Shortening the Libert–Peters–Yung Revocable Group Signature Scheme by Using the Random Oracle Methodology

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Abstract. At EUROCRYPT 2012, Libert, Peters and Yung (LPY) proposed the first scalable revocable group signature (R-GS) scheme in the standard model which achieves constant signing/verification costs and other costs regarding signers are at most logarithmic in $N$, where $N$ is the maximum number of group members. However, although the LPY R-GS scheme is asymptotically quite efficient, this scheme is not sufficiently efficient in practice. For example, the signature size of the LPY scheme is roughly 10 times larger than that of an RSA signature (for 160-bit security). In this paper, we propose a compact R-GS scheme secure in the random oracle model that is efficient not only in the asymptotic sense but also in practical parameter settings. We achieve the same efficiency as the LPY scheme in an asymptotic sense, and the signature size is nearly equal to that of an RSA signature (for 160-bit security). It is particularly worth noting that our R-GS scheme has the smallest signature size compared to those of previous R-GS schemes which enable constant signing/verification costs. Our technique, which we call parallel Boneh–Boyen–Shacham group signature technique, helps to construct an R-GS scheme without following the technique used in LPY, i.e., we directly apply the Naor–Naor–Lotspiech framework without using any identity-based encryption.

Keywords: Group signature, Revocation, Scalability

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Group signature is a kind of digital signatures, proposed by Chaum and van Heyst [1]. In a group signature scheme, a group manager issues a membership certificate to each group member. Then, a signer, who has a membership certificate, can produce a group signature, and a verifier can verify whether a group signature was created by a group member or not, without identifying who the actual signer is. In order to capture a case of dispute, only the authority called “opener” can identify the corresponding signer of group signatures. In many practical scenarios, it is conceivable that signing keys will be leaked, or group members will quit. Hence, the revocation functionality is desirable in practice. To address this need, group signature schemes with revocation, which are referred to as revocable group signatures (R-GS), have been proposed.†

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† In this paper, we use the word “revocation” to mean that signing keys are expired. That is, a user is revoked when the user signing key is expired. As a remark, the open functionality is sometimes referred to as “anonymity revocation” since the opener can break the anonymity and can identify the signer. In addition to this, we can consider “unlinkability revocation” which allows one to decide whether two signatures are made by the same signer or not, e.g., traceable signatures [2] or group signatures with controllable linkability [3].
In particular, Libert, Peters and Yung [4] proposed the first scalable R-GS schemes, where all costs regarding signers are at most logarithmic in $N$, where $N$ is the maximum number of group members. Their main technique to achieve scalability was to employ broadcast encryption, where the group manager publishes a ciphertext of a broadcast encryption scheme using non-revoked members as authorized receivers. Then only non-revoked members can prove decryption ability of the ciphertext. Concretely, they applied the Naor–Naor–Lotspiech framework [5] and the Dodis–Fazio construction [6], where the Complete Subtree (CS) method of the framework is implemented from identity-based encryption (IBE) and the Subset Difference (SD) method of the framework is implemented from hierarchical IBE (HIBE), respectively. Libert et al. proposed two R-GS schemes with respect to the CS and SD methods in [4]. We denote these schemes the CS-based LPY scheme and the SD-based LPY scheme, respectively.

1.2 Our Motivation

Though the LPY R-GS schemes [4, 7] are asymptotically quite efficient, these schemes are not very efficient in practice. For example, the signature size of the LPY scheme [4] is roughly 10 times larger than that of an RSA signature (for 160-bit security), and that of the LPY scheme in [7] is even larger. Since the LPY R-GS schemes are constructed in the standard model and use Groth–Sahai proofs, they are not efficient. Therefore, it seems natural to consider an R-GS scheme secure in the random oracle model, where the scheme realizes the same efficiency as the LPY schemes in an asymptotic sense, but has a small signature size. Moreover, from a practical perspective, even if there is an efficient scheme in the standard model, it is meaningful to provide a more efficient scheme in the random oracle model as an alternative choice. In fact, two of the three public-key encryption schemes listed in ISO/IEC 18033-2 [8] are secure only in the random oracle model. In addition, several group signature schemes (e.g., Hwang et al. [9] or Furukawa–Imai [10]) listed in ISO/IEC 20008-2 [11] are also only provably secure in the random oracle model. We note that (R-)GS schemes secure in the standard model [12, 4, 7, 13] are constructed using Groth–Sahai proofs [14], whereas the schemes secure in the random oracle model [15, 16, 10] are constructed using the Fiat–Shamir transformation [17], which converts $\Sigma$-protocols to Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK) proofs. Therefore, in order to construct an efficient and scalable R-GS scheme secure in the random oracle model, one may think that an LPY R-GS scheme in the random oracle model can be constructed easily via the Fiat–Shamir transformation, as in [15, 16, 10]. However, it is not straightforward to construct such a scheme due to the following two reasons.

- The languages of Groth–Sahai proofs and those of Fiat–Shamir proofs are completely different.
- There is no suitable HIBE scheme (i.e., achieving constant ciphertext size, compatible with the Fiat–Shamir proof, etc., see below) in the random oracle model.

As for the former issue, Groth–Sahai proofs prove pairing product equation relations, and therefore the witness typically consists of group elements. In contrast, the witness in a Fiat–Shamir proof consists of the discrete logarithm of group elements, for example. Therefore, even though there exists a standard model scheme which proves the possession of certain group elements, it is not obvious how to convert this into a more efficient scheme in the random oracle model.

As for the latter issue, the SD-based LPY scheme strongly depends on the algebraic structure of the underlying HIBE. Moreover, the ciphertext-size must be constant in order to achieve constant signing/verification costs, which is the reason why the SD-based LPY scheme is based on the Boneh–Boyen–Goh HIBE scheme [18]. That is, even if the Gentry–Silverberg HIBE scheme [19] (which is secure in the random oracle model) is used, the ciphertext size is not constant and signing/verification costs will depend on $N$. So, even if we allow the use of random oracles, it seems difficult to implement the SD-based LPY scheme (and the LPY scheme [7] based on concise vector commitments [20]) in the random oracle in an efficient way. For a more detailed discussion of the difficulty of instantiating the SD-based construction, see Section 4.4.
The last option may be the CS-based LPY scheme [4] since the CS method does not apply HIBE but IBE, and the Boneh–Franklin IBE scheme [21] is quite efficient in the random oracle model. However, the next hurdle is signatures computed by the group manager for authorizing subsets which cover all non-revoked members. That is, in the CS-based LPY scheme (as well as in other LPY schemes), the group manager computes a signature on ciphertexts of identity-based encryption for authorizing such ciphertexts. To sign anonymously, a signer selects one of these ciphertexts, and prove the decryption ability of that ciphertext.‡

To instantiate this approach, one may choose the Boneh–Franklin IBE scheme [21] for the underlying IBE scheme. Unfortunately, this choice does not work well, because the ciphertext of the Boneh–Franklin scheme contains a target-group element. The group manager needs to authorize such ciphertexts by signing these, but there are no appropriate signature schemes which can sign a target-group element. In summary, this approach to the construction of an efficient R-GS scheme is still difficult, and therefore an efficient R-GS construction in the random oracle model is not obvious at all.

1.3 Our Contribution

In this paper, we propose the most scalable R-GS scheme secure under popular complexity assumptions (the decision linear (DLIN) assumption and the \( q \)-strong Diffie–Hellman (\( q \)-SDH) assumption) with the help of random oracles. More concretely, (1) our scheme achieves the same efficiency as the LPY schemes in an asymptotic sense, i.e., all costs regarding the signer are at most logarithmic in \( N \), and the signing/verification costs are constant (see Table 1), and (2) we can drastically reduce the signature size of the LPY scheme. A signature of our scheme contains 5 \( G_1 \) elements and 13 \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) elements whereas that of the LPY scheme contains 96 \( G_1 \) elements. We also summarize the concrete communication and computational costs of the five R-GS schemes that are based on the subset covering methodology in Table 2. In our scheme, \( e(g, h) \), \( e(g_1, v_{k_0}) \), \( e(g_2, v_{k_0}) \), \( e(g_1, h) \), \( e(g_2, h) \), \( e(h_0, h) \), \( e(h_1, h) \), \( e(h_2, h) \), \( e(g'_1, v_{k_0}) \), \( e(g'_2, v_{k_0}) \), \( e(g'_1, h) \), and \( e(g'_2, h) \) are pre-computable. Thus, we assume that these values are implicitly contained in \( gpk \), and remove these computations from Table 2. We also count the number of computations of the other schemes with the same policy.

In the following, we outline the techniques used to construct our scheme.

1. For revocation, we directly apply the NNL framework without the use of IBE or HIBE which the original LPY schemes rely on [4]. That is, the group manager publishes a revocation list containing signatures on non-revoked users’ identities.
2. In order to prove that a signer is not revoked, the signer proves that a signature corresponding to the signer is contained in the revocation list by using the Boneh–Boyen–Shacham (BBS) group signature [15]. The construction of the proposed scheme can be seen as parallel use of the BBS group signature since the possession of both (1) a membership certificate and (2) a signature contained in the revocation list are simultaneously proved by two instances of the BBS group signature scheme.
3. In order to further reduce the signature size, we apply the randomness reuse technique due to Kurosawa [34].

Our scheme is secure under the DLIN assumption and the \( q \)-SDH assumption. We additionally remark that the asymmetric pairing setting is highly desirable in practice due to the recent novel attack on discrete logarithms on finite fields with small characteristics, e.g., [35, 36]. Therefore, we use the asymmetric pairing setting though the LPY schemes use the symmetric pairing setting.

‡ R-GS schemes secure in the standard model which achieve constant-size revocation list have been proposed [22, 23]. However, these schemes apply an identity-based revocation scheme [24] or extended accumulators based on [25] respectively, and these also strongly depend on the underlying algebraic structures.
A signature scheme is secure under a simple assumption, their R-GS scheme is also secure without relying on the LMPY signature scheme \[37\] instead of employing the BBS+ signature scheme. Since the LMPY scalability in the random oracle model. They completely followed our technique presented in Section 4.1.

Very recently, as a follow up work of our paper, Emura and Hayashi \[33\] proposed an R-GS scheme with scalability in the random oracle model. They completely followed our technique presented in Section 4.1.

| Table 1. Comparison of Concrete Signature Length and Computational Costs. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Signature length | # of elements | 80-bit security | 160-bit security | Computational costs | Signing | Verification |
| **Signature** | **# of elements** | **80-bit security** | **160-bit security** | **160-bit security** | **160-bit security** |
| LPY1 (SD) \[4\] | 94 | 16714 bits | 48384 bits | 311exp[\(G\)] + 43exp[\(G\)] + 479p + 220exp[\(G\)] | | |
| LPY2 (CS) \[4\] | 94 | 16714 bits | 48384 bits | 281exp[\(G\)] + 43exp[\(G\)] + 479p + 220exp[\(G\)] | | |
| LPY3 \[7\] | 145 | 25690 bits | 74496 bits | 587exp[\(G\)] + 130exp[\(G\)] + 857p + 432exp[\(G\)] | | |
| EH \[33\] | 12 | 2720 bits | 4096 bits | 32exp[\(G\)] + 10p + 5exp[\(G\)] | | |
| Ours \[8\] | 5 | 3090 bits | 5888 bits | 18exp[\(G\)] + 2p + 15exp[\(G\)] | | |

1. n[\(G\)] + m[\(Z_p\)] denotes that the signature includes n \(G\)-elements and m \(Z_p\)-elements. The same holds for the notation n[\(G_1\)] + m[\(Z_p\)] with \(G_1\)-elements and \(Z_p\)-elements.

2. In the symmetric pairing (|\(G_1\)|, |\(Z_p\)|) = (176 bits, 170 bits), and in the asymmetric pairing (|\(G_1\)|, |\(Z_p\)|) = (170 bits, 170 bits).

