Game-Theoretic Security for Two-Party Protocols

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Abstract

Asharov, Canetti, and Hazay (Eurocrypt 2011) studied how game-theoretic concepts can be used to capture the cryptographic properties of correctness, privacy, and fairness in two-party protocols for fail-stop adversaries. In this work, we further study the characterization of the cryptographic properties of specific two-party protocols, oblivious transfer (OT) and commitment, in terms of game theory. Specifically, for each protocol, OT and commitment, we define a two-party game between rational sender and receiver together with their utility functions. Then, we prove that a given protocol satisfies cryptographic properties if and only if the strategy of following the protocol is in a Nash equilibrium. Compared to the previous work of Asharov et al., our characterization has several advantages: The game is played by multiple rational parties; All the cryptographic properties of OT/commitment are characterized by a single game; Security for malicious adversaries is considered; Utility functions are specified in general forms based on the preferences of the parties; A solution concept employed is a plain Nash equilibrium.

Based on the above equivalence between game-theoretic and cryptographic security, we introduce a new game-theoretic security by considering several unsatisfactory points in the utility functions of the game-theoretic framework. Then, we show that it is equivalent to the cryptographic security against risk-averse adversaries, who behave maliciously, but does not act in a way that can cause the other party’s successful attacks. Our results indicate that the security against risk-averse adversaries may be more natural from the perspective of game theory.

Keywords: Cryptography; Game theory; Two-party protocol; Oblivious transfer; Commitment; Nash equilibrium.

1 Introduction

In cryptography, two-party protocols are designed for two parties to compute some function while concealing the input from each other. To guarantee the secrecy of the inputs, we consider the case where one of the parties is an adversary who is interested in attacking the other, e.g., digging out the other’s secret. In general, the adversary acts only for attacking the other, and does not care about protecting his own secret. Also, cryptography only considers the situations where at least one party is honest, i.e., always follows the protocol description.

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Game theory mathematically analyzes decision making of multiple parties. In particular, non-cooperative game theory deals with the situations where the parties act independently. The parties are said to be rational, and they only care about their own preferences to achieve their best satisfactions. If a party has two or more preferences, he considers the trade-offs among them and aims to obtain the most reasonable result.

As described, both non-cooperative game theory and cryptography study the situations where parties act. However, they capture such situations from different perspectives. By assessing the situations realistically, even adversaries may be reluctant to reveal their secrets. Also, if a party is sure that there is no danger, he may deviate from the protocol description to obtain more information than following it. That is, all parties may not be completely honest. In a game-theoretic framework, it seems to be possible to characterize two-party protocols in such a realistic perspective.

There is a line of work using game-theoretic concepts to study cryptographic protocols. For a survey on the joint work of cryptography and game theory, we refer to [26, 10]. Halpern and Teague [23] introduced such approach of study on secret sharing. They study it in the presence of rational parties, seeking for secure protocols in a game-theoretic framework. Their work has been followed in many subsequent works, and the field is called rational secret sharing [1, 30, 15, 28, 29, 33, 11, 5, 27]. Besides secret sharing, there are several studies using game-theoretic frameworks for cryptographic protocols, e.g., two-party computation [4, 18], leader election [16, 2], Byzantine agreement [19], public-key encryption [35], delegation of computation [6, 20, 7, 21, 25], and protocol design [12, 13].

Asharov, Canetti, and Hazay [4] studied how game-theoretic concepts can be used to capture the three requirements of the two-party protocols in cryptography, correctness, privacy, and fairness. They characterize these requirements individually by using a game-theoretic concept, a computational Nash equilibrium. They focus on two-party protocols in the fail-stop model, in which adversaries are allowed to choose whether to abort or continue at each round, but cannot conduct other actions such as sending illegal messages. Using game-theoretic concepts, they characterize the requirements of two-party protocols in the following way: A protocol satisfies a “certain” requirement if and only if the strategy of honestly following the description of the protocol is in a computational Nash equilibrium in a “certain” game defined with “certain” utility functions. For privacy and correctness, they showed the equivalence between the corresponding cryptographic and the game-theoretic definitions. For fairness, they showed that their game-theoretic definition is strictly weaker than existing cryptographic ones, and proposed a new cryptographic definition that is equivalent to the game-theoretic one. Groce and Katz [18] continued their consideration on fairness, and showed a way to circumvent impossibility results in the study of [4].

1.1 This Work

Based on the work of Asharov et al. [4], we further explore how the cryptographic requirements can be captured in a game-theoretic framework. In particular, our target protocols are oblivious transfer (OT) and commitment.

Oblivious transfer. OT is a two-party protocol run between the sender and the receiver. The sender has two secrets $x_0$ and $x_1$, and the receiver has a choice bit $c \in \{0, 1\}$. After running the protocol, the receiver obtains $x_c$, while the sender obtains nothing. We restrict our attention to two-message OT in which the receiver sends the first message to the sender, and the sender replies with the second message to the receiver who then learns the secret $x_c$. There are constructions of two-message OT based on various computational assumptions [32, 3, 22, 24].
We usually consider three requirements in OT, the sender’s privacy, the receiver’s privacy, and correctness. By the sender’s (resp. receiver’s) privacy, it is guaranteed that the receiver (resp. sender) cannot learn anything about $x_1$ (resp. $c$). Correctness guarantees that when two parties honestly follow the protocol description, the receiver learns the secret $x_c$. Note that, in the indistinguishability-based security definitions, the three requirements are defined separately. Thus, for example, we usually do not consider an adversary who tries to break the other party’s privacy and protect its own privacy simultaneously. It is known that the indistinguishability-based security is weaker than the simulation-based security. See [22, Section 3] for the detailed discussion.

Commitment. Commitment is also a two-party protocol run between the sender and the receiver. The protocol consists of two phases. In the first phase, called the commit phase, the sender who has a string $x \in \{0, 1\}^t$ interacts with the receiver. After that, the receiver obtains a commitment string $c$, and the sender obtains a decommitment string $d$. In the latter phase, called the open phase, the sender persuades the receiver that the committed string is $x$ through an interaction by using $d$. Finally, the receiver claims whether she accepts that $x$ is the committed string.

We usually consider three requirements in commitment, hiding, binding, and correctness. Hiding is the property that the receiver cannot learn anything about the committed string $x$ before starting the open phase. Binding is that the sender cannot generate two decommitment strings to open the commitment to two distinct strings $x$ and $x'$. Correctness guarantees that when two parties honestly follow the protocol description, the receiver learns the string that was committed by the sender in the commit phase. As in the case of OT, in cryptography, each of the three properties is defined individually. Thus, we usually do not consider a party who tries to break hiding and protect binding simultaneously.

Game-theoretic characterizations. In this work, for each cryptographic primitive, we define a game together with the utility functions of the sender and the receiver. Then, we show that, given a protocol for OT/commitment, the strategy of honestly following the protocol is in a Nash equilibrium in this game if and only if the protocol satisfies all the cryptographic properties of OT/commitment in the malicious model. In other words, we present a novel way to capture the standard cryptographic security in terms of game theory.

In our framework, first, we define the experiment for a protocol between the sender and the receiver, in which the strategies of the sender, say $S$, and the receiver, say $R$, are specified. The experiment outputs several values as an outcome. Next, the utility functions $(U_S, U_R)$ of the sender and the receiver are defined as functions of $S$ and $R$. It is specified such that $U_S(S, R) > U_S(S', R)$ if and only if some expected values depending on the outcome of the experiment satisfy some condition by comparing the two experiments played with $(S, R)$ and $(S', R)$. We say the pair of strategies, or protocol, $(S, R)$ is game-theoretically secure if $(S, R)$ is in a Nash equilibrium under the utility functions $(U_S, U_R)$.

Our characterization of OT and commitment has the following advantages compared to the work of [4]

- The game defined in our work is played between two rational parties, while every game defined in [4] is played by a single rational party. For example, the game for the privacy of party 1 in [4] is essentially played between a rational party and an honest party. Since game-theoretic concepts are of significant meaning in the presence of multiple rational parties, it is preferable to characterize a single game that is essentially played between two rational parties.

- We put multiple preferences of the parties into a single game, while each of them is characterized by different games in [4]. This means that rational parties pay attention to the trade-offs among the preferences in the game, while such trade-offs are not considered in the standard cryptographic
security. Although we show the equivalence of the game-theoretic characterization of the protocols to the existing cryptographic security (therefore we call the characterization “game-theoretic security”), the strength of the game-theoretic security can be altered by considering different utility functions and solution concepts.

Indeed, our game-theoretic characterization reveals the difference between the parties’ preferences for correctness in OT and commitment. For OT, the cryptographic security is equivalent to the game-theoretic one as long as at least one of the parties has a preference for correctness. In contrast, for commitment, the game-theoretic security becomes weaker if the sender has a preference for correctness. The equivalence holds when only the receiver has a preference for correctness.

- We can capture the setting of malicious adversaries, who can take any action in the protocol. The malicious model is stronger and more realistic than the fail-stop model that is studied in [4], where adversaries choose to “continue” or “stop” in each round.

- Utility functions are specified in general forms based on the preferences of the parties. In [4], utility functions are defined such that they take some fixed values, say 0 and 1, depending on the outcomes of the game. We only consider the increase and decrease based on whether the preferences are satisfied or not. Thus, fixed-valued utility functions can be seen as a special case of our utility functions.

- We can capture the cryptographic requirements by plain Nash equilibrium, not computational Nash equilibrium. This can be done by reforming the way of perceiving the preferences. First, we define the preferences of the parties not over the outcome of a single execution, but over the algorithms used by the parties. This way of defining preferences seems natural since protocols are usually designed for the repeated use, and thus the users are not just interested in a good outcome of a single game but prefer to use a good algorithm (protocol) for multiple games. Second, we exclude from strategies sub-algorithms such as a distinguisher for guessing the secret. For example, a utility function of a party is defined such that the party prefers strategy A to B if there exists a distinguisher that predicts a challenge bit better when using A. Thereby, we can define strategies of the parties in a simplified form. As a result, we can characterize the cryptographic properties by plain Nash equilibrium.

As described above, our characterization clarifies the difference between OT and commitment regarding the parties’ preferences for correctness. The difference is not obvious from the cryptographic security definitions. Thus, the game-theoretic characterization can be used to clarify the functionalities of protocols that have several cryptographic requirements which are defined individually.

New game-theoretic security. Based on the game-theoretic characterizations of the cryptographic security against malicious adversaries, we introduce a new game-theoretic security. We observe that the game-theoretic security which is equivalent to the security against malicious adversaries has unsatisfactory points in its utility functions. The first point is that when a party, say the sender, tries to achieve a higher utility by employing some strategy, the utility functions require that some condition holds if the receiver employs some strategy. However, it seems to be difficult for the sender to control the receiver’s strategy. The second point is that the definition does not specify some part of parties’ strategies. It would be better if it indicates the “default” strategies the parties should follow.

On the basis of the above observation, we modify the utility functions so that the above unsatisfactory points can be circumvented. A new game-theoretic security is simply defined by changing the utility functions. Interestingly, the new game-theoretic security has a natural cryptographic meaning. We show that
Table 1: Summary of the characterizations of [4] and this work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Asharov et al. [4]</th>
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<td>Fairness</td>
<td>Receiver's privacy</td>
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<td># of rational parties in one game</td>
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<td>Solution concept</td>
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it is equivalent to the cryptographic security against risk-averse adversaries. Intuitively, risk-averse parties behave maliciously, but does not act in a way such that their own security can be compromised. Thus, the security against risk-averse adversaries is weaker than that in the malicious model, but stronger than the semi-honest model. Furthermore, we show that it is possible to adopt the sender’s preference for correctness in commitment in the new game-theoretic security. This study indicates that the security against risk-averse adversaries may be more natural in the game-theoretic sense.

We summarize the results of [4] and this work in Table 1.

1.2 Organization

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review some concepts and definitions including two-party protocols, oblivious transfer, commitment, and game theory in Section 2. In Sections 3 and 4, we propose game-theoretic characterizations of oblivious transfer and commitment, respectively. We conclude the paper in Section 5.

2 Preliminaries

In this section, we provide some basic notions and notations.

A function $\mu : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}$ is said to be negligible if for any polynomial $p(\cdot)$, $\mu(n) < 1/|p(n)|$ for every sufficiently large $n$. We describe a negligible function as $\text{negl}(\cdot)$. Throughout the paper, we denote by $n$ the security parameter, and all the parties are assumed to run in time polynomial in $n$. Formally, it is assumed that each party receives $1^n$ as a part of input. We omit it if it is obvious from the context. For a set $X$, we denote by $x \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} X$ the process of choosing an element $x \in X$ uniformly at random. The empty string is denoted by $\varepsilon$.

A two-party protocol consists of interactive algorithms of the parties. Let us consider the case where two parties interacts using algorithms $A_1$ and $A_2$ on private inputs $x_1$ and $x_2$, respectively. In the interaction between $A_1$ and $A_2$, the view to the $i$-th ($i \in \{1, 2\}$) party is denoted by $\text{view}_{A_i(x_i)}(A_{3-i}(x_{3-i}))$, which is equal
to \((x_i, r_i, m^i_1, m^i_2, \cdots)\), where \(r_i\) is the internal randomness of \(A_i\), \(m^i_j\) is the \(j\)-th message sent from \(A_{3-i}\) to \(A_i\). The output of the algorithm \(A_i\) after the interaction is denoted by \(\text{out}_{A_i(x_i)}(A_{3-i}(x_{3-i}))\).

For two functions \(a, b : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}\), we write \(a \preceq b\) if \(a(n) \leq b(n) + \negl(n)\) for every sufficiently large \(n\), and \(a \prec b\) if there is a polynomial \(p(\cdot)\) such that \(a(n) \leq b(n) - 1 / p(n)\) infinitely often. Also, we write \(a \approx b\) if \(a \preceq b\) and \(a \succeq b\). Note that these notations (\(\prec, \preceq, \approx\)) are used for functions of the security parameter \(n\).

### 2.1 Cryptographic Notions

We define oblivious transfer and commitment, together with their cryptographic security notions according to [14, 9, 24].

In this work, we consider two-message oblivious transfer, where both the sender and the receiver send their own message only once.

**Definition 1** (Two-message oblivious transfer). A two-message oblivious transfer protocol \(\text{OT}\) is a pair of two probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms, denoted by \(\text{OT} = (S, R)\). First, \(R\) runs on input \(b \in \{0, 1\}\), and outputs a message \(m_b\) and a state \(s\). Second, \(S\) runs on input \((x_0, x_1)\) and \(m_R\), and outputs a message \(m_S\). Finally, \(R\) runs on input \(m_S\) and \(s\), and outputs a string \(y\).

By considering two-message oblivious transfer, we can define the indistinguishability-based security [24, Section 2.6]

**Definition 2** (Security against malicious adversaries for oblivious transfer). Let \(\text{OT} = (S, R)\) be a two-message oblivious transfer protocol. We say \(\text{OT}\) is cryptographically secure against malicious adversaries if it satisfies the following three properties:

- **Receiver’s privacy**: For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms \(S^*\) and \(D_S\), inputs \(x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^*\) with \(|x_0| = |x_1|\), and auxiliary input \(z \in \{0, 1\}^*\), it holds that

\[
\Pr[D_S(\text{view}_{S^*}(x_0, x_1, z)(R(0))) = 1] \approx \Pr[D_S(\text{view}_{S^*}(x_0, x_1, z)(R(1))) = 1].
\]

- **Sender’s privacy**: For any deterministic polynomial-time algorithm \(R^*\), probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \(D_R\), inputs \(x_0, x_1, x \in \{0, 1\}^*\) with \(|x_0| = |x_1| = |x|\), \(c \in \{0, 1\}\), and auxiliary input \(z \in \{0, 1\}^*\), there exists a function choice \(c^* : \{0, 1\}^* \to \{0, 1\}\) such that

\[
\Pr[D_R(\text{view}_{R^*}(c, z))(S(X^0), X^0, X^1) = 1] \approx \Pr[D_R(\text{view}_{R^*}(c, z))(S(X^1), X^0, X^1) = 1],
\]

where \(c^* = \text{choice}(R^*, c, z)\), \(X^0 = (x_0, x_1)\), and \(X^1 = (x_0, x)\) if \(c^* = 0\), \(X^1 = (x, x_1)\) otherwise.

- **Correctness**: For any strings \(x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^*\) with \(|x_0| = |x_1|\), and \(c \in \{0, 1\}\), it holds that

\[
\Pr[\text{out}_{R^*}(c)(S(x_0, x_1)) = x_c] \geq 1.
\]

The function choice in the sender’s privacy determines which index the receiver’s algorithm \(R^*\) chooses. Since we restrict \(R^*\) to be deterministic, it is possible to determine the index that \(R^*\) chooses on input \((c, z)\). Note that the security against malicious receiver is not weakened by this restriction. Since \(R^*\) receives an auxiliary input \(z\), \(R^*\) can use the “best” random coins as \(z\).

