when messages are dropped or are arriving out of order.

The cached secret \(cs_1 = \text{KDF}_2(kdk_2, \text{“RetainedSecret”}, \text{ctx}, 2f)\) is derived to ensure key continuity. The computed value can be used in future key negotiations to authenticate to the other party. In order to prevent a denial of service (DOS) attack, the client replaces the stored value of \(cs\) with \(cs_1\) only after the mac of the other party is verified.

After key generation, Bob compares the computed value of \(mac_a\) with the received value. If the values match, Bob is

\(^2\)The standards suggest that instead of just the expand function, the entire extract/enhance/expand construction constitutes the KDF and it should have been named accordingly. Throughout this paper, we use the Silent Circle notation in order to match the specification.
convinced that Alice was able to complete her side of the DH exchange. He stores the required keys, updates his cached secret \( cs_0 \) to \( cs_1 \) and is ready to communicate with Alice.

Bob now responds with the Confirm message, consisting of \( mac_0 = \text{KDF}_{sk_b} \text{("ResponderMACKey", ctx, 256)} \). He can erase all intermediary keys from his device, such as \( sk_b \), \( Z \), \( kdk \) and \( kdk_2 \).

Upon receiving the Confirm message, Alice expands the rest of the key values from \( kdk_2 \) and compares her computed value of \( mac_0 \) with the received one. When they match, she updates her cached secret \( cs \) to \( cs_1 \), deletes all intermediary keys from her device and is ready to communicate with Bob.

2.1.5. Short authentication string. At this stage in the protocol, Alice and Bob have the necessary keys to start sending data and indeed they can start messaging. However, it is better for them to verify the identities of their communication partner first. The key exchange so far has been done using only ephemeral keys, so setting up a man-in-the-middle attack is trivial for an adversary with sufficient control over the network. The solution by Silent Circle is the short authentication string (SAS). The method for displaying the SAS to the user and the length of the SAS depends on the \texttt{sasMethod} option (sent in the Commit message) which determines the length and how the SAS is compared by Alice and Bob.

Alice and Bob both know \( SAS = \text{KDF}_{kdk_2}(\text{"SAS", ctx, 20}) \) at this stage. They need to set up an out-of-band connection on which they can authenticate each other before they start comparing their SAS values. According to Silent Circle [21] “[a] phone call would be sufficient for this purpose since confidence building cues such as voice timbre and manner of speech are present.”

Silent Circle is not specific on what it means to verify the SAS. The fact that this action should result in mutual authentication, suggests that both parties will have to read half of the SAS code that is displayed to them. However, without very precise instructions, the users might verify using a subtly different method and not detect that they are the victim of a man-in-the-middle attack.\(^3\)

2.1.6. Reasons for the commit value. The SAS is a short code, typically 20 bits. Therefore, the protocol requires the hash commitment, which forces the adversary to select a public key without knowing the key of the other party. Without commitments, the adversary could acquire the public keys of the honest parties before searching for corresponding keys that would result in a SAS collision. Such a collision would result in an undetected man-in-the-middle attack. This is displayed in Figure 2. The Commit message ensures that an adversary can have only one blind guess for his public key.

\(^3\)For example, assume that Eve sets up a man-in-the-middle attack on the SCimp connection of Alice and Bob. Further assume that Eve has some control over the voice channel that they use to verify the SAS (not unlikely in case of a phone call). Eve lets Alice and Bob talk until they are convinced they are talking to each other but degrades the quality. She then sends both participants a message over SCimp to speak out the full SAS. When Alice says the SAS, Eve (temporarily) mutes the audio for Bob. Eve confirms to Alice that the SAS is correct, which she can do with a message over SCimp, or maybe she has a recording of Bob saying “OK”. She can repeat the trick with Bob. More ways to circumvent SAS authentication are described in [23].

![Figure 2: Man-in-the-middle attack on (hypothetical) key negotiation without commit value](image)

2.2 Rekeying

If the participants have negotiated keys before, they share a cached secret (\( cs \)), derived from \( kdk_2 \). This secret is used for key continuity, meaning that future keys will depend on this value and thus depend upon previous keys. When Alice wants to derive a new key, she initiates the same process as for the initial key negotiation.

If the received value of \( hcs \) is invalid, a warning is issued to the user that the identity of the other party is no longer verified. The protocol continues as if it was the first key negotiation. That also means that the SAS needs to be confirmed again to ensure that no man-in-the-middle attack is in progress. The reason that the protocol does not abort is that an honest user could lose their copy of the \( cs \), for example, due to a device reset or loss of connection when Bob has updated \( cs \) but Alice has not.

2.2.1. Key erasure. Whenever new keys are negotiated successfully, these keys will depend upon the old keys, but this is a one-way process. The old keys cannot be derived from the new keys. The KDF, MAC and hash functions are all one-way functions and fresh randomness is introduced in both values of \( sk \). When the old keys are erased, a compromise of key material does not compromise the security of old messages.

The protocol specification provides only partial information to detect how many (if any) messages have not arrived yet when user messages may arrive out of order. See Section 3.5 for how this is handled in the implementation and how this affects key erasure.

2.2.2. Future secrecy. Although it is not documented when keys should be renegotiated, for future secrecy it is important that this happens often. The SCimp ratchet (see Section 2.3) derives each message key directly from the previous one, so when one message key gets compromised, all following message keys are compromised as well, until new keys are negotiated with the rekeying protocol.

An attacker that has compromised the message keys from
one participant, but does not have access to either $sk_a$ or $sk_b$ that is used in key renegotiation, will no longer have any knowledge of the freshly generated keys.

On the other hand, compromising the current value of $cs$ is enough for an adversary to set up an undetected man-in-the-middle between the participants. However, as soon as the adversary misses one key negotiation, $cs$ is replaced with a fresh value. The participants will receive a warning that the old values of $cs$ did not match, so they will have to reconfirm the SAS. Additionally, even when an undetected man-in-the-middle attack is in progress, the participants should be able to detect this by reconfirming the SAS after rekeying.

Silent Circle calls the future secrecy property of rekeying the “self-healing property”, which is a bit of a misnomer. Only when the adversary misses the first rekeying, will the protocol self-heal. If the adversary has already successfully set up a man-in-the-middle attack in the past and then misses one rekeying, the protocol only detects the error, but does not self-heal. “Healing” requires a new SAS verification.

The important part for future secrecy is that the adversary misses the key negotiation. When users communicate over the internet, it might be easy for an adversary to intercept all communication, especially if all messages are routed via a single node, such as the Silent Circle server. Because the protocol does not rely on the underlying transportation layers, it should be possible for two participants to do a full key negotiation out-of-band. For example, when they physically meet, they could exchange the key messages using near field communication (NFC) or by scanning QR-codes. This would make it very unlikely that a man-in-the-middle attack is in progress, giving the users a guarantee that future communication is secure and giving them the ability to detect whether past communication was secure. We are unaware of such a functionality in Silent Text or Blackphone.

### 2.2.3. Commit contention

Two participants might try to initiate a key negotiation at the same time. According to the SCimp white paper, the protocol will then flag an error and let the application decide what to do. The suggestion they give is to compare the values of the hash commitments and let that comparison decide which participant becomes initiator and which becomes responder.

#### 2.3 Sending User messages

When both sender and receiver have derived the keys, they can start sending messages, see Figure 3. Messages are encrypted with AES in CCM-mode (Counter with CBC-MAC) \(^{(30)}\): $ct = AES_{CCM}^k(\text{header}, pt)$ providing Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD). That means that besides encrypting and authenticating plaintext, the mode also accepts a header (Associated Data) that is authenticated, but not encrypted. CCM also requires a nonce $N$ that is unique per encryption key $k$.

CCM encryption is specified as follows: first compute a CBC-MAC over $N$, the header and plaintext $pt$, resulting in an authentication tag $T$. Concatenate $pt || T$ and encrypt it in counter mode, using $N$ to initialize the counter, resulting in ciphertext $ct^3$.

In case of SCimp, the key $k$ and the nonce $N$ are set to the value of $k_{sand,j}$, split into two equal-sized halves. For

\(^3\)The actual specification is more convoluted, including authentication of lengths and data encoding instructions. See \[^{[12]}\] for further details.

![Figure 3: SCimp: data exchange](image-url)

The header value, SCimp uses the full 64-bit value of index $i_{sand,j}$. In order to achieve key erasure, the key is updated with every message that is sent.

Each send/receive key is derived from the previous one with the SCimp ratchet, which is implemented as follows: $k_{i_{sand},j} = KDF_{k_{sand,j}}(\text{"MessageKey"}, sess || i_{sand,j}, l)$, where $x \in \{sand, rcv\}$.

