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Paper 2014/661

One-Round Deniable Key Exchange with Perfect Forward Security

Weiqiang Wen and Libin Wang and Min Xie

Abstract

In response to the need for secure one-round authenticated key exchange protocols providing both perfect forward secrecy and full deniability, we put forward a new paradigm for constructing protocols from a Diffie-Hellman type protocol plus a non-interactive designated verifier proof of knowledge (DV-PoK) scheme. We define the notion of DV-PoK which is a variant of non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, and provide an efficient DV-PoK scheme as a central technical building block of our protocol. The DV-PoK scheme possesses nice properties such as unforgeability and symmetry which help our protocol to achieve perfect forward secrecy and full deniability respectively. Moreover, the security properties are formally proved in the Canetti-Krawczyk model under the Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption. In sum, our protocol offers a remarkable combination of salient security properties and efficiency, and the notion of DV-PoK is of independent interests.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Authenticated Key ExchangePerfect Forward SecrecyFull DeniabilityNon-Interactive Zero-KnowledgeProof of Knowledge
Contact author(s)
lbwang @ scnu edu cn
History
2014-08-28: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/661
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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