

# Revisiting Structure Graphs: Applications to CBC-MAC and EMAC

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**Abstract.** In Crypto'05, Bellare et al. proved an  $O(\ell q^2/2^n)$  bound for the PRF (pseudorandom function) security of the CBC-MAC based on an  $n$ -bit random permutation  $\Pi$ , provided  $\ell < 2^{n/3}$ . Here an adversary can make at most  $q$  prefix-free queries each having at most  $\ell$  many “blocks” (elements of  $\{0, 1\}^n$ ). In the same paper an  $O(\ell^{\alpha(1)} q^2/2^n)$  bound for EMAC (or encrypted CBC-MAC) was proved, provided  $\ell < 2^{n/4}$ . Both proofs are based on **structure graphs** representing all collisions among “intermediate inputs” to  $\Pi$  during the computation of CBC. The problem of bounding PRF-advantage is shown to be reduced to bounding the number of structure graphs satisfying certain collision patterns. In the present paper, we show that *the Lemma 10 in the Crypto '05 paper, stating an important result on structure graphs, is incorrect*. This is due to the fact that the authors **overlooked certain structure graphs**. This invalidates the proofs of the PRF bounds. In ICALP '06, Pietrzak improved the bound for EMAC by showing a *tight bound*  $O(q^2/2^n)$  under the restriction that  $\ell < 2^{n/8}$ . As he used the same flawed lemma, this proof also becomes invalid. In this paper, we have revised and sometimes simplified these proofs. We revisit structure graphs in a slightly different mathematical language and provide a complete characterization of certain types of structure graphs. Using this characterization, we show that PRF security of CBC-MAC is about  $\sigma q/2^n$  provided  $\ell < 2^{n/3}$  where  $\sigma$  is the total number of blocks in all queries. We also recover tight bound for PRF security of EMAC with a much relaxed constraint ( $\ell < 2^{n/4}$ ) than the original ( $\ell < 2^{n/8}$ ).

**Keywords:** CBC, EMAC, ECBC, FCBC, structure graph, accident

## 1 Introduction

BRIEF HISTORY ON CBC AND EMAC. The notion of authentication in cryptographic protocols was first introduced by Diffie and Hellman in their seminal paper [9] of 1976. In symmetric key settings, this need is fulfilled by message authentication codes, better known as MACs. CBC-MAC is a block cipher based MAC construction which is based on the CBC mode of operation invented by Ehrtam et al. [13]. The CBC-MAC was an international standard [1] which was proven to be secure for fixed length messages [2, 5] or prefix-free message spaces [30, 16]. The fixed length constraint is not desired in practice. One way to

circumvent this is to use the length of message as the first block in CBC computation. This requires prior knowledge of the message length. A more reasonable and popular approach is to encrypt the CBC output with an independent keyed permutation. This later approach is called the EMAC which has been proved to be secure without any restrictions on the message [30]. We refer readers to section 2 for a brief overview of literature related to CBC-MAC.

**CBC AND EMAC FUNCTIONS.** Throughout the paper, we fix a positive integer  $n$  and let  $\mathcal{B} := \{0, 1\}^n$ . Elements of these sets are called *blocks*. Let  $\text{Perm} := \text{Perm}(n)$  be the set of all permutations over  $\mathcal{B}$ . The CBC (cipher block chaining) function with key  $\pi \in \text{Perm}$ , denoted by  $\text{CBC}_\pi$ , takes as input a message  $M = (M[1], \dots, M[m]) \in \mathcal{B}^m$  and outputs a block  $\text{out}^\pi(M)[m]$  which is inductively computed as  $\text{out}^\pi(M)[0] = 0^n$  and

$$\text{out}^\pi(M)[i] = \pi(\text{out}^\pi(M)[i-1] \oplus M[i]), \quad i = 1, \dots, m.$$

For  $0 < i < m$ ,  $\text{in}^\pi(M)[i] := \text{out}^\pi(M)[i-1] \oplus M[i]$  and  $\text{out}^\pi(M)[i]$  are said to be the *intermediate input and output* respectively. Fig 3 in section 3.6 provides an illustration of CBC computation and intermediate values.

**SECURITY DEFINITIONS.** In this paper we consider two types of attacks for an adversary which makes queries of at most  $\ell$  blocks:  $\text{atk} = \text{pf}$  and  $\text{atk} = \text{any}$  mean no query is a prefix of another and the queries are arbitrary distinct strings, respectively. Let  $\text{Adv}_F^{\text{atk}}(q, \ell, \sigma)$  denote the *maximum advantage attainable by any adversary making  $q$  queries and the total number of blocks in all  $q$  queries is at most  $\sigma$* , mounting an  $\text{atk}$  attack, in distinguishing whether its oracle is  $F$  or a random function that outputs  $n$  bits.<sup>1</sup> To analyze the security of CBC and EMAC for the random permutation  $\Pi$ , the *collision probability* and *full collision probability*

$$\mathbf{CP}_n(M_1, M_2) := \Pr_\Pi[\text{CBC}_\Pi(M_1) = \text{CBC}_\Pi(M_2)]$$

$$\mathbf{FCP}_n(M_1, M_2) := \Pr_\Pi[\text{out}^\Pi(M_2)[m_2] = \text{out}^\Pi(M_r)[j]; \exists (r, j) \neq (2, m_2)]$$

were introduced for distinct messages  $M_1$  and  $M_2$  with lengths  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  respectively. Moreover, let  $\mathbf{CP}_{2,\ell}^{\text{atk}}$  and  $\mathbf{FCP}_{2,\ell}^{\text{atk}}$  denote the maximum collision and full collision probabilities respectively where the maximum is taken over all distinct messages  $M, M'$  having at most  $\ell$  blocks and satisfies  $\text{atk}$ . In [3], the following results were shown:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{EMAC}}^{\text{any}}(q, \ell) \leq \binom{q}{2} (\mathbf{CP}_{2,\ell}^{\text{any}} + 2^{-n}), \quad \text{Adv}_{\text{CBC}}^{\text{pf}}(q, \ell) \leq q^2 (\mathbf{FCP}_{2,\ell}^{\text{pf}} + 4\ell/2^n).$$

As EMAC encrypts output of CBC-MAC under an independent key, as long as there is no collision in the output of CBC-MAC, the final output behaves randomly. This is essentially the same as the Carter-Wegman construction [33].

<sup>1</sup> In this paper,  $F$  is either CBC-MAC or EMAC based on the random permutation  $\Pi$  on  $n$  bits (i.e.,  $\Pi$  is chosen uniformly from  $\text{Perm}$ ).

The CBC-MAC function can be similarly viewed as a (dependent) nested construction in which the final encryption is computed under the same key as the internal computation. This is why we need an extended definition of collision which is appropriately captured by the full collision event. Thus, bounding PRF advantages are reduced to bounding (full) collision probabilities. These are again reduced to bounding the number of structure graphs as described in the following paragraph.

**STRUCTURE GRAPH.** A **block-vertex structure (BS) graph**  $\mathbf{G}$  with vertex set  $V \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$  associated to a message  $M$  and a permutation  $\pi$ , is the directed edge-labeled graph induced by the edge set  $E$  consisting of all edges

$$e_i : \text{out}^\pi(M)[i-1] \rightarrow \text{out}^\pi(M)[i] := (\text{out}^\pi(M)[i-1], \text{out}^\pi(M)[i]), \quad 1 \leq i \leq m.$$

The label for  $e_i$  is  $\mathcal{L}(e_i) = M[i]$ . Note that a BS graph can be simply viewed as an  $M$ -walk. Informally, an  $M$ -walk is nothing but the walk generated by the message  $M$  starting at  $0^n$ . In this paper we often use this equivalent representation of BS graphs. A **structure graph**  $\mathbf{G}^*$  over a vertex set  $V^* \subseteq \mathcal{I}$  (an index set) is an isomorphic graph of the BS graph  $G$  mapping  $0^n$  to  $0$ . The labelled walk of  $G$  is preserved in  $G^*$  (in isomorphism sense) due to the isomorphism between  $G$  and  $G^*$ . So we can have a similar representation of a structure graph in terms of walks. We refer readers to Definition 4 for a more formal definition of a structure graph. The (block-vertex) structure graph is also similarly defined for a tuple (or sometimes pair) of messages  $\mathcal{M} = (M_1, \dots, M_q)$ .

Given a structure graph  $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$ , suppose we reconstruct the graph by defining edges one by one along the  $M$ -walk. Now there are three possibilities at any point of time: (1) we add a new edge heading to a new vertex (not obtained so far) (2) we get an old edge which is already defined and (3) we add a new edge heading to an already existing vertex. True collisions correspond to the last case. The number of such true collision can be equivalently defined as the following sum

$$\mathbf{TC}(G) := \text{in} - \deg(0^n) + \sum_{v \in V \setminus \{0\}} (\text{in} - \deg(v) - 1).$$


Let us assign a variable  $Y_v$ , meant for the intermediate output, for each node  $v \in V^*$ . Let  $\delta := (u, v ; z)$  be a triple such that  $u \rightarrow z, v \rightarrow z$  and  $u \neq v$ . We call such triple *input-collision* (also called collision). Given any such input-collision the following linear equation, denoted by  $L_\delta$  must hold whenever  $Y$ -variables are actually assigned as intermediate outputs:

$$Y_v \oplus Y_u = c_\delta \text{ where } c_\delta = \mathcal{L}(v, z) \oplus \mathcal{L}(u, z).$$

When  $0$  has no in-degree, the accident of a structure graph  $G^*$ , denoted by  $\mathbf{Acc}(G)$ , is the rank of all linear equations  $L_\delta$  over all collisions of the graph. When  $0$  has positive in-degree we add one to the rank to define the accident. In section 5, we provide a more detailed study on the structure graph.

**A Flaw in [3, Lemma 10].** The Lemma 10 of [3] states that for any structure graph  $G^*$  realized by a pair of messages  $\mathbf{Acc}(G^*) = 1$  implies  $\mathbf{TC}(G^*) = 1$ .

This result has been used to bound  $\mathbf{FCP}_n$  (in [3]) as well as  $\mathbf{CP}_n$  (in [3, 31]). Unfortunately, the claim is incorrect as illustrated in Fig. 1 where we have two structure graphs with true collision 2 and accident 1. Surprisingly, this flaw remained unobserved till now, although it has been applied for other results.



**Fig. 1:** Counter-example for [3, Lemma 10]. The walks corresponding to the two messages start at  $v_1$ , and end at  $v_3$ . Here  $M_2[1] := M_1[1] \oplus M_1[2] \oplus M_1[3]$  and  $*$  can be any number of blocks. In particular when  $*$  has no block, the figures in (a) and (b) are identical. In (a) we have two input-collisions  $\delta_1 := (v_1, v_2 ; v_2')$  and  $\delta_2 := (v_1, v_2 ; v_3)$ . The two linear equations  $L_{\delta_1}$  and  $L_{\delta_2}$  corresponding to the two input-collisions are the same as  $Y_{v_1} \oplus Y_{v_2} = M_1[1] \oplus M_1[2]$  and so the rank of all collisions (which is also the accident) is one. However, true collision is two (at  $v_2'$  and  $v_3$ ) which contradicts [3, Lemma 10]. A similar argument can be given for (b).

### 1.1 Our Contributions

The flaw in [3, Lemma 10] is an important observation that affects several results [3, 31, 15, 35] based on it. Naturally, the next course of action should be to study the impact of this flaw to those results in addition to [3], where it has been applied. This work serves this purpose. To our best knowledge, it has been applied in [31] and probably in [10, Lemma 3] (no proof of this claim is publicly available though). The bound on  $\mathbf{FCP}_{2,\ell}^{\text{pf}}$  (see [3]) is also used in the PRF analysis of truncated CBC [15]. Any revision in the  $\mathbf{FCP}_{2,\ell}^{\text{pf}}$  bound [3] will also necessitate revision of bound in [15].

**Characterization of all accident-one structure graphs.** As [3, Lemma 10] is wrong and we have identified two graphs which violate this lemma, it is important to see whether there are any more missing cases. We first settle this issue and show that these are the only missing cases. To do so, we characterize all structure graphs (realized by a single message) having at most accident 1 (see Lemma 4. This will actually help when we study structure graphs for two messages.