3. In the symmetric pairing (|\(G_1\)|, |\(Z_p\)|) = (512 bits, 256 bits), and in the asymmetric pairing (|\(G_1\)|, |\(Z_p\)|) = (256 bits, 256 bits).

4. nexp[\(G\)] + mp + texp[\(G\)] denotes that the signing/verification algorithms include n exponentiations in \(G\), m pairing operations, and t exponentiations in \(G\).

5. The cost is estimated for the case that the number of the group members is \(2^{20}\).
$q$-type assumptions. One disadvantage of our scheme is the signature size, as the signatures of our scheme is longer than that of the Emura–Hayashi scheme for both 80-bit security and 160-bit security. An advantage is signing/verification costs. Usually, the pairing computation is the most bottleneck part. For example, benchmarks on the Barreto–Lynn–Scott curves [38] over a 455-bit prime field have been given [33], and it shows that $p \approx 2^{\exp[G_T]} \approx 6^{\exp[G]}$. According to the benchmarks, we conclude that our scheme is more efficient than the EH scheme in terms of signing and verification cost. See Table 2.

1.4 Related Work

Many efficient constructions of group signatures have been proposed. Most of these schemes rely on the random oracle model [15, 39–41, 10, 16, 42, 43, 37, 44]. Though most of them are based on discrete-logarithm type assumptions, Gordon et al. [45] proposed the first group signature scheme from lattice assumptions. Later, several group signature schemes from lattices have been proposed, e.g., [46–52].

Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [15] proposed an R-GS scheme where the group manager publishes a list containing membership certificates of revoked users. In their scheme, the public parameters and the signing keys of the non-revoked users are updated in such a way that the revoked users are excluded from the system. This technique was also applied by Delerablée and Pointcheval [16], and Furukawa and Imai [10]. However, this technique introduces two problems. First, non-revoked users are involved in the revocation process, even when they are not revoked, and second, the cost of updating the signing key is $O(r)$. In order to remove the need for signers updating their certificates, Brickell [53] proposed the concept of verifier-local revocation (VLR), where no signer is involved in the revocation procedure. In the VLR approach, a revocation list is given to verifiers and verifiers check sequentially whether the signer is included in the revocation list. This technique allows the signing cost to be independent of the number of revoked users, but the verifying cost is $O(r)$. Specific constructions were proposed by Boneh and Shacham [26], Nakanishi and Funabiki [27], Libert and Vergnaud [28], Langlois, Ling, Nguyen and Wang [54], etc. This VLR approach can be used for implementing the opener’s ability to identifying the signer. Bichsel et al. [42] constructed an efficient R-GS scheme without using encryption though the cost of opening depends on the number of users.

Though either the signing cost or the verification cost is $O(r)$ in the above methodologies, Nakanishi, Fuji, Hira, and Funabiki [29] proposed the first R-GS scheme with both constant signing and verification costs. However a drawback of their construction is that public key size is $O(\sqrt{N})$. Later, Fan, Hsu, and Manulis [30] also proposed an R-GS scheme with not only constant signing/verification costs but also constant size public key. However, the size of the revocation list is $O(N)$.

Kumar et al. [55] proposed a group signature scheme with probabilistic revocation. In their scheme, a token (which they call alias token) is contained in a group signature, and the same token is used when group signatures are generated in the same time period, i.e., these are linkable during a time period. This model is different from the LPY model that we adopt in this paper. Furthermore, the signing cost of their scheme is proportional to the maximum number of the time periods. Therefore, their scheme is not scalable in our sense, and thus we do not provide more detailed comparison among Kumar et al.’s scheme and the scalable schemes such as the LPY schemes, the EH scheme, and ours.

In the research of security models, first, Bellare, Micciancio, and Warinschi (BMW) [56] showed that full-anonymity and full traceability are sufficient for (static) group signatures, and now the BMW model is widely recognized as the de-facto standard security model of the group signature area. Bellare, Shi, and Zhang (BSZ) [57], and Kiayias and Yung (KY) [58, 59] independently extended the BMW model from static groups to dynamic groups. Later, Sakai et al. [60] showed that there is room for improving the BSZ model since a signature hijacking attack is possible in the BSZ model, and proposed an extended BSZ model by considering a new security notion called opening soundness. In the LPY papers [4, 7], they extended the KY model by considering the revocation functionality (the LPY model). Bootle et al. [61] pointed out that in the previous models, a user may be able to sign messages with respect to earlier time intervals during which
the user was not a member of the group. Note that they also gave a countermeasure, and it is also applicable to our scheme. Since our main aim is to implement the LPY scheme in the random oracle model, we adopt the LPY model in this paper.

2 Preliminaries

In this section, we review the complexity assumptions which our scheme relies on, the BBS+ signature scheme, and the complete subtree method. Let $x \overset{R}{\leftarrow} X$ denote that $x$ as being uniformly sampled from the set $X$, and $x \overset{R}{\leftarrow} X$ denote that $x$ as being sampled from the distribution of the random variable $X$.

2.1 Complexity Assumptions

Let $G$ be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes a security parameter $\lambda$ as input and generates a parameter $(p, G_1, G_2, T, e, g, h)$ of bilinear groups, where $p$ is a $\lambda$-bit prime, $G_1, G_2$ and $G_T$ are groups of order $p$, $e$ is a bilinear map from $G_1 \times G_2$ to $G_T$, and $g, h$ are generators of $G_1$ and $G_2$, respectively. Here we use the asymmetric setting, i.e., $G_1 \neq G_2$. Similarly, we describe $(p, g, y) \overset{R}{\leftarrow} G(1^\lambda)$ with the same manner.

Let $(p, G, g) \overset{R}{\leftarrow} G(1^\lambda)$, $x \overset{R}{\leftarrow} Z_p$ and $y := g^x$. The discrete logarithm (DL) problem is stated as follows: Given $(g, y, p, G)$, output $x = \log_p y$. The advantage of an probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm $A$ against the DL problem is defined as $\text{Adv}^\text{DL}_G(\lambda) = \text{Pr}[A(g, y, p, G) = x | y = g^x]$.

**Definition 1.** We say that the DL assumption holds if $\text{Adv}^\text{DL}_G(\lambda)$ is negligible in $\lambda$ for any PPT algorithm $A$.

Let $(p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e, g, h) \overset{R}{\leftarrow} G(1^\lambda)$, $\gamma \leftarrow Z$ and $A_i := g^{\gamma^i}$ for $i = 0, \ldots, q$. The $q$-strong Diffie–Hellman (q-SDH) problem is stated as follows: Given $(g, (A_i)_{0 \leq i \leq q}, h, h^\gamma)$, output $(c, g^{1/(\gamma + c)})$ where $c \in Z_p$. The advantage of an algorithm $A$ against the q-SDH problem is defined as $\text{Adv}^\text{q-SDH}_G(\lambda) = \text{Pr}[A(g, (A_i)_{0 \leq i \leq q}, h, h^\gamma) = (c, g^{1/(\gamma + c)}) \land c \in Z_p]$.

**Definition 2.** We say that the q-SDH assumption holds if $\text{Adv}^\text{q-SDH}_G(\lambda)$ is negligible in $\lambda$ for any PPT algorithm $A$.

Let $(p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e, g, h) \overset{R}{\leftarrow} G(1^\lambda)$, $u, v, h \leftarrow G_1$, $\alpha$, $\beta$, $r \leftarrow Z_p$ and $g_1 := u^\alpha, g_2 := v^\beta$. The decision linear (DLIN) problem is stated as follows: Given $(u, v, h, u^\alpha, v^\beta, z)$, output 1 if $z = h^{\alpha + \beta}$, otherwise 0 if $z = h^r$. The advantage of an algorithm $A$ against the DLIN problem is defined as $\text{Adv}^\text{DLIN}_G(\lambda) = |\text{Pr}[A(u, v, h, u^\alpha, v^\beta, z) = 1 | z = h^{\alpha + \beta}] - \text{Pr}[A(u, v, h, u^\alpha, v^\beta, z) = 1 | z = h^r]|$.

**Definition 3.** We say that the DLIN assumption holds if $\text{Adv}^\text{DLIN}_G(\lambda)$ is negligible in $\lambda$ for any PPT algorithm $A$.

2.2 BBS+ Signature

We introduce the BBS+ signature scheme [10, 62, 63] in the following. Let $g_0, g_1, \ldots, g_L, g_{L+1}$ be generators of $G_1$, $h$ be a generator of $G_2$ and $e : G_1 \times G_2 \rightarrow G_T$ be a pairing function.

**Key Generation:** Choose $\gamma \overset{R}{\leftarrow} Z_p^*$, and let $w = h^{\gamma}$. The verification key is $vk = w$, and the secret key is $sk = \gamma$.

**Signing:** For the message $(m_1, \ldots, m_L) \in Z_p^L$, choose $\eta, \zeta \overset{R}{\leftarrow} Z_p$ and compute $A = (g_0g_1^\zeta g_2^{m_1} \cdots g_{L+1}^{m_L})^{1/\gamma}$.

Let the signature $\sigma = (A, \eta, \zeta)$. 
Verifying: For the signature $\sigma = (A, \eta, \zeta)$ and $(m_1, \ldots, m_L)$, if $e(A, h^\eta v^k) = e(g_0^{\zeta}g_2^{m_1}\cdots g_{L+1}^{m_L}, h)$ then output 1, and otherwise output 0.

This signature scheme has unforgeability against chosen message attack (CMA) under the $q$-SDH assumption. For the formal security proof, see [62]. In our usage, we set $L = 2$.

2.3 Complete Subtree Method

Naor, Naor and Lotspiech (NNL) [5] proposed the subset cover framework that is a general technique for membership revocation and traitor tracing, and this technique is used for constructing broadcast encryption. This framework is implemented by two methods: Subset Difference (SD) and Complete Subtree (CS) method.

Let $\mathcal{N}$ be the set of all signers, and $\mathcal{R} \subset \mathcal{N}$ be the set of revoked signers. In such a case, the set of non-revoked users are divided into $\text{num}$ disjoint sets where $\text{num}$ is the number of subset. That is, $\mathcal{N} \setminus \mathcal{R} = S_1 \cup \cdots \cup S_{\text{num}}$.

Denote $S_i$ $(1 \leq i \leq \text{num})$ as the set of leaf nodes that have the same parent node $v_i$. In [5], it is proved that $\text{num} \leq r \cdot \log(N/r)$ in the case of the CS method, where $\text{num}$ is the number of subset and $r = |\mathcal{R}|$.

By using the CS method, we can construct a symmetric key setting broadcast encryption scheme as follows. A key is assigned to each node of a binary tree, and each user is assigned to a leaf node of the binary tree, and let $\{u_0, u_1, \ldots, u_t\}$ be the path from the root node to the leaf node. Then, the user obtains a key associated with the node $u_i$ such that $u \in \{u_0, u_1, \ldots, u_t\} \cap \{u_0', u_1', \ldots, u_{\text{num}}'\}$. Therefore, the user can decrypt the ciphertext using the key associated with the node $u$.

The detailed node assignment algorithm is defined as follows.