The index must be ratcheted forward as well, this is done simply by addition: $i_{sand,j+1} = i_{sand,j} + 1$.

Besides ciphertext $ct$, Alice also sends the 16 least significant bits of the send index $i_{sand,j}$, which Bob can use to find the correct key for the message.

#### 2.3.1. Receiving

Upon receiving the message, Bob inspects the sent index to retrieve the corresponding key. The specification does not state how many old keys to keep in memory. We note that these stored keys not only compromise the secrecy of the messages that have not been received yet, but also that of all subsequent messages, because the keys corresponding to those messages can be derived from the stored keys.

#### 2.4 Progressive Encryption

The problem with SCimp version 1 is that it requires both participants to be online in order to complete a key exchange. This is not always the case, even if both devices are on. For example, the iPhone puts applications to sleep and disconnects them from the network after a short time when they are not in the foreground. This includes the times the device is in a locked state. The upside is that this reduces battery usage.

The downside is that a background application cannot receive and send the messages required for the key negotiation. If Alice sends a Commit message to Bob, who happens to be “offline”, he does not receive the message immediately. Instead, Alice always sends her message to the Silent Circle server, which then sends a push message to Bob (either via Apple Push Notifications (APN) \[^{[2]}\] or Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) \[^{[14]}\] for iPhones or via GCM for Android devices). When Bob's device is “online”, it simply downloads the message from Silent Circle, but when Bob's device is “offline”, it will display a notification to Bob, who can put the application in the foreground so that it can receive and send the required messages.
Once he gets online, Bob uses $pk_0$ and his medium-term secret key $sk_B$ to compute $sk_B.pk_0$ and to decrypt the ciphertexts sent so far. Alice and Bob now share key material and can use it to communicate. But, they should also complete the regular key negotiation. Once they have finished that key negotiation, they discard the old key material.

Only when Alice and Bob have derived the new key material can they compare their values of the SAS and confirm that no man-in-the-middle was present during any of this. In order to verify that this is also true for the messages that were sent before key negotiation completed, the PKStart message is digested in the value $h_{total}$.

### 2.4.1. Public Key

In order for Alice to be able to send a message to Bob, Bob needs to have uploaded his public key $pk_B$ to the Silent Circle server. Attached to the key that he uploads, is both the owner $B$ and a locator $id_{pk_B} = KDF^{sk_B}("SCKey\_ECC\_Key", nonce, 160)$. It is not documented where this nonce comes from, but it is very likely a device specific value. However, it is of no importance for the security of the protocol, because the value of the locator is never validated.

A public key also contains a lifetime, indicated by a start and end date, which is set at a medium term lifetime, so that it should be updated every 30 days. Public key packets should be self-signed. Additional signatures are allowed. For example, a signature by a previous key of the same user adds an eavesdropper cannot distinguish the first key negotiation from any other.

Alice completes an initial DH key exchange with Bob’s public key, from which she derives the required keys for communication with Bob. This is done in the same extract/enhance/expand process as in key negotiation, with the small alteration that the value of $h_{total}$ is set to zero in $kd_k = MAC_0(Z_{0,x})$ and $ct = len(A) \| A \| len(B) \| B \| 0$.

The enhance and expand phase are identical. Although the implementation does derive values for $mac_a$, $mac_b$, SAS and $cs$, these values are not used.

In DH mode (with a Commit message instead of PKStart), $hcs$ is included in the Commit and DH1 message, so that an eavesdropper cannot distinguish the first key negotiation from rekeying by inspection of the message. The PKStart message is easily distinguished from Commit messages, so there is no point in sending a value of $hcs$ anymore. The value $hcs_0$ is still sent in the DH1 message, but it can be ignored.

After having sent the PKStart message, Alice and Bob can send more data, similar to how they would send data in a normal situation (they have to keep forwarding the ratchet).

### 2.4.2. PKStart

Alice initiates a DH key exchange with Bob’s public key, from which she derives the needed keys for communication with Bob. This is done in the same extract/enhance/expand process as in key negotiation, with the small alteration that the value of $h_{total}$ is set to zero in $kd_k = MAC_0(Z_{0,x})$ and $ct = len(A) \| A \| len(B) \| B \| 0$.

The enhance and expand phase are identical. Although the implementation does derive values for $mac_a$, $mac_b$, SAS and $cs$, these values are not used.

In DH mode (with a Commit message instead of PKStart), $hcs$ is included in the Commit and DH1 message, so that an eavesdropper cannot distinguish the first key negotiation from rekeying by inspection of the message. The PKStart message is easily distinguished from Commit messages, so there is no point in sending a value of $hcs$ anymore. The value $hcs_0$ is still sent in the DH1 message, but it can be ignored.

After having sent the PKStart message, Alice and Bob can send more data, similar to how they would send data in a normal situation (they have to keep forwarding the ratchet).

### 2.4.3. DH1/DH2/Confirm

In parallel to the data messages that Alice and Bob can now send, they should also complete the key negotiation that was initiated by Alice’s value of $h_{total}$. The rest of the key negotiation is identical to that in Figure 1, except for the computation of $h_{total} = hash(id_{pk_B}) \| pk_0 \| hash(pk_0) \| ct \| pk_0 \| hcs \| pk_0$), where $ct$ is the ciphertext from the PKStart message.

The presence of $id_{pk_B}$ and $pk_0$ in $h_{total}$ ensures that these values are mixed into the extract phase of the key derivation. This ensures key continuity, which in turn ensures that when the users confirm the SAS, they also confirm the authenticity and confidentiality of keys derived from $Z_{0,x}$.

Figure 4: SCimp: Progressive Encryption

In the delay that was introduced by the ECC Key, Alice’s device might have gone offline again, introducing more delay when receiving the DH1 message. In total, four key negotiation messages (containing no user input) need to be sent back and forth until Alice can send her first user message. The resulting process gives a very poor user experience.

To solve this problem, Silent Circle invented a technique they named “Progressive Encryption”, shown in Figure 4. The main idea behind this technique is that users upload a non-ephemeral public key to the Silent Circle server. Whenever Alice wants to send a message to Bob, she downloads Bob’s public key from the Silent Circle server. Alice uses that key to complete a DH key exchange with her own ephemeral key $pk_0$, from which she derives symmetric key material, just as she would upon completion of a regular key negotiation. She encrypts/authenticates her message $pt$ with the derived symmetric key and can send the ciphertext $ct$ in the first message. In addition, she also generates an ephemeral key pair $(sk_a, pk_a)$ as if composing a Commit message. Alice combines $pk_0$, $ct$, and the Commit message in one message, labeled PKStart.
2.5 SCimp group conversations

While SCimp version 1 only allowed for one-to-one conversations, SCimp version 2 also enables group conversations by introducing two more modes: SCimp PubKey mode and SCimp Symmetric mode. The former is used to set up symmetric keys for members of the group, so that they can have a conversation using the latter mode. Alternatively, Symmetric mode can also be set up with a manually provided initial key.

In order to deliver the multicast messages to all group members, SCimp uses the XMPP extension XEP-0033 [15] in the XMPP layer.

2.5.1. SCimp PubKey mode. In order to set up the SCimp Symmetric mode, the users need to have a shared symmetric key. They can set this up with SCimp PubKey mode. This multicast key is encapsulated in a PubData message (similar to how Siren is encapsulated in SCimp, see Section 4), but the PubKey mode of SCimp can in principle send any message.

When Alice initiates the group conversation, she generates a random symmetric key that she encapsulates in a Multicast Key message msg. She sends that message to Bob in a PubKey message. First, she gets Bob’s public key from the Silent Circle server. Note that this is the same key used for Progressive Encryption: the public key is used both for DH key exchange and for (ElGamal) encryption. She then generates a random session key \( k_{\text{session}} = \text{rand}() \) which she splits into \((ek, n) = \text{split}(k_{\text{session}})\), an encryption key and a nonce. She derives a 64-bit index from Bob’s public key \( i_{\text{msg}} = \text{hash}(pk_B) \) encrypts the message: 
\[
ct = \text{AES}_C\text{CM}_64(\text{msg})
\]
Alice sends the key to Bob, asymmetrically encrypted: \(esk = \text{EC-encrypt}_{pk_B}(k_{\text{session}})\).

The full PubKey message that Alice sends consists of the label “pubkey”, the protocol version (always 2), a cipher suite, a locator for the public key used \((id_{sk_B})\), the encrypted session key \((esk)\) and the encrypted message \((ct)\).

