Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/529

Efficient Public-Key Cryptography with Bounded Leakage and Tamper Resilience

Antonio Faonio and Daniele Venturi

Abstract: We revisit the question of constructing public-key encryption and signature schemes with security in the presence of bounded leakage and tampering memory attacks. For signatures we obtain the first construction in the standard model; for public-key encryption we obtain the first construction free of pairing (avoiding non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs). Our constructions are based on generic building blocks, and, as we show, also admit efficient instantiations under fairly standard number-theoretic assumptions.

The model of bounded tamper resistance was recently put forward by Damgård {\em et al.} (Asiacrypt 2013) as an attractive path to achieve security against arbitrary memory tampering attacks without making hardware assumptions (such as the existence of a protected self-destruct or key-update mechanism), the only restriction being on the number of allowed tampering attempts (which is a parameter of the scheme). This allows to circumvent known impossibility results for unrestricted tampering (Gennaro {\em et al.}, TCC 2010), while still being able to capture realistic tampering attacks.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / tamper resilience, public-key encryption, signature schemes

Original Publication (with minor differences): IACR-ASIACRYPT-2016

Date: received 29 May 2016, last revised 23 Aug 2016

Contact author: afaonio at gmail com, danone83 at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20160823:133749 (All versions of this report)

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