**Revision of the CP and FCP, and PRF bound of CBC.** We revise the  $\mathbf{FCP}$  bound of [3]. Fortunately, the upper bounds of  $\mathbf{FCP}$  and hence PRF

**Table 1:** PRF upper bounds for CBC-MAC, EMAC, ECBC and FCBC. Entries in boldface are proved in this paper.

Construction	Best Known Result	This paper
CBC-MAC(prefix-free)	$O\left(\frac{\ell q^2}{2^n}\right)$ for $\ell \leq 2^{n/3}$ [3] <sup>a</sup>	<b><math>O\left(\frac{\sigma q}{2^n}\right)</math> for <math>\ell \leq 2^{n/3}</math></b>
EMAC	$O\left(\frac{q^2}{2^n}\right)$ for $\ell \leq 2^{n/8}$ [31] <sup>a</sup>	<b><math>O\left(\frac{q^2}{2^n}\right)</math> for <math>\ell \leq 2^{n/4}</math></b>
ECBC	$O\left(\frac{q^2}{2^n}\right)$ for $\ell \leq 2^{n/8}$ [31] <sup>a</sup>	<b><math>O\left(\frac{q^2}{2^n}\right)</math> for <math>\ell \leq 2^{n/4}</math></b>
FCBC	$O\left(\frac{\ell q^2}{2^n}\right)$ for $\ell \leq 2^{n/3}$ [23]	<b><math>O\left(\frac{q^2}{2^n}\right)</math> for <math>\ell \leq 2^{n/4}</math></b>

<sup>a</sup> Proof is flawed.

advantage of CBC, are only increased by a constant factor keeping the order of the bound unchanged (see section 7). In case of the **CP** bound due to Bellare et al. [3] their [3, Lemma 15] used to bound the main claim is false. Fortunately, it can be shown that the main claim remains true after revision.

**Revision of the PRF bound of EMAC, ECBC and FCBC.** We revisit Pietrzak’s [31] proof of the PRF bound for EMAC in section 8. Unfortunately, a straight forward revision gives a non-tight bound on EMAC. Then, we take a different approach (by considering a different bad event) to show in Theorem 3 the tight bound for EMAC. Our approach is much **simpler** and gives the tight bound even for a more relaxed choice of  $\ell$ , namely  $\ell < 2^{n/4}$ , whereas the original constraint was  $\ell < 2^{n/8}$ . Furthermore, small tweaks in the proof give similar bounds for ECBC and FCBC.

**Other Consequences.** The **CP** and **FCP** bounds in [3] have been used in multiple subsequent works. For instance, Gazi et al. [15] applied this result to bound the probability of a bad event in PRF analysis of truncated CBC. Similarly, Yasuda [35] used the **CP** bound of [3]. Fortunately, the proofs in these works hold with small changes in constant factors. Since these changes are minor, in this paper we concentrate solely on [3, 31].

## 2 Related Works

The security of MAC constructions has seen constant research interest. Among the block cipher based constructions CBC-MAC and its variants are the most popular. Here we try to summarize the research on PRF security of CBC-MAC and its variants. The aim is to list the state of the art results as well as emphasize the progress that has been made till date.

- **Analysis of CBC-MAC.** First concrete results on CBC-MAC were given by Bellare et al. [2]. They showed a bound of  $2\ell^2 q^2 / 2^n$  for fixed length

queries, which was further improved to  $\ell^2 q^2 / 2^n$  by Maurer [22]. Later Bernstein [5] simplified the proof for fixed-length CBC-MAC. Petrank and Rackoff [30] extended the proof in [2] to prefix-free queries and a similar extension on Bernstein’s proof was done by Rackoff and Gorbunov [16]. Both bounds are about  $\ell^2 q^2 / 2^n$ . The most recent bound on CBC-MAC is by Bellare et al. [3] who improved (in terms of  $\ell$ ) the bound to  $12\ell q^2 / 2^n + 64\ell^4 q^2 / 2^{2n}$ . Another way of improving the bound is to show the PRF bound of the form  $q\sigma / 2^n$  (see [26]).

- **Analysis of EMAC.** In [2] Bellare et al. also suggested some variants of CBC-MAC to handle variable length messages. In particular, they mentioned a construction where the output of CBC-MAC is further encrypted by an independent key. This construction known as EMAC was first developed during the RACE [4] project. Petrank and Rackoff [30] proved that DMAC (same as EMAC) is secure up to  $2.5\ell^2 q^2 / 2^n$ . Bellare et al. [3] improved the bound to  $q^2 \cdot d'(\ell) / 2^n$  which was further improved by Pietrzak [31] to  $q^2 / 2^n$  for  $\ell \leq 2^{n/8}$ . However, the proof of the later result is invalid due to the flaw that we discussed earlier. A result on  $\mathbf{CP}_{2,\ell}^{\text{eq}}$  stated in [10] also gives a tight bound of  $O(q^2 / 2^n)$  for equal length messages.
- **Analysis of variants of CBC-MAC and EMAC.** Although the EMAC construction is tolerant to variable length messages it has a domain limited to  $\mathcal{B}^+$ . Black and Rogaway [7] introduced three refinements to EMAC, viz., ECBC, FCBC and XCBC to allow use of variable block length strings. They showed that ECBC and FCBC are secure upto  $2.5\sigma^2 / 2^n$  [7] and the bound on XCBC is  $3.75\sigma^2 / 2^n$  [7]. Jaulmes et al. [19] gave a randomized version of EMAC which they called RMAC and proved that the construction resists birthday attacks. However the proof seems to be incorrect (as suggested in [3]). Other excellent variants of CBC-MAC are TMAC [21], OMAC [17] and GCBC [24]. A variant of OMAC, namely OMAC1 is equivalent to CMAC which became a NIST recommendation [12] in 2005. Another design approach is the PMAC construction proposed by Black and Rogaway [6] which is inherently parallel. In [23, 18, 27, 25] the improved bounds for XCBC, TMAC, PMAC and OMAC are shown in the form of  $O(\ell q^2 / 2^n)$ ,  $O(\sigma^2 / 2^n)$  and  $O(\sigma q / 2^n)$ . Apart from these specific constructions Jutla [20] suggested a general class of DAG-based PRF constructions.

**Beyond Birthday Bound (BBB) Security.** Another direction of research is BBB security, where the aim is to achieve more than  $n/2$ -bits security in  $\sigma$ . Among the block cipher based BBB secure MACs, PMAC\_Plus [36] and 3kf9 [37] are two efficient candidates. Both these candidates are three-key constructions. Recently, Dutta et al. [8] proposed a one-key candidate named 1kf9, which also offers beyond birthday security of 3kf9.

**Structure Graph Analysis.** Structure graphs are the basic tool for analyzing sequential construction based on random permutation as evident from the work on CBC based MACs [3, 31, 15] and 1kf9 [8]. Although structure graphs have been mainly used in analysis of random permutation based constructions, they

have also found application in random function based construction as evident from the analysis of NI MAC by Gazi et al. [14] and the one key compression function based MAC by Dutta et al. [11]. From our observation these later works [14, 8, 11] are free from the flaw that we observed for [3, 31].

### 3 Preliminaries

**BASIC NOTATION.** Throughout the paper, we fix a positive integer  $n$ . Let  $\text{Perm}$  be the set of all permutations on  $\mathcal{B} := \{0, 1\}^n$ . Elements of  $\mathcal{B}$  are called **blocks**. For any two integers  $a \leq b$ , we write  $[a..b]$  (or simply  $[b]$ , when  $a = 1$ ) to denote the set  $\{a, a + 1, \dots, b\}$ . Let  $\phi$  be a property defined for the elements of  $S$ . We define the subset

$$S[\phi] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{x \in S : x \text{ satisfies } \phi\}.$$

The above set will appear in this paper many times for different choices of  $S$  and  $\phi$ . Let  $\mathbf{P}(m, k) := m(m-1) \cdots (m-k+1)$  denote the  $k$ -permutations of  $m$ .

#### 3.1 Notation on Sequences

Let  $\mathcal{I}$  and  $S$  be two sets. A  $S$ -sequence  $x$  over the index set  $\mathcal{I}$  is denoted as  $(x[\alpha])_{\alpha \in \mathcal{I}}$  where  $x[\alpha] \in S$  for all  $\alpha \in \mathcal{I}$ . The length of the sequence is  $|\mathcal{I}|$ , the size of the index set. In this paper we mostly consider *block sequences*, i.e.  $S = \mathcal{B}$ . When the index set is  $[a..b]$ , we also write the sequence as a tuple or vector  $x[a..b] := (x[a], \dots, x[b])$ . Sometimes, by abusing notation,  $x$  also represents the set  $\{x[\alpha] : \alpha \in \mathcal{I}\}$ . Similarly  $x[a..b]$  represents  $\{x[\alpha] : \alpha \in [a..b]\}$ . We write  $\#x$  to denote the number of distinct elements in the sequence  $x$ . We write  $S^+$  and  $S^{\leq \ell} := \cup_{i \leq \ell} S^i$  to represent the set of all  $S$  sequences of positive and finite length, and of length at most  $\ell$ , respectively. Now we define an equivalence relation that captures the equalities among the elements of the sequence  $x$ .

**Definition 1.** *Given a sequence  $x$  over an index set  $\mathcal{I}$ , we define an equivalence relation  $\sim_x$  over the index set as follows:  $\alpha \sim_x \beta$  if  $x[\alpha] = x[\beta]$ .*

Let  $\rho : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ . Let  $x$  and  $y$  be, respectively,  $\mathcal{D}$ - and  $\mathcal{R}$ -sequences over an index set  $\mathcal{I}$ . We write  $x \xrightarrow{\rho} y$  to mean that  $\rho(x[\alpha]) = y[\alpha]$  for all  $\alpha \in \mathcal{I}$  and we simply say that  $\rho$  *multi-maps*  $x$  to  $y$ . This is a property of function  $\rho$ . When  $\mathcal{D} = \mathcal{R}$ , the subset  $\text{Perm}[x \xrightarrow{\pi} y]$  represents the set of all permutations  $\pi$  multi-mapping  $x$  to  $y$ . We say that  $(x, y)$  is *permutation compatible* if there exists a permutation  $\pi$  such that  $x \xrightarrow{\pi} y$ . It is easy to see that  $(x, y)$  is permutation compatible if and only if  $\sim_x = \sim_y$ .

#### 3.2 Notation on Strings

We call  $\mathcal{B}$  an *alphabet* and its elements will be referred to as *letters*. A *string* over the alphabet  $\mathcal{B}$  is an element of  $\mathcal{B}^*$ . We can also say that a string is a finite concatenation  $S := a_1 \| a_2 \| \dots \| a_\ell$  where  $a_i \in \mathcal{B}$ . Note that the elements

of  $\mathcal{B}$  are also strings. We can also view strings as  $\mathcal{B}$ -sequences over an index set  $\mathcal{I}$ . The length of a string  $S$ , denoted by  $|S|$  is defined as the total number of letters in it. Note that for an empty string the length will be 0 as it does not have any letters in it. For a string  $S = X\|Y$ ,  $X$  (respectively  $Y$ ) is said to be a *prefix* (respectively *suffix*) of  $S$ . We write  $X <_1 S$  if  $X$  is a prefix of  $S$ . We write  $X <_2 S$  if  $X[1..x-1] <_1 S$  but  $X[x] \neq S[s]$ , where  $x = |X|$  and  $s = |S|$ . For two strings  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  of lengths  $s_1$  and  $s_2$  respectively, a non-negative integer  $p := \text{LCP}(S_1; S_2)$  (respectively  $s := \text{LCS}(S_1; S_2)$ ) is called the index of the *largest common prefix* (respectively *largest common suffix*), if  $S_1[1..p] = S_2[1..p]$  and  $S_1[p+1] \neq S_2[p+1]$  (or  $S_1[s..s_1] = S_2[s..s_2]$  and  $S_1[s-1] \neq S_2[s-1]$ ).

### 3.3 Basic Definitions and Notation of Graph

**DIRECTED EDGE-LABELED GRAPH.** A directed edge-labeled graph is a pair  $G := (V, E)$  with  $E \subseteq V \times V \times L$  where  $V$  is the set of vertices,  $L$  is the set of edge labels, and  $E$  is the set of edges along with their corresponding labels. In this paper we will consider only those directed edge-labeled graphs where for each pair of vertices  $u, v \in V$  there exists at most one label  $a \in L$  with  $((u, v); a) \in E$ . We also write  $u \xrightarrow{a} v$  to mean that  $((u, v); a) \in E$ .

**Convention:** By abusing notation,  $E$  also denotes the set of unlabeled edges and the label  $a$  of the edge  $e := (u, v)$  is expressed as  $\mathcal{L}_G(e)$  (this notation makes sense as there is a unique choice of the label for an edge) or simply  $\mathcal{L}(e)$  whenever the graph is understood.

For an edge  $e := (u, v)$ , vertex  $u$  is called a *predecessor* of  $v$ , and  $v$  a *successor* of  $u$ . An edge  $(u, v)$  is called a *loop* if  $u = v$ . We define two sets:

1. The predecessor set of a vertex  $v$  is  $\text{nbd}(* \rightarrow v) := \{u : (u, v) \in E\}$ .
2. The successor set of  $v$  is  $\text{nbd}(v \rightarrow *) := \{u : (v, u) \in E\}$ .

The sizes of the predecessor and successor sets of  $v$  are called **in-degree** and **out-degree** respectively. We implicitly assume that no vertex has both in-degree and out-degree 0. So the vertex set and hence the graph without the edge labels is uniquely determined by the edge set.