**Definition 4 (Complete Subtree Algorithm).** This algorithm takes as input a binary tree $\mathcal{BT}$ and a set of revoked user $\mathcal{R}_t$ on time $t$, and outputs a set of nodes. A formal description of this algorithm is as follows: If $u$ is a non-leaf node, then $u_{\text{left}}$ and $u_{\text{right}}$ denote the left and right child of $u$, respectively. Each user is assigned to a leaf node. If a user $i$ (assigned to a leaf node $u$) is revoked on time $t$, then $i \in \mathcal{R}_t$. $\text{Path}(u)$ denotes the set of nodes on the path from $u$ to $u_0 := \text{root}$. The description of the CS algorithm is given below.

$$CS(\mathcal{BT}, \mathcal{R}_t) :$$

- $X, Y \leftarrow \emptyset$;
- $\forall i \in \mathcal{R}_t$
  - Add Path$(u)$ to $X$ where $i$ is assigned to $u$
  - $\forall x \in X$
    - If $x_{\text{left}} \notin X$ then add $x_{\text{left}}$ to $Y$
    - If $x_{\text{right}} \notin X$ then add $x_{\text{right}}$ to $Y$
- If $Y = \emptyset$ then add $\text{root}$ to $Y$
- Return $Y$

We give an example of the CS method in Fig 1. Each user is assigned to a leaf node. Let the user assigned with $u_0$ be revoked. The user has keys associated with nodes $\text{Path}(u_0) = \{u_0, u_1, u_3, u_9\}$. Then, the CS algorithm outputs $Y = \{u_2, u_3, u_{10}\}$. Since a ciphertext consists of multiple encryption constructed using keys assigned to $\{u_2, u_3, u_{10}\}$, and $\{u_0, u_1, u_4, u_9\} \cap \{u_2, u_3, u_{10}\} = \emptyset$ holds, the revoked user cannot decrypt the ciphertext.

In our R-GS scheme, each signer is assigned to a leaf node, and is issued a set of signatures $(A$ in the scheme) whose signed messages are the nodes on the path from the root node to the leaf node. A revocation
The list contains signatures ($B$ in the scheme) whose corresponding signed messages are nodes determined by the CS method. If a signer is not revoked, then there exist two signatures that sign the same node.

3 Definition of Revocable Group Signature

In this section, we give definitions of R-GS. We adopt the LPY model [4] which is a modification of the Kiayias–Yung (KY) model [58,59].

An R-GS scheme consists of the following six probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Setup, Join, Revoke, Sign, Verify, Open).

Setup: It takes as inputs a security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and the number of group member $N \in \mathbb{N}$, and outputs the group public key $gpk$, the secret key of the group manager $sk_{GM}$, the secret key of the opener $sk_{OA}$, the public information that is represented by state $St = (St_{users}, St_{trans})$. After the execution of Setup, state $St$ is initialized as $St_{users} = \emptyset$, and $St_{trans} = \epsilon$ (empty string).

Join: It is an interactive protocol between the group manager and a signer. Let the execution of Join (that the signer takes as input $\lambda$ and $gpk$, the group manager takes as input $\lambda$, $gpk$, $St$ and $sk_{GM}$) denote as $[J_{users}(gpk), J_{GM}(gpk, St, sk_{GM})]$. By the execution of Join, the signer gets a membership certificate $cert_i$ and the secret key $sec_i$. In addition, $St$ is updated as $St_{users} := St_{users} \cup \{i\}$, and $St_{trans} := St_{trans} \| (t, transcript)$.

Revoke: It takes as input the set of revoked users $R_t \subset St_{users}$ for $gpk$, $sk_{GM}$, revocation epoch $t$, and outputs the revocation list $RL_t$ for the epoch $t$.

Sign: It takes as input $gpk$, $t$, $RL_t$, $cert_i$, $sec_i$ and a message $M$, and outputs $\bot$ if $i \in R_t$, and otherwise outputs a group signature $\sigma$.

Verify: It takes as inputs $\sigma$, $t$, $RL_t$, $M$, $gpk$, and outputs 1 if $\sigma$ is valid a group signature and otherwise outputs 0.

Open: It takes as inputs $M$, $t$, $RL_t$, $\sigma$, $sk_{OA}$, $gpk$, $St$, and outputs a signer index $i \in St_{users}$ or $\bot$.

Let $cert_i = gpk \ x \ sec_i$ denote that $cert_i$ and $sec_i$ are a valid certificate and a secret key by the execution of $[J_{users}(gpk), J_{GM}(gpk, St, sk_{GM})]$. We borrow this notation from the LPY model.

Correctness: We say that an R-GS scheme satisfies correctness when the R-GS satisfy following requirement.

Fig. 1. Example of the CS method.
Security Requirements: Here, we introduce the security requirements of R-GS. First, the notation and the oracles used in the definitions are given as follows:

1. \( St = (St_{users}, St_{trans}) \), where \(|St_{users}| = |St_{trans}| \) (i.e., each signer is assigned to unique tag, respectively).\(^3\)

2. If \([\text{Join}(gpk), J_{GM}(gpk, St, sk_{GM})]\) is executed correctly, and the signer gets \( \langle i, cert_i, sec_i \rangle \), then \( cert_i \leftarrow gpk \cdot sec_i \).

3. For all \( \langle i, cert_i, sec_i \rangle \) such that \( cert_i \leftarrow gpk \cdot sec_i \) and the revocation epoch \( t \), the equation \( \text{Verify}(\sigma, M, t, RL_t, gpk) = 1 \) is satisfied where \( \sigma = \text{Sign}(gpk, t, RL_t, cert_i, sec_i, M) \).

4. For all state \( St \) and \( \langle i, cert_i, sec_i \rangle \) that issued by using \( St \), if \( St \) is updated to \( St' \) by honest executions of the Join protocol, for \( t \) such that \( i \notin R_t \) and \( \sigma = \text{Sign}(gpk, t, RL_t, cert_i, sec_i, M) \), the equation \( \text{Open}(M, t, RL_t, \sigma, sk_{OA}, gpk, St') = i \) is satisfied.

- \( \text{state}_1 \): The current state. It includes \( (St, gpk, sk_{GM}, sk_{OA}) \) and epoch \( t \). The initial state is set to be \( \text{state}_1 = (St, gpk, sk_{GM}, sk_{OA}, t) \) where \( (St, gpk, sk_{GM}, sk_{OA}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, N) \) and \( t \leftarrow 0 \).
- \( n = |St_{users}| < N \): The number of the group member.
- \( \text{Sigs} \): The history of signatures issued by signing oracle. The form of each element is \( (i, t, M, \sigma) \), which means \( \sigma \) is the signature for message \( M \) in the epoch \( t \) by the signer \( i \).
- \( U^a \): The set of the group members that collude with the adversary.
- \( U^b \): The set of the group members that do not collude with the adversary.
- \( O_{gpk}, O_{OA} \): When these oracle are called, return \( gpk, sk_{GM}, sk_{OA} \) to the adversary, respectively.
- \( O_{\text{a-join}} \): The adversary executes Join with honest group manager, and the signer that collude with the adversary is added to the group. Then the number of users \( n \) is incremented and add the information of new signer to \( St = (St_{users}, St_{trans}) \).
- \( O_{\text{b-join}} \): The adversary executes Join while colluding the group manager (this signer does not collude with the adversary). Then the number of users \( n \) is incremented and add the information of new signer to \( St = (St_{users}, St_{trans}) \).
- \( O_{\text{sig}} \): It receives a query that is a message \( M \) and index \( i \) and returns \( \bot \) if \( i \in R_t \) or \( i \notin U^b \), and otherwise returns \( \sigma \) for the signer \( i \) and epoch \( t \). Then, \( \text{Sigs} := \text{Sigs} \cup (i, t, M, \sigma) \).
- \( O_{\text{open}} \): It receives a query that is \( (M, \sigma) \) and epoch \( t \), and returns the index of the signer \( i \) who generated the signature \( \sigma \). Let denote \( S = \{(M, \sigma, t)\} \), and we will write \( O_{\text{open}} \) as the element of \( S \) cannot be queried to \( O_{\text{open}} \).
- \( O_{\text{read}}, O_{\text{write}} \): Reading and writing \( \text{state}_1 \).
- \( O_{\text{revoke}} \): It revokes a signer from the group. It receives a query of signer index \( i \in St_{users} \) and increment \( t \), add \( i \) in \( R_t \) and update \( RL_t \).

Next, we define anonymity, which guarantees that no adversary (who does not have \( sk_{OA} \)) can distinguish whether signers of two group signatures are the same or not. Moreover, an adversary is allowed to access \( O_{\text{open}} \). This notion is called CCA anonymity. Here, the \texttt{IsRevoked} algorithm takes as input \((sec, cert, RL_t)\), and outputs \( 1 \) if a user who has \((sec, cert)\) is contained in \( RL_t \), and \( 0 \) otherwise.

\(^3\) The state information \( St_{trans} \) is separated into a set of entries of the form \( (i, transcript) \). Namely, it has a form of \( St_{trans} = (i_1, transcript_1) \cdots (i_n, transcript_n) \). We denote the number of the entries by \(|St_{trans}|\). In other words, \(|St_{trans}| = |(i_1, transcript_1) \cdots (i_n, transcript_n)| = n|.
Definition 5 (Anonymity [4]). Anonymity is defined by the following game $\text{Exp}^\text{anonym}_A$.

Experiment $\text{Exp}^\text{anonym}_A(\lambda)$

$(St, gpk, sk_{GM}, sk_{OA}, t) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, N)$
$t \leftarrow 0$
$state_1 \leftarrow (St, gpk, sk_{GM}, sk_{OA}, t)$
$(aux, M^*, t^*, RL_t^*, (sec_0^b, cert_0^b), (sec_1^b, cert_1^b))$
$\leftarrow A(\text{play} : O_{gpk}, O_{GM}, O_{revoke}, O_{open}, O_{read},$
$O_{write})$

If $\neg cert_b^i \equiv gpk \text{sec}^b$

or IsRevoked$(sec^b, cert^b, RL_t^*) = 1$ for $b \in \{0, 1\}$

or $cert_0^b = cert_1^b$ then return 0.

d $\leftarrow \{0, 1\}$
$\sigma^* \leftarrow \text{Sign}(gpk, t^*, RL_t^*, cert^*_d, sec^*_d, M^*)$

d' $\leftarrow A(\text{guess} : \sigma^*, aux, O_{gpk}, O_{GM}, O_{open}^{-1}((M^*, \sigma^*, t^*),$
$O_{read}, O_{write})$

If d' = d then return 1;
Return 0.

The advantage of the adversary $A$ against the above game is as follows:

$\text{Adv}^\text{anonym}_A(\lambda) = | \text{Pr}[\text{Exp}^\text{anonym}_A(\lambda) = 1] - 1/2 |$

We say that the R-GS scheme satisfies anonymity if $\text{Adv}^\text{anonym}_A(\lambda)$ is negligible in $\lambda$ for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $A$.

Next, we define non-frameability which guarantees that no adversary (who can corrupt the group manager and the opener) can produce a group signature whose opening result is an honest user.

Definition 6 (Non-Frameability [4]). Non-frameability is defined by the following game $\text{Exp}^\text{frame}_A$.

Experiment $\text{Exp}^\text{frame}_A(\lambda)$

$(St, gpk, sk_{GM}, sk_{OA}, t) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, N)$
$t \leftarrow 0$
$state_1 \leftarrow (St, gpk, sk_{GM}, sk_{OA}, t)$
$(M^*, \sigma^*, t^*, RL_t^*)$
$\leftarrow A(O_{gpk}, O_{GM}, O_{OA}, O_{b-join}, O_{revoke}, O_{sig},$
$O_{read}, O_{write})$

If Verify$(\sigma^*, M^*, t^*, RL_t^*, gpk) = 0$ then return 0

i = Open$(M^*, t^*, RL_t^*, \sigma^*, sk_{OA}, gpk, St)$

If i $\notin U^b$ return 0
If $(\wedge j \in U^b, t, j = i) (j, t^*, M^*, *) \notin \text{Sigs}$ then return 1
Return 0.
The advantage of $A$ against the above game is as follows:

$$\text{Adv}_A^{\text{frame}}(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_A^{\text{frame}}(\lambda) = 1]$$

We say that the R-GS scheme satisfies non-frameability if $\text{Adv}_A^{\text{frame}}(\lambda)$ is negligible in $\lambda$ for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $A$.

Next, we define misidentification resistance which guarantees that no adversary (who does not have $sk_{GM}$) can produce a valid group signature whose opening result is in outside of the set of non-revoked adversarially-controlled users.