2.5.2. Multicast key. The content of the PubKey message in the context of group messages is the initial multicast key. Each group conversation is identified by its unique thread id. It is not specified how the thread id is generated. A random initial symmetric key \(k_{\text{init}}\) is generated, with its corresponding locator \(id_{\text{init}}\).

The full Multicast Key message msg consists of the label “multicast_key”, the protocol version (always 2), a cipher suite, the symmetric key \((k_{\text{init}})\), the key locator \((id_{\text{init}})\), the start time of the thread, the thread creator (XMPP address) and the thread ID \((id_{\text{thread}})\).

2.5.3. SCimp Symmetric mode. Symmetric conversations are set up by deriving a multicast key \(k\) from the initial key \(k_{\text{init}}\) as \(k = \text{KDF}_{k_{\text{init}}}\) (“SymmetricMasterKey”, \(id_{\text{thread}}, 2\)), \(i = \text{KDF}_{k_{\text{msg}}}\) (“InitialIndex”, \(id_{\text{thread}}, 64\)), \(t_{\text{offset}} = \text{rand}()\), and \(\text{SAS} = \text{KDF}_{k_{\text{msg}}}\) (“SAS”, \(id_{\text{init}}, 64\)).

It is strange that a value for the SAS is computed, even though a method for verifying the SAS was never specified. The SAS is now a 64 bit value, although the verification of the SAS does not necessarily use the full value for verification. But most important, the computed SAS value depends only upon the value \(k_{\text{init}}\), which renders it useless. Verifying these values are the same for different parties does not authenticate anything: an attacker can just replay it.

To encrypt a message for the group, a participant creates a SCimp Data message. The encryption is similar to that of regular SCimp, with the exception that the header value is set to the value of \(i \oplus t_{\text{offset}}\) and after sending, the value of \(t_{\text{offset}}\) is incremented by one. The group key \(k\) is never updated.

2.5.4. Key erasure. Group messaging does not do anything to ensure key erasure or future secrecy. This is the intended behavior according to the Silent Circle documentation [19]: “The process of keeping multiple participants SCIMP contents synchronized would be fraught with errors and trying to add the concept of perfect forward security in a shared conversation would seem moot.”

We strongly disagree with this statement. Key erasure becomes even more important when one is communicating with multiple users, because the attack surface grows with every device that has access to the keys. For a successful attack, the adversary only needs to compromise one device and retrieve the key. This would compromise all previous group messages.

3. RESULTS

This section shows the main vulnerabilities found in SCimp. We base our analysis on the Silent Circle documentation, but because of the lack of details we also considered the SCimp implementation [27].

3.1 Persistent man-in-the-middle attack on SCimp version 2

Although Progressive Encryption benefits the user experience, from a security perspective it introduces a weakness. The keys that are derived from \(Z_{0,x}\) are authenticated only retroactively, when the users verify the SAS derived from the key negotiation.

One might be tempted to verify the SAS that is derived from \(Z_{0,x}\), but Figure 5 shows why that does not authenticate the other party. The lack of a commitment to the first key of the DH key exchange gives the attacker the opportunity to find a SAS-collision.
The lower part of Figure 5 also illustrates how Eve can maintain a successful man-in-the-middle attack. The trick is to keep forwarding the data (optionally with alterations), but never letting Alice or Bob complete a full key negotiation with her. At that time, Alice and Bob will already send data that is decryptable by Eve (and requires Eve to re-encrypt to stay unnoticed). If they would complete the key negotiation, they might call each other to verify the new SAS, which no longer matches.

Eve might not go undetected when the users are sufficiently cautious, because they would know that in an uncompromised conversation they should have been able to verify the identity of the other party after at most four messages have gone back and forth. The protocol does not generate any warning at this point. A vigilant user would probably not want to use the PKStart message anyway, because the authenticity of messages can be guaranteed only after the messages have been sent. At that point, the users might indeed detect that they have been victim of a man-in-the-middle attack, but part of the conversation already took place. For that vigilant user, the Commit message from SCimp version 1 is still available in the protocol layer as an alternative in SCimp version 2, but we are unaware if such a functionality is accessible through the user interface. Furthermore, there are no clear indications of what method is used for an incoming message.

3.3 Desynchronizing clients

Silent Circle only documents how progressive encryption should be done in the context of a fresh conversation. It remains undefined how Bob should handle a PKStart message from Alice when he has already set up a SCimp session with her (and they share a cs). It turns out that Eve can use the unspecified behaviour in order to desynchronize the parties, which she can leverage into a full undetected man-in-the-middle attack.

By inspection of the code (see Section 5.2 for details) we found that the implementation will blindly accept any incoming PKStart message, delete cs and initiate a fresh protocol. Only the plaintext message header is inspected before triggering this behaviour. By deleting cs, the key continuity is destroyed and the identity of the other party is no longer validated. This gives rise to a trivial man-in-the-middle attack: Eve waits until Alice and Bob have set up a SCimp session and have verified the SAS. She then sends Alice a PKStart message, pretending it originates from Bob. She could use (for example) an automatically handled Siren message receipt (see Section 4) as user message so that Alice does not even detect that any message was sent at all. Alice continues with the key negotiation with Eve—as if it was the first key negotiation with Bob—and she will never even receive a warning that she has rekeyed from scratch. Eve completes the same process with Bob and effectively she has set up a man-in-the-middle attack without any of the parties noticing. Eve can go one step further and repeat the process with one of the parties until the SAS of both sessions matches. This way she avoids detection even in the unlikely event that a vigilant Alice and Bob somehow decide to revalidate their already confirmed SAS.

Version 2 of the protocol introduced another similar bug. When a client receives an out of order keying message (DH1, DH2 or Confirm), a general protocol error warning is given and cs is deleted. Only the plaintext message header is inspected before triggering this behaviour. The given warning does not hint at any malicious activity. Eve can leverage this to a man-in-the-middle attack as well. When Alice wants to send her next message it will probably be a PKStart message, for which she needs Bob’s medium-term key (that was also deleted during the session reset). Eve injects her own public key and completes the key negotiation. Vigilant users can protect themselves from this attack by rekeying and revalidating the SAS after every protocol error warning they get. It is unlikely that they will, especially considering that Eve can inject arbitrarily many invalid messages to trigger protocol errors until Alice and Bob grow tired of revalidating every single time.

3.3.1. Commit contention. According to the specification, clients should gracefully handle Commit contention (see Section 2.2.3).

What actually happens in the implementation is that when Alice receives an unexpected Commit message (possibly but not necessarily during key negotiation), she resets her state, deletes cs, issues a protocol contention warning and continues to process the Commit message. This means she will reply with a DH1 message that Bob does not expect, so it will trigger the above described bug and Bob resets his session. Out of order messages after Commit contention will also crash the protocol, but with more delay. Alice and Bob must redo the first key negotiation including the SAS confirmation, losing all benefit from key continuation.

3.4 Identity misbinding attack

The identity misbinding attack was first described by Diffie, van Oorschot and Wiener [11]. The original attack describes the scenario where Eve claims to own the public key of Bob and then lets Alice talk to Bob while she thinks she is talking to Eve. For example, this attack applies to the Signal Protocol [13]. SCimp does not have long-term public keys,
so the attack does not work directly, so Eve will have to fool Alice and Bob some other way.

Imagine that Alice and Bob are two chess grandmasters. Eve also likes to play chess, but she is not a very good player. Luckily, she has a way to fool both Alice and Bob. She is going to let them play a game of chess over SCimp, in which they will send each other messages containing the moves.

Eve tells Alice that her XMPP address is \( B \), which is actually the address of Bob. Likewise, she convinces Bob that her address is \( A \). They will initiate in a key exchange and derive their keys, at which point they should confirm their SAS.

At this stage, Eve calls them both at the same time, but makes sure that neither party can hear the other. Both phone calls can be over a fully authenticated channel and Alice and Bob are allowed to gain all the “confidence in the identity of the other party using standard human interaction”. After all, they really are talking to Eve. Eve just waits for one of the parties to confirm half of the SAS. Assume that Alice talks first. Eve repeats Alice’s code to Bob, who will reply with the other half of the code. Eve forwards the code to Alice. Now both grandmasters are convinced that they are connected to Eve, and the chess game begins.

Note that Eve can mount the same attack on both players by simply setting up a separate SCimp connection with both players. She then forwards every message she gets to the other player. This attack would match the chess-grandmaster attack described in [5] or the mafia-fraud attack described in [10]. However, this is not the issue with the above scenario: the issue is that Alice is convinced that \( B \) is the address of Eve and Alice and Bob are communicating directly without any message passing from Eve.