**Definition 3** (Commitment). A commitment protocol \(\text{Com}\) is a tuple of four probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms, denoted by \(\text{Com} = ((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))\). The protocol consists of two phases:
• **The commit phase** is an interaction between \( S_C \) and \( R_C \), where \( S_C \) receives \( x \in \{0,1\}^l \) as an input. The output of the commit phase consists of the commitment string \( c \) and a private output \( d \) for the sender, called the decommitment string. Without loss of generality, we can consider \( c \) to be the transcript of the interaction between \( S_C(x) \) and \( R_C \), and \( d \) the view of \( S_C \), including the private random coins of \( S_C \).

• **The open phase** is an interaction between \( S_O \) and \( R_O \), where \( S_O \) and \( R_O \) receive, as inputs, \( (x,d) \) and \( c \), respectively. We assume that the first message of \( S_O \) explicitly contains \( x \), which indicates that the sender is to persuade the receiver that the committed string is \( x \). After the interaction, \( R_O \) outputs 1 if the receiver accepts, and 0 otherwise.

**Definition 4** (Security against malicious adversaries for commitment). Let \( \text{Com} = ((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O)) \) be a commitment protocol. We say \( \text{Com} \) is cryptographically secure if it satisfies the following three properties:

- **Hiding**:
  For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms \( R_C^* \) and \( D \), inputs \( x_0, x_1 \in \{0,1\}^l \), and auxiliary input \( z \in \{0,1\}^* \), it holds that
  \[
  \Pr[D(\text{view}_C^{(z)}(S_C(x_0)), x_0, x_1) = 1] \approx \Pr[D(\text{view}_C^{(z)}(S_C(x_1)), x_0, x_1) = 1].
  \]

- **Binding**:
  For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms \( S_C^*, S_O^* \), and \( F \), input \( x \in \{0,1\}^l \), and auxiliary input \( z \in \{0,1\}^* \), it holds that
  \[
  \Pr[\text{out}_{R_O(c)}(S_O^*(x,d,z)) = \text{out}_{R_O(c)}(S_O^*(x',d',z)) = 1] \leq 0,
  \]
  where \( c \) and \( d \) are the commitment and decommitment strings generated by the interaction between \( S_C(x,z) \) and \( R_C \); \( (x',d') \) is the output of \( F(\text{view}_C^{(z)}(R_C)) \), where \( x' \in \{0,1\}^l \setminus \{x\} \).

- **Correctness**:
  For any \( x \in \{0,1\}^l \), it holds that
  \[
  \Pr[\text{out}_{R_O(c)}(S_O(x,d)) = 1] \geq 1,
  \]
  where \( c \) and \( d \) are the commitment and decommitment strings generated by the interaction between \( S_C(x) \) and \( R_C \).

### 2.2 Game-Theoretic Notions

A strategic-form game consists of three elements: a set of parties, a set of possible strategies for the parties, and utility functions. We define a two-party game as \( \Gamma = (N, (A_S, A_R), (U_S, U_R)) \), where \( N = \{S,R\} \) is the set of parties, \( A_i \) is a set of strategies for party \( i \in N \), and \( U_i \) is the utility function for party \( i \in N \). The utility function \( U_i \) maps a pair of strategies \( (\sigma_S, \sigma_R) \in A_S \times A_R \) to a real number which represents preferences of party \( i \) when the game is played with the pair \( (\sigma_S, \sigma_R) \).

Solution concepts characterize which tuples of strategies are likely to be chosen by the parties. While there are many solution concepts introduced in the field of game theory, we employ Nash equilibrium, which is the most commonly used one. When all parties choose a strategy in a Nash equilibrium, no party gains his utility by changing his strategy unilaterally. Namely, if parties are assumed to choose a Nash equilibrium strategy, no party has any incentive to change his strategy.

**Definition 5** (Nash equilibrium). Let \( \Gamma = (N, (A_S, A_R), (U_S, U_R)) \) be a two-party game. A tuple of their strategies \( (\sigma_S, \sigma_R) \) is in a Nash equilibrium in the game \( \Gamma \) if for every strategies \( \sigma_S' \in A_S \) and \( \sigma_R' \in A_R \), it holds that
\[
U_S(\sigma_S', \sigma_R) \leq U_S(\sigma_S, \sigma_R), \text{ and } U_R(\sigma_S, \sigma_R') \leq U_R(\sigma_S, \sigma_R).
\]
3 Game-Theoretic Security for Oblivious Transfer

In this section, we characterize the security of two-message oblivious transfer in terms of game theory. First, we define a game-theoretic security, and show its equivalence to the cryptographic security against malicious adversaries. After that, based on the game-theoretic security, we introduce a new game-theoretic security, and show that it is equivalent to the cryptographic security against risk-averse adversaries.

3.1 Definition

First, we define an experiment for the execution of an oblivious transfer protocol. By specifying natural preferences of the parties, we define a game-theoretic security for oblivious transfer. A Nash equilibrium is used as a solution concept in the security definition.

**Experiment.** For a two-message oblivious transfer protocol, we define an experiment between a sender and a receiver. The sender has two polynomial-time algorithms \((S,D_S)\) as a strategy, and the receiver also has two polynomial-time algorithms \((R,D_R)\).

In the experiment, first, bits \(b\) and \(c\) are chosen uniformly at random. Then, the sender and the receiver execute the protocol using \(S\) and \(R\). The receiver, on input \(c\), generates the first message \(m_0\) by using \(R\). After that, the sender, on input a pair \((x_0,x_1)\) and \(m_0\), generates the second message \(m_1\) by using \(S\). We assume that the receiver wants to obtain \(x_c\), that is indicated by the choice bit. The actual input to the sender is set to be \(X_b\), where \(X_0 = (x_0,x_1)\), and \(X_1 = (x_0,x)\) if \(c = 0\), and \(X_1 = (x,x_1)\) otherwise. After the execution, the sender tries to predict \(c\) by using \(D_S\), and the receiver tries to predict \(b\) by using \(D_R\). More specifically, \(D_S\) tries to guess whether the receiver’s choice \(c\) is 0 or 1, and \(D_R\) does whether the other input of the sender (namely, one not chosen by the receiver) is \(x\) or \(x_{1-c}\). We note that the receiver will obtain \(x_c\) regardless of whether the input to the sender is \(X_0\) or \(X_1\).

We define the experiment formally. (See also Figure 1.)

**Definition 6** (Experiment for oblivious transfer). Let \(S, R, D_S, D_R\) be algorithms, \([0,1]^n = (x_0,x_1) = |x|, and b,c \in \{0,1\}\). For a function \(\text{choice} : \{0,1\} \rightarrow \{0,1\}\), we define \(X_0 = (x_0,x_1)\), and \(X_1 = (x_0,x)\) if \(\text{choice}(R,c,z_R) = 0\), and \(X_1 = (x,x_1)\) otherwise. The experiment \(\text{Exp}^{\text{OT}}((S,D_S),(R,D_R),c,x_0,x_1,x,z_S,z_R)\) runs as follows:

1. Set \(\text{guess}_S = \text{guess}_R = \text{suc} = \text{abort} = 0\), choose \(b,c \in \{0,1\}\) uniformly at random, and let \(c^* = \text{choice}(R,c,z_R)\).
2. Execute the oblivious transfer protocol \((S,R)\) on input pair \(((X^b,z_S),(c,z_R))\). Set \(\text{abort} = 1\) if some party aborts the protocol.
3. Run \(D_S(\text{view}_S(X^b,z_S)(R(c,z_R)))\) and \(D_R(\text{view}_R(R,c,z_R)(S(X^b,z_S)),X^0,X^1)\), and obtain \(c'\) and \(b'\) as output, respectively.
4. Set \(\text{guess}_S = 1\) if \(c^* = c'\), and \(\text{guess}_R = 1\) if \(b = b'\). Set \(\text{suc} = 1\) if either \(\text{out}_R(R,c,z_R)(S(X^b,z_S)) = x_{c^*}\) or \(\text{abort} = 1\).

The tuple \((\text{guess}_S,\text{guess}_R,\text{suc})\) is the outcome of the experiment. In the experiment, aborting the protocol means that the party sends a special symbol \(\perp\) to the other party.
Utility function. We assume that each party has multiple goals. The sender has the following three preferences.

- He prefers to know which of the secrets the receiver chooses to obtain.
- He does not prefer the receiver to learn both of his secrets.
- He prefers the receiver to obtain the secret that she chooses unless the protocol was aborted.

The receiver has the following preferences.

- She does not prefer the sender to know which of the secrets she chooses to obtain.
- She prefers to learn both of the sender’s secrets.
- She prefers to obtain the secret that she chooses unless the protocol was aborted.

We formalize these preferences as utility functions. Note that we do not define utility functions as functions over the outcomes of the experiment; rather, our utility functions are defined over the “average” outcomes of the experiment. This way of defining utility function is more natural, since parties in protocols choose their best strategy based on the average performance of the strategy, not on a single outcome of the strategy.

**Definition 7** (Utility function for oblivious transfer). Let \((S, R)\) be a two-message oblivious transfer protocol, and \(S'\) and \(R'\) algorithms.

The utility function \(U_{S}^{OT}\) for the sender is a function such that \(U_{S}^{OT}(S', R) > U_{S}^{OT}(S, R)\) if there exist probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms \(D_{S}\) and \(D_{R}\), and \(x_{0}, x_{1}, x, z_{S} \in \{0, 1\}^{*}\) with \(|x_{0}| = |x_{1}| = |x|\), that satisfy at least one of the following three conditions:

(S1) \[|\Pr[\text{guess}]=1]-\frac{1}{2}| > |\Pr[\text{guess}']=1]-\frac{1}{2}|, \quad |\Pr[\text{guess}]=1]-\frac{1}{2}| \geq |\Pr[\text{guess}]=1]-\frac{1}{2}|, \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[\text{suc}]=1 \geq \Pr[\text{suc}]=1].\]
and the party would prefer \( Pr \) could successfully guess some value. However, all the values to be guessed are chosen uniformly at random, \( \text{guess} \) This is because we assume that each party evaluates his own strategies as their average performance. After a \( \text{choice} \)

\[(\text{Definition 8}) \text{ (Game-theoretic non-adaptive security for oblivious transfer)} \]

where \( \text{guess}, \text{guess}_R, \text{succ} \) and \( \text{guess}', \text{guess}_R', \text{succ}' \) are the random variables representing the outcomes of \( \text{Exp}^{\text{OT}}((S, D_S), (R, D_R), \text{choice}_0, x_0, x_1, x, \epsilon, \epsilon) \) and \( \text{Exp}^{\text{OT}}((S', D'_S), (R, D_R), \text{choice}_0, x_0, x_1, x, z_5, \epsilon) \), respectively, where \( \text{choice}_0 \) is a function that, on input \((R, c), \text{outputs} c \).

Similarly, the utility function \( U_R^{\text{OT}} \) for the receiver is a function such that \( U_R^{\text{OT}}(S, R') > U_R^{\text{OT}}(S, R) \) if there exist probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms \( D_S \) and \( D_R, x_0, x_1, x, z_5 \in \{0, 1\}^* \) with \( |x_0| = |x_1| = |x| \), and a function \( \text{choice} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \) that satisfy at least one of the following three conditions:

\[(\text{R1}) \mid \text{Pr}[\text{guess}' = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \mid < \mid \text{Pr}[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \mid, \quad \text{Pr}[\text{guess}_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \mid \geq \mid \text{Pr}[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \mid, \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Pr}[\text{succ} = 1] \geq \text{Pr}[\text{succ}' = 1]; \]

\[(\text{R2}) \mid \text{Pr}[\text{guess}' = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \mid \geq \mid \text{Pr}[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \mid, \quad \text{Pr}[\text{guess}_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \mid < \mid \text{Pr}[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \mid, \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Pr}[\text{succ} = 1] \geq \text{Pr}[\text{succ}' = 1]; \]

\[(\text{R3}) \mid \text{Pr}[\text{guess}' = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \mid \geq \mid \text{Pr}[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \mid, \quad \text{Pr}[\text{guess}_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \mid < \mid \text{Pr}[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \mid, \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Pr}[\text{succ} = 1] \geq \text{Pr}[\text{succ}' = 1], \]

where \( \text{guess}, \text{guess}_R, \text{succ} \) and \( \text{guess}', \text{guess}_R', \text{succ}' \) are the random variables representing the outcomes of \( \text{Exp}^{\text{OT}}((S, D_S), (R, D_R), \text{choice}_0, x_0, x_1, x, \epsilon, \epsilon) \) and \( \text{Exp}^{\text{OT}}((S, D_S), (R', D'_R), \text{choice}, x_0, x_1, x, \epsilon, z_5) \), respectively.

Note that we evaluate the success of the guess with \( \mid \text{Pr}[\text{guess} = 1] - 1/2 \mid \) rather than \( \text{Pr}[\text{guess} = 1] \). This is because we assume that each party evaluates his own strategies as their average performance. After a single execution of the experiment, a party may prefer guess to be 0 since guess = 1 implies the other party could successfully guess some value. However, all the values to be guessed are chosen uniformly at random, the party would prefer \( \text{Pr}[\text{guess} = 1] \) to be close to 1/2. Therefore, we use the gap between \( \text{Pr}[\text{guess} = 1] \) and 1/2 as representing the success of the guess.

The following pair of functions \((u_S^{\text{OT}}, u_R^{\text{OT}})\) is an example of the utility functions satisfying Definition 7:

- \( u_S^{\text{OT}}(S, R) = \alpha_S \mid \text{Pr}[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \mid - \beta_S \mid \text{Pr}[\text{guess}_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \mid + \gamma_S \text{Pr}[\text{succ} = 1]; \)
- \( u_R^{\text{OT}}(S, R) = -\alpha_R \mid \text{Pr}[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \mid + \beta_R \mid \text{Pr}[\text{guess}_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \mid + \gamma_R \text{Pr}[\text{succ} = 1], \)

where \( \text{guess}, \text{guess}_R, \text{succ} \) are the random variables representing the outcome of the experiment, and \( \alpha_S, \beta_S, \gamma_S, \alpha_R, \beta_R, \gamma_R \) are positive constants.

**Game-theoretic security.** For a two-message oblivious transfer protocol \( \text{OT} \), consider the two-party game \( \Gamma^{\text{OT}} = ((S, R), (A_S, A_R), (u_S^{\text{OT}}, u_R^{\text{OT}})) \) where experiment \( \text{Exp}^{\text{OT}} \) in Definition 6 is employed, \( A_S \) is composed of all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms, \( A_R \) is composed of all deterministic polynomial-time algorithms, and \( u_S^{\text{OT}} \) and \( u_R^{\text{OT}} \) are the utility functions defined in Definition 7.

We define a game-theoretic security that is equivalent to the cryptographic one.

**Definition 8** (Game-theoretic non-adaptive security for oblivious transfer). A two-message oblivious transfer protocol \((S, R)\) is said to be game-theoretically secure against non-adaptively chosen strategies if \((S, R)\) is in a Nash equilibrium in the game \( \Gamma^{\text{OT}} \).
We refer to the above security as non-adaptive security by contrasting it with adaptive security defined in Section 3.3. Intuitively, the reason is that, in the utility function of Definition 7, strategies \( S', D_S, \) and \( D_R \) are specified at the same time when the sender tries to achieve the relation \( U^{\text{OT}}_S(S', R) > U^{\text{OT}}_S(S, R) \).

### 3.2 Equivalence to the Cryptographic Security against Malicious Adversaries

We show that, for oblivious transfer protocols, the cryptographic security (Definition 2) and the game-theoretic security (Definition 8) are equivalent.

**Theorem 1.** A two-message oblivious transfer protocol \( \text{OT} \) is cryptographically secure against malicious adversaries if and only if \( \text{OT} \) is game-theoretically secure against non-adaptively chosen strategies.

First, we prove that the cryptographic security implies the game-theoretic one.

**Lemma 1.** If \( \text{OT} \) is cryptographically secure against malicious adversaries, then \( \text{OT} \) is game-theoretically secure against non-adaptively chosen strategies.

**Proof.** Assume that \( \text{OT} = (S, R) \) is not game-theoretically secure. Namely, \( (S, R) \) is not in a Nash equilibrium in the game \( \Gamma^{\text{OT}} \). Then, there are two cases: (1) \( U^{\text{OT}}_S(S', R) > U^{\text{OT}}_S(S, R) \) for some \( S' \in \mathcal{A}_S \); and (2) \( U^{\text{OT}}_R(S, R') > U^{\text{OT}}_R(S, R) \) for some \( R' \in \mathcal{A}_R \).