**Definition 7 (Misidentification resistance [4]).** Misidentification resistance is defined by the following game $\text{Exp}_A^{\text{misid}}$.

**Experiment $\text{Exp}_A^{\text{misid}}(\lambda)$**

$$(St, gpk, sk_{GM}, sk_{OA}, t) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, N)$$

$t \leftarrow 0$

$state \leftarrow (St, gpk, sk_{GM}, sk_{OA}, t)$

$$(M^*, \sigma^*, t^*, RL_{i*}) \leftarrow A(O_{gpk}, O_{a-join}, O_{revoke},$ 

$O_{read}, O_{OA})$

*If $\text{Verify}(\sigma^*, M^*, t^*, RL_{i*}, gpk) = 0$ then return 0*

$i = \text{Open}(M^*, t^*, RL_{i*}, \sigma^*, sk_{OA}, gpk, St)$

*If $(i \notin U^a \setminus R_{i*})$ return 1*

Return 0.

The advantage of $A$ against the above game is as follows:

$$\text{Adv}_A^{\text{misid}}(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_A^{\text{misid}}(\lambda) = 1]$$

We say that the R-GS scheme satisfies misidentification resistance if $\text{Adv}_A^{\text{misid}}(\lambda)$ is negligible in $\lambda$ for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $A$.

## 4 Proposed R-GS Scheme

In this section, we give the proposed R-GS scheme. First, we explain our technique called parallel BBS group signature technique which is the core technique of our R-GS construction.

### 4.1 An NIZK Proof for Parallel BBS Group Signature Technique

In our R-GS scheme, each signer is associated to a leaf node of a binary tree. Let $g, g_1, g_2, f_1, f_2, f_3, h_0,$ $h_1, h_2, X \in \mathbb{G}_1$ and $h \in \mathbb{G}_2$. Let $\{u_0, u_1, \ldots, u_\ell\}$ be the path from the root node to the leaf node. Then, the signer is issued BBS+ signatures $\{A_j = (g^h_{u_j^0} h_1^u X)^{u_j^0 + u_j^1} \}_{j \in [1, \ell]}$ for all $u_j \in \{u_0, u_1, \ldots, u_\ell\}$ as the membership certificate. A revocation list contains BBS+ signatures $\{B_{i,t} = (g^h_{u_i^0} h_1^{u_i} h_2) ^ {u_i + u_{i+1}} \}_{i \in [1, num]}$ for all $u_i \in \{u_0, u_1', \ldots, u_{num}'\}$ where $\{u_0', u_1', \ldots, u_{num}'\}$ is determined by the CS method. If a signer is not revoked, then there exist two signatures $A_j$ and $B_{i,t}$ that sign the same node $u_j = u_i$.

In order to describe our R-GS scheme, first, we show NIZK proofs which prove the possession of two BBS+ signatures and also prove the equality of the two signed messages. Since we use two BBS group signatures simultaneously, we call it the parallel BBS group signature technique. The statement to be proved is explained as follows.
A signer $i$ has a membership certificate $A_j$ that proves “the signer belongs to the group.” Let $u_j$ be the signed message of $A_j$ where $u_j \in \{u_0, u_1, \ldots, u_t\}$.

A signature $B_{i,t}$, whose signed message is also $u_j$, is contained in the revocation list that proves “the signer who is a descendant of the node $u_j$ is not revoked at time $t$.” $A_j$ held by the signer contains a secret key $x$, which is hidden against even the group manager (for non-frameability).

We prove the above statement as follows. We omit the subscript of BBS+ signatures such that $A$ and $B_t$. Let $\theta = (A, \eta, \zeta)$ be a BBS+ signature for the message $(m, x)$ such that $A = (gh_0^\alpha h_1^\eta h_2^\beta)_\pi^{m,\eta,\beta}$. Let $\Theta = (B_t, \eta', \zeta')$ be a BBS+ signature for the message $(m', t)$ such that $B_t = (gh_0^\alpha h_1^\eta h_2^\beta)_\pi^{m',\eta,\beta}$. The statement of the protocol, that proves that possession of $(A, x)$ and $B_t$ such that $m = m'$, is described as follows. Let $vk_0 = h_0^\eta$ and $vk_1 = h_1^\beta$ be the verification key for the BBS+ signatures $A$ and $B_t$ with $m = m'$, respectively, and $H$ be a random oracle.

First, the prover encrypts two components $A$ and $B_t$ by the decision linear variant of Cramer–Shoup encryption [64]. In order to further reduce the signature size, $A$ and $B_t$ are encrypted using same scheme and its random values are reused. This technique comes from Kurosawa’s multi-recipient public-key encryption.

Concretely, the prover chooses $\alpha, \beta \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_p$, and encrypts $A$ and $B_t$ such that $\psi_1 = f_1^\alpha$, $\psi_2 = f_2^\beta$, $\psi_3 = f_3^{\alpha+\beta}$, $\psi_4 = (g_1^\alpha g_2^{-\beta})$, and $\psi_5 = (g_1^\alpha g_2^\beta B_t)$. Remark that additional NIZK proofs of the well-formedness of $(\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_5)$ are added later. These proofs ensure the CCA security of this encryption scheme, and also ensure the CCA anonymity of our scheme. Next, the prover generates proofs that prove the values $(\alpha, \beta, x, m, \eta, \eta', \zeta, \zeta')$ satisfy the following relation, where $\eta, \eta' \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_p$:

$$
\psi_1 = f_1^\alpha, \quad \psi_2 = f_2^\beta, \quad \psi_3 = f_3^{\alpha+\beta}, \\
\epsilon(\psi_4 \cdot g_1^\alpha g_2^{-\beta}, h_0^\eta vk_0) = \epsilon(gh_0^\alpha h_1^\eta h_2^\beta, h), \\
\psi_1^\eta f_1^{-\alpha\eta} = 1, \quad \psi_2^\eta f_2^{-\beta\eta} = 1, \\
\epsilon(\psi_5 \cdot g_1^\alpha g_2^{-\beta}, h_0^\eta vk_1) = \epsilon(gh_0^\alpha h_1^\eta h_2^\beta, h), \\
\psi_1^\eta f_1^{-\alpha\eta'} = 1, \quad \psi_2^\eta f_2^{-\beta\eta'} = 1.
$$

The first line and second and third lines, and the first line and fourth and fifth lines are the statement of the BBS group signature scheme. This relations can be seen as parallel BBS group signature for $A$ (the first line and second and third lines) and $B_t$ (the first line and fourth and fifth lines), respectively, where $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are reused. As a remark, the equation $\psi_1^\eta f_1^{-\alpha\eta} = 1$ (resp. $\psi_1^\eta' f_1^{-\alpha\eta'} = 1$) is for proving the validity of $\alpha\eta$ (resp. $\alpha\eta'$).

Note that the value $t$ is not a witness, since $t$ (which indicates a revocation epoch in our R-GS scheme) is a public value.

Here, we give the NIZK proof which is constructed from a $\Sigma$-protocol for proving $(\alpha, \beta, x, m, \eta, \eta', \zeta, \zeta')$ via the Fiat–Shamir transformation. Briefly, random values are chosen for each witness and $R$ values are computed according to the relation to be proved. Note that the suffix appeared in random/R values indicate the corresponding witness.

This paper shows that randomness in the Cramer–Shoup encryption [65] can be reused for directing different messages to different recipients. We use this technique in order to encrypt a vector of messages. Intuitively, this might be reminiscent of the fact that under the decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption, given $g^\xi$, $g^{y_1}$, and $g^{y_2}$ the two elements $g^{x+y_1}$ and $g^{x+y_2}$ look random elements. For further details, please refer to our security proof or the [34] paper.

Note that in the original BBS group signature scheme a Boneh–Boyen (BB) short signature [66] is used as a membership certificate. Since we need to use a signature scheme with multiple signed messages, we use the BBS+ signature scheme instead of the BB signature scheme.
Proof: The proof of the above relations is as follows: Choose \( r_\alpha, r_\beta, r_\eta, r_\zeta, r_\eta', r_\zeta', r_\alpha, r_\beta, r_\alpha', r_\beta', r_m, r_x \) \( \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \) and compute \( R_\alpha, R_\beta, R_{\alpha+\beta}, R_A, R_B, R_{\alpha}, R_{\beta}, R_{\alpha'}, R_{\beta'} \) in the following.

\[
\begin{align*}
R_\alpha &\leftarrow f_1^{\alpha}, \quad R_\beta \leftarrow f_2^{\beta}, \quad R_{\alpha+\beta} \leftarrow f_3^{\alpha+\beta}, \\
R_A &\leftarrow e(\psi_4, h)^r e(g_1, h)^{-r_\alpha} e(g_1, v k_0)^{-r_\eta} e(g_2, h)^{-r_\zeta} e(h_0, h)^{-r_\eta'} e(h_1, h)^{-r_\zeta'} e(h_2, h)^{-r_m} e(h_2, h)^{-r_x}, \\
R_{\alpha} &\leftarrow \psi_1^{\alpha} f_1^{-r_\alpha}, \quad R_{\beta} \leftarrow \psi_2^{\beta} f_2^{-r_\beta}, \\
R_B &\leftarrow e(\psi_5, h)^{r_\eta} e(g_1, h)^{-r_{\eta'}} e(g_1, v k_0)^{-r_\alpha} e(g_2, h)^{-r_{\eta'}} e(h_0, h)^{-r_\zeta} e(h_1, h)^{-r_{\eta'}} e(h_2, h)^{-r_\zeta'} e(h_0, h)^{-r_m}, \\
R_{\alpha'} &\leftarrow \psi_1^{r_{\alpha'}} f_1^{-r_{\alpha'}}, \quad R_{\beta'} \leftarrow \psi_2^{r_{\beta'}} f_2^{-r_{\beta'}}.
\end{align*}
\]

Here, \( (R_\alpha, R_\beta, R_{\alpha+\beta}, R_A, R_{\alpha}, R_{\beta}) \) and \( (R_\alpha, R_\beta, R_{\alpha+\beta}, R_B, R_{\alpha'}, R_{\beta'}) \) correspond to a BBS group signature, respectively. Again, \( R_\alpha, R_\beta, R_{\alpha+\beta} \) and \( R_{\alpha'}, R_{\beta'} \) are commonly used. Using the above \( R_\alpha, \ldots, R_{\beta'}, \) compute

\[
c \leftarrow H(\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_5, R, \ldots, R_{\beta'}),
\]

and then compute following values:

\[
\begin{align*}
s_\alpha &\leftarrow r_\alpha + c_\alpha, \quad s_\beta \leftarrow r_\beta + c_\beta, \\
s_\eta &\leftarrow r_\eta + c_\eta, \quad s_\zeta \leftarrow r_\zeta + c_\zeta, \quad s_\eta' \leftarrow r_\eta' + c_\eta', \\
s_\zeta' &\leftarrow r_\zeta' + c_\zeta', \quad s_\alpha' \leftarrow r_\alpha + c_\alpha, \\
s_\alpha'' &\leftarrow r_\alpha'' + c_\alpha', \quad s_\beta_\eta \leftarrow r_\beta_\eta + c_\beta_\eta, \\
s_\beta' &\leftarrow r_\beta' + c_\beta', \quad s_m \leftarrow r_m + c_\eta,
\end{align*}
\]

Finally, output the proof \( \pi = (c, s_\alpha, s_\beta, s_\eta, s_\zeta, s_\eta', s_\zeta', s_\alpha', s_\beta_\eta, s_\beta', s_m, s_x) \), and the prover sends \( (\psi_1, \psi_2, \psi_3, \psi_4, \psi_5, \pi) \) to the verifier.