### 3.5 Out of order messages

The documentation lacks details on how to handle out of order messages. The implementation has two separate mechanisms in place in order to handle these messages: a few receive keys are stored to handle messages that are not too old and seed keys are stored in case messages arrive after rekeying.

More precisely, Bob computes 16 symmetric message receive keys \( k_{rcv} \) in advance and puts them in an array. When he receives a message, he looks up the corresponding key, by inspecting the array of precomputed receive keys and seeking if an index matches. When it does, he copies the stored key for use in decryption and erases the original. When the precomputed array starts to get empty (four or more receive keys have been erased), he forwards the ratchet to fill the array again. Keys older than 16 messages get discarded. If Bob cannot find the key index in the array, he inspects the stack of old seed keys. If the difference in indices is smaller than 32, the key is derived from the seed key.

After successful rekeying, Bob has derived new message keys. Before \( k_{rcv,0} \) is overwritten with the newly expanded value, the array of precomputed receive keys is inspected for unused key values. The key with the lowest index is stored as a seed key for later usage, so that messages that arrive out of order (sent before rekeying but received after rekeying) can still be decrypted.

The problem with the stored seed keys is that the key will remain stored in the array of precomputed receive keys, if a message was withheld from the receiver, either by a network failure or by an adversary. If rekeying happens before the key is erased from the array (before 16 messages have been received), that key will be stored as the seed key. This key does not only compromise the key erasure property of the withheld message, but of all messages until rekeying, because the keys for those messages can be derived from the seed key.

### 3.6 First key negotiation leakage

The documentation states that a random value should be used for \( cs \), when Alice and Bob do not yet share a cached secret. With a random value, Bob can ignore \( hcs_b \) from everyone he has not communicated with before (and parties should be careful not to include the value in the computation of \( hcs_{total} \)). Substituting a random value for \( cs \) has the advantage that the message does not leak if this is the first key negotiation or not.

However, in the implementation, the value \( cs \) is not chosen randomly, but set to 0. The implemented version leaks whether the key negotiation is an initial key negotiation or a rekeying. It is leaked in the message content to an attacker that computes \( hcs_b \) using \( cs = 0 \) and compares the sent value. This means an attacker can easily see that a new key negotiation has started without existing \( cs \). This gives a confirmation that the DOS attack of Section 3.3 was successful in erasing \( cs \).

### 3.7 Multiple devices

The SCimp protocol has no good way to send messages to a user that uses multiple devices with only one XMPP address.

Assume that Bob owns both an Android device and an iPhone, with both of them linked to his XMPP address. When Alice wants to talk to Bob, she creates a new SCimp context on her device, which she will use to initiate a key negotiation with Bob. She sends an XMPP stanza, containing her Commit message, to the Silent Circle XMPP server. The server sees Bob’s XMPP address as recipient and sends the message to the first of Bob’s device that it sees online. Assume that it is the Android device, then Alice and Bob can complete the key negotiation and set up a session between Alice’s device and Bob’s Android device.

When Alice sends a message to the Bob, the XMPP server will just send the message to whatever device it sees online first. If that device is the iPhone, Bob cannot decrypt the message, because the keys that belong to the SCimp context are stored on the Android device and not on the iPhone. Bob’s iPhone will display an error and send back a resend request.

SCimp has no robust method for handling the problem. Instead, Alice will have to store a SCimp context on her device for both of Bob’s devices. When encrypting a message, she simply picks the context that she used to decrypt the last message she received from Bob. If that context turned out to be wrong, hopefully Bob will send a resend request from the correct context so she can resend the message, re-encrypted in the correct context. Because the communication is asynchronous, this might take a long time. The user experience can get especially bad if Bob switched to his first device before the resend message was received: he will again be unable to decrypt the message and another context switch is required.

This problem is not a specific problem of SCimp, but one
that affects many other secure messaging protocols as well. A possible solution would be not to allow switching between devices, but this would give a poor user experience, possibly worse than the current solution for multiple devices.

4. SIREN

Silent Circle also provides some security/usability features to their application by adding functionality in a layer on top of SCimp, called Siren. For the SCimp protocol, Siren messages are just normal data messages. However, some of the features that Siren provides do affect the security properties of the protocol. In particular, message signatures in Siren can undermine some deniability of the message and sending files with Siren (using the Silent Circle cloud) is not as secure as it should be.

Siren packets are JSON encoded messages that are the plaintext input (pt) to the SCimp protocol. In addition to sending the actual message, the user can also add some security attributes to the message. For example, Siren could add a “for you eyes only”-tag to a message, which should prevent the other party from copying the message or taking a screenshot of it. Other features are to let the message delete itself after a certain amount of time, to redact a message, to request re-sending of an old message, to request a receipt upon message delivery or to send GPS data.

None of these features can be ensured by the protocol or by any other cryptographic measure in an application, although it might be enforced by the Blackphone if these features are integrated in the OS. We consider these features to be nothing more than polite requests that may or may not be honored by the other party.

That does not mean that Siren packets do not have impact upon the security of the protocol as a whole. First of all, in SCimp version 2, messages can be signed, which affects the deniability of messages. Some Siren packets, such as message redaction, will even require a signature in future versions SCimp. Secondly, SCimp version 2 allows for files to be sent via the cloud, which also has implications on the security of the protocol. We do not know if Siren (or a similar layer) is added on top of the Signal Protocol layer in the Silent Phone application, but if it is then the findings of this section apply to the current application as well.

4.1 Signed messages

Silent Circle mentions that it allows for signatures on Siren packets and will even require signatures for certain Siren messages in future requests. It is not clear how this was imagined to be done, since users do not own a long-term public key. The medium-term key has problems of its own, as described in Section 3.2.

The documentation [19] mentions that: “To prevent a form of denial of service attack at the XMPP level, we require that the burn request originate from the same JID as the message being burned, and in later versions require that the request be signed by the originator.”

The reason that a signature is necessary is that a sender might want to redact a message from the Silent Circle server before it has been delivered to the receiver. To do so, the user sends an XMPP stanza to the server containing a plaintext identifier of the earlier message and the plaintext request that the message will not be delivered. Since it is plaintext, anyone observing traffic to the server could fake to send this XMPP stanza.

Without a signature on the redaction message, the sender can plausibly deny sending the message at all. However, when the user has signed a message redaction, they have implicitly admitted that they have sent the message. Instead of being able to deny that the message was sent at all, the user can only deny the content of the message. This is a more general issue, but certainly not one solved by SCimp.

4.2 Cloud storage

A second feature that is encapsulated in Siren packets is the ability to send files via SCimp. To send files over XMPP would be very inefficient. Instead, the sender uploads their file to the Silent Circle cloud. Before uploading, the files are encrypted using convergent encryption, which encrypts the files using a key that was not generated randomly, but derived from the file contents.

Silent Circle claims [19] that convergent encryption is used because it reduces storage space on the Cloud service: “We do this to avoid duplication for media such as photos and documents. However we purposely added in a device unique salt to prevent third parties from deducing a file’s content by checksumming the same data.”

Unfortunately, this quote does not reflect what is implemented, because a salt is only added to the file locator and not to its encryption key.

Furthermore, a device unique salt would prevent third parties from deducing the file’s content only if that salt was secret and if it contained enough entropy to be unguessable by a third party. Silent Circle uses a public value, namely the senders bare XMPP address (without resource information, for example “alice@silentcircle.com”). Secondly, when the salt is only added to the file locator, an attacker that can eavesdrop on the encrypted data that is downloaded from or uploaded to the server is able to bypass any security that the salt would add if it were secret.

4.2.1. Convergent Encryption. For completeness, in this section we will describe the details of how convergent encryption is implemented by Silent Circle. This is shown in Figure 6. When Alice wants to send a file f to Bob, she first derives a key k from the file metadata and data as $k = \text{hash}(\text{metadata} || \text{data})$.

The hash-algorithm is SKEIN256, resulting in a 256 bit value. She continues to compute an identifier for the file ($id_f$), derived from the computed key and a salt as $id_f = \text{KDF}_k(\text{"SCloudLocator"}, \text{salt}, 32)$.

The KDF always uses HMAC in combination with SHA256.
The value for the salt is a device specific value, which is set at the sender’s bare XMPP address. In order to encrypt the data in CBC mode, Alice requires both an encryption key \(ek\) and an IV \(n\), which are simply computed by splitting key \(k\) in equally sized halves: \((ek, n) = \text{split}(k)\). She encrypts as \(ct = \text{AES}_{ek}(\text{metadata} \parallel \text{data})\). The encryption algorithm is AES128 in CBC mode. Files bigger than 64kB are cut into chunks, which will each be encrypted with their own key and get their own file locator.