In case (1), it follows from the definition of \( U^{\text{OT}}_S \) that there exist \( S', D_S, D_R, x_0, x_1, z_S \) that satisfies either (S1), (S2), or (S3). Condition (S1) implies that, by using \( (S', D_S) \) as a strategy, the sender can predict the choice bit \( c \) with probability greater than 1/2. More specifically, \( \Pr[D_S(\text{view}_{S'(X^c, z_S)}(R(c))) = c] > 1/2 \). This means that \( \text{OT} \) does not satisfy the receiver’s privacy. Condition (S2) means that \( \Pr[\text{guess}_S = 1] - 1/2 \geq 0 \) when both parties follow the protocol. Namely, \( \Pr[D_R(\text{view}_R(S(X^b), X^0, X^1)) = b] - 1/2 \geq 0 \), which implies that \( R \) breaks the sender’s privacy. It follows from condition (S3) that \( \Pr[\text{out}_{R(c)}(S(x_0, x'_1)) = x_c] < 1 \) for some \( x_0', x'_1 \). This implies that \( \text{OT} \) does not satisfy correctness.

Next, let assume that (2) holds. Then, by the definition of \( U^{\text{OT}}_R \), either (R1), (R2), or (R3) holds. Condition (R1) means that \( \Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] - 1/2 \geq 0 \) when both parties follow the protocol. More precisely, \( \Pr[D_S(\text{view}_{S(X^b)}(R(c))) = c] > 0 \), which implies that the sender can break the receiver’s privacy. It follows from condition (R2) that \( \Pr[\text{guess}'_R = 1] - 1/2 \geq 0 \), which implies that \( \Pr[D_R(\text{view}'_{R(c)}(S(X^b), X^0, X^1)) = b] > 0 \). Thus, \( R' \) breaks the sender’s privacy. Condition (R3) implies that \( \Pr[\text{out}_{R(c)}(S(x_0', x'_1)) = x'_c] < 1 \) for some \( x_0', x'_1 \). Hence, \( \text{OT} \) does not satisfy correctness.

Thus, the statement follows.

Next, we show that the game-theoretic security implies the cryptographic one. Suppose that a protocol is not cryptographically secure. Then, it does not satisfy at least one of the cryptographic requirements. If only one of the properties is broken, it is not difficult to show that the protocol does not satisfy the game-theoretic security. However, when a protocol does not satisfy more than one properties in cryptographic security, a deeper consideration is needed. This is because, multiple requirements may cancel out the gain of utility, and there are possibilities that neither party gain by changing their strategies. We show that there is no such possibility in our game-theoretic security.

**Lemma 2.** If \( \text{OT} \) is game-theoretically secure against non-adaptively chosen strategies, then \( \text{OT} \) is cryptographically secure against malicious adversaries.

**Proof.** Suppose that \( \text{OT} = (S, R) \) is not cryptographically secure against malicious adversaries. Let consider the following five cases.
(1) OT does not satisfy correctness.

(2) OT satisfies correctness, but does not satisfy the receiver’s privacy when the sender follows S.

(3) OT satisfies correctness and the receiver’s privacy when the sender follows S, but does not satisfy the receiver’s privacy when the sender follows strategy $S' \neq S$.

(4) OT satisfies correctness, the receiver’s privacy, but does not satisfy the sender’s privacy when the receiver follows R and employs $\text{choice}_0$ as the choice function.

(5) OT satisfies correctness, the receiver’s privacy, and the sender’s privacy when the receiver follows R, but does not satisfy the sender’s privacy when the receiver follows strategy $R' \neq R$.

For each case, we show that OT is not game-theoretically secure against non-adaptively chosen strategies, namely, $(S,R)$ is not in a Nash equilibrium.

In case (1), there exist $x_0, x_1 \in \{0,1\}^*$ with $|x_0| = |x_1|$ and $c \in \{0,1\}$ such that

$$\Pr[\text{out}_{\text{R}(c)}(S(x_0,x_1)) = x_j] < 1.$$ 

Let $D^{\text{rand}}$ be an algorithm that outputs a uniformly-random bit, and $S^{\text{abort}}$ an algorithm that sends an abort message after getting a message from the receiver. Let consider the outcomes $(\text{guess}_S, \text{guess}_R, \text{suc})$ and $(\text{guess}'_S, \text{guess}'_R, \text{suc}')$ of the experiments $\text{Exp}^{\text{OT}}((S,D^{\text{rand}}), (R,D^{\text{rand}}), \text{choice}_0, x_0, x_1, x, \epsilon, \epsilon)$ and $\text{Exp}^{\text{OT}}((S^{\text{abort}}, D^{\text{rand}}), (R,D^{\text{rand}}), \text{choice}_0, x_0, x_1, x, \epsilon, \epsilon)$, respectively, where $x = 0^{|x_0|}$. Then, we have that

- $|\Pr[\text{guess}'_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = |\Pr[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = 0,$
- $|\Pr[\text{guess}'_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = |\Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = 0,$
- $\Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] = 1 > \Pr[\text{suc} = 1].$

By condition $(S3)$ of $U_S^{\text{OT}}$, it holds that $U_S^{\text{OT}}((S^{\text{abort}}, D^{\text{rand}}), (R,D^{\text{rand}})) > U_S^{\text{OT}}((S,D^{\text{rand}}), (R,D^{\text{rand}}))$, which implies that $(S,R)$ is not in a Nash equilibrium.\footnote{We can also show that $(S,R)$ is not in a Nash equilibrium based on condition $(R3)$ of $U_R^{\text{OT}}$ by using almost the same argument as above.}

Case (2) implies that there exist a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $D_S$, and $x_0, x_1 \in \{0,1\}^*$ with $|x_0| = |x_1|$ such that

$$\Pr[D_S(\text{view}_{S(x_0,x_1)}(R(c))) = c] > \frac{1}{2},$$

where $c \in \{0,1\}$ is chosen uniformly at random. Let $R^{\text{abort}}$ be an algorithm that sends an abort message before sending the first message. Let consider the outcomes $(\text{guess}_S, \text{guess}_R, \text{suc})$ and $(\text{guess}'_S, \text{guess}'_R, \text{suc}')$ of the experiments $\text{Exp}^{\text{OT}}((S,D_S), (R,D^{\text{rand}}), \text{choice}_0, x_0, x_1, x, \epsilon, \epsilon)$ and $\text{Exp}^{\text{OT}}((S,D_S), (R^{\text{abort}}, D^{\text{rand}}), \text{choice}_0, x_0, x_1, x, \epsilon, \epsilon)$, respectively, where $x = 0^{|x_0|}$. Then, we have that

- $|\Pr[\text{guess}'_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = 0 < |\Pr[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|,$
- $|\Pr[\text{guess}'_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = |\Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = 0,$
- $\Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] = 1 \approx \Pr[\text{suc} = 1].$
By condition (R1) of $U^\text{OT}_R$, it holds that $U^\text{OT}_R((S, D_S), (R^{\text{abort}}, D^{\text{rand}})) > U^\text{OT}_R((S, D_S), (R, D^{\text{rand}}))$, which implies that $(S, R)$ is not in a Nash equilibrium.

In case (3), the receiver’s privacy holds for semi-honest senders, but not for a malicious sender. Specifically, there exist probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms $S'$ and $D_S$, and $x_0, x_1, z_S \in \{0, 1\}^*$ with $|x_0| = |x_1|$ such that

$$\Pr[D_S(\text{view}_{S'(x_0, x_1, z_S)}(R(c))) = c] > \frac{1}{2},$$

where $c \in \{0, 1\}$ is chosen uniformly at random. Let $S''$ be an algorithm that simulates $S'$, and sends an abort message right before sending his message. Consider the experiments $\text{Exp}^\text{OT}((S, D_S), (R, D^{\text{rand}}), \text{choice}_0, x_0, x, z_S, \varepsilon)$ and $\text{Exp}^\text{OT}((S'', D_S), (R, D^{\text{rand}}), \text{choice}_0, x_0, x, z_S, \varepsilon)$, where $x = 0^{x_0}$, and their corresponding outcomes $(\text{guess}_S, \text{guess}_R, \text{suc})$ and $(\text{guess}'_S, \text{guess}'_R, \text{suc}')$. It holds that

- $|\Pr[\text{guess}'_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = |\Pr[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \approx 0$,
- $|\Pr[\text{guess}'_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = |\Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = 0$,
- $\Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] = 1 \approx \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$.

It follows from condition (S1) of $U^\text{OT}_S$ that $U^\text{OT}_S((S'', D_S), (R, D^{\text{rand}})) > U^\text{OT}_S((S, D_S), (R, D^{\text{rand}}))$. Hence, $(S, R)$ is not in a Nash equilibrium.

Next, we consider case (4). In this case, there exist a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $D_R$ and $x_0, x_1, x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ with $|x_0| = |x_1| = |x|$ such that

$$\Pr[D_R(\text{view}_{R(c)}(S(X^b)), X^0, X^1) = b] > \frac{1}{2},$$

where $X^0 = (x_0, x)$, $X^1 = (x_0, x)$ if $c = 0$, and $X^1 = (x, x_1)$ otherwise, and $b, c \in \{0, 1\}$ are chosen uniformly at random. Let consider the experiments $\text{Exp}^\text{OT}((S, D^{\text{rand}}), (R, D_R), \text{choice}_0, x_0, x, x, \varepsilon, \varepsilon)$ and $\text{Exp}^\text{OT}((S^{\text{abort}}, D^{\text{rand}}), (R, D_R), \text{choice}_0, x_0, x, x, \varepsilon, \varepsilon)$, and their corresponding outcomes $(\text{guess}_S, \text{guess}_R, \text{suc})$ and $(\text{guess}'_S, \text{guess}'_R, \text{suc'})$. Then, it holds that

- $|\Pr[\text{guess}'_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = |\Pr[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = 0$,
- $|\Pr[\text{guess}'_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = 0 < |\Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$,
- $\Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] = 1 \approx \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$.

By condition (S2) of $U^\text{OT}_S$, we have that $U^\text{OT}_S((S^{\text{abort}}, D^{\text{rand}}), (R, D_R)) > U^\text{OT}_S((S, D^{\text{rand}}), (R, D_R))$. Therefore, $(S, R)$ is not in a Nash equilibrium.

Finally, let consider case (5). There exist a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm $R'$ and probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $D_R$, and $x_0, x_1, x, z_R \in \{0, 1\}^*$ with $|x_0| = |x_1| = |x|$ such that for any function choice : $\{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, it holds that

$$\Pr[D_R(\text{view}_{R'(z_R)}(S(X^b)), X^0, X^1) = b] > \frac{1}{2},$$

where $X^0 = (x_0, x_1)$, $X^1 = (x_0, x)$ if $c^* = 0$, and $X^1 = (x, x_1)$ otherwise, $c^* = \text{choice}(R', c, z_R)$, and $b, c \in \{0, 1\}$ are chosen uniformly at random. Consider an algorithm $S''$ that simulates $R'$ and sends an abort message after receiving a message from the sender. Let $(\text{guess}_S, \text{guess}_R, \text{suc})$ and $(\text{guess}'_S, \text{guess}'_R, \text{suc'})$ be the outcomes of the experiments $\text{Exp}^\text{OT}((S, D^{\text{rand}}), (R, D_R), \text{choice}_0, x_0, x, \varepsilon, \varepsilon)$ and $\text{Exp}^\text{OT}((S^{\text{abort}}, D^{\text{rand}}), (R'', D_R), \text{choice}_0, x_0, x, \varepsilon, z_R)$, respectively. Then, we have that
More specifically, a new utility function
the default strategy for
does not specify the "default" algorithms for
utility without depending on the receiver’s strategies. The second unsatisfactory point is that the definition
difficult for the sender to control the receiver’s strategies, it would be better if the sender can achieve higher
of the protocol
stick
S
assumes that the receiver employs the strategy
D
receives the second message from the sender. Thus, if such
Remark
2 (Abort after completing the protocol)
In every case, we have shown that (S, R) is not in a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the statement follows.

Remark 1 (Unnecessary conditions in utility functions). In the proof of Lemma 2, we did not use condition
(R3) of \( U_R^{OT} \). It is not difficult to see that Lemma 1 holds even if condition (R3) is not included in \( U_R^{OT} \).
This implies that the equivalence holds even if condition (R3) is excluded from \( U_R^{OT} \). The proof of Lemma 2
can be completed by using condition (S3) of \( U_S^{OT} \) instead of (R3) of \( U_R^{OT} \). Thus, we can also say that the
 equivalence holds if condition (S3) is excluded from \( U_S^{OT} \), where (R3) should be included in \( U_R^{OT} \). In other
words, the equivalence holds between the game-theoretic security and cryptographic one as long as at least
one of the parties prefers the receiver to obtain the secret that she chose.

Note, however, that if some party has the opposite preference to, say, condition (S3), the equivalence
does not hold. If the sender prefers the receiver to obtain the secret which was not chosen by the receiver,
then Lemma 1 does not hold while Lemma 2 holds. In this case, a cryptographically-secure protocol does
not achieve a Nash equilibrium because the receiver can obtain the secret she chose, which is not preferred
by the sender. Conversely, if a given protocol satisfies the game-theoretic security for the sender with this
utility, it implies that the protocol achieves a Nash equilibrium for the receiver who has a preference for
correctness. Therefore, it satisfies the cryptographic security.

Remark 2 (Abort after completing the protocol). In case (5) of the proof of Lemma 2, we use the fact that
the receiver can abort the protocol even after receiving the second message from the sender. Thus, if such
an abort is not allowed, the equivalence may not hold.

3.3 A New Game-Theoretic Security

In this section, we introduce a new game-theoretic security based on Definition 8. First, we observe that the
game-theoretic security of Definition 8 has several unsatisfactory points. After that, based on the observation,
we define a new game-theoretic security which does not contain such points, and show that the new
notion is equivalent to another cryptographic security.

Let consider the case that there is a malicious sender \( S' \) that breaks the game-theoretic security
of the protocol \((S, R)\). Namely, it holds that \( U_S^{OT}(S', R) > U_S^{OT}(S, R) \), which means that there exist
\( S', D_S, D_R, x_0, x_1, x, z_S \) such that by considering two experiments executed by \((S, D_S), (R, D_R)\)
and \((S', D_S), (R, D_R)\), either (S1), (S2), or (S3) holds. The first unsatisfactory point is that, in order to achieve
higher utility values, the sender \( S' \) assumes that the receiver employs the strategy \( D_R \). Since it seems to be
difficult for the sender to control the receiver’s strategies, it would be better if the sender can achieve higher
utility without depending on the receiver’s strategies. The second unsatisfactory point is that the definition
does not specify the “default” algorithms for \( D_S \). Since \( D_S \) can be seen as a part of strategies of the sender,
the default strategy for \( D_S \) should be specified.

To circumvent the above unsatisfactory points, we modify the utility functions. First, we modify them
so that the relation such as \( U_S^{OT}(S', R) > U_S^{OT}(S, R) \) can be achieved without assuming the existence of \( D_R \).
More specifically, a new utility function \( U_S^{OT'} \) achieves the relation \( U_S^{OT'}(S', R) > U_S^{OT'}(S, R) \) if there exist

\[ \Pr[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2} = \Pr[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2} = 0, \]
\[ \Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2} > 0 \approx \Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2}, \]
\[ \Pr[\text{succ} = 1] = 1 \approx \Pr[\text{succ} = 1]. \]

It follows from condition (R2) of \( U_R^{OT} \) that \( U_R^{OT}((S, D^{rand}), (R', D_R)) > U_R^{OT}((S, D^{rand}), (R, D_R)) \). Thus, \((S, R)\) is not in a Nash equilibrium.

In every case, we have shown that \((S, R)\) is not in a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the statement follows.

\( \square \)
\(S', D_S, x_0, x_1, x, z_S\) such that for any \(D_R\) condition (S1) holds. For conditions (S2) and (S3), we require that the condition holds for some \(D_R\) as in Definition 8. This is because condition (S2) cannot occur if the receiver employs \(D_R\) that outputs a random bit. Also, condition (S3) cannot be satisfied if \(R\) always aborts the protocol. For the new utility function \(U_R^{OT'}\) for receivers, we require that condition (R2) holds for any \(D_S\).

Second, in the new utility functions, we specify \(D^{\text{rand}}\), which outputs a random bit, as the default algorithms for \(D_S\) and \(D_R\). However, when considering strategies of the sender, we do not assume that the receiver employs \(D^{\text{rand}}\) as \(D_R\), since it seems to be difficult for the sender to control the choice of \(D_R\). Thus, we consider two experiments executed by \(((S, D^{\text{rand}}), (R, D_R))\) and \(((S', D_S), (R, D_R))\). Namely, the receiver follows the strategy \((R, D_R)\) in both experiments, where \(D_R\) can be chosen arbitrarily, and the sender considers to change the default strategy \((S, D^{\text{rand}})\) to another strategy \((S', D_R)\).

We provide the formal description of new utility functions.

**Definition 9** (New utility function for oblivious transfer). Let \((S, R)\) be a two-message oblivious transfer protocol, and \(S'\) and \(R'\) algorithms.