Verify: The verifier computes the following values from \( \pi \):

\[
\begin{align*}
R'_\alpha &\leftarrow f_1^{s_\alpha} \psi_1^{-c}, \quad R'_\beta \leftarrow f_2^{s_\beta} \psi_2^{-c}, \quad R'_{\alpha+\beta} \leftarrow f_3^{s_\alpha+s_\beta} \psi_3^{-c}, \\
R'_A &\leftarrow e(\psi_4, h)^{s_\alpha} e(g_1, h)^{-s_\eta} e(g_1, v k_0)^{-s_\eta'} e(g_2, h)^{-s_\zeta} e(h_0, h)^{-s_{\eta'}} e(h_1, h)^{-s_{\zeta'}} e(h_2, h)^{-s_m}, \\
R'_A &\leftarrow \psi_1^{s_\alpha} f_1^{-s_\alpha}, \quad R'_{\beta} \leftarrow \psi_2^{s_\beta} f_2^{-s_\beta}, \\
R'_B &\leftarrow e(\psi_5, h)^{s_\alpha} e(g_1, h)^{-s_\eta} e(g_1, v k_0)^{-s_\eta'} e(g_2, h)^{-s_\zeta} e(h_0, h)^{-s_{\eta'}} e(h_1, h)^{-s_{\zeta'}} e(h_2, h)^{-s_m}, \\
R'_B &\leftarrow \psi_1^{s_\beta} f_1^{-s_\beta}, \quad R'_{\alpha'} \leftarrow \psi_2^{s_{\alpha'}} f_2^{-s_{\alpha'}}, \quad R'_{\beta'} \leftarrow \psi_3^{s_{\beta'}} f_3^{-s_{\beta'}}.
\end{align*}
\]

If \( c = H(\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_5, R'_\alpha, \ldots, R'_{\beta'}) \) then the proof \( \pi \) is accepted, and otherwise rejected.

In the next section, we give the proposed R-GS scheme. In our R-GS scheme, \( A \) (generated in the Join algorithm) is a membership certificate and \( B \) (generated in the Revoke algorithm and contained in the revocation list) is a signature corresponding to non-revoked users.
4.2 The Proposed R-GS Construction via Parallel BBS Group Signature Technique

Here, the construction of the proposed scheme is described as follows. In our scheme, a signer is assigned to a leaf node, and let \( (u_0, u_1, \ldots, u_\ell) \) be the path from the root to the leaf. Then the signer is issued a membership certificate according to the path such that \( \{A_j = (gh_0^{\xi_j} h_1^{u_j} X) \} \in \{1, \ldots, \ell\} \). Moreover, if the signer is not revoked (at \( t \)), \( B_{t,i} = (gh_0^{\xi_i} h_1^{u_i} h_2^{\ell-\ell_i-1}) \) is contained in the revocation list where \( u_i = u_j \). Then, a group signature is computed shown in Sect. 4.1 by setting \( m = u_j \) as a signed message of the BBS+ signature. Note that \( x \) (chosen in the Join algorithm) is known by a user only, and therefore no group manager can make a group signature instead of the user.

Setup\((1^\lambda, N)\): Choose \( (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e, g, h) \) \( \leftarrow R \mathcal{G}(1^\lambda) \), \( f_1, f_2, f_3, h_0, h_1, h_2 \) \( \leftarrow R \mathbb{G}_1 \setminus \{1\} \). Let \( \gamma_0, \gamma_1 \leftarrow R \mathbb{Z}_p \) and \( (sk_0, vk_0) = (\gamma_0, h^{\gamma_0}) \), \( (sk_1, vk_1) = (\gamma_1, h^{\gamma_1}) \). Then, choose \( \xi_1, \xi_2, \xi_3, \xi_1', \xi_2', \xi_3', \varepsilon_1', \varepsilon_2' \leftarrow R \mathbb{Z}_p \), and compute \( g_1 = f_1^{\xi_1} f_3^{\xi_1'}, g_2 = f_2^{\xi_2} f_3^{\xi_2'}, g_1' = f_1^{\xi_1'} f_3^{\xi_1}, g_2' = f_2^{\xi_2} f_3^{\xi_2} \). Choose a hash function \( H: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \). Let \( sk_{OA} = (\xi_1, \xi_2, \xi_3, \xi_1', \xi_2', \varepsilon_1', \varepsilon_2'), sk_{GM} = (sk_0, sk_1) = (\gamma_0, \gamma_1), gpk = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e, g, f_1, f_2, f_3, g_1, g_1', g_2, h_0, h_1, h_2, v_0, v_1, H) \), and \( St = (St_{user}, St_{trans}) = (\emptyset, e) \). Finally, output \( sk_{OA}, sk_{GM}, gpk, St \).

Join: A user \( i \) chooses \( x \leftarrow R \mathbb{Z}_p \) and computes a signature \( sig_i \) for the message \( X = h_2^2 \), then send \( (X, sig_i) \) to the group manager. Next, the group manager assigns the user \( i \) to a leaf \( u_\ell \) of the binary tree. Let \( u_0, u_1, \ldots, u_\ell \) be the path from the root node to the lead node. For \( j = 0, \ldots, \ell \), the group manager chooses \( \eta_j, \zeta_j \leftarrow R \mathbb{Z}_p \), and computes \( A_j = (gh_0^{\xi_j} h_1^{u_j} X) \). Then, the group manager sends \( \{\theta_j = (A_j, \eta_j, \zeta_j)\}_{j=0}^\ell \) to the user \( i \). The user obtains the user membership certificate \( cert_i = (\{v_i\}, \{A_j\}_{j=0}^{\ell}, X) \) and secret key \( sec_i = x \), respectively. Finally, the group manager adds \( i \) and \( transcript_i = (X, \{A_j\}_{j=0}^\ell, sig_i) \) to the state \( St_{trans} \).

Revoke\((gpk, sk_{GM}, t, R_t)\): Determine the set of node \( \{v_0, v_1, \ldots, v_{\text{num}}\} \) from the CS method (note that \( \text{num} \leq r \cdot \log(N/\epsilon) \)). For all \( i \), choose \( \eta_i, \zeta_i \leftarrow R \mathbb{Z}_p \), then compute \( B_{t,i} = (gh_0^{\xi_i} h_1^{u_i} h_2^{\ell-\ell_i-1}) \) and let \( \Theta = (B_{t,i}, \eta_i, \zeta_i)_{i=0}^{\text{num}} \). Then, output \( RL_t = (t, R_t, \{\Theta_i\}_{i=1}^{\text{num}}) \).

Sign\((gpk, t, RL_t, cert_i, sec_i, M)\): If \( i \in R_t \) then return \( \bot \). Otherwise, the signature is computed as follows.

Since \( i \notin R_t \), there exist \( (A_j, x) \) and \( B_{j,t} \) such that \( A_j = (gh_0^{\xi_j} h_1^{u_j} h_2^{\ell-\ell_j-1}) \) and \( B_{j,t} = (gh_0^{\xi_j} h_1^{u_j} h_2^{\ell-j-1}) \). Choose \( \alpha, \beta \leftarrow R \mathbb{Z}_p \) and compute \( \psi_1 = f_1^{\alpha}, \psi_2 = f_2^{\beta}, \psi_3 = f_3^{\alpha+\beta}, \psi_4 = (g_0^{\alpha} g_2 A_j), \) and \( \psi_5 = (g_0^{\alpha} g_2 B_{j,t}) \). Then, the signer issues an NIZK proof \( \pi \) that proves \( (A_j, x) \) is possessed and \( u_i \) corresponds to both \( A_j \) and \( B_{j,t} \) as shown in Sect. 4.1. Let \( m = u_j \). Again note that \( t \) is not a witness. Moreover, we note that the signed message \( M \) is included such as \( c \leftarrow H(gpk, t, M, \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_5, R_{\alpha}, \ldots, R_{\beta}) \). Finally, output the signature \( \sigma = (\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_5, \pi) \).

Verify\((\sigma, M, t, RL_t, gpk)\): The verifier checks the NIZK proof \( \pi \) as the verifying procedure in Sect. 4.1. Note that the signed message \( M \) is included such as \( c \leftarrow H(gpk, t, M, \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_5, R_{\alpha}, \ldots, R_{\beta}) \). If \( \pi \) is accepted, then output 1, and otherwise output 0.

Open\((M, t, RL_t, \sigma, sk_{OA}, gpk, St)\): Compute \( A' = (\psi_4/\psi_1^{\xi_1} \psi_2^{\xi_2} \psi_3^{\xi_3}) \). If there exists \( \{i, transcript_i\} = (X, \{\theta_j\}_{j=0}^\ell, sig_i) \) where \( \theta = (A', \ast, \ast) \) in \( St_{trans} \), then verify \( sig_i \) and output \( i \) if \( sig_i \) is a valid signature, and otherwise output \( \bot \).

4.3 Security

The proposed scheme satisfies the following Theorems 1, 2, and 3.

**Theorem 1.** The proposed R-GS scheme has anonymity in the random oracle model under the DLIN assumption, where \( H \) is modeled as a random oracle.
Now, since anonymity means that no signer can be identified without opener’s secret key, the attack on anonymity is equal to the attack on the encryption \((\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_5)\) by which membership certificate is encrypted. Namely, the anonymity of this scheme is reduced to the CCA security of the linear encryption scheme [64].

The concrete proof is given as follows. The proof proceeds with a sequence of games. First, we define the following games. In the following we denote by \(S_i\) the event that in Game \(i\) the adversary successfully guesses the bit picked by the challenger.

**Game 0.** The initial game is identical to the game defined in the definition of admittance anonymity. We assumed that queries to the hash function are responded by the challenger. For this purpose the challenger maintains a hash list, which contains tuples of the form \((M, t, \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_5, R_{\alpha}, \ldots, R_{\beta}\psi, c)\) for the hash function \(H\).

**Game 1.** In this game we replace the zero-knowledge proof of the challenge signature with a simulated proof. When the adversary asks a challenge signature \((\psi_1^*, \ldots, \psi_5^*, c^*, R_{\alpha}^*, \ldots, R_{\beta}\psi^*\)) by sending \((i_0, i_1, M)\), the challenger computes it as follows: the challenger flips the bit \(b \in \{0, 1\}\), computes \((\psi_1^*, \ldots, \psi_5^*)\) as specified in the construction with the signing key \((cert_{ib}, sec_{ib})\), generates random integers \(c^*, s_{\alpha}, \ldots, s_{\beta}\psi\), and compute

\[
R_{\alpha}' \leftarrow f_1^{s_{\alpha}} \psi_1^{s_{\alpha} - c'}, R_{\beta}' \leftarrow f_2^{s_{\beta}} \psi_2^{s_{\beta} - c'}, \\
R_{\alpha+}\leftarrow f_3^{s_{\alpha} + s_{\psi} \psi_3^{s_{\psi} - c}}, \\
R_A' \leftarrow e(\psi_4^*, h) s_{\psi} e(g_1, h) - s_{\psi} e(g_1, v_{k0}) - s_{\psi} e(h_0, h) - s_{\psi} \psi_1^* e(h, g) e(h, v_{k0}) e(h, v_{k0}) e(h, v_{k0}) - c', \\
R_B' \leftarrow e(\psi_5^*, h) s_{\psi} e(g_1, h) - s_{\psi} e(g_1, v_{k0}) - s_{\psi} e(h_0, h) - s_{\psi} \psi_1^* e(h, g) e(h, v_{k0}) e(h, v_{k0}) e(h, v_{k0}) - c', \\
R_{\alpha\eta}' \leftarrow \psi_1^{s_{\alpha}} f_1^{s_{\alpha} - c'}, R_{\beta\eta}' \leftarrow \psi_2^{s_{\beta}} f_2^{s_{\beta} - c'}, \\
R_{\alpha\eta}' \leftarrow \psi_1^{s_{\alpha} + s_{\psi} \psi_3^{s_{\psi} - c}}, R_{\beta\eta}' \leftarrow \psi_2^{s_{\beta} + s_{\psi} \psi_3^{s_{\psi} - c}}.
\]

The challenger adds the tuple \((M^*, t^*, \psi_1^*, \ldots, \psi_5^*, R_{\alpha}^*, \ldots, R_{\beta}\psi^*, c^*)\) to the hash list for \(H\). At this point if the list for \(H\) already contains a tuple of the form \((M^*, t^*, \psi_1^*, \ldots, \psi_5^*, R_{\alpha}^*, \ldots, R_{\beta}\psi^*, c)\) for some \(c\), the challenger outputs \(\perp\) and halts. Otherwise the challenger sends \((\psi_1^*, \psi_5^*, c^*, s_{\alpha}, \ldots, s_{\beta}\psi)\) to the adversary as the challenge signature. We will argue that this change introduce only a negligible difference in the adversary’s advantage.