Alice uploads the ciphertext \(ct\) to the cloud, using the locator \(id_f\) as an address for retrieving the file. She encapsulates \(k, id_f\) and some file metadata in a Siren packet, which is sent to Bob as a SCimp Data message.

Decryption of convergent encryption is depicted in Figure 7. Upon receiving the SCimp message, Bob is able to download the file from the cloud using the file locator. He is able to decrypt the file using the key that Alice has sent him.

### 4.2.2. Confirmation of a file. A known attack on convergent encryption is the confirmation of a file:

Assume that Ed wants to send a secret file to Glenn, but he does not want his employer to know that he sent that file. He also knows that they are monitoring all traffic to and from his device. His employer has already precomputed a database of all the secret files (\(t\) in total), encrypted with convergent encryption. The moment he uploads his file to the cloud, his employer intercepts the data and searches for a match in the database. Using binary search, the employer can complete this search in \(O(\log t)\).

If Silent Circle had added the device specific salt to the encryption key (like they claim in the documentation), the cost for the employer would only have grown if multiple users are suspected. For \(m\) suspicious employees, they would need to add \(tm\) encrypted files to the database. Binary search would still make the runtime of the search a very effective \(O(\log \log tm)\). This does assume that the attacker knows the device specific salt of each device, which is a reasonable assumption when the salt is simply the bare XMPP address.

However, this attack would have been prevented if each device added a secret value instead of a public salt. Ed could then have provided the decryption key per file, without leaking his secret salt.

### 4.2.3. Learn the remaining information. Another well-known attack on convergent encryption is the “learn-the.remaining-information” attack [32]. This attack applies to files that contain little entropy. The attacker can just convergently encrypt all possible files until the ciphertext matches that of the uploaded file. Not only has the attacker gained confirmation that this file was uploaded, but they also learned the remaining information that was in the file.

A device specific salt would help only a little, because now the attacker has to brute-force the files for each user individually, instead of being able to search all users at the same time. Again, a secret value instead of a public salt would have prevented this attack, as long as it contained enough entropy to make a brute-force search unfeasible.

### 4.2.4. File injection. The above attacks are well known attacks on convergent encryption, which leak metadata or even parts of data of a file. The Silent Text implementation has the additional problem that attacker can swap in a different file when they know which file is being uploaded.

When attackers use one of the attacks above to learn which file is being uploaded, they also learn the encryption key, because they can derive it from the file. They can use that key to encrypt another file, which could contain malware. When Bob requests the file from the cloud, the attacker substitutes the file with the encrypted malicious file. Bob, who is able to decrypt, falsely assumes that the file came from Alice.

Bob can detect this attack by recomputing the key from the decrypted file and comparing it to the one he used for decryption. When they do not match, he knows that the file he received was not the file uploaded by Alice. At that point the file can be deleted, before it is opened by an application.

Note that authenticated encryption, for example, CCM instead of CBC blockmode, would not have helped prevent this attack, because it only authenticates the data under the assumption that the encryption key is unknown by the attacker.

### 4.2.5. Conclusion on convergent encryption. It seems that convergent encryption introduces more problems than it solves. Convergent encryption, as implemented in Silent Text, only saves space when a user sends one file to multiple recipients. When the same file is uploaded by different senders, the file gets stored under different locators, so they are very likely stored as separate files.

A much simpler and more secure solution would be to generate a random key for encryption, encrypt the file in CCM mode, upload the ciphertext to the cloud and send the key in a secure SCimp message to the other party or to multiple parties if the file should be shared. We are not aware of other implementations of convergent encryption omitting the easy check of file correctness.

### 5. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS

Due to the insufficient level of documentation, code review was necessary, though tedious. The implementation of SCimp provided on GitHub had several implementation errors, including cryptographic errors. We report the results of our code review in this section. The SCimp implementation is written in C and should be suited to run on both Android and iPhone mobile devices. A cross-platform library called libgcrypt contains the code for both SCimp and SCloud.

There are many ways in which the described bugs affect the security of the communication. Some bugs compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the protocol, or simply crash the application, leading to a possible DOS attack. More subtly, some encryption primitives are implemented...
wrong and leak information to an adversary through side-channels.

We conclude this section by analyzing non security-critical bugs, which could also be classified as style issues. We explicitly mention them because they hinder the legibility and maintainability of the overall software. To put it into the words of Jon Callas, one of the Silent Circle co-founders: “All bugs are security bugs” [8].

5.1 High level overview

The heart of SCImp is implemented in a few files: SCimp.c (1219 sloc), SCimpProtocol.c (2970 sloc), SCimp.h (451 sloc) and SCimpPriv.h (227 sloc). This code calls cryptographic functions, provided by the LibTomCrypt library, wrapped in the custom Silent Circle functions in SCcrypto.c and SCccm.c. To communicate with the SCimp message format, two serializers are provided in SCimpProtocolFmtJSON.c (default) and SCImpProtocolFmtXML.c.

The basic flow of a SCImp conversation is shown in Figure 8. Each conversation is managed by a separate SCImpContext “object” (actually a structure, because C has no objects). It can be created with the function SCImpContext: SCImpNew, as shown in point 1. Various properties such as a choice for the cipher suite and the SAS method are set. Setting the event handler is non-optional and turns out to be very important for the functionality and security of the protocol. This handler is responsible for many types of events, the most important ones being errors, warnings and sending packets.

The SCImpContext structure contains a few fields worth mentioning here. First of all, it holds a state variable of type SCImpState. It indicates the current position in the protocol. For example, when the devices state is SCImpState_DH2, the role of the device is initiator and it has just sent a DH2 message. A SCImpContext also holds a reference to the used serializer.

At point 2 of Figure 8, the initiator starts the first key negotiation by calling SCImpStartDH (or for Progressive Encryption: SCImpStartPublicKey). Points 3–5 show the basic structure of how the first key negotiation is further handled. Internally, when SCImpProcessPacket is called, the deserializer handler processes the message and triggers a transition, based upon the message tag. The functions that are then called by the state machine are responsible for putting all the data in the right place to be able to call the cryptographic primitives. After the keyed event has been triggered, the participants can send data, as shown in points 6–9.

Besides handing the messages, a SCImpContext is also responsible for managing key material, including storing keys for out of order messages. It also holds on to a queue of transitions (necessary when running with multiple threads), the role of the current device (initiator or responder), etc. Basically, it is just a structure that holds the entire administration that is required for running SCImp.

5.2 State machine

The SCImp implementation defines a state machine that determines what will happen when certain transitions are triggered. The state machine is defined in SCIMP_state_table and displayed in diagram 9. This section explains the state machine, indicates some problems that it has, and looks at a few ways how the implementation bypasses the state machine all together.

In the diagram, the blocks define the states, while labeled arrows define the transitions between states. The label defines both the transition that is triggered and the function that handles the transition. For example, rcvDH2 triggers the transition kSCImpTrans_RCV_DH2 and is handled by doRcvDH2. The double label at the pkCommit state means that the transition rcvPKStart is handled by pkStartContention. Arrows that do not start at a state represent events that can be handled from any state, except for states that already handle that transition. For example, the rcvPKStart transition goes to the dh1 state, except when the current state is pkCommit.
Internally, SCimp has a function `sProcessTransition` that manages the state, by referring to the state machine, implemented in `SCIMP_state_table`. Each table entry consists of four items:

1. the current state
2. the transition that was called
3. the next state
4. the function that handles the transition

5.2.1. State machine bugs. The biggest issue with the state machine is highlighted in red. The `rcvPKStart` transition can be triggered by an incoming message and is independent of the current state. This leads to the man-in-the-middle attack described in Section 3.3.

There are a few other things wrong with this state machine. First of all, SCimp defines a state `pkInit` that does not even occur in the table. It is strange that there are three states for Progressive Encryption, even when there is only one message that differs from keying in SCimp version 1. According to the code comments, the states represent the following phases in the protocol:

- `pkInit`: `pkStart` info ready, waiting for first send
- `pkCommit`: `pkStart` sent, waiting for DH1
- `pkCommit`: `pkStart` was received, sent DH1

The `pkStartContention` should happen when the device has just sent the PKStart message and then receives a PKStart message, so when it is in state `pkStart`. Upon inspection of the state machine, it turns out that contention on PKStart happens in the `pkCommit` state. In the `pkStart` state, the state machine is showing that it expects a Commit message. It appears as if the `pkCommit` state should have been named `pkStart`, `pkStart` should have been `pkInit` and `pkInit` should not exist.

