Paper 2016/530
Destroying Steganography via Amalgamation: Kleptographically CPA Secure Public Key Encryption
Alexander Russell and Qiang Tang and Moti Yung and Hong-Sheng Zhou
Abstract
We describe a general technique to protect randomized algorithms against kleptographic attacks. We then apply the technique to construct the first IND-CPA secure public-key encryp- tion scheme in the kleptographic setting. Our scheme preserves IND-CPA security, even when all relevant cryptographic algorithms—including key generation—are subject to adversarial subversion. The scheme requires no trusted parties or re-randomization reverse firewalls. The technique also gives a secure symmetric key encryption scheme that advances the state-of-the- art by permitting adversarial subversion of key generation and, furthermore, requiring no a priori decryptability assumptions. Designing cryptographic primitives immune to kleptographic subversion is an active area which has led to remarkable new models and techniques; many of these are realizable by systems and can reduce the threat of such strong attacks. The feasibility of public-key encryption that is kleptographically secure in the CPA sense has been open till now.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Contact author(s)
- qt44 @ cornell edu; hszhou @ vcu edu
- History
- 2018-09-16: last of 4 revisions
- 2016-05-31: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/530
- License
-
CC BY