The utility function \(U_S^{OT'}\) for the sender is a function such that \(U_S^{OT'}(S', R) > U_S^{OT'}(S, R)\) if and only if there exist a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \(D_S\), and \(x_0, x_1, x, z_S \in \{0, 1\}^*\) with \(|x_0| = |x_1| = |x|\) that satisfy at least one of the following three conditions:

\[(S1')\] For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \(D_R\), \(|\Pr[\text{guess}'_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \succ |\Pr[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|, \quad \Pr[\text{guess}'_R = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \succ \Pr[\text{guess}_S = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2}, \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[\text{suc}'_R = 1] \succ \Pr[\text{suc} = 1];

\[(S2')\] For some probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \(D_R\), \(|\Pr[\text{guess}'_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \suc \Pr[\text{guess}_S = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2}, \quad \Pr[\text{guess}'_R = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \succ \Pr[\text{guess}_S = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2}, \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[\text{suc}'_R = 1] \suc \Pr[\text{suc} = 1];

\[(S3')\] For some probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \(D_R\), \(|\Pr[\text{guess}'_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \suc \Pr[\text{guess}_S = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2}, \quad \Pr[\text{guess}'_R = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \succ \Pr[\text{guess}_S = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2}, \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[\text{suc}'_R = 1] \suc \Pr[\text{suc} = 1].

where \((\text{guess}_S, \text{guess}_R, \text{suc})\) and \((\text{guess}'_S, \text{guess}'_R, \text{suc}'_R)\) are the random variables representing the outcomes of \(\text{Exp}^{\text{OT}}((S, D^{\text{rand}}), (R, D_R), \text{choice}_{0, x_0, x_1, x, z_S, e}, e)\) and \(\text{Exp}^{\text{OT}}((S', D_S), (R, D_R), \text{choice}_{0, x_0, x_1, x, z_S, e}, e)\), respectively, where \(D^{\text{rand}}\) is an algorithm that outputs a random bit.

Similarly, the utility function \(U_R^{OT'}\) for the receiver is a function such that \(U_R^{OT'}(S, R) > U_R^{OT'}(S', R)\) if and only if there exist a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \(D_R\), and \(x_0, x_1, x, z_R \in \{0, 1\}^*\) with \(|x_0| = |x_1| = |x|\) such that for any function choice : \(\{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}\), at least one of the following three conditions holds:

\[(R1')\] For some probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \(D_S\), \(|\Pr[\text{guess}'_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \suc \Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2}, \quad \Pr[\text{guess}'_S = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \succ \Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2}, \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[\text{suc}'_S = 1] \suc \Pr[\text{suc} = 1];

\[(R2')\] For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \(D_S\), \(|\Pr[\text{guess}'_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \suc \Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2}, \quad \Pr[\text{guess}'_S = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \succ \Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2}, \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[\text{suc}'_S = 1] \suc \Pr[\text{suc} = 1];

\[(R3')\] For some probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \(D_S\), \(|\Pr[\text{guess}'_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \suc \Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2}, \quad \Pr[\text{guess}'_S = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \succ \Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2}, \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[\text{suc}'_S = 1] \suc \Pr[\text{suc} = 1].

where \((\text{guess}_S, \text{guess}_R, \text{suc})\) and \((\text{guess}'_S, \text{guess}'_R, \text{suc}'_R)\) are the random variables representing the outcomes of \(\text{Exp}^{\text{OT}}((S, D_S), (R, D^{\text{rand}}), \text{choice}_{0, x_0, x_1, x, z_S, e, e})\) and \(\text{Exp}^{\text{OT}}((S', D_S), (R', D_R), \text{choice}_{0, x_0, x_1, x, e, e})\), respectively.
A new game-theoretic security is defined such that the utility function of Definition 9 is employed instead of Definition 7. We do not change other aspects such as the solution concept, for which a Nash equilibrium is used.

Define game $\gamma^{\text{OT}'} = (\{S,R\}, (A_S, A_R), (U_S^{\text{OT}'} , U_R^{\text{OT}'} ))$ where experiment $\text{Exp}^{\text{OT}}$ in Definition 6 is employed. $A_S$ is composed of all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms, $A_R$ is composed of all deterministic polynomial-time algorithms, and $U_S^{\text{OT}'}$ and $U_R^{\text{OT}'}$ are the utility functions defined in Definition 9.

**Definition 10** (Game-theoretic adaptive security for oblivious transfer). A two-message oblivious transfer protocol $(S,R)$ is said to be game-theoretically secure against adaptively chosen strategies if $(S,R)$ is in a Nash equilibrium in the game $\gamma^{\text{OT}'}$.

We refer to the above security as adaptive security, since a part of strategies can be chosen adaptively. Let consider the situation in which the sender tries to achieve a higher utility by employing $S'$ and satisfying condition (S1'). Then, the relation $U_S^{\text{OT}'}(S',R) \leq U_S^{\text{OT}'}(S,R)$ can be achieved if there exists $D_R$ for which condition (S1') does not hold. Thus, a part of strategies of the receiver, $D_R$, is chosen adaptively after specifying $S'$. In contrast, in the utility function of Definition 7, $D_R$ is chosen non-adaptively at the same time as $S'$ is chosen.

**Equivalence to the Cryptographic Security against Risk-Averse Adversaries**

We show that the new game-theoretic security of Definition 10 has a cryptographic meaning. Specifically, we introduce a new cryptographic security notion, called security against risk-averse adversaries, and prove that it is equivalent to the new game-theoretic security. Intuitively, risk-averse adversaries behave maliciously, but do not act in a way such that their own security properties can be compromised.

The new security notion is weaker than the malicious security of Definition 2, and stronger than the semi-honest security, where parties try to compromise other parties’ security by following the protocol description. Here, we consider parties who try to compromise the security of other parties by following strategies that are indistinguishable from the protocol description when considering other security properties.

We provide a formal description of the security against risk-averse adversaries.

**Definition 11** (Security against risk-averse adversaries for oblivious transfer). Let $\text{OT} = (S,R)$ be a two-message oblivious transfer protocol. We say $\text{OT}$ is cryptographically secure against risk-averse adversaries if it satisfies the following five properties:

- **Receiver’s privacy against semi-honest senders:** For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $D_S$, inputs $x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^*$ with $|x_0| = |x_1|$, it holds that
  \[ \Pr[D_S(\text{view}_{S(x_0,x_1)}(R(0))) = 1] \approx \Pr[D_S(\text{view}_{S(x_0,x_1)}(R(1))) = 1]. \]

- **Receiver’s privacy against risk-averse senders:** For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms $S^*$ and $D_S$, inputs $x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^*$ with $|x_0| = |x_1|$, and auxiliary input $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$ satisfying the following two conditions:
  - **Risk-averseness for privacy:** For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $D_R$ and $x \in \{0, 1\}^{|x_0|}$,
    \[ \Pr[D_R(\text{view}_{R(c)}(S^*(X^b,z)),X^0,X^1) = 1] \approx \Pr[D_R(\text{view}_{R(c)}(S(X^b)),X^0,X^1) = 1], \]
    where $b \in \{0, 1\}$ is chosen uniformly at random, $X^0 = (x_0, x_1)$, and $X^1 = (x_0, x)$ if $c^* = 0$, $X^1 = (x, x_1)$ otherwise;

  where $b \in \{0, 1\}$ is chosen uniformly at random, $X^0 = (x_0, x_1)$, and $X^1 = (x_0, x)$ if $c^* = 0$, $X^1 = (x, x_1)$ otherwise;
– **Risk-averseness for correctness:** \( \Pr[\text{out}_{R(c)}(S'(x_0, x_1, z)) = x_c \lor S' \text{ aborts}] \approx \Pr[\text{out}_{R(c)}(S(x_0, x_1)) = x_c \lor S \text{ aborts}] \), where \( c \in \{0, 1\} \) is chosen uniformly at random, it holds that
\[
\Pr[D_S(\text{view}_{S'(x_0, x_1, c)}(R(0))) = 1] \approx \Pr[D_S(\text{view}_{S(x_0, x_1, c)}(R(1))) = 1].
\]

- **Sender’s privacy against semi-honest receivers:** For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \( D_R \), inputs \( x_0, x_1, x \in \{0, 1\}^* \) with \( |x_0| = |x_1| = |x| \), and \( c \in \{0, 1\} \), it holds that
\[
\Pr[D_R(\text{view}_{R(c)}(S(X^0)), X^0, X^1) = 1] \approx \Pr[D_R(\text{view}_{R(c)}(S(X^1)), X^0, X^1) = 1],
\]
where \( X^0 = (x_0, x_1) \), and \( X^1 = (x_0, x) \) if \( c = 0 \), \( X^1 = (x, x_1) \) otherwise.

- **Sender’s privacy against risk-averse receivers:** For any deterministic polynomial-time algorithm \( R^* \), probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \( D_R \), inputs \( x_0, x_1, x \in \{0, 1\}^* \) with \( |x_0| = |x_1| = |x| \), \( c \in \{0, 1\} \), and auxiliary input \( z \in \{0, 1\}^* \) satisfying the following two conditions:

  – **Risk-averseness for privacy:** For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \( D_S \),
\[
\Pr[D_S(\text{view}_{S(x_0, x_1)}(R^*(b, z))) = 1] \approx \Pr[D_S(\text{view}_{S(x_0, x_1)}(R(b)) = 1],
\]
where \( b \in \{0, 1\} \) is chosen uniformly at random;

  – **Risk-averseness for correctness:** \( \Pr[\text{out}_{R^*(c, z)}(S(x_0, x_1)) = x_c \lor R^* \text{ aborts}] \approx \Pr[\text{out}_{R(c)}(S(x_0, x_1)) = x_c \lor R \text{ aborts}] \), where \( c \in \{0, 1\} \) is chosen uniformly at random, there exists a function \( \text{choice} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \) such that
\[
\Pr[D_R(\text{view}_{R^*(c, z)}(S(X^0)), X^0, X^1) = 1] \approx \Pr[D_R(\text{view}_{R(c, z)}(S(X^1)), X^0, X^1) = 1],
\]
where \( c^* = \text{choice}(R^*, c, z) \), \( X^0 = (x_0, x_1) \), and \( X^1 = (x_0, x) \) if \( c^* = 0 \), \( X^1 = (x, x_1) \) otherwise.

- **Correctness:** For any strings \( x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^* \) with \( |x_0| = |x_1| \), and \( c \in \{0, 1\} \), it holds that
\[
\Pr[\text{out}_{R(c)}(S(x_0, x_1)) = x_c] \geq 1.
\]

Note that, in the definition, we explicitly require privacy against semi-honest parties. This is necessary because without it the security can be achieved by a trivial protocol in which, first, the receiver sends the choice bit \( c \), and then the sender replies with the string \( x_c \). If the security against semi-honest parties is not required, this protocol can satisfy privacy against risk-averse parties, since it only requires that the probability that some goal of risk-averse parties is achieved is almost the same as the probability that the same goal is achieved by semi-honest parties. Thus, if we do not bound the probability that the goal is achieved by semi-honest parties, the security property against risk-averse parties can be easily achieved.

We show that the security against risk-averse adversaries of Definition 11 is equivalent to the game-theoretic security of Definition 10. Here, we describe the intuition of their equivalence. Roughly speaking, the game-theoretic adaptive security of Definition 10 guarantees that even if the sender tries to use \( S' \) as a protocol, the utility of the sender cannot increase if the receiver successfully chooses \( D_R \) for which some condition does not hold, and the same holds for the receiver. This implies that each party performs the game by considering the other party’s distinguishers, which will be chosen adaptively based on the party’s strategy. Thus, the parties do not take the risk of choosing strategies that can cause the other party’s successful attacks.
Theorem 2. A two-message oblivious transfer protocol OT is cryptographically secure against risk-averse adversaries if and only if OT is game-theoretically secure against adaptively chosen strategies.

We first prove the only if part.

Lemma 3. If OT is cryptographically secure against risk-averse adversaries, then OT is game-theoretically secure against adaptively chosen strategies.

Proof. Assume that OT = (S, R) is not in a Nash equilibrium in the game ΓOT. There are two cases: (1) U_S^{OT}(S', R) > U_S^{OT}(S, R) for some S' \in A_S; and (2) U_R^{OT}(S, R') > U_R^{OT}(S, R) for some R' \in A_R.

In case (1), there exist S', D_S, x_0, x_1, x, z \in S that satisfies either (S1'), (S2'), or (S3'). Let (guess, guess_R, suc) be the random variables representing the outcomes of Exp^OT((S, D^{rand}), (R, D_R), choice_0, x_0, x, e, e) and Exp^OT((S', D_S), (R, D_R), choice_0, x_0, x, e), respectively, where D_R is an algorithm employed in (S1'), (S2'), and (S3').

If (S2') holds, then there exists some D_R such that |Pr[guess' = 1| - 1/2| ≥ |Pr[guess_s = 1 - 1/2], |Pr[guess'_R = 1] - 1/2| ≤ |Pr[guess_R = 1| - 1/2|, and Pr[suc' = 1] ≥ Pr[suc = 1]. This implies that when the parties follow (S, R) and the receiver employs D_R as a distinguisher, the receiver can break the sender’s privacy. Namely, the sender’s privacy against semi-honest receivers can be broken.

When (S3') holds, we have that, for some D_R, |Pr[guess'_s = 1| - 1/2| ≥ |Pr[guess_s = 1 - 1/2], |Pr[guess'_R = 1] - 1/2| ≤ |Pr[guess_R = 1| - 1/2|, and Pr[suc' = 1] > Pr[suc = 1]. This implies that Pr[out_{R'}(S(x_0, x_1)) = x_c] < 1, meaning that OT does not satisfy correctness.

Let assume that (S1') holds, but neither (S2') nor (S3') holds. Then, there exist D_S, x_0, x_1, x, z \in S such that for any D_R,

- |Pr[guess'_s = 1| - 1/2| ≥ |Pr[guess_s = 1 - 1/2], |Pr[guess'_R = 1] - 1/2| ≤ |Pr[guess_R = 1| - 1/2|, and Pr[suc' = 1] ≥ Pr[suc = 1];
- |Pr[guess'_s = 1| - 1/2| ≤ |Pr[guess_s = 1 - 1/2], |Pr[guess'_R = 1] - 1/2| ≥ |Pr[guess_R = 1| - 1/2|, or Pr[suc' = 1] > Pr[suc = 1]; and
- |Pr[guess'_s = 1| - 1/2| ≤ |Pr[guess_s = 1 - 1/2], |Pr[guess'_R = 1] - 1/2| ≥ |Pr[guess_R = 1| - 1/2|, or Pr[suc' = 1] ≤ Pr[suc = 1],

which implies that |Pr[guess'_s = 1| - 1/2| > |Pr[guess_s = 1 - 1/2], |Pr[guess'_R = 1] - 1/2| > |Pr[guess_R = 1| - 1/2|, and Pr[suc' = 1] > Pr[suc = 1]. Then, it holds that

Pr[D_R(view_{R'}(S(X^b, z)), X^0, X^1) = 1] ≈ Pr[D_R(view_{R'}(S(X^b), X^0, X^1) = 1) for any D_R, and

Pr[out_{R'}(S(x_0, x_1)) = x_c \vee S aborts] \approx Pr[out_{R'}(S(x_0, x_1)) = x_c \vee S aborts],

where b \in \{0, 1\} is chosen uniformly at random. Thus, S is a risk-averse sender having risk-averseness both for privacy and correctness that breaks the receiver's privacy by employing D_S.

Let consider case (2), which implies that there exist R', D_{R'}, x_0, x_1, x, z \in S such that for any choice, either (R1'), (R2'), or (R3') holds. Let (guess, guess_R, suc) and (guess'_s, guess'_R, suc') be the random variables representing the outcomes of Exp^OT((S, D_S), (R, D^{rand}), choice_0, x_0, x_1, x, e, e) and Exp^OT((S, D_S), (R', D_{R'}), choice_0, x_0, x_1, x, e, z), respectively, where D_S is an algorithm employed in (R1'), (R2'), and (R3').

Suppose (R1') holds. Then, there exists D_S such that |Pr[guess'_s = 1| - 1/2| > |Pr[guess_s = 1 - 1/2|, |Pr[guess'_R = 1] - 1/2| ≥ |Pr[guess_R = 1| - 1/2|, and Pr[suc' = 1] ≥ Pr[suc = 1]. This implies that the receiver’s privacy against semi-honest senders can be broken by using D_S.
When (R3') holds, there exists some $D_S$ satisfying $|\Pr[\text{guess}_S' = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \lesssim |\Pr[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, $|\Pr[\text{guess}'_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \gtrsim |\Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, and $\Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] \approx \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$. Then, $\Pr[\text{out}_{R(c)}(S(x_0, x_1)) = x_c] < 1$, which implies that OT does not satisfy correctness.