What is remarkable is that no state transition leads to either the `pkStart` or `pkCommit`. It turns out that the state machine is bypassed, see Section 5.2.2.

A second issue is that the `sndConfirm` transition seems redundant, because the `rcvDH2` handler should just handle anything that needs to happen when the Confirm message is sent. The code comment at the `sndConfirm` handler suggests that this is a pseudo state, used to inform the user of keying when it is ready. We think this could and should have been done in the `rcvDH2` handler.

The `commitContention` handler is called when the `recvComm` transition is triggered in any state other than `init`, `PKStart` or `ready`. It is not displayed because it can be triggered in any current state and does not affect the next state, so it is unrelated to the rest of the state machine. Real commit contention can only happen when the sender is in the `commit` state. This indicates that the `commitContention` handler does not actually handle commit contention. It actually resets the `SCimpContext` and thereby bypasses the state machine, triggering the bug described in Section 3.3.1.

A minor style issue is that the `startDH` transition from the `init` state is redundant, because the `startDH` transition will have the same result from any state.

5.2.2. State machine bypass. The described bugs might suggest that this state machine does not work at all. The fact that the application can actually send messages suggests otherwise. The reason is simple, the state machine is ignored often and many functions are called directly, which should only be called from a state machine handler. In other places in the code, the `state` variable is even modified directly.

It already begins with creating a new `SCimpContext`. The `SCimpNew` function resets the context, including setting the state to the value `init`. After resetting, the function `sEvent-Transition` is called, which tricks the event handler into thinking that an event transition has taken place. There is no reason not to use the reset transition of the state machine.

Approximately the same problem occurs with the handlers `commitContention`, `improperRekey` and `pkStartContention`. By the definition of the state machine, we expect these handlers not to alter the state. The `commitContention` handler first resets the `SCimpContext`, effectively setting the state to `init`, then goes on to call the `rcvCommit` handler (bypassing the state machine) and finally sets the `state` variable to `dh1`. The `pkStartContention` handler follows the same pattern.

The `improperRekey` handler has its own confusing implementation. First, it triggers the warning `protocolError` (apparently not an error) and then goes on to reset the `SCimpContext`, which leads to the second man-in-the-middle attack described in Section 3.3.

The irony is that all this bypassing of the state machine means that the state machine must set `NO_NEW_STATE` for the next state, otherwise it would undo everything that was bypassed by the handler.

Fix. The state machine appears to be a good idea, taken from the OTR documentation/code. However, it should be the foundation of the message handling implementation and not implemented as an afterthought, as is in SCimp. The result is that the state machine more often gets in the way of the programmer than that it helps him to keep the code clean. Bypassing the state machine can then feel more natural for the programmer, even if it results in hacks such as the `sndConfirm` transition.

Unfortunately, there is no easy fix for this bug, as it would require changes to the entire structure underlying the code itself. Many functions will have to be rewritten. It might be easier to simply strip out the state machine completely and directly interact with the handling functions. From a security perspective, this easier fix is not ideal, since a well implemented state machine makes it much easier to analyze the code.

5.3 CCM Encryption

The design of SCimp contains the CCM blockmode, standing for Counter mode with CBC-MAC. Counter mode is used for encryption/decryption of the data, while the CBC-MAC authenticates the data, by computing an authentication tag over the plaintext and additional data—or header. This blockmode is implemented in LibTomCrypt [28, 16], according to the NIST specification [12]. This implementation contained an error leading to a timing side-channel vulnerability.

According to the NIST specification of CCM, the authentication tag is part of the ciphertext. In order to decrypt, this full ciphertext must be decrypted, resulting in a “plaintext” tag. The tag must then be recomputed from the plaintext and compared with the decrypted value. However, upon decryption in the LibTom implementation, the plaintext is
computed and a tag is computed from the header and (de- 
crypted) plaintext. This is then re-encrypted, so that the 
caller of the function must check the correctness of the tag. 

NIST specifies that “only the error message INVALID is 
returned” when the decryption-verification fails. In that case 
“the payload P and the MAC T shall not be revealed” and 
“the implementation shall ensure that an unauthorized party 
cannot distinguish whether the error message results from 
[invalid message format] or from [authentication failure], for 
example, from the timing of the error message.”

In the case of SCimp, the ccm_memory wrapper function in 
SCcmm.c does indeed compare the tag value after decryption, 
but this comparison is done with a call to memcmp, which 
does a byte-by-byte comparison and returns as soon as the 
first difference was encountered (see also Section 5.4) thereby 
leaking the first difference.

We proposed several fixes to the LibTomCrypt develop-
ers, for example removing the tag parameter from the func-
tion and letting it be part of the ciphertext parameter (as it 
should be according to the specification). Verification of au-
thentication can then be done inside the function ccm_memory. 
Since this would break compatibility with the existing 
implementation we came up with a quickfix as a compromise 
which was integrated upstream.7

Listing 1: LibTomCrypt: CCM quickfix

```c
if (direction == CCM_ENCRYPT) {
  for (x = 0; x < len && x < *taglen; x++) {
    if (x < len && x < *taglen; x++) {
      tag[x] = PAD[x] ^ CTRPAD[x];
      } 
      *taglen = x;
    } else {
      *direction = CCM_DECRYPT ;/
    for (x = 0; x < len && x < *taglen; x++) {
      if (x < len && x < *taglen; x++) {
        ptTag[x] = tag[x] ^ CTRPAD[x];
      } 
      *taglen = x;
    }
    err = XMEM_NEQ(ptTag, PAD, *taglen);
  }
}
```

The function ccm_memory does both encryption and de-
cryption, depending on the direction parameter. At the end 
of the ccm_memory function, the PAD array holds the value 
of the authentication tag, computed over the plaintext and 
header, CTRPAD is the encryption/decryption block from the 
Counter mode and tag is the function parameter. In case of 
decryption, the tag is decrypted and compared against the 
computed PAD with the XMEM_NEQ function.

Upon inspection of this function, we found another bug. 
The function indeed did a constant time comparison of the 
input arrays, by computing the exclusive or of the complete 
array per byte and combining the results with the or-
operator. The problem was that they did not convert this 
byte into a single bit output before outputting the result. 
By investigating the exact value of the returned value, an 
attacker learns the error locations and might learn something 
about the secret data that was compared. We proposed 
a simple fix, by folding the resulting byte (ret) into one single 
bit.8

Listing 2: LibTomCrypt: XMEM_NEQ

```c
ret &= ret >> 4;
ret &= ret >> 2;
ret &= ret >> 1;
return ret ;
```

One thing to note, however, is that modes that work by 
encrypt-then-mac are not vulnerable to the attack that was 
described in this section, because a good implementation 
will only decrypt data that is authenticated.9

5.4 Side-channels

A side-channel to software implementations of a crypt-
osystem happens when an attacker can learn secret infor-
mation from observing the physical implementation. For 
example, an attacker might observe how long a device takes 
to perform a certain cryptographic operation. If the timing 
depends upon secret data, some information of that secret 
 leaks to an attacker measuring the time taken.

In this section, we look for software bugs that might lead 
to a timing attack. We did not analyze the LibTomCrypt 
library for other side-channel vulnerabilities, such as cache-
based side-channel attacks [4], because there were enough 
timing attacks.

5.4.1. Comparison of secrets. Every comparison of secret 
data should be done in constant time. We already men-
tioned that after CCM decryption, the verification is done 
by calling memcmp, which does non-constant time compari-
sion, because it sequentially compares byte-by-byte and re-
turns as soon as the first difference was encountered. This 
is not the only place in the code where this happens, be-
cause almost all secret values are compared with this same 
function, leading to side-channel attacks.

SCpubTypes.h defines a macro CMP, that is used to com-
pare secret values.

Listing 3: SCpubTypes.h (line 121–125)

```c
#define CMP(b1, b2, length) ((memcmp( (void **)b1, (void **)b2, (length) ) == 0))
#define CMP2(b1, b2, length) (((memcmp( (void **)b1, (void **)b2, (length) ) == 0))
```

The macro opens up a side-channel when validating hcs0, 
in DH1 (SCImpProtocol.c::2254); when validating hcsa in 
DH2 (SCImpProtocol.c::2318); when validating maca in 
DH2 (SCImpProtocol.c::2336); when validating macb in 
Confirm (SCImpProtocol.c::2371); and in validating pkb.

The leakage is not an issue for mac and pkb, – all key ma-
terial is discarded. However, hcs depends upon the long-term 
secret value cs and not upon fresh random values, meaning 
that it might leak through a timing attack. The attacker 
can fix a value for pkb, and send a guess for hcs in DH1 and 
time how long it takes to receive DH2. When the value of 
hcs is wrong, the honest initiator will get a warning, but the 
protocol will continue and the device will reply with DH2.