**Definition 2 (walk).** A walk of length  $s$  is defined as a vertex sequence  $w := (w[0], \dots, w[s])$ , such that  $w[i-1] \rightarrow w[i]$  for all  $i \in [s]$ . We define the label of the walk as  $\mathcal{L}(w) := (a_1, \dots, a_s)$  where  $a_i = \mathcal{L}(w[i-1], w[i])$ ,  $i \in [s]$ .


Since a walk is a  $V$ -sequence over the index set  $\{0, 1, \dots, s\}$ , we define a subwalk  $w[a..b] := (w[a], \dots, w[b])$  where  $0 \leq a \leq b \leq s$ .

When all vertices of a walk sequence are distinct, we call it a **path**. When all vertices  $w[0], \dots, w[s-1]$  are distinct and  $w[s] = w[0]$  then we call it a **cycle**. Other special examples of walks, which will be studied later in the paper, are  $\rho$  walks and  $\rho'$  walks.

A  $\rho$  walk is a walk  $w := (w[0], \dots, w[s])$  such that for some  $0 \leq i < j \leq s$ ,  $w[0..j-1]$  is a path,  $w[j] = w[i]$  and for all  $j < k \leq s$ ,  $w[k] = w[i+r]$  where

$0 \leq r < (j - i)$  and  $(k - r)$  is a multiple of  $(j - i)$ . It is illustrated in Fig 2(a). In words, a  $\rho$  walk comes back to one previous vertex (which makes a cycle) and afterwards it remains in the cycle.

A  $\rho'$  walk is an extension of a  $\rho$  walk that leaves the cycle and does not come back. It is illustrated in Fig 2(b). Note that the lengths of the subwalks labeled with  $*$  can be zero.



**Fig. 2:** The graphs corresponding to  $\rho$  and  $\rho'$  walks. Note that the lengths of the parts labeled with  $*$  can be zero.

A directed edge-label graph  $G = (V, E)$  is called a *function graph* if for all  $v \in V$ , there do not exist two distinct successors  $v_1$  and  $v_2$  of  $v$  with  $\mathcal{L}_G(v, v_1) = \mathcal{L}_G(v, v_2)$ . In other words, for every vertex  $v$  and any label  $a$  we can find at most one successor  $w$  for which the label of the edge  $(v, w)$  is  $a$ . This observation can be extended for a walk in a function graph  $G$  as follows:

$$w_1[0] = w_2[0], \mathcal{L}(w_1) = \mathcal{L}(w_2) \Rightarrow w_1 = w_2.$$

So if there is a walk with label  $M$  then it must be unique and we call such a walk  $M$ -walk.

### 3.4 PRF Advantage of a Keyed Function

If  $S$  is a finite set, then  $x \xleftarrow{\$} S$  denotes the uniform random sampling of  $x$  from  $S$ . Let  $\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathcal{B}^+$  be a finite set. A **random function** from  $\mathcal{D}$  to  $\mathcal{B}$  is  $\text{RF}(\mathcal{D}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Func}(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{B})$ , the set of all functions from  $\mathcal{D}$  to  $\mathcal{B}$ . When the domain  $\mathcal{D}$  is understood, we simply write the random function as  $\text{RF}$ .

**Definition 3.** Let  $F$  be a keyed function from  $\mathcal{D}$  to  $\mathcal{B}$  with a finite key space  $\mathcal{K}$ . We define the **prf-advantage** (or *pseudorandom function advantage*) of an adversary  $A$  against  $F$  as

$$\text{Adv}_F^{\text{atk}}(A) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} |\Pr[A^{F_K} = 1 : K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}] - \Pr[A^{\text{RF}} = 1]|.$$

The *maximum prf-advantage* of  $F$  is defined as

$$\text{Adv}_F^{\text{atk}}(q, \ell, \sigma) = \max_A \text{Adv}_F^{\text{atk}}(A)$$

where the maximum is taken over all adversaries  $A$  making at most  $q$  queries from the domain  $\mathcal{D}$ , say  $M_1, \dots, M_q$  with  $M_i \in \mathcal{B}^{m_i}$ , such that  $\sum_i m_i \leq \sigma$

and  $\max_i m_i \leq \ell$ . Note that  $\mathbf{atk} = \mathbf{pf}$  means none of the query is a prefix of another;  $\mathbf{atk} = \mathbf{eq}$  means the queries are of equal length; and  $\mathbf{atk} = \mathbf{any}$  means all queries are arbitrary distinct strings. This is an information theoretic definition and we allow an unbounded time adversary. There is no loss to assume that  $A$  always makes exactly  $q$  distinct queries, represented by a sequence say  $\mathcal{M} = (M_1, \dots, M_q)$ . In this case for any  $T = (T_1, \dots, T_q) \in \mathcal{B}^q$ , we have

$$\Pr_{\text{RF}}[\mathcal{M} \xrightarrow{\text{RF}} T] = 2^{-nq}.$$

### 3.5 Coefficient-H Technique

Let  $A$  be an adversary which makes  $q$  distinct queries (possibly adaptive) to  $F$ . Let the queries be  $x_1, \dots, x_q$  and the corresponding  $F$  outputs be  $y_1, \dots, y_q$ . Let  $\text{view}(A^F)$  denote the  $q$ -tuple of pairs  $((x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_q, y_q))$  where  $x_i$  denotes the  $i^{\text{th}}$  query and  $y_i$  is the corresponding response.

For any  $q$ -tuple of pairs  $\tau = ((x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_q, y_q))$ , the following probability

$$\text{IP}^F(\tau) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Pr_F[(x_1, \dots, x_q) \xrightarrow{F} (y_1, \dots, y_q)]$$

is called the *interpolation probability*, where the probability is taken under the randomness of  $F$ 's key. Here we assume that  $F$  is stateless and so the above probability is independent of the order of the pairs.

**Theorem 1.** [*Coefficient-H Technique*] Let  $\mathcal{T}_{\text{good}}$  be some set of  $q$ -tuples of pairs. Suppose the interpolation probability for a (stateless) oracle  $\mathcal{O}$  follows the inequality

$$\text{IP}^{\mathcal{O}}(\tau) \geq (1 - \epsilon) \cdot \text{IP}^{\text{RF}}(\tau) = (1 - \epsilon)2^{-nq} \quad \forall \tau \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{good}}.$$

Then, for any adversary  $A$  we have,

$$\text{Adv}_F^{\text{atk}}(A) \leq \epsilon + \Pr[\text{view}(A^{\text{RF}}) \notin \mathcal{T}_{\text{good}}].$$


This technique was first introduced by Patarin in his PhD thesis [28] (as mentioned in [32]). The proof of this theorem can be found in [29]. So we skip the proof. We use this theorem to bound the PRF advantage of CBC function defined in the next subsection.

### 3.6 CBC-MAC and EMAC Functions Based on Permutations

**CBC FUNCTION.** The CBC (cipher block chaining) function (see figure 3) with an oracle  $\pi \in \text{Perm}$ , viewed as a key of the construction, takes as input a message  $M = (M[1], \dots, M[m]) \in \mathcal{B}^m$  with  $m$  blocks and outputs  $\text{CBC}_{\pi}(M) := \text{out}^{\pi}(M)[m]$ . This is inductively computed as follows:  $\text{out}^{\pi}(M)[0] = 0^n$  and

$$\text{out}^{\pi}(M)[i] = \pi(\text{in}^{\pi}(M)[i]), \quad \text{in}^{\pi}(M)[i] = \text{out}^{\pi}(M)[i-1] \oplus M[i], \quad i \in [m]. \quad (1)$$

We call  $\text{in}^\pi(M)$  and  $\text{out}^\pi(M)$  **intermediate input** and **output vectors** respectively, associated to  $\pi$ . Note that the intermediate input vector  $\text{in}^\pi$  is uniquely determined by  $\text{out}^\pi$  (and does not depend on the permutation  $\pi$ ). We can write down this association generically as a function  $\text{out2in}_M : \mathcal{B}^m \rightarrow \mathcal{B}^m$  mapping any block vector  $y$  to a block vector  $x$  where  $x[1] = M[1]$  and  $x[i] = y[i-1] \oplus M[i]$  if  $1 < i \leq m$ . So for all permutations  $\pi \in \text{Perm}$ , we have  $\text{out2in}(\text{out}^\pi) = \text{in}^\pi$ .



**Fig. 3:** CBC function and its intermediate values.

**EMAC FUNCTION.** The EMAC function (E for encrypted) is derived from the CBC function by additionally encrypting the output with another permutation  $\pi' \in \text{Perm}$ . Formally,  $\text{EMAC}_{\pi, \pi'}(M) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \pi'(\text{CBC}_\pi(M))$ .

## 4 PRF Analysis of CBC and EMAC

In this section we quickly recall the PRF analysis of CBC and EMAC as done in [3, 31]. Here CBC is based on a uniform random permutation  $\Pi$  chosen uniformly from  $\text{Perm}$  and EMAC is based on two independent random permutations  $\Pi$  and  $\Pi'$ . In this section we reduce the bounding PRF advantages of CBC and EMAC to the full bounding collision and collision probability respectively. We use the coefficient-H technique rather than the game playing technique used in [3].

### 4.1 PRF Advantage of EMAC

Let  $M_1$  and  $M_2$  be two distinct tuples of blocks. Let  $\text{coll}_\pi(M_1; M_2)$  denote the event that  $\text{CBC}_\pi(M_1) = \text{CBC}_\pi(M_2)$  and we call it the collision event for a pair of messages  $M_1$  and  $M_2$ . We similarly define the collision event for a tuple of  $q \geq 2$  distinct messages  $\mathcal{M} = (M_1, \dots, M_q)$  as

$$\text{coll}_\pi(\mathcal{M}) = \bigcup_{i \neq j} \text{coll}_\pi(M_i; M_j).$$

We define the **collision probability** as  $\text{CP}_n(\mathcal{M}) = \Pr[\text{coll}_\Pi(\mathcal{M})]$ .

Let  $\text{CP}_{q, \ell}^{\text{atk}} = \max_{\mathcal{M}} \text{CP}_n(\mathcal{M})$  where the maximum is taken over all  $q$ -tuples of distinct messages  $\mathcal{M}$  having at most  $\ell$  blocks each and satisfy **atk** (i.e., when

atk = eq, messages must have equal length, similarly when atk = pf no message is prefix to others, and finally atk = any means no restriction other than length restriction). Following [3], we view EMAC as an instance of the Carter-Wegman paradigm [33]. This enables us to reduce the problem of bounding the prf-advantage of EMAC to bounding the collision probability as

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{EMAC}}^{\text{any}}(q, \ell) \leq \mathbf{CP}_{q, \ell}^{\text{any}} + \frac{q(q-1)}{2^{n+1}}. \quad (2)$$

Note that  $\mathbf{CP}_{q, \ell}^{\text{any}} \leq \binom{q}{2} \mathbf{CP}_{2, \ell}^{\text{any}}$  as the collision for  $q$  messages is the union of collision events for each of the  $\binom{q}{2}$  pairs of messages. Bellare et al. [3] proved that

$$\mathbf{CP}_{2, \ell}^{\text{any}} \leq \frac{2d'(\ell)}{2^n} + \frac{64\ell^4}{2^{2n}}. \quad (3)$$

where  $d'(\ell) = \max_{\ell' \leq \ell} d(\ell')$  and  $d(\ell')$  is the number of divisors of  $\ell'$ . In [34], Wigert showed that  $d'(\ell) = \ell^{1/\Theta(\ln \ln \ell)} = \ell^{o(1)}$ . Using this bound of collision probability for a pair of messages, we see that the prf-advantage of EMAC is about  $O(d'(\ell)q^2/2^n)$  for  $\ell < 2^{n/4}$ . Later Pietrzak [31] provided an improved analysis of EMAC and proved that the PRF advantage of EMAC is about  $O(q^2/2^n)$  for  $\ell < \min\{q^{1/2}, 2^{n/8}\}$ . We revisit this improved analysis later in section 8. A related claim on  $\mathbf{CP}$  is  $\mathbf{CP}_{2, \ell}^{\text{eq}} = 2^{-n} + (d(\ell))^2 \cdot \ell \cdot 2^{-2n} + \ell^6 \cdot 2^{-3n}$  (see [10]) which gives tight bound for equal length messages.

## 4.2 PRF Advantage of CBC

Now we revisit the security analysis of CBC-MAC construction. Let  $\text{Fcoll}_{\pi}(M_1; M_2)$ , called **full collision**, denote the event that

$$\text{in}^{\pi}(M_2)[m_2] = \text{in}^{\pi}(M_r)[j] \text{ for some } (r, j) \neq (2, m_2).$$

In other words, if the full collision event does not hold then the last intermediate input of  $\pi$  is “fresh” (not appeared before) while computing  $\text{CBC}_{\pi}(M_2)$ . So when  $\pi$  is replaced by a random permutation and this event does not hold then the CBC-output should behave “almost” randomly. We use this intuition while we provide a bound of prf-advantage of CBC.