Finally, consider the case that (R2') holds, but neither (R1') nor (R3') holds. In this case, there exists $D_R, x_0, x_1, x, z_R$ such that for any $D_S$,

- $|\Pr[\text{guess}_S' = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \leq |\Pr[\text{guess}_S' = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, $|\Pr[\text{guess}_S' = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \gtrsim |\Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, and $\Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] \approx \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$;
- $|\Pr[\text{guess}_S' = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \gtrsim |\Pr[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, $|\Pr[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| < |\Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, or $\Pr[\text{suc} = 1] \approx \Pr[\text{suc'} = 1]$; and
- $|\Pr[\text{guess}_S' = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \gtrsim |\Pr[\text{guess}_S = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, $|\Pr[\text{guess}_S' = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| < |\Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, or $\Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] \approx \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$,

which implies that $|\Pr[\text{guess}_S' = 1] - 1/2| \approx |\Pr[\text{guess}_S' = 1] - 1/2|$, $|\Pr[\text{guess}_S' = 1] - 1/2| \approx |\Pr[\text{guess}_R = 1] - 1/2|$, and $\Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] \approx \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$. Then, it holds that

$$\Pr[D_S(\text{view}_{S(x_0, x_1)}(R'(c, z_R))) = 1] \approx \Pr[D_S(\text{view}_{S(x_0, x_1)}(R(c))) = 1]$$

for any $D_S$, and

$$\Pr[\text{out}_{R'(c, z_R)}(S(x_0, x_1)) = x_c \vee R' \text{ aborts}] \approx \Pr[\text{out}_{R(c)}(S(x_0, x_1)) = x_c \vee R \text{ aborts}],$$

where $c \in \{0, 1\}$ is chosen uniformly at random. Hence, $R'$ satisfies risk-averseness both for privacy and correctness, and breaks the sender’s privacy by employing $D_R$.

In every case, we have shown that, by assuming that OT is not in a Nash equilibrium, OT does not satisfy the security against risk-averse adversaries. Therefore, the statement follows. □

Next, we prove the if part.

**Lemma 4.** If OT is game-theoretically secure against adaptively chosen strategies, then OT is cryptographically secure against risk-averse adversaries.

**Proof.** Assume that OT = $(S, R)$ is not cryptographically secure against risk-averse adversaries. We consider the following five cases:

1. OT does not satisfy correctness.
2. OT does not satisfy the receiver’s privacy against semi-honest senders.
3. OT does not satisfy the receiver’s privacy against risk-averse senders.
4. OT does not satisfy the sender’s privacy against semi-honest receivers.
5. OT does not satisfy the sender’s privacy against risk-averse receivers.

Let $R^{\text{abort}}$ and $S^{\text{abort}}$ be algorithms defined as in the proof of Lemma 2.

In case (1), there exist $x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^+$ with $|x_0| = |x_1|$ and $c \in \{0, 1\}$ such that

$$\Pr[\text{out}_{R(c)}(S(x_0, x_1)) = x_c] < 1.$$

Let consider the outcomes $(\text{guess}_S, \text{guess}_R, \text{suc})$ and $(\text{guess}_S', \text{guess}_R', \text{suc'})$ of the experiments $\text{Exp}^{\text{OT}}(\text{(S, R), (S, D^{\text{rand}}), (R, D^{\text{rand}}), choice_0, x_0, x_1, x, e, e})$ and $\text{Exp}^{\text{OT}}(\text{(S, D^{\text{rand}}), (R, D^{\text{rand}}), choice_0, x_0, x_1, x, e, e})$, respectively, where $x = 0^{\left| x_0 \right|}$. Then, we have that
Then, we have that

\[ |\Pr[\text{guess}_S] - \frac{1}{2}| = |\Pr[\text{guess}_R] - \frac{1}{2}| = 0, \]

\[ |\Pr[\text{guess}_R'] - \frac{1}{2}| = |\Pr[\text{guess}_R] - \frac{1}{2}| = 0, \]

\[ \Pr[\text{suc}'] = 1 \Rightarrow \Pr[\text{suc}] = 1. \]

By condition (R1') of \( U^{OT'}_R \), it holds that \( U^{OT'}_R(S, R_{\text{abort}}) > U^{OT'}_R(S, R) \), which implies that \( (S, R) \) is not in a Nash equilibrium.

Case (2) implies the existence of a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \( D_S \), and \( x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^* \) with \( |x_0| = |x_1| \) such that

\[
\Pr[D_S(\text{view}_{S(x_0, x_1)})(R(c))] = c > \frac{1}{2},
\]

where \( c \in \{0, 1\} \) is chosen uniformly at random. Let consider the experiments \( \text{Exp}^{OT}((S, D_S), (R, D')_{\text{rand}}), \text{choice}_{0, x_0, x_1, x, z_S, \epsilon} \) and \( \text{Exp}^{OT}((S, D_S), (R_{\text{abort}}, D')_{\text{rand}}), \text{choice}_{0, x_0, x_1, x, z_S, \epsilon} \), where \( x = 0^{\lceil x_0 \rceil} \), and their corresponding outcomes \( (\text{guess}_S, \text{guess}_R, \text{suc}) \) and \( (\text{guess}_S', \text{guess}_R', \text{suc}') \).

Then, we have that

\[
\Pr[|\text{guess}_S' - 1| - \frac{1}{2}] = 0 < \Pr[|\text{guess}_S - 1| - \frac{1}{2}],
\]

\[
\Pr[|\text{guess}_R' - 1| - \frac{1}{2}] = 0 = \Pr[|\text{guess}_R - 1| - \frac{1}{2}],
\]

\[
\Pr[\text{suc}'] = 1 \geq \Pr[\text{suc}] = 1. \]

By condition (R1') of \( U^{OT'}_R \), it holds that \( U^{OT'}_R(S, R_{\text{abort}}) > U^{OT'}_R(S, R) \), which implies that \( (S, R) \) is not in a Nash equilibrium.

Next, consider case (3), in which the receiver's privacy does not hold for a risk-averse sender. There exist a risk-averse sender \( S' \), \( D_S \), and \( x_0, x_1, z_S \in \{0, 1\}^* \) with \( |x_0| = |x_1| \) such that

\[
\Pr[D_S(\text{view}_{S'(x_0, x_1, z_S)})(R(c))] = c > \frac{1}{2},
\]

where \( c \in \{0, 1\} \) is chosen uniformly at random. For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \( D_R \), consider the experiments \( \text{Exp}^{OT}((S, D_S), (R, D')_{\text{rand}}), \text{choice}_{0, x_0, x_1, x, z_S, \epsilon} \) and \( \text{Exp}^{OT}((S', D_S), (R, D_R), \text{choice}_{0, x_0, x_1, x, z_S, \epsilon}) \), where \( x = 0^{\lceil x_0 \rceil} \), and their corresponding outcomes \( (\text{guess}_S, \text{guess}_R, \text{suc}) \) and \( (\text{guess}_S', \text{guess}_R', \text{suc}') \).

Since \( S' \) is a risk-averse sender, it holds that

\[
\Pr[|\text{guess}_S' - 1| - \frac{1}{2}] > \Pr[|\text{guess}_S - 1| - \frac{1}{2}],
\]

\[
\Pr[|\text{guess}_R' - 1| - \frac{1}{2}] \approx \Pr[|\text{guess}_R - 1| - \frac{1}{2}],
\]

\[
\Pr[\text{suc}'] = 1 \approx \Pr[\text{suc} = 1].
\]

It follows from condition (S1') of \( U^{OT'}_S \) that \( U^{OT'}_S(S', R) > U^{OT'}_S(S, R) \). Hence, \( (S, R) \) is not in a Nash equilibrium.

In case (4), there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \( D_R \) and \( x_0, x_1, x \in \{0, 1\}^* \) with \( |x_0| = |x_1| = |x| \) such that

\[
\Pr[D_R(\text{view}_{R(c)})(S, X^b), X^0, X^1] = b > \frac{1}{2},
\]

where \( X^0 = (x_0, x_1) \), \( X^1 = (x, x_1) \) if \( c = 0 \), and \( X^1 = (x, x_1) \) otherwise, and \( b, c \in \{0, 1\} \) are chosen uniformly at random. Let consider the experiments \( \text{Exp}^{OT}((S, D_S), (R, D_R), \text{choice}_{0, x_0, x_1, x, \epsilon, \epsilon}) \) and \( \text{Exp}^{OT}((S', D'_S), (R, D_R), \text{choice}_{0, x_0, x_1, x, \epsilon, \epsilon}) \), and their corresponding outcomes \( (\text{guess}_S, \text{guess}_R, \text{suc}) \) and \( (\text{guess}_S', \text{guess}_R', \text{suc}') \). Then, it holds that
4 Game-Theoretic Security for Commitment

In this section, we provide a game-theoretic characterization of commitment protocols. First, we show that our game-theoretic security is equivalent to the cryptographic security against malicious adversaries, and discuss the implication of this equivalence. After that, as in the case of oblivious transfer, we introduce a new game-theoretic security, and show its equivalence to the cryptographic security against risk-averse adversaries.

4.1 Definition

First, we define an experiment for the execution of a commitment protocol. Then, we consider natural preferences of the sender and the receiver. By using a Nash equilibrium as a solution concept, we define the game-theoretic security of commitment.
**Experiment.** Let \( \text{Com} = ((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O)) \) be a commitment protocol. We define an experiment between a sender and a receiver. Both the sender and the receiver have three algorithms \((S_C, S_O, F)\) and \((R_C, R_O, D)\), respectively. These algorithms interact as follows.

First, the sender and the receiver execute a commit phase by using \( S_C \) and \( R_C \), where \( S_C \) is given input \( x_b \in \{0,1\}^t \), where \( x_0, x_1 \in \{0,1\}^t \) are possible inputs, and \( b \in \{0,1\} \) is chosen uniformly at random. Let \( c \) and \( d \) be the commitment and decommitment strings generated in this phase. Then, a distinguisher \( D \) of the receiver tries to guess the committed string \( x_b \) based on the view of \( R_C \) in the commit phase and possible inputs \( x_0, x_1 \). After that, a decommitment finder \( F \) of the sender tries to generate \((x',d')\) so that \( x' \neq x_b \) can be opened by using \( d' \) as the decommitment string. Then, the open phase is executed twice, where the first one checks if \( x_b \) can be opened with the decommitment string \( d \), and the second one does if \( x' \) with \( d' \).

We formally define the experiment for commitment protocols. (See also Figure 2.)

**Definition 12** (Experiment for commitment). Let \( S_C, S_O, F, R_C, R_O, \) and \( D \) be algorithms, \( x_0, x_1 \in \{0,1\}^t \), and \( z_S, z_R \in \{0,1\}^* \). The experiment \( \text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}((S_C, S_O, F), (R_C, R_O, D), x_0, x_1, z_S, z_R) \) is executed as follows.

1. Set \( \text{guess} = \text{amb} = \text{succ} = \text{abort}_C = \text{abort}_O = 0 \), and choose \( b \in \{0,1\} \) uniformly at random.

2. Execute a commit phase by using \( S_C(x_b, z_S) \) and \( R_C(z_R) \). Let \( c \) and \( d \) be the commitment and decommitment strings, respectively, that are generated during the execution. Set \( \text{abort}_C = 1 \) if some party aborts the protocol.

3. If \( \text{abort}_C = 0 \), run \( D(\text{view}_{R_C(z_R)}(S_C(x_b, z_S)), x_0, x_1) \) and \( F(\text{view}_{S_C(x_b, z_S)}(R_C(z_R))) \), and obtain as output \( b' \) and \( (x',d') \), respectively. Otherwise, choose \( b' \in \{0,1\} \) uniformly at random.

4. If \( \text{abort}_C = 0 \), execute an open phase twice, where the first one is done between \( S_O(x_b, d, z_S) \) and \( R_O(c, z_R) \), and the second one is between \( S_O(x', d', z_S) \) and \( R_O(c, z_R) \). Let \( o \) and \( o' \) be the outputs.
of $R_0$ in the first and second executions, respectively. If some party aborts in the first (and second) interaction(s), set $\text{abort}_O = 1$ and $o = 0$ (and $o' = 0$).

If $\text{abort}_C = 1$, set $o = o' = 0$.

5. Set $\text{amb} = 1$ if $x_b \neq x'$ and $o = o' = 1$. Set $\text{suc} = 1$ if either $o = 1$, $\text{abort}_C = 1$, or $\text{abort}_O = 1$. Set $\text{guess} = 1$ if $b = b'$.

The tuple $(\text{guess}, \text{amb}, \text{suc})$ is the outcome of this experiment. In the experiment, aborting the protocol means that the party sends a special symbol $\bot$ to the other party.

**Utility functions.** We assume that each party of commitment has multiple goals. The sender has the following two preferences:

- He does not prefer the receiver to know the committed string $x_b$ before executing the open phase.
- On executing the open phase, he prefers to be able to choose a string to be opened.

The receiver has the following three preferences:

- She prefers to learn the committed string $x_b$ before executing the open phase.
- She does not prefer the sender to be able to choose a string to be opened in the open phase.
- She prefers to open the true committed string $x_b$ unless the protocol was aborted.

We formalize these preferences as utility functions. As in the case of oblivious transfer protocols, the utility functions are defined over the average outcomes of the experiments.

**Definition 13** (Utility functions for commitment). Let $((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))$ be a commitment protocol, and $S'_C, S'_O, R'_C, R'_O$ algorithms. The utility function $U^\text{Com}_S$ for the sender is a function such that $U^\text{Com}_S((S'_C, S'_O), (R_C, R_O)) > U^\text{Com}_S((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))$ if there exist probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms $F$ and $D$, $x_0, x, z_0, \epsilon \in \{0, 1\}^*$, and $s \in \{0, 1\}^*$, that satisfy at least one of the following two conditions:

$$
\begin{align*}
\text{(S1)} & \quad |\Pr[\text{guess'} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| < |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[\text{amb'} = 1] \preceq \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]; \\
\text{(S2)} & \quad |\Pr[\text{guess'} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \leq |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[\text{amb'} = 1] > \Pr[\text{amb} = 1].
\end{align*}
$$

where $(\text{guess}, \text{amb}, \text{suc})$ and $(\text{guess'}, \text{amb'}, \text{suc'})$ are the random variables representing the outcomes of $\text{Exp}^\text{Com}_S((S_C, S_O, F), (R_C, R_O, D), x_0, x, z_0, \epsilon, \epsilon)$ and $\text{Exp}^\text{Com}_S((S'_C, S'_O, F), (R_C, R_O, D), x_0, x, z_0, \epsilon, \epsilon)$, respectively.

The utility function $U^\text{Com}_R$ for the receiver is a function such that $U^\text{Com}_R((S_C, S_O), (R'_C, R'_O)) > U^\text{Com}_R((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))$ if there exist probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms $F$ and $D$, $x_0, x, z_0, \epsilon \in \{0, 1\}^*$, and $s \in \{0, 1\}^*$, that satisfy at least one of the following three conditions:

$$
\begin{align*}
\text{(R1)} & \quad |\Pr[\text{guess'} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| > |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|, \quad \Pr[\text{amb'} = 1] \preceq \Pr[\text{amb} = 1], \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] \succeq \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]; \\
\text{(R2)} & \quad |\Pr[\text{guess'} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \geq |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|, \quad \Pr[\text{amb'} = 1] \preceq \Pr[\text{amb} = 1], \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] \succeq \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]; \\
\text{(R3)} & \quad |\Pr[\text{guess'} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \geq |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|, \quad \Pr[\text{amb'} = 1] \preceq \Pr[\text{amb} = 1], \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] \succeq \Pr[\text{suc} = 1],
\end{align*}
$$

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where \((\text{guess}, \text{amb}, \text{suc})\) and \((\text{guess}', \text{amb}', \text{suc}')\) are the random variables representing the outcomes of \(\text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}((S_C,S_O,F),(R_C,R_O,D),x_0,x_1,\varepsilon,\varepsilon)\) and \(\text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}((S_C,S_O,F),(R'_C,R'_O,D),x_0,x_1,\varepsilon,\varepsilon_R)\), respectively.

An example of the utility functions satisfying Definition 13 is the following functions \((u_S^{\text{Com}}, u_R^{\text{Com}})\):

- \(u_S^{\text{Com}}((S_C,S_O),(R_C,R_O)) = -\alpha_S \Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2} + \beta_S \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]\);
- \(u_R^{\text{Com}}((S_C,S_O),(R_C,R_O)) = \alpha_R \Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2} - \beta_R \Pr[\text{amb} = 1] + \gamma_R \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]\),

where \((\text{guess}, \text{amb}, \text{suc})\) are the random variables representing the outcome of the experiment, and \(\alpha_S, \beta_S, \alpha_R, \beta_R, \gamma_R\) are positive constants.

**Game-theoretic security.** For a commitment protocol \(\text{Com}\), let define the two-party game \(\Gamma^{\text{Com}} = (\{S,R\}, (A_S,A_R), (U_S^{\text{Com}}, U_R^{\text{Com}}))\) in which the experiment \(\text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}\) defined in Definition 12 is executed, both \(A_S\) and \(A_R\) are composed of pairs of all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms, and \(U_S^{\text{Com}}\) and \(U_R^{\text{Com}}\) are the utility functions defined in Definition 13.