For the attack to succeed, the victim needs to initiate 
the protocol repeatedly and there might be warnings, at

---

7 See also: http://thoughtcrime.org/blog/the-cryptographic-doom-principle/.
8 commit 25af184cd59b1769c0f588678362adb5f4d41a50ed
9 commit 75b114517a3f8db2075a45b0af87d4d74778ad66
which point the device might decide\textsuperscript{10} that the value cs is no longer trusted and that the SAS should be confirmed to re-authenticate the other person. If that happens, it does not matter if the attacker learns cs. The attacker also needs to make sure that the value of cs does not get erased on the side of the honest initiator, which will happen if she sends any other message than Confirm. The honest initiator might still erase her value of cs, but that depends upon the error handler.

A timing attack on \textit{hcs}, is also unlikely, because this value gets sent together with \textit{mac}, in message DH2. The chance of a correct guess for \textit{mac}, is negligible, so the honest responder will abort the protocol. For the attacker, that means that there will be no reply from which to measure timing.

Of course, these timing attacks are assumed to be done over the network. If an attacker can get their hands on the victims device, it might be easier to exploit the timing vulnerabilities. For example, re-initiating the rekeying protocol might be trivial.

\textbf{Fix.} Even though exploiting the existing timing channels is non-trivial, to fix the vulnerabilities is very easy. Simply use a constant time comparison, preferably by reusing the XMEM\_NEQ function in LibTomCrypt (see Listing 2).

5.5 Software bugs

The code contains a few other bugs as well.

5.5.1. Transition queue race condition. The library is designed to work with multiple threads running in parallel. In order to keep these threads from competing for the same resources, the SCimpContext structure has a \textit{pthread_mutex_t} value (mp), that gets locked every time a SCimp transition is triggered.

\textbf{Listing 4: SCimpProtocol.c (line 3516–3544)}

```c
SCLError scTriggerSCimpTransition(
    SCimpContextRef ctx, SCimpTransition trans,
    SCimpMsg* msg)
{
    SCLError err = kSCLError_NoErr;
    if(pthread_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mp) == EBUSY)
    {
        err = sQueueTransition(&ctx->transQueue, trans, msg);
        return err;
    }
    err = sProcessTransition(ctx, trans, msg);
    while(ctx->transQueue.count > 0)
    {
        TransItem item;
        err = sDeQueueTransition(&ctx->transQueue, &item);
        if(err == kSCLError_NoErr)
        {
            sProcessTransition(ctx, item.trans, item.msg);
        }
    }
    pthread_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mp);
    return err;
}
```

This mutex ensures that no more than one thread is able to process a transition at the same time. However, this implementation is missing a mutex on the queue itself. The thread holding the mutex might unlock it before the new transition was enqueued, with the result that it will not be processed. The thread that holds the mutex mp might try to dequeue the ctx->transQueue, while another thread is not yet finished with enqueuing a new item, or two threads might try to enqueue to the same queue slot at the same time, resulting in corrupted data. This bug is known as a race condition and can lead to non-deterministic behavior.

\textbf{Fix.} The blocking function \textit{pthread_mutex_lock} should be used instead of the non-blocking \textit{pthread_mutex_trylock}. If this costs too much in terms of performance, an additional mutex could lock access to the queue. The latter solution will probably turn out moderately complex, because it should prevent the active thread from unlocking the mp mutex before the item was enqueued.

5.5.2. Delete receiving keys. Upon receiving a data message, the receiver tries to retrieve the key by using the (plaintext) value LSB(\textit{init}) in the function call \textit{sGetKeyForMessage}. When that function finds the key in the queue of receive keys, it copies the key to a buffer and overwrites the queue item with zeros. It continues to verify-decrypt the message, displaying it to the user and finally clears the copied key buffer as well.

This gives the opportunity for an attacker to perform a DOS attack, by injecting random messages to the receiver, but with a value for the index that was expected. Since the index value is simply incremented with every message, the attacker can repeat the attack for as long as he likes, whereby forwarding the key of the receiver arbitrarily far, disabling further communication between the honest participants.

\textbf{Fix.} Only after the message was verified successfully, should the key value be deleted.

5.5.3. Mixing label in \textit{hcs}. A discrepancy between code and spec is which value is hashed: according to the documentation the “Initiator” string is not digested: \textit{hcs} = MAC\textsubscript{cs}(hash(\textit{pk})), “Initiator”). In the implementation, Alice does digest this string as hash(\textit{pk}, “Initiator”). With the documented design, Bob can check the validity of \textit{hcs}, before engaging in key generation. He can ignore invalid Commit messages, whereas with the implementation he needs to wait for Alice to open her commitment in message DH2. This makes the protocol less efficient and opens up the possibility for a DOS attack, where Eve can trick Bob into opening many SCimp sessions.

5.5.4. Verify memory allocation. In order to allocate memory, C has the function \texttt{malloc}, which is used on a few places in the SCimp implementation. More often, the code calls the macro \texttt{XMALLOC}, which is defined either in the file \texttt{src/main/accrypto/SCPubTypes.h}, the file \texttt{src/main/tommath/tommath.h} or in \texttt{src/main/tomcrypt/-headers/tomcrypt_custom.h}, depending on the order of imports. In any case, the macro simply gets reduced to \texttt{malloc}. A call to \texttt{malloc} can fail and return NULL, which should be caught and handled appropriately. The same applies for other memory allocating functions such as \texttt{calloc} and \texttt{realloc}.

For this reason, \texttt{SCpubTypes.h} defines the \texttt{CKNULL} macro.
More often than not, this check is omitted after a memory allocation. This can lead to the software crashing, but we are not aware of any way this can compromise the security of the application.

Fix. The fix is simple: search for all memory allocations in the code and add the CKNULL macro where necessary.

5.5.5. Checking error codes.

Something similar happens with the CKERR macro, which should be called after every SCimp function that might return an error (which includes almost every function).

```c
#define CKERR if( (err != kSCLErrorNoErr) ) \ 
    STATUS_LOG( "ERROR
      if( (err != kSCLErrorNoErr) ) \ 
    STATUS_LOG( "ERROR
    goto done; 
    goto done;

    The structure of this macro implies that every call to such a possibly failing function should store the result in a variable named err, and should define a flag at the end of the function named done. One could argue that this is a fragile structure, but it appears to work throughout the code. Except of course, in the cases where this call to the macro CKERR is forgotten, so that the error is not caught and the code continues to run. The consequence for the security of the implementation is highly dependent on the context. We have found a few omissions of CKERR, but we have not been able to escalate these bugs into security exploits.

Fix. Again, the fix is simple: search for the string “err” and include CKERR where necessary.

5.6.5. Message index.

In this section, we look at some issues that affect the code, but which are not necessarily bugs. These style issues will make it very difficult to understand and thus maintain the code. These style issues could lead to someone making a change in the code that results in a bug, because they misunderstood someone. Or someone interacting with the code might have some incorrect assumptions about the function they are using and will trigger some unexpected or undefined behavior. In the long term, these style issues could lead to application failure or even security vulnerabilities.

5.6.1. MAC length in the serializer.

When inspecting the calls to the CCM decryption function, something stands out.