*Remark 1.* We would like to remark that in the original paper [3], the full collision event is defined through the intermediate outputs instead of inputs. Since we consider CBC based on permutation only, equalities among inputs and equalities among outputs are the same.

For a  $q$ -tuple of messages  $\mathcal{M}$ , the union of full collision events is similarly denoted by  $\text{Fcoll}_{\pi}(\mathcal{M})$ . The probability of this event, called **full collision probability**, is denoted by  $\mathbf{FCP}_n(\mathcal{M})$ . The maximum full collision probability is denoted by  $\mathbf{FCP}_{q, \ell}^{\text{atk}}$ . Similar to inequality 2, the following result has been proved in [3].

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{CBC}}^{\text{pf}}(q, \ell) \leq q^2(\mathbf{FCP}_{2, \ell}^{\text{pf}} + 4\ell/2^n). \quad (4)$$

Note that we must restrict the adversary to make prefix-free queries, since otherwise it would be easy to distinguish CBC from a random function (using the classical length extension attack). Similarly, if  $M_2$  is a prefix of  $M_1$ , it is easy to see that  $\mathbf{FCP}_n(M_1, M_2) = 1$  so the above result becomes meaningless. As before, we also state an equivalent form of PRF advantage of CBC in terms of full collision probability among  $q$  messages. The above inequality 4 would be again a straightforward application of the following result.

**Proposition 1.** *We have  $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{CBC}}^{\text{pf}}(q, \ell, \sigma) \leq \mathbf{FCP}_{q, \ell}^{\text{pf}} + \frac{2\sigma q}{2^n} + \frac{q^2}{2^{n+1}}$ .*

**Proof.** Let  $\mathcal{T}_{\text{good}} := ((M_1, T_1), (M_2, T_2), \dots, (M_q, T_q))$  be the set of all pairs of  $\mathcal{M} = (M_1, \dots, M_q) \in (\mathcal{B}^+)^q$  and  $T = (T_1, \dots, T_q) \in \mathcal{B}^q$  such that the  $M_i$  are distinct and the  $T_i$  are also distinct. Trivially, random function RF returns a collision pair on any  $q$  distinct queries with probability at most  $\binom{q}{2}2^{-n}$  for any adversary  $A$ . Thus,

$$\Pr[\text{view}(A^{\text{RF}}) \notin \mathcal{T}_{\text{good}}] \leq \frac{q^2}{2^{n+1}}.$$

Using the coefficient H-technique, now we only need to bound the relationship between the interpolation probabilities. We fix  $\mathcal{M} = (M_1, \dots, M_q) \in (\mathcal{B}^+)^q$  and  $T = (T_1, \dots, T_q) \in \mathcal{B}^q$  such that the  $M_i \in \mathcal{B}^{m_i}$  are distinct and the  $T_i$  are also distinct. Let  $m_i \leq \ell$  for all  $i$  and we write  $\sum_i m_i = m \leq \sigma$ . Now, a permutation  $\pi$  is called **bad** if

1.  $\text{Fcoll}_\pi(\mathcal{M})$  holds, or
2.  $\text{out}^\pi(M_r)[i] = T_{r'}$ , for some  $r, r' \in [q], i \in [m_r]$ .

All other permutations are called good. We define an equivalence relation  $\sim$  on Perm as  $\pi \sim \pi'$  if  $\text{in}^\pi(M_r) = \text{in}^{\pi'}(M_r)$  for all  $r$ . It is clearly an equivalence relation and a good permutation can only be related with another good permutation. Let  $\mathcal{C}$  be an equivalence class consisting of some good permutations. Let  $s$  be the number of distinct intermediate inputs for the computation of all  $\text{CBC}_\pi(M_r)$  where  $\pi \in \mathcal{C}$ . Note that  $s$  is the same for all  $\pi \in \mathcal{C}$ . Then,  $|\mathcal{C}| = (2^n - s)!$ , as the outputs of exactly  $s$  inputs of  $\pi$  are determined. Since the  $T_i$  are not intermediate outputs, we have

$$|\mathcal{C}[\mathcal{M} \xrightarrow{\text{CBC}_\pi} T]| = (2^n - s - q)!$$

(since  $q$  additional restrictions on input-output are being added). So for any class of good permutations  $\mathcal{C}$ ,

$$\Pr[\mathcal{M} \xrightarrow{\text{CBC}_\pi} T \mid \Pi \in \mathcal{C}] = \frac{(2^n - s - q)!}{(2^n - s)!} \geq 2^{-nq}.$$

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\mathcal{M} \xrightarrow{\text{CBC}_\pi} T] &\geq \sum_{\mathcal{C} \text{ is good}} \Pr[\mathcal{M} \xrightarrow{\text{CBC}_\pi} T \mid \Pi \in \mathcal{C}] \times \Pr[\Pi \in \mathcal{C}] \\ &\geq \Pr[\Pi \text{ is good}] \times 2^{-nq}. \end{aligned}$$

So it is sufficient to bound a random permutation being bad. Then we will be done by using the coefficient H-technique as stated in theorem 1. By definition of full collision probability, the first condition for a permutation to be bad can happen with probability at most  $\mathbf{FCP}_{q,\ell}^{\text{pf}}$ . The second condition says that we sample at most  $m$  outputs of a random permutation and one of them belongs to the set  $\{T_1, \dots, T_q\}$ . This can happen with probability at most  $m q / 2^n - m$  which is further less than  $m q / 2^{n-1}$  provided  $m < 2^{n-1}$ . Note that  $m \leq \sigma$ . If  $m \geq 2^{n-1}$  then the above bound holds trivially. So the probability of bad permutation is bounded by  $\mathbf{FCP}_{q,\ell}^{\text{pf}} + m q / 2^{n-1}$ . After applying the coefficient-H technique, we have proved the result.  $\square$

*Remark 2.* Note that  $\mathbf{FCP}_{q,\ell}^{\text{pf}} \leq q(q-1)\mathbf{FCP}_{2,\ell}^{\text{any}}$  by considering all ordered pairs  $(M_i, M_j)$ . This also proves the original claim from [3] as stated in inequality 4. In fact, it is potentially a better bound than the original as it uses the total number of blocks  $\sigma$  instead of  $\ell q$ . In [3], it is proved that

$$\mathbf{FCP}_{2,\ell}^{\text{pf}} \leq \frac{8\ell}{2^n} + \frac{64\ell^4}{2^{2n}}. \quad (5)$$

In section 7 we revisit the above bound. In particular we revise the proof in light of the flaw in [3, Lemma 10] and get an increment in the multiplication factor. Moreover, our revised bound of  $\mathbf{FCP}_{q,\ell}^{\text{pf}}$  would be in the order  $\sigma q / 2^n$  instead of  $\ell q^2 / 2^n$  (whenever  $\ell \leq 2^{n/3}$ ). So our analysis rectifies the previous proof and also provides a better bound in some cases (e.g., average message length is much smaller than the length of longest messages which may occur when message lengths are very skewed).

## 5 Revisiting Structure Graph

In the previous section we have seen how the PRF advantage of CBC or EMAC is essentially reduced to bound some collision events of internal inputs or outputs of the underlying permutation. Thus, it would be useful to have an object which deals with the intermediate inputs and outputs. The structure graph does so and it has been used to bound the (full) collision probabilities in [3]. In this section we revisit the structure graph and show that one of the main claims in [3] (namely, [3, Lemma 10]) about structure graphs is false.

**Notation and Conventions for this section:** Let us fix a tuple of messages  $\mathcal{M} = (M_1, \dots, M_q)$  throughout this section where  $M_i \in \mathcal{B}^{m_i}$  and let  $m := \sum_{i=1}^q m_i$  and  $\max_i m_i = \ell$ .

### 5.1 Intermediate Inputs and Outputs

**Index Set.** We first collect all intermediate inputs and outputs which are obtained through the computation of  $\text{CBC}_\pi(M_r)$  for all  $r$ . These intermediate values will be defined as a sequence over a two-dimensional index set. Each index

is a pair where the first element of the pair corresponds to the message number and the second element is the block number of that message. More formally, we define the *index set*

$$\mathcal{I} = \{(r, i) : r \in [q], i \in [m_r]\}$$

and the dictionary order  $\prec$  on it as follows:  $(r, i) \prec (r', i')$  if  $r < r'$  or  $r = r'$  and  $i < i'$ . Let  $x$  be a sequence over this index set. For any  $r \in [q]$ , we denote the subsequence  $(x[r, 1], \dots, x[r, m_r])$  by  $x[r, *]$ . Sometimes we also consider the index set  $\mathcal{I}_0 = \mathcal{I} \cup \{(r, 0) : r \in [q]\}$ , and the natural extension of the order  $\prec$  on  $\mathcal{I}_0$ .

**Sequences for Intermediate Inputs and Outputs.** We denote the *sequences of intermediate outputs* and *inputs* over the index set  $\mathcal{I}$  as  $\text{out}^\pi(\mathcal{M})$  and  $\text{in}^\pi(\mathcal{M})$  respectively where

$$\text{out}^\pi(\mathcal{M})[r, *] = \text{out}^\pi(M_r), \quad \text{in}^\pi(\mathcal{M})[r, *] = \text{in}^\pi(M_r), \quad \forall r \in [q].$$

For a single message, we have seen before that the intermediate input sequence is uniquely determined by the intermediate output sequence and we denote the association by a function  $\text{out2in}$ . The same is true for  $q$  messages and we extend this definition as follows: Given any block sequence  $y$  over the index set  $\mathcal{I}$ , we define  $\text{out2in}(y)$  as a block sequence  $x$  over the same index space where  $x[r, *] = \text{out2in}_{M_r}(y[r, *])$ ,  $r \in [q]$ . Thus, for any  $\pi$ , we have  $\text{out2in}(\text{out}^\pi) = \text{in}^\pi$ .

## 5.2 Structure Graphs and Block-Vertex Structure Graphs

A block-vertex structure graph is a graph theoretical representation of intermediate output  $\text{out}^\pi$ . The **block-vertex structure graph**  $\text{Bstruct}^\pi$  for a permutation  $\pi$  is defined by the set of labeled edges


$$E \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \cup_{r=1}^q \{(\text{out}^\pi[r, i-1], \text{out}^\pi[r, i] ; M_r[i]) : i \in [m_r]\}.$$

Clearly,  $G$  is a union of  $M_i$ -walks for all  $i \in [q]$ , and vertex  $0^n \in V$  has positive out-degree. Let  $\text{Bstruct}(\mathcal{M})$  denote the set of all block structure graphs for the tuple of messages  $\mathcal{M}$ . Note that as explained below,

$$v \xrightarrow{A} w \Rightarrow \pi(v \oplus A) = w. \quad (6)$$

So for every  $v \in V$ , all outward edges (similarly for inward edges) have distinct edge labels. Using this property, it is easy to see that **the walks are unique** and we denote them by  $w_{M_i}$  or simply  $w_i$  whenever the message tuple is understood. See Fig. 4 for a single message (i.e.,  $q = 1$ ) in which the input and output vectors are stored in a directed graph.


While storing the intermediate sequences as a set of labeled edges, we may lose the order as well as the repetition of the elements. Interestingly, we see that we can uniquely reconstruct the intermediate sequences from such an edge-labeled graph by using uniqueness of  $M_i$ -walks. More precisely,  $\text{out}^\pi[r, i] = w_r[i]$ .



**Fig. 4:** Let  $M_1 = (1, 0, 2, 0, 2)$  and  $\pi(1) = 2, \pi(2) = 3$ . For any such  $\pi$ , we have  $\text{out}^\pi = (0, 2, 3, 2, 3, 2)$  and  $\text{in}^\pi = (1, 2, 1, 2, 1)$ . However, the graph consists of three vertices  $\{0, 2, 3\}$  and edge set  $E = \{(0, 2), (2, 3), (3, 2)\}$  with labels 1, 0 and 2 respectively. We see that the intermediate input and output sequences actually can be reconstructed from this labeled structure graph. The walk corresponding to the message  $M_1$  will uniquely identify the output vector as  $\text{out}^\pi = (0, 2, 3, 2, 3, 2)$  and the input vector  $\text{in}^\pi = (1, 2, 1, 2, 1)$  can be constructed using the relation between input, output and message.

Let  $G = (V, E)$  be a labeled directed graph and  $f : V \rightarrow V^*$  a bijective function. Then one can define a labeled directed graph  $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$  isomorphic to  $G$  for which  $f$  is an isomorphism. More precisely,  $((u, v); a) \in E$  if and only if  $((f(u), f(v)); a) \in E^*$ . When  $f$  is an injective function we can view the function where the range set is the image set of the function and this makes the function bijective. We call the graph obtained as described above a transformed  $G$  with respect to  $f$ .

