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Paper 2015/1204

Constructing secret, verifiable auction schemes from election schemes

Elizabeth A. Quaglia and Ben Smyth

Abstract

Auctions and elections are seemingly disjoint research fields. Nevertheless, we observe that similar cryptographic primitives are used in both fields. For instance, mixnets, homomorphic encryption, and trapdoor bit-commitments, have been used by state-of-the-art schemes in both fields. These developments have appeared independently. For example, the adoption of mixnets in elections preceded a similar adoption in auctions by over two decades. In this paper, we demonstrate a relation between auctions and elections: we present a generic construction for auctions from election schemes. Moreover, we show that the construction guarantees secrecy and verifiability, assuming the underlying election scheme satisfies secrecy and verifiability. We demonstrate the applicability of our work by deriving an auction scheme from the Helios election scheme. Our results inaugurate the unification of auctions and elections, thereby facilitating the advancement of both fields.

Note: This is the full version (i.e., with all the proofs).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Auctionselectionsprivacysecrecyverifiability.
Contact author(s)
lizquaglia @ gmail com
History
2018-03-28: last of 5 revisions
2015-12-18: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/1204
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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