```c
err = CCM_Decrypt_Mem( 
    scSCimpCipherAlgorithm( ctx->cipherSuite ), 
    key, 
    scSCimpCipherBits( ctx->cipherSuite )/4, 
    msgIndex, 
    sizeof(msgIndex), 
    m->msg, 
    m->msgLen, 
    m->tag, 
    sizeof(m->tag), 
    &PT, 
    &PTLen); 
CKERR;
```

The length of the authentication tag is specified by the length of the tag received in the message. In other words:

```c
LOG( "ERROR
    goto done;
    goto done;
```

The structure of this macro implies that every call to such a possibly failing function should store the result in a variable named err, and should define a flag at the end of the function named done. One could argue that this is a fragile structure, but it appears to work throughout the code. Except of course, in the cases where this call to the macro CKERR is forgotten, so that the error is not caught and the code continues to run. The consequence for the security of the implementation is highly dependent on the context. We have found a few omissions of CKERR, but we have not been able to escalate these bugs into security exploits.

Fix. Again, the fix is simple: search for the string “err” and include CKERR where necessary.

5.6. Style issues.

In this section, we look at some issues that affect the code, but which are not necessarily bugs. These style issues will make it very difficult to understand and thus maintain the code. These style issues could lead to someone making a change in the code that results in a bug, because they misunderstood someone. Or someone interacting with the code might have some incorrect assumptions about the function they are using and will trigger some unexpected or undefined behavior. In the long term, these style issues could lead to application failure or even security vulnerabilities.

5.6.5. Message index.

The message index makes it possible to handle out-of-order messages. It is derived from kdk2, using the KDF. In our Proverif analysis we showed that the protocol is secure when this value is made public. This in-

```c
err = CCM_Decrypt_Mem( 
    scSCimpCipherAlgorithm( ctx->cipherSuite ), 
    key, 
    scSCimpCipherBits( ctx->cipherSuite )/4, 
    msgIndex, 
    sizeof(msgIndex), 
    m->msg, 
    m->msgLen, 
    m->tag, 
    sizeof(m->tag), 
    &PT, 
    &PTLen); 
CKERR;
```

The length of the authentication tag is specified by the length of the tag received in the message. In other words:

```c
LOG( "ERROR
    goto done;
    goto done;
```
dicates that the value might as well be initialized at zero, speeding up the implementation.

5.6.6. KDF vs MAC. Silent Circle uses a standard extract-expand construction for deriving keys. Instead of naming this as their KDF, they decided to relabel a MAC function with fixed labels as a KDF, while it should have been called expand. Their additional enhance “step” is not really a different step, it is really just a part of the extract step.

Silent Circle does not explain in its documentation why it is necessary to make the Extract and Enhance steps separate steps. The design could be simplified by including the value ctxStrLen in the extract step.

The confusing specification of the KDF lead to another implementation bug. \( kdk_2 = \text{KDF}_{\text{key}}(Z_x, \text{“MasterSecret”}, \text{“SCimp-ENHANCE”}) \parallel \text{ctx} \parallel 0x00, 256 \). Note that the function KDF differs from the regular KDF function as it has four arguments: the value \( Z_x \) is prepended to the digested value in the MAC computation. The value \( Z_x \) was already mixed in the value of \( kdk \), so there appears to be no reason to include it again in \( kdk_2 \). Since the documentation does not mention this parameter, it appears to be an implementation error and \( kdk_2 \) should have been computed with the regular KDF function.

5.6.7. KDF implementation. Code could be eliminated where multiple calls to the MAC functions (init, update and final) could be replaced by a single call to the KDF (sComputeKDF). This happens for the computation of \( kdk_2 \), cs, \( k_{ad,j} \) and \( k_{cv,j} \) (for \( j > 0 \)).

The prototype of the KDF function itself could be simplified as well. The \( L \) parameter is passed twice to sComputeKDF: once as the hashLen (in bits) and once as the outLen (in bytes). One would expect the equation \( \text{hashLen}/8 = \text{outLen} \) to always be true, but in reality it is more often false (see also Section 5.6.8). The reason that this does not break the application is that both sender and receiver of messages use the same erroneous implementation to derive keys.

5.6.8. Length inconsistencies. The following code fragment illustrates a problem with length parameters that propagates throughout the entire code-base:

```
Listing 8: SCimpProtocol.c (line 1136–1138)

unsigned long ctxStrLen = 0;
size_t kdkLen;
int keyLen = SCImpCipherBits((ctx->cipherSuite);

The values ctxStrLen and kdkLen represent byte lengths, while keyLen represents a length in bits. The types do not match and are not computed consistently. For example, ctxStrLen is computed as a size_t but (implicitly) converted to an unsigned long. The length of key \( k_{ad} \) is actually \( 2 \times \text{keyLen} \), so to convert to bytes, one needs to divide by four. This confusing design has the consequence that the computation of the KDF is often done wrong, with the value of \( L \) not actually matching the hash length. This might also have to do with the fact that the KDF function is sometimes computed with the function sComputeKDF, while other times it is bypassed and the MAC functions MAC_init, MAC_update and MAC_final are used directly.

The LibTomCrypt function ccm_memory has the strange property that it silently downgrades the length of the authentication tag to the largest valid value of 16 bytes. The wrapper functions, that are used for SCimp (see SCcm.c), always pass the value 32. To add to the confusion, these wrappers distinguish a value tagLen and tagSize, with the following cryptic comment in the decryption wrapper:

```
Listing 9: SCcm.c (line 216–221)

// This will only compare as many bytes of
// the tag as you specify in tagSize
// we need to be careful with CCM to not
// leak key information, an easy way to do
// that is to only export half the hash.
if( memcmp(T.tag, tagSize) != 0 )
    RETERR(kSCLError_CorruptData);
```

We could not find any literature about CCM mode leaking key information. Nor is there a hash in sight to export. The value tagSize turns out to be 8 bytes in both encryption and decryption, which is only half as big as the tag that is actually computed in both encryption and decryption. According to the NIST specification [12]: “Larger values of Tlen provide greater authentication assurance [...]. The performance tradeoff is that larger values of Tlen require more bandwidth/storage”. An overhead of 8 bytes on a message that is encoded in XML seems negligible to us. Even if it is not, the correct parameter of 8 bytes should be passed to the function ccm_memory—and not 32 bytes silently lowered to 16.

5.6.9. Naming inconsistencies. Many inconsistencies exist between names as well. A pointer to a SCimpContext is called a SCimpContextRef, while a pointer to a SCImpMsg is called a SCimpMsgPtr. To add to the confusion, it seems an arbitrary choice whether to use this pointer type or to use the C pointer syntax (*). All the SCimp version 1 code calls the SCImpContext parameter that gets passed are called ctx, while code that was introduced with version 2 refers to it by the name scimp.

None of these issues are necessarily bugs, but they make understanding and maintaining the code more difficult than necessary. It is almost inevitable that in the long term, this code base will lead to application bugs. It might already have been the reason for past bugs.

5.6.10. Code comment/documentation. The code has little documentation. The existing documentation in the form of the whitepaper [21] is outdated and inconsistent, both with itself and with the actual code of either version. The messaging ecosystem document [19] is a good high-level description of SCimp and the context in which it runs, but lacks the details necessary for analysis of the protocol.

As an example: SCimp version 2 implemented a sync mode for several functions, without any explanation. It turns out to have nothing to do with the protocol itself, but as Vinnie Moscaritolo explained to us: “sync mode is something we added to the API recently to allow android apps to work a bit better. The android environment couldn’t handle callbacks through the JNI very well, so we made a mode that worked without callbacks.” In our opinion, this is something that needs to be documented.

6. COMPARISON

SCimp is an implementation of SecureSMS [3] in XMPP. The SecureSMS protocol took many ideas from existing protocols (most notably ZRTP [33] and OTR [6, 1]) and combined them to be suitable for a mobile environment. Now
that SCimp has been discontinued, Silent Circle wrote their own implementation\textsuperscript{12} of the Signal Protocol [13]. The results of a comparison between the protocols is given in Table 1.

Although SCimp version 2 can send user data in the first message, we have shown that this is insecure. Signal improves the forward secrecy by hashing the message keys of the ratchet keys. As SCimp is a SAS based protocol, users cannot share public keys before initiating communication. Note that elliptic-curve crypto does not necessarily mean that the protocol is more secure, but its lower computational requirements and smaller keysizes make it more suitable for a mobile environment.

We refer the interested reader to [29] for a more detailed explanation of these results and to [13] for a detailed analysis of Signal.

7. FORMAL VERIFICATION

The ProVerif models of SCimp version 1 and Progressive Encryption are available on GitHub:

github.com/sebastianv89/scimp-proverif

SCimp version 1 shares some structure with ZRTP, of which the secrecy was modelled in ProVerif in [7]. We go beyond that model, by formalizing the SAS confirmation instead of having to rely on an ad-hoc argument that the SAS prevents a man-in-the-middle attack. In addition, our models cover authenticity, forward secrecy, future secrecy and deniability of the protocol and we model Progressive Encryption. ProVerif confirms that SCimp version 1 is secure and finds the man-in-the-middle attack on Progressive Encryption described in Section 3.1.

8. CONCLUSIONS

This paper found several weaknesses in the SCimp protocol and implementation. Despite the high price tag of Blackphone and Silent Text, the quality of crypto and code looks worse than for OTR or Signal, which is yet another confirmation of the importance of open code and detailed security analysis.

9. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work was done while Verschoor was a student at TU/e. A much extended version can be found in his masters thesis [29]. This work was supported in part by the European Commission through H2020-ICT-645421 ECRYPT-NET. This work was supported in part by Canada’s NSERC

\textsuperscript{12}We did not inspect the Silent Circle implementation, just the original implementation [22] by Open Whisper Systems.

10. REFERENCES