**Game 2.** In this game we modify the linear encryption in the challenge to be “invalid.” More precisely, to compute the challenge \((\psi_1^*, \ldots, \psi_5^*, c^*, s_{\alpha}, \ldots, s_{\beta}\psi)\), the challenger selects random integers \(\alpha, \beta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p\) and \(\tau \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \setminus \{\alpha + \beta\}\), and computes \(\psi_1^* = f_1^{s_{\alpha}}, \psi_2^* = f_2^{s_{\beta}}, \psi_3^* = f_3^{s_{\tau}}, \psi_4^* = (\psi_1^*)^{\xi_1}(\psi_2^*)^{\xi_2}(\psi_3^*)^{\xi_3} A_{ib},\) and \(\psi_5^* = (\psi_1^*)^{\xi_1}(\psi_2^*)^{\xi_2}(\psi_3^*)^{\xi_3} B_{ib}\) where \(f_1, f_2, f_3\) are the part of the group public key \(gpk\), \(b\) is the bit flipped for the challenge, \(A_{ib}\) is the part of the user membership certificate of the member \(i_0, B_{ib}\) is the signature of the group manager in the revocation list \(RL_{ib}\) corresponding the member \(i_0\). Notice that challenger uses the secret key \(sk_{OM}\) for opener (actually its component \(\xi_1, \xi_2, \xi_3, \xi_1', \xi_2', \xi_3'\)) to compute the challenge. All the other components of the challenge is generated as in Game 1. This modification also does not change the adversary’s winning probability non-negligibly, provided that the DLIN assumption holds.

**Game 3.** In this game we modify the opening oracle to reject a signature \((\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_5, s_{\alpha}, \ldots, s_{\beta}\psi)\) when it satisfies the following two conditions: \((\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_5) = (\psi_1^*, \ldots, \psi_5^*)\), that is, the components \(\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_5\) in
the query are reused from the challenge signature, and \((R_{o_1}, \ldots, R'_{\beta}) = (R_{s_1}, \ldots, R'_{\beta'})\), where \((R_{o_1}, \ldots, R'_{\beta'})\) is the group elements reproduced in the verification process.

**Game 4.** We further introduce another rejection rule. In this game the opening oracle rejects a signature that contains a ciphertext whose linear encryption component \((\psi_1, \psi_2, \psi_3)\) does not constitute a linear tuple. Specifically when \(\psi_1, \psi_2, \psi_3\) satisfy \(\psi_1 = f_1^1, \psi_2 = f_2^2, \psi_3 = f_3^3\), the challenger immediately rejects queries such that \(\alpha + \beta \neq \nu\), and all other queries are treated as before. This modification does not affect the behavior of the adversary, as the adversary can issue such as invalid query with a valid (that passes the verification) proof only with negligible probability.

**Lemma 1.** \(\Pr[S_0] - \Pr[S_1]\) is negligible.

**Proof.** We claim that the distribution (of the challenge) in Game 1 is identical to that in Game 0 except for cases in which the challenger outputs \(\perp\). This follows from a standard discussion of the simulation of zero-knowledge proof. To see this, we can observe that \(s_\alpha^* - c^* \alpha\) in Game 1 corresponding to \(r_\alpha\) in Game 0, and similar correspondence holds for all other \(s^*\)'s and \(r^*\)'s. We can also see that both \(s_\alpha^* - c^* \alpha\) and \(r_\alpha\) are uniformly distributed over \(\mathbb{Z}_p\). We will then see that the challenger in Game 1 outputs \(\perp\) only with negligible probability. It can be obtained from the fact that \((R_{o_1}, \ldots, R'_{\beta})\) are distributed uniformly over a set with cardinality (at least) \(p\), that is, the oracle queries to \(H\) issued before the challenge phase contain \((M^*, t^*, \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_3, R_{o_1}, \ldots, R'_{\beta}, c)\) with probability (at most) \(q_H/p\) where \(q_H\) denotes the number of oracle queries to \(H\) issued by the adversary.

**Lemma 2.** \(\Pr[S_1] - \Pr[S_2]\) is negligible, provided that the DLIN assumption holds.

**Proof.** We will describe a distinguishing algorithm \(B\) of the DLIN problem to bound the absolute difference \(\Pr[S_1] - \Pr[S_2]\). The algorithm receives a tuple \((f_1, f_2, f_3, f_1^1, f_2^2, f_3^3)\), in which \(\tau\) is either \(\alpha + \beta\) or not, together with the description \((p, G, G_T, e, g, h)\) of the bilinear groups. The distinguisher sets up the scheme by choosing \(\xi_1, \xi_2, \xi_3, \xi'_1, \xi'_2, \xi'_3, \gamma_0, \gamma_1, \eta_0, \eta_1, \eta'_0, \eta'_1, x_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p (1 \leq i \leq n)\), \(h_0, h_1, h_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{G} \setminus \{1\}\), setting \(g_1 = u^{\xi_1} h^{\xi_3}\), \(g_2 = v^{\xi_2} h^{\xi_3}\), \(v k_0 = h^{\gamma_0}\), \(v k_1 = h^{\gamma_2}\) and \(A_i = (g h_0 h_1 g_{2i}^{\eta_1} g_{3i}^{\eta_2} g_{4i}^{0})^{-1/\tau}\), \(B_i = (g h_0 h_1 h_2^{\gamma_1} h_3^{\gamma_2} h_4^{0})^{-1/\tau}\), and \(sk_{OA} = (\xi_1, \xi_2, \xi_3, \xi'_1, \xi'_2, \xi'_3)\), \(cert_i = (\langle v_i \rangle, \{A_j\}_{j=1}^i, g^{x_i})\), \(sec_i = x_i\). Queries from the adversary \(A\) to the random oracle \(H\) are responded in the ordinary manner, that is, all fresh queries are responded with a random hash value and are recorded together with the hash value, while previously issued queries are responded in the same way as in the previous query. Opening queries are responded as specified in the scheme, that is, the distinguisher first verifies the NIZK proof, and if the proof passes the verification, the distinguisher decrypts the linear encryption part \((\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_3)\) using \((\xi_1, \xi_2, \xi_3, \xi'_1, \xi'_2, \xi'_3)\), otherwise return \(\perp\). When the adversary requests a challenge regarding \((i_0, i_1, M)\), the distinguisher proceeds as follows: To compute the challenge \((\psi_1', \ldots, \psi_3')\) using \((\xi_1, \xi_2, \xi_3, \xi'_1, \xi'_2, \xi'_3)\), otherwise return \(\perp\). When the adversary requests a challenge regarding \((i_0, i_1, M)\), the distinguisher proceeds as follows: To compute the challenge \((\psi_1', \ldots, \psi_3', \ldots, \psi_{\beta'})\), the distinguisher flips a bit \(b\), and sets \(\psi_1' = f_1^1, \psi_2' = f_2^2, \psi_3' = f_3^3, \psi_4' = (\psi_1')^{\xi_1}(\psi_2')^{\xi_2}(\psi_3')^{\xi_3}A_{i_b}, \psi_4'' = (\psi_1')^{\xi_1}(\psi_2')^{\xi_2}(\psi_3')^{\xi_3}B_{i_b}\). The zero-knowledge proof \((c^*, s_{\alpha'}, \ldots, s_{\beta'})\) is computed with the simulation algorithm as in Game 1. The distinguisher sends the challenge computed as above to the adversary. After receiving the challenge, the adversary further makes queries to the random oracle and the opening oracle, which are responded as before by the distinguisher. Finally, the adversary outputs the guess \(b'\). The distinguisher outputs 1 if \(b = b'\), outputs 0 otherwise.

Observe that when the distinguisher receives a random tuple \((\tau \neq \alpha + \beta)\), the adversary’s view is equivalent to that of Game 2. In contrast, when the distinguisher receives a linear tuple, we can see that the view is identical to that of Game 1, as the equation \((\psi_1')^{\xi_1}(\psi_2')^{\xi_2}(\psi_3')^{\xi_3} = g_{2i}^0 g_{1}^2\) and \((\psi_1')^{\xi_1}(\psi_2')^{\xi_2}(\psi_3')^{\xi_3} = g_{2i}^0 g_{1}^2\) holds. Finally, the lemma follows from the inequality \(\Pr[S_1] - \Pr[S_2] = \Pr[B(f_1, f_2, f_3, f_1^1, f_2^2, f_3^3) | \tau \neq \alpha + \beta] = Adv^{DLIN}_B(\lambda)\).

**Lemma 3.** \(\Pr[S_2] - \Pr[S_3]\) is negligible, provided that the DL assumption holds.
Proof. Game 2 and 3 differ if the adversary issues an opening query that is not rejected in Game 2 but is rejected in Game 3. To bound the probability that such a query is issued, we construct the following reduction.

Let \( \sigma^* = (\psi_1^*, \ldots, \psi_5^*, \pi^*) \) be the challenge signature where \( \pi^* = (c^*, s_{\alpha}^0, s_{\beta}^0, s_\eta^0, s_{\alpha\eta}^0, s_{\alpha\eta'})^t \). Let \( \sigma = (\psi_1^*, \ldots, \psi_5^*, \pi) \) a signing query in question where \( \pi = (c, s_{\alpha}, s_{\beta}, s_\eta, s_{\alpha\eta}, s_{\alpha\eta'}) \). Game 2 and 3 differ if the adversary issues an opening query that is not rejected in Game 2 but is rejected in Game 3. We thus bound the probability that the adversary issues such a query to the opening oracle for verifying the queried signature.

We argue that if \( \pi \neq \pi^* \) there are following cases.

\[ c \neq c^* : \text{Since } R_\alpha' = R_\alpha, f_1^s \psi_1^{-c} = f_1^s \psi_1^{-c'} \text{ holds. Thus, } s_{\alpha} - \log f_1 \psi_1^s c = s_{\alpha}^0 - \log f_1 \psi_1^s c \text{ and } \log f_1 \psi_1^s = (s_{\alpha} - s_{\alpha}^0)/(c^* - c) \text{ holds.} \]

\[ c = c^* : \text{From } f_1^s \psi_1^{-c} = f_1^s \psi_1^{-c'} \text{ and } f_2^s \psi_2^{-c} = f_2^s \psi_2^{-c'}, s_{\alpha} = s_{\alpha}^0 \text{ and } s_{\beta}^0 = s_{\beta} \text{ hold. We consider the following 4 cases as follows. Let } a_1 := \log g_1, a_2 := \log g_2, b_0 := \log h_0, b_1 := \log g_2, b_2 := \log g_2. \]

\[ s_0^\ast \neq s_0 : \text{From } \psi_1^s f_1^{-s_{\alpha\eta}} = \psi_1^s f_1^{-s_{\alpha\eta}}, \text{ we obtain } \alpha^* q_1 s_{\eta} - q_1 s_{\alpha\eta} = \alpha^* q_1 s_{\eta} - q_1 s_{\alpha\eta} \text{ where } \psi_1 = f_1^s. \]

\[ s_0 = s_0^\ast: \text{Then from } \psi_1^s f_1^{-s_{\alpha\eta}} = \psi_1^s f_1^{-s_{\alpha\eta}}, \text{ we obtain } s_{\alpha} - s_{\alpha}^0 = s_{\alpha} - s_{\alpha}^0. \]

\[ s_0^\ast \neq s_0 : \text{As in the case of } s_{\eta}^\ast \neq s_{\eta}, \alpha^* \text{ and } \beta^* \text{ are computed by } (s_{\eta}, s_{\eta}', s_{\alpha\eta}^0, s_{\alpha\eta}') \text{ and } (s_{\eta}, s_{\eta}', s_{\alpha\eta}^0, s_{\alpha\eta}'). \]

Thus, the reduction is able to solve a DL problem.