**Definition 4 (structure graph).** For every vertex  $v$  of a block-vertex structure graph  $G = (V, E)$ , we define a mapping  $\alpha : V \rightarrow \mathcal{I}$  as  $\alpha_v = \alpha(v) = (r, i)$  where  $(r, i)$  is the minimum index such that  $w_r[i] = v$ . Clearly, it is an injective mapping with an image set say  $V^*$ . The structure graph  $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$  associated to  $\pi$  is the  $\alpha$ -transformed block-vertex structure graph.



**Fig. 5:** Structure Graph corresponding to the labeled structure graph.

*Example 1.* Let  $M_1 = (M_1[1], M_1[2], M_1[3], M_1[2], M_1[4])$  and  $M_2 = (M_2[1])$  be two messages and for  $\pi \in \text{Perm}$  let  $\text{in}^\pi[1, *] = (Y_0 \oplus M_1[1], Y_1 \oplus M_1[2], Y_2 \oplus M_1[3], Y_1 \oplus M_1[2], Y_2 \oplus M_1[4])$ ;  $\text{out}^\pi[1, *] = (Y_0, Y_1, Y_2, Y_1, Y_2, Y_3)$  and  $\text{in}^\pi[2, *] = (Y_0 \oplus M_2[1])$ ;  $\text{out}^\pi[2, *] = (Y_0, Y_3)$ . The corresponding block labeled structure graph  $\text{Bstruct}^\pi$  is as shown in fig. 5(a). Following the above steps we arrive at a valid structure graph  $\text{struct}^\pi$  in fig. 5(b).

Let  $w_{r,*}$  denote the  $M_r$ -walk in  $G^*$ . It is easy to see that a structure graph is again an **union of  $M_r$ -walks**  $w_r^*$  starting from 0.<sup>2</sup> A structure graph is called a **zero-output graph** if 0 has positive in-degree, otherwise we call it **non-zero output graph**. To express it mathematically, we define a binary function  $\text{Iszero}$  such that for each zero-output graph  $G^*$ ,  $\text{Iszero}(G^*) = 1$ , otherwise it maps to 0.

To reconstruct a block-vertex structure graph realizing  $G^*$  we have to find labels from  $\mathcal{B}$  for all the vertices in a “consistent manner” and we call such a labeling **valid**. Basically, we need to find an injective mapping  $\alpha^{-1} : V^* \rightarrow \mathcal{B}$  such that image set of  $\alpha^{-1}$  is  $V$  and  $\alpha := (\alpha^{-1})^{-1}$  is an isomorphism.

**Definition 5 (valid block label).** An injective function  $Y : V^* \rightarrow \mathcal{B}$  is called **valid block label** for a structure graph  $\mathcal{S} = (V^*, E^*)$  if the graph  $G = (V, E)$  is a block-vertex structure graph where

1.  $V = \{0^n\} \cup \{Y_i := Y(i) : i \in V^*\}$  and
2.  $E$  is the edge set after relabeling  $i$  by  $Y_i$  (we assume  $Y_0 := 0^n$ ).

NECESSARY CONDITION OF VALID LABELING FUNCTION  $Y$ . Now we try to find necessary conditions of a valid labeling. First of all, by definition,  $Y_i$  should be all distinct as the valid block label is injective (distinct vertex should get distinct block label). In addition to this, whenever  $e_1 := (u, z), e_2 := (v, z) \in E$  we must have  $Y_u \oplus \mathcal{L}(e_1) = Y_v \oplus \mathcal{L}(e_2)$  as these are input for the vertex  $z$ . An **input-collision or simply a collision** of a graph  $G$  is defined by such a triple  $\delta = (u, v; z)$ . The set  $\{u, v\}$  is called the *source of the collision* whereas  $z$  is called the *head of the collision*. We also say the edges  $e_1$  and  $e_2$  are colliding edges. Thus, an input-collision  $\delta = (u, v; z)$  induces a linear restriction  $L_\delta : Y_u \oplus Y_v = c_\delta$  where  $c_\delta = \mathcal{L}(u, z) \oplus \mathcal{L}(v, z) \in \mathcal{B}$ . Thus, a valid block label must satisfy the above condition for all collisions  $\delta$ . Let  $\Delta_{G^*}$  denote the set of all collisions of  $G^*$ . Let  $\text{rank}(G^*)$  denote the rank of all linear equations  $\{L_\delta : \delta \in \Delta_{G^*}\}$ . The accident of a structure graph is defined depending on whether the graph is zero-output or not.

**Definition 6 (Accident of a structure graph).** We define the accident of a structure graph  $G^*$  as  $\text{Acc}(G^*) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{rank}(G^*) + \text{Iszero}(G^*)$ . Thus, the accident of a non-zero structure graph  $G^*$  is defined to be  $\text{rank}(G^*)$ , whereas the accident of a zero-output graph is  $\text{rank}(G^*) + 1$ .

**Lemma 1.** If there is a vertex  $v$  with in-degree  $d$  then  $\text{rank}(G^*) \geq d - 1$ . Moreover, if the graph is a zero-output graph then  $\text{Acc}(G^*) \geq d$ .

**Proof.** Let  $v_1, \dots, v_d$  be all predecessors of  $v$ . Let us define an input-collision  $\delta_{i,j} := (v_i, v_j; v)$ . It is now easy to see that  $L_{\delta_{i,j}} = L_{1,i} \oplus L_{1,j}$ . Moreover, the  $L_{1,i}$ 's are linearly independent. Thus, the first part is proved, The second part is also trivial from the first part and the definition of the accident.  $\square$

<sup>2</sup> Note that, as per the convention used here and in the preceding discussion  $w_r^*[i] = \alpha(w_r[i])$ .

*Remark 3.* Another simple but useful observation is as follows: if a structure graph  $G^*$  has at least two collisions with different source, then  $\text{rank}(G^*) \geq 2$ .

Let  $S = (V^*, E^*)$  be a structure graph with rank  $r$  and  $|V^*| = s + 1$ . Then from linear algebra we know that some  $s - r$  choices of  $Y_i$  values will uniquely determine the rest and so the number of valid block labelings is at most  $\mathbf{P}(2^n, s - r)$ . Any valid choice of  $Y$  induces a block-vertex structure graph  $G = (V, E)$  such that  $G^* = S$ . Note that  $s + \text{Iszero}(G)$  is the number of vertices  $v \in V$  with positive in-degree. So exactly  $(2^n - s - \text{Iszero}(G))!$  number of permutations can result in a block-vertex structure graph  $G$ . Therefore,

$$\Pr[\text{Bstruct}^\Pi = G] = \frac{(2^n - (s + \text{Iszero}(G)))!}{2^n!} = \frac{1}{\mathbf{P}(2^n, s + \text{Iszero}(G))}. \quad (7)$$

So  $\Pr[\text{struct}^\Pi = S] = \sum_{G:G^*=S} \Pr[\text{Bstruct}^\Pi = G]$ . Here the sum is taken over all block-vertex structure graphs  $G$  such that the induced structure graph  $G^* = S$ . As there are at most  $\mathbf{P}(2^n, s - r)$  many vertex-label structure graphs (by bounding the number of valid block label functions as described above and using  $s + 1 \leq m$ ), we proved the following important result.

**Lemma 2.** *For any structure graph  $S$  with accident  $a$ , we have*

$$\Pr[\text{struct}^\Pi = S] \leq \frac{1}{(2^n - m)^a}.$$

Now we state another important result which bounds the number of structure graphs with accident  $a$ . The proof of this result can be found in [3, 31]. So we skip the proof here.

**Lemma 3.** *The number of structures graphs associated to  $\mathcal{M} = (M_1, \dots, M_q)$  with accident  $a$  is at most  $\binom{m}{2}^a$ . In particular, there exists exactly one structure graph with accident 0.*

**Corollary 1.** *Let  $a \geq 1$  be an integer. Then,*

$$\Pr[\text{Acc}(\text{struct}^\Pi) \geq a : \Pi \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Perm}] \leq \left(\frac{m^2}{2^n}\right)^a.$$


This can be shown by making a straightforward algebraic simplification after applying the lemma 2 and lemma 3. So we skip the proof.  $\square$

### 5.3 True Collision and an Observation on [3, Lemma 10]

The definition of the accident is not obvious by looking at the structure graph. It would be good to have some transparent definition for a structure graph. True collision is such a metric. Let  $G^*$  be a structure graph and  $w_i^*$  the  $M_i$ -walks. Suppose we reconstruct the graph  $G^*$  again by making all the walks  $w_i^*$  for  $i = 1$  to  $q$ . While we walk along  $w_i^*$  for all  $i$  we count how many times we reach an existing vertex which increases its current in-degree. The total count is defined

to be the number of true collisions of the graph. Mathematically, one can define it as follows: For a vertex  $v \in V^* \setminus \{0\}$ , we define the number of true collisions at  $v$  by  $\mathbf{TC}(v) := |\text{nbd}(* \rightarrow v)| - 1$  and  $\mathbf{TC}(0) = |\text{nbd}(* \rightarrow 0)|$ . So the above count is actually the sum  $\mathbf{TC}(G^*) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{v \in V^*} \mathbf{TC}(v)$ . By lemma 1 we know that  $\mathbf{Acc}(G^*) \geq \mathbf{TC}(v)$  for all  $v \in V^*$ . From the definition of the accident it is also obvious that  $\mathbf{Acc}(G^*) \leq \mathbf{TC}(G^*)$ .

**Lemma 10 of [3].** To identify all structure graphs with accident 1 it would be good if we have some relationship between true collision and accident. Lemma 10 of [3] was meant for this. It says that when  $q = 2$ ,  $\mathbf{Acc}(G^*) = 1 \Rightarrow \mathbf{TC}(G^*) = 1$ . This lemma is wrong due to the following counter-examples given in figure 6. The lemma has been used to bound the PRF advantage of CBC [3] and EMAC [31, 3]. As this becomes wrong, it would be very important to look back the proof and rectify the results as much as possible.



**Fig. 6:** The counter examples. (a)  $M_1 = (M_1[1], M_1[2], M_1[3], M_1[2], M_1[4])$  and  $M_2 = (M_2[1])$  be two messages such that  $M_2[1] := M_1[1] \oplus M_1[3] \oplus M_1[4]$ . Here we have two input-collisions  $\delta_1 := ((1, 0), (1, 2) ; (1, 1))$  and  $\delta_2 := ((1, 0), (1, 2) ; (1, 5))$ . The two linear equations  $L_{\delta_1}$  and  $L_{\delta_2}$  corresponding to the two input-collisions are same as  $Y_{(1,0)} \oplus Y_{(1,2)} = M_1[1] \oplus M_1[3]$  and so the rank (which is also the accident in this case) is one. However, true collision is two (at  $(1, 1)$  and  $(1, 5)$ ) which contradicts [3, Lemma 10]. Similar arguments can be given for figure (b), where  $M_1 = (M_1[1], M_1[2], M_1[3])$  and  $M_2 = (M_2[1])$ , such that  $M_2[1] := M_1[1] \oplus M_1[2] \oplus M_1[3]$ .


## 6 Characterization of accident-one structure graphs

In this section we characterize all structure graphs with accident 0 or 1. We have already seen that the authors of [3] have missed some structure graphs for two messages. Thus it is important to see whether there are other such graphs or not. To do so we characterize single message structure graph which is much easier to convince. Later in section we characterize all structure graphs for a pair of messages satisfying some event. Note that from here onwards we will not deal with the block-vertex structure graph. So for simplicity from here onwards we

will use  $G$  (instead of  $G^*$ ) to represent a structure graph and  $w_r$  (instead of  $w_r^*$ ) to represent the  $M_r$ -walk in the structure graph.

Let  $\text{struct}_a(\mathcal{M}) = \{G \in \text{struct}(\mathcal{M}) : \mathbf{Acc}(G) = a\}$ , the set of all structure graphs associated to  $\mathcal{M}$  with accident  $a$ . In particular we are interested in  $\text{struct}_0(\mathcal{M})$  and  $\text{struct}_1(\mathcal{M})$  the sets of all structure graphs with accident 0 and 1 respectively. Lemma 3 says that the number of graphs with accident 1 is at most  $\binom{m}{2}$  where  $m = \sum_i m_i$  and  $M_i \in \mathcal{B}^{m_i}$ . The number of structure graphs with accident 0 is at most one. In the following we actually identify a structure graph and hence it is unique. We call it the **free graph** associated to  $\mathcal{M}$ .

**Free Graphs.** As there is no accident every non-zero vertex has in-degree 1 and 0 has in-degree 0 (i.e., non-zero output graph). Being a structure graph,  $G$  is union of  $M_i$ -walks  $w_{M_i}$ . An  $M_i$ -walk starting from 0 with no vertex having in-degree 2 must be a path. So  $G$  is a union of  $M_i$ -paths  $w_{M_i}$ . Now for any  $i \neq j$ , let  $p = \text{LCP}(M_i; M_j)$ . Then,  $w_i[1..p] = w_j[1..p]$  and  $w_i[p+1] \neq w_j[p+1]$  (if these are defined). It is also easy to see that  $w_i[1..p]$ ,  $w_i[p+1..m_i]$ , and  $w_j[p+1..m_j]$  are disjoint paths. Thus, any two paths  $w_i$  and  $w_j$  are identical up to the length of the largest common prefix of  $M_i$  and  $M_j$  and afterwards they remain disjoint. We call this unique graph **free graph**. A free graph for three messages is illustrated in Fig 7.