We say that a protocol is game-theoretically secure if the strategy of following the protocol description is in a Nash equilibrium.

**Definition 14** (Game-theoretic non-adaptive security for commitment). A commitment protocol \(((S_C,S_O),(R_C,R_O))\) is said to be game-theoretically secure against non-adaptively chosen strategies if \(((S_C,S_O),(R_C,R_O))\) is in a Nash equilibrium in the game \(\Gamma^{\text{Com}}\).

### 4.2 Equivalence to the Cryptographic Security against Malicious Adversaries

In this section, we prove the equivalence between the cryptographic security (Definition 4) and the game-theoretic security (Definition 14) for commitment protocols.

**Theorem 3.** A commitment protocol \(\text{Com}\) is cryptographically secure against malicious adversaries if and only if \(\text{Com}\) is game-theoretically secure against non-adaptively chosen strategies.

First, we show that the cryptographic security implies the game-theoretic security.

**Lemma 5.** If \(\text{Com}\) is cryptographically secure against malicious adversaries, then \(\text{Com}\) is game-theoretically secure against non-adaptively chosen strategies.

**Proof:** Let assume that \(\text{Com} = ((S_C,S_O),(R_C,R_O))\) is not game-theoretically secure against non-adaptively chosen strategies, namely, \(((S_C,S_O),(R_C,R_O))\) is not in a Nash equilibrium. Then, there are two cases: (1) \(U_S^{\text{Com}}((S'_C,S'_O),(R_C,R_O)) > U_S^{\text{Com}}((S_C,S_O),(R_C,R_O))\) for some \((S'_C,S'_O)\in A_S\); and (2) \(U_R^{\text{Com}}((S_C,S_O),(R'_C,R'_O)) > U_R^{\text{Com}}((S_C,S_O),(R_C,R_O))\) for some \((R'_C,R'_O)\in A_R\).

In case (1), it follows from the definition of \(U_S^{\text{Com}}\) that either \((S1)\) or \((S2)\) holds. We observe that condition \((S1)\) implies that \(\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - 1/2 > 0\). Then, it holds that \(\Pr[D(\text{view}_{C}(S_C(x_b))) = b] = 1/2 > 0\), where \(b \in \{0,1\}\) is chosen uniformly at random. This means that \(\text{Com}\) does not satisfy hiding property. Condition \((S2)\) implies that \(\Pr[\text{amb}' = 1] > 0\), which means that \(\Pr[D(\text{out}_{C}(S'_C(x_b,d,z_S)) = \text{out}_{C}(S'_C(x',d',z_S)) = 1)] > 0\), where \(c,d\) are the commitment and decommitment string generated by the interaction between \(S_C(x_b,z_S)\) and \(R_C\), \((x',d')\) is the output of \(F(\text{view}_{C}(x_b,z_S))\), and \(b \in \{0,1\}\) is chosen uniformly at random. This implies that \(\text{Com}\) does not satisfy binding property.

Next, we consider case (2). It follows from the definition of \(U_R^{\text{Com}}\) that either \((R1)\), \((R2)\), or \((R3)\) holds. Condition \((R1)\) implies that \(\Pr[\text{guess}' = 1] - 1/2 > 0\). This means that
\[ \Pr[D(\text{view}_{\text{C}(x \mid b)}(S_C(x_b, z_S), x_0, x_1) = b) > 1/2, \text{ where } b \in \{0, 1\} \text{ is chosen uniformly at random. Hence,} \]

\[ \text{Com} \text{ does not satisfy hiding property. Condition (R2) implies that } \Pr[\text{amb} = 1] > 0. \text{ This means that} \]

\[ \Pr[\text{out}_{\text{R}_0(c)}(S_O(x_b, d)) = \text{out}_{\text{R}_0(c)}(S_O(x', d')) = 1] > 0, \text{ where } c \text{ and } d \text{ are the commitment and decommitment} \]

\[ \text{strings generated by the interaction between } S_C(x_b) \text{ and } R_C, (x', d') \text{ is the output of } F(\text{view}_{S_C(x_b)}(R_C)) \]

\[ \text{with } x' \neq x_b, \text{ and } b \in \{0, 1\} \text{ is chosen uniformly at random. This implies that } \text{Com} \text{ does not satisfy binding} \]

\[ \text{property. Finally, let consider condition } (R3), \text{ which implies } \Pr[\text{suc} = 1] < 1. \text{ Then, we have that} \]

\[ \Pr[\text{out}_{\text{R}_0(c)}(S_O(x_b, d)) = 1] < 1, \text{ where } c \text{ and } d \text{ are the commitment and decommitment} \]

\[ \text{strings generated by } S_C(x_b) \text{ and } R_C, \text{ and } b \in \{0, 1\} \text{ is chosen uniformly at random. This means that } \text{Com} \text{ does not satisfy} \]

\[ \text{correctness property.} \]

\[ \text{In every case, we have shown that } \text{Com} \text{ is not cryptographically secure. Therefore, the statement follows.} \]

\[ \Box \]

Next, we show that the game-theoretic security implies the cryptographic security.

**Lemma 6.** If \( \text{Com} \) is game-theoretically secure against non-adaptively chosen strategies, then \( \text{Com} \) is cryptographically secure against malicious adversaries.

**Proof.** Suppose that \( \text{Com} = ((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O)) \) is not cryptographically secure. We consider the following five cases, and show that \( \text{Com} \) is not game-theoretically secure in each case.

(1) \( \text{Com} \) does not satisfy correctness.

(2) \( \text{Com} \) satisfies correctness, but does not satisfy binding property for \((S_C, S_O)\).

(3) \( \text{Com} \) satisfies correctness and binding property for \((S_C, S_O)\), but does not satisfy binding property for some \((S'_C, S'_O) \neq (S_C, S_O)\).

(4) \( \text{Com} \) satisfies correctness and binding property, but does not satisfy hiding property for \((R_C, R_O)\).

(5) \( \text{Com} \) satisfies correctness, binding property, and hiding property for \((R_C, R_O)\), but does not satisfy hiding property for some \((R'_C, R'_O) \neq (R_C, R_O)\).

In case (1), for some \( x \in \{0, 1\}^l \), it holds that

\[ \Pr[\text{out}_{\text{R}_0(c)}(S_O(x, d)) = 1] < 1, \]

where \( c \) and \( d \) are the commitment and decommitment strings generated during the interaction between \( S_C(x) \) and \( R_C \). Let \( D^{\text{rand}} \) be an algorithm that outputs \( b \in \{0, 1\} \) uniformly at random, \( F_0 \) an algorithm that, on input the view including \( (x, c, d) \), outputs \( (x, d) \), and \( R_c^{\text{abort}} \) a strategy of sending an abort message right after starting the commit phase. We denote by \( (\text{guess}, \text{amb}, \text{suc}) \) and \( (\text{guess}', \text{amb}', \text{suc}') \) the outcomes of the experiments \( \text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}((S_C, S_O, F_0), (R_C, R_O, D^{\text{rand}}), x, x, e, e) \) and \( \text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}((S_C, S_O, F_0), (R_c^{\text{abort}}, R_O, D^{\text{rand}}), x, x, e, e) \), respectively. Note that, when the receiver follows \( R_c^{\text{abort}} \), \( \text{abort}_c = 1 \) in the experiment, and thus the tests for \( F \) and \( D \) will not be checked. Thus, we have that

- \( |\Pr[\text{guess}' = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = 0, \)
- \( \Pr[\text{amb}' = 1] = 0 \leq \Pr[\text{amb} = 1], \)
- \( \Pr[\text{suc}' = 1] = 1 \Rightarrow \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]. \)
By condition (R3) of $U_R^{\text{Com}}$, we have that $U_R^{\text{Com}}((S_C,S_O),(R_C^{\text{abort}},R_O)) > U_R^{\text{Com}}((S_C,S_O),(R_C,R_O))$, which implies that the tuple $((S_C,S_O),(R_C,R_O))$ is not in a Nash equilibrium.

Next, we consider case (2). In this case, there is a probabilistic polynomial-time decommitment finder $F$ and $x \in \{0,1\}^t$ such that

$$\Pr[\text{out}_{R_O}(c)](S_O(x,d)) = \text{out}_{R_O}(c)(S_O(x',d')) = 1 > 0,$$

where $c$ and $d$ are the commitment and decommitment strings generated by $S_C(x)$ and $R_C$, $(x',d')$ is the output of $F(\text{view}_{S_C(x)}(R_C))$. Let $(\text{guess}, \text{amb}, \text{suc})$ and $(\text{guess}', \text{amb}', \text{suc}')$ be the outcomes of the experiments $\text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}((S_C,S_O,F),(R_C,R_O,D^{\text{rand}}),x,x',\varepsilon,\varepsilon)$ and $\text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}((S_C,S_O,F),(R_C^{\text{abort}},R_O,D^{\text{rand}}),x,x',\varepsilon,\varepsilon)$, respectively, where $x' \in \{0,1\}^t \setminus \{x\}$. Then, we have that

- $\left| \Pr[\text{guess'} = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right| = \left| \Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right| = 0$,
- $\Pr[\text{amb'} = 1] = 0 < \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]$,
- $\Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] = 1 \approx \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$.

Hence, by condition (R2) of $U_R^{\text{Com}}$, it holds that $U_R^{\text{Com}}((S_C,S_O),(R_C^{\text{abort}},R_O)) > U_R^{\text{Com}}((S_C,S_O),(R_C,R_O))$. Therefore, the tuple $((S_C,S_O),(R_C,R_O))$ is not in a Nash equilibrium.

In case (3), there exist a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $F$, $x \in \{0,1\}^t$, and $z \in \{0,1\}^*$, it holds that

$$\Pr[\text{out}_{R_O}(c)](S_O'(x,d,z)) = \text{out}_{R_O}(c)(S_O'(x',d',z)) = 1 > 0,$$

where $c$ and $d$ are the commitment and decommitment strings generated by $S_C'(x,z)$ and $R_C$, and $(x',d')$ is the output of $F(\text{view}_{S_C'(x,z)}(R_C))$ with $x' \neq x$. Let $(\text{guess}, \text{amb}, \text{suc})$ and $(\text{guess}', \text{amb}', \text{suc}')$ be the outcomes of the experiments $\text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}((S_C,S_O,F),(R_C,R_O,D^{\text{rand}}),x,x,\varepsilon,\varepsilon)$ and $\text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}((S_C',S_O',F),(R_C,R_O,D^{\text{rand}}),x,x,z,\varepsilon)$, respectively. We have that

- $\left| \Pr[\text{guess'} = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right| = \left| \Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right| = 0$, and
- $\Pr[\text{amb'} = 1] > \Pr[\text{amb} = 1] \approx 0$.

By condition (S2) of $U_S^{\text{Com}}$, it holds that

$$U_S^{\text{Com}}((S_C',S_O'),(R_C,R_O)) > U_S^{\text{Com}}((S_C,S_O),(R_C,R_O)).$$

Thus, the tuple $((S_C,S_O),(R_C,R_O))$ is not in a Nash equilibrium.

We consider case (4), in which the receiver can break hiding property with the honest strategy. Then, there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $D$ and $x_0,x_1 \in \{0,1\}^t$ such that

$$\Pr[D(\text{view}_{R_C}(S_C(x_b),x_0,x_1)) = b] - \frac{1}{2} > 0,$$

where $b \in \{0,1\}$ is chosen uniformly at random. Let $S_C^{\text{abort}}$ be the strategy of sending an abort message right after starting the commit phase. We denote by $(\text{guess}, \text{amb}, \text{suc})$ and $(\text{guess}', \text{amb}', \text{suc}')$ the outcomes of the experiments $\text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}((S_C,S_O,F_0),(R_C,R_O,D),x_0,x_1,\varepsilon,\varepsilon)$ and $\text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}((S_C^{\text{abort}},S_O,F_0),(R_C,R_O,D),x_0,x_1,\varepsilon,\varepsilon)$, respectively. Then, we have that

- $\left| \Pr[\text{guess'} = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right| = 0 < \left| \Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right|$,  


• \( \text{Pr}\{\text{amb}' = 1\} = 0 \approx \text{Pr}\{\text{amb} = 1\} \).

Hence, by condition (S1) of \( U^\text{S}_S \), it holds that \( U^\text{S}_S((S^\text{C}_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O)) > U^\text{S}_S((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O)) \), which implies that the tuple \((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O)\) is not in a Nash equilibrium.

In case (5), there exist probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms \( R_C' \neq R_C \) and \( D, x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^t \), and \( z \in \{0, 1\}^* \), such that

\[
\left| \text{Pr}[D(\text{view}^{R_C}_{S}(S_C(x_b))), x_0, x_1] - \frac{1}{2} \right| > 0,
\]

and

\[
\left| \text{Pr}[D(\text{view}^{R_C}_{S}(S_C(x_b))), x_0, x_1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \right| \approx 0,
\]

where \( b \in \{0, 1\} \) is chosen uniformly at random. Let \( R_O^{\text{abort}} \) be the strategy of sending an abort message right after starting the open phase. We denote by \((\text{guess}, \text{amb}, \text{suc})\) and \((\text{guess}', \text{amb}', \text{suc}')\) the outcomes of the games \( \text{Exp}^\text{Com}((S_C, S_O, F_0), (R_C, R_O, D), x_0, x_1, \varepsilon, \varepsilon) \) and \( \text{Exp}^\text{Com}((S_C, S_O, F_0), (R_C', R_O^{\text{abort}}, D), x_0, x_1, \varepsilon, z) \), respectively. Then, it holds that

- \( |\text{Pr}[\text{guess}' = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| > 0 \approx |\text{Pr}[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|. \)
- \( \text{Pr}[\text{amb}' = 1] = 0 \approx \text{Pr}[\text{amb} = 1]. \)
- \( \text{Pr}[\text{suc}' = 1] = 1 \approx \text{Pr}[\text{suc} = 1]. \)

It follows from condition (R1) of \( U^\text{R}_R \) that \( U^\text{R}_R((S_C, S_O), (R_C', R_O^{\text{abort}})) > U^\text{R}_R((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O)) \), which implies that the tuple \((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O)\) is not in a Nash equilibrium.

In every case, we have shown that the tuple \((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O)\) is not in a Nash equilibrium. Thus, the statement follows. \( \Box \)

### 4.2.1 Sender’s preference for correctness

In our characterization, only the receiver has the preference corresponding to correctness. Let us consider the case in which the sender has the following preference.

- The sender prefers the receiver to open the true committed string \( x_b \) in the open phase unless the protocol was aborted.

Then, \( U^\text{S}_S \) will be changed so that \( U^\text{S}_S((S'_C, S'_O), (R_C, R_O)) > U^\text{S}_S((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O)) \) holds if there exist probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms \( F \) and \( D, x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^t \), and \( z_S \in \{0, 1\}^* \), that satisfy at least one of the following three conditions:

\begin{align*}
\text{(S1*)} & \quad |\text{Pr}[\text{guess}' = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| < |\text{Pr}[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|, \quad \text{Pr}[\text{amb}' = 1] \geq \text{Pr}[\text{amb} = 1], \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Pr}[\text{suc}' = 1] \geq \text{Pr}[\text{suc} = 1]; \\
\text{(S2*)} & \quad |\text{Pr}[\text{guess}' = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \leq |\text{Pr}[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|, \quad \text{Pr}[\text{amb}' = 1] > \text{Pr}[\text{amb} = 1], \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Pr}[\text{suc}' = 1] \geq \text{Pr}[\text{suc} = 1]; \\
\text{(S3*)} & \quad |\text{Pr}[\text{guess}' = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \leq |\text{Pr}[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|, \quad \text{Pr}[\text{amb}' = 1] \geq \text{Pr}[\text{amb} = 1], \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Pr}[\text{suc}' = 1] > \text{Pr}[\text{suc} = 1];
\end{align*}
where \((\text{guess, amb, suc})\) and \((\text{guess}', \text{amb}', \text{suc}')\) are the random variables representing the outcomes of \(\text{Exp}^\text{Com}((S_C, S_O, F), (R_C, R_O, D), x_0, x_1, e, e)\) and \(\text{Exp}^\text{Com}((S_C', S_O', F), (R_C, R_O, D), x_0, x_1, z_S, e)\), respectively.

Under the above conditions on \(U_S^\text{Com}\), we cannot prove the equivalence to the cryptographic security. More precisely, we can show Lemma 5 in a similar way as the above proof. However, we cannot prove Lemma 6 under the above utility function. Specifically, in case (3) in the proof of Lemma 6, it is assumed that there exists \((S_C', S_O')\) that breaks binding property. We need to choose \((S_C', S_O')\) so that

- \(|\Pr[\text{guess}' = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \approx |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|\),
- \(\Pr[\text{amb}' = 1] > \Pr[\text{amb} = 1] \approx 0\),
- \(\Pr[\text{suc}' = 1] \geq \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]\).