In any cases, the reduction can obtain the DL solutions, hence the lemma holds.

Lemma 4. \( |\text{Pr}[S_3] - \text{Pr}[S_4]| \) is negligible.

Proof. Game 4 differs from Game 3 when the adversary queries the opening oracle with a signature which is not rejected in Game 3 but is rejected in Game 4. We thus bound the probability that the adversary issues such a query. More precisely, the event we consider is that the adversary issues a signature \( \sigma = (\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_5, s_{\alpha}, R_{\beta}, R_{\alpha+\beta}, R_{A}, R_{B}, R_{\alpha\eta}, R_{\beta\eta}, R_{\alpha\eta'}) \) such that: it is not rejected by the opening oracle, \( (\psi_1, \psi_2, \psi_3) \) does not constitute a linear tuple, and \( (\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_5, R_\alpha', \ldots, R_{\beta\eta}') \# (\psi_1^*, \ldots, \psi_5^*, R_\alpha', \ldots, R_{\beta\eta}') \) in which \( R_{\alpha}', \ldots, R_{\beta\eta}' \) is the group elements computed in Verify algorithm and \( R_{\alpha}', \ldots, R_{\beta\eta}' \) are the group elements used for generating challenge signature. If the adversary issues such a query to the opening oracle, there should be the query \((M, t, \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_5, R_{\alpha}, \ldots, R_{\beta\eta}) \) in \( H \) (issued by the adversary explicitly or by the opening oracle for verifying the queried signature) such that \((\psi_1, \psi_2, \psi_3) \) does not constitute a linear tuple, and the hash value \( H(gpk, t, M, \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_5, R_{\alpha}, \ldots, R_{\beta\eta}) \) coincides with the unique challenge \( \psi \).
that is determined from the problem instance \((ψ_1, \ldots, ψ_5)\) and the commitment \((R_α, \ldots, R_β)\). Hence for concluding the proof it is sufficient to bound the probability of this event. Noticing that in this case any query \((M, t, ψ_1, \ldots, ψ_5, R_α, \ldots, R_β)\) to \(H\) in question is different from \((M^∗, t^∗, ψ_1, \ldots, ψ_5, R_α, \ldots, R_β)\) which is used for backpatching, the output of \(H\) is chosen from \(Z_p\) uniformly, and thus the probability that a query to \(H\) described as above exists with probability less than \(q_H + q_{open}/p\) in which \(q_H\) and \(q_{open}\) respectively denote the upper bounds of the number of queries issued by the adversary to \(H\) and the opening oracle, therefore \(q_H + q_{open}/p\) is negligible.

**Lemma 5.** \(Pr[S_4] = 1/2\).

**Proof.** We prove that the value \((ψ_1^∗)ξ_1(ψ_2^∗)ξ_2(ψ_3^∗)ξ_3\) and \((ψ_1^∗)ξ_4(ψ_2^∗)ξ_5(ψ_3^∗)ξ_6\) are uniformly random in this game even when conditioned on the adversary’s view. To this end we examine the distribution of the adversary’s view related to the randomness \(ξ_1, ξ_2, ξ_3, ξ_4, ξ_5, ξ_6\) under the condition where all the other randomness involved in the game are fixed. The adversary obtains information related \(ξ_1, ξ_2, ξ_3, ξ_4, ξ_5, ξ_6\) from the part of the group public key \(g_1, g_2, g_1′, g_2′\) and the responses from the opening oracle. As for the responses from the opening oracle, any query whose \(φ_1, ψ_2, ψ_3\) components does not constitute the linear tuple will be rejected by the opening oracle, thus the adversary gains no information on \(ξ_1, ξ_2, ξ_3, ξ_4, ξ_5, ξ_6\) from such queries. A query with a linear tuple also gives no information to the adversary. When the adversary issues a signature \((ψ_1, \ldots, ψ_5, c, s_α, \ldots, s_β)\), the opening oracle computes group elements \((ψ_1^∗)ξ_1(ψ_2^∗)ξ_2(ψ_3^∗)ξ_3\) and \((ψ_1^∗)ξ_4(ψ_2^∗)ξ_5(ψ_3^∗)ξ_6\) (the rest of the calculation performed by the oracle is done without referring to \(ξ_1, ξ_2, ξ_3, ξ_4, ξ_5, ξ_6\)), which is what the adversary learns from this query. It in fact does not increase the information the adversary knows, since the above equation can be rewritten as \((ψ_1^∗)ξ_1(ψ_2^∗)ξ_2(ψ_3^∗)ξ_3 = (f_1^∗)ξ_1(f_2^∗)ξ_2(f_3^∗)ξ_3\) and \((ψ_1^∗)ξ_4(ψ_2^∗)ξ_5(ψ_3^∗)ξ_6 = g_1^∗g_2^∗\) can be similarly obtained, when we write \(ψ_1 = f_1^∗, ψ_2 = f_2^∗, ψ_3 = f_3^∗\). The right-hand side of the equation shows that the response of the opening oracle gives no information to the adversary, since all the values that appears in the right-hand side are already known to the adversary. The above discussion shows that the responses of the opening oracles do not leak any information of \(ξ_1, ξ_2, ξ_3, ξ_4, ξ_5, ξ_6\).

Finally we shows that the value \((ψ_1^∗)ξ_1(ψ_2^∗)ξ_2(ψ_3^∗)ξ_3\) and \((ψ_1^∗)ξ_4(ψ_2^∗)ξ_5(ψ_3^∗)ξ_6\) are uniformly distributed conditioned on the group public key \(g_1, g_2, g_1′, g_2′\). This can be done by considering the following equation

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\log_g g_1 \\
\log_g g_2 \\
\log_g (ψ_1^∗)ξ_1(ψ_2^∗)ξ_2(ψ_3^∗)ξ_3
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
t_1 & t_2 & t_3 \\
0 & t_2 & t_3 \\
t_1α & t_2β & t_3τ
\end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix}
ξ_1 \\
ξ_2 \\
ξ_3
\end{pmatrix},
\]

where \(t_1 = \log_g f_1, t_2 = \log_g f_2,\) and \(t_3 = \log_g f_3.\) Since the matrix in the right-hand side has the determinant \(t_1t_2t_3(τ - α - β) \neq 0,\) the value \((ψ_1^∗)ξ_1(ψ_2^∗)ξ_2(ψ_3^∗)ξ_3\) is distributed uniformly and independently of \(g_1\) and \(g_2.\) This shows that the challenge signature is independent of \(A_{ib}\) and hence of the challenge bit \(b.\)

From the above, the proof of Theorem 1 is completed.

**Theorem 2.** The proposed R-GS scheme is non-frameable in the random oracle model under the DL assumption, where \(H\) is modeled as a random oracle.

The discrete logarithm \(x\) of \(X\) in the membership certificate is the secret information that only the signer knows, and the signer issues the NIZK proof for the knowledge of \(x\) in the signing. Therefore, it seems that the signature cannot be forged without \(x.\) In the simulation of the adversary against the DL problem, the extractor of \(x\) can be construct by rewinding the adversary against non-frameability (this proof is based on the forking lemma [67]). Therefore, the non-frameability of this scheme is reduced to the DL problem.

**Proof.** The adversary \(A\) comes up with a forgery \((M^*, σ^*)\) that opens to some honest user \(i \in U^b\) and that did not issue a signature.
Given a problem instance \((g, y = g^x), p, G_1\), the simulator \(B\) generates \((f_1, f_2, f_3, h_0, h_1, h_2) \leftarrow G_1 \setminus \{1\}, h \leftarrow G_2, \gamma_0, \gamma_1, \xi_1, \xi_2, \xi_3, \xi'_1, \xi'_2, \xi'_3 \leftarrow Z_p\), then compute \((sk_0, vk_0) = (\gamma_0, h^{\gamma_0}), (sk_1, vk_1) = (\gamma_1, h^{\gamma_1})\), \(g_1 = f_1^2 f_3^2, g_2 = f_2^2 f_3^2, g'_1 = f_1^2 f'_3^2, g'_2 = f_2^2 f'_3^2\), set \(sk_{OA} = (\xi_1, \xi_2, \xi_3, \xi'_1, \xi'_2, \xi'_3)\), \(sk_{GM} = (sk_0, sk_1)\), \(gpk = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e, g, f_1, f_2, f_3, g_1, g'_1, g'_2, h_0, h_1, h_2, h, vk_0, vk_1, H)\).

At the beginning of the game, \(B\) picks a random index \(j^* \leftarrow \{1, \ldots, q_{join}\}\) of the \(O_{b\text{-}join}\) query. Then, \(B\) interacts with \(A\) as follows:

- \(O_{gpk}, O_{GM}, O_{OA}\) query: \(B\) returns \(gpk, sk_{GM}\) and \(sk_{OA}\) as described above, respectively.
- \(O_{b\text{-}join}\) query: When \(A\) (as group manager) requests to run \(Join\) protocol for a new honest user \(i\) in the group, \(B\) executes \(J_{user}\). Depending on the index of \(O_{b\text{-}join}\) queries, \(B\) behaves as follows:
  - If \(i \neq i^*\), \(B\) follows \(J_{user}\) exactly.
  - If \(i = i^*\), \(B\) sends the value \(y = g^x\) as \(X\). In subsequent steps of the \(Join\) protocol, \(B\) proceeds as the real \(J_{user}\). When \(Join\) terminates, \(B\) obtains a membership certificate \(cert_i = ((v_i), \{A_j\}_{j=0}^\ell, X)\).
- \(O_{revoke}\) query: It can be treated as the real game, since \(B\) has \(sk_{GM}\).
- \(O_{sig}\) query: When \(A\) asks for a signature for a message \(M\) of the user \(i \in U^b\), \(B\) treats as follows:
  - If \(i \neq j^*\), \(B\) can simulate the signing algorithm as the real game.
  - If \(i = j^*\), \(B\) generates the signature using \(cert_j\), issued by the \(j^*\)th query of \(O_{b\text{-}join}\).

Finally, \(B\) outputs a signature \(\sigma^* = (\psi_1^*, \ldots, \psi_s^*, c^*, s'_a, \ldots, s'_{\beta(q)}^s)\), for some message \(M^*\), that opens to some user \(i^* \in U^b\) who did not sign \(M^*\). Then, \(B\) computes \(A_{\sigma^*} = \psi_1^*/\psi_2^*/\psi_3^*\). If there exists the transcript \(((v_i), \{A_j\}_{j=0}^\ell, X)\) such that \(X = y = g^x\), we apply forking lemma [67] and obtain the discrete logarithm \(x\) of \(y = g^x\), then output \(x\). Otherwise, \(B\) outputs \(\perp\) and halts.

For proving the theorem, we use the forking lemma [67].

**Lemma 6 (Forking Lemma).** Fix an integer \(q_H \geq 1\). Let \(A\) be a randomized algorithm that on input \(x, h_1, \ldots, h_{q_H}\), where \(x\) is a random source for running \(A\), \(h_1, \ldots, h_{q_H}\) are the responses from the random oracle. The acceptance probability of \(A\), denoted \(acc(k)\) is defined as \(acc(k) = Pr[i \geq 1 \mid vk \leftarrow Gen(1^\lambda); x \leftarrow \mathcal{R}; h_1, \ldots, h_{q_H} \leftarrow Z_p; i = A(vk, x)^{(h_1, \ldots, h_{q_H})}]\). The forking algorithm \(B\) corresponds with \(A\) is a randomized algorithm proceed as follows: (1) \(x \leftarrow \mathcal{R}\), (2) \(h_1, \ldots, h_{q_H}, h'_1, \ldots, h'_{q_H} \leftarrow Z_p\), (2) \(i \leftarrow A(vk, x)^{(h_1, \ldots, h_{q_H})}\), (4) \(i' \leftarrow A(vk, x)^{(h_1, \ldots, h_{q_H})}\), (5) Outputs 1 if \((i = i') \land (i \neq 0) \land (h_i \neq h'_i)\), otherwise outputs 0.

