You are looking at a specific version 20160831:074931 of this paper. See the latest version.

Paper 2015/483

Improved security proofs in lattice-based cryptography: using the Rényi divergence rather than the statistical distance

Shi Bai and Adeline Langlois and Tancrëde Lepoint and Amin Sakzad and Damien Stehle and Ron Steinfeld

Abstract

The Rényi divergence is a measure of closeness of two probability distributions. We show that it can often be used as an alternative to the statistical distance in security proofs for lattice-based cryptography. Using the Rényi divergence is particularly suited for security proofs of primitives in which the attacker is required to solve a search problem (e.g., forging a signature). We show that it may also be used in the case of distinguishing problems (e.g., semantic security of encryption schemes), when they enjoy a public sampleability property. The techniques lead to security proofs for schemes with smaller parameters, and sometimes to simpler security proofs than the existing ones.

Note: Full version.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s)
damien stehle @ gmail com
History
2018-02-25: last of 4 revisions
2015-05-21: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/483
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.