The first condition can be easily satisfied by using \(D^{\text{rand}}\) as a part of the receiver’s strategy. To satisfy the second condition, we need to use \((S_C', S_O')\). The problem is how to achieve the last condition. Suppose that the protocol has the property such that whenever the sender breaks binding property, the correctness is not preserved. It implies that the last condition cannot be satisfied when the second condition holds. Thus, the lemma does not hold under the new utility function.

Furthermore, let consider the sender who has the opposite preference regarding correctness. Namely, the sender does not prefer the receiver to obtain the committed string. In this case, Lemma 5 does not hold, while Lemma 6 holds. Since a cryptographically-secure protocol satisfies the correctness property, the rational sender does not prefer to following the protocol, which implies Lemma 5 does not hold. Conversely, if a given protocol achieve a Nash equilibrium even if the sender has the opposite preference for correctness, since the receiver has the preference for correctness, the protocol satisfies the cryptographic security.

The above examples illustrate the flexibility and generality of game-theoretic security. The party having the utility \(U_S^\text{Com}\) defined with conditions \((S1^*), (S2^*), \) and \((S3^*)\) can be considered a party who does not prefer to breaking binding without preserving correctness. The sender who has the opposite preference to correctness is a party who prefer to breaking binding and correctness simultaneously.

### 4.3 A New Game-Theoretic Security

In this section, we define a new game-theoretic security based on Definition 14. The idea behind the new security notion is the same in the case of oblivious transfer in Section 3.3.

First, we define the utility function such that \(U_S^\text{Com}((S_C', S_O'), (R_C, R_O)) > U_S^\text{Com}((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))\) if and only if there exist \(F, x_0, x_1, z_S\) such that for any \(D\), condition (S2) holds, and that \(U_R^\text{Com}((S_C, S_O), (R_C', R_O')) > U_R^\text{Com}((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))\) if and only if there exist \(D, x_0, x_1, z_R\) such that for any \(F\), condition (R1) holds. Here, we do not require that condition (S1) holds for any \(D\), and (R2) or (R3) holds for any \(F\). This is because if the receiver employs \(D\) that output a random bit, condition (S1) cannot hold, and if the sender employs \(F\) that always outputs invalid values, neither (R2) nor (R3) can hold.

Second, we specify \(D^{\text{rand}}\) and \(F_0\), which, on input \((x, c, d)\), outputs \((x, d)\), as the default algorithms for \(D\) and \(F\), respectively.

The following is the formal definition of new utility functions.

**Definition 15** (New utility functions for commitment). Let \(((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))\) be a commitment protocol, and \(S_C, S_O, R_C, R_O\) algorithms. The utility function \(U_S^\text{Com}^f\) for the sender is a function such that \(U_S^\text{Com}^f((S_C', S_O'), (R_C, R_O)) > U_S^\text{Com}^f((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))\) if there exist probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms \(F, x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^t, \) and \(z_S \in \{0, 1\}^u,\) that satisfy at least one of the following two conditions:
For some probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $D$, $|\Pr[\text{guess}'] = 1 - \frac{1}{2}| < |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$ and $\Pr[\text{amb'} = 1] \geq \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]$;

For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $D$, $|\Pr[\text{guess}'] = 1 - \frac{1}{2}| < |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$ and $\Pr[\text{amb'} = 1] > \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]$.

where $(\text{guess, amb, suc})$ and $(\text{guess', amb', suc'})$ are the random variables representing the outcomes of $\text{Exp}_R^{\text{Com}}((S_C, \mathcal{S}_O, F_0), (R_C, R_O, D), x_0, x_1, \varepsilon, \varepsilon)$ and $\text{Exp}_R^{\text{Com}}((S_C', S_O', F), (R_C, R_O, D), x_0, x_1, z_S, \varepsilon)$, respectively, where $F_0$ is an algorithm that, on input $(x, c, d)$, outputs $(x, d)$.

The utility function $U^\text{Com'}_R$ for the receiver is a function such that $U^\text{Com'}_R((S_C, S_O), (R'_C, R'_O)) > U^\text{Com'}_R((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))$ if there exist probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms $D, x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^*$, and $z_R \in \{0, 1\}^*$, that satisfy at least one of the following three conditions:

- $(R1')$ For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $F$, $|\Pr[\text{guess}'] = 1 - \frac{1}{2}| > |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, $\Pr[\text{amb'} = 1] < \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]$, and $\Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] \geq \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$;

- $(R2')$ For some probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $F$, $|\Pr[\text{guess}'] = 1 - \frac{1}{2}| \geq |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, $\Pr[\text{amb'} = 1] < \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]$, and $\Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] \geq \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$;

- $(R3')$ For some probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $F$, $|\Pr[\text{guess}'] = 1 - \frac{1}{2}| \geq |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, $\Pr[\text{amb'} = 1] < \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]$, and $\Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] > \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$.

where $(\text{guess, amb, suc})$ and $(\text{guess', amb', suc'})$ are the random variables representing the outcomes of $\text{Exp}_R^{\text{Com}}((S_C, S_O, F), (R_C, R_O, D^{\text{rand}}), x_0, x_1, \varepsilon, \varepsilon)$ and $\text{Exp}_R^{\text{Com}}((S_C', S_O', F), (R'_C, R'_O, D), x_0, x_1, \varepsilon, z_R)$, respectively, where $D^{\text{rand}}$ is an algorithm that outputs a random bit.

Let define a two-party game $\Gamma^{\text{Com'}} = (\{S, R\}, \{A_S, A_R\}, (U^\text{Com'}_S, U^\text{Com'}_R))$ in which the experiment $\text{Exp}_R^{\text{Com}}$ of Definition 12 is executed, both $A_S$ and $A_R$ are composed of pairs of all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms, and $U^\text{Com'}_S$ and $U^\text{Com'}_R$ are the utility functions defined in Definition 15.

Definition 16 (Game-theoretic adaptive security for commitment). A commitment protocol $((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))$ is said to be game-theoretically secure against adaptively chosen strategies if $((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))$ is in a Nash equilibrium in the game $\Gamma^{\text{Com'}}$.

4.3.1 Equivalence to the Cryptographic Security against Risk-Averse Adversaries

We show that the game-theoretic security of Definition 16 is equivalent to the cryptographic security against risk-averse adversaries. The following is the security against risk-averse adversaries for commitment protocols.

Definition 17 (Security against risk-averse adversaries for commitment). Let $\text{Com} = ((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))$ be a commitment protocol. We say $\text{Com}$ is cryptographically secure against risk-averse adversaries if it satisfies the following five properties:

- **Hiding against semi-honest receivers**: For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $D$ and inputs $x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^*$, it holds that $\Pr[D(\text{view}_{R_C}(S_C(x_0)), x_0, x_1) = 1] \approx \Pr[D(\text{view}_{R_C}(S_C(x_1)), x_0, x_1) = 1]$. 

- **Hiding against risk-averse receivers**: For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms $R^*_C, R^*_O, D$, inputs $x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^*$, and auxiliary input $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$ satisfying the following two conditions:
– **Risk-averseness for binding:** For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \( F \), it holds that

\[
\Pr[\text{out}_{R^c_O(c^*,z)}(S_O(x_b,d^*)) = \text{out}_{R^c_O(c^*,z)}(S_O(x',d^{**})) = 1] \\
\approx \Pr[\text{out}_{R^c_O(c)}(S_O(x_b,d)) = \text{out}_{R^c_O(c)}(S_O(x',d')) = 1],
\]

where \( b \in \{0,1\} \) is chosen uniformly at random, \( c^* \) and \( d^* \) are the commitment and decommitment strings generated by the interaction between \( S_C(x_b) \) and \( R^c_C(z) \), \( c \) and \( d \) are the strings generated between \( S_C(x_b) \) and \( R_C \), \( (x',d^{**}) \) is the output of \( F(\text{view}_{S_C(x_b)}(R^c_C(z))) \) satisfying \( x' \in \{0,1\}^I \setminus \{x_b\} \), and \( (x',d') \) is the output of \( F(\text{view}_{S_C(x_b)}(R_C)) \) satisfying \( x' \in \{0,1\}^I \setminus \{x_b\} \).

– **Risk-averseness for correctness:** \( \Pr[\text{out}_{R^c_O(c^*)}(S_O(x_b,d^*)) = 1 \lor (R^c_C(z), R^c_O) \text{ aborts}] \approx \Pr[\text{out}_{R^c_O(c)}(S_O(x_b,d)) = 1 \lor (R_C, R_O) \text{ aborts}] \), where \( b \in \{0,1\} \) is chosen uniformly at random, \( c^* \) and \( d^* \) are the commitment and decommitment strings generated by the interaction between \( S_C(x_b) \) and \( R^c_C(z) \), \( c \) and \( d \) are the strings generated between \( S_C(x_b) \) and \( R_C \).

it holds that

\[
\Pr[D(\text{view}_{R^c_C(c)}(S_C(x_0)), x_0, x_1) = 1] \approx \Pr[D(\text{view}_{R^c_O(c)}(S_C(x_1)), x_0, x_1) = 1].
\]

• **Binding against semi-honest senders:** For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \( F \) and input \( x \in \{0,1\}^I \), it holds that

\[
\Pr[\text{out}_{R^c_O(c)}(S_O(x,d)) = \text{out}_{R^c_O(c)}(S_O(x',d')) = 1] \preceq 0,
\]

where \( c \) and \( d \) are the commitment and decommitment strings generated by the interaction between \( S_C(x) \) and \( R_C \), \( (x',d') \) is the output of \( F(\text{view}_{S_C(x)}(R_C)) \) satisfying \( x' \in \{0,1\}^I \setminus \{x\} \).

• **Binding against risk-averse senders:** For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms \( S^*_C, S^*_O \), and \( F \), input \( x_0, x_1 \in \{0,1\}^I \), and auxiliary input \( z \in \{0,1\}^I \) satisfying the following condition:

– **Risk-averseness for hiding:** For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \( D \), it holds that

\[
\Pr[D(\text{view}_{R_C}(S^*_C(x,b,z)), x_0, x_1) = 1] \approx \Pr[D(\text{view}_{R_O}(S^*_C(x_b)), x_0, x_1) = 1],
\]

where \( b \in \{0,1\} \) is chosen uniformly at random,

it holds that

\[
\Pr[\text{out}_{R^c_O(c)}(S^*_O(x,d,z)) = \text{out}_{R^c_O(c)}(S^*_O(x',d',z)) = 1] \preceq 0,
\]

where \( c \) and \( d \) are the commitment and decommitment strings generated by the interaction between \( S^*_C(x,z) \) and \( R_C \), \( (x',d') \) is the output of \( F(\text{view}_{S^*_C(x,z)}(R_C)) \), where \( x' \in \{0,1\}^I \setminus \{x\} \).

• **Correctness:** For any \( x \in \{0,1\}^I \), it holds that

\[
\Pr[\text{out}_{R^c_O(c)}(S_O(x,d)) = 1] \succeq 1,
\]

where \( c \) and \( d \) are the commitment and decommitment strings generated by the interaction between \( S_C(x) \) and \( R_C \).

Now, we prove that the game-theoretic security of Definition 16 is equivalent to the cryptographic security of Definition 17. Intuition behind the equivalence is the same as in the case of oblivious transfer.
A commitment protocol Com is cryptographically secure against risk-averse adversaries if and only if OT is game-theoretically secure against adaptively chosen strategies.

Lemma 7. If Com is cryptographically secure against risk-averse adversaries, then Com is game-theoretically secure against adaptively chosen strategies.

Proof. Assume that Com = (\((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O)\)) is not game-theoretically secure against adaptively chosen strategies. We have two cases: (1) \(U^\text{Com}_1((S'_C, S'_O), (R_C, R_O)) > U^\text{Com}_2((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))\) for some \((S'_C, S'_O) \in A_S\); and (2) \(U^\text{Com}_1((S_C, S_O), (R'_C, R'_O)) > U^\text{Com}_2((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))\) for some \((R'_C, R'_O) \in A_R\).

In case (1), there exists \(F, x_0, x_1 \in \{0,1\}^t\) and \(z_S \in \{0,1\}^s\) that satisfies either \((S_1')\) or \((S_2')\). Let \((\text{guess}, \text{amb}, \text{suc})\) and \((\text{guess}', \text{amb}', \text{suc}')\) be the random variables representing the outcomes of \(\text{Exp}^\text{Com}_1((S_C, S_O, F), (R_C, R_O, D), x_0, x_1, \varepsilon, \varepsilon)\) and \(\text{Exp}^\text{Com}_2((S'_C, S'_O, F), (R_C, R_O, D), x_0, x_1, z_S, \varepsilon)\), respectively, where \(D\) is an algorithm employed in \((S_1')\) and \((S_2')\).

When \((S_1')\) holds, there exists \(D\) such that \(|\Pr[\text{guess}' = 1] - 1/2| < |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - 1/2|\) and \(Pr[\text{amb}' = 1] \geq Pr[\text{amb} = 1]\), which implies that \(\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - 1/2 > 0\). Then, we have that \(\Pr[D(\text{view}_{R_C}(S_C(x_0)), x_0, x_1)] = b - 1/2 > 0\), where \(b \in \{0,1\}\) is chosen at random. This implies that Com does not satisfy hiding against semi-honest receivers.

Suppose that \((S_2')\) holds, but \((S_1')\) does not hold. Then, for any \(D\),

- \(|\Pr[\text{guess}' = 1] - 1/2| \leq |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - 1/2|\) and \(\Pr[\text{amb}' = 1] > \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]\); and
- \(|\Pr[\text{guess}' = 1] - 1/2| \geq |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - 1/2|\) or \(\Pr[\text{amb}' = 1] < \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]\),

which implies that \(|\Pr[\text{guess}' = 1] - 1/2| \approx |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - 1/2|\) and \(\Pr[\text{amb}' = 1] \approx \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]\). It holds that
\[
\Pr[D(\text{view}_{R_C}(S'_C(x_0, z_S)), x_0, x_1) = 1] \approx \Pr[D(\text{view}_{R_C}(S_C(x_0)), x_0, x_1) = 1] \text{ for any } D,
\]
\[
\Pr[\text{out}_{R_O(c)}(S'_O(x_0, d, z_S)) = \text{out}_{R_O(c)}(S_O(x', d', z_S))] = 1 > 0,
\]
where \(b \in \{0,1\}\) is chosen uniformly at random, \(c\) and \(d\) are the commitment and decommitment strings generated by the interaction between \(S'_C(x_0, z_S)\) and \(R_C\), and \((x', d')\) is the output of \(F(\text{view}_{S_C(x_0, z_S)}(R_C))\) satisfying \(x' \in \{0,1\}^t \setminus \{x_0\}\). Thus, \(S'_C\) is a risk-averse sender that breaks the binding property of Com.

Next, consider case (2), which implies that there exist \(D, x_0, x_1 \in \{0,1\}^t\), \(z_R \in \{0,1\}^s\) that satisfy either \((R_1')\), \((R_2')\), or \((R_3')\). Let \((\text{guess}, \text{amb}, \text{suc})\) and \((\text{guess}', \text{amb}', \text{suc}')\) be the random variables representing the outcomes of \(\text{Exp}^\text{Com}_1((S_C, S_O, F), (R_C, R_O, D^{\text{rand}}), x_0, x_1, \varepsilon, \varepsilon)\) and \(\text{Exp}^\text{Com}_2((S'_C, S'_O, F), (R'_C, R'_O, D), x_0, x_1, \varepsilon, z_R)\), respectively, where \(F\) is an algorithm employed in \((R_1')\), \((R_2')\), and \((R_3')\).

When \((R_2')\) holds, there exists \(F\) such that \(|\Pr[\text{guess}' = 1] - 1/2| \geq |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - 1/2|\) and \(\Pr[\text{amb}' = 1] > \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]\). Then, we have that \(\Pr[\text{out}_{R_O(c)}(S_O(x, d)) = \text{out}_{R_O(c)}(S_O(x', d', z_S))] = 1 > 0\), where \(c\) and \(d\) are the commitment and decommitment strings generated by the interaction between \(S_C(x)\) and \(R_C\), and \((x', d')\) is the output of \(F(\text{view}_{S_C(x)}(R_C))\). Thus, Com does not satisfy binding against semi-honest senders.

If \((R_3')\) holds, there exists \(F\) such that \(|\Pr[\text{guess}' = 1] - 1/2| \geq |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - 1/2|\) and \(\Pr[\text{amb}' = 1] \leq \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]\). Then, we have that \(\Pr[\text{out}_{R_O(c)}(S_O(x_0, d)) = 1] < 1\), where \(b \in \{0,1\}\) is chosen at random, \(c\) and \(d\) are the commitment and decommitment strings generated by the interaction between \(S_C(x)\) and \(R_C\). Thus, Com does not satisfy correctness.