Let \(frk(k)\) be the probability that \(B\) outputs 1. Then, the following equation holds.

\[
frk(k) \geq acc(k) \cdot \left(\frac{acc(k)}{q_H} - \frac{1}{p}\right).
\]

Next, we prove the following lemma by using the forking lemma.

**Lemma 7.**

\[
Adv^f_{\mathcal{L}}(\lambda) \leq \left(q_{b\text{-}join} \cdot q_{sig} \cdot Adv^\mathcal{DL}_B(\lambda) + \frac{(1 + q_{sig})}{p}\right)^{1/2}
\]

**Proof.**

\[
frk(k) \geq Adv^f_{\mathcal{L}}(\lambda) \cdot \left(\frac{Adv^f_{\mathcal{L}}(\lambda) - 1/p}{q_{sig}} - \frac{1}{p}\right)
\]

\[
> \frac{(Adv^f_{\mathcal{L}}(\lambda))^2}{q_{sig}} - 1 + 1/q_{sig}
\]

\[
\frac{p}{q_{sig}}
\]
Moreover, if $\mathcal{A}$ outputs forged signature, $\mathcal{B}$ outputs the discrete logarithm with probability $1/q_{\text{frame}}$. That is, \[ \frac{(\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{frame}}(\lambda))^2}{q_{\text{sig}}} - \frac{1 + 1/q_{\text{sig}}}{p} \leq q_{\text{frame}} \cdot \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\text{DL}}(\lambda) \]

From the forking lemma, it is shown that $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{frame}}(\lambda)$ is negligible if $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\text{DL}}(\lambda)$ is negligible.

**Theorem 3.** The proposed R-GS scheme has misidentification resistance in the random oracle model under the $q$-SDH assumption and knowledge of secret key (KOSK) assumption [68], where $H$ is modeled as a random oracle.

The misidentification attack means a forgery of the BBS+ signature as membership certificate. Hence, the security against misidentification attacks can be reduced to the unforgeability of the BBS+ signature scheme, and it is proved in [62]. We consider two types of forgers: (1) forgery of the certificate for belonging to the group, and (2) forgery of the certificate of the non-revoked users. Since breaking the unforgeability of the BBS+ signature scheme allows us to construct an algorithm that breaks the $q$-SDH assumption, the theorem holds.

In the actual Join algorithm, a user sends $X = h_t^2$ to the group manager, and the group manager, who has the signing key of the BBS+ signature scheme, can sign $x$ without knowing $x$ itself, and can make a certificate $A$. Whereas, in the security proof, the simulator needs to send a signed message $x$ in order to access the signing oracle of the underlying BBS+ signature scheme. However, since an adversary sends not $x$ but $X$ to the simulator, we need to consider how to obtain the corresponding $x$ in the security proof. To circumvent this obstacle, one solution is to add the proof of knowledge of the secret key in the beginning of the Join algorithm, and extract $x$ by rewinding the adversary. However, we need to rewind the adversary a number of queried times. This requires much loose reduction cost, and it seems difficult to estimate the actual success probability of the extraction. Therefore, we introduce the knowledge of secret key (KOSK) assumption [68] where the adversary is required to reveal the secret key of the honest users, which is joined by $O_{\text{a-join}}$ queries. In addition, we assume that $O_{\text{a-join}}$ queries are not executed concurrently.

In type (1) forgery, we simulate a group manager who implements the join protocol. In this simulation, he/she gets $X = h_t^2$ from a user and sends $A_j$ to the user. The group manager needs $x = \log_{h_t} X$ that is sent to the signature oracle in order to get signature $A_j$. On the other hand, in type (2), we simulate a group manager who implements the Revoke algorithm. In this simulation, he/she can make $B_j$ that is a part of revocation list $RL_j$ without proof of knowledge.

**Proof.** The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ comes up with a forgery $(M^*, \sigma^*)$ that doesn’t open to non-revoked dishonest user $i \in U^* \setminus R_t$, and that did not issue a signature. We will argue that the simulator $\mathcal{B}$ that breaks the BBS+ signature (which is secure under $q$-SDH assumption) can be constructed from the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that breaks the misidentification resistance of the proposed scheme.

At the beginning of the game, $\mathcal{B}$ picks a random index $j^* \leftarrow \{1, \ldots, q_{\text{join}}\}$ of the $O_{\text{a-join}}$ query. We consider two types of adversary. Given a problem instance $(g, w = h^t, p, G_1)$ (public key of the BBS+ signature), the simulator $\mathcal{B}$ generates $(f_1, f_2, f_3, h_0, h_1, h_2) \leftarrow G_1 \setminus \{1\}, h \leftarrow G_2, \gamma_0, \gamma_1, \xi_1, \xi_2, \xi_3, \xi_1', \xi_2', \xi_3' \leftarrow Z_p$. If we consider type (1) forger, set $vk_0 = w$, and compute $(sk_1, vk_1) = (\gamma_1, h^{\gamma_1})$. Otherwise (i.e., consider type (2) forger), set $vk_1 = w$, and compute $(sk_0, vk_0) = (\gamma_0, h^{\gamma_0})$. Then, compute $g_1 = f_1^{\xi_1} f_3^{\xi_1'}, g_2 = f_2^{\xi_2} f_3^{\xi_2'}, g_3 = f_1^{\xi_2'} f_3^{\xi_2'}, g_4 = f_2^{\xi_3'} f_3^{\xi_3}, g'_2 = f_2^{\xi_3'} f_3^{\xi_3}, g' = f_1^{\xi_2} f_3^{\xi_2'}, \text{ set } sk_{OA} = (\xi_1, \xi_2, \xi_3, \xi_1', \xi_2', \xi_3'), sk_{GM} = (sk_0, sk_1), gpk = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e, g, f_1, f_2, f_3, g_1, g_2, g'_2, h_0, h_1, h_2, h, vk_0, vk_1, H)$.

- Type (1) forger: The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ forges a certificate $A_j$ for that belonging to the group, which corresponds with $O_{\text{a-join}}$ queries.
- Type (2) forger: The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ forges a certificate $B_{j^*, t^*}$ for that the non-revoked member, which corresponds with $O_{\text{revoke}}$ queries.

$\mathcal{B}$ interacts $\mathcal{A}$ as follows:
- \(O_{gpk}\) query: \(B\) returns \(gpk\) as described above to \(A\).
- \(O_{a\text{-}join}\) query: When \(A\) requests to run Join protocol for a (corrupted) user \(i\) in the group, \(B\) executes \(J_{GM}\). \(B\) behaves as follows:
  - Type (1) forger: When \(A\) sends a group elements \(X\), \(A\) also sends \(x = \log_{h_2}X\) (by the KOSK assumption). Then \(B\) asks the signing oracle of the BBS+ signature to generate a (part of) certificate \(A_j = (g^{h_0^j} h_1^u h_2^j)^{1+\gamma}\). In the subsequent step of the Join protocol, \(B\) proceeds as the real \(J_{GM}\).
  - Type (2) forger: It can be treated as in real game.
- \(O_{revoke}\) query: When \(A\) asks to revoke the user \(i\), \(B\) behaves as follows.
  - Type (1) forger: \(B\) generates new certificates for non-revoked users \(\{\theta = (B_i,t,\eta_i,\zeta_i)\}_{i=0}^{num}\). It can be treated as in real game, since \(B\) has \(sk_{GM}\).
  - Type (2) forger: \(B\) generates the BBS+ signature \(\{B_i,t = (g^{h_0^j} h_1^u h_2^j)^{1 + \gamma}\}\) by asking the signing oracle of BBS+ signatures. In the subsequent steps, \(B\) proceeds as the real game. New certificates for non-revoked users \(\{\theta = (B_i,t,\eta_i,\zeta_i)\}_{i=0}^{num}\).

Finally, \(A\) outputs a signature \(\sigma^* = (\psi_1^*, \ldots, \psi_n^*, \beta^*, s_{\alpha_0}^*, \ldots, s_{\beta_{\eta}}^*)\) for some message \(M^*\), that opens to some user \(i^* \in U^a \setminus R_t\) who did not sign \(M^*\). Then, \(B\) decrypts \(\psi_4\) to get \(A_1^*\) (if type (1) forger) or decrypts \(\psi_5\) to get \(B_{i^*,t}\) (if type (2) forger). \(B\) outputs the decrypted certificates as the forged signature. Let the events that \(A\) of Type (1) and (2) succeed to forge the BBS+ signature be \(F_1\) and \(F_2\), respectively. From the above game, \(B\) can forge the BBS+ signature if \(A\) wins the misidentification game. Therefore, the following equation \(Adv_A^{\text{misid}}(\lambda) \leq Pr[F_1] + Pr[F_2]\) holds. The probability \(Pr[F_1]\) and \(Pr[F_2]\) are negligible if the \(q\)-SDH assumption holds since the BBS+ signature is unforgeable under \(q\)-SDH assumption. Therefore, it is shown that \(Adv_A^{\text{misid}}(\lambda)\) is negligible if the \(q\)-SDH assumption holds.

### 4.4 Discussion on the construction of SD-based R-GS scheme

In this section, again we consider to construct a SD-based scheme in the random oracle model in an efficient way. By using the SD method, all (non-revoked) users are partitioned as \(S_1, \ldots, S_{\text{num}}\) (as in the CS method) where \(\text{num} = O(r)\). Each set \(S_j\) is described as \(S_j := S_{k_j, k_j'}\) where \(k_j\) and \(k_j'\) are node of the tree of level \(\phi_j\) and \(\psi_j\), respectively. If a signer who has certificates of \(u_0, u_1, \ldots, u_r\) is not revoked, that the condition (1) \(k_j = u_0, \ldots, u_{\ell}\) is not revoked, and the condition (2) \(k_j' \neq u_{\psi_i}, k_j'\) is not an ancestor of the leaf node) must hold. The first “equality” condition can be proved as in our CS-method based scheme. However, it is not trivial to prove the second “inequality” condition where signed messages of two BBS+ signatures are different without showing messages themselves. In [7], this inequality relation is proved by using the Boneh–Boyen signature with the form \(g^{1/(k_j' - u_{\psi_i})}\) and Groth–Sahai proofs for the verification pairing equation of the signature. As mentioned in the paper, the languages of the Groth–Sahai proof and those of the Fiat–Shamir proof are completely different. This is the first obstacle.

Even if we can solve this problem, the next problem is efficiency (signature size). That is, we need to prove (at least) one more relation compared to the CS method based scheme. More precisely, in our scheme two BBS group signature schemes are run for \(A\) and \(B_t\), respectively, and we need to (at least) run one more BBS group signature if the inequality relation needs to be proved additionally. This means the signature size is at least 1.5 times longer than that of the proposed scheme. This is the second obstacle.

From the above discussions, it seems not trivial to efficiently construct a SD-based scheme in the random oracle model. We leave it as a future work of this paper.

### 5 Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed a scalable R-GS group signature scheme with compact signature size. In order to efficiently implement the scheme, we used the parallel BBS group signature technique where two BBS group
signature schemes are simultaneously run but a part of random values are commonly used. By using this technique, we do not have to apply broadcast encryption which was used in the LPY schemes. Since random oracles break underlying algebraic structures, it seems not trivial to achieve constant certificate size [7] or constant revocation list [22, 23] without detracting the current efficiency. We leave it as an interesting future work of this paper.

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