**Fig. 7:** Free structure graph for three messages.

### 6.1 Accident one for a Single Message

Now we consider the structure graph for a single message  $M \in \mathcal{B}^+$ . Note that any such structure graph must be a walk  $w$  of length  $m$ . We say a node  $w[i]$  is **fresh** in the walk if  $w[i] \neq w[j]$  for all  $j \neq i$ .

**Case A: 0 has positive in-degree** As 0 has positive in-degree there can not be any more collision pairs otherwise the accident would be at least two. Let  $c$  be the minimum positive integer such that  $w[c] = 0$ , so we have a cycle  $(w[0], w[1], \dots, w[c])$ . Let  $X$  be its label. Suppose  $M = X^i || Y$  where  $i$  is the maximum positive integer for which we can write  $M$  in this form. So  $X$  is not a prefix of  $Y$ . Let  $s = \text{LCP}(X; Y)$ . Thus,  $w[ic + j] = w[j] \quad \forall j \in [0..s]$ .

1. If  $Y$  is a prefix of  $X$  then the structure graph is a cycle of size  $c$  ending at  $w[s]$ . It is illustrated in fig. 8(a) where the  $*$  is empty.
2. If  $Y$  is not a prefix of  $X$  then  $w[ic + s] = w[s]$  and  $w[ic + s + 1] \neq w[s + 1]$ . Further,  $w[ic + s + 1] \neq w[j]$  for all  $j \in [c]$  since otherwise we get a collision. In fact it can be shown that all subsequent nodes are fresh. Suppose not, then let  $j > ic + s + 1$  be the first such integer for which  $w[j] = w[k]$  for some  $k < j$ , hence we obtain a collision. So the structure graph is an edge disjoint union of a cycle of size  $c$  and a path starting from  $s$ , as illustrated in fig. 8(a). The length of the cycle is  $c$ , whereas the length of the path is  $m - ic - s$ . We also called this graph  $\rho'$  graph. The tail (path from 0 to the cycle) of the  $\rho'$  walk is empty.

**Case B: 0 has in-degree 0** As 0 has in-degree 0, there is a collision  $\delta = (u_0, v_0; z)$ . In fact, all other collisions must have same source as that of  $\delta$ .

Consider the  $M$ -walk  $(w[0], w[1], \dots)$  which is clearly not a path. Let  $(i_0, j_0)$  be the smallest positive distinct integers such that  $w[i_0] = w[j_0]$ .<sup>3</sup> As 0 has in-degree 0 so  $1 \leq i_0 < j_0$  and we can assume that  $w[i_0 - 1] = u_0$  and  $w[j_0 - 1] = v_0$ . Now, as in Case A, let  $A = \mathcal{L}(w[0..i_0])$ ,  $X = \mathcal{L}(w[i_0..j_0])$ ,  $j_0 - i_0 = c$ . Then,  $A \parallel X$  is the prefix of  $M$ . Let  $t$  be the largest positive integer such that  $M = A \parallel X^t \parallel Y$ . So  $X$  is not a prefix of  $Y$ . If  $Y$  is a prefix of  $X$  then we have a structure graph as illustrated in fig. 8(d) and 8(f) (the end point lies inside the cycle). Suppose  $Y$  is not a prefix and let  $s = \text{LCP}(X; Y)$ .

**Claim.** *The walk after  $A \parallel X^t \parallel Y[1..s]$  is a path and disjoint from the rest* (illustrated in fig. 8(c)).

**Proof of the claim.** Suppose  $\exists v \neq w[s] \in w[tc + s..m] \cap w[1..tc + s]$ . We distinguish the following cases.

**Case B.1:  $w[tc + s + 1] = w[i]$ ,  $i \in [tc + s]$ .** If  $s \neq j_0 - 1$  then we have a new collision  $\delta' = (w[i - 1], w[tc + s]; w[i])$  independent of  $\delta$  which increases the accident to 2. If  $s = j_0 - 1$  then  $i \neq i_0$  as  $X[s + 1] \neq Y[1]$ . Now the only way to make  $\delta'$  dependent on  $\delta$  is to have  $i - 1 = i_0 - 1$ . This implies a collision at  $w[j]$  where  $j \in [1..i_0 - 1]$ , as the walk must come back to  $i_0 - 1$  at the  $(i - 1)$ -th step. This again gives a new accident.


**Case B.2:  $w[tc + s + 1] \notin w[1..tc + s]$  and  $w[j] = w[i]$ ,  $i \in [tc + s]$ , and  $j \in [tc + s + 2..m]$ .** So, there is a new collision  $\delta' = (w[j - 1], w[i - 1]; w[i])$  which is independent of  $\delta$ . This gives a new accident. Thus, we have  $w[tc + s + 1..m] \cap w[1..tc + s] = \emptyset$ .

**Case B.3:  $w[tc + s..m]$  is not a path.** Therefore  $\exists i, j \in [tc + s..m]$  such that  $(w[i], w[j]; w[i + 1])$  is a collision. Clearly this will be independent from  $\delta$  and hence gives a new accident. So none of the case 1, 2 or 3 is possible.  $\square$

<sup>3</sup>  $i_0$  and  $j_0$  can be fixed one by one. First fix  $i_0$  to be the smallest positive integer such that  $w[i_0] = w[j]$ ,  $j \in [i_0 + 1..m]$ . Now, fix the smallest positive integer  $j_0$  such that  $w[j_0] = w[i_0]$ .

Observe that  $s = j_0 - 1$  is a special case. In addition to this condition, suppose we have an edge  $e := (w[i_0 - 1], w[tc + s + 1])$  which creates a collision  $\delta' = (w[i_0 - 1], w[j_0 - 1]; w[tc + s + 1])$  dependent on  $\delta$ . The edge  $e$  cannot occur in a single message graph, as that will imply  $\text{nbd}(* \rightarrow w[j]) \geq 2$  for some  $j \in [0..i_0 - 1]$  which gives a new accident. But for a two message graph this is realizable (counter-examples) as illustrated in fig. 8(b) and 8(e). We summarize our discussion in the following lemma.

**Lemma 4.** *For  $m \geq 1$ ,  $M \in \mathcal{B}^m$  and  $\pi \in \text{Perm}$ , the graphs in figure 8 exhaust all possible forms for  $G_\pi(M)$  when the accident is 1.*



**Fig. 8:** Characterizing all accident-one structure graphs realizable by a single message. The dashed lines in these illustrations represent optional subwalks. **Here the vertex  $w[i]$  is represented by  $i$ , for notational simplicity.**

## 7 Revisiting $\text{CP}_n(M_1, M_2)$ and $\text{FCP}_n(M_1, M_2)$ bounds

In this section our main aim is to revise the proofs of  $(CP)$  and  $(FCP)$  bounds and consequently the PRF advantages in [3]. As mentioned earlier the motivation for this revision is our observation that one of the main tools [3, Lemma 10] in bounding  $|\text{struct}_1[\text{coll}]|$  and  $|\text{struct}_1[\text{Fcoll}]|$  is false.

We start off with a discussion that establishes the role of structure graphs in the PRF security analysis of CBC-MAC and EMAC. Note that we have already seen that bounding PRF advantages of CBC-MAC and EMAC is reduced to bounding full collision probability  $\text{FCP}_{2,\ell}^{\text{pf}}$  and collision probability  $\text{CP}_{2,\ell}^{\text{any}}$  respectively. So it would be sufficient to bound these probabilities. For this we first prove a general claim as stated in (proposition 2).

**Structure Graph Events.** Let  $\mathcal{M} = (M_1, \dots, M_q)$  be a tuple of  $q$  messages. Let  $E$  be an event defined on the intermediate output sequence  $\text{out}^\pi(\mathcal{M})$  for a permutation  $\pi$ . We say that the event  $E$  is **defined by a structure graph** if

there is an event  $E'$  defined on the structure graph  $\mathbf{struct}^\pi$  such that  $E$  holds if and only if  $E'$  holds. We call such an event a **structure graph event**. Moreover, we say that  $E$  is *non-free* if it is false for the free structure graph (the structure graph with accident 0). Note the the collision event for any distinct messages as well as the full collision event for prefix-free messages are examples of non-free structure graph events. In consistency with our notation, we denote by  $\mathbf{struct}_a(E)$  the set of all structure graphs with  $a$  accidents and satisfying a non-free event  $E$ .

**Proposition 2.** *Let  $E$  be a non-free structure graph event for the message tuple  $\mathcal{M}$ . Then,*

$$\Pr_{\Pi}[E] \leq \frac{|\mathbf{struct}_1[E]|}{2^n - m} + \frac{m^4}{2^{2n}}.$$

**Proof.** Note that for any structure graph event  $E$ ,

$$\Pr_{\Pi}[E] = \sum_{a \geq 0} \Pr[\mathbf{struct}^{\Pi} \in \mathbf{struct}_a[E]].$$

As the event is non-free, the sum can be done for  $a \geq 1$ . Moreover, we know that  $\Pr[\mathbf{Acc}(\mathbf{struct}^{\Pi}) \geq 2] \leq \frac{m^4}{2^{2n}}$ . So the result follows from the Lemma 2 which bounds the probability of realizing a structure graph with accidents  $a$ .  $\square$

## 7.1 Revisiting the $\mathbf{CP}_{2,\ell}$ Bound

Suppose  $M_1 \in \mathcal{B}^{m_1}$  and  $M_2 \in \mathcal{B}^{m_2}$  such that  $M_1[m_1] \neq M_2[m_2]$ ,  $0 \leq m_1 \leq m_2$ , since otherwise we can remove the largest common suffix which does not change the collision probability. Note that the first message  $M_1$  now can be empty (then  $M_2$  is not as they are distinct) and in this case collision event means that  $\mathbf{out}^{\Pi}(M_2)[m_2] = 0^n$ . This is a structure graph event because 0 is a vertex of the structure graph. Due to proposition 2, we only need to bound the number of structure graphs with accident 1 satisfying the  $\mathbf{coll}$  event for the pair of messages. More precisely, we have to bound the size of the set  $\mathbf{struct}_1(M_1, M_2)[\mathbf{coll}]$ .

**Case 1:  $M_1$  is an empty message.** In this case we have

$$\mathbf{struct}_1(M_1, M_2)[\mathbf{coll}] = \mathbf{struct}_1(M_2)[w_{M_2}[m_2] = 0].$$

Now, we make the following claim which is essentially [3, Lemma 14]:

**Claim.**  $|\mathbf{struct}_1(M_2)[w_2[m_2] = 0]| \leq d(m_2)$

**Proof of the claim.** Let  $x$  be the smallest positive integer such that  $w_2[x] = 0$ . Let  $X$  be the label of the walk  $w_2[0..x]$ . If  $M_2 = X^d$  with some positive integer  $d$ , then  $\mathbf{struct}_1(M_2)[w_2[x] = 0]$  contains exactly one structure graph. Note that  $x$  must divide  $m_2$  and hence the number of possible choices of such  $x$  is at most  $d(m_2)$ , the number of divisors of  $m_2$ . Suppose  $M_2 = X^d || Y$  for some non-empty

$Y$  where  $d$  is the largest such integer of this form. If  $Y$  is a prefix then  $W_2[m_2]$  is the point in the cycle and it must be 0. This can be zero only if  $Y = X$  which contradicts the maximality of  $d$ . So now assume that  $Y = Y_1\|Y_2$  such that  $Y_1$  is the largest common prefix of  $X$  and  $Y$ , and  $Y_2$  is some non-empty string. If  $s$  is the length of  $Y_1$  then  $Y_2[1] \neq Y[s+1]$ . Thus,  $w_2[dx+s+1] \neq w_2[s+1]$ . As it is a zero-output structure graph, we can not have any collision. So there is no way to obtain  $w_2[m_2] = 0$ . This proves the claim.

**Case 2:  $M_1$  is not an empty message.** In this case we have a collision

$$(u := w_1[m_1 - 1], v := w_2[m_2 - 1], z := w_2[m_2])$$

as the labels of the last edges for walks  $w_1$  and  $w_2$  are different. Any other collision, if any, must have the same source set  $\{u, v\}$ . Moreover, 0 can not have positive in-degree. Now we consider different sub-cases:

**Case 2.1: Both  $w_1$  and  $w_2$  are paths:** In this case, the union of  $w_1[1..m_1-1]$  and  $w_2[1..m_2-1]$  is a free graph (as  $w_1[m_1-1]$  and  $w_2[m_2-1]$  can not appear before in the graph and so no collision among the path can occur). This gives only one choice of the graph as shown in the figure 9(a). So the number of choices is bounded by at most 1. This is proved as part of the incorrect lemma [3, Lemma 15].