Finally, suppose that \((R_1')\) holds, but neither \((R_2')\) nor \((R_3')\) holds. Then, for any \(F\),
which implies that $|\Pr[\text{guess'} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| > |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, $\Pr[\text{amb}' = 1] \leq \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]$, and $\Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] \geq \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$; 

- $|\Pr[\text{guess'} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| < |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, $\Pr[\text{amb}' = 1] \geq \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]$, or $\Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] < \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$; and

- $|\Pr[\text{guess'} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| < |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, $\Pr[\text{amb}' = 1] > \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]$, or $\Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] \leq \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$.

which implies that $|\Pr[\text{guess'} = 1] - 1/2| > |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - 1/2|$, $\Pr[\text{amb'} = 1] \approx \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]$, and $\Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] \approx \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$. Thus, it holds that

- $\Pr[D(\text{view}_{\text{c}(\text{z})})(S_C(x_0),x_0,x_1) = 1] - \Pr[D(\text{view}_{\text{c}(\text{z})})(S_C(x_1),x_0,x_1) = 1] > 0$ for some $D$,

- $\Pr[\text{out}_{\text{c}(\text{z})}(S_O(x_b,d')) = \text{out}_{\text{c}(\text{z})}(S_O(x',d'')) = 1]$ 
  $\approx \Pr[\text{out}_{\text{c}(\text{z})}(S_O(x_b,d)) = \text{out}_{\text{c}(\text{z})}(S_O(x',d''))) = 1$, and

- $\Pr[\text{out}_{\text{c}(\text{z})}(S_O(x_b,d')) = 1 \lor (R''_C, R''_O) \text{ aborts}] \approx \Pr[\text{out}_{\text{c}(\text{z})}(S_O(x_b,d)) = 1 \lor (R''_C, R''_O) \text{ aborts}]$,

where $b \in \{0,1\}$ is chosen at random, $c'$ and $d'$ are the commitment and decommitment strings generated by the interaction between $S_C(x_b)$ and $R''_C(z_R)$, $c$ and $d$ are the strings generated between $S_C(x_b)$ and $R_C$, $(x',d'')$ is the output of $F(\text{view}_{\text{c}(\text{z})}(R''_C(z_R)))$ satisfying $x'' \in \{0,1\}^t \setminus \{x_b\}$, and $(x',d'')$ is the output of $F(\text{view}_{\text{c}(\text{z})}(R_C))$ satisfying $x' \in \{0,1\}^t \setminus \{x_b\}$. Hence, $R''_C$ and $R''_O$ are risk-averse receivers that break the hiding property of Com by employing $D$.

In every case, we have shown that OT is not secure against risk-averse adversaries. Therefore, the statement follows. \hfill \square

**Lemma 8.** If Com is game-theoretically secure against adaptively chosen strategies, then Com is cryptographically secure against risk-averse adversaries.

**Proof.** Suppose that $\text{Com} = ((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))$ is not cryptographically secure against risk-averse adversaries. We consider the following five cases.

1. Com does not satisfy correctness.
2. Com does not satisfy binding against semi-honest senders.
3. Com does not satisfy binding against risk-averse senders.
4. Com does not satisfy hiding against semi-honest receivers.
5. Com does not satisfy hiding against risk-averse receivers.

For each case, we show that Com is not in a Nash equilibrium. Let $s_{\text{c}}^{\text{abort}}, r_{\text{c}}^{\text{abort}}, r_{\text{O}}^{\text{abort}}$ be algorithms defined in the proof of Lemma 6.

In (1), for some $x \in \{0,1\}^t$, it holds that

$$\Pr[\text{out}_{\text{c}(\text{z})}(S_O(x,d)) = 1] < 1,$$

where $c$ and $d$ are the commitment and decommitment strings generated during the interaction between $S_C(x)$ and $R_C$. Let consider the experiments $\text{Exp}_{\text{c}}(S_C, S_O, F_0), (R_C, R_O, D^{\text{rand}}), x, x', x, x', x, x')$ and $\text{Exp}_{\text{c}}((S_C, S_O, F_0), (R_C^{\text{abort}}, R_O, D^{\text{rand}}), x, x, x, x, x, x, x', x, x', x, x')$, and their corresponding outcomes $(\text{guess, amb, suc})$ and $(\text{guess', amb', suc'})$, respectively. Then, we have that
By condition (R3') of $U_R^{\text{Com}}$, $U_R^{\text{Com}'}((S_C, S_O), (R_{\text{abort}}^C, R_O)) > U_R^{\text{Com}'}((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))$, which implies that the tuple $((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))$ is not in a Nash equilibrium.

Next, consider case (2), where there is a probabilistic polynomial-time decommitment finder $F$ and $x \in \{0, 1\}^t$ such that $\Pr[\text{out}_R(c) (S_O(x, d)) = \text{out}_R(c) (S_O(x', d')) = 1] > 0$, where $c$ and $d$ are the commitment and decommitment strings generated by $S_C(x)$ and $R_C$, $(x', d')$ is the output of $F(\text{view}_{S_C(x)}(R_C))$. Let $(\text{guess}, \text{amb}, \text{suc})$ and $(\text{guess}', \text{amb}', \text{suc}')$ be the outcomes of the experiments $\text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}((S_C, S_O, F), (R_C, R_O, D^{\text{rand}}), x, x', \epsilon, \epsilon)$ and $\text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}((S_C, S_O, F), (R_{\text{abort}}^C, R_O, D^{\text{rand}}), x, x', \epsilon, \epsilon)$, respectively, where $x' \in \{0, 1\}^t \setminus \{x\}$. Then, it holds that

- $|\Pr[\text{guess}'] = 1| - \frac{1}{2} = |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = 0$,
- $\Pr[\text{amb}'] = 1 = \Pr[\text{amb} = 1] = 0$,
- $\Pr[\text{suc}'] = 1 = 1 > \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$.

Thus, it follows from condition (R2') of $U_R^{\text{Com}}$ that $U_R^{\text{Com}'}((S_C, S_O), (R_{\text{abort}}^C, R_O)) > U_R^{\text{Com}'}((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))$. Hence, $((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))$ is not in a Nash equilibrium.

Let consider case (3), in which there exist a risk-averse sender $(S'_C, S'_O)$, $F$, $x \in \{0, 1\}^t$, and $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$ such that $\Pr[\text{out}_{R_0}(c) (S'_O(x, d, z)) = \text{out}_{R_0}(c) (S'_O(x', d', z)) = 1] > 0$,

where $c$ and $d$ are the commitment and decommitment strings generated by the interaction between $S'_C(x, z)$ and $R_C$, $(x', d')$ is the output of $F(\text{view}_{S'_C(x, z)}(R_C))$ satisfying $x' \in \{0, 1\}^t \setminus \{x\}$. Let $(\text{guess}, \text{amb}, \text{suc})$ and $(\text{guess}', \text{amb}', \text{suc}')$ be the outcomes of the experiments $\text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}((S_C, S_O, F_0), (R_C, R_O, D), x, x, \epsilon, \epsilon)$ and $\text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}((S'_C, S'_O, F), (R_C, R_O, D), x, x, z, \epsilon)$, respectively, where $D$ is any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. Since $(S'_C, S'_O)$ is a risk-averse sender, we have that

- $|\Pr[\text{guess}'] = 1| - \frac{1}{2} \approx |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, and
- $\Pr[\text{amb}'] = 1 > \Pr[\text{amb} = 1] \approx 0$.

By condition (S2') of $U_S^{\text{Com}'}$, it holds that $U_S^{\text{Com}'}((S'_C, S'_O), (R_C, R_O)) > U_S^{\text{Com}'}((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))$. Thus, the tuple $((S_C, S_O), (R_C, R_O))$ is not in a Nash equilibrium.

In case (4), there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $D$ and $x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^t$ such that

$$|\Pr[D(\text{view}_{R_C}(S_C(x_0), x_0, x_1)) = b] - \frac{1}{2}| > 0,$$

where $b \in \{0, 1\}$ is chosen uniformly at random. Let consider the experiments $\text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}((S_C, S_O, F_0), (R_C, R_O, D), x_0, x_1, \epsilon, \epsilon)$ and $\text{Exp}^{\text{Com}}((S_{\text{abort}}^C, S_O, F_0), (R_C, R_O, D), x_0, x_1, \epsilon, \epsilon)$, and their corresponding outcomes $(\text{guess}, \text{amb}, \text{suc})$ and $(\text{guess}', \text{amb}', \text{suc}')$. It holds that

- $|\Pr[\text{guess}'] = 1| - \frac{1}{2} = 0 < |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$,
- $\Pr[\text{amb}'] = 1 = \Pr[\text{amb} = 1] = 0$.  

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Thus, by condition (S1’) of $U_{S'}^{\text{Com}}$, it holds that $U_{S'}^{\text{Com}}((S', S_0), (R_C, R_O)) > U_{S}^{\text{Com}}((S_C, S_0), (R_C, R_O))$, which implies that the tuple $((S_C, S_0), (R_C, R_O))$ is not in a Nash equilibrium.

Finally, we consider case (5), in which there exists a risk-averse receiver $(R'_C, R'_O), D, x_0, x_1 \in \{0,1\}^t$, and $z \in \{0,1\}^t$ such that

$$
\Pr[D(\text{view}_{R'_C(S(x_0)))}, x_0, x_1) = b] - \Pr[D(\text{view}_{R_C(S(x_b))}, x_0, x_1) = b] > 0,
$$

where $b \in \{0,1\}$ is chosen uniformly at random. Let $(\text{guess}, \text{amb}, \text{suc})$ and $(\text{guess'}, \text{amb}', \text{suc'})$ be the outcomes of the games $\text{Exp}_{(S_C, S_0, F)}((R_C, R_O), D, x_0, x_1, \epsilon, \epsilon)$ and $\text{Exp}_{(S_C, S_0, F')}((R'_C, R'_O), D, x_0, x_1, \epsilon, \epsilon, z)$, respectively, where $F$ is any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. Since $(R'_C, R'_O)$ is a risk-averse receiver, we have that

- $|Pr[\text{guess'} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| > 0 \approx |Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$.
- $Pr[\text{amb'} = 1] = 0 \approx Pr[\text{amb} = 1]$.
- $Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] = 1 \approx Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$.

By condition (R1’) of $U_{R}^{\text{Com}}$, we have that $U_{R}^{\text{Com}}((S_C, S_0), (R'_C, R'_O)) > U_{R}^{\text{Com}}((S_C, S_0), (R_C, R_O))$, which implies that the tuple $((S_C, S_0), (R_C, R_O))$ is not in a Nash equilibrium.

In every case, we have shown that $((S_C, S_0), (R_C, R_O))$ is not in a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the statement follows.

4.3.2 Adopting sender’s preference for correctness

As discussed in Section 4.2.1, when the sender has a preference for correctness in the non-adaptive game-theoretic security, it is difficult to prove the equivalence to the security against malicious adversaries. Interestingly, however, we can adopt the sender’s preference for correctness in the adaptive game-theoretic security in proving the equivalence to the security against risk-averse adversaries.

Let consider the utility of Definition 15 in which the sender’s preference for correctness was adopted. Specifically, the utility function $U_{S'}^{\text{Com}}$ was changed so that $U_{S'}^{\text{Com}}((S'_C, S'_0), (R_C, R_O)) > U_{S'}^{\text{Com}}((S_C, S_0), (R_C, R_O))$ holds if there exist probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms $F, x_0, x_1 \in \{0,1\}^t$, and $z_5 \in \{0,1\}^t$, that satisfy at least one of the following three conditions:

(S1’) For some probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $D, |Pr[\text{guess'} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| < |Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, $Pr[\text{amb'} = 1] \geq Pr[\text{amb} = 1]$, and $Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] \geq Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$;

(S2’) For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $D, |Pr[\text{guess'} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \leq |Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, $Pr[\text{amb'} = 1] > Pr[\text{amb} = 1]$, and $Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] > Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$; and

(S3’) For some probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $D, |Pr[\text{guess'} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \leq |Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$, $Pr[\text{amb'} = 1] \geq Pr[\text{amb} = 1]$, and $Pr[\text{suc'} = 1] > Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$,

where $(\text{guess}, \text{amb}, \text{suc})$ and $(\text{guess'}, \text{amb'}, \text{suc'})$ are the random variables representing the outcomes of $\text{Exp}_{(S_C, S_0, F_0), (R_C, R_O, D), x_0, x_1, \epsilon, \epsilon}$ and $\text{Exp}_{(S'_C, S'_0, F'), (R'_C, R'_O, D), x_0, x_1, z_5, \epsilon}$, respectively, where $F_0$ is an algorithm that, on input $(x, c, d)$, outputs $(x, d)$.

We can show that the game-theoretic adaptive security under the above utility function is equivalent to the cryptographic security against risk-averse adversaries in which the binding property holds for senders who also have the risk-averseness for correctness. More concretely, we define the following binding property in the cryptographic security against risk-averse adversaries.
- **Binding against risk-averse senders**: For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms $S_C^r$, $S_D^r$, and $F$, input $x_0,x_1 \in \{0,1\}^t$, and auxiliary input $z \in \{0,1\}^*$ satisfying the following two conditions:

  - **Risk-averseness for hiding**: For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $D$, it holds that
    \[
    \Pr[D(\text{view}_{R_C}(S_C^r(x_b,z)),x_0,x_1) = 1] \approx \Pr[D(\text{view}_{R_C}(S_C(x_b)),x_0,x_1) = 1],
    \]
    where $b \in \{0,1\}$ is chosen uniformly at random,

  - **Risk-averseness for correctness**: \[
    \Pr[\text{out}_{R_D(c)}(S_D^r(x_b,d^*,z)) = 1 \lor (S_C^r,S_D^r) \text{ aborts}] \approx \Pr[\text{out}_{R_D(c)}(S_D(x_b,d)) = 1 \lor (S_C,S_D) \text{ aborts}], \]
    where $b \in \{0,1\}$ is chosen uniformly at random, $c^*$ and $d^*$ are the commitment and decommitment strings generated by the interaction between $S_C^r(x_b,z)$ and $R_C$, and $c$ and $d$ are the strings between $S_C(x)$ and $R_C$,

  it holds that
  \[
  \Pr[\text{out}_{R_D(c)}(S_D^r(x,d,z)) = \text{out}_{R_D(c)}(S_D^r(x',d',z)) = 1] \leq 0,
  \]
  where $c$ and $d$ are the commitment and decommitment strings generated by the interaction between $S_C^r(x,z)$ and $R_C$, $(x',d')$ is the output of $F(\text{view}_{S_C^r(x,z)}(R_C))$, where $x' \in \{0,1\}^t \setminus \{x\}$.

  We describe the differences in the proofs of Lemmas 7 and 8 in proving the equivalence under the above definitions. Since the proof of Lemma 8 can be done in almost the same way, we present the difference in proving Lemma 7. To prove Lemma 7, in case (1), we need to consider three cases. The first case is that (S1') holds, and we use the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 7. Next, we consider the case that (S3') holds. In this case, as in the case that (R3') holds, we can show that $\text{Com}$ does not satisfy correctness. The third case is that (S2') holds, but neither (S1') nor (S3') holds. Then, it can be shown that there exists $(S_D',S_D)$ such that for any $D$, $|\Pr[\text{guess}' = 1] - 1/2| \approx |\Pr[\text{guess} = 1] - 1/2|$, $\Pr[\text{amb}' = 1] > \Pr[\text{amb} = 1]$, and $\Pr[\text{suc}' = 1] \approx \Pr[\text{suc} = 1]$, which implies that $(S_D',S_D)$ is a risk-averse sender that satisfies risk-averseness both for hiding and correctness that breaks the binding property. Thus, $\text{Com}$ does not satisfy the binding against risk-averse senders.

5 Conclusion and Future Work

This paper has studied oblivious transfer and commitment using game-theoretic concepts. Based on the previous work by Asharov et al. [4], we have extended the game-theoretic characterization of cryptographic protocols. In our game-theoretic security, the parties can consider the trade-off among the preferences. Our conceptual contribution includes capturing the computational security by plain Nash equilibria. We have shown that the game-theoretic security is equivalent to the cryptographic security against malicious adversaries. In addition, by observing several unsatisfactory points in the utility functions in our framework, we have introduced a new game-theoretic security, and shown its equivalence to the security against risk-averse adversaries. The results imply that the security against risk-averse adversaries may be more natural from the perspective of game theory. To further study and understand the security against risk-averse adversaries is an interesting future work.

Our results illustrate the generality of game-theoretic formalizations. The game-theoretic security can be easily strengthened and weakened by considering various solution concepts and utility functions. For example, we can define a stronger security by employing a subgame perfect equilibrium, which is a preferable solution concept than a Nash equilibrium in extensive-form games. Several solution concepts are studied for
dealing with computationally bounded strategies [17, 34]. Exploring the possibilities of applying various solution concepts in our formalization is also an interesting future work.

Finally, we note that although oblivious transfer and commitment are fundamental protocols in cryptographic protocols, they are rarely considered the final protocol, and are mostly used as building blocks of other protocols. Since a game-theoretic consideration of protocol participants is most useful in the final protocol, it is necessary to investigate the game-theoretic security for more advanced protocols.

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