**Case 2.2:  $w_2$  is not a path:** Then we have already characterized all possibilities of  $w_2$ . So there exist some integers  $t, c$  such that  $w_2[1..t]$  is a path with  $w_2[t-1] = u$  and  $w_2[t] = p$ ,  $w_2[t..t+c]$  is a cycle of length  $c$  such that  $w_2[t+c-1] = v$ . (Note that  $w_2[t-1] \neq w_2[m_2-1]$ .) Now,  $w_1[m_1-1] = u$ .

**Claim 2.2.1:**  $w_1[1..m_1-1] = w_2[1..t-1]$  and so  $m_1 = t$ .

**Proof.** Let  $s$  be the length of the largest common prefix of  $w_1[1..m_1-1]$  and  $w_2[1..t-1]$ . If  $s < t-1$  then in the walk  $w_1$  there is no way to reach  $u$  without coming back to the walk  $w_2[1..t-1]$ . Coming back is not possible as it leads to a collision with a different generator set. Similarly we can disprove that  $s = t-1$  and  $m_1 > t$ . Thus, we have  $m_1 = t$  and  $w_1[1..m_1-1] = w_2[1..t-1]$ .  $\square$

Now, we distinguish two cases for the choices of  $p = \text{LCP}(M_1; M_2)$ .

1. **Case 2.2.1.(a):** If  $w_1[p] = z$  then we have the structure graph as illustrated in Fig 9(b). In this case  $M_1$  is a prefix of  $M_2$ . The number of such structure graphs is again at most  $d(m_2 - m_1)$  (similar to the previous case where  $M_1$  is the empty message). This is also [3, Lemma 13].
2. **Case 2.2.1.(b):** If  $w_1[p] \neq z$ . Then we get a case which was not considered in [3]. In this case  $w_1[p]$  should be a fresh node otherwise we get a collision with different source set. Thus, we get a structure graph which is shown in the Fig 9(c). Let  $M_1 = A\|a$  where  $A = M_1[1..t-1]$  and  $a = M_1[t]$ . Note that  $t-1$  is the length of the largest common prefix of  $M_1$  and  $M_2$ . Then,


$$M_2 = A\|b\|(X\|x)^{d-1}\|X\|c, \text{ where } c = M_2[m_2], b = M_2[t], x = a \oplus b \oplus c.$$

The choice of  $X$  is variable. But it must satisfy the above for some  $d > 1$ . In fact  $X$  is determined by its length which is  $c$ . Again,  $c$  must divide  $m_2 - m_1$  and hence the number of choices of  $c$  is at most  $d(m_2 - m_1) - 1$ .

This completes the characterization of all structure graphs satisfying  $\text{coll}$  with accident 1 and bounds the number of such graphs for all cases. Note that the cases 2.2.1.(a) and 2.2.1.(b) cannot hold simultaneously. But, Cases 2.2.1.(b) and 2.1 can hold simultaneously which makes the total count of these two cases at most  $d(m_2 - m_1)$ . Since the order of messages does not matter in  $\text{coll}$  we are done.

**Lemma 5.** *Let  $M_1 \in \mathcal{B}^{m_1}$ ,  $M_2 \in \mathcal{B}^{m_2}$ ,*

1. *If  $M_1 <_1 M_2$  then  $\text{struct}_1(M_1, M_2)[\text{coll}]$  is of the form illustrated in Fig 9(b) and the number of such graphs is at most  $d'(m_2)$ .*
2. *If  $M_1 <_2 M_2$  then  $\text{struct}_1(M_1, M_2)[\text{coll}]$  is of the form illustrated in Fig 9(c) and the number of such graphs is at most  $d'(m_2)$ .*
3. *In all other cases,  $\text{struct}_1(M_1, M_2)[\text{coll}]$  is of the form illustrated in Fig 9(a) and the number of such graphs is at most one.*



**Fig. 9:** Characterizing all accident-one structure graphs realizable by two messages which satisfy the  $\text{coll}$  event. Dashed lines represent  $w_1$  and solid lines represent  $w_2$ .

**Corollary 2.** *We have  $|\text{struct}_1(M_1, M_2)[\text{coll}]| \leq d'(m_2)$  for any distinct messages  $M_1, M_2$  with  $m_1 \leq m_2$ . Thus,*

$$\mathbf{CP}_{2,\ell}^{\text{any}} \leq \frac{d'(\ell)}{2^n - 2\ell} + \frac{16\ell^4}{2^{2n}}$$

## 7.2 Revision of $\mathbf{FCP}_{2,\ell}^{\text{pf}}$ Bound

Since  $\text{Fcoll}$  is a non-free structure graph event, we have, using proposition 2,

$$\mathbf{FCP}_n^{\text{pf}}(M_1, M_2) \leq \frac{|\text{struct}_1(\text{Fcoll})|}{2^n - m_1 - m_2} + \frac{(m_1 + m_2)^4}{2^{2n}}.$$

Thus, it would be again sufficient to bound the number of structure graphs for two messages with accident 1 and satisfy full collision property. Bellare et al. [3] proved that  $|\text{struct}_1(\text{Fcoll})| \leq 4 \max\{m_1, m_2\}$ . While bounding the  $|\text{struct}_1(\text{Fcoll})|$ , they proved a strong result [3, Lemma 19] that will be also useful in our analysis also. We reproduce it here in our notations.

**Lemma 6.** For  $b \in \{1, 2\}$  and any  $i \in [0..m_b]$ ,

$$|\text{struct}_1(M_1, M_2)[w_b[i] \in w_b[0..i-1, i+1..m_b]]| \leq m_b.$$

Since the proof of lemma 6 can be found in [3], we skip it here. Now, we revise the **FCP** bound to  $|\text{struct}_1(\text{Fcoll})| \leq 3(m_1 + m_2)$  and the new bound is as follows

**Lemma 7.**  $\text{FCP}_n^{\text{pf}}(M_1, M_2) \leq \frac{3(m_1+m_2)}{2^n - m_1 - m_2} + \frac{(m_1+m_2)^4}{2^{2n}}$ .

**Proof.** We need to bound the number of structure graphs for a pair of prefix-free messages  $M_1 \in \mathcal{B}^{m_1}$  and  $M_2 \in \mathcal{B}^{m_2}$  which satisfy the **Fcoll** event and have at most accident 1. Note that the event implies that the structure graphs must have at least accident 1 as the messages are prefix-free. The event **Fcoll** can be written as  $w_2[m_2] \in w_2[0..m_2-1] \cup w_2[m_2] \in w_1[1..m_1]$ .

**Case 1:**  $w_2[m_2] \in w_2[0..m_2-1]$ . This case can be bounded to at most  $m_2$ , by direct application of lemma 6.

**Case 2:**  $w_2[m_2] \in w_1[1..m_1]$ . Suppose **Fcoll**( $M_1; M_2$ ) happens due to  $w_2[m_2] = w_1[r]$  for an arbitrary  $r \in [1..m_1-1]$ . Then **Fcoll**( $M_1; M_2$ ) is equivalent to **coll**( $M_1[1..r], M_2$ ). For simplicity let  $M'_1 := M_1[1..r]$ . Let  $s := \text{LCS}(M'_1; M_2)$ . Then  $M'_1[s-1] \neq M_2[m_2-r+s-1]$ . Let  $M_1^* = M'_1[1..s-1]$  and  $M_2^* = M_2[1..m_2-r+s-1]$ . From lemma 5 we know that  $G^* \in \text{struct}_1(M_1^*; M_2^*)[\text{coll}]$  must be one of (a), (b) or (c) in fig. 9. Note that  $G^*$  is a subgraph of some  $G \in \text{struct}_1(M_1; M_2)[\text{Fcoll}]$ .

**Case 2.1: In this case,  $G^*$  is as in fig. 9(a).** Therefore  $w_1^*$  and  $w_2^*$  are paths. For a fixed  $r$  the only possible collision is at  $(w_1^*[s-2], w_2^*[m_2-r+s-2]; w_1^*[s-1])$  and hence the number of such graphs is at most 1. There are at most  $m_1$  possible values for  $r$ . So, the number of choices for  $G \in \text{struct}_1(M_1; M_2)[\text{Fcoll}]$  is at most  $m_1$ .

**Case 2.2:  $G^*$  is either as in fig. 9(b) or (c).** In this case, at least one of  $w_1^*$  and  $w_2^*$  is not a path. Without loss of generality assume  $w_1^*$  is not a path. Let  $p^* = \text{LCP}(M_1^*; M_2^*)$ . We know that  $M_1^* <_1 M_1$  and  $M_2^* <_1 M_2$ . Thus  $M_1[1..p^*] = M_2[1..p^*]$ . Now we must have a collision  $(u, v ; z)$  in  $w_1^*$ . From lemma 5 we know that the graph can be either fig. 9(b) or (c) depending on whether  $z = w_1^*[p^*]$  or  $z = w_1^*[p^*+1]$ . Next we make two claims which will enable us to bound the two cases. The proofs for these two claims are given later in the section.

**Claim 2.2.1:** If  $G^*$  is fig. 9(b) then  $w_1[\text{LCP}(M_1; M_2)]$  is not fresh in  $w_1$ .

**Claim 2.2.2:** If  $G^*$  is fig. 9(c) then  $w_1[\text{LCP}(M_1; M_2) + 1]$  is not fresh in  $w_1$ .

Recall that in a walk  $w$  a vertex  $w[i]$  is not fresh if  $\exists j \neq i$  such that  $w[j] = w[i]$ . By claim 2.2.1 we know that  $w_1[\text{LCP}(M_1; M_2)]$  is not fresh when  $G^*$  is as in fig. 9(b). Similarly, by claim 2.2.2 we know that  $w_1[\text{LCP}(M_1; M_2) + 1]$  is not

fresh when  $G^*$  is as in fig. 9(c). So using lemma 6 we bound the number of such graphs  $G$  to at most  $m_1 + m_1 = 2m_1$  when  $w_1^*$  is not a path. Similarly we have at most  $2m_2$  choices when  $w_2^*$  is not a path. Therefore the total number of choices in case 2.2 is at most  $2(m_1 + m_2)$ . Combining case 1, 2.1 and 2.2 we have at most  $3(m_1 + m_2)$  choices. The result follows.  $\square$

**Proof for claim 2.2.1:** If  $G^*$  is like fig. 9(b), we must have  $z = w_1^*[p^*]$ . Let  $q$  be the minimum index such that  $w_1^*[q] = w_1^*[p^*]$ . Let  $P = \mathcal{L}(w_1^*[0..p^*])$  and  $X = \mathcal{L}(w_1^*[p^*..q])$ ,  $c = q - p^*$ . Then  $M_1^* = P\|X$  and  $M_2^* = P$ . As  $M_1^*$  and  $M_2^*$  are formed by removing the largest common suffix from  $M_1'$  and  $M_2$  respectively, therefore  $M_1' = (M_1^*\|X^{i_1}\|Y) = (P\|X^{i_1+1}\|Y)$  and  $M_2 = (M_2^*\|X^{i_2}\|Y) = (P\|X^{i_2}\|Y)$  where  $i_1, i_2 \geq 0$  are the largest such indices. Since  $M_1'$  and  $M_2$  are prefix-free, we have  $i_1 + 1 > i_2$ . Now  $M_1 = (M_1'\|Z) = (P\|X^{i_1+1}\|Y\|Z)$ , where  $|Z| \geq 0$ . From now onwards we will work on the walk  $w_1$  (instead of  $w_1^*$  which is a subwalk of  $w_1$ ) corresponding to  $M_1$ . If  $Y$  is a prefix of  $X$  then  $M_2 <_1 M_1$  which contradicts the prefix-free condition. So  $Y$  is not a prefix of  $X$ . If  $X$  is a prefix of  $Y$  then it contradicts the maximality of  $i_1, i_2$ . So  $X$  is not a prefix of  $Y$ . Assume  $Y = Y_1\|Y_2$  such that  $Y_1$  is the largest common prefix of  $X$  and  $Y$ , and  $Y_2$  is some non-empty string. If  $p$  is the length of  $Y_1$ , then  $Y_2[1] = Y[p+1] \neq X[p+1]$ . Thus  $M_1[1..i_2c+p] = M_2[1..i_2c+p]$  and  $M_1[i_2c+p+1] \neq M_2[i_2c+p+1]$ . So,  $p = \text{LCP}(M_1; M_2)$ . Further since  $i_2 < i_1 + 1$ ,  $w_1[p]$  is traversed twice. Thus  $w_1[\text{LCP}(M_1; M_2)]$  will not be fresh. Note that we started off with an arbitrary  $r$ . So  $w_1[\text{LCP}(M_1; M_2)]$  will not be fresh irrespective of the value of  $r$ .  $\square$

**Proof for claim 2.2.2:** If  $G^*$  is like figure 9(c), we must have  $z = w_1^*[p^* + 1]$ . As noted earlier in the revision of the **CP** bound, this case was missing in the proof in [3]. Using a similar line of argument as in the previous case we can conclude that irrespective of the value of  $r$ , the cycle goes through  $w_1[\text{LCP}(M_1; M_2) + 1]$  twice. Thus,  $w_1[\text{LCP}(M_1; M_2) + 1]$  is not fresh.  $\square$

Note that our approach in Case 2.2 above is a bit subtle. We used lemma 5 to identify a fundamental property (cycle goes through  $p$  or  $p + 1$  twice) and then exploited this property to bound the counting. A straightforward approach of summing the counts for graphs in fig. 9(b) and (c) over all values of  $r$  will give a worse bound of  $m_b d'(m_b)$ ,  $b \in \{1, 2\}$ . To get a tighter bound of  $m_b$  we needed this subtlety. Now we extend the bound for  $\mathbf{FCP}_n^{\text{pf}}(M_1; M_2)$  to  $\mathbf{FCP}_{q,\ell}^{\text{pf}}$ , in order to get the revised prf bound for CBC-MAC.

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{FCP}_{q,\ell}^{\text{pf}} &\leq \sum_{i \neq j \in [q]} \mathbf{FCP}_n^{\text{pf}}(M_i; M_j) \\
&\leq \sum_{i \neq j \in [q]} \left( \frac{3(m_i + m_j)}{2^n - m_1 - m_2} + \frac{(m_i + m_j)^4}{2^{2n}} \right) \\
&\leq \sum_{i \neq j \in [q]} \frac{6(m_i + m_j)}{2^n} + \frac{(m_i + m_j)^4}{2^{2n}} \\
&\leq \frac{6mq}{2^n} + \frac{8mq\ell^3}{2^{2n}} \leq \frac{6\sigma q}{2^n} + \frac{8\sigma q\ell^3}{2^{2n}} \tag{8}
\end{aligned}$$

Here we have computed the bound in terms of  $q$ ,  $\ell$  and  $\sigma$ . Another approach (as used in [3]) is to bound the value using  $q$  and  $\ell$  only, in which case the bound will be

$$\mathbf{FCP}_{q,\ell}^{\text{pf}} \leq \frac{12\ell q^2}{2^n} + \frac{16\ell^4 q^2}{2^{2n}}$$

Using proposition 1 and eq. 8, we get the following theorem.

**Theorem 2.** *We have  $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{CBC}}^{\text{pf}}(q, \ell, \sigma) \leq \frac{8\sigma q}{2^n} + \frac{8\sigma q \ell^3}{2^{2n}} + \frac{q^2}{2^{n+1}}$*

This gives a bound of  $O(\frac{\sigma q}{2^n})$  for  $\ell < 2^{n/3}$ . As noted earlier, this is a better bound whenever the average message length is much smaller than the length of the longest message.

## 8 Revised Security Analysis of EMAC

In this section we revisit the PRF analysis of EMAC due to Pietrzack [31]. We first identify the actual flaw in the proof and then provide a different proof to obtain, in fact, a better bound of EMAC (in terms of  $\ell$ ). For notational simplicity we will keep our bounds in order notation and avoid the constant factors.

### 8.1 Flaw and Revision of PRF Advantage of EMAC [31]

The proposed bound for EMAC as stated in [31] is

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{EMAC}}^{\text{prf}}(q, \ell, \sigma) = O\left(\frac{q^2}{2^n} \left(1 + \frac{\ell^8}{2^n}\right)\right)$$

provided  $\ell^2 \leq q$ . Thus, it becomes tight bound  $q^2/2^n$  when  $\ell \leq \min(q^{1/2}, 2^{n/8})$ . To show the above result we need to bound the collision probability  $\mathbf{CP}_{q,\ell}$ . One possible approach is to group the  $q$  message into  $O(q/\ell^2)$  groups, each group consists of about  $\ell^2$  messages. So the collision event among  $q$  messages implies that a collision occurs in two of the groups. Since coll is a non-free event, proposition 2 gives

$$\mathbf{CP}_{q,\ell} = O\left(\frac{|\mathbf{struct}_1(\mathcal{M})[\text{coll}]|}{2^n}\right) + O\left(\frac{q^4 \ell^4}{2^{2n}}\right).$$

Applying this with  $q = 2\ell^2$  (i.e. for two groups) we have

$$\mathbf{CP}_{q,\ell} = O\left(\frac{q^2}{\ell^4}\right) \times \mathbf{CP}_{\ell^2,\ell} = O\left(\frac{q^2 N}{\ell^4 2^n}\right) + O\left(\frac{q^2 \ell^8}{2^{2n}}\right)$$

where  $N$  denote the number of accident one structure graphs satisfying coll for  $\ell^2$  messages with maximum length  $\ell$ . The  $O(q^2/\ell^4)$  term is due to the number of ways in which we can choose two groups. In [31, Lemma 4], Pietrzak claimed that  $N = O(\ell^4)$ . So, plugging this bound for  $\ell$  we have the desired bound. Now to prove this bound for  $N$ , Pietrzak considered two cases for a pair of messages

$M$  and  $M'$  (note that accident 1 and collision must occur for a pair of messages). More precisely, it can be shown that

$$N = \ell^4 \max_{M \not\prec_1 M'} |\mathbf{struct}_1(M.M')[\mathbf{coll}]| + \ell^4. \quad (9)$$

Recall that  $M \not\prec_1 M'$  means that they become prefix-free after removing the largest common suffix of  $M$  and  $M'$ .

**Claim 1 of [31].** If  $M \not\prec_1 M'$  then  $|\mathbf{struct}_1(M.M')[\mathbf{coll}]| = 1$ .

If this claim happens to be true then  $N = O(\ell^4)$ . However, we have seen before there exists  $M, M'$  with  $M <_2 M'$  (such that  $M \not\prec_1 M'$ ) with  $|\mathbf{struct}_1(M, M')[\mathbf{coll}]| = d(\ell - 1)$ . Thus,

$$|\mathbf{struct}_1(M, M')[\mathbf{coll} \wedge M \not\prec_1 M']| = O(d'(\ell)).$$

If we plug in this, we find the modified bound as  $N = O(\ell^4(d'(\ell))^2)$  and so the revised bound for the collision probability becomes  $O(q^2 d'(\ell)/2^n)$  which is not tight.

## 8.2 Simple Proof of PRF Security for EMAC

We have seen in the last subsection that the influence of the flaw from [3, Lemma 10] is more serious having tight bound of EMAC. So it is very crucial to revisit the security analysis of EMAC. One possible approach to fix the proof of [31], by bounding  $N$  in a different way. For example, we can consider two cases  $M <_1 M'$  and  $M <_2 M'$  (i.e.,  $M[1..m-1] <_1 M_2$  but  $M \not\prec_1 M'$ ). For any pair of messages which are not related by any one of these two relations then the number of structure graphs can be shown to be one. However, we need to show that the remaining graphs is still about  $\ell^4$  (see second term of Eq. 9).

In this section we actually took a slightly different and, in fact simpler, approach. Instead of making groups of  $q$  messages we directly bound the number of structure graphs for a slightly different choices of permutations. We will ignore all those permutations (i.e. bad permutations) which induces one of the following:

1. For some pair of messages  $M_i$  and  $M_j$  the number of accident is two or more.
2. For some message  $M_i$ , the accident is one.

Let  $\phi$  be the property to represent the complement of the event. Let  $S$  be a structure graph associated to a  $q$ -tuple of messages. We recall that  $S$  is an union of  $q$  walks  $w_i$ . We denote the sub-graph  $S_i$  and  $S_{i,j}$  to represent the walk  $w_i$  and  $w_i \cup w_j$ . Note that these are again structure graphs associated to  $M_i$  and  $(M_i, M_j)$  respectively. In this notation,  $\phi$  is a property on all structure graphs  $S$  on  $\mathcal{M}$  such that  $\mathbf{Acc}(S_{i,j}) \leq 1$  for all  $i \neq j$  and  $\mathbf{Acc}(S_i) = 0$  for all  $i$ . We call a permutation good if its induced structure graph satisfies  $\phi$ , otherwise we call bad. Now we claim our new bound.

**Lemma 8.**  $\mathbf{CP}_{q,\ell}(\mathcal{M}) \leq O\left(\frac{q^2}{2^n}\right) + O\left(\frac{\ell^2 q}{2^n}\right) + O\left(\frac{\ell^4 q^2}{2^{2n}}\right)$ .

**Proof.** We first bound the probability of bad random permutation. For a bad permutation (1) there exists  $i$  and  $j$  such that the accident for the pair of message  $M_i$  and  $M_j$  is at least 2 or (2) there exists  $i$ , such that the accident for  $M_i$  is at least one. The first event can happen with probability  $O(\ell^4 q^2 / 2^{2n})$  by using corollary 1. Similarly the second event can happen with  $O(\ell^2 q / 2^n)$ . Now we bound the probability  $p := \Pr[\text{coll} \wedge \phi]$ . Note that collision event implies that there exists  $i$  and  $j$  such that collision event holds for the message  $M_i$  and  $M_j$ . Now  $\phi$  implies that accident of  $S_{i,j}$  is one whereas accident of  $S_i$  and  $S_j$  are zero. In section 6 we have characterized all structure graphs for a pair of messages with accident one satisfying collision. Among all possibilities only one structure graph satisfies  $\phi$ . Hence there is exactly one structure graph. This implies that  $\Pr[\text{coll}(M_i, M_j) \wedge \phi] = O(2^{-n})$ . Hence, by summing over all possible  $i, j$  we have

$$\Pr[\text{coll}(\mathcal{M}) \wedge \phi] = O(q^2 / 2^n).$$

Now we summarize above discussion as

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{CP}_{q,\ell}(\mathcal{M}) &= \Pr_{\Pi}[\text{coll}_{\Pi}(\mathcal{M}) \wedge (\text{struct}^{\Pi}(\mathcal{M}) \in \text{struct}(\mathcal{M})[\phi])] \\ &\quad + \Pr[\text{struct}^{\Pi}(\mathcal{M}) \notin \text{struct}^{\Pi}(\mathcal{M})[\phi]] \\ &= \sum_{i \neq j} O\left(\frac{|\text{struct}(M_i, M_j)[\text{coll} \wedge \phi]|}{2^n}\right) + O(\ell^2 q / 2^n) + O(\ell^4 q^2 / 2^{2n}) \\ &= O(q^2 / 2^n) + O(\ell^2 q / 2^n) + O(\ell^4 q^2 / 2^{2n}) \end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

This completes the proof.  $\square$

**Theorem 3.**  $\mathbf{Adv}_{EMAC}^{any}(q, \ell, \sigma) = O\left(\frac{2q^2}{2^n} + \frac{q\ell^2}{2^{2n}} + \frac{q^2\ell^4}{2^{2n}}\right)$ . So if  $\ell \leq \min\{q^{1/2}, 2^{n/4}\}$  then  $\mathbf{Adv}_{EMAC}^{any}(q, \ell, \sigma) = O\left(\frac{q^2}{2^n}\right)$ .

Note that our theorem gives tight bound for a better constraint than what we had before in [31]. The condition  $q > \ell^2$  can be dropped if we assume  $\ell \leq 2^{n/4-k}$  for some small  $k$  such that  $2^{-k}$  is negligible. More precisely, if  $\ell \leq 2^{n/4-k}$  then the PRF advantage of EMAC is about  $\frac{q^2}{2^n} + \frac{1}{2^k}$ .

*Remark 4.* A straightforward application of the proof technique used in case of EMAC to ECBC gives tight PRF bound for ECBC.

*Remark 5.* Note that FCBC can also be viewed as an instance of Wegman-Carter MACs. In case of FCBC one has to prove that the final internal input of CBC-MAC behaves as universal hash output. This can be argued as follows: An input collision occurs if and only if the corresponding outputs collide (due to the permutation nature of the internal function). The final output of CBC-MAC is universal, hence the final input of CBC-MAC is universal with identical collision probability bound. Hence FCBC is birthday bound secure PRF when  $\ell \leq 2^{n/4}$ . To the best of our knowledge this is the first demonstration of tight PRF bound for FCBC.

## 9 Conclusion and Future Work

In this paper we have revisited the PRF security analysis of CBC-MAC and EMAC. We made the revision as we have found one of the main claims in the original papers providing improved bounds is not correct. This claim, in fact, influences some of the other claims. More importantly, the tight bound claim of EMAC becomes invalid even after a simple fix of the claim. So we feel that revision is essential and this paper serves this. Fortunately we have recovered same bounds, at least in terms of the order, for both constructions. While revising we attain potentially better bound of  $O(\sigma q/2^n)$  for CBC-MAC. Moreover, we have found a better way to analyze EMAC which provides tight bound with a much relaxed constraint on message length  $\ell$ . Namely our constraint is  $\ell < 2^{n/4}$  whereas the original constraint was  $\ell < 2^{n/8